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Volume I

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Editorial Offices

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

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Notes on Contributors

Elena Agarossi (or Aga-Rossi) has taught contemporary history at the University of L'Aquila, Italy and at the Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione in Rome. Her research interests focus on the history of political parties, Italian foreign politics, World War II, and cold war. She conducted extensive research in the UK, as well as in the United States, at Harvard, Stanford, and Washington as fellow at the W. Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of *Una guerra a parte, I militari italiani nei Balcani, 1940–1945* (with M. T. Giusti) published in 2011.

Yehuda Bauer is a professor (emeritus) of Holocaust Studies of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and the academic advisor to Yad Vashem. He is a member of the Israeli Academy of Science, and serves as the active honorary chairman of the International Task Force for Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research. His latest books (in English) are *Jews For Sale?* (Yale University Press, 1994), *Rethinking the Holocaust* (Yale University Press, 2001), and *The Death of the Shtetl* (Yale University Press, 2009).

M. Todd Bennett is an assistant professor of history at East Carolina University. His first book, *One World, Big Screen* – about Hollywood's portrayal of internationalism during World War II – is forthcoming from the University of North Carolina Press. His work has appeared in the *Journal of American History* and *Diplomatic History*. He served with the Office of the Historian, US Department of State, and taught at The George Washington University.

Barton J. Bernstein is a professor of history at Stanford University, and one of the leading scholars on the subject of the atomic bomb and World War II. Dr. Bernstein's research focuses on the Truman administration, science and technology policy, nuclear history, US foreign policy, and international crises.

Jochen Böhrer is a research associate at the Imre Kertész Kolleg for contemporary eastern European history at the University of Jena, Germany. He was working at the German Historical Institute in Warsaw from 2000 until 2010. His books *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939* (Fischer, 2006), *Einsatzgruppen in Polen: Darstellungen und Dokumentation* with Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Jürgen Matthäus (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008) and *Der Überfall: Deutschlands Krieg gegen Polen* (Eichborn, 2009) have triggered an ongoing debate on the early stage (1939–1941) of the War of Annihilation.

R. J. B. Bosworth is a senior research fellow at Jesus College, Oxford, and emeritus professor of history at the University of Western Australia. His latest book is *Whispering city: Rome and its histories* (Yale University Press, 2011).

Judith A. Byfield is an associate professor in the Department of History at Cornell University. The primary focus of her scholarship has been women's social and economic history in Nigeria. Her first book, *The Bluest Hands: A Social and Economic History of Women Indigo Dyers in Western Nigeria, 1890–1940* (Heinemann: African Social History Series, 2002), examined the indigo dyeing industry in Abeokuta, a Yoruba town in western Nigeria.

Dr. D'Ann Campbell is a professor of history at Culver-Stockton College. Her publications include her book, *Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era* (Harvard University Press, 1984), as well as three dozen articles on women in the military in the twentieth century, especially World War II.

Earl J. Catagnus, Jr. is a lecturer of history at Montgomery County Community College and is finishing his doctorate in military history at Temple University.

Robert M. Citino is one of America's most prolific military historians. He is the author of nine books, including *The German Way of War* (2005), *Death of the Wehrmacht* (2007), and *The Wehrmacht Retreats* (2012). His book *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm* (2004) was the winner of both the American Historical Association's Paul M. Birdsall Prize for military and strategic history and the Society for Military History's Distinguished Book Award.

Isabelle Davion is teaching contemporary history of German-speaking countries and east-central Europe at the University Paris-Sorbonne. She is also a member of the executive committee joint research group IRICE (Identities, International Relations, and Civilizations in Europe), and of the History office of the French Ministry of Defense. She has been giving conferences at Sciences-Po Paris from 2005 until 2010. Her book *Mon voisin, cet ennemi: la politique de sécurité française face aux relations polono-tchécoslovaques entre 1919 et 1939* (Peter Lang, 2009) was awarded by the Institut de France.

Simon Davis (PhD, Exeter, 1994) is a professor of history at the City University of New York's Bronx Community College and CUNY Graduate Center. Most recently, he is the author of *Contested Space: Anglo-American Relations in the Persian Gulf, 1941–1947*. His current project is *From Development and Welfare to Martial Law: Britain and Arab Palestine, 1929–1939*.

Frédéric Dessberg, associate and doctor in history, senior lecturer at Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne University, on secondment at Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan Military Academy. He is heading the European Defense and Security Department at the Centre of Research of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan, member of UMR IRICE (Paris I–Paris IV). He is interested in the French policy in central and Eastern Europe between the two World Wars, he has recently published *Le Triangle impossible: Les relations franco-soviétiques et le facteur polonais dans les questions de sécurité en Europe, 1924–1935* (Peter Lang, 2009) and *Les Horizons lointains de la politique extérieure française* (Peter Lang, 2011).

Richard L. DiNardo is the professor for national security affairs at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia. He is the author or editor of six books. His most recent book is *Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915* (ABC-CLIO, 2010). It also won honorable mention in the Western Front Association's Tomlinson Book Prize for 2010.

Mark Edele is an associate professor in history at the University of Western Australia. He received much of his education in Germany (MA, University of Tübingen) and earned an

MA and PhD from the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society* (Oxford University Press, 2008) and *Stalinist Society* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Brian P. Farrell teaches military history at the National University of Singapore, where he has been working since 1993. His research interests include the military history of the British Empire, imperialism and military history in Asia, coalition warfare, and special forces. Major publications include *The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy 1940–1943: Was There a Plan?* (1998) and *The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940–1942* (2005).

Richard B. Frank published his first book, *Guadalcanal*, in 1990. His second work, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*, appeared in 1999 and has been called one of the six best books in English on World War II. Both Random House books won awards and became main selections of the History Book Club. In 2006, he completed *MacArthur* as part of the Palgrave Great Generals series. In addition to his numerous appearances on television and radio, he was also a consultant for the epic HBO miniseries, *The Pacific*. He is currently working on a narrative history trilogy on the Asian-Pacific War.

Christopher R. Gabel, PhD, is a professor of military history at the US Army Command and General Staff College. His publications include *The US Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941*; *Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II*; and *Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign*.

Marc Gallicchio, Villanova University, was editor for *The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in US–East Asian Relations* (2007) and author of *The Scramble for Asia: US Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War* (2008) as well as *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (2000) which won the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Robert H. Ferrell prize. (Bats right, throws right.)

Sarah Ellen Graham has served as a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Studies/Center for Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California, lecturer in international relations at the University of Southern California, and lecturer in modern history at the University of Western Sydney. She is a research fellow of the USC Center for Public Diplomacy for 2011–2013 and is a past winner of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Bernath Article Prize.

Dr. Neil Gregor is a professor of history at the University of Southampton. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including *Haunted city: Nuremberg and the Nazi past* (Yale University Press, 2008).

Jacob Darwin Hamblin is an associate professor of history at Oregon State University. He specializes in the international dimensions of science, technology, and the environment during the cold war era. His books include *Oceanographers and the Cold War* (Washington, 2005) and *Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age* (Rutgers, 2008).

Travis J. Hardy is a lecturer of history at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville where he received his doctorate in American diplomatic and military history in 2010 and specializes in examining the role of the US in the world. His article, “Race as an Aspect of the US–Australian Alliance in World War II,” was recently accepted for publication in the journal *Diplomatic History*.

Gary R. Hess is an emeritus distinguished research professor at Bowling Green State University. His research has concentrated on American relations with South and Southeast Asia, leading to

America Encounters India, 1941–1947; The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asia Power, 1940–1950; and Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War. His most recent books include the second edition of *Presidential Decisions for War, Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War*, and the third edition of *The United States at War, 1941–45*.

Alexander Hill is an associate professor in military history at the University of Calgary, Canada, and author of *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945: A Documentary Reader* (Routledge, 2009) and *The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West Russia, 1941–1944* (Frank Cass, 2005).

Dr. Talbot C. Imlay is a professor of history at the Université Laval. He is the author of many books and articles, including *Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France* (Oxford, 2003).

Dr. Akira Iriye is Charles Warren Professor of American History in 1991. He has written widely on American diplomatic history and Japanese–American relations. Among those works are *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911* (1972); *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945* (1981); *Fifty Years of Japanese-American Relations* (in Japanese, 1991); *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (1992); *The Globalizing of America* (1993); and *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (1997).

Ashley Jackson is a professor of imperial and military history at King's College London and a visiting fellow at Kellogg College Oxford. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Britain's imperial and military history.

Julian Jackson is a professor of modern French history at Queen Mary, University of London. He has written extensively on twentieth century France. His publications include *France: the Dark Years* (2001) and *The Fall of France* (2003). He is currently working on a new biography of de Gaulle.

Patricia Kollander is a professor of history at Florida Atlantic University. Her publications include *Frederick III: Germany's Liberal Emperor* (Greenwood Press, 1995) and *"I Must be a Part of this War": A German-American's Fight against Hitler and Nazism* (Fordham University Press, 2005). She is currently examining the experiences of German-born émigrés who fought in the US army during World War II.

Dr. Stephan Lehnstaedt is a researcher at the German Historical Institute in Warsaw. He is the author of *Okkupation im Osten: Besatzeralltag in Warschau und Minsk 1939–1944* (Oldenbourg-Verlag, 2010).

Sean L. Malloy is an associate professor of history and member of the founding faculty at the University of California, Merced. He is the author of *Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan* (Cornell University Press, 2008) as well as articles dealing with nuclear targeting in World War II and the radiation effects of the atomic bomb.

Professor Frank McDonough was educated at Balliol College, Oxford. He holds a chair in international history at Liverpool John Moores University. He is the author of many books and articles. His most recent titles are *Sophie Scholl* (2009) which was one of the London Evening Standard "Books of the Year" and *The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective* (2011), a Sunday Telegraph "Book of the Year."

Edward G. Miller is a defense consultant and retired US Army logistics officer. He was a designated army historian and appeared on the Fox News Channel. His books cover the battle of the Hurtgen Forest and US Army operations in the European theater. He has led battle staff rides for US Army officers and NCOs in Europe since 1986.

William H. Miller is an independent scholar in the areas of twentieth century war, mobilization, and technology. His current project explores continuities between World War II industrial mobilization and contemporary times.

John E. Moser is an associate professor of history at Ashland University, where he teaches courses on US, European, and East Asian history. He is author of three books: *Twisting the Lion's Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars* (New York University Press, 1999); *Presidents from Hoover through Truman, 1929–1953* (Greenwood Press, 2002); and *Right Turn: John T. Flynn and the Transformation of American Liberalism* (New York University Press, 2005).

Stephen H. Norwood (PhD, Columbia University) is a professor of history at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of four books, most recently *The Third Reich in the Ivory Tower: Complicity and Conflict on American Campuses* (Cambridge University Press), finalist for the National Jewish Book Award for Holocaust Studies. He is the editor (with Eunice Pollack) of the prize-winning *Encyclopedia of American Jewish History*.

Christopher D. O'Sullivan (PhD, MA, University of London; BA, University College Berkeley) teaches history and international studies at the University of San Francisco, where he is the recipient of their 2011 Distinguished Teaching Award. He is the author of *FDR and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), *Colin Powell: A Political Biography* (2010), *Sumner Welles: Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order* (2008), and *The United Nations: A Concise History* (2005).

Michael Alfred Peszke is a professor emeritus of the University of Connecticut Health Center, a distinguished life fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and a member emeritus of the American College of Psychiatrists. His avocation is Polish World War II military history and he has published a number of books and many papers on the subject.

John Prados is the author of twenty-one books on diplomatic, military, or intelligence history and many hundreds of papers, articles, and web postings on these topics as well as government secrecy, conflict simulation, and board gaming. His works on World War II include *Normandy Crucible*, the award-winning *Combined Fleet Decoded*, and the forthcoming *Islands of Destiny*. Prados is a senior fellow and project director with the National Security Archive in Washington, DC and holds a PhD in political science (international relations) from Columbia University.

Mark Roehrs received his PhD in history from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in 1998. In addition, he also holds a B.S. in education (1987) from Concordia Teacher's College in Seward, NE and a MA in history (1989) from the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. He has been teaching full time since 1997. Roehrs was an instructor in the University of Wisconsin Colleges system and taught at the Marathon County and Baraboo/Sauk County campuses for three years. For the past ten years he has been a professor at Lincoln Land Community College in Springfield, IL. Roehrs has also coauthored a text on the Pacific War.

Dr. Christoph J. M. Safferling is a professor of criminal law, international criminal law, and international law at the Institute for Criminal Science at the Philipps-University Marburg. He is the author of numerous books and articles on war crimes and international criminal law, including *Towards an International Criminal Procedure* (Oxford University Press 2001, in paperback 2003).

Professor Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Southern California. He also earned a MA degree in history from the University of Kentucky. Before that he earned a BA in history from the University of Texas. He is the author of *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and US-Japanese Relations* (2000), *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon*

Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell (2004), and *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan* (2009), and a forthcoming book about the making of the film *Patton*. He has published a number of award-winning articles that appeared in journals such as *Diplomatic History*, *English Historical Review*, *The Journal of Military History*, and *Joint Forces Quarterly*. He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has previously taught at Texas A&M University – Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Dr. Raffael Scheck is a professor of history at Colby College. He has published four books and many articles on German history at the time of the World Wars. His third book, *Hitler's African Victims* (Cambridge University Press, 2006, in paperback 2008), has been translated into French (2007) and German (2009).

James Schwoch is the senior associate dean for the School of Communication at Northwestern University in Qatar, and a professor at Northwestern University. His research explores the nexus of global media, media history, international studies, and global security.

Kenneth Slepyan (PhD, University of Michigan) is a professor of modern European history at Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky. He is the author of several publications on Soviet resistance during World War II, including *Stalin's Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II* (University Press of Kansas, 2006).

Kevin Smith is an associate professor of history and department chair at Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana. He is author of *Conflict over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War* (1996) and several articles, most notably "Reassessing Roosevelt's View of Chamberlain after Munich: Ideological Affinity in the Geoffrey Thompson–Claude Bowers Correspondence," in *Diplomatic History*. He is also senior historical consultant for *Echoes of War: Stories from the Big Red One* (2007).

Marietta Stankova studied modern European history at the universities of Sofia, Budapest, and Oxford. She obtained her PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science, where she has also taught extensively. She has written widely on Bulgaria, the cold war, and communism and is an experienced researcher in the archives of Britain, Bulgaria, and Russia.

Mark A. Stoler is a professor emeritus of history at the University of Vermont, where he taught from 1970 to 2007. He is the author of *Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940–1945* (Hodder-Arnold, 2005) as well as numerous other books, articles, and book chapters in US diplomatic and military history.

Barbara Brooks Tomblin is a naval historian and the author of *GI. Nightingales: The Army Nurse Corps in World War II*; *With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942–45*; and *Bluejackets and Contrabands: African Americans and the Union Navy* as well as articles on American military and naval history. She holds a doctorate in American history from Rutgers University where she also taught courses in military history.

Susanne Vees-Gulani is an associate professor of modern languages and literatures at Case Western Reserve University. She is the author of *Trauma and Guilt: Literature of Wartime Bombing in Germany* (de Gruyter, 2003) and editor of *Generational Shifts in Contemporary German Culture* (Camden House, 2010, with Laurel Cohen-Pfister). Her research concentrates on twentieth and twenty-first century German literature and culture, World War II, postwar reconstruction and identity formation, trauma and memory studies, science and literature, and medicine and literature.

Olli Vehviläinen (born in 1933) is a professor emeritus of history at the University of Tampere, Finland. He was the director of the research project Finland in the Second World War (SUOMA)

and the chairman of the editorial board of a three-volume work on Finland in World War II which was published between 1989 and 1992. He is also the Finnish editor and coauthor of a joint Finnish-Russian work on the Winter War 1939–1940. Among his publications is *Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia* (Palgrave 2002).

Colonel (retired) Randall Wakelam (PhD) teaches history and leadership at the Royal Military College of Canada. He has published extensively on issues of command and leadership and on military education. In addition to several papers and chapters, his books include *The Science of Bombing: Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command*; *The Report of the Officer Development Board: Maj-Gen Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces*; and *Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945–54*.

Gerhard L. Weinberg served in the US Army in 1946–1947, took a history PhD at the University of Chicago, worked on Columbia University's War Documentation Project, and established the program for microfilming the captured German documents. He taught at the Universities of Chicago, Kentucky, Michigan, and North Carolina and served on several US government advisory committees. Now retired, he is the author or editor of ten books including *World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II*; *Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II*; *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*; *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders*; and over hundred chapters, articles, guides to archives, and other publications.

Charlie Whitham is a senior lecturer in history at Cardiff Metropolitan University, UK. Charlie has published widely on Anglo-American diplomatic and economic relations during World War II and cold war periods, and is currently researching the role of American business organizations in postwar planning during the 1940s.

Neville Wylie is a professor of international political history at the University of Nottingham, UK, and dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at its campus in Malaysia. He is author of *Britain, Switzerland and the Second World War* (2003), and editor of *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (2002). His latest book, *Barbed Wire Diplomacy: Britain, Germany and the Politics of Prisoners of War, 1939–1945* appeared in 2010 with Oxford University Press.

Dr. Maochun Yu is a professor of East Asia and military history at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. He holds a doctoral degree from the University of California at Berkeley (1994), a Masters degree from Swarthmore College (1987) and a Bachelors degree from Nankai University (1983). He is the author of *The Dragon's War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937–1947* (Naval Institute Press, 2006), *OSS in China – Prelude to Cold War* (Yale University Press, 1997), and numerous articles on modern China and the military and intelligence history of World War II and the cold war.

Introduction

The most transformative event in world history since the Industrial Revolution, World War II, continues to be a benchmark to this day for national development, security and economic policies, and issues of morality. It might seem like hyperbole, but more than any event since the Industrial Revolution, this war was the most pivotal event of the past two or three centuries in terms of the carnage it caused, the developments in every aspect of human life, and the consequences it wrought. World War II represented the culmination of decades of diplomacy, modernization, and societal shifts across the world, between and among regions, and within nations. It also initiated whole new systems of government and international organization, sparked revolutions and counterrevolutions, and served as a warning to the world to avoid a repeat of the horror of atomic warfare or suffer the ultimate consequence: the destruction of the planet. Alterations, even revolutions, for that matter, in the international system (disintegration of empires, the rise of the United States, the end of fascism, the emergence of communism, and the creation of a global network of institutions that addressed topics from security to finance to health) and the very memories of the evils it eradicated remain with us. Generations born after the war have felt its effects.

Because of its timeliness, its influence on a host of areas affecting humanity, and its continual, and continued, contestation and benefits through relations among nations and peoples, World War II remains a significant topic for students. Also, the fact that the history of World War II reveals the contours of the human experience at the mid-point of the twentieth century means that we all have a stake in understanding the world it created. The two volumes that comprise this *Companion to World War II* explore the conflict's contexts around the world, within nations, and across transnational groupings of people. We did not attempt to be exhaustive; readers will find topics, theaters, areas of the world, campaigns, and people excluded or addressed in

glancing fashion. The goal is to shape research on World War II; that is, the volumes are suggestive in indicating areas for current and future study.

This work is also more than a military history, although one of its intentions is to cover the many sides of battle, operations, and strategy that engaged the belligerents. The *Companion* does so, however, largely without fixating in detail on individual battles and campaigns. Thus, the volumes include examinations of the “old” and “new” military histories. The 58 chapters in this *Companion* provide insights into how the war linked nations, systems, and cultures, and they also lay out agendas for future researchers to further that effort, as well as cover the import behind the military engagements.

The war, which some believe stretched from the Japanese invasion of China in July 1937 to Japan’s surrender in September 1945, encompassed six continents on which nations, governments, militaries, and civilians developed responses to deal with the conflict. The actual beginning of the war is in dispute: did it start in China, or later with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939? The European phase ended in May 1945, but did the onset of decolonization and wars of liberation actually push World War II to 1975, with the end of the Vietnam War and the signing of the Helsinki Accords that settled the postwar boundaries of Europe? Regardless, the impact and consequences of the war are clear. Nobody was spared its effects; it was truly history’s most comprehensive global *event* as well as war. Because of its worldwide scope, the vast mobilization of people and resources, and the use of cutting-edge technology, World War II was also the most destructive conflict in recorded human history in terms of lives and property lost. For this result alone, the war deserves further intensive study.

A Companion to World War II probes this most significant and traumatic of wars in its many global dimensions: military and technological, diplomatic and political, economic, gender and racial, and social and cultural between and within the major participants. In short, the volume addresses the historiography of the war, offering readers and scholars a survey of various subjects in a way that provides them with a state-of-the-art assessment of trends, issues, and topics.

Reflecting research in several subfields over the past seven decades, the writing of the history of World War II has undergone major change, most notably (but not exclusively) by the turn toward “bottom-up” social and cultural studies that explore the experiences of a variety of people (soldier, citizen, generals, strategists, policymakers, manufacturers, etc.) and their bearing on societies. *A Companion to World War II* embraces this new scholarship from an international as well as a transnational perspective. To be sure, the volume does not shun the classic tradition of strategic, operational, and even tactical narratives; the older-style “blood and guts” history is present on both a national and global scale. But the so-called “New Military History” is very much in evidence in terms of analyses of the way of war and the influence of war on society, and vice versa. Ideology, economics, culture, social change, interdisciplinary crossings, and transnational connections and movements figure prominently into the writing – indeed, into the very selection – of these chapters. No other historiographical collection strives for comparable extensive global coverage combined with thematic depth and breadth.

Of course, the effort to bring a greater understanding of the global nature of the war has been underway for some time, as has the push to expand the topics and

methodologies of studying the conflict. The sheer volume of publications is daunting; shelves groan under the weight of this output (both scholarly and amateur) of every sort – biographies, memoirs, battle accounts, operational surveys, and analyses of the causes, nature, and consequences. The avalanche of books and articles make World War II one of the most researched topics in scholarship of any kind. A quick survey of finding aids on Internet sources such as Amazon, Google, and the Library of Congress, for instance, indicates a yield of anywhere from 60,000 to 300,000 books (and those numbers do not even reflect the enormous number of articles) that in some way touch on the war. The volume of scholarship is so considerable, and there is so much produced every month, that even a survey such as this one risks being outdated very quickly. Even this *Companion* has surely overlooked key sources, themes, and actors that will likely become critical to the study of the war in coming years.

Nevertheless, what is already in press is stunning in its breadth, depth, and numbers. The vast production of World War II literature of every kind staggers the mind, and surely does the same to students who seek to get a handle on the historiography. There is, of course, the cottage industry of deserved (though often weakly historicized) recognition of generations, nations, units, people, and the like that has a tendency to border on hagiography and hero worship. The now classic of this genre of hagiography is Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (1998), but Stephen Ambrose both preceded and followed that laudatory study with many other popular works, such as *Citizen Soldiers* (1997), *Band of Brothers* (2001a), and *The Good Fight* (2001b). The classic war memoir of the realist model is still E. B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* (1981).

And, there is the flipside: literature that tells of the horrifying, brutal side of men under duress or making decisions that led to mistakes, injury, and death, and attests to the bottomless level of degradation (as well as the heights) that humans can reach. See, for instance, Nicholson Baker, *Human Smoke: The Beginnings of World War II, the End of Civilization* (2008), as well as classic recollections of participants, such as Kurt Vonnegut, *Slaughterhouse Five, or the Children's Crusade: A Duty-Dance with Death* (1969), regarding the bombing campaign in Europe, and John Hersey, *Hiroshima* (1946). These works are not included in the *Companion* but need mention because they are such a stock in trade that has made, and makes, the war a popular topic. Much of this outpouring is American-centered, and some of it very good for the illumination of experiences and attitudes, although other nations certainly have their triumphal “good war” motifs.

In a more scholarly sense, students can learn about the war in film and radio, cartoons and newspapers, art forms from music to painting, literature, advertising and propaganda, and through personal accounts. For still the best bilateral examination of the cultural aspects of the war, see Dower (1987); for a sampling from the American side, see Chambers and Culbert (1996), Doherty (1993), Fox (1975), Horten (2002), Roeder (1993), Bird and Rubenstein (1998), Minear (1999), and National Archives (n.d.); and for personal accounts, see Linderman (1997). Archives, maps, exhibits, and discussions are readily available (see, for example, the US Military Academy website, West Point Maps of the Asian Pacific War, available online at <http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/WWII%20Asian%20Pacific%20Theater.aspx> (one also exists of the European theater); useful is the “World War II

Links on the Internet” website, available at http://homepage.mac.com/oldtownman/ww2_links.html). Home fronts have been studied in detail, and have become a significant focal point for investigators of race, gender, immigration, law, and other fields that deal with social change. For instance, on the US side, John Morton Blum, *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (1976), though dated, still stands up to scrutiny. Other sources for other nations’ domestic lives can be found in the “Homelands” section of this *Companion*. Historians (military, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural), philosophers, theologians, social scientists, journalists, and other researchers have joined participants and military buffs to produce a myriad of reference books that consider seemingly every step and aspect of the war. More recently, work has blossomed on resistance movements, intelligence, and Nazi oppression, topics addressed in this *Companion*. One of the most keenly examined subjects has been the morality of the combatants at the national, group, and individual level (Fussell 1989; Burke 2001; Dear 2005; Bess 2006). Yet, even with such an outpouring, authors are careful to note that these works are not definitive; World War II still holds treasures beyond what scholars have already dug up.

By the 1970s and 1980s, as archives opened, secondary sources on campaigns and battles proliferated. At the same time, the war itself lost its immediacy and began to dim for younger generations. As a result, historians launched trends that lifted World War II from the domain of war buffs interested in generals, armies, tactics, and operations – in war as a game, or in a family member’s role in battle, or in militaries driven by great personalities. That stated, some of the best work on operational history continued to grace the shelves of military history libraries, including the masterpiece *A War To Be Won* by Murray and Millett (2000). Following in this tradition are several texts by major publishers that draw on updated research and approach the war through an organizational structure different from the standard Europe-first model. See, for instance, Zeiler, *Annihilation: A Global Military History of World War II* (2011). A combined military and strategic lens is found in Evan Mawdsley, *World War II: A New History* (2009). Grand strategy and individual experiences comprise the readable Andrew Roberts, *The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War* (2011). With a more focused theme but equally encompassing is Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (1995) and, in a specific theater, the superb H. P. Willmott, *The Second World War in the East* (1999). Before and after Williamson and Murray produced their study, however, others had also undertaken broad looks at military engagements, with an eye on the uses of technology, the political causes and consequences of the war, and a nod to the human context (Keegan 1989; Black 2003). The resulting body of work has provided a military history of the war noted for its thoroughness and attention to minute details of men and materiel, and battles and backdrops to conflict. The *Companion* touches on much of this methodology.

The Companion to World War II is designed for the researcher but it is also a useful pedagogical tool, and therefore reflects the teaching of the conflict at the advanced high school, but primarily the college and postgraduate levels. World War II and military history in general, for that matter, share an accessibility for the layperson, including students. In reality, war is understandable as well as exciting, dramatic, and tragic, and this conflict being the biggest of them all reaches into nearly everyone’s sensibilities. Teaching about World War II is an effective way to transmit complex ideas about ideology, ethics, nationalism, and the nature of war itself, to name but a

handful of concepts. For a good overview of the pedagogy regarding the war and ideas for teaching it, see Murray (2011). Many of the publications on the war were designed with teaching in mind. Furthermore, because of the need to assign readable texts in classes that are of limited duration, it is also important to point out that the war has attracted a host of short overviews that survey the military and, on occasion, the social landscapes in each country or theater. The classic in this regard is James Stokesbury's *A Short History of World War II* (1980), a text that still endures after more than thirty years in print. Other abbreviated explorations of the war followed Stokesbury – and, indeed, he subsequently published a short history of World War I, and then of other American wars as well (e.g. Kitchen 1990; Lyons 2010; see also Zeiler 2011). Although they do not offer the breadth of the thousand-page volumes, or the depth of the monograph, they are surprisingly complete in their coverage of topics. Thus, while the focus is on the military campaigns, they capitalize – in brief – on many of the themes found in this *Companion*. Presumably, future short histories of World War II will steer readers to some of the newer subjects that range beyond battles, strategies, and personalities.

Setting aside the brief treatments and the pedagogical aspects of the war, scholarship has reached into explorations of the very meaning of “total war” in terms of combat, the role and plight of civilian noncombatants, mobilization of home fronts (and the power that civilians, governments, and modes of production rendered to the belligerents) as well as the conduct of the war and the change World War II made on societies and in the international structure of power. The United States has been a major beneficiary of these studies, but Europe and Asia – and most recently, the China-Burma-India theater and the Soviet-German Eastern Front – have garnered increasing attention as scholars move into more subaltern looks at the war, refocus on less traditional topics like genocide, and discover new memoirs and correspondence of participants (Stoler and Gustafson 2003; Martel 2004; Chickering, Forster, and Greiner 2005). For an example of the (media-driven) American dominance on the war that taps into recent interests in societal aspects, see Ward and Burns (2007); for the Eastern Front, see Snyder (2010); and an example of correspondence is Masuda (2008). We now have a burgeoning body of literature on every nation involved in the conflict (Peszke 2006; Kimble 2006; Anonymous 2006; Merridale 2007), and subgroups within those nations (for subgroups, on the American side, for example, see Honey 1984, 1999; Daniels 1993; O’Sullivan 1996; Terkel 1997; Bentley 1998; Townsend 2000; Sklaroff 2002; Moore 2004; Alvarez 2008). This old and new military history covers so much ground that it is beyond a single author to present it; edited collections or coauthored works are the norm. Likewise, this *Companion* also draws on the efforts of dozens of scholars. But just as important as the number of scholars working in the field is the multinationality of their backgrounds. The *Companion* has sought out experts from a variety of nations, many of whom do not speak English as their primary language. They were able to bring a unique perspective, and include non-English sources, in their chapters in a way that proves invaluable to expanding our knowledge of the war.

We should not confuse the inclusion of all theaters – ranging from Europe and Asia to Africa and the Atlantic – with a truly global historical analysis. The *Companion* represents an initial attempt at mounting a comparative global historiography of World War II, but it admittedly relies on the reader to make those ties across borders.

Earlier and current work take a global approach in terms of delving into common themes in the history on each continent, which is an accomplishment in itself, but the effort does not necessarily result in a truly comparative world history. Over four decades have passed since Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint divided their monumental work (it was one of the first of the studies in the thousand-page range), *Total War*, into two geographic sections: the western hemisphere and Asia. This was an attempt to write a history comprehensive in scope. They abandoned a chronological approach that lumped the theaters together, and took a sequential look (at Europe first, then Asia) because they found that “the two hemispheres were much less closely interdependent than we had at first supposed.” Their rationale rested on the premise that the stories behind the war begun by Hitler were “distinctly intelligible” from the Sino-American-Japanese conflict (Calvocoressi and Wint 1972, p. xii).

That argument can be debated because many of the chapters in this *Companion* indicate that there were certainly shared experiences, outlooks, and consequences around the world that render a globalized version of the war more possible than before. The bombing campaigns, for one, prove this point, as do issues of civilian involvement (both in mobilization and casualties), technology, strategy and coalition-building, imperialism, and expansionist ideological, national, and cultural visions. Again, the *Companion* makes a stab at globalizing the history of World War II by the very nature of the topics and authors chosen to write the chapters. But, it is suggestive of ways readers can draw parallels, contrasts to various aspects of the conflict, and narratives and analyses of the experiences of nations, groups, and people.

Nearly two decades ago, the now classic account of the war, Gerhard Weinberg’s *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, aimed to link the various theaters together without bogging down in excessive detail on the actual fighting. As Weinberg noted, he sought to overcome the parochialism of treatments that tended to focus on one nation or area at a time by showing the simultaneity of events, decisions, and movements. Thus, revealing the “inter-relationships between the various theaters and the choices faced by those in positions of leadership” were the objectives of his magnificent, masterly work. This *Companion* is fortunate to benefit from his insights in chapters that explore both the run-up to and conclusion of the war (Weinberg 1995, p. xiv). Yet while the coverage is comprehensive, *A World at Arms* is largely a political book and does not drill down into the various transnational themes of society, culture, economics, and even ideology to compare them across time and place.

The objective of the *Companion* is not to correct *A World at Arms* (or, for that matter, any other account of the conflict); rather, its goal is to complement and supplement Weinberg’s and others’ histories by situating them in the historiography. These volumes, therefore, introduce the reader to the myriad elements of the war’s developments, experiences, and influences, home fronts, battles and theaters, diplomacy, economics, intelligence, and roles of a host of nations, including major neutrals.

Our hope is that a subject addressed in a chapter might be suggestive of work to be done in another. For instance, chapters cover mobilization in Europe, and also collaboration and resistance in the region, but neither are treated in Asia or the United States; that might disappoint readers but they should be able to look elsewhere for that topic. Some obvious military history – such as battles on the Western Front before 1944 or the North African campaign – lack attention, though other theaters and campaigns are included. Australia, Canada, and Latin America do not come in for

specific notice, nor does Hirohito or even Hitler and his rise to power in a sustained way. Some US topics that are commonly addressed, such as Japanese American internment or mobilization of the military, remain in the background, though all of these topics are significant and beg for attention. The collection tries to deal with issues from a variety of perspectives, so that as many themes as possible could be included. Still, readers will find many other subjects that are either novel (such as comparisons across nations) or commonplace (but approached in greater depth than seen before). We hope to acquaint students of World War II with ways of approaching the war, as well as with the potential for digging deeper.

To that end, the *Companion* is organized into broad sections under which various themes, methods, and topics fall. This categorization is evident in the Contents list but merits a word here in order to show the breadth and depth of the volume and also to explain why certain issues appear where they do. Six basic sections delineate the volume. First, the “Roots of War,” which addresses the buildup to the war and provides explanations of the factors of why war occurred, offers fairly traditional, political and economic approaches but includes the most recent research. A second section, “Fighting the War,” of mostly military history is broken down by theaters. Note should be made that not every battle, campaign, nor even area of combat is considered in this part; for example, Latin America and North Africa do not receive much mention. Section three and four are called “Multinational and Transnational Zones of Combat: Strategy” and “Multinational and Transnational Zones of Combat: Society” respectively, and the intention here is to analyze shared experiences, movements, and histories across borders in both a multinational (contacts across borders by official governments) and transnational (unofficial contacts by people, movements, experiences, and organizations beyond national boundaries) context. The fifth section deals with “Homelands,” and addresses the historical issues, and historiography, from the point of view of individual nations. Finally, the concluding sixth section provides insights into the “Aftermath and Consequences” of the war. The last chapter in this section, and in the volume as a whole, is fittingly written by Gerhard Weinberg, who also opens the *Companion* with the first entry in the first section.

When reflecting on the Contents listings, and then reading the chapters, one is struck by the broad scope of the topics. If the chapters are lumped into broad, methodological fields of inquiry – strategic, political, military, or social as well as cultural, economic, science, and the like – the coverage is both wide and deep. A rough count, for example, reveals that well over three quarters of the chapters embrace a strategic, political, or military approach. In addition, about half of all the chapters are social in content, and a quarter follow the cultural turn. Slightly less than a quarter have economic substance, and a handful deal with the themes of science, technology, or environment as well as intellectual history, and gender. A step back from these fields shows that well over half of the chapters are transnational or multinational in methodology. Actually, this estimate is rather conservative because many more touch, in some way, on the international and global connections and perspectives related to World War II. About ten of the contributions examine solely or primarily the national. So, the *Companion* looks at many topics, and views them from several angles, that signify some of the leading trends in the historiography of World War II.

The *Companion to World War II* engages the scholarly and official debates, in the English-speaking community as well as other languages, and addresses the course of

the war through historiographical state-of-the field analysis, rather than narrative description, although chapters provide some historical background as a basis for understanding the reviews of the literature. Established and emerging experts in their fields have participated in this grand project, and we thank them profusely for the time and care taken to produce cutting-edge historiography. We hope that the volumes raise as many questions as they answer, or provoke researchers to read on as they investigate new topics or simply stretch the boundaries of old ones. All readers, moreover, should come away from the *Companion* with an awareness that the transformative World War II will continue to be a factor for years to come in the lives of every person, whether they realize it or not. It is the cardinal objective of these volumes to stimulate, support, and expand that realization.

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PART I

Roots of War

CHAPTER ONE

How a Second World War Happened

GERHARD L. WEINBERG

As a prisoner of war in December 1945, German Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb mused in his diary about the lessons of World War II on the way Germany should prepare for and conduct World War III that he evidently assumed Germany would fight against essentially the same enemies as in the conflict that had just ended (Meyer 1976, p. 80). The record of Germany since 1945, whether in two states or as one, suggests that this anticipation was not widely shared. There was concern about the cold war possibly turning into open conflict, but the idea of Germany once again taking on France, England, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United States proved limited to a minority so tiny that it would have been hard to find. After World War I, however, the idea of another war was by no means so inconceivable to a considerable number of Germans as one might have expected after the enormous casualties and costs of that war. How did that come to be?

In order to try to understand the origins of World War II, it would be best first to define the war that carries that name. The conflict between Japan and China that Japan initiated in 1931 by occupying the Chinese territory of Manchuria and that broke into open conflict in July 1937 needs to be seen as a local conflict in a series initiated by Japan in 1894 against China and in 1904 against Russia. It is true that in 1941 Japan joined the war Germany had begun in 1939 on the assumption that Germany would win. This was Japan's chance to profit from Germany's victory at the expense of the countries with which it had been allied in World War I; but this action by Japan would not have occurred had not Germany started the new conflict. Similarly, the war of Italy against Abyssinia/Ethiopia in 1935–1936 has to be seen as a resumption of Italian colonial warfare conducted earlier against the same country and subsequently against the Ottoman Empire. When Italy joined World War II in the summer of 1940, it was also in anticipation of profiting from a German victory that appeared to be imminent. The critical point is that without the initiative of Germany there would have been no World War II, and it is therefore the origins of that initiative that need to be examined.

Before one examines the 1919 peace settlement's implications for future German choices, there is a critical feature of the war itself that must be mentioned. The wars of the German states against Denmark in 1864, the war of Prussia against Austria and other German states in 1866, and the war against France in 1871–1872 had all been fought on the territory of the other country. Similarly, with minimal exceptions, World War I had seen fighting and destruction everywhere but in Germany. There was thus, and would be until well into World War II, the tacit assumption by most Germans that war was something that took place elsewhere. There had been, and might well be once again, privations at home, but the physical destruction of modern war was something that occurred in the cities and countryside of Germany's enemies. It would be in World War II that the Germans received substantial reeducation, as the terminology went at the time, on this point.

Several features of the peace settlement of 1919 at the end of World War I require careful attention. The defeat of the Russian Empire by Germany and Austria-Hungary with the subsequent defeat of the latter powers by the Allies opened the way for the independence of a series of countries from Finland to Poland, while a Bolshevik regime triumphed after assistance from Germany in what was left of the prewar Russian Empire. The defeat of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire led, *not* as after prior wars to these empires losing pieces of territory, but in their dissolution. This in turn led to the independence of additional states in eastern Europe and to British and French control of portions of the Middle East. Whatever the merits and demerits, justice and injustice, of the boundaries of the newly independent – and in the case of Serbia greatly enlarged – states, for the first time in over a century, Russia was separated from Germany and the successor states of Austria-Hungary by a revived Poland and a tier of newly independent countries.

A second aspect of the peace settlement was that although the German Empire had been defeated it was not broken up. The newest of the European great powers, less than half a century old in 1918, was seen by the peacemakers as a basic unit in the context of a settlement based on the principle of nationality. It was obliged to return territory to several of its neighbors taken from them in the past; but with the most minimal exceptions, these had not been under German control for long. In places where there were doubts about the national affiliation of the local population, plebiscites were scheduled to be followed by the allocation of territory based on the vote.

A third aspect of enormous long-term significance that was integrally related to the national principle was the refusal of the American and British representatives at the peace conference to agree to detaching the Rhineland from Germany to secure France from future invasion by Germany. Since this decision would leave France and Belgium open to attack, the French were reassured by defensive alliance treaties with the United States and Britain in case of such an attack – the assumption or at least hope being that the existence of these treaties would discourage Germany from trying.

The fourth especially significant aspect of the peace settlement was that the United States refused to ratify it, refused to join the League of Nations created by that settlement, and refused to ratify the treaty with France that had been that country's security compensation for leaving the Rhineland with Germany. The American refusal led to a British refusal, so that the major ally most weakened by the war was deprived of either form of security against German attack.

The fifth aspect of the peace settlement was the fiercely strong negative reaction to it by Germany. This reaction was the product, primarily, of two strongly held beliefs and a failure to recognize any of the advantages of the peace treaties for Germany. One belief deliberately sponsored by the military leaders who had brought about Germany's defeat by their poor strategy, excessive territorial ambitions, and insistence on a total victory, was that Germany had actually not been defeated at all. It had lost its chance of victory by what came to be called the stab-in-the-back by traitorous elements at home. Those elements, variously identified as socialist, communists, and Jews, had deprived Germany of the fruits of its massive exertions in the war. The other belief was the widely shared view that Poles were some east European variety of cockroach who had no ability to have and maintain a state. The very idea of returning territory to such a state, of having the nerve to ask people whether they considered themselves Poles or Germans – as if there could be any theoretical equivalence between them – looked preposterous and insulting to most Germans. The substitution for the east–west corridor through Polish territory arranged by Frederick the Great in 1772 to connect his Prussian and Brandenburg lands of a north–south corridor as had existed in prior centuries looked to most Germans as a deliberate affront to their dignity.

The advantages of the peace settlement for Germany, which most did not recognize until they were lost in World War II, were several. The possibility that being separated from the Soviet Union by a Poland that had its own serious disputes with that country might be a good thing occurred to few Germans until Russian forces came to Berlin in 1945. The willingness of the Allies to allow Germany to remain united similarly did not look like a good thing until 1945, any more than the limitation of occupation to a portion rather than all of the country. A German general captured in Tunisia in 1943 was overheard commenting to other captured generals in February 1945 that they would jump for joy if Germany could obtain another Treaty of Versailles (Neitzel 2007, p. 137). The recognition of reality came too late (Weinberg 1995, ch. 1).

Ironically, the man who wanted to lead Germany and obtained the opportunity to do so held and advocated a view of the peace settlement different from that of most Germans. In his speeches and his writings, Adolf Hitler always denounced those who wanted to reclaim what Germany had lost by the peace treaty as stupid “Grenzpolitiker,” border politicians, as compared to his brilliant self, the “Raumpolitiker,” the politician of space (Jäckel 1980). What Germany needed was certainly *not* the snippets of land lost by the 1919 treaty; securing their recovery would mean wars costing large numbers of lives for land that would still leave Germany without the agricultural space on which to raise the food it needed. What Germany really needed was hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land on which to settle farm families who would grow the food Germany needed and raise the children who would provide soldiers for added conquests of land until the whole earth was occupied by the racially superior Germans. There would be a demographic revolution on the globe, and the killing of all Jews would be a central portion of that event (Heuss 1932).

Designated chancellor of Germany by President Hindenburg at the end of January 1933, Hitler quickly consolidated his powers. He explained to the country's military leaders a few days after becoming chancellor that all democratic and pacifist trends would quickly end and that rearmament would enable the country to conquer vast lands in the east and their ruthless Germanization (Müller 2001; Weinberg 2010,

pp. 23–35). Many of the military convinced themselves that he meant Polish territory, but Hitler never considered Poland as important as they did. To him, that country's lands were always subordinate to the expected destruction of the Soviet Union, a state easier to conquer in his eyes because of the fortunate replacement of the old Germanic elite by the Bolshevik revolution that left incompetents ruling a racially inferior Slavic population. That was where the first major installment of living space for Germany would be found.

The rearmament program initiated in 1933 built on the prior secret violations of the peace treaty's restrictions on Germany's military but looked beyond them to the wars Hitler expected to fight. Relatively minor expansion of Germany's armed forces would suffice for a first war against Czechoslovakia, a campaign that before or after the annexation of Austria would solidify Germany's position in central Europe as well as provide the population and industrial basis for further expansion of the military. The major armaments expansion would be needed for the defeat of France, and by late 1934, of England (Weinberg 1995, ch. 6). It would be safe to turn east against the Soviet Union once the Western powers had been crushed, but that war required no special weapons because of the weakness of a country that Germany had defeated even before the stroke of good fortune of the Bolshevik Revolution. It was the fourth war against the United States which called for new weapons. It, too, was a weak country – the converse of belief in the stab-in-the-back legend was that America's military role in World War I had made no difference – but the country was distant and had a large navy. If, for the war with France, one needed tanks and single-engine dive-bombers and for the war with England a substantial navy and two-engine dive-bombers, war with the United States implied an intercontinental bomber and super-battleships. Since these would take years to design and build, it is easy to understand why in 1937, when the weapons for war against France and England were getting into production, Hitler gave the directives to begin work on the ones for war against the United States.

In 1937, the American government was continuing to develop what was called "neutrality legislation," a subject that belongs into the framework of the reaction of other countries to the new regime in Germany and of the way the Germans tried to deal with those reactions. In a world that looked back with horror at the human losses and massive destruction of what was called "the Great War," the shocked reaction abroad was dealt with by the pretense that the new regime wanted only peace. To make sure that no one moved against Germany before it was ready, Hitler took steps to reassure those most alarmed. There were a nonaggression pact with Poland, a renewal of the credit agreement with the Soviet Union, and a concordat with the Vatican (Weinberg 2010, chs. 2–4). All would be broken by Germany when Hitler thought the time ripe, but in only two respects did the new regime move drastically.

At what looked like the earliest opportunity, Germany left the Disarmament Conference then in session and withdrew from the League of Nations. The idea of being on an equal status with other countries in the League, including having like any other great power a permanent seat on the League's Council, was too much to expect of a state destined to lead and control the world. As for Austria, Hitler believed that it should be annexed promptly and tried to accomplish this by economic pressure from the outside and political pressure from the Nazi Party inside the country. When this effort did not produce prompt results, he ordered a July 1934 coup in Vienna by

which a Nazi stooge, Anton Rintelen, would replace Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was to be killed. Not only did the coup fail, though Dollfuss was murdered, but the attempt caused trouble with the one country that Hitler had long hoped to bring to Germany's side: Italy.

Hitler admired Benito Mussolini, the dictator of Italy, and had hoped for an alignment with Italy even before the latter's assumption of power (Pese 1955). The Italian government, however, preferred a small and weak Austria on its northern border rather than a large and strong Germany. Far from being a reversal of the lengthy struggle of Italians against Austria to attain unification, this interest in Austrian independence was caused by fear that a revived Germany might demand the southern Tyrol with its substantial German minority that Italy had acquired by the peace treaty with Austria and perhaps the port of Trieste on the Adriatic that Italy had also obtained in 1919. The breach between Italy on the one hand and Britain and France on the other – when those two opposed Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia – very voluble reassurances from Berlin about the South Tyrol, and parallel intervention on the side of Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War from July 1936 to April 1939 opened the way for a rapprochement between Italy and Germany, a development also hastened by Mussolini's visit to Germany in 1937 and Hitler's visit to Italy in 1938. It was Mussolini who coined the term "Axis" for this relationship after his visit to Germany. From his point of view, an alliance with Germany looked like the best and perhaps the only way to gain the imperial expansion he hoped to attain at the expense of France and England (Mallett 2003).

If this was the way Italy reacted to the new regime in Germany, how about the other major European powers? The Soviet Union altered its prior line, set by Josef Stalin, that the worst enemies of communism were the social democratic parties of central and west European countries in favor of a new line that called for a common front against fascism. In practice, however, this made little difference. The Soviet Union was in the throes of collectivization of agriculture and the first five-year plan, and hence in no position for an active foreign policy. On the contrary, Stalin made periodic efforts to make an arrangement with Nazi Germany – which were ignored by Berlin – and did what he could to appease the Japanese in the Far East. Once famine and industrialization had simultaneously reduced the rural population and shifted many of the survivors into new industries, Stalin ordered a massive purge of the military, administrative, and economic leadership, thereby weakening the country internally and reducing its already limited attractiveness as any state's prospective ally (Weinberg 2010, ch. 3).

France had been terribly weakened by World War I. Its major effort to insist on the terms of the peace treaty by occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 had led instead to a breach with its wartime allies as the British opposed this action and the United States evacuated its zone of occupation in the Rhineland (Schuker 1976). The French government subsequently tried to develop a system of alliances with potential victims of German aggression like Poland and Czechoslovakia, and even added one with the Soviet Union to this project, but there was always a realization behind these efforts that without the support of Britain and, hopefully, also the United States, there was realistically little that could be done to restrain Germany. France itself was too weak to cope with its powerful eastern neighbor and had been exhausted by its efforts in what an excellent study has called its "Pyrrhic Victory" in 1918 (Doughty 2005).

This would become dramatically evident when the possibility of a German attack on France's Czechoslovak ally became a prospect in 1938.

Great Britain had been one of the victors of World War I, but the overwhelming desire to avoid any further commitment in Europe had several origins that combined to make for a strong determination to stay out of war. In the first place, there was the enormous human cost of the war. It was not only that hundreds of thousands had died, but that the class nature of England, with commissions in the army originally reserved for the upper classes, assured that a disproportionate percentage of the children of the ruling elite lost their lives. Herbert Asquith, the prime minister when Britain went to war, had lost a son; Andrew Bonar Law, the first postwar prime minister, had lost two sons. Those at the top of British society knew all too well what modern war was likely to mean.

There had also been a reversal of the military relationship of Britain to its empire in World War I from prior conflicts. In earlier wars, soldiers from Britain had been sent out to defend – and hopefully add to – its colonial possessions and to cope with powers attempting to control Europe. In World War I, this situation was reversed. Troops from the empire, especially Canada, Australia, India, and New Zealand, and to some extent from African colonies, had been needed to fight the Central Powers. If Britain were ever to become involved in a European war again, such forces would again be needed – but would they be available? This issue, it should be noted, would arise in dramatic form in the 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia.

There was, furthermore, something of a reversal in still another facet of Britain's role in wars with European powers. Before 1914, the British had often assisted their allies with financial subsidies that helped the latter finance their war efforts. This occurred again in World War I, but this time it had been more in the form of borrowing from the United States on behalf of allies whose credit was not good enough for massive borrowing. This meant, in effect, that when the war ended, it was Britain that owed large sums to the United States in addition to having exhausted its own accumulated savings to help finance the enormous expenses of the war.

As if this financial problem was not enough, the whole economy of the island kingdom was so dramatically affected by the exertions of the war and the loss of markets and investments abroad that the country was in something of a depression throughout the postwar years even before the Great Depression hit. Under these economic burdens, postwar Britain was anything but the "land fit for heroes" hoped for during the years of fighting (Johnson 1968).

One final factor affected the calculations of all in leadership positions in London. The fact that World War I had developed out of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia suggested that almost any war in Europe, whatever the location and whatever the issue in controversy, might very well draw Britain in. Under these circumstances, it looked to many that the best way to avoid Britain becoming involved in another war was to try hard to keep war from starting anywhere in Europe. The origin of the concept of appeasement, of trying to settle difficulties peacefully even at substantial sacrifices, should be seen as a reflection of the belief based on the experience of 1914 that any conflict on the continent, even between countries in which Britain had no special interest, would draw in Britain regardless of the issue that had precipitated the fighting.

In the United States, the public was very much disturbed by reports of events in Germany, but the dismay over the evident turn of a people thought highly civilized

toward barbarism only accentuated the desire to avoid war. The widespread disillusionment with the results of what was increasingly considered a mistaken entry into World War I fed the effort to avoid any possibility of repetition. The so-called neutrality legislation of the 1930s might well have kept the United States out of World War I had it been in effect in 1914; but its existence in the 1930s served to discourage France and Britain from vigorous opposition to Germany since it told them that if their policies led to war with that country, they could not count on any material or financial support from the United States. President Franklin Roosevelt kept carefully informed about developments inside Germany but recognized that the people of the country were strongly opposed to any support for prospective victims of Germany. Furthermore, both the President and the American people were aware of the fact that there were other dangers possibly looming from Japan in East Asia as that country embarked on ever more violent expansionist policies.

A major element in the situation of Britain, France, and the United States was that all had effectively disarmed after World War I. Britain had dissolved its huge wartime army and maintained a land force about the size of that specified by the peace treaty for Germany. By the mid-1930s, much of it was committed to the mandate of Palestine acquired by Britain from the Ottoman Empire, reduced in 1922 to less than a quarter of its original size, and wracked by an Arab revolt against British rule and Jewish immigration. There was a small British air force, and the Royal Navy was restricted by a series of naval agreements. In the 1930s, there was a minimal effort at rearmament, especially in the air, but this was heavily contested. In what would be the last election before World War II, that of 1935, the Labour Party opposition pictured Neville Chamberlain as a warmonger for his support of a minimal program to rebuild the country's armed forces (Shay 1977). France similarly initiated a minimal rearmament program in the 1930s, but such steps also met with substantial opposition (Kiesling 1996). It was hoped that a line of fortifications, named the Maginot Line after one of its early sponsors, would protect the country from a German invasion, but this procedure with its obvious emphasis on defense hardly inspired confidence in the smaller countries of east and southeast Europe in French willingness to come to their aid if attacked by Germany. In the United States, a small program to rebuild the navy began in the mid-1930s; but a major effort to create an air force did not start until the end of 1938, while the country waited to start putting an army together until 1940, the year it also concluded that facing dangers from across both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, it actually needed a "Two-Ocean Navy."

It was in this context of major powers unwilling and unprepared to respond forcefully to Germany's openly breaking what remained of the peace settlement's restrictions that the Nazi regime moved forward. In order to fool the British government into postponing any serious rebuilding of its navy, Hitler had his favorite diplomat, Joachim von Ribbentrop, sign a naval agreement in the summer of 1935 that he had instructed the German Navy to violate beforehand, perhaps an innovation in German diplomacy since the country in the Nazi years usually broke treaties *after* signing them. The breach over Italy's invasion of Abyssinia between the British and Italian guarantors of the 1925 Locarno settlement of the Rhineland issue suggested to Hitler that this was the time to violate that treaty by remilitarizing the Rhineland. When doing so, he promised publicly to return to the League and to arrive at a replacement treaty, but he made certain thereafter that nothing of the sort occurred.

Every effort, especially by the British government, to find a way to develop a new settlement for European security including the new Germany was carefully and deliberately sabotaged by Hitler. When a formal proposal, including concessions on colonies, had been developed by the government of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and was presented to him in March, 1938, Hitler promised a written response – but never found the time to write one. Only in the imagination of some historians was the German leader seriously interested in an agreement with London.

As German rearmament went forward, there were major and practically interminable disputes within the German civilian and military leadership about priorities in the allocation of human and material resources, but until 1938 there were no significant differences over the general direction of preparing the country for war. The ability of the country to try out its new weapons on the side of Franco in the Civil War in Spain provided a welcome opportunity to replace the one that had in the 1920s been provided – ironically enough – by the Soviet Union. From the perspective of Berlin, the longer the war in Spain lasted, the better. Enough aid would be sent to Franco to keep him from losing, but a concentration of international attention on the conflict in Spain was seen as an advantage not to be lost by more massive assistance and a quick victory of the Nationalists (Weinberg 2010, pp. 221–233, ch. 19).

If a lengthy fight inside Spain looked advantageous to the German government, the one Japan started with China in 1937 did not. German interests in China were considerable. There were German military advisors to the Chinese Nationalist government as well as substantial economic ties important for German rearmament. While this led most in the German military and diplomatic leadership to favor China, Hitler looked to Japan as a country that, like Italy, could attain much of the imperial expansion it wanted only at the expense of its World War I allies. When a serious German effort to mediate the conflict between Japan and China in the winter of 1937–1938 foundered on Japanese intransigence, Hitler ordered the German position in China abandoned in the hope of an alignment with Tokyo. There would be almost interminable difficulties in the relationship between Germany and Japan, but eventually the authorities in Tokyo would plunge their country toward disaster on the assumption that Germany would win the new war (Weinberg 2010, chs. 5, 13, 20).

A critical issue for German policy was the time pressure under which Hitler believed the country was laboring. The personal element in this was his own oft-expressed view that he was not likely to live long and hence needed to initiate the first of his wars as soon as possible. The practical element was his recognition of the likelihood that the aggressive policy of Germany would spur others to their own rearmament policy. That rearmament would necessarily involve standardization on weapons systems initiated later than those of Germany and hence possibly better than the ones put earlier into production by Germany. Furthermore, in the existing situation of the 1930s, these rearmament programs of others would have a larger economic base than Germany's. In this context of his time perspective, Germany needed to initiate the first of its planned wars just as soon as possible and then utilize the larger population and material base gained by it to move toward the big wars that were to follow. It was the latter of these elements that Hitler shared with his top military and diplomatic advisors in November of 1937. Austria and Czechoslovakia would be annexed, and bigger conflicts would necessarily come soon thereafter before the German advantage in the armaments field had been eroded (Weinberg 2010, pp. 312–318; Maiolo 2010).

At that meeting, the minister of war, Werner von Blomberg, army commander in chief, Werner von Fritsch, and the foreign minister, Constantin von Neurath, raised no questions about a possible annexation of Austria but indicated doubts about an invasion of Czechoslovakia that they thought likely to bring on a wider war. In a comprehensive reshuffling of the government and high command, Hitler in early February 1938 rid himself of all three. Foreign Minister Neurath was replaced by Ribbentrop, a change that also fit Hitler's preference for Japan rather than China since that was the view of the new foreign minister. It was no coincidence that in his February 20 speech, Hitler included the switch in German foreign policy by announcing recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo that the Japanese had established (Weinberg 1957). As for the military side, Hitler himself assumed the position of Blomberg. There would be no minister of war; instead a hard-working but totally subservient Wilhelm Keitel would be his main assistant in running the German armed forces. As new commander in chief of the army, Hitler carefully picked Walther von Brauchitsch, a general who could be described as an anatomical marvel, having no backbone whatever(!), and enabled to marry an enthusiastic Nazi wife by a special subvention from Hitler. Hitler's experience with this form of bribery may have played a role in his subsequently providing vast secret bribes to all higher German military leaders and other high officials to assure unswerving devotion (Ueberschär and Vogel 1999; Goda 2000).

The combination of the recently developed closer relationship with Italy with a new military structure inside Germany emboldened Hitler to push for the annexation of Austria. He summoned the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg to meet him in February 1938, browbeat him into concessions; and then, when the latter tried to reassert Austrian independence by announcing a plebiscite inside the country, ordered the German army to invade Austria. Schuschnigg refused to order the Austrian army to fight although the advancing German units had lots of breakdowns and other problems. Large portions of the Austrian public cheered the invaders, and masses of people in Vienna demonstrated their enthusiasm for Hitler when he arrived. The head of the Austrian Catholic church, Theodor Cardinal Innitzer, welcomed the German leader, while many Viennese citizens vented their hatred for their Jewish neighbors in violence, looting, and humiliating measures.

The domestic impact of the annexation of Austria was extremely favorable for Hitler and his regime: the German public was enthusiastic about what looked like the realization of a dream many had long held, and the Austrian gold reserve assisted a government wrestling with the costs of a vast rearmament program. In an election on April 10, 1938, of the sort that jokers at the time suggested might have its results stolen from the Ministry of Propaganda ahead of time, the population affirmed its support for the annexation and the list of nominees. This would be the last election of its type; the term of the Reichstag then elected would be extended to January 30, 1947 (Weinberg 2010, p. xii).

The international aspects of the annexation also proved favorable for the Nazi regime. Mussolini's quiet acquiescence in the absorption of Austria by Germany enormously increased Hitler's regard for him, a regard the German leader retained until the bitter end. No country was about to go to war for the independence of a people who evidently did not want it. The prospective next victim of Germany, Czechoslovakia, saw its southern border now controlled by Germany. Hungary and

Yugoslavia saw a weak Austria replaced by a strong Germany on their border. Most Austrians would only learn by seven years of being part of Germany that they might be better off in a separate country.

Although the geographical position of Germany for an invasion of Czechoslovakia was substantially improved by the annexation of Austria, Hitler's determination to attack that country provoked some resistance from within the German military. The chief of staff of the army, General Ludwig Beck, was alarmed that Germany's action would lead to a general war that the country was likely to lose. He was unable to persuade the new commander in chief, Brauchitsch, of this and resigned, becoming a key figure in the internal opposition to the regime and losing his life in the failed plot of July 20, 1944. Hitler and his more enthusiastic supporters in the military moved forward with plans to attack in the fall 1938. Influenced by the incident that had touched off World War I, Hitler contemplated arranging the assassination of the German minister to Czechoslovakia (as he had earlier mulled over an assassination of the German ambassador or military attaché in Vienna as an incident to use for invading Austria). Instead, the German minority inside Czechoslovakia – that was expected to provide the population basis for additional divisions of the German army – would be utilized in two ways. Endless propaganda about the alleged mistreatment of the minority that was probably the one best treated in Europe (unlike the worst treated one in the South Tyrol) would provide a way of discouraging the Western powers from coming to the aid of the attacked state. They were instructed in March to raise demands of the Prague government so that a deadlock would develop. Simultaneously, a group of hoodlums selected from the minority would stage a series of incidents of which Germany would utilize one as the pretext for invasion at a time of its choosing, but without risking disclosure by not letting the provocateurs know which one would be selected. It was the fact that the latter ran out of incidents before the end of the crisis that would lead the German government to adopt a different procedure when initiating war against Poland in 1939 (Weinberg 2010, ch. 24).

A further way in which Hitler hoped to keep the attack on Czechoslovakia from leading to a general war before he believed the country ready for it was the trumpeting of Germany's developing fortifications on its western border. Although warned by military advisors that the Westwall or Siegfried Line was, in fact, not adequate, the public emphasis on its alleged strength might assist – as indeed it did – in restraining any thoughts in France of coming to the aid of the country's Czechoslovak ally (Weinberg 1978, pp. 24–40).

The reaction of the government of Czechoslovakia was to try to defuse the situation by concessions to the demands of the German minority, referred to as the Sudeten Germans after a mountain chain along the border. When in May there appeared to be signs of an imminent German attack, the country moved to a partial mobilization, but otherwise tried to remain calm in the face of provocations. In August, Prague offered very extensive concessions, but by that time the issue was moving out of Czechoslovakia's control.

By July, the government of France had decided that it could and would not fight for Czechoslovakia over the issue of the Sudeten Germans, and so informed the Prague government secretly, a move that contributed to the willingness of the latter to make concessions (Weinberg 2010, pp. 587–588). When asked by the British how they would act to rescue Czechoslovakia if it came to war, the French military

explained that since they did not see their way to assaulting the German fortifications in the west or striking at Italy – which they assumed would join Germany – in the Alps, they intended to invade Libya from Tunisia (p. 545). This approach to the military situation did not encourage the authorities in London.

The British government had seen all its efforts to find a new European settlement that included Germany and maintained the independence of the latter's neighbors thwarted by Germany. The emphasis on the issue of the Sudeten Germans by Berlin led the Chamberlain government to pressure Czechoslovakia to make maximum concessions. Although Winston Churchill in public attacked the government, in private he assured the Czechs that if he were in office, he would follow the same policy (Kral 1968, p. 144).

An important factor in the London government's approach was the messages they were receiving from the governments of the Dominions of Canada, the Union of South Africa, and Australia that they would not join England in war over the Sudeten question. In this context, Chamberlain decided to try to save the situation by flying to see Hitler to work out a way to avoid another general war (Weinberg 2010, chap 25). Hitler was surprised but felt unable to refuse to meet the British Prime Minister. When they met at Berchtesgaden, Hitler insisted on the annexation of those parts of Czechoslovakia inhabited largely by Germans, a demand he assumed would not be met and could thus provide the excuse he wanted to go to war under circumstances in which the German home front would be united while France and Britain might stand aside. He was not concerned about the Soviet Union, which had no common border with Czechoslovakia and was in the process of decapitating its military.

When, to Hitler's astonishment, Chamberlain obtained the agreement of the Prague government to the demand for territorial cession as the British leader told him when they met again at Bad Godesberg, he quickly raised his demands so that he could still turn to military action. This revelation of Germany's real aim quickly brought about a double reversal in the international situation. In the first place, the London government now shifted to a willingness to go to war and expected the French government to go along, however reluctantly. Simultaneously, Hitler decided not to go to war after all. Several factors influenced his abrupt change. After his May visit to Rome, he felt confident that Mussolini would lead Italy into war on Germany's side. He now learned that the Italian dictator was unwilling to take his country, still engaged massively in Spain and unprepared for a wider conflict, into war but instead urged a conference to settle the issue peacefully. Hitler was also influenced by signs that the German public was not enthusiastic about a new war that appeared likely to be general and by advice from some of his political and military advisors that war at this time was not the best idea. He now reluctantly agreed to a conference at which Germany's ostensible demands rather than its real aims would be met.

At Munich on September 29, 1938, the leaders of Germany, Italy, Britain, and France met and signed an agreement that imposed on Czechoslovakia the cession of the borderlands inhabited predominantly by people of German cultural background. There was worldwide relief at the avoidance of another world war that had looked – quite correctly – as about to break out. The agreement appeared to be a great and bloodless victory for Germany and a terrible loss of territory for Czechoslovakia since most of the country's fortifications were there, along with a blot on the reputation of Britain and France. Since the Germans were determined to break the agreement and

occupy the now defenseless Czechoslovakia anyway – as they did in March 1939 – the actual impact would be different. Having agreed under pressure to cede the territory, Czechoslovakia would receive it back at the end of the war with Allied agreement to the expulsion of its German inhabitants. The slogan of the Sudeten Germans had been “Heim ins Reich,” home into the Reich. They would get their wish, but not the way they had anticipated.

In the weeks after the Munich agreement, Hitler greatly regretted having called off the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He blamed others in the German military and civilian leadership for what he considered their cowardice, when it was he himself who had drawn back rather than put their dire predictions to the test. He determined never to make a similar mistake again. His “lesson of Munich” was under no circumstances to draw back again, and the moves of Germany that produced war in 1939 were largely framed by his determination not to be trapped into negotiations again. Plans for the destruction of Czechoslovakia were ordered immediately after the Munich conference and would be implemented in March 1939. In the meantime, other measures went forward to make certain that war would come that year.

In the winter of 1938, Hitler made his intention clear to others in the German government and media that war would be started in 1939. At a gathering of representatives of German newspapers on November 10, 1938, he deplored the extent to which the German public had believed the regime’s protestations of peaceful intentions that had been designed to fool the outside world while Germany prepared for war. The obvious relief of so many at the peaceful resolution of the Munich crisis – a relief publicly demonstrated by the masses of Germans who had cheered Chamberlain – had to be countered by a propaganda effort to lead the German public to call for war. This would be the major mission of the press in the coming months (Treue 1958).

The other major domestic action taken at the same time as instructing the press to raise public enthusiasm for war was a great anti-Jewish pogrom ordered by Hitler on November 9 and implemented in the following days. The political assassination of the leader of the National Socialist Party in Switzerland by a Jew in 1936 had been met by instructions to government and party agencies to refrain from anti-Jewish acts, and was instead marked by naming a German Labor Front cruise ship for the victim (Kropat 1997, p. 9). The shooting of a junior diplomat in the German embassy in Paris in what was essentially a private quarrel was utilized for a nationwide pogrom against the country’s remaining Jewish population. Synagogues were burned or smashed, stores and apartments looted, a huge fine levied, Jewish children expelled from schools and other restrictions imposed. Most important from the regime’s point of view was the deportation to concentration camps of over thirty thousand Jewish men who would be released when accepted for immigration into another country. There was massive Nazi Party and popular participation in the pogrom that marked a stage in the persecution of Jews looking toward what became known as the Holocaust synchronized with the move toward war (Steinweis 2009).

From Hitler’s perspective, war against the Western powers in 1939 presupposed a quiet situation on Germany’s eastern borders. In the winter of 1938–1939, German diplomacy was directed toward assuring this. Of the three countries along the border, German diplomacy succeeded with Hungary and Lithuania but failed with Poland (Weinberg 2010, ch. 26). Rewarded with the easternmost portion of Czechoslovakia

when Germany occupied most of it in March, 1939, Hungary moved firmly into the German camp. There had been signs of this earlier, but Hitler always retained some suspicion of the Hungarian government because of its reluctance to go to war on Germany's side in the 1938 crisis. Lithuania was never in a position to challenge the Third Reich and ceded to it the Memel territory it had acquired through the 1919 peace treaty.

German-Polish relations were supposedly governed by a nonaggression pact, but Hitler wanted certainty that Poland would not intervene when Germany fought France and Britain. This meant not merely that Poland would have to make specific practical concessions but would signify subordination by joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Polish government was willing to make concessions to Germany in serious negotiations on specific issues, including a partition of the Free City of Danzig that would give Germany the city itself and most of the population and land (Weinberg 1995, ch. 9). The leaders of the revived independent Poland were certainly anti-Communist but would not subordinate independence to anyone. If necessary, they would fight even in a hopeless situation rather than sign away independence the way the Czechs had done after making all the specific concessions Germany had demanded.

It was under these circumstances that Hitler decided, in January 1939, that Poland had to be attacked first, whether or not any other country came to its aid. He hoped none would, but he wanted to crush Poland before turning to the attack on France and Britain. As he explained to his military leaders, an isolated campaign against Poland was preferable, but if the Western powers intervened, that would not affect basic policy. Since he set the invasion of Poland for the fall, a winter would intervene before there was serious fighting in the west (Weinberg 2010, chs. 27–28). To make certain that he would not be trapped again in negotiations as had happened, he believed, in 1938, there would be no negotiations with Poland in the summer of 1939. Instead there would be endless propaganda about the awful way the Poles treated the German minority, and the incidents to excuse invasion would be arranged to occur *inside* Germany by the German police with the corpses of concentration camp inmates dressed in Polish uniforms to prove war was Poland's fault (Runzheimer 1962).

During the same months that Hitler decided that no one was going to cheat him of war this time, the British and French changed their policy. As they recognized in the winter that the cession of Czechoslovak territory was not Germany's last demand as Hitler had proclaimed, rumors of a German strike at the Low Countries brought agreement that the next time Germany attacked any country that defended itself, they would come to its assistance. The German seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, hardened this resolve: whether in western Europe or in eastern Europe, a German move would be resisted. Guarantees were given publicly to Poland and Romania, and efforts were made to bring the Soviet Union into an arrangement that would offer defense to victims of German aggression. Lengthy negotiations carried out largely in public led nowhere since the Soviet Union was secretly negotiating with the Germans for the opposite result: the carving up of Poland and other countries of eastern Europe.

During the 1930s, Soviet leader Josef Stalin had repeatedly sounded out the German government about a return to good relations, but Hitler invariably waved off any such arrangements. The Soviet Union had no common border with either Austria

or Czechoslovakia and hence was, in his view, of no possible help in his plans to annex both. The situation, as he decided to attack Poland, was different. From his point of view, if the Soviets would join in the destruction of Poland – with which they had a very long border – that would not only hasten that campaign but also provide a common border across which shipments from the Soviet Union itself or from other states could reach a Germany that the Western powers thus could not effectively subject to a blockade. An agreement with the Soviet Union might even discourage them from aiding Poland, but in any case, there would not be a blockade as he fought them either at the same time as Poland or in the following year. Since he assumed that after victory in the west his forces would quickly crush the Soviet Union, whatever was conceded to Stalin now would be quickly retaken when the time came.

Once it became clear to both sides in tentative contacts during the summer of 1939 that each was interested in an agreement that would divide eastern Europe between them, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to work out the details. His instructions allowed him to grant, essentially, anything that Stalin might demand and even include possible concessions that Stalin did not think to ask for. Since the Germans were going to seize it all later, from their perspective it made little difference what was yielded to Stalin as long as he was willing to help Germany crush Poland and defeat its enemies in the west before it became his turn to fall to German might.

During the summer of 1939, accordingly, there were no negotiations between Germany and Poland. The Germans prepared to attack that country and organized the incidents designed as an excuse, this time inside Germany. Mussolini was not at all interested in a war that he expected would be general; in fact he believed he had received German assurances that there would be several more years for him to prepare Italy. The Japanese were concentrating on their war with China and concerned about their relations with the Soviet Union that had involved border hostilities the year before and did again in 1939. Hence, a war with the Western powers was not on their current agenda. The British tried to discourage Germany from war by emphasizing that they would indeed enter the war if Germany attacked Poland. For the first time in peacetime, the British parliament voted for conscription with all Labour and Liberal Party members opposing the building up of an army. Furthermore, the attitude of the governments in the Dominions was moving in the same direction as that in London: Germany was going too far, and if it came to war, it would not be about alleged mistreatment of German minorities but about Germany's determination for domination at least of Europe and most likely of the world. There was a lesser but still significant hardening of attitudes in France.

In the last days of August 1939, there was some agitated diplomatic activity, but the clearest indication of what was afoot was the removal of German ambassadors from London, Paris, and Warsaw in the last days of peace – an indication of Hitler's fear that at the last moment some "Sauker!" (perhaps the equivalent of SOB) might push for compromise and peace. He used this expression when orienting his military leaders on August 22 about the forthcoming war and its nature as one of annihilation rather than the mere shifting of boundaries. In those final days, Hitler did put off the invasion for a few days but then did not utilize the last day that he had told the army chief of staff was available. War sooner rather than later was his view; and to assure a united home front, he prepared what looked like moderate demands on Poland that he could publish after declaring them lapsed.

Germany opened hostilities with a terror bombing attack on an undefended Polish community early on the morning of September 1 (Böhler et al. 2005). On Germany's refusal of a British demand to end hostilities, Britain and France declared war on Germany, followed by Canada, Australia and New Zealand with the Union of South Africa doing so a bit later while Eire remained neutral. The Soviet Union would join in the attack on Poland two weeks later after arriving at a truce with Japan, while the latter and Italy waited to see how the war would go before committing themselves. The American government had formally asked the belligerents to refrain from bombing civilian targets and was answered by a German bomb dropped on its Warsaw embassy grounds. The world was again involved in a war that would spread to most countries on the globe.

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CHAPTER TWO

The Versailles Peace Settlement and the Collective Security System

FRÉDÉRIC DESSBERG

At the end of the Paris Peace Conference, the Treaty of Versailles was signed between Germany and the victorious powers on June 28, 1919. Thus ended World War I. Other treaties were to be signed with the allies of Germany – Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire – in the following months but the Versailles treaty was regarded as the most important. It aimed to prevent any new conflict of the scale of the Great War. The peace was, from the start, as much an object of severe criticism among the defeated countries as it was among the victors. The two main criticisms against the Versailles treaty and its negotiators followed, on the one hand, that of John Maynard Keynes and, on the other hand, that of Jacques Bainville. The first arose mainly from Great Britain and the United States. It was based on the idea that Germany – an economic engine – was likely to be too weakened to conduct its own future that an economic recovery of Europe would be impossible. The second type of criticism, which especially took into account the French’ needs for security, concluded that the treaty left Germany as an intact and, thus, still dangerous power. According to this view, peace could only endure with extreme difficulty. From the start, Marshal Ferdinand Foch spoke of a twenty-years peace, and a few years after him, Édouard Herriot, the President of the *Parti radical*, envisaged a new war with Germany within fifteen years. It is thus not surprising that historians tried to find a link between the two world wars and that recent scholarship has paid much attention to the question of the impact of the Versailles peace settlement.

Scholars put forth the question: was World War II a prolongation or an inevitable consequence of the Great War? Historian A. J. P. Taylor (1961) asked the question in *The Origins of the Second World War*. He gave an affirmative answer for the “prolongation” school of thought while considering that the German problem had not been solved in 1919 and in the twenty following years: “If this were settled,

everything would be settled; if it remained unsolved, Europe would not know peace” (p. 40). This issue appeared again nearly forty years later. In *Pourquoi la 2^e Guerre Mondiale?*, the French historian Pierre Grosser (1999) reminded readers that from 1948, Winston Churchill proposed to include World War I and World War II in only one continuous “Thirty Years War” (p. 23). In France, Charles de Gaulle and Raymond Aron also shared this idea. In *Turbulente Europe et Nouveaux Mondes*, Girault and Frank (2004) recalled several assumptions that made the Versailles system responsible for the outbreak of World War II. One of them posited that the Treaty of Versailles was one of the main causes that led to the war, before it was partly dismantled beginning in 1931 and altogether shattered by 1935. Another assumption focused on the worldwide crisis and on Nazism. A third one claimed that the new order that replaced the European system of the postwar period – from 1919 to 1924 – itself was destroyed in turn in the 1930s. The mainly British, American and French historiography which will be studied here thus takes into account not only the new established world order after the Great War and its enforcement but also the evolution of international policy in the 1920s.

The 1919–1920 treaties were the object of renewed interest since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of Europe into Western and Communist blocs. The “realist” historiography denounced the Versailles treaty and its enforcement for a long time, but the perception changed toward the peace treaty. Most historians agree today that the Versailles peace settlement, if not a positive development, at least had a much more moderate effect than previously thought. For example, as in the culmination of several decades of new interpretations, Georges-Henri Soutou (2007) thought in *L'Europe de 1815 à nos jours* that the treaty could not have differed from its original form, and, especially, that it allowed for various orientations to deal with the future behavior of Germany. He wrote

The treaty was nevertheless more flexible than it has been said: it authorized a hard policy towards Germany, but also a more flexible policy; the Locarno agreements and the anticipated evacuation of the Rhineland in 1930 testify some. All misfortunes of the 1930s are not the consequence of the treaty. (Soutou 2007, p. 85)

In her detailed study of the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, *Peacemakers*, Margaret MacMillan (2001) underlined the role of the chief negotiators – Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson – and the responsibility which fell on them. But she tended to minimize the weight of the consequences of the treaties. She recalled that it became commonplace to affirm that the 1919 agreements were a failure and that they led straight to World War II but that it was probably an “over-estimation of their impact.” She then concluded that Hitler did not cause the war “because” of the Versailles treaty, although its existence was a godsend for his propaganda.

This argument was very much present in the collective work, *The Treaty of Versailles: a Reassessment after 75 Years* (Boemcke, Feldman, and Glaser 1998). The authors agreed to consider that in spite of multiple constraints and a particularly precarious context, the negotiators managed in a pragmatic way to mitigate the most urgent problems by certain compromises, particularly between the victorious powers. Not only did the Versailles peace maintain a durable tension between the victorious states on the one

hand, and the defeated and revisionist states (Germany, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and even the dissatisfied Italy) on the other hand, but it still caused rancor among the victors. In *Politics and Diplomacy of Peace Making*, Arno J. Mayer (1967) explained a part of the difficulties in the elaboration and the enforcement of the treaties by showing the influence of the internal policies and resistance to them. At the same time, French historians followed Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle by taking account of the *forces profondes* in the study of international relations. Many historians, among them Ruth Henig (1995), emphasized the strength of popular feeling, particularly in France, and its influence on the elaboration of the Versailles peace settlement.

Because the Versailles peace failed to set up a stable world order, the main initiator of this new system, Woodrow Wilson, was long the target of the most severe criticism. Scholarship has traditionally granted a very important place to the influence of Wilsonianism on the peace settlement and, consequently, on the failures of the interwar period. Under the aegis of the US president, the new system attempted to put an end to secret diplomacy, to give rise to a democratic international framework founded on national self-determination, and to favor open and competitive trade. It was also supposed to ensure peace, through collective security and disarmament.

As a “realist” statesman and historian, Henry Kissinger (1994) severely criticized Wilson’s principles. Proclaiming himself a “realist” too, historian Ambrosius (2002) was also critical toward the “idealistic” vision of Wilson in the international questions. In his introduction to *Wilsonianism*, Ambrosius affirmed: “This lack of realism characterized Wilson’s peacemaking. It thwarted his ability to reconcile or even comprehend the competing claims of the Allies at Paris or the Germans at Versailles. It also prevented the democratic president from compromising with republican senators during the treaty fight at home.” He attacked, therefore, Wilsonian doctrines, as Kennedy (2009) did in *The Will to Believe*: “President Wilson’s vision for a new world order included another problematic element: the notion that spreading democracy would contribute to the efficacy of collective security and thus to a lasting peace” (p. 222).

Wilson tried to deflect the criticisms which were directed against the Treaty of Versailles: the fact that the rights of people to self-determination have been held up to ridicule, that the peace imposed on Germany was much too severe, and that the treaty planted the seeds of future conflicts. But the concept of national self-determination was underlined by Thomas J. Knock (1992) as being, in Wilson’s mind, the right of each nation to choose its political regime freely, even if the American president extended it into the international arena. In fact, it was a question of justifying the appearance of new states on the debris of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. In *The Wilsonian Moment*, Manela (2009) pointed out “that a durable peace required government rule by popular consent appeared to pose a direct challenge to the imperial arrangements that spanned much of the world at the time” (p. 24). The “Eurocentric shortsightedness” of the negotiators at Versailles has been recently denounced by Andelman (2008) in *A Shattered Peace* for the consequences that they caused, even until today. “Those who were ignored and disdained at Versailles, for whatever multitude of reasons, were those whose heirs and descendants would return and wreak to their vengeance on us all” (p. 3). This remark seems to derive from recent concerns about the frustration felt by peoples of central Europe, Asia, and Middle East, which look likely to direct the historians toward a new line of research.

Historians have now turned from the charge of Wilson's leniency toward Germany to the issue of French concerns about safety. Ross Kennedy (2009) recently pointed out that the will of the US president to alleviate conflicts with Lloyd George, and especially with Clemenceau, as well as his desire to punish Germany, pushed him with certain rigor toward the Weimar Republic: "The president had ... produced a treaty clearly designed in large measure to contain and hurt Germany, a treaty that most Germans saw as an instrument of oppression" (p. 197).

Besides, Boemecke, Feldman, and Glaser (1998) pointed out, it was precisely in Germany that the figure of Wilson was most badly tarnished for a long time. However, in this work, which marked a crucial step in the new approach to the Versailles treaty, William K. Keylor clearly refuted the qualification of "Carthaginian peace," which John M. Keynes had spread, because it "compared not only with the fate of the ancient Carthage itself but more recently with the brutal treatment of defeated Germany at the end of the World War II in the form of both territorial amputations and reparations" (p. 505).

The question of the peace settlement is closely related to that of attributing responsibility for the outbreak of the World War II. This debate related to the impact of Article 231 of the Versailles treaty, which affirmed the moral responsibility for Germany in instigating the world war. This provision particularly shocked German public opinion and it contributed largely to the reputation of "Diktat" of the treaty. It established the basis of German revisionism, and then Nazi propaganda. This "prove" of the intransigence of the Allies occurred after the myth of the "stab in the back" started spreading in Germany, stemming from nationalist and conservative military circles. This thesis stated that at the time of the armistice, the German Army had not been overcome by the Allies, and it even would have won if not for the betrayal of the German civil government (Jardin 2005).

Taylor (1961) considered that the Treaty of Versailles and, in particular, Article 231 led to World War II. This assertion has been contradicted in the book edited by Martel (1999), *The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered*. Marks (2003) denounced the "myth of the alleged unilateral responsibility" (p. 19) of Germany, after having recalled that Article 231 had been adopted on the initiative of the United States in order to reduce the obligation of Germany to pay the whole of the war reparations. The important thing was that Lloyd George and Clemenceau could justify the compensation to their nations' publics.

In *The Great Disorder*, devoted to the phenomenon of inflation in Germany during the 1920s, Gerald Feldman (1993) considered that the perception of Article 231 – of which opinions and presentation were more serious than its reality – contributed to destabilize the Weimar regime and to ruin the chances of the integration of Germany into the new European system. Some "realist" historians, such as Sally Marks and Stephen Schuker, indicated their conviction that Germany was really able to pay the amount of the reparations which was initially fixed in 1921 (Martel 1999). But this debate is not yet resolved among the historians.

Anyhow, the criticism of the clauses concerning reparations was used to support the arguments of the revisionists in Germany and in Great Britain as well. In *The Lights That Failed*, Zara Steiner (2005) noted that "the German opponents of reparations won a delayed victory. The reverberations of Keynes's arguments were still to be heard after Hitler took power. They are still heard today" (p. 67). She also added

more generally that “the Treaty of Versailles was unquestionably flawed, but the treaty in itself did not shatter the peace that it established” (p. 67).

Generally speaking, the scholarship agrees today that if peace were not inevitably possible, it was not “Carthaginian” either. The best proof is that during the establishment of the frontiers in Europe, Germany remained a power in spite of the amputations of its territory and the constraints that compelled its disarmament. This was the principal criticism of Jacques Bainville, for whom the Treaty of Versailles is an ideological peace and, by sparing German power, was “too gentle for what is in it that is harsh.” Stevenson (1998a) dismissed this approach while considering that the treaty had destroyed Germany’s capacity to effect harm (p. 107). According to him, the failure thus did not take place in 1919, at the time when German disarmament was effective, but fifteen years later, when the clauses of Versailles had lost force. Stevenson (1998b) furthermore indicated that “Bainville was wrong and the Versailles treaty did contain enough to prevent another war in Europe, but not if the task were left to France alone” (p. 25). Even as Germany had not been allowed to carry out actual negotiations it is doubtful that it would have accepted a different treaty in 1919. Pierre Grosser summarized the current historical tendency while indicating that “it is thus less the treaty itself than the non-resolution of the problems of prewar period and the international situation resulting from war which are accused to explain the disorders which followed it” (pp. 40–41).

Uppermost among these questions were the fate of Germany. Admittedly, especially for the populations who spoke the German language and, more generally, for the defeated countries, self-determination was not appreciated. This point was in apparent contradiction with Wilson’s doctrines but William Keylor justified it when he pointed out that Wilson was rather more favorable to autonomy than to independence for the Central European nationalities. Ambrosius argued the same. For him, “Wilson did not promise that postwar Germany should include all Germans” (Baechler and Fink 1996). Wilson, like Clemenceau, believed in the nation-state and thus both opposed dismembering Germany. For all that, the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not a consequence of the initial intentions of the negotiators at Versailles. On the contrary, the diplomats were presented with a *fait accompli*. This consideration seems to close a debate which started up again twenty years ago, following the 1989 “velvet revolutions” in central Europe.

As at the beginning of the Versailles era, the Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed with Austria, and the Treaty of Trianon, signed with Hungary, have been the object of criticisms because the disappearance of the old empire reinforced Germany’s power *de facto* and it especially endangered the European balance of power. In *Requiem pour un Empire défunt*, Fejtő (1988) spelled out his conviction that the collapse of the Habsburg Empire was a product of an ideological plot by Clemenceau and Wilson, as well as the Czech personalities Masaryk and Beneš. He blamed “republican and left-wing France, missionary of freethinking and progress” (p. 308). On the contrary, Bernard Michel (1991) defended the thesis of the inescapable failure of Austria-Hungary. In his biography of Masaryk, Soubigou (2002) estimated that Wilson lined up belatedly – but not before the middle of 1918 – behind the idea of a status quo for Austria “which did not seem to want to democratize itself” (p. 249). Carlier and Soutou (2001) also defended the idea that the disappearance of the empire was inevitable “since the war had been prolonged beyond the autumn of 1917, ultimate limit after which a

peace of compromise was not possible any more” (p. 307), while they considered regrettable that the fall of the empire destroyed the European concert and endangered the balance of power on the continent.

In English-language countries, the debate also divided the historians. The battle over the ineluctability of the fall of the Habsburg Empire was fought in particular by Alan Sked (2001), against Wank (1998). One should note, however, that Cornwall (2000) and Healy (2004) put forward the thesis that internal problems and the consequences of the Austrian defeats, as well as the consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, explained the collapse of the Habsburg Empire.

The Versailles peace settlement had not been able to prevent World War II. For this reason, the keystone of the system was called into question: the League of Nations has been considered an “imperfect instrument of regulation of the international system” (Soutou 2007). The League had been presented in Wilson’s Fourteen Points address and it remained his priority. Its implementation required of him some sacrifices and compromises toward his allies so that the system could operate. In *After Victory*, Ikenberry (2001) explained the US president’s objective: “The League of Nations, in Wilson’s view, was a vehicle to lock European states into a new type of order. It was the key to the entire settlement: an institution that would ensure peaceful settlements of disputes and reinforce democratic government” (p. 139). The American influence in the League helped to alleviate definitively the European situation through the real political integration of Germany into Europe.

Scholarship naturally sought to seize on the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations. After having enumerated all the flaws of the incipient international organization in *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Hinsley 1963) – such as the rule of unanimity, the absence of the United States, Germany, and Russia, and other factors – Hinsley insisted on long lasting reasons which found their roots in the European history, namely that “the League remained as it began: a League of governments and not of peoples” and that “clearly, for example, it could not be a federation” (pp. 311–312).

Ever since, the weak points of the League have always been analyzed as partly explaining the failure of Wilsonianism but its positive aspects were also put forward. Among the principal weak points of the League, French historiography tends to favor a crucial factor: the British refusal of an international armed force recommended by Léon Bourgeois (Gerbet 1996; Réau 2007) as well as the rule of unanimity appearing in an article of the Covenant of the League (Soutou 2007). Néré (2002) also considered, in *The Foreign Policy of France*, that the clause of revision – which was planned in Article 19 – “condemned Europe to a troubled future” (p. 24). This author found a contradiction with the role of the League aimed at maintaining the territorial integrity and the independence of the states and, in particular, at ensuring the respect of the borders. It is possible to consider that this approach took into account the French concern with security at the time. In *Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson*, Cooper (2008) answered this reproach by estimating that the US president wanted the League to be flexible.

The role of states was finally regarded as the principal disruptive element of the Versailles system and that of the collective security which was then in outline form. In *Quel ordre européen?* Sylvain Schirmann (2006) went against the “realistic” criticism generally leveled against the League, while pointing, as a consequence of the American desertion, to the regionalization of the League, a “European more than world” organization which had the appearance of “a club of the victors.” “Should it consequently be

astonishing,” he asked, “that it primarily deals with European questions, that it adopts an attitude of conservation of the order the 1919–1920 treaties had established and that it thinks of organizing Europe on the basis of political and economic liberalism?” (p. 61).

In fact, the Council of the League of Nations had become grounds for rivalry between the powers, especially between the French and the British. Thus, Sharp and Stone (2000) announced in their introductory chapter to *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century* that “their rival conceptions and approaches to the League helped to undermine its effectiveness and credibility whilst the very existence of the League itself undermined their own attempts to deal with postwar problems by more traditional methods” (p. 4). But Ruth Henig considered that the opposition between the old and the new diplomacy was not inevitably justified within the framework of the League of Nations (Henig 2001). Zara Steiner (2001) emphasized the fact that the League “was not, and was never intended to be, a supranational body but one that tried to bridge the gap between sovereign states and a functioning international order” (p. 30). Peace could be safeguarded only if Paris and London supported it. The year 1939 thus did not mark the failure of the League of Nations but a setback of traditional diplomacy, “with the return to alliances and bi-lateral diplomacy” (p. 30).

In *1918–1925: Comment faire la paix?* Carlier and Soutou (2001) underlined that the 1919–1920 treaties did not fit well with Wilsonian principles but they emerged mainly from the model of the former Concert of Europe. Thus, the prohibition of *Anschluss* aimed at not reinforcing Germany. The establishment of the borders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania was often the result of French strategic concerns. Another example was that the Allies imposed a treaty of protection of national minorities in the new states (p. 308).

The situation remained chaotic at the time of the elaboration of the peace treaties and of the setting of the borders in central Europe. It could only influence the decisions of the Allies and in particular the attitude of France: Paris was anxious to build an “Eastern barrier” of the new states between Germany and Russia. The situation in central Europe was complex and fragile and it is not pointless to recall that the states that succeeded the Habsburg Empire did not survive twenty years in the new European order. For Wandycz (1992; see also Aleksiu et al. 2004), the main responsibility for this failure must be related to gaps in the international order which did not guarantee security. The quarrels about the borders resulted in increasing the bitterness between the populations of the Central European area and between the states.

World War II began in central Europe. The 1938 Munich episode immediately referred to the birth of Czechoslovakia, of which the borders were disputed by its neighbors. It was a “heterogeneous state, with very strong minorities, and militarily difficult to defend because of its stretching,” as Antoine Marès (2009) indicated, of a country which he described as a “seismograph of the European history.” At the time of the negotiations on central Europe, many contradictions came into play between the Allies. Erik Goldstein (1991) synthesized them:

The Americans were entranced by the “scientific principles” of president Wilson ... The French ... were already concerned with laying the foundations for an alliance system in Eastern Europe ... Italy ... calculated its moves according to ... its various irredentist claims ... For Britain ... there was some continuity with the concepts of the Congress of Vienna.” (p. 242)

Historians, however, also insisted on the fact that the new states of central Europe bore a considerable share of responsibility, particularly because of the attitude “which was not without reproach” of the Romanian or Czechoslovakian central powers, for example, toward their national minorities (Grosser 1999). Girault and Frank (2004) estimated that nationalism was generally reinforced after the war in central Europe. Except for Czechoslovakia, this nationalism was “conservative, militarist, antiparliamentary and anticommunist” (p. 135). Wynot (1999) shares this opinion. He noted in *Caldron of Conflict* that “the political map of Eastern Europe may have changed but the attitudes and behaviour patterns of its inhabitants not only remained intact but ... were often even more inflammatory than before World War I” (p. 25).

A policy of armed takeover could thus prevail for the settlement of the frontier conflicts, as was the case between Poland and Lithuania since September 1920, when Polish troops occupied Vilnius. In this case, the League of Nations had been presented with a *fait accompli*, in particular because of the divergent positions of the French and British. But the League of Nations was sometimes able to settle disagreements in central Europe. This happened when the Council decided on the partition of Upper Silesia between German and Polish populations, after the riots which followed the 1921 plebiscite. It was during this success of the League of Nations when the French, who supported the Poles, and the British, favoring the Germans, found a solution apart from the limit of the bilateral framework. This question deserves more detail in general than that of the different plebiscites provided by the Versailles treaty which implicated German populations. It is important to add too that even if the League of Nations often had to accept several armed takeovers in Central and Eastern Europe – such as in Vilnius or Memel – its actions were sometimes successful in the enforcement of the peace treaties. In particular, Raphaële Ulrich-Pier (2006) estimated that the “Ambassadors Conference ... contributed thus to shape the new face of the interwar period Europe” (p. 73).

The evolution of the revolutionary situation in Russia and the threat of expansion of the communist movement, especially at the moment when the peace treaties were in preparation, were other big factors in this context. The idea prevailed for a long time that the fear of a revolutionary danger had pushed the negotiators of Versailles to spare Germany. Recent historiography stressed the question of Russia, particularly with regard to the role of Wilson. For Fogelson (1995), Wilson’s decision to send a task force into Russia was due to the concern of preventing the German Army from taking advantage in Russia and to help the Czech troops in Russia, but also due to the will to undermine Bolshevik power. He thus broke with an older historiography which distinguished between the two objectives. In fact, Wilson certainly had the same objectives as his European partners: to act simultaneously against Germany and Soviet Russia.

The question of the Franco-British rivalry in connection with Russia is also the subject of recent research. Carley (1983) already raised this question. Unlike Debo (1992), Watson’s (2000) opinion was that one should not give too much importance to this subject. However, he noticed that in 1919–1920, “war-time cooperation degenerated into mutual rivalry and suspicion” (p. 91) even if it ceased because of the defeat of the White troops in Russia. But, according to Keith Nelson (2006), the Soviet Union was marginal to British interests at this point. The position of Great Britain, at the same time, diverged regarding Poland, which was then at war against

Russia. The debate related to the help for Marshal Piłsudski and to disagreement between the Allies, which showed that the Franco-British rivalry also related to central Europe. Adamthwaite (1995) considered in *Grandeur and Misery* that after 1918, “dissension was simply the fact that Germany’s defeat and Russia’s eclipse made London and Paris once again leading contenders for international influence” (p. 73). But the fact remains that, especially for France, Germany and Soviet Russia were still thought of as clear and immediate threats.

The question of the safety of France, vis-à-vis the possibility of German revenge, lay at the heart of the negotiations between the Allies and it prompted Clemenceau to oppose his interlocutors. After having initially supported the arguments of Foch and President Poincaré for the creation of an autonomous buffer state in the Rhineland, Clemenceau reached a compromise with Wilson and Lloyd George, namely a temporary occupation, against the promise of the signature of guarantee treaties. The question arose of whether Clemenceau had sacrificed French safety against an illusory guarantee, insofar as the pacts were not signed because the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. For a long time, French historiography was concerned with the justification of the French policy of security. However, in the biography that he devoted to him, *Clemenceau*, Duroselle (1988) recalled that the “Tiger” was confident in Article 429 of the treaty, which provided the possibility to prolong the occupation or to occupy again the evacuated area if Germany failed to keep its promises, which included the payment of war reparations. “If it were well used,” Duroselle wrote, “such an article could allow this perpetual occupation of which Clemenceau had dreamed” (p. 753). Georges-Henri Soutou added that Clemenceau was convinced that the continuation of the war-period alliance between the three Western democracies, which made necessary the French renunciation to the “natural boundaries policy,” was a pillar for French safety. “That is why he was convinced that the peace should be not only victorious but also just” (Boemecke, Feldman, and Glaser 1998, p. 171).

In *France and Britain, 1900–1940: Entente and Estrangement*, Bell (1996) considered that the US Senate had little chance to accept the guarantee treaty. He supports the idea of the French priority for security on the Rhine and accepted the arguments of the French opponents against the guarantee pact. At the same time, he believed Lloyd George guilty of duplicity when, at the last moment, he had inserted the preliminary American ratification of the treaty as a condition to a British signature. Bell thus considered that Clemenceau had fallen into the British trap: “The proposed guarantee thus appeared a mere trick ... Worse, the whole idea was probably baseless from start to finish” (p. 121). On the other hand, according to Lentin (2000), the American Senate’s refusal to ratify the guarantee treaty, which Wilson had signed on June 28, 1919, placed France in a difficult situation, but the fault did not fall on Clemenceau who “chose wisely” (p. 115).

William Keylor (1995) refuted the idea according to which the guarantee pact was a “vague promise” on the part of Wilson. According to him, even the American senators who were hostile to the participation of the United States in the League of Nations were completely disposed to support the guarantee pact, which they regarded as “an appropriate instrument for preventing another European war” (p. 69). Wilson’s failure to obtain the ratification of the Versailles treaty thus caused the abandonment of the pact. This point of view was also expressed by Lundestad (1999). He estimated

that the Senate was all the more ready to accept the guarantee pact that “was to act as a deterrent against German revanchism; it did not require the United States to furnish either men or money to back it up” (p. 55). Lundestad also insisted on the fact that Lloyd George’s attitude of subordinating the British guarantee to the American one was justified by the desire to obtain an American guarantee for both European allies. It remains that this failure for French security poisoned the relations between Paris and London. The recent historiography has privileged this aspect of the negotiations in the study of the opposition between the French geopolitical obsession of continental safety and the British will to prevent any hegemony in Europe.

The policy of the *Bloc national* French government aimed to force Germany to strictly enforce the clauses of the Versailles treaty in order to obtain the payment of war reparations and the effective disarmament of Germany. In that, this policy was opposed to the British one. London was concerned about overly weakening Germany which could be prejudicial to the payment of reparations and, more significantly, undermine European recovery. It was also a question for London of avoiding a French hegemony on the continent. Recent historiography brought notable corrective measures to the evaluation of the French policy. First of all, Marc Trachtenberg (1980) indicated that the payment of reparations was not the main aim for the French government, in spite of the destruction the country had suffered. It is true that this question was related to that of French security. French intransigence was reexamined and minimized. For instance, Sharp (2008) considered in *The Versailles Settlement* that “French policy was more subtly motivated and flexible than the cartoon caricature of a large Frenchman demanding money with menaces from a destitute German child” (p. 83). Until mid-1922, Poincaré, the president of the French Cabinet, was still well disposed to a reduction of the amount of reparations against specific British military guarantees. But he was not in the same mood at the end of the year, when he intended to ensure security “by other means,” according to Henig (2000) who noted Poincaré’s firm intransigence.

In his biography *Raymond Poincaré*, Keiger (1996) showed that the president of the French Cabinet was in fact much more flexible than his reputation deserves. As for Roth (2000), another of his biographers, he relativized the action of Poincaré when he indicated that while coming to power in January 1922, “a policy had been defined and a whole administrative and military staff was ready to carry out if necessary” (p. 412).

In January 1923, the occupation of the Ruhr was the culminating point of Franco-British dissension. Kleine-Ahlbrandt (1995), in *The Burden of Victory*, considered that the occupation was particularly dangerous for the sale of British coal: “with a combined production of almost 200 million tons a year, this empire could squeeze the British out of continental markets” (p. 19). The Ruhr affair also showed that London and Paris were unable to get along on the question of Germany. But the occupation was also a dramatic problem between France and Germany, “one of the greatest untold stories of European history,” Conan Fisher declared (2003), with serious consequences but ones that held the roots of future Franco-German reconciliation.

Jeannesson (1998) showed in *Poincaré, la France et la Ruhr* that for Paris, the question of reparations was closely dependent on that of security. Military operations had initially been a success but for Poincaré, as Jeannesson wrote, “it was less a question of forcing a return to the enforcement of the Versailles treaty than to seek an improvement of the treaty” (p. 139). He then noted in a critical way that the final

failure of the occupation, due to the diplomatic isolation of France, showed that Paris did not have the economic and monetary means to support its ambitions. This point can apply as well to the French policy that aimed at building a security system in central Europe, which was expanded between 1920 and 1924.

As we see it, this ambition resulted from the failure of the guarantee pacts and, especially, from the British refusal to take this route. Ahmann, Birke, and Howard (1993) indicated that the choice to establish a network of military alliances with Belgium in 1920 and with the states of central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania) was only a second or even a third choice, after the search for a British alliance and the push for collective security. Actually, a strictly speaking French security system never existed. France was in search of reverse alliances in order to replace partially the old Franco-Russian alliance but, according to Kleine-Ahlbrandt (1995), it was ready to give the most limited engagements to make possible this outcome. He considered that in the clauses of the treaties they signed with France, "the Belgians and the Poles gave better than they got. The lack of reciprocity did not seem to worry the French who considered security treaties with smaller powers as essentially short-term agreements" (p. 46). It is possible to find here a beginning of explanations of the French attitude toward its eastern allies in the 1930s.

This point of view was only belatedly accepted in the French historiography which considered that the efforts of the French staff to reinforce the bonds with the eastern allies were often obstructed by the politicians. In an important article for the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, G.-H. Soutou (1981) considered that from 1924, the successive French governments sought to "get rid" of a Polish alliance which had become awkward within the framework of Franco-German reconciliation. The work undertaken since makes it possible to seize on the ambiguities of the alliances since they were signed. The main reason was that French concerns, which were exclusively turned toward a potential German threat, did not take into account the aspirations for the safety of the Allies. In the case of Romania, Traian Sandu (1999) raised the issue of a major misunderstanding about the supposed French Central European system, estimating that "those who made of it a strong foundation of French safety confuse the cooperation between allies within the League of Nations and the supposed convergence of precise geostrategic interests" (p. 453).

In her study of the relations between France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, *Mon Voisin, cet ennemi*, Davion (2009) concluded that it was a failure of the French attempt to carry out the Polish-Czechoslovak "soldering" that Foch desired between his two allies and which would have required Paris "to initially register close relationships of safety within a bilateral framework. It is the case neither in the pact of 1924 with Prague, nor even in the agreements of 1921 with Warsaw" (p. 447). Dessberg (2009) also defended the idea of continuity in French policy, in *Le triangle impossible*, by estimating that the very timid Franco-Soviet rapprochement, which started before 1924 in order to enclose Germany, had not been able to reinforce security in Europe and did not permit a real improvement of Polish-Soviet relations. Actually, it had contributed to damaging relations between Paris and Warsaw, the latter then trying to be detached from its French tutor.

The French setbacks in central Europe in political and economic matters led Paris, which was always in search of a British military guarantee, to evolve a rapprochement with London from the end of 1921. A part of the most recent historiography considers

that, from the moment when Paris was determined to include Germany in the post-Versailles system, the treaty could really be enforced in all its nuances, including possible revisions.

On the French side, Aristide Briand had chosen this orientation at the end of 1921. In his biography of Briand, Gérard Unger (2005) considered that at that time – he was then president of the Cabinet – Briand “had widened his horizon with the international scene by wishing, in fact, alleviated Europe where, hardly tacitly, he envisaged a place for democratized Germany” (p. 441). A Franco-British agreement then became possible, which would lead to guarantees for French security and to European recovery. The 1922 international conferences had this aim.

For Sergio Romano (1995), 1922 marked indeed the beginning of “the end of Versailles’s Europe” and of the dismantling of one of the “most disastrous treaties of the history of Europe” (p. 7). The work published by Petricioli carved out a place for the idea that the will of European recovery resulting from the 1922 diplomatic meetings – Washington, Genoa and Lausanne conferences – paved the way for a “dangerous illusion” (Petricioli 1995, p. 13). Marks (2003) developed this topic in the same “realist” way in *The Illusion of Peace*, in which she estimated that the equality required by Germany could not be compatible with security necessary for France. Jacques Bariéty (1995) observed that in 1922 the opposition between Lloyd George’s intention of a “vast multilateral negotiation” and the French’s need for security still remained too strong. The German-Soviet agreement which was signed in Rapallo on April 16, 1922, on the fringe of the Genoa conference, created a true trauma in France and was one of the causes of the occupation of the Ruhr. But the situation changed on the occasion of the July 1924 London conference, when the Dawes Plan reorganized the payment of German reparations.

The historical research considers this episode in various ways. For Stephen Schuker (1976), it was the starting point of the end of the “French predominance,” which was due to the will of American and British policymakers. Counter to this assertion, Anthony Adamthwaite (1995) considered that France remained a strong military power and that the French “fatigue was the consequence of the financial crisis and Ruhr failure, not a symptom of chronic debility” (p. 111).

Regardless of the differences, this debate poses the problem of American and British involvement in European affairs, which has been reevaluated by the recent historiography. Far from the analysis of the “realists,” who broached the question of the French security in the first place, the new scholarship proposed a different meaning for international relations in 1924. In *The Unfinished Peace after World War I*, Patrick O. Cohrs (2006) considered that the 1924 London conference represented a defeat for French policy, if we take into consideration its 1919 requirement of security on the Rhine, but that it meant above all an “American peace” in Europe: “This became the only way to improve relations with those powers that alone could provide the craved-for security – Britain – and indispensable resources – America” (p. 164). Cohrs subscribes thus to the opinion of the new president of the French Cabinet, Édouard Herriot who had been strongly criticized in France for the sacrifices to which he had to consent in London.

Several historians of the last two decades have insisted on the importance of US involvement in European affairs during the 1920s, and thus laid to rest the “myth of American isolationism.” McKercher (2000) recalled that, according to the “revisionists,” there was “little difference in the thrust of policy pursued by Wilson, the three

republicans, and Roosevelt" (p. 182). In *Financial Missionaries to the World*, Emily Rosenberg (1999) showed that the influence of the British and American financial experts was decisive since 1921 in the question of the reparations, and that it led to a policy of recovery. Indeed, American bankers helped the stabilization of central Europe but they were not alone because the League of Nations also had an important role in financial and economic matters.

Another question is whether the stabilization of Europe in the mid-1920s was diplomatic or economic, or even both. The League of Nations should have had a leading role in political stabilization but it was hampered by the nearly constant opposition between Great Britain and France. By means of the 1922 conferences, Lloyd George had tried to extricate Britain from the Anglo-French dialogue and to find a new balance of power. Grayson (1997) explained in *Austen Chamberlain* that the new British Labor prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, tried to "calm" France in September 1924, and a year later, Austen Chamberlain proposed a British guarantee to "defend" Germany's frontiers with France and Belgium. With the October 1924 Geneva Protocol, MacDonald and Herriot chose the way of collective security to ensure peace in Europe and, as Henig (2000) explains, they agreed "about the importance of arbitration" (p. 151). For Schirmann (2006), arbitration and disarmament went together but for the French, disarmament could only be "the consequence of an efficient arbitration and of guaranteed frontiers" (p. 119).

The problem still remained when the British Cabinet dismissed the Geneva Protocol in 1925. The October 16, 1925, Locarno agreements ensured diplomatic stabilization as a result of a rebirth of a European concurrence of the great powers. A. J. P. Taylor considered that Locarno marked the true end of World War I and the beginning of a period of stabilization. Among his followers, Cohrs (2006) declares that the London conference and the Locarno agreements instituted a fragile system in which London and Washington represented an essential pivot:

Britain as the "honest broker" of the fledgling European concert, America as the arbiter of financial-cum-political stabilization under the Dawes regime and chief creditor of France. The Franco-German process could not be advanced decisively without a powerful third party ... The same held true for Polish-German accommodation and, essentially, for the Euro-Atlantic peace order as a whole. (Cohrs 2006, p. 7)

Considering the disappointments which followed the "Locarno era," historians were often very critical of the Locarno agreements and the 1920s "pactomania." For example, Jon Jacobson (1972) considered that the differences between conflicted national policies were too strong. Carole Fink (Petricoli 1995) regretted that the Allies "failed in their attempts to dominate Germany" and considered that "League of Nations and Minority treaties were sacrificed to a resurrected and illusory 'balance of power' system which, from Locarno to Munich, destroyed European peace" (pp. 27–28). The main problem was, perhaps, that Locarno guaranteed a peace settlement in western Europe but not on the eastern German frontiers. Moreover, the efficiency of the League of Nations in the case of a conflict remained doubtful in the enforcement of the Locarno agreements.

In spite of all these uncertainties, recent scholarship gave fair recognition to the Locarno agreements and to its negotiators. Johnson (2004) found in *Locarno Revisited* that it was the "real" peace treaty with Germany. In *Aristide Briand* (Bariéty 2007),

Locarno was estimated as a “synthesis” between the League of Nations and the French–British guarantee treaty (p. 115). The French minister of Foreign Affairs was shown to be simultaneously leading the enforcement of the League of Nations and pressuring for the continuation of the policy of alliances. A precise study of the 1920s controversies about frontiers and nationalities in central and eastern Europe could confirm this analysis.

Concerning Chancellor Gustav Stresemann’s policy, recent biographers dismissed the old accusation of duplicity. For Wright (2002), the question was not “whether Stresemann put national interests first, which is not in doubt, but how he defined them and whether this definition was compatible with the interests of other European countries” (p. 2). As for Baechler (1996, 2001), the German statesman was convinced that a dialogue with France and Great Britain through economic solidarity and territorial settlement was the only way for Germany to recover its sovereignty. As a matter of fact, most of the recent scholarship estimates now that the Versailles peace settlement died in Locarno, which was a solution to the main problem of how to treat Germany.

With the Locarno agreements, Germany gave up any hope of modification of the eastern frontiers by force and adopted the collective security system instead. That was the major point and a real success after Versailles. It opened a period of optimism and faith in a collective security system which included the potential enemy but which sounded like “dogma” even in the 1930s. Recent works point out the enthusiasm of public opinion toward the League of Nations. Christine Manigand (2003) showed this infatuation for the Geneva spirit. A positive analysis of the work of the League even emerged from recent studies, like Henig’s (2010) *The League of Nations*. Against the “realist” considerations about the failure of the League of Nations and the accusation of “idealistic” illusion of the collective security policy, Fleury (1998) considered that a real continuity did exist before 1914 and after 1945, and that “World War II functions not as a caesura, but rather as an accelerator of preexisting tendencies” (p. 517). This viewpoint holds for economic as well as political issues. The Versailles system could thus have been only a short and transitional episode and the 1920s’ regional collective security system could be considered as more efficient than it has often been claimed.

For a long time, the 1920s suffered less attention than the 1930s. Thus, this period remains a promising sphere of research, especially because it was the time when many transnational movements appeared and formed which also influenced the founders of the European Community in the 1950s. Men who negotiated at Locarno (among them Aristide Briand) had the vision of a democratic Europe, even if it was still restricted to western Europe, but which was supposed to spread through the whole continent. The study of European pacifist movements and regional cooperation networks deserves to be deepened, as well as the work of individuals (politicians, journalists, writers) who tried to bring the former belligerents together.

A comparative study about national perceptions and realities in the different European countries could help to seize the impact of the 1919–1920 treaties in a cultural approach. It could be helpful for a good understanding of the weight of the public opinions in international crisis. It could also facilitate our reflection on very present concerns like the new political and diplomatic architecture of Europe, the problem of ethnic minorities and boundaries, and the Western model of nation-state which had generally been imposed on countries all over the continent.

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CHAPTER THREE

The Great Depression

JOHN E. MOSER

Historians of World War II have long recognized that the Great Depression contributed significantly to the causes and course of the war. However, it is only fairly recently that they have tried to clarify exactly why and how. The reason for this, as Robert Boyce suggests, is that the crude determinism employed by Marxists had placed the study of economic factors in a bad light. To be sure, the Great Depression did not “cause” World War II, but the economic crisis – as well as the attempts by various governments to deal with that crisis – had an undeniable effect on the circumstances of the war. It did so in at least four ways: (a) by fostering an upsurge in nationalism in reaction against ideas of economic as well as political liberalism, (b) by encouraging some of these regimes to seek the answers to economic problems through conquest rather than trade, (c) by poisoning relations among the powers who under other circumstances might have cooperated to resist aggression, and (d) by encouraging these so-called “status quo powers” to stand aside, or even actively to aid, revisionist powers in their aggression.

If there is one effect of the Great Depression that is universally accepted, it is that the crisis dealt a serious blow to what might be called classical liberalism – that is, a set of ideas that emphasized, in the economic realm, laissez-faire and free trade, and in the political realm limited, constitutional government and majority rule. The Allied victory in 1918 seemed to represent the triumph of liberalism, and the 1920s saw virtually everywhere the dominance of parties committed to its principles, as well as an effort to restore the regime of global free trade, based on the gold standard, that had prevailed before the war. By contrast, the Great Depression’s most important political consequence was the rise of popular nationalism. As Rothermund (1996) puts it in *The Global Impact of the Depression*, the politicians who succeeded in the 1930s were those who were regarded as “protectors of the people” against the “sinister forces” (Jews, Gypsies, Wall Street bankers) whom they blamed for the current conditions. “Wherever the political system had been dominated by a small upper-class in previous years, such populist leaders managed to seize power and to

cling to it by making arrangements with the upper classes without depending on them too much" (pp. 136–138). This movement manifested itself as fascism in much of Europe, ultranationalism in Japan, and in the United States (in a far less virulent form) as the New Deal.

The best known example of a country in which liberalism gave way to extreme nationalism is Germany, where Adolf Hitler built his Third Reich on the wreckage of the Weimar Republic. Kershaw (1990), in the introductory essay of his edited collection *Weimar: Why did German Democracy Fail?* notes a high degree of consensus on many essential parts of the explanation. All agree, for example, that the republic suffered from a lack of legitimacy, particularly among those on the political right, and that its continued existence depended on its ability to provide for the material well-being of important interest groups. All accept, moreover, that the Weimar economy suffered from systemic problems even before the Depression hit, suffering from low domestic capital formation, dependence on foreign loans, and an increasingly expensive social welfare system. Once the Depression hit, and foreign lending ceased, the regime was forced to make painful decisions involving spending cuts and tax hikes. The political course of events is ably recounted in Peukert's (1993) *The Weimar Republic*. Support dwindled for the more moderate parties with more and more voters flocking to parties of the extreme right and left, which had the advantage of never having been faced with the responsibilities of power. The increasingly unemployed industrial working class backed the Communists, while the peasantry and artisanal class (*Mittelstand*) threw their support behind Hitler's National Socialists. The republic collapsed altogether when, in early 1933, the traditional conservative parties, fearing a move toward out-right socialism, invited the Nazis to join in a coalition.

The extent to which German industrialists and financiers helped bring Hitler to power has been an extremely contentious issue. The Marxist historian David Abraham (1981) threw down the gauntlet in his book *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis*, in which he saddled capitalists with much of the blame for Hitler's rise to power. He was challenged by Turner (1985), who in *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* demonstrated that the vast majority of the Nazis' political contributions came from ordinary Germans, and that most businessmen only threw their support to Hitler after it became clear that he was going to win – and even then they did so reluctantly. It is Turner's interpretation that most historians accept, particularly since he pointed out a series of instances in which Abraham inadequately cited certain sources and misquoted others. Nevertheless, Abraham has had some prominent members in his camp, including Arno J. Mayer and Carl Schorske.

A second area of disagreement involves whether this outcome could have been avoided. Accounts written in the 1960s and 1970s placed much of the blame for the republic's fall on Heinrich Brüning. As chancellor from 1930 to 1932, Brüning pursued an openly deflationary strategy, despite the evidence that it was driving unemployment up, in an effort to prove to the world that Germany could not meet its reparations payments from World War I. Had only this "gravedigger of the republic" opted to increase spending and lower taxes, the claim went, Weimar could have been saved. This conclusion came under fire by Knut Borchardt of the University of Munich, who claimed not only that Brüning had no alternative but to deflate given Germany's high level of debt and public fear of inflation, but also that, even had he been able to carry out an alternative strategy, it would not have brought recovery quickly enough to save

the republic. The Borchardt thesis was enormously controversial, with one critic – Bernd Weisbrod – countering with the assertion that Brüning deliberately sought to undermine the economy in order to pave the way for a restoration of the monarchy. Holtfrerich (1990), meanwhile, continues to defend the earlier view that Brüning's policies were “unnecessary, economically counter-productive and politically suicidal”; even if the necessary spending had occurred too late to save Weimar, it perhaps could have ushered in a government that was preferable to that of the Nazis (p. 80). An authoritarian regime dominated by the military would have no doubt been repressive, and would have sought to overturn Versailles, but would not likely have provoked a global war, let alone carry out a campaign of genocide. Nevertheless, Borchardt's characterization of the republic as chronically “sick” has been widely accepted, as it is fully in line with predictions made by Keynes (1920), who foresaw that the provisions of the Versailles Treaty would prevent Germany from recovering from the war. As the English historian Richard Bessel puts it, “Perhaps the remarkable thing about the Weimar Republic is not that it collapsed but that it lasted as long as it did” (Bessel 1990, p. 148).

The other country to succumb to extreme nationalism as a result of the Depression was Japan, although here the case is different – after all, in Japan there was no republic to be overthrown. Nevertheless, 1920s saw the development of a vibrant party system and a popularly elected Diet with real political power. But as Iriye wrote in *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, “the coming of the age of mass politics coincided with the world economic crisis” (Iriye 1987, pp. 5–6). Kirshner's (2007) *Appeasing Bankers* and Fletcher's (1989) *The Japanese Business Community and National Trade Policy* discuss how the industrialists and financiers who had dominated the political life of the 1920s had favored a domestic policy of reduced government expenditures, along with a foreign policy which aimed at maintaining good relations with China and the West. The culmination of this strategy was the return of the yen to the gold standard in 1929 – mere weeks after the Wall Street crash. The Depression undermined all of this by forging an alliance between the two interest groups most adversely affected by the liberalism of the 1920s – the armed forces and the rural population. Smethurst (1974), has detailed how rural Japan, driven to misery by the collapse of rice and silk prices between 1927 and 1931, became the country's strongest base of support for extreme nationalism and militarism. The civilian government came under fire for having placed Japan's fate at the mercy of foreign countries, and the result was the formation of terrorist groups such as the Cherry Blossom Society, which planned a series of assassinations and coup attempts in the early 1930s. Among those murdered were Hamaguchi Osachi and Inoue Junnosuke, who, as prime minister and finance minister, respectively, had been most responsible for Japan's return to the gold standard in 1929.

Even though their prestige had suffered an enormous blow, Japanese business and financial interests did not simply disappear from politics. Japan's departure from the gold standard in 1931 brought a quick economic recovery. Gross national product increased by a healthy four percent per year between 1932 and 1936, and the value of Japanese exports – sold mostly to China as well as the British, French, and Dutch colonies in East Asia – nearly doubled during the same period. However, China and the West, still suffering from high unemployment, reacted by erecting ever-higher tariff walls; British India, for example, imposed a 75 percent surcharge on Japanese

imports. As William Miles Fletcher III points out, Japan's industrialists and financiers gradually concluded that their future lay not in trade, but rather in subordinating themselves to the government, which could guarantee foreign markets through conquest and provide business in the form of military contracts. If any doubts remained, an attempted coup by young army officers in February 1936 swept them aside, along with any meaningful participation by civilians in national affairs. Thereafter Japan's political parties were reduced to impotence (indeed, they would be dissolved in 1940), while officers of the army and navy determined national policy.

The shift from liberalism to nationalism was mirrored internationally by a move away from international trade toward conquest as a means of obtaining resources, a vivid illustration of a saying often attributed to the French economist Frederic Bastiat, "When goods do not cross borders, soldiers will." The notion that seizing territory was a more reliable means of access to resources than the uncertainties of commerce was hardly new, and had gained many adherents during World War I, when it was widely assumed that the victory of the Allied Powers was solely attributable to their ability to cut Germany off from critical raw materials. However, by dealing a devastating blow to world trade, the economic crisis gave plausibility to those who advocated conquest as the key to recovery. Just as, on the domestic level, the Depression generated among the poor a deep resentment of the wealthy, it became common in international politics to speak of "have" and "have-not" nations based on control of resources – the United States and the British Empire falling into the former category, and Germany, Italy and Japan falling into the latter.

Here again, Nazi Germany is the classic example. Hitler's insistence that Germany required *Lebensraum* for its survival was not a product of the Depression; he had laid out his argument in detail in *Mein Kampf* (Hitler 1925). Avraham Barkai (1990) in *Nazi Economics* claims that the Nazis drew on "a long tradition of state-directed economic development" that stretched as far back as Friedrich List (p. 19). As Tooze (2006) demonstrates in his book, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*, Hitler regarded the fact that Germany was forced to import food to sustain its population as "a recipe for 'race death'" (pp. 168–169). The ultimate goal, therefore, was self-sufficiency.

In the short term, however, the Depression was a pressing problem. Overy (1994) explained in his *War and Economy in the Third Reich*, "Hitler knew well enough that the failure to reduce unemployment would make other goals difficult to achieve, and would sustain the very social and political instability that had brought him to power in the first place" (p. 4). Nazi propaganda would trumpet economic recovery as the first great triumph of the regime, and for many years it was accepted that Hitler had achieved an economic miracle through an essentially Keynesian policy of government spending, particularly on armaments. In recent years scholars have undermined this assessment. Both Overy (1994) and Silverman (1998) point out that spending on armaments remained fairly limited before 1935, and cannot therefore be given credit for the significant decline in unemployment that took place in Germany in 1933 and 1934. Silverman attributes roughly one quarter of the recovery to work-relief programs, which the Third Reich was willing and able to fund to an extent that had not been possible during Weimar's final years. James (1986), however, claims that the regime's hallmark was its "fiscal conservatism" (p. 378). Public spending as a percentage of gross domestic product did not increase significantly, and spending on public works was less

than it had been during pre-Depression Weimar. What produced “recovery” was brute force – the abolition of the labor unions (thus driving down the cost of labor), the introduction of the concentration camp (where the unemployment found “positions” as camp guards, administrators, or inmates), and finally conscription. Similarly, Tooze (2006) questions whether it is appropriate to speak of a Nazi economic recovery at all before 1935; the picture he paints is of a regime limping along, encountering repeated crises for lack of foreign currency, defaulting on its foreign debts while millions remained unemployed, with even those with jobs finding their living standards in decline. Whatever improvement in Germany’s economic position occurred between 1933 and 1935, he concludes, was mainly due to a natural cyclical upturn – one that was in evidence by late 1932, before Hitler became chancellor.

A major turning point in Nazi economic policy arrived in 1936. Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht, as well as many prominent businessmen, advocated a return to the world economy and a shift in emphasis away from armament and toward exports. Of course, Hitler’s intention was just the opposite, and he responded with a Four Year Plan of accelerated rearmament and efforts to produce synthetic substitutes for resources that could only be obtained through foreign trade – namely oil and rubber. At the same time, conquest was close to the top of the agenda, and even though Hitler’s desire for *Lebensraum* was driven far more by ideological than economic factors, the latter undoubtedly had some influence on German foreign policy in the late 1930s. Clavin (2000) points out that Hitler’s support for Franco’s Nationalists was in part a function of his desire for access to rich reserves of iron ore in northern Spain; indeed, by 1938 Germany was the world’s leading consumer of Spanish exports. Overy (1994) and Leitz (2004), meanwhile, claim that an economic slump in 1938 made Austria, the Sudetenland, and finally Bohemia and Moravia irresistible targets for German conquest, because of their mineral wealth, labor force, heavy industry, and reserves of gold and foreign currency.

Japanese aggression in China had similar origins. Barnhart’s (1987) *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* traces the growth of a “total war” ideology among army officers and reformist bureaucrats. Drawing, again, on the example of Germany during World War I, they concluded that future wars would demand the commitment of the nation’s entire resources, and that victory would only go to those that were able to satisfy all of their wartime needs without having to rely on other powers. This meant having reliable access to the resources of northern China, but the rise of Chinese nationalism made the “total war” advocates increasingly skeptical that peaceful trade would be capable of supplying Japan’s needs. Indeed, Beasley (1987) demonstrates that Tokyo’s trade with China began to drop even before the Depression, thanks to anti-Japanese demonstrations and boycotts. Of course, once the economic crisis set in the value of Japanese trade plummeted even further, strengthening the hand of those who sought to obtain the resources of northern China by force. In 1931, therefore, while the liberal civilian government was reeling from the effects of the Depression, officers of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria took matters into their own hands. In September they occupied all of Manchuria, and given the high prestige of the military – and the growing unpopularity of liberalism – the government in Tokyo felt it had little choice but to acquiesce.

Japanese development of Manchuria is the subject of Young’s (1998) *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. The Kwantung Army’s

fait accompli was an example of the “new social imperialism,” in which Japan’s suffering tenant farmers were offered “the social and economic benefits of colonial expansion as an alternative to social welfare policies” (p. 308). The example of Manchuria – which by the end of the decade was the largest consumer of Japanese exports – was “extended first to include north China, then the rest of China, and finally Southeast Asia in a self-sufficient yen bloc” (p. 50). Yet as Barnhart points out, the attempt to dominate China in the name of self-sufficiency led to all-out war starting in 1937, and the demands of the war effort ironically made the country more dependent on foreign imports, particularly scrap iron and steel, rubber, and oil. Tokyo’s efforts by the end of the decade to free itself from this dependence led it to embrace the so-called “strike south” – an offensive to seize the resources of Southeast Asia – which ultimately involved war with Great Britain and the United States.

Benito Mussolini’s decision to embark on an expansionist foreign policy may also be attributed to the Depression. Mussolini’s regime dated back to 1922, and while talk of imperial glory had long been a feature of Fascist propaganda, the government’s foreign and domestic policies remained basically conservative in the 1920s. As Zamagni (1993) demonstrates, Mussolini in 1927 had insisted on returning the lira to the gold standard at a deliberately overvalued rate, and kept the currency on gold even after Great Britain and the United States had abandoned it. However, between 1929 and 1931 Italy’s industrial production dropped by more than 20 percent, and unemployment rose to 15 percent. Mallett (2003) denies that Mussolini’s turn to aggression – marked by the 1934 invasion of Ethiopia – had anything to do with the downturn, since the Great Depression in Italy was basically over by 1935. However, Boyce (Boyce and Maiolo 2003) claims the opposite. Planning for the operation began as early as December 1932, and at the point when it was launched Italy’s industrial output had reached its low point. Mussolini tried to sell the Italian people on the invasion by promising that it would solve the country’s overpopulation problem and bring in immense wealth, although it is hard to imagine that he actually believed this. Unlike Manchuria, Ethiopia possessed no real mineral wealth to plunder. The war – followed by Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War – did bring about a recovery of sorts, in the sense that conscription can generally be counted upon to relieve unemployment, and rampant spending (funded simply by printing money) can produce a temporary revival of economic activity. However, by the end of the decade, Italy was no wealthier than it had been before, and its economy was increasingly dependent on Germany – a point developed in Bosworth (2006).

Further encouraging German and Japanese imperialism was the effect that the Depression had on Eastern Europe and East Asia. Kaiser (1980) has shown how the economies of Eastern Europe, dependent as they were on exports of agricultural goods, suffered particularly from the crisis of the early 1930s. This made them naturally receptive to German trade overtures, and willing to accept Reichsmarks instead of gold as payment for their exports. Kaiser shows how this paved the way for German domination of the region. Likewise, Dietmar Rothermund’s account of the Depression’s effects on Asia show how it weakened the influence of Western colonial powers on the region. Britain, France, and the Netherlands sought to promote their own recovery by squeezing their colonies, and while nothing comparable to Kaiser’s work on Eastern Europe has been attempted for Asia, it is reasonable to assume that the economic crisis made the region more vulnerable to Japanese penetration.

The challenges to the status quo posed by Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany would likely have been impossible in a properly functioning international system. However, Boyce (2009) portrays the entire interwar period as one of ongoing political and economic crises brought on by the failure of the victorious Allies from World War I to establish “a framework of rules, restraints and institutions capable of ensuring social and political as well as economic stability” (pp. 6–7). Instead, Great Britain immediately set about trying to undermine the international order created at Versailles, while the United States washed its hands of Europe altogether. France attempted to exercise some semblance of leadership, but without British or American cooperation the effort was doomed to failure.

When the Great Depression hit, the response of all three powers was to blame one another. The British faulted the French for their protectionism, their undervalued currency (which led to a boom in French exports and the accumulation of a massive gold hoard on the Bank of France), and their treatment of Germany. Indeed, as Hamby (2004) points out, His Majesty’s Government convinced itself that had it not been for France’s inflexible attitude toward revision of Versailles, Hitler never would have come to power. The French, for their part, were outraged by what they regarded as Britain’s naïveté regarding a possible resurgence of German power. Shamir (1989) notes that as late as 1931 France remained relatively untouched by the economic crisis, but that by the following year Paris and London were “on a collision course ... when it came to all important issues” (p. 168). The French accused Britain of seeking to cancel German reparations to make it easier for Germany to repay its commercial loans to British banks. Worse yet, the British decision to abandon the gold standard in September 1931 caused French exports to be comparatively overpriced almost overnight, leading to accusations that Britain was responsible for France’s economic woes. Finally, Britain’s implementation in 1932 of “Imperial Preference,” which raised tariffs on most goods imported from outside the Commonwealth, was bitterly (if hypocritically) resented in Paris. Indeed, a trade war raged between the two countries for much of the decade, with predictable consequences for their ability to cooperate diplomatically.

However, if London and Paris could agree on one thing in the early 1930s, it was that US policies under Herbert Hoover were making a bad situation worse. Hoover had a reputation as an internationalist, but this quickly faded with the Great Depression. His insistence on blaming other countries for the crisis was bad enough, but his support for the Smoot-Hawley tariff led to worldwide denunciations. US tariffs, which had remained high throughout the 1920s, allegedly reached record levels under Smoot-Hawley and, as Robert Boyce points out, other countries began to retaliate even before the bill’s passage in 1931. Economic historian Peter Fearon (1987) calls it “an extremely damaging piece of legislation” that “led to a great degree of bitterness and resentment among many nations, who viewed it as an example of destructive insularity on the part of a powerful creditor country” (p. 130). On the other hand, Eckes (1995) argues powerfully that historians have, at the very least, overstated the negative effects of Smoot-Hawley. The bill, Eckes writes, actually reduced rates on many goods, while the overseas objections were trumped up by Democratic Party operatives and a hostile Department of State.

Even Hoover’s sole effort to address the problems of the international economy brought him scorn from abroad. His announcement of a one-year moratorium on war

debt and reparations payments (which Boyce claims was pushed on him by others) was certainly not long enough to arrest the slide. In fairness to Hoover, anything more was politically impossible, given America's own economic woes. In any case, the moratorium incensed the French, who regarded it (as Haim Shamir indicates) as a unilateral revision of Versailles and proceeded to demand concessions from Germany – the abandonment of plans for a customs union with Austria, and a halt in construction of a “pocket battleship” – as the price for their acquiescence. Melvyn P. Leffler (1979) recounts Hoover's outrage over the French reaction, which he regarded as “intolerable.” He resolved to risk no more political capital in defense of the global economy “until France demonstrated to his satisfaction that she was willing to share in the sacrifices and risks necessary to restore European stability” (p. 270).

Of course, Hoover had precious little political capital to spend, as evidenced by his trouncing at the polls in November 1932. The new president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had no experience in foreign affairs, although the fact that the Democrats had traditionally been the party of free trade was surely regarded by Europeans as a hopeful sign. Nevertheless, he quickly gained a reputation as a “narrow nationalist” (p. 158), at least among the British (McKercher 1999). McKercher hastens to add that the assessment was unfair, and most historians agree. It is often difficult to get a handle on Roosevelt's mind; as Kimball (1991) demonstrates, he was a notoriously cagey political operator, a “juggler” who confided in virtually no one. Nevertheless, those who have written on his foreign policy are unanimous in their assessment that the president did, indeed, intend for the United States to have a major role on the world stage. At the same time, he was hamstrung by the sentiments of the American people, as well as the attitudes of those whom they elected to Congress. That the Depression deepened the desire of Americans to isolate themselves from international affairs is universally noted. It also dealt a serious blow – just as in Japan – to the prestige of the industrial and financial circles that had been the most reliable supporters of internationalism. Cole (1983) pays particular attention to the critical role in Congress of Western progressives, who combined support for most of Roosevelt's domestic policies with a thoroughgoing isolationism. The president feared offending them, and thus jeopardizing his agenda, by attempting bold new foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, as Melvyn Leffler points out, Roosevelt moved everything related to foreign affairs, including the lowering of tariffs, to the back burner during his first two years in office. “Roosevelt pretty clearly never sympathized with the isolationist currents that ran so strong during the thirties,” Alonzo Hamby concludes, “but he found it hard to swim against them” (p. 393).

This position revealed itself most clearly at the London Economic Conference, which met in June 1933. It had come as little surprise when Roosevelt pulled the dollar off the gold standard two months earlier. However, it led to hopes among the French and British that some sort of fixed exchange rate could be set among their three currencies, thus restoring monetary stability and allowing for a revival of world trade. The president torpedoed these hopes with his “bombshell” telegram of July 3, in which he announced that

The world will not long be lulled by the specious fallacy of achieving a temporary and probably an artificial stability in foreign exchange on the part of a few large nations only. The sound internal economic situation of a nation is a greater factor in its well-being than the price of its currency.

In subsequent years, Roosevelt was saddled with the blame for wrecking the conference, which broke up soon thereafter. One sees echoes of this in the work of economic historian Charles Kindleberger (1986) who claims that the United States bears primary responsibility for the persistence of the crisis thanks to its failure to assume leadership of the global economy once it became clear that Great Britain was no longer capable of doing so. More recent accounts have been kinder to Roosevelt, however. Peter Fearon, for example, insists that Roosevelt “was correct in his judgment that domestic recovery should have priority” (p. 227), an opinion shared by Dallek (1979). Clavin (1996) meanwhile demonstrates that Roosevelt was a convenient scapegoat for the failure of a conference that was doomed in any case. All of the major participants in attendance had different expectations – the United States desired an end to Britain’s system of imperial preference, France wanted the British and Americans to return to the gold standard, and Britain and France both sought the forgiveness of war debts. Nevertheless, it is possible to accept all of this while still finding fault with Roosevelt’s approach to the conference. As Alonzo Hamby concludes, the episode

revealed him at his worst – impetuous and uncomprehending, taking a monumentally important decision in isolation, disregarding his most competent advisers, composing the most important diplomatic document of his short presidency in a fit of petulance. The failure of the conference was a serious setback for Western liberal democracy; the way in which Roosevelt had wrecked it was even worse. The “bombshell” verged on the insulting and seemed to demonstrate a lack of understanding of international economic mechanisms. (2004, pp. 134–135)

Indeed, Clavin notes that the conference’s failure came as welcome news to Hitler, whose greatest fear was an Anglo-American understanding.

One final country that deserves to be mentioned in this context is the Soviet Union. On one level, the lack of cooperation between Stalin’s Russia and the Western democracies requires little explanation. Even though they had recognized the communist regime (the United States did not do so until 1933), it was still widely regarded as an international pariah, possibly to be feared more than Nazi Germany. In addition, the Depression of the 1930s barely touched the Soviet Union, whose industrial capacity, as pointed out by Nove (1992), increased by roughly 20 percent each year from 1929 to 1932. In other words, communism seemed to be triumphing at the precise moment that capitalism appeared to be about to collapse.

At the same time, it was during this period that the Soviet Union became even more isolated from world affairs than it had been during the 1920s. As late as 1930, the Soviets had contracts with 124 foreign firms, mostly based in Germany and the United States, giving Moscow access to advanced technology. However, by 1933 the number of contracts had fallen to 46, and foreign specialists had been largely driven from the country. Haslam (1983) attributes this to Marxism-Leninism’s peculiar interpretation of global events. While there was undoubtedly rejoicing in the Kremlin regarding the imminent collapse of capitalism, there was at the same time considerable anxiety that the West might launch an all-out effort to destroy the Soviet Union before it could serve as the lodestone for world revolution. This led the regime to turn inward and focus on defense, while the Comintern warned communist parties abroad to tone down their agitation for fear that the offensive would come before the Red Army was up to the task of defending the country.

Lewis (1994) points instead to economic motives behind the growing distance between the Soviet Union and the West. Stalin had intended to fund his first Five Year Plan mainly through increased exports of grain, but the fall in grain prices between 1928 and 1930 was far more dramatic than the drop in prices for the machine tools and other industrial goods that the Soviets needed to import. The result was a massive imbalance of trade, causing Russia's foreign debt to double between 1929 and 1931. Stalin's regime attempted to remedy this by slashing to the bone all imports deemed nonessential, which is illustrated vividly in the statistics on Soviet trade with the United States, traced by White (1992) and Funigiello (1988). The United States and the Soviet Union exchanged goods valued at US\$111.3 million in 1930; by 1933 this figure had fallen to a mere \$8 million. The virtual elimination of foreign imports, coupled with the departures of Great Britain and the United States from the gold standard and increased domestic gold production (a threefold increase between 1928 and 1933), kept the regime from bankruptcy. By this time, however, the Soviet Union's isolation was complete, as it found when it tried to improve relations with the West, via the strategy of the Popular Front, later in the decade.

The disunity of the great powers during the critical period 1930–1933 forced Britain and France to work out whatever deals they might with the rising aggressor states, while the United States remained on the sidelines for much of the decade. The resulting policy of appeasement has been the subject of intense scrutiny ever since. For nearly thirty years it was universally denounced, with historians more or less uncritically accepting the assessment of Winston Churchill, who in the first volume of his *The Second World War* (Churchill 1948) portrayed the events of the 1930s and thereafter as a complete vindication of his contemporary criticisms of appeasement. However, beginning in the 1970s – and corresponding with the release of hitherto secret government documents – historians began to reconsider the policy. An examination of the Great Depression, largely ignored in the historiography of the immediate postwar era, has been central to this reassessment. According to these revisionists – whose views are today widely accepted, at least in the academy – the economic crisis, and, just as importantly, the National Government's response to it, not only delayed British disarmament, but it convinced most British leaders that the country's trade with Germany was too important to risk a war.

One of the most influential of the revisionists is G. C. Peden, whose book *British Rearmament and the Treasury: 1932–1939* (1979) notes arms spending remained flat between 1931 and 1934. It increased in 1935 in response to Hitler's repudiation of the Versailles treaty's disarmament clauses and Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, but British rearmament remained strictly limited, and concentrated almost exclusively on the navy and the air force, until 1939. The reason for this was that Britain's leaders remained terrified that massive spending would produce "another 1931" (Peden 1979, p. 179), with a repeat of the flight of gold that had led to the country's withdrawal from the gold standard. Without sufficient gold stocks, they feared, Britain would find it impossible to import the raw materials and foodstuffs that it would need to fight a long war. As Chamberlain put it, finance was the country's "fourth arm of defense." Peden not only finds this line of thinking defensible, but claims that it had an overall beneficial effect. The "fourth arm" policy forced the government to set priorities and make tough choices; it meant shortchanging the army (at least before 1939) and emphasizing the production of fighters and anti-aircraft guns – precisely the weapons which won the Battle of Britain.

Likewise, Schmidt (1986) and Bell (1996) link appeasement to the Depression. Schmidt claims that the crisis created the widespread impression that Britain was a power in decline, and so even by the mid- to late 1930s – when the economy was clearly on the mend – the government believed that war would threaten the country's "social and economic fabric" (Schmidt 1986, p. 388). Appeasement, based on the theory that Hitler's regime would mellow over time, and that, if war must come, it was best delayed as long as possible, was perfectly understandable and defensible. Bell (1996) concurs, arguing that given the multiple threats facing Britain and its empire, the state of the economy, and public opinion, there was no alternative to appeasement.

A challenge to the pro-appeasement orthodoxy has come from Price (2001) who claims that the "fourth arm" policy forced the country into humiliating dependence on the United States. The British Commonwealth, he contends, possessed ample resources to build a truly massive army, navy, and air force in the 1930s, if only it had been organized into a self-sufficient bloc. Chamberlain and his allies, however, remained wedded to a free trade policy that worked only to the benefit of the United States, and therefore the country by 1940 was wholly reliant on the American arms industry to produce weapons that Britain otherwise would have been perfectly capable of producing itself. However, Peden (2007) rejects Price's claim, insisting that the Dominions enjoyed too much independence for Britain to create a closed system. In particular, Canada's economy was more intimately tied to the US economy than that of Britain.

Recent accounts have focused as well on another powerful economic motive behind appeasement, namely the importance to the British economy of trade with Germany. Wendt (1983) claims access to the German market was critical to the health of British capitalism. Nazi Germany may have been a threat to the international order, but it was surprisingly reasonable when it came to matters of trade. Moreover, although Britain had a negative balance of trade with Germany throughout the 1930s, the terms of trade moved gradually in Britain's favor at a time when Britain's trade balance with the rest of the world – particularly the United States – was heading in the opposite direction. MacDonald (1981) and Newton (1996) employ similar arguments, attributing appeasement to the desire of Britain's ruling elite to bring about "an export-led recovery" (Newton 1996, pp. 4–5). However, Forbes (2000) dismisses Wendt's argument as conspiracy theory. Forbes sees another dynamic at work: Britain's two chief means of combating the Depression – the departure from the gold standard and imperial preference – had destabilized the European economy, and in the eyes of British political leaders had contributed to the rise of Hitler. It followed from this that Germany might return to a path of moderation if Europe were to return to prosperity, and offering access to British markets was the best means of doing that.

Britain's policy of appeasement is even more understandable when one considers the effect of the Depression on its only likely major-power ally. France was last to be affected by the economic crisis – serious symptoms did not appear until 1931 – but also last to recover, in 1938. And while the Depression had a moderating effect on British politics, leading to the formation of a National Government that had the support of the vast majority of the population, it produced the opposite result in France. Adamthwaite (1995) offers a fine overall account. A center-right coalition tried unsuccessfully to cope with the crisis between 1931 and 1936, when it was succeeded by Leon Blum's Popular Front government, which in turn was replaced by a return to the earlier coalition (now headed by Edouard Daladier) early in 1938.

Each swing of the pendulum brought with it bitter disappointment among those interest groups represented by parties out of power. Workers struck and rioted in the early part of the decade, while conservatives were convinced that the Popular Front would bring communism. In the face of such deep divisions the governments of the 1930s hesitated to make any sort of forceful response to German provocations; indeed, Hitler's annexation of Austria in March 1938 came at a time when, thanks to Blum's resignation, there was no government in Paris at all. Furthermore, Imlay (2003) recounts that although Daladier's government brought economic recovery, the manner in which it did so (i.e., repealing legislation passed under the Popular Front) left the working class thoroughly alienated as the country moved toward war in 1939. As a result, "[o]n the eve of Germany's great offensive in the West in spring 1940, no obvious parliamentary majority existed in favour of continuing the war against Germany" (p. 184).

The Depression most profoundly affected France's foreign policy in hindering its efforts at rearmament. Jackson (1985) demonstrates that popular fear of inflation deterred the governments of the early 1930s from pulling the franc from the gold standard, long after Great Britain and the United States had devalued their currencies. Faced with declining revenues, the only option was to slash spending, and as Weber (1994) points out, cuts in defense expenditure represented half of the government's savings. Kirshner (2007) recounts how in 1930 Maxime Weygand, Chief of the General Staff, proposed a six-year, 9-billion-franc plan to modernize the armed forces. Of that he received 690 million franc, and the services were shrunk, rather than modernized. Fully a quarter of the soldiers in the French Army, for example, were dismissed, along with some 5,000 officers. The only military project to be fully funded was the Maginot Line, the construction of which had begun in the late 1920s. Maginot has become a symbol of the short-sightedness of French security policy, with numerous authors pointing out that France in the 1930s spent twice as much on fortifications as it did on weapons systems. However, Alexander (1998) claims that the decision was understandable and even defensible; he asserts that the funds spent on the line were the only form of defense spending that the French public was willing to accept, since its construction provided employment for tens of thousands of workers in eastern France. Military leaders did not make a choice "between concrete and cavalry tanks, between barbed wire and bombers" (p. 182); had the Maginot Line not been built, the funds that went toward its construction would not have been spent on defense at all.

Spending on rearmament increased under the Popular Front government, which finally abandoned the gold standard in 1936. Nevertheless, the sheer cost of modern armaments remained massive. Frankenstein (1983) demonstrates that the burden of armaments in 1938 was more than double what it had been on the eve of World War I, consuming as much as a third of the government's budget at a time when half the budget was going toward debt service and soldiers' pensions from the last war. In addition, Girault (1983) points out that France, like Britain, experienced a massive gold drain during this same period as nervous investors (fearing the Popular Front at least as much as they did Nazi aggression) moved their capital out of the country. This forced the government practically to freeze defense spending as late as 1938. While 1939 saw huge increases in expenditure as well as weapons production – France built more tanks than did Germany in that year – the delay had profound effects.

As Adamthwaite (1995) makes clear, Germany at the start of the war possessed more than six times the number of modern aircraft as France.

Did the United States practice a policy of appeasement as well? Offner (1969) claims that the Roosevelt administration, in its eagerness to avoid war, did just that. Offner does not attribute this to the Depression, but other authors do, particularly those following in the “New Left” tradition of William Appleman Williams. Gardner (1964), MacDonald (1981), Harden (1987), and Schröder (1983) have all emphasized the conflict in the Roosevelt administration – also noted by Offner – between “appeasers,” who sought to moderate German policy through offers of trade, and “anti-appeasers” who sought to use sanctions as a means of bringing down the Nazi regime. The New Left historians, however, claim that both sides, as well as Roosevelt himself, were motivated consistently by a belief that recovery from the Great Depression was only possible through the creation of a liberal trading order in which US exports were free to compete on equal terms with those of all other nations. The construction of such an order was jeopardized not only by Hitler’s efforts toward autarky, but also by Great Britain’s system of imperial preference.

The main problem with this interpretation is that while it may explain Roosevelt’s policies after, say, 1935, it is hard to portray his strategy during the first three years of his administration as tending toward the creation of a liberal trading order. His previously mentioned “bombshell” message to the World Economic Conference was clearly an assertion of national over international priorities, as were his departure from the gold standard and his manipulation of the exchange rate from mid-1933 until January 1934. There is no question that Secretary of State Cordell Hull sought to promote a global regime of free trade but, as Butler (1998) demonstrates, Roosevelt before 1936 repeatedly threw obstacles in the path of Hull’s agenda. As Dallek (1979) points out, even the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, the New Deal’s most important contribution to foreign commerce, “chiefly served American rather than world economic interests” by promoting exports through bilateral treaties (pp. 92–93). This helps to explain why Dallek, as well as other US historians such as Hamby (2004), Nash (1992), and Kennedy (1999), continues to embrace the orthodox position originally advanced by Burns (1956) and Leuchtenberg (1963): that while Roosevelt saw economic recovery at home and the promotion of a stable world order abroad as worthwhile goals, he regarded them as two separate tasks, and that the second could only be undertaken once the first was well underway.

One of the most positive developments in the study of the Great Depression’s impact on international affairs has been the growing willingness of diplomatic historians to draw on the work of economic historians such as Kindleberger (1986) and Eichengreen (1995). Not only has this enriched our understanding of the diplomacy of the interwar period, but it may well help to settle the ongoing debate over the causes of the economic crisis. Boyce (2009) points the way in this regard by insisting that the severity of the Depression cannot be understood by focusing on economic factors alone; an unstable international political system exacerbated what otherwise would have been a quite ordinary cyclical downturn. Much more work in this area is needed.

Second, further examination is required into the effects of the Depression on the diplomacy of countries beyond Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Kaiser’s (1980) research on Eastern Europe is a signal achievement, but similar work in English on East Asia, Africa, and the Soviet Union would be of great benefit.

Finally, although there are now ample works that consider the Depression's effects on the foreign policies of particular countries, there is still a need for a grand work of synthesis. Boyce's (2009) *Great Interwar Crisis*, for all its strengths, emphasizes only the period through 1933–1934, treating the years leading up to World War II as an afterthought. Kindleberger, Eichengreen, and Dietmar Rothermund are all helpful to understanding the global nature of the crisis, but say virtually nothing about the diplomacy of the period. A single work bringing together the economic and diplomatic histories of the world during the interwar period, and thus demonstrating the Great Depression's massive impact on the causes and course of World War II, would be a tremendous contribution.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Colonialism in Asia

CHRISTOPHER D. O'SULLIVAN

World War II had numerous colonial dimensions. The war was partly ignited by colonialism, particularly in Asia, and became a war fought among several colonial powers. Colonialism was a major factor in provoking war in Asia and the Pacific where a genuine contest of empires occurred. Anticolonialism and decolonization became ideological aspects of the war and the conflict gave a boost to anticolonialism during the war and after. The defeat and weakening of colonial powers in Europe during Germany's initial victories in 1940 saw several of the chief colonial powers such as France, the Netherlands, and Belgium occupied and Great Britain isolated and weakened, provoking changes in their overseas colonies. The subsequent series of Japanese victories in Asia and the Pacific in 1941–1942 further accelerated these trends. The war had tremendous implications for the future of colonialism, provoking changes in the European empires as the administrative situation in the colonial periphery was challenged and the colonized witnessed the shattering of the notion of European invincibility. European defeats throughout Asia in 1941–1942 and the rise of China undermined notions of white supremacy that had underpinned European colonial empires. The creation of the United Nations at the war's conclusion also transformed the terms of debate over colonialism and provoked changes in the international system that proved unfavorable to colonialism in the postwar era.

The war in Asia and the Pacific was the climax of a half-century of competition for colonies and resources. It was also a war for the domination of the Asian landmass, with China as a prize and a major theater of operations. One of the key issues that had precipitated the Pacific War was the refusal of the United States, as “the conscious antagonist of Japanese expansion,” to countenance Japanese colonial expansion in Asia, but particularly in China (Iriye 1965, p. 13). China's stubborn refusal to capitulate guaranteed that Japan would fight a two-front war throughout World War II, one against Western allies and another on the Asian landmass in China, where substantial Japanese forces remained tied down that might otherwise have been used to threaten

India through Burma or to reinforce Japanese positions in the Philippines or the Pacific (Iriye 1997). Ironically, Chinese resistance made it possible for the British colonial empire to live another day, particularly in India.

Exploring the history of World War II in the context of colonialism and decolonization broadens interpretations and our understanding of the war. In the decades after the end of World War II, memoirs, popular accounts, and early scholarly interpretations frequently overlooked or downplayed the colonial dimensions of the war or its colonial causations. The topic of colonialism rarely fit comfortably with "good war" and "greatest generation" narratives of World War II, both of which have had a tremendous impact on popular interpretations of the war and shaped mass perceptions. Part of this was no doubt due to the themes emphasized in influential postwar memoirs, particularly the multivolume work of Winston Churchill, but also due to the influence of the cold war on World War II historiography. Cold war perspectives shaped much of the postwar historiography with an emphasis on Anglo-American-Soviet wartime relations, with the colonial dimensions of the prewar and wartime periods often underappreciated. When the origins of the Pacific War were explored, the focus frequently centered on the events leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 rather than broader contextual issues, such as the colonial nature of the war in Asia or prewar events in China.

Early accounts by Akira Iriye sought to rectify this by emphasizing the contextual issues of the interwar period. Moreover, in the late 1970s, important works by Christopher Thorne (1978) and William Roger Louis (1978) placed the primary emphasis on the colonial dimensions of the war. Louis looked at colonialism in a global context, with particular emphasis on Asia, and Thorne focused exclusively on Asia and the Pacific. Thorne and Louis established a template for much of the vast scholarly focus on the colonial dimensions of World War II that followed. Increasingly, new themes and approaches such as the racial aspects of the war, nationalism, and resistance movements, have driven a focus on colonialism, and the bibliography is growing larger by the year. Evidence of colonial resistance to the Europeans and collaborations with the Japanese has long suggested that much of the colonial periphery did not perceive the war as a clearly defined struggle between the Allied and Axis powers. In much of Asia, but also throughout parts of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, many saw the war as an opportunity to reduce or even terminate colonial control. German military successes in Europe, and Japanese victories throughout Asia, substantially expedited postwar liberation by undermining and challenging European and American rule and discrediting many of the chief ideological rationales upholding colonial regimes.

World War II greatly sped up the demise of the colonial powers, particularly in Asia, a process that was already in motion at the end of World War I and throughout the interwar years. Understanding World War II's role in the dissolution of the colonial empires requires some exploration of the historical development of these complex enterprises. The emergence of vast European colonial empires after 1500 in Asia, but also in the Americas, the Middle East and Africa, occurred because of a series of unique historical factors, including increased globalization during the modern, post-1500 period and emerging European advances in technologies, particularly in the areas of seafaring, navigation and weaponry, but also bacteriological advantages. All of these factors shifted the balance decisively in favor of European

colonizers. Well-organized Europeans often exploited divisions in societies they came into contact with and deployed European advantages to establish large overseas empires. Europeans gradually began supplanting local power structures and earlier empires such as the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and North Africa, the Mogul Empire in South Asia, and the power and influence of the Ming and Manchu empires in East Asia. As these earlier imperial systems weakened, European powers such as Great Britain, France, Spain, and even relatively small European states such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, and eventually non-European states such as the United States and Japan, filled the vacuum. The industrial revolution further accelerated the drive for raw materials. The European hunger for resources resulted in the division of much of the world among these states.

World War I also had important consequences for colonialism. As Allied soldiers died by the millions on the Western Front, Great Britain took possession of much of the Middle East from the crumbling Ottoman Empire, securing the routes to India, and guaranteeing future control over the vast oil deposits of the Gulf. World War I had a galvanizing effect on decolonization, however. The Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Czarist Russian empires collapsed, but less obvious was the weakening of the British and French empires, both of which lost a large measure of their moral legitimacy. Bolshevik anti-imperialist rhetoric and Wilsonian rhetoric about the evils of colonialism, stoked anticipation in the colonial world that World War I would lead to changes in the European colonial empires. The post-World War I political environment in much of the colonial world was profoundly altered. A heightened sense of national consciousness throughout much of the colonial world, and feelings of betrayal after the war, led to a series of anticolonial risings from Ireland to China (Manela 2007). Instead of traditional spoils, Great Britain and France had to settle for the establishment of League of Nations mandates over territories taken from the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and the German overseas empire in Africa, the Far East, and the Pacific. The mandates hinted at a new direction. Ideally, European possessions could no longer merely be exploited economically as the mandates implied tutelage, reform, and liberal empire. Instead, the mandates often became smokescreens for informal or indirect empire and many of the peoples inhabiting these possessions seethed with a sense of betrayal. Despite much talk in London about reform or informal empire, increasingly these complex enterprises were held together by the manipulation of colonial politics and repression, making a mockery of the notion that the colonial empires were mutual endeavors and discrediting colonial political systems. To many of the colonized, repression underscored the true reasons for the existence of the colonial empires such as resource extraction, strategic advantage, and international prestige.

The various colonial powers emerged in different parts of the world with distinctive administrative systems and styles. The European colonial empires grew into vast, complex, multifaceted entities, making it difficult to generalize about them because substantial differences emerged even within single colonial empires. At the outbreak of World War II, conditions in Britain's white dominions differed greatly from the treatment of indigenous populations in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East. The degree of national self-determination allowed, and the degree of emergent national consciousness and resistance to colonialism, differed greatly among the various empires and colonies. These complexities were compounded by a

diverse matrix of colonial systems and bureaucracies, both in the metropolitan centers and in the colonial peripheries (Shipway 2008).

The colonial empires brought certain advantages, but also liabilities. Raw materials such as oil, minerals, and rubber fueled the industrial economies, and military-industrial complexes, of several European states and Japan, and the geostrategic advantages of empire had been underscored during World War I. Imperial defense often posed a burden for Great Britain and France, however, and diverted scarce military resources from the European core while creating numerous hostages to fortune, particularly in Asia. Moreover, the persistence of the European colonial empires complicated the international relations of the interwar period, rendering it difficult for Great Britain and France to criticize Italy's attack on Abyssinia or Japan's brutal treatment of China. Great Britain, France, and the United States, hardly in a position to offer a credible protest, found it difficult to mount an effective counterargument to Japanese aggression in Asia in the years leading up to 1941.

The war occurred at a vulnerable moment for the colonial powers, with the rise of national consciousness throughout the interwar years, particularly in India and the Middle East. The European colonial powers had been slow to recognize these profound changes in their empires and had failed to make much progress reforming and modernizing their possessions during the critical interwar years. Even the mandates had largely languished. There had always been a paradox at the heart of colonial enterprises, and particularly the mandates schemes after World War I. Progress in the political and economic sphere would encourage and expedite self-rule; whereas a lack of such progress would justify continued colonial rule. Increasingly, the stated reasons for colonialism, particularly in the mandates, were economic and political development and advancement to self-rule. But the unspoken *de facto* reasons for colonialism largely continued to be resource extraction and strategic imperatives, thus leaving many colonies deliberately underdeveloped. The European colonial empires in Asia and the Far East remained closed economic systems. By the twentieth century, however, as European states weakened relative to the rest of world and as the peoples of the colonial periphery asserted themselves, colonialism was challenged almost everywhere. During the interwar years, much of the colonial world began slowly to experience a revolution in national consciousness. At the same time, the European overseas colonial empires began to show signs of overstretch, as the maintenance of the empires became an increasing drain on metropolitan treasuries and exposed the periphery to strategic threats, particularly in Asia and Oceania but also in the Middle East. The colonial powers also faced growing impatience among colonized peoples.

Historians have differed over the extent to which World War II stimulated decolonization. Some works, such as those of William Roger Louis, John Gallagher's (1982) *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire*, and Colin Cross's (1968) *The Fall of the British Empire, 1918–1968*, emphasized the war's importance to decolonization and the end of empire. While the conflict may have accelerated aspects of decolonization, colonial powers such as Great Britain and France also anticipated that the war might bring opportunities for colonial consolidation, perhaps even expansion. Explorations of the subject of colonialism during the interwar period and during World War II have often emphasized the role of Great Britain and the British Empire. The British colonial empire was the largest in the world in terms of territory, population, and links to earlier parts of the empire, which became dominions such as

Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. As one of the Big Three during World War II, Great Britain's colonial policies often took on a greater importance than those of other colonial empires. For several centuries, Great Britain had traditionally enlarged its colonial empire through wars, as they, and the French, did during and after World War I, particularly in the Middle East and Africa through the establishment of the mandates system. Many British officials had every reason to believe they might yet again extend their empire during and after World War II. The wartime resurgence of imperial rhetoric was not mere bombast. British officials such as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Leo Amery and others believed the war might lead to a consolidation and perhaps expansion of the British colonial empire. In the short term, the war may have actually slowed the process of decolonization in some colonies as the British and Free French crushed local nationalism in their possessions in India and throughout the Middle East.

In Asia, there was little that had not come under the control of colonial empires. Europeans ruled in French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, East Timor, and New Guinea. The American Philippines had originally been a Spanish colony, taken by the United States in 1898. Japan entered the colonial contest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, taking control of Taiwan (1895) Korea (1910), parts of China such as Shantung (1920) and Manchuria (1931). The Japanese had been attempting to colonize ever larger parts of China since 1937. Japan ultimately failed to absorb China, where resistance was fueled by a nationalist reaction to Japan's brutality (Beasley 1987). Historians have explored different aspects of the Japanese Empire. Michael A. Barnhart's (1987) *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Security, 1919–1941* focused on security and economics, while Peter Duus's (1995) *The Abacus and the Sword: the Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* explored the role of business, and Louise Young's (1988) *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* looked at the influence of a wide range of social and interest groups on the Japanese right and left.

The December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was the climax of a long geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Tokyo. During World War I, Japan, after entering the war on the side of the Allies in August 1914, seized Germany's Pacific possessions north of the equator and in 1915 coerced a weak and divided China to grant it extensive economic privileges in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, as well as the right to German concessions on the Shantung Peninsula.

German victories in 1940, and the capitulation of European colonial powers such as France and the Netherlands, had consequences in the colonial periphery. French colonies, for example, entered a state of limbo where pro-Vichy administrators were allowed to run them but the colonies could be used for the benefit of the Axis powers at any moment (Thomas 2007). The emergence of Japan as a great power during the first half of the twentieth century, and Japan's stunning military successes in 1941–1942, contributed to undermining European colonial rationales based on race. The slower, but nevertheless inevitable, rise of China as an emerging power, together with the explosion of national consciousness among many other peoples of the world, notably in India and the Middle East, undermined notions of white superiority that had long been cultivated by the European colonial powers as a justification for their rule. The notion of white superiority could only persist so long as the European

powers actually proved to be superior. The humiliating nature of the Allied defeats in Europe and Asia between 1940 and 1942 dealt a blow to such thinking. European notions about the poor fighting spirit of "eastern races" did nothing to explain the success of Japanese forces in Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Hawaii. The Japanese offensive in 1941–1942 exposed the weakness of European powers. The 1942 fall of Singapore was considered the greatest blow to British imperial prestige since Yorktown in 1781 (Tarling 1993). Asian nationalists drew the necessary conclusions about European weakness. Japan's proclamation of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the convening of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Conference in November 1943, further encouraged Asian nationalist politics which the Europeans had long repressed.

Japan's territorially vast colonial project further expanded between 1941 and 1942 into French Indochina, British Hong Kong, British Singapore, British Malaya, British Borneo, the American Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and Australian New Guinea. These territories "liberated" from Europeans by the Japanese did not achieve genuine independence but were instead often subjected to harsh occupations and further colonialism. Nonetheless, an Asian power had humiliated the Europeans and Americans, with profound consequences for the postwar continuance of colonial rule in Asia.

In South Asia, the breached promises of the previous war, along with continued repression and a British declaration of war on behalf of India, exposed as fiction the notion of Indian autonomy and led to significant wartime strife. Successive India Acts in 1919 and 1935 had failed to satisfy nationalist feeling in the subcontinent. Mass mobilization and strike action against the British culminated in the 1942 Quit India movement, the biggest rising there since 1857. In the Indian province of Bengal, imperial incompetence led to the death of an estimated 3 million people (Bayly and Harper 2007). British efforts to blame the Indians left lasting bitterness playing into the hands of Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army (Mukerjee 2010). Like many nationalists throughout the European empires, Bose saw war in Europe as an opportunity. In neighboring Burma, the Japanese offensive encouraged Ba Maw and his Sinyetha movement, where the Japanese granted independence in August 1943. In the Dutch East Indies, Japanese occupation had expelled the Dutch and galvanized anticolonial nationalism. Millions of Indonesians resisted the restoration of their Dutch colonial masters, and Sukarno's nationalist anticolonial movement had broad public support. Some 250,000 Indonesians voluntarily worked for the Japanese war effort, and the ferocity with which much of the population opposed the return of the Dutch authorities at the end of the war demonstrated the depth of their loathing for continued European rule (McMahon 1978). In Malaya and Singapore, anticolonial nationalism gained momentum under Japanese occupation. Korea had been subjected to Japanese colonial rule longer than any other Asian territory. Made a Japanese protectorate in 1905, and annexed outright in 1910, Korea in 1919 tried to persuade the conferees at Paris to recognize its right to self-determination. But Japan had been an ally during the Great War and the peacemakers ignored Korean pleas. Korea's industrialization in the 1930s, coupled with its rich mineral resources and extensive coastline, made it a critical strategic point in Asia.

Tensions between imperialism and national self-determination emerged even prior to American entry into World War II. Once in the war, however, American

critics of colonialism were emboldened as the war offered an opportunity to push for reform or even end the colonial empires (Gardner 2008). Exploring American anticolonialism, as Christopher Thorne has demonstrated, assists in challenging some of the myths of the special relationship (Thorne 1978). Roosevelt's views on colonialism evolved and changed with the circumstances of the war. American officials sought to exploit to their advantage the rise of national consciousness among the peoples of Asia, the Middle East, and particularly in India (Louis 1978). Regardless of the war's outcome, FDR believed the colonial world would be profoundly altered. American officials gave much attention to formulating a response to the emergent nationalism in the colonial world. The United States might best promote its interests if it aligned itself with the aspirations of the many millions in the colonial world. National self-determination, and how to ally America with these movements, would be a huge political factor in the postwar years. In the United States, decolonization became enmeshed with the issue of domestic race relations and pressure for racial progress at home, making a connection between colonial rule and racism on the home front. Could the Washington fight colonialism abroad but not address race at home? Could it critique colonialism abroad, but perpetuate aspects of it through domestic racism (Von Eschen 1997)? Walter White called for the convening of a "Pacific Conference" where President Roosevelt might meet with Nehru and Gandhi, and perhaps Chiang, leading to proclamation of a "Pacific Charter" pledging to end colonial rule.

Many American officials also held the view that the persistence of European colonialism would adversely affect US national interests in the postwar years (Kimball 1991). American hostility to the colonial empires was only partly about national self-determination, but was also about the desire to open up the closed imperial economic systems as well as all other closed economic colonial empires, such as France, the Netherlands, and Japan. The weakening of colonial economic systems would allow for easier access to vital raw materials and export markets after the war (Dobson 1988). Both the March 1941 Lend-Lease Act and the August 1941 Atlantic Charter deliberately challenged closed colonial economic systems, demanding reciprocity by opening the Imperial Preference system to American commercial interests. The original draft of Article Three of the Atlantic Charter sought to extend the call for restoration of self-government to the colonial world. Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and his undersecretary of state, Sumner Welles, believed that the Atlantic Charter would guarantee that colonial powers could not return to the status quo after the war. At the conference, Churchill argued that the Atlantic Charter applied only to Europe. Welles argued that the Charter should not be limited to "the White race." He announced: "Peoples capable of autonomous government should be possessed of that right whether they be yellow or brown, black or white" (O'Sullivan 2008, p. 138). But, by acceding to the Atlantic Charter, Churchill unintentionally lent legitimacy to self-determination. Many in the colonial world and America argued that self-determination meant nothing if not applied to all colonial empires. The Atlantic Charter lent legitimacy to the anti-imperial struggle. Despite Churchill's best efforts, anticolonialism was emerging as an Allied war aim (Toye 2010).

Washington nonetheless struggled to develop a broad policy to counter the Japanese call for an Asia for Asians and a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, one that would simultaneously undermine Japanese propaganda efforts while allying

the United States with the aspirations of the colonial peoples. An important component of this was the acceleration of independence for the Philippines. The Americans saw the Philippines as a showcase. With the Tydings–McDuffie Act of 1934, America officially pledged to make it a self-governing commonwealth, with full independence scheduled for 1946. After the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941–1942, the United States pledged that the islands would achieve immediate independence upon liberation by US forces. American officials hoped their treatment of the Philippines would set a useful example for the rest of the world, and Roosevelt allowed the Philippines to sign the Declaration of the United Nations in December 1941.

India emerged as an issue in the Anglo-American wartime contest over colonialism. A few days before the Atlantic Conference, Welles suggested to Roosevelt that he discuss Indian independence “in a very personal and confidential way directly with Mr. Churchill” (O’Sullivan 2008, p. 48). American impatience with British policy in India steadily increased after the United States entered the war, when many British actions might be misinterpreted as having Washington’s tacit approval (Hess 1971). When London sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India in an attempt to reach a settlement with the Congress Party leaders by proposing dominion status for India, Roosevelt simultaneously dispatched to the subcontinent Colonel Louis Johnson (Venkataramani and Shrivastava 1979) and, later, William Phillips (Clymer 1988). Some British officials suspected that the true intent of American interference was to secure a large share of India’s postwar commercial market. Nor did the British accept Washington’s high-minded justifications for supporting self-determination. Other British officials saw the Americans as “economic imperialists” or “economic expansionists” who aimed to supplant British interests throughout the world and suspected that the true intent of American interference was to secure a larger share of the postwar global commercial market (Kent 1993).

The Americans saw China as a rising anticolonial power playing a key role in decolonization, believing China might be utilized as a counterweight to Britain and a proxy for American goals of decolonization throughout Asia. The future status of China represented another area of disagreement among the Allies. The gradual emergence of China as one of the great powers during World War II, and Roosevelt’s insistence that China be included as part of the wartime Big Four, rankled Churchill and the British. China and the United States had similar views on the colonial situation in Asia. Chiang applauded the American pledge to free the Philippines and desired independence for Korea as soon as possible and the Chinese vehemently opposed the British colonial presence in the region. American officials grew concerned that China, having been dominated by foreign powers for much of its recent history, would feel threatened if global trends appeared to be heading in the direction of a “new imperialism” at the end of the war. China’s emergence might change the very nature of the world order, leading to an erosion of imperial prestige throughout the colonial world. Against British opposition, Chiang visited the Indian subcontinent in February 1942, where he publicly expressed sympathy for the nationalist cause and the Americans gave serious consideration to Chinese views on European colonialism in the Far East, concluding that China should be included in the discussion if the reconstruction of the world was to be successful. According to Michael Schaller’s *The US Crusade in China, 1938–1945*, the British

in particular feared that American policy had determined to pull down the foundations of the empire even before a final verdict was rendered ... Churchill believed Roosevelt's game was to make China strong enough to "police" Asia while remaining essentially dependent upon the United States. The Prime Minister complained to subordinates that the Americans expected to use China as a "faggot vote on the side of the United States in an attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire." (Schaller 1979, pp. 91–93)

The British felt threatened by American plans to promote China and resented Chinese interference in the affairs of India and Hong Kong (Kimball 1991). British officials saw clearly what China's rise portended for British colonial interests, not only in Asia but also throughout the wider world, undermining racial rationales upholding the colonial empires (Shai 1980). The Prime Minister's disdain for the Chinese blinded him to the larger strategic realities of Asia and made it difficult for him to comprehend China's contributions to the war. Churchill did not comprehend how China's stubborn refusal to capitulate effectively tied down substantial Japanese forces that might otherwise have been available for Burma or India. Works such as Schaller's (1979), Wesley M. Bagby's (1992) *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with China in World War II*, Xiaoyuan Lui's (1996) *Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941–1945*, and Paul A. Varg's (1973) *Closing the Door: Sino-American Relations, 1936–1946*, have emphasized estrangement and misperception in the US–China wartime relationship, whereas Margret Denning's (1986) *The Sino-American Alliance in World War II: Cooperation and Dispute among Nationalists Communists, and Americans*, has argued that the alliance achieved its basic aims.

US officials saw the war as an opportunity to dismantle the French colonial empire, thus provoking further conflict with Churchill and the British. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, Roosevelt wanted to see France disarmed, stripped of its empire, and removed from the ranks of the great powers. He believed that after the war the French empire would be a destabilizing force in the world and that the United States must use its power to bring French colonialism to an end. After American entry into the war, American officials concluded that France had lost any legitimacy to maintain control over territory in Southeast Asia. Speaking before the postwar planning committee, Sumner Welles asked: "what inherent right has France to territory which she seized, sometimes by war, as recently as the 1880 s, any more than has Japan to seize by force certain territories of China which she has now occupied? The only difference is in point of time" (O'Sullivan 2008, p. 147). Roosevelt was prepared to go further with regard to Indochina. In July 1943, the US president told a gathering of the Pacific War Council that the French should be stripped of their colonial possessions in the Far East because they had "done nothing for the population, but had misgoverned and exploited it," and their return to Indochina after the war would "make bad feeling throughout the Far East." "Indochina should not be given back to the French Empire after the war," he concluded (Kimball 1991, p. 140).

Beyond Asia and the Pacific, the European colonial empires had become dangerously overextended during the first half of the twentieth century, a reality that was made explicit by the global nature of World War II. Having lost much of Asia in 1941–1942, Britain was determined to hang on in the Middle East, defending the Suez Canal, the Iraqi oil fields, and the routes to India. World War II had important

consequences for the future of the Middle East, where British and French actions, and the systematic repression of the imperial regimes, presented the Allies with numerous challenges (Louis 1978). Great Britain was perhaps most exposed in Egypt, which, with the Suez Canal, was deemed absolutely vital to British interests, but nationalist stirrings also heightened in Iraq and the Levant (Thomas 2007). Britain and France's possessions in the Middle East also grew increasingly restive and remained in a state of sporadic rebellion throughout the war and after. World War II ended with Great Britain and France still in control over most of the Middle East. But this obscured the profound changes occurring in the region during the war and the new realities that had emerged in the postwar era. The French hold over the Levant states had completely eroded during the war and Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria were not long from independence. Britain's informal control over Iraq and Egypt looked increasingly tenuous and repressive measures to hold their position in the Middle East drove many into the nationalist movements. Postwar conflicts in Suez, Iraq and Algeria cannot be understood without an exploration of the events in the Middle East during the interwar period and World War II. Moreover, growing fears of possible Axis penetration of West Africa, coupled with the emergence of Africa as an important theater of war for the Allies, meant that the European colonial possessions on that continent loomed large as a site of valuable strategic materials, while its proximity to Allied shipping lanes gave it a heightened geopolitical value. Many Africans observed the weakening of their old colonial overseers and it became increasingly clear that, regardless of the war's outcome, the colonial powers would emerge greatly diminished (Kent 2000).

With the war over in 1945, and many of the European colonial powers restored to their former positions of dominance in their colonial possessions, many assumed that life would return to the *status quo ante bellum*. In the French colonial empire, and the Netherlands East Indies, the colonial powers faced formidable obstacles to restoring the status quo after the war. World War II largely proved to be the undoing of colonial empires, however, and a postwar colonial policy increasingly based on repression had little likelihood of success. In much of Asia such as British India, Singapore, Malaya, French Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies, local populations were largely indifferent or often hostile to European colonial rule. The war also altered Britain's relations with the Dominions, particularly Australia and New Zealand (Stewart 2008). Moreover, many of the resistance movements that emerged during the war became important factors in the postwar world, particularly in French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya. The war also led to the immediate decolonization of the Japanese colonial empire in Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and parts of China. Decolonization in much of South Asia and East Asia followed soon after the conclusion of the war. The United States relinquished the Philippines in 1946, Great Britain departed from India in 1947, and the Dutch departed from Indonesia in 1949. The ferocity with which millions of Indonesians resisted the reimposition of Dutch rule revealed the depth of loathing for European colonialism (McMahon 1978). Decolonization did not occur immediately everywhere, however. Wars of decolonization persisted in Indochina, where the French fought on until 1954, and in Malaya where the British fought on throughout the 1950s. Decolonization also occurred in the Middle East and was on the horizon in sub-Saharan Africa.

After World War II, decolonization became entangled in cold war politics. At the same time, the international community underwent a postwar legitimacy revolution with the United Nations an important part. Its establishment in 1945 further advanced the wartime idea that all peoples would be sovereign in the postwar era and it provided an institutional destination for decolonized peoples, what Norrie MacQueen in *Colonialism* has called a “diplomatic self-help association” made up of formerly colonized peoples (MacQueen 2007, p. 95). The UN sped the end of colonialism and gave voice to former colonies such as India for the emergence of a new, postwar, order devoid of exploitative race-based colonial relationships. European hopes of a liberal or informal empire built upon greater racial harmony and an appreciation of colonial multiculturalism foundered upon the grim realities of colonies established primarily for the extraction of resources and occupied by troops who had little sympathy for or understanding of the colonized. Wartime talk about reformed empire and transitioning to commonwealth status was undermined by a climate of heightened national consciousness that followed the war, as well as by the increasing number of colonial wars and atrocities. A series of messy and often violently botched decolonization crises led to further repression and mass dispossession and wars to prevent decolonization such as in Algeria, Indochina, and Kenya had tremendous consequences for the postwar years.

The subject of World War II and colonialism will continue to provide fresh historiographical interpretations. Previously, with the exception of the works mentioned above, the colonial dimensions of the war have often been overlooked. When they have been explored, it was largely from a British perspective, largely because of the availability of archives and general interest. Perspectives are gradually shifting to other areas, such as the study of Japanese colonialism in Korea, Taiwan, China, and throughout Asia and the Pacific from 1942–1945, as well as of the consequences of European colonialism in the Middle East, India, and Africa. In the Middle East, World War II will be seen as the high water mark of European imperialism in the region, an event that began to tip the balance to the disadvantage of the British and French and in favor of local nationalists. Following the war, conflicts related to decolonization occurred in Syria, Palestine, Suez, Iraq, and Algeria. These new perspectives may feature less emphasis on metropolitan perspectives and more on the periphery, availability of sources permitting. New perspectives will not only be contingent upon fresh interpretive frameworks, but also upon access to peripheral sources. “It may become progressively harder,” John Darwin has observed, “to balance the view of the Imperial centre or of its agencies – richly, efficiently, and accessibly documented – with that of the local, indigenous, colonial periphery – archivally voiceless or disinherited” (Darwin 1999, p. 556).

A broader international interest in the war might provoke new interpretations from the vantage point of the so-called colonial periphery, further contextualizing the better-known perspectives of Washington and London. New accounts might emphasize colonial autonomy and the emergence of postcolonial politics on the periphery over a metropolitan focus on colonial bureaucracies and administration. Moreover, there might be more emphasis on China’s role in Asian decolonization. The steady rise of China as a factor in world politics and culture in the twenty-first century might mean more emphasis on its role in the international system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From an Asian perspective, World War II might come to be seen

as only a part of the larger worldwide struggle to end colonialism. As Bayly and Harper have argued, perhaps World War II will be seen as only a part of a "Great Asian War" running from 1937 to 1975 (Bayly and Harper 2007, p. 539).

In recent years, there have been explorations of the legacy of racism in the colonial empires and the question of race may also feature more prominently in future accounts. Questions related to race and the United States role in the Philippines are explored in Paul A. Kramer's (2006) *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*, and Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (2003) *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*. Peter Duus (1995) explores race in Japanese-Korean context in his *The Abacus and the Sword: the Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910*. Although often ignored by proponents of empire and its revisionist defenders since, racial exclusivity was often a prominent feature of colonialism and among its most lasting and destructive legacies. Racism ultimately undermined colonialism, however, and became a chief target of criticism of the forces of decolonization. The racial nature of World War II meant that the Germans and even Japanese emphasized race and racial hierarchies. The defeat of Nazism and Japanese imperialism undermined racism as an organizing principle of societies and colonial empires. The war revealed to many the spurious nature of racial rationales that had been used to justify colonial domination.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Visionaries of Expansion

R. J. B. BOSWORTH

On 13 April 1915 Luigi Medici del Vascello, a member of one of liberal Italy's most distinguished families, addressed a meeting of the Nationalist Association in Rome. His uncle, Giacomo, had been a prominent follower of both Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi, a defender of the Roman Republic in 1849 and a leader of the Thousand in 1860. By the war with Austria in 1866, he was a general in the national army, thereafter nominated to be the prefect of Palermo. He was a free mason and a member of parliament and then a senator and, in 1876, the family was ennobled. Luigi's brother, Giuseppe, was a senior diplomat, long serving in Constantinople and eventually promoted to be ambassador to Spain. But it was Turkey to which Luigi Medici del Vascello turned his attention in those weeks while his Italy was preparing to enter World War I. Italy, he argued, must not allow the Mediterranean to fall under the domination of Britain, France, or Russia. Rather, throughout the east and especially in Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine, "Italian traditions lived and breathed in local memory and language." "Remember, sirs," he concluded in grand peroration, "Constantinople was built by a Roman Caesar and today on the banks of the enchanting Bosphorus, while the sound of the Muezzin rocks the Turk in his fatal torpor, the Galata Tower sighs imploringly to its Genoa and so to Italy!" (Medici del Vascello 1916, pp. 156–185).

Since I am a historian of Italy and my task is to explore those visions of expansion that drove participants in World War II, let me shift the scene forward two decades. A major recent publication for any student of Mussolini's Fascist dictatorship is the massive diary of his last lover, Claretta Petacci. She obsessively recorded his every word mostly about their sex life but often, too, about politics and war, nation, race and Italy's ideal destiny. So, we learn from Petacci's pages that the *Duce* thought that Franco was "an idiot," unsurprisingly given that the Spanish people were "indolent, inert and had much of the Arab about them." The English, too, were "really pigs. They think only with their bums. They're completely mediocre and detest anyone

who rises from the ranks, a man who imposes himself, someone who is exceptional.” The Austrians were irredeemable: “We hate the Austrians and they hate us.” The French, too, had nothing to be said for them, “these idiotic French owe their decadence and their cretinism to three things – syphilis, absinthe and [a free] press.” Similarly, Jews were “pigs, a people destined to be completely wiped out. ... Traitors who always revolt against a people that has given them refuge and protection. Puah! ... I detest them.” The Czechs had no future, “every little state is destined to die. Their time is over. Only the great Nations will live.” Even Italians were split into the descendents of slaves – four million of them – and of real Romans. If the former “raise their heads, I shall destroy them, I shall exterminate them all,” the *Duce* boasted.

Only the (Prussian) Germans and Adolf Hitler escaped Mussolini’s vengeful consignment to perdition. Hitler was “a big teddy bear” at heart, his fellow dictator stated with an extraordinary misreading of character, who “adored” him and loved Italy. In any case, even when there were “800 million” Germans, “there will always be an Italian people who will know how to defend themselves and will always beat the Germans.” After all, even in regard to nice men with a notable sense of humor like Hitler, Mussolini was sure, it was a cruel and violent world. In it, “no country ever goes to war to please another but only to pursue its own interests and thinking therefore of booty.” This world grew tougher every day. It was good that his younger daughter, Anna Maria, afflicted with polio, gained pleasure from watching lambs being slaughtered. That was appropriate, Mussolini told his guileless lover, since the struggle between humans was always visceral, and was now more so than ever (Petacci 2009, pp. 124, 126, 196, 215, 244–245, 299–300, 307, 332–333, 413, 415, 424).

Two images, then, a liberal-nationalist gentleman in 1915 and a Fascist dictator with World War II approaching, each with visions (or nightmares) of the best possible fate for their country, throughout its post-Risorgimento history the least of the great nations. What do they reveal of the visions of expansion or survival of those who lived through the “thirty years war” of the first half of the twentieth century? After all, when it came to vast ambition, impelled by an idea, it was Medici del Vascello who was arguably the less restrained as he dreamed of a Roman Empire fully restored to the liberal “Third” Italian nation and returning a *Mare Nostrum* to its guide. Mussolini, plainly, was no gentle peacemaker. Yet, his worldview was bleak and savage, threaded, for all his boasting, with a deep pessimism, at least as “realistic” as it was ignited by Fascist ideology. This contrast will be worth remembering as we venture into a survey and analysis of the attitudes toward expansion possessed by the leaders of the combatant states of World War II and by their societies.

What, after all, was Italy’s purpose in entering World War II on 10 June 1940, as in World War I, nine months late, but again with studied deliberation and knowledge as to what the conflict would be like? Sometimes the regime’s answer to a query about its aims was that Italians intended to construct a “revolutionary” Fascist “new order” (Rodogno 2006). At others, the motive was “good business” or more crudely “booty,” gains of any sort that could reinforce Italy’s doubtful position as a Power. “Idealism” (of a perverted sort) or realism, each can be seen as the key to fascist war making.

Many commentators have endeavored to resolve this difference either in philosophical or personal terms, maximizing or minimizing the Fascist ideological drive, ascribing greater or lesser fanaticism and bloodlust to Mussolini. Yet structures should not

be forgotten. If a full tally of Italian ambition in the war is made, it might include Tunis, Djibouti, Corsica, Nice (and even Provence, romanized as Provensa – see, for example, Landra 1939), the Ticino, Malta, imaginably Egypt, British Somaliland, Dalmatia, Slovenia (in January 1942, Fascist Party secretary, Aldo Vidussoni, talked blithely of committing genocide on the local people but without any planning of such large-scale murder), a protectorate over Croatia, Kossovo (Albania having already been seized on Good Friday 1939), the Epirus, Corfu, other parts of Greece, and much of Asia Minor.

This grandiose list is striking for two reasons, with the most illuminating being its mixture of national and imperial claims. Maybe, by some loose definition, the population of southern France, the borderlands of Switzerland and Yugoslavia, Malta, Corsica, all could be argued to be “Italian.” But elsewhere, in North and East Africa and in territories that had once been part of the Ottoman Empire, Italy was seeking to round out its belated and imitative “empire of rags and patches,” as it has been evocatively termed. If this is the sin of commission in lustful Italian dreams, a sin of omission is more glaring. Where, in fact, did “Italians” live in vast numbers and, during the first half of the twentieth century, build an informal empire massively greater and richer than anything ruled by the Italian state? The answer was simple: in the New Worlds of the Americas, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and the rest. True, Italy, after Pearl Harbor, did join battle against the USA (and, technically at least, against its Latin American allies and satellites). But not even the maddest Fascist dreamed of annexing New York and Buenos Aires and bringing the Italians who lived there home to an Italian Reich. No doubt, well before the war, the dictatorship was more active than its liberal predecessor in fostering a nationalized or nationalizing culture among Italian emigrants, wherever they might be found. But Fascists did not hanker for a “mathematically precise” world (the phrase was one of Mussolini’s favorites and almost always signified imprecision) where all Italian-speaking peoples were ruled by Rome. It did not blindly seek to make the borders that marked the use of the Italian language coterminous with the nation.

This lingering national uncertainty was evident after 1940. When war began, the dictatorship, despite its earlier innovations and success in propaganda, proved one of the feeblest combatants in rallying a version of history behind its cause. Neither talk about Britain as the new Carthage, nor efforts to hail a “Fifth War of the Risorgimento” (with perilously anti-German overtones) got far.

More contemporary motivation was also hard to harness behind the war effort. Was Italy fundamentally anticommunist, armed and ready to wage righteous battle against Stalin? After all, the regime had arisen to defeat and suppress the country’s socialist and communist movements. Moreover, at the end of the 1930s, the Catholic Church and many members of the elite were zealots of a world without communism. After September 1939 Galeazzo Ciano, the yuppy minister of foreign affairs and the *Duce*’s son-in-law, half-began preparations to send military support to Finland in that country’s “Winter War” against the USSR. If this scheme failed, in June 1941, although Hitler did not bother to inform his Axis partner about Operation Barbarossa until it had commenced, Italy did send troops to the east. Yet, the Italian regime did not really see itself as engaged in a fundamentalist crusade there, and it was not long before Mussolini was trying to nudge Hitler into a compromise deal with Stalin, so that the Axis could confront its “real” enemy (or anyway the foe nearest to Italy),

the “plutocratic powers” of the USA and UK. Mussolini’s mind did not fully comprehend the totality of his partner’s commitment to a war of extermination against Judeo-Bolshevism. Thus Fascist anti-Semitic legislation and practice from 1938 onwards never lost its air of improvisation and, even if Italians were not “nice people” (*brava gente*) toward the Jews under their rule, they can scarcely be defined as “Mussolini’s willing executioners” (even the *Duce* was erratic in his anti-Semitic passion).

It is a cliché that Italians were not persuaded to fight their version of World War II with the same dedication and self-sacrifice of the armies of their German and Japanese allies or even of their English-speaking opponents. There are some dangers in accepting too easily this view that “Italians cannot fight.” Yet, it probably is true that Italy’s war was only popular in those rare moments when it seemed that the Fascist nation was going to win a cheap and easy victory. Quite a few Italians, then, opened their minds to visions and nightmares of ideological and/or national expansion. But these visions never properly cohered. The contradictions in them could not be hidden or denied, as Mussolini, in his more honest moments, knew. Fascist Italy proved a feeble warrior state, both because it had not resolved the economic and technological realities of Italy’s relative national weakness and especially because from June 1940 it engaged in World War II, although its dictatorship was unable to work out clearly why, how far it should seek to expand and how much strive to keep what it already had.

Most commentators, when they examine the “predator” states of the War (Burleigh 2010, pp. 1–34) note that Italy was Germany’s “first ally” and then pass hastily on to an account of the Nazi horror and, if they have global interest, to a study of Japanese imperialism in the Far East. Today, few would want to deny that the conflict that began on 3 September 1939 was at its base racial, a “mad” Hitlerite “war against the Jews,” what in most modern parlance was a fundamentalist Nazi crusade of hate and extermination. Doubts may be raised about confining our understanding of the war to a Holocaust with a capital “H” (Novick 1999). But the Nazi regime’s determination on “Judeocide” through the combination of bureaucracy and industrial methods, state and business, with the slaying based on a (pseudo-)science that identified Jews with seeming objectivity, was unique and must continue to be placed at the center of any interpretation of the visions that propelled World War II. In recent years the geographical and political widening of the meaning ascribed to genocide, as well as the ironically positive assessment given to historical victimhood by the multiple parties of identity politics, have on occasion chafed at the central place of the killing of the Jews in the war. So, too, have some of the policies of Israel, a troubled democracy that is both a new nation, emphatic like other nations that it is vastly old, and the carrier of ambiguous histories from the British, French, Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov, Ottoman, Soviet, and American empires. Yet, any appraisal of the role of one social group or political comity over another during World War II must start by acknowledging and deploring the fanatical Nazi intention to murder every Jew in Europe. The conflict was indeed a race war and, as far as the fate of the Jews was concerned, a total one. In this aspect of the Nazi mind, expansion meant the “final solution to the Jewish problem” and nothing was subordinate to that end.

This totality must not be infringed by relativism. Nonetheless, race was, and is, a complex matter. Even among the Nazis, issues survive in the historiography about

how “twisted” was the road map to the death camps. Nazi decision-making was by no means a limpid process and Hitler was anything but a conventional executive, if such a person is thought likely to be reliably at his desk, every day formulating clear and consistent policies. In the detail of the Holocaust, there was space for men and even women on the ground to accelerate or delay murder. Moreover, the Jews were never the Nazis’ only assigned victims. When Hitler and others talked of their determination to cancel from the world the ultimate evil of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” they meant what they said. Tactics on occasion could come into play – and notoriously did so in the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact signed on 23 August 1939, thereby becoming the immediate short-term cause of the “War for Danzig” start of World War II. But Hitler spoke with design, when, in August 1942, he mused that victory would ensure that “St. Petersburg must therefore disappear utterly from the earth’s surface. Moscow, too. Then the Russians will retire into Siberia” (Hitler 1953, p. 617). Similarly, in *Mein Kampf*, he had urged that Germany, asserting its necessary right to be a world power, must seize land to the east, especially since Bolshevism had entailed the rule of the Jew over all the Russias. “The end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. We have been chosen by Fate as witness of a catastrophe,” for Jews and Slavs together, he prophesied (Hitler 1972, p. 598).

Although Göring would talk cheerfully about the disappearance of “ten million” Soviets, regime experts imagined “thirty million” dying in an artificially induced famine and POWs from the USSR were notoriously the first victims of Nazi gassing, Hitler’s regime soon focused on killing Jews, despite the cost in the efficient progress of what Nazi leaders thought in 1941 was certain victory over the communist regime. Yet, as Omer Bartov remarked a generation ago, the war in the east was “a unique phenomenon,” the epicentre of total “barbarisation” (Bartov 1986, p. 156). Sadly familiar to most historians of the war is the death rate of POWs from the Eastern Front: 57.5 percent of Soviets in German charge, 37.5 percent of Germans who fell to the Stalinist regime, as against 3.5 percent of British and American captives who perished in Nazi hands.

Debates continue about the final toll of soldiers and civilians on the Eastern Front but it seems reasonably agreed that the USSR lost at least 27 million in the conflict, almost two-thirds of them being civilians. Yet, any account of this appalling tally has to admit that millions perished, both directly and indirectly, through the policy not of the Nazi enemy but of the Stalin dictatorship. In appraising that regime’s brutal history, it is easy to leap to the conclusion that the USSR and Nazi Germany were therefore “brotherly enemies,” each the common foe of decent humankind (Burleigh 2010, pp. 76–114). Such a conclusion may give a satisfactory sense of moral superiority to commentators in the other combatant states that participated in the war. But there are also negative effects since any understanding of the war that engages in a thorough review of the Eastern Front has to admit that it was not a simple battle between good guys and bad guys. The participants are not well categorized historically as either perpetrators or bystanders or victims.

Making it hard to accept this complex reality has been the fact that, whatever might be concluded about the Soviets’ waging of its so-called “Great Patriotic War,” it can scarcely be denied that, after 1945, the USSR, whether ruled by Stalin or any of his domestic successors down to Gorbachev, and however obsessive were its domestic re-evocations of war and victory, was hopelessly unsuccessful in the global competition

for righteous memory about the war (Tumarkin 1994; Merridale 2005; see also Carleton 2010, pp. 135–168, with his tracing of a perhaps logical Russian, post-Soviet, drift to an absolute, where heroism, virtue and annihilation are united). Thus, in France and Italy, Nazi massacres at Oradour (Farmer 1999) or in the hinterland of Arezzo (Belco 2010) have, at different times, been examined in graphic detail, with the purpose being to ennoble the suffering of nationally or locally defined “ordinary” people and elevate them among the sacred “victims” of the war. Only very recently has this research begun to be extended to what were the “70,000” villages devastated by the German invaders (Bartov 1986, p. 153). Although we live in a world of victims, Soviet ones remain largely un-mourned and unacknowledged.

When the face of battle on the Eastern Front is reviewed in a scholarly manner, quite a few conditioning features emerge over the nature of expansionism and death there. Once again, context is significant. Thus Joshua Sanborn has located “a radically new [and murderous] social and political ecosystem” that operated already during World War I. In those years, by his estimate, between half a million and a million Jews were subject to compulsory migration. Nor were Jews alone; in this time of crisis, military and civilian life intermingled. The perilous effect was that government or its warlord substitutes, in fear, opportunity and weakness, felt impelled to engage in what has recently come to be called “ethnic cleansing” (Sandborn 2005, pp. 290–324). Now began the idea of precisely ensuring a single, “united” population and the demonizing of “minorities” that would so prompt slaughter in World War II.

By 1920 Mussolini was happily announcing his intention to cleanse newly annexed Trieste ethnically, perhaps the first politician openly to deploy this metaphor. It is therefore ironical that, as Götz Aly has noticed, the trial run for the Nazi regime’s terrible ethnic policies occurred at an international level just before the start of World War II in September 1939, when the Axis allies, Germany and Italy, agreed to population transfers in the Alto Adige or Süd Tirol. Hitler characteristically gave Heinrich Himmler and the SS carte blanche to manage the details, with a target of at least 200,000 to be brought home from Italian rule (Aly 1999, pp. 24–25). Both definitions (the Italians clung to their voluntarist understanding of race rather than endorsing Nazi “science”) and process were left vague. The issue where these new Germans should be settled was soon merged into the more general problem of the identification and salvation of “*völkisch* stock” in Poland and the rest of the east. What was clear was that the Nazi idea of war was fundamentally committed to the “scientific” and therefore unarguable racial differentiation of peoples, the idea that had surfaced in the Russian–German conflict of World War I that nations must be rendered homogeneous, with the easy additional implication that some were good and others bad, some destined to live and prosper, others to be destroyed.

It may be that this idea of purifying and tidying up national borders ethnically had a history that went back before World War I. A brutal ethnic cleansing occurred during and following the Balkan wars of 1912–1913, with “Turks” of doubtful definition the most obvious victims. In turn the Armenian genocide, committed by wartime Turkey, offered a model that Hitler for one noticed, while also showing historians yet again that the manufacture of a nation through assertions of historical longevity and rights can carry deadly implications for those who are to be othered out of it (even though many Armenians were murdered by Kurds, soon themselves to become the longstanding victims of efforts to render modern Turkey Turkish)

(Bloxham 2005). Once again, Russia was part of this story since the “vengeance” exacted on Armenians in 1915–1916 was sometimes justified by memories of the imperial Russian cleansing of the Caucasus in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, some two million Moslems then having been expelled with devastating effects on their lives and cultures (King 2008, pp. 96–97).

One further matter needs noting as providing background to the pitiless history of the Eastern front in World War II and the visions of racial extirpation brought to reality there. In the gentler, kinder, age of the *belle époque*, when European intellectuals first experimented with the visions that became actions after 1939, almost everyone could agree that the world was split into Europe (or “civilization”) and the rest, dwelling place of “lesser breeds outside the law,” as Kipling memorably put it. Reflecting on this past just after the Nazi Judeocide, Hannah Arendt published her account of “the origins of totalitarianism.” There, she argued that the killing of the Jews was intimately linked to European imperialism, its lack of borders, and end. She cited Cecil Rhodes declaring that “expansion is everything ... these stars ... these vast worlds that we can never reach. I would annex the planets if I could.” Racism, she contended, sprang fundamentally from this commitment to “expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics” and so did the Final Solution (Arendt 1967, pp. 124–125). Liberal and other forms of imperialism were therefore the progenitors of the desire for totality that drove the “totalitarian” states, whether Nazi or communist, to kill with mathematical finality to the last man, woman, and child.

The detail of Arendt’s argument may be contested. Yet, the difference between the style of war waged in western and eastern Europe (including the Balkans) is fundamental to any understanding of World War II and its killing fields. A. J. P. Taylor may have been “goating” when he remarked that Hitler, over-fond of reading Karl May frontier romances, “always saw himself in the dramatic role of a Red Indian brave” (*The Observer*, June 12, 1977). However, Taylor was right to draw attention to the fact that the Nazis waged an imperial-style conflict in the east as against their “European” battle in the west. Commencing in Poland after September 1939 and then more drastically in the USSR, their expansionism eastwards was always exterminatory in intent. Their “final final solution,” as it were, was to build a vast German agrarian and industrial empire that reached to the Urals and beyond, to be serviced by a slave mass whose lives could only be nasty, brutish, and short. It was there that they would build an empire on which the sun scarcely set.

Eventually the Germans were stopped at Stalingrad and gradually and ferociously driven back to Berlin by forces marshaled by the communist dictator, Joseph Stalin. What was the Soviets’ aim? If the words of the regime are to be believed, then, along with self-defense, the intention, in war as in peace, was world revolution, a vision of expansion that was global, if with a purpose theoretically defined by class and not nation. Many realities conditioned this utopia. Stalin was the least intellectual of the original Bolshevik leadership; his victory in the party disputes that followed the death of Lenin was owed to his cunning, more than of a bandit chief than a Marxist ideologue, and to his “ordinariness” and its appeal to workers and peasants, incessantly told that they were being liberated by communist rule but with their prosperity always postponed.

There were other contradictions, too, deeply engrained in all the Russias and making it certain that the formulae of Marxism would be distorted or rejected in

Soviet practice. Most notable was the utopianism of communist internationalism. Rather than treating the workers of the world as free and equal, the USSR never ceased to behave like a Russian Empire, the heir of the Romanovs. So the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact, the deal with Romania over Bessarabia and the Winter War with Finland, all “restored” what had been Romanov-ruled territories to Soviet control. Causing still greater mayhem were the Soviets’ confused but continuous and expanding efforts to employ ethnicity as a major marker at home. In the ramshackle communist imperium, those awarded the chance to confirm or invent their nationality could gain advantage. There was always a downside, however. As early as 1923, the Soviet regime, a paranoid system that did have many sworn enemies, began treating its “border regions” with special attention and duress. Simultaneously Stalin and his comrades ensured that “ethnic cleansing,” xenophobia, and more general fear about the yawning gaps between the theory and practice of national belonging, steadily reinforced themselves in the USSR (Martin 1998, p. 829). As a result, the victims of the Great Purge in 1937–1938 in considerable part went to their deaths because they possessed a “threatening” ethnicity, and population transfers and national murder took terrible toll during the Soviet waging of its second world war.

With victory, in May 1945, the Georgian or perhaps Ossete, Stalin, gave thanks to the “Russians” as the “leading nation of all the nations belonging to the Soviet Union,” the country’s “guiding force.” Wartime propaganda had regularly and helpfully drafted imperial, Romanov, history behind the present cause. Yet, such emphasis countered any idea that the USSR was itself a “nation,” and so differentiated it troublingly from what seemed true of other modern states and all but historically “inevitable.” Either death or confusion was the result and each remained possible until the collapse of the Soviet regime (and on into the Chechen and other wars of post-Soviet Russia). In the USSR, the Marxist vision of the global freeing of the working class was made nightmarish by the nagging presence of the real or imagined nationalities of all the Russias.

If World War II cannot be understood without review of the Eastern Front, combat extended well beyond what anyone might want to call a common European home. With its attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, imperial Japan made itself a plain aggressor in the war, a perpetrator state. As a result, in the effort to explain why, and despite the uneasiness and the racial incompatibility of its alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Japan has been examined to see whether or not the adjective “fascist” can be properly applied to its regime and society. (A follower of Niall Ferguson into the “counter-factuals” of “virtual history” might be tempted to imagine a German leader with the effrontery of Frederick II rather than the literalness of Adolf Hitler using Pearl Harbor to justify the declaration of war on “racially inferior” Japan). The results have been uncertain, however, with Rikki Kersten wisely emphasizing the irony of a situation where “the desire to stand apart from Europe was a core element of Japan’s fascist journey” (Kersten 2009, p. 543).

Yet, the Japanese leadership did pursue a vision of expansion. It was Japan that first broke the settlement reached in Paris at the end of World War I and so infringed the existing world order by its attack on Manchuria in September 1931 and the subsequent creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo from 1932 under the nominal rule of Puyi, the last Qing emperor. Soon Japan abandoned the League of Nations, the body that ideally was meant to curb any rogue expansionism among its member states. It was the first major power to do so (although Brazil and Costa Rica had left in the 1920s).

China refused to abdicate its nominal sovereignty in Manchuria and, from July 1937, faced invasion from Japan, while continuing to endure its own raft of civil wars. In December the conquest of Nanking (Nanjing) precipitated murder on a massive scale, with the tally of victims still put in the wide range of 100,000 to 300,000. Thereafter, devastating campaigns continued and the total of war dead (a minimum of 10 million, although that may be a vast underestimation) remains unclear and is still not added to Eurocentric accounts of the war. The population of that part of China contested between Japan and the local communists through death and flight fell from 44 million to 25 million in 1941–1942 (Dower 1986, p. 43). When, in 1942, Japanese forces took Singapore and spread as far as New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, further killing followed, despite worthy promises by Japan that it was liberating Indo-China, the Philippines, and the East Indies from French, American, Dutch, and British rule. As the tide of battle turned, what has been well termed a “war without mercy” entailed the ravaging of much of the western Pacific and the eventual battering of Japan, either through firebombing or the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, acts that finally persuaded the Emperor Hirohito and his military advisors to surrender.

As in Nazi Germany, imperial Japan was motivated in its rampage of expansion by a combination of nationalism and race. The *kokutai* or “national way” that lay at the heart of the official version of Japanese identity had allegedly lasted “three thousand years” and was “infallible for all ages and true in all places.” The national cause was underpinned by race. As one commentator put it already in 1909, “not once has there been a change in race. ... There is no mistake in saying that we have been a homogeneous race since antiquity” (Bix 2000, p. 71). Technically speaking, the chief Japanese war aim was the creation of the “Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere,” sketched before 1941 and ostensibly offering fraternal assistance to most Asian peoples in liberating themselves from European rule. Some were convinced, with Ba Maw of British Burma announcing in Tokyo as late as November 1943 that his “Asiatic blood” had “always called him to other Asiatics.” However, warrior Japan was scarcely a generous and benign invader and administrator, as it had long demonstrated with its brutal domination of Korea since 1910 and its harsh treatment of Korean immigrants and other subordinate peoples in its own territories. Moreover, in the minds of some planners, “Asia” was not enough to satisfy Japan’s ambitions, with one academic geographer in late 1942 demanding that all the world’s oceans be renamed the “Great Sea of Japan” since they did flow into each other (Dower 1986, pp. 5, 273). Here indeed were the frightening lineaments of a world policy.

Yet, can historians really be certain that the Japanese should be joined to the other bad guys of the war and tidily divided from the good? It is now a generation since John Dower pointed out that, in the profundity of their racism, the Japanese and their American and Australian foes were “enemies of a kind” in the Pacific. Japanese soldiers, he argued, fought to the death, less because they had been fanaticized by their imperial regime and more because they believed that, if captured by the Americans and, still more so, by the Australians, they would be killed anyway. Allied soldiers, he said, liked collecting Japanese heads and gold teeth in a racial contempt that might be paralleled with the habit of Italian soldiery in Ethiopia or Germans in the east, fond of being photographed beside their hanging or otherwise executed enemies (Dower 1986, pp. 65–68). Joanna Bourke may have exaggerated when she

underlined the “pleasure” that soldiers in the twentieth century have gained from killing (Bourke 1999). Yet her finding needs all the more to be remembered in our present when part of the collateral damage in English-speaking countries of the so-called “war against terror” has been a spreading rhetoric and public practice that assumes that all “our” soldiers are, and always were, pure and self-sacrificing heroes of the democratic nation.

Certainly, any serious student of World War II must admit that the American and Australian armies that pushed the Japanese back across the Pacific, were, on the one hand, staffed by men (and women) who had more claims than most combatants to come from democratic societies and, on the other, were deeply and automatically racist. Studs Terkel may have decided that the United States engaged in what was remembered as a “good war” (Terkel 1984). Yet it came at a cost to speedily and forcibly interned Nisei (long settled Japanese-Americans) and other racially defined prisoners, while the military scarcely gave equal combat or welfare status to its black soldiery for whom “civil rights” would not arrive for a generation or more.

Nor was the USA alone in such contradiction as it overthrew Nazi-fascist tyranny. To focus momentarily on my native Australia, one of the ironies of the war and its racial definitions was that immediate postwar Australian Labor politicians, backed by “public opinion,” fearful that the near irruption of the hated Japanese onto their shores meant that the country must “populate or perish,” quickly welcomed German immigrants. As a spokesman of returned servicemen put it bluntly: “for defence [Australia] would rather have an Afrika Corps and some of its types than some who have come here from Mediterranean ports,” let alone “Asians” or others who might drastically infringe the “White Australia policy.” Still more ironically, as Australia expanded its immigrant intake over the next decade, liberal social scientists happily measured the desired assimilation of the newcomers by dividing them into “Northern,” “Eastern” and “Southern Europeans,” thus reviving the racial categories in their own (pseudo-)science that had driven German racism, against which Australia had ostensibly been fighting in World War II (Wilton and Bosworth 1984, pp. 15, 21–24).

If racial belief and practice was not confined to the Axis side of World War II, similarly it can scarcely be assumed that the democratic or liberal democratic Allies did not have visions of expansion of their own. For example, it does not need a full acceptance of the revisionist position about the origins of the cold war to acknowledge that American capitalism found its global ambitions confirmed by victory and its clear demonstration that the USA was now the most modern, efficient, and powerful nation in the world. By 1945 the American government’s aim was indeed “to sustain and to reform world capitalism” (Kolko and Kolko 1972, p. 11). These visions were not destined to disappear in the postwar; rather, when American power was confirmed with its victory over the hapless USSR in the cold war, Francis Fukuyama, in however halting prose, hymned global or even universal and eternal victory, the “end of history,” a time when the American model had expanded everywhere and when no alternative thoughts about politics were possible (Fukuyama 1992).

But what of the other Allies, especially France and Britain, those empires the prospect of whose decadence and dissolution Mussolini, for one, warmed himself with as he took Italy to war? On the surface, France, given its military collapse in May–June 1940 and the social and political divisions between its Pétainist, Vichyite, and Gaullist forces in wartime, might have seemed a nation which had lost any vision

of expansion. Yet, immediately in 1944, De Gaulle's effrontery knew no bounds in treating the defeat as mere *histoire événementielle* when, contrary to every evidence, he proclaimed that France had liberated itself. His inspiration, he would recall, was always France's global and permanent "power" and, in the interim, he moved quickly in April 1945 to seize a few mountain communes around Tenda on the Alpine border with Italy and half planned a French takeover of the Val d'Aosta. "Justice," he was sure in typically ruthless nationalist deployment of a usable past, lay with France, given that "fragments of our territory" had been "artificially detached from Savoy in 1860" and passed to the rule of the Italian "enemy." Equally, De Gaulle urged his army into action against the Japanese in France's imperial territories in Indo-China, with his motives sounding little different from Mussolini's notorious justification of war with France in June 1940 when a few dead soldiers could enhance Italian status at the coming peacemaking. For De Gaulle, "French blood shed on the soil of Indo-China would constitute an impressive claim" for a major role in an Asian peace (De Gaulle 1960, pp. 100, 160, 162).

The reluctance of French politicians, including many on the Left, to accept that their country's destiny had become confined to Europe is a reminder that any easy view that the Allies, the wicked USSR apart, were virtuous democracies who took on the terrible combat against Nazi-fascism with moral intent, needs major qualification. Interwar Britain may have been a liberal parliamentary state, equipped with a liberal capitalist economy, a country where liberty was firmly entrenched. Equality and fraternity (and sorority) were different matters. And Britain did not win World War II because it was a democracy. Rather, Britain became a democracy under the impact of its version of the war. The key moment was the election of July 1945 when, remarkably, the electorate, including the personnel of the armed forces, voted out Winston Churchill, the heroic but also aristocratic, high living and tax minimizing "Prime Minister of Victory," and his Tory colleagues, replacing them with drab little Clement Attlee and a Labour party committed to building the welfare state.

That sea change, however, did not mean the end of visions of empire in the UK, either among conservatives or in the mainstream of the Labour party. For the Britain that entered the war in 1939 was, above all, an empire. Then, even its (white) Dominions talked as though, despite their achievement of "Commonwealth" status through the Statute of Westminster in 1931, they were still "British to the bootstraps," as the then Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies (to be his country's dominating political figure also in the 1950s) put it. Menzies phrased Australia's war entry characteristically (and his colleagues in Canada and New Zealand were no different): "It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially that in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war" (Menzies 1967, p. 15).

But the war was curbing British power. No doubt, in May and then August 1945, London could celebrate victory in European and Pacific war over Germany, Italy, and Japan. Yet, somewhere between the lines, Britain had simultaneously lost two less visible battles. The first was with the United States, whose economic domination over Britain thereafter was confirmed when, in December 1945, that country reluctantly ratified the system framed at the Bretton Woods conference held the year before.

The other lost war was with India and, in domino effect, with all Britain's non-European "subject peoples." This defeat was notably galling to Churchill, the

recalcitrant imperialist, who, as late as November, was deluded enough to state: "I did not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." Nor had his mind changed as India swiftly moved to independence after the war. Churchill's bitter conclusion that India had been "the greatest war profiteer" was removed from the text of his war memoirs on the advice of F. W. Deakin, his key historical advisor (Reynolds 2005, pp. 195–196, 335). If Britain's national vision was destined to contract and not expand, then that withdrawal was scarcely at the wish of the empire's wartime leader.

In any case, postwar Britain found a curious method to conceal and limit the severe contraction of its global power. Decolonization throughout Asia and Africa may have been continuous through the 1950s and early 1960s. Yet, through denying the completeness of Britain's defeat in its economic and its cultural contest with the United States, British leaders recast themselves as the junior partners in their "special relationship" with the USA, while shoring up the financial strength of the City in London as all but matching Wall Street in New York. However rude was the American failure from time to time fully to acknowledge this partnership (notably during the Suez crisis in 1956, when the "end of British imperial history" was stark), British leaders went on gladly participating in global police duties in the American cause. As a result, they armed themselves with nuclear weapons and spent massively on more orthodox defense, thereby persuading the British people that they were not merely European but still the proud subjects of a global power.

There was one further element to this comforting mix and that was a history and memory of World War II that possessed the totality of the "Holocaust" and its view that the conflict had been merely a "war against the Jews." No one who watches Britain today can fail to be impressed by the regular reiteration through this or that anniversary of the country's special role in "defeating Hitler." It is a claim to singularity of virtue that coexists readily enough with the view that the Holocaust was "unique," despite potential contradiction. To be sure, some historians have attempted audits of the war that admit Britain's loss to the USA and even wonder if Churchill might bear responsibility for the end of empire. Some of the notable efforts to do so include *Churchill: the end of glory – a political biography* (Charmley 1993); *Churchill's Grand Alliance 1940–1957* (Charmley 1995); *The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation* (Barnett, 1986); and *The Lost Victory: British Dreams and British Realities, 1945–50* (Barnett 1995). But the established line is that the myth of uniquely virtuous war, fought courageously from start to finish no matter the cost, is "too deeply imprinted in the hearts and minds of the British people" to be worth challenging and, anyway, it "contains many elements of truth" (p. 1).

Perhaps, in this chapter, there is no need to proceed further with analysis of British illusions. But the point of the chapter is that it is easy to write a simple moral tale about visions or nightmares of expansion that fueled Nazi-fascism and Japanese imperial aggression and murder in World War II. They existed, they were dynamic, they caused the war, they marked an abyss in human history. Yet, they were not unique. Again, few will want to quarrel, although not everyone has acknowledged the implications, when it is noted that Stalin's USSR equally aspired to global power. As is still starkly evident in the rhetoric of Tony Blair in Britain, along with Israel and Russia the society which still clings most stubbornly and damagingly to its war myths, liberal imperialism retains its self-confidence and crusading urge. Certainly neither in

1939 nor in 1945, had the liberal democracies, France, Britain, and the United States, abandoned their desire for expansion. Neither had the various and more unreliably liberal smaller powers and subnations whose stories I have not had time to relate but which also waged their own second world wars. In so far as international relations are concerned, and indeed any aspect of human history, it is inadvisable to force our predecessors (or ourselves) into the categories of “good guys” and “bad guys.” As they warred and hoped in victory, few combatant states in World War II had fully renounced dreams of greater greatness.

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CHAPTER SIX

Soviet Planning for War, 1928–June 1941

ALEXANDER HILL

Getting the strategy right does not guarantee a successful outcome, but as the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union illustrates, a coherent strategic policy can limit the impact of tactical and operational inadequacies – particularly where that strategic policy facilitates superior resource mobilization. The Soviet Union was in many senses strategically prepared for war by June 1941, but poor operational-strategic deployment and operational and tactical failings allowed the Wehrmacht to achieve far more through operational and tactical competence than perhaps need have been the case. Nonetheless, despite these failings during Operation Barbarossa – the German invasion of the Soviet Union – the Red Army and the Soviet state were able to survive the summer and fall of 1941. As the war progressed, a combination of Soviet improvements at the operational and tactical levels and superior resource mobilization, stemming to a large extent from strategic planning, made German victory on the Eastern Front increasingly unlikely.

Soviet strategic planning and ideology were closely related. For the Soviet revolutionary project, there were ultimately two possible outcomes – worldwide revolution or destruction at the hands of the capitalist world. For the ideologically committed, the second was of course not an option for the revolutionary project as a whole. Even if the Soviet Union was defeated and the doubters of 1917 who argued that revolution in Russia was premature were vindicated, it would only be a matter of time before revolution came elsewhere. However, for the revolutionaries who had worked so hard and waited so long for their revolution, it was better of course that the Soviet republic was not crushed by capitalist powers. Hopes of international revolution in 1917–1920 proved illusory – even attempts to transport revolution to Poland by force of arms in 1920 were undermined not only by the lack of support in Poland but by the weakness of the Red Army. The uneasy truce with the capitalist world that followed the end of the Russian Civil War and associated foreign intervention left the Soviet Union very much defensively minded; differences between Stalin’s “socialism

in one country” and Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” were more rhetorical than anything else. Political victory by either camp would probably have seen the Soviet Union push industrialization forward with an eye on defense, but with the option for the promotion of revolution through offensive action in appropriate international circumstances – circumstances that could be encouraged by the Soviet Union, through the Comintern or otherwise. That defense might mean offense in appropriate circumstances was not in question, as documents reproduced in Hill (2009) show.

The Five-Year Plans of 1928 onwards, launched by a Soviet Union now clearly led by Stalin but in which the dictator had not quashed all independent-minded figures in the leadership, were geared toward the long-term defense of the Soviet Union. The expansion of heavy industry was to precede the strengthening of the defense sector of the economy. The relationship between Soviet economic development and increasing military power during the 1930s has been examined by a number of authors in English, including a volume edited by Mark Harrison (2008) entitled *Guns and Rubles: The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State*. Also important are Lennart Samuelson (2000) and David Stone (2000). While Stone highlights the militarization of the Soviet economy by 1933, material in Harrison’s later volume suggests that military needs did not dominate the economy until much later. A later article by Stone (2005) shows some of the compromises made between military and broader requirements during the First Five-Year Plan.

As the Russian historian Oleg Ken showed in his Russian-language work in 2002 on *Mobilization Planning and Political Decision Making*, reviewed in English in Hill (2005), during the First Five-Year Plan and despite rhetoric to the contrary, future war remained an abstraction for the Soviet leadership that only took form in propaganda, despite real underlying concerns about the threat posed by the capitalist world. However, with the rise of Hitler and appearance of Nazi Germany on the international stage, concerns for Soviet security became far more immediate, particularly as German rearmament and flagrant disregard for the Versailles Treaty became apparent. The Soviet Union sought membership of the international diplomatic community and alliances with other capitalist powers in an attempt to prevent a war that threatened to take place at a time not of the Soviet Union’s choosing. Even before the Great Purges of 1936–1938, Stalin had removed potential threats to his position, removing such prominent figures such as Bukharin and Rykov from the leadership and indeed the Party. The Great Purges saw the deaths of many prominent Bolsheviks in an orgy of violence that from Stalin’s perspective was arguably related to the threat of war and the possibility of his position being destabilized by internal opposition. The idea of a close relationship between the threat of war and the Great Purges is coherently and concisely expressed in a seminal article by the Russian historian Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, 2003).

The failure of Soviet diplomacy in the pursuit of “collective security” during the mid- to late 1930s is well documented by authors such as Geoffrey Roberts (1995) and Jonathan Haslam (1984). There was fierce debate in the literature during 1990s among authors such as Gorodetsky (1999) and Carley (2001), opposed by authors such as Hochman (1984) and Hoffmann (1998), as to whether the Soviet pursuit of “collective security” in the 1930s was more than a cynical ploy to hide the Soviet Union’s own longer-term aggressive intentions. A Soviet dissident writing under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov suggested that, in fact, the Soviet Union intended to attack

Nazi Germany during the summer of 1941. According to Suvorov, the Soviet Union had been working toward this objective for many years, and the German invasion was, in effect, a preemptive strike. For Suvorov, what started as a short article (Suvorov 1985) became a series of books in Russian, the most recent of which, in English, is *The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II* (Suvorov 2008).

In many ways, the literature has now moved on from what became known as the “Suvorov” debate discussed in Hill (2009) and by authors such as Uldricks (1999) and Cynthia Roberts (1995). Few authors take Carley’s line that presents the Soviet Union as having no aggressive plans whatsoever, and few take Suvorov’s line that most Soviet actions were part of some sort of grand design to conquer Europe. Roberts’s recent work (2006) is a further development of the historiographical line promoted by Gorodetsky in highlighting the Soviet desire to forestall war in 1940–1941, while ignoring the many indicators (Hill 2009) that the Soviet Union not only saw war with the capitalist powers as inevitable but also the fact that it was willing to start war if the prospects for Soviet victory were good. It is difficult however to argue that the Soviet pursuit of “collective security” against Nazi aggression was not sincere in the short term. From the Soviet perspective, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August-September 1939, which stemmed from failure to reach agreement with Britain and France on how to deal with Nazi Germany’s territorial ambitions, was intended to buy time and push Germany towards war with the Western powers. A German war in the west would, it was hoped, be long and costly and give the Soviet Union plenty of time to ready herself for the inevitable showdown. The collapse of France in June 1940 was, however, more rapid than anticipated, and brought with it the realization that war with Nazi Germany might come sooner than had been feared – particularly if Britain also fell.

The Soviet Union thus started to prepare with renewed vigor for war, ideally one in which the Soviet Union would undertake offensive operations from the outset, having had the necessary time to ready itself for such an undertaking. Enemy attack before the Soviet Union was ready could not be ruled out and, therefore, despite offensive rhetoric, defensive preparations had at least half-heartedly to be undertaken despite the Party line that any future war would take place on enemy territory. Defensive measures included the fortification of the new Soviet border after the territorial gains of September 1939–June 1940 that included territory from Poland, Finland, Rumania, and the Baltic Republics. Defensive preparations along the new border, however, were not prioritized.

As the threat of war with Nazi Germany increased again in the summer of 1940, the expansion of the Red Army was given additional impetus. Red Army expansion during 1940 and early 1941 took place in some senses in less than favorable circumstances, in part given the loss during the Great Purges of many at least experienced, even if not always brilliant, command cadres required to help train and organize a rapidly growing force. As Reese (1996) shows, new junior command elements received reduced training and military education like their counterparts in Germany as a result of demand for commanders for new units, but in a society less well educated and culturally less homogeneous to start with. Fortunately for the Soviet Union, despite the Great Purges, the Red Army still had a cohort of well-educated and capable leaders that would rise above Stalin’s cronies and the “politicals,” such as Voroshilov and Budennii, as the Great Patriotic War progressed.

Many member of this cohort had been exposed to the Academy of the General Staff and capable theoreticians, such as G. S. Isserson who ended up as lecturers there, in some instances, no doubt, instead of being purged. In addition to Zhukov and Rokossovskii, this command cohort included such names as Vasilevskii, Vatutin, and Antonov – generals who would be credited, after Stalin, with turning the tide against Nazi Germany and her allies.

Increased production of armaments for new Red Army units was impressive, as highlighted by figures in Harrison (1996), but production could not meet the demands of an expanding Red Army that also had to replace equipment produced during the mid-1930s and which had now been superseded. The Red Army also found itself in doctrinal and, hence, organizational turmoil. Ideas developed in the Soviet Union during the early and mid-1930s on the effective use of tanks in coordination with other arms in order to break through enemy defenses and exploit the breakthrough – “deep battle” – were politically unacceptable after the deaths of many of their proponents during the Great Purges. As Habeck (2003) highlights, the opposition of key purge survivors and cronies of Stalin, such as Voroshilov and Budennii, and generalization from the poor showing of tanks during the Spanish Civil War, helped fuel uncertainty as to the role of the various arms, and particularly over whether armor would be the principal arm. That such complex doctrine as that developed during the early and mid-1930s was difficult to implement within an expanding Red Army in a peasant-dominated and relatively poorly educated society was also a factor in reverting to more World War I-style ideas of the tank as primarily an infantry support weapon.

The border conflicts of 1938–1939 with Japan seem to have had little impact on doctrinal and organizational issues within the Red Army, despite the apparent success of tanks used in brigade strength and at times successful coordination with other arms in the encirclement of Japanese forces at Khalkin-Gol in the late summer of 1939. This fighting is described in considerable detail from a Japanese perspective in Coox (1985), and Erickson’s account (1962) from a Soviet perspective is also still useful. The debacle in Finland, which initially saw forces of the Leningrad Military District squander thousands of lives in poorly coordinated attacks against Finnish positions in Karelia in late 1939, received more formal attention in Soviet military circles, highlighting serious problems in many aspects of Red Army performance including command and control and command initiative. The soul searching that followed the war in Finland was genuine, as the transcripts of a command conference on the matter of April 1940 show, even if it did not go as far as addressing broader systemic issues and the impact of the Great Purges. These transcripts are available in English as *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War 1939–1940* (Chubaryan and Shukman 2002), and a good account of the war is provided in Van Dyke (1997). The Finnish debacle prompted an end – at least until July 1941 – to the system of dual-command that had been reintroduced during the Great Purges and required commanders to share authority in military decision making with political officers. Soviet analysis of the war in France in particular (Hill 2009) highlighted the key role played by massed German armor as a breakthrough and exploitation weapon when supported appropriately by other arms, and prompted some reconsideration of the need for the recently disbanded larger armored formations. All of this analysis and reorganization was taking place in a political climate of fear in the aftermath of the

worst of the Great Purges, a climate in which initiative was stifled and discussion taking place within extremely limited parameters.

Despite damage caused by the Great Purges, and the fact that Soviet planning and reorganization in the light of World War II to date was geared by early 1941 toward “readiness” for war during 1942 at the earliest, in the summer of 1941 the Red Army was, on paper, a formidable force that had benefited from considerable and increasing Soviet investment in the defense sector throughout the 1930s. Despite Soviet weaknesses in command exacerbated at times by inadequate equipment, particularly sufficient radios for effective command and control, the Wehrmacht and her allies faced a huge military machine that has been described in detail by David Glantz (1998b). Glantz describes the Red Army prior to and during the early stages of the Great Patriotic War as a “stumbling colossus” – a vast military machine that might be likened to the Colossus of Rhodes of the ancient world or even a biblical Goliath. In both cases size was not matched by agility!

German intelligence underestimated Soviet strength and mobilization potential during the summer of 1941 by as much as half. Yet on June 22, 1941, German forces achieved tactical and operational surprise against the Soviet colossus, and in a matter of days destroyed the bulk of Soviet mechanized forces and the air force in forward areas. This despite the fact that during the spring of 1941, Soviet intelligence received information from diverse sources that could have been interpreted to indicate the likelihood of German attacks during the summer. In order to understand Soviet defeats at the hands of the Wehrmacht and her allies, it is important to examine the decision-making process, particularly in May 1941 that contributed to the lack of Soviet tactical and operational preparedness for events at the end of June 1941, in the broader context of an inopportune operational-strategic deployment discussed below.

It has already been noted that by the late 1930s, Stalin had removed figures likely to speak out against him from the political leadership – and the same applied to the military. Figures such as Zhukov, Chief of Staff in May 1941, have quite possibly tended to exaggerate the extent to which they voiced and certainly persisted in voicing opinions that ran contrary to Stalin’s own expressed opinion, although Stalin would often only step in to debate between subordinates late in a discussion. In May 1941, he was formally both head of the Party and state, having recently become chairman of the government (*Sovnarkom*). Stalin was undoubtedly the final arbiter in any decision making in the Soviet Union in May 1941, even if other figures could make policy proposals and even if Stalin chose to consult with them.

The first key issue here is the nature of intelligence available to Stalin and the Soviet leadership and how it was interpreted. This matter is discussed in some depth in a slightly sensational manner in David Murphy’s *What Stalin Knew* (2005). Certainly, during the spring of 1941, rich intelligence was being provided to the Soviet Union from a range of sources. Important sources of intelligence were agents such as “Starshina” at Luftwaffe headquarters and “Korsikanets” in the German economic apparatus, and along with Sorge in Japan and other agents. The Red Army was aware from its own sources of the increasing number of German divisions along the Soviet border, as it was of the increasing number of overflights of Soviet territory by German aircraft that were likely to have been undertaking reconnaissance work.

That Stalin received much of the information provided by these sources is beyond question. In his Russian-language memoirs, Zhukov states that much of the

information collated by Red Army intelligence was relayed to Stalin by Zhukov himself. Molotov's postwar recollections to Felix Chuev (1993) suggest that Stalin was well aware of the short-term threat of war, as was foreign minister Molotov. Some of Molotov's testimony refers to intelligence received during early June 1941, but material available when Molotov was still chairman of *Sovnarkom* was also available prior to May 6, and so the Soviet Union had plenty of warning. There is little doubt that Stalin, Molotov, and others were not only aware of the long- and indeed medium-term threat from Nazi Germany, but also about the possibility of war in 1941. Therefore, they worked toward the amassing of Soviet forces in the west and the strengthening of both offensive, and to a lesser extent defensive, capabilities.

Both David Glantz (1998b) and Evan Mawdsley (2003) analyze changing Soviet dispositions in the west during early 1941, and both are discussed in Hill (2009). Unlike Suvorov (1985, 2008) Glantz, Mawdsley and Hill highlight the extent to which Soviet dispositions in June 1941 were neither suited to offense or defense, even if Soviet strength was increasing in the border region. Stalin was willing to sanction the transfer of additional Soviet troops to the western border region in late April and early May from the Trans-Baikal and Far East Military Districts and to a lesser extent Urals and Siberian Districts respectively, with large-scale "wargames" in early June providing justification for the filling out of existing divisions and troops for fortified regions. Full-scale mobilization was not deemed to be a viable option in that it might be seen as provocative by Germany. The strengthening of Soviet forces in the region was, therefore, satisfied through a gradual shifting of readily available units and formations, fleshed out through partial mobilization that started prior to, and continued after, May 1941. Soviet forces in the region were echeloned, with the second not having been in a viable position to support the first perhaps being explained by the desire to avoid provocation, but also an overestimation of Soviet transport and logistical capabilities in the region.

Although full mobilization was not actually ordered until June 22, 1941, after the German attack had begun, during May 1941 Stalin had not only sanctioned partial mobilization but also at least considered acting upon available intelligence and ordering Red Army forces in position in the border region to strike preemptively against Germany and her allies. Plans for a preemptive strike against German forces massing on the Soviet border were produced for May 15, 1941. The plan involved the destruction of "principal forces of the German army" (Hill 2009) by hitting German forces southeast of Warsaw before ideally moving on to encircle German forces of Army Groups Center and north through the seizure of Poland and East Prussia.

The plan for a preemptive strike of May 15, 1941 seems to have been part of a wider shift in Soviet policy toward getting the country ready for war in the short- to medium term that took place abortively in May 1941. Evidence of this shift includes a speech Stalin gave to graduating commanders on May 5, provided in English with commentary by Jürgen Förster and Evan Mawdsley (2004). As the Russian historian Vladimir Nevezhin notes in a 1995 English-language article, there was also evidence of a planned shift in Soviet propaganda against Germany from the favorable line that had been taken since the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August–September 1939.

Glantz has certainly shown in *Stumbling Colossus* (1998b) how, in terms of unit strengths and supplies, Soviet forces were in no position for offensive operations in May 1941. The second Soviet echelon was hardly positioned to exploit any successes

by the first. Molotov suggested that Stalin believed that the Soviet Union would not be ready “to meet the Germans as equals” until 1943 (Chuev 1993). The reorganization and expansion of the Red Army under Mobilization Plan 41 (MP-41) for the beginning of 1942 was certainly progressing less rapidly than might have been deemed desirable in May 1941, and Soviet mechanized units destroyed in the fighting in the border regions in June–July 1941 were often hopelessly understrength, even if the Red Army had ample tanks for a more modest number of formations. MP-41 allocated a total of 6.5 million men out of a total of 7.85 million to the western region of the Soviet Union, whereas by June 22, 1941, manpower strength in the region had reached only 2,901,000 men according to Glantz (1998b).

With Soviet forces neither fully equipped and supplied, nor suitably deployed for offensive operations, one might have assumed a defensive stance would have been appropriate. However, despite analysis of the war in the west, according to the more complete 1995 version of Zhukov’s memoirs, Soviet operational planning during spring 1941 assumed a period of fighting in border regions before the commitment of principal forces, giving the Soviet Union ample time to mobilize and prepare for an offensive behind the cover of forces already in border regions should war actually start with German attack. However, although broader Soviet operational planning might have assumed a period of fighting on the border that would give the Red Army time to deploy, the May 15 war plan stated that Germany could issue a surprise blow by anticipating Soviet deployment (Hill 2009). Despite the growing threat of German attack, as long as German forces did not actually attack, the door was always open to explaining away the increasingly impressive evidence of impending German attack on the basis that it would not be rational for Germany to attack now. It was possible to argue that a two-front war would be folly and that the supplies that the Soviet Union was providing to Germany made it unnecessary to invade. This ignoring of the ideological dimension to the German invasion is ironic where the Soviet Union is concerned.

It is unclear to what extent warnings of impeding German attack were persistently presented to Stalin. Even if they were, they may actually have contributed to Stalin’s unwillingness to accept the reality of the short-term threat after a decision had been taken in mid-May not to take offensive action. After the rejection of plans for the Red Army to take offensive action against Germany, Soviet appeasement was even more blatant. In late May and into June, this appeasement took many forms beyond the supply of war materials to Germany, and many of these policies proved detrimental to the Soviet military position. According to Zhukov’s Russian-language memoirs, Stalin went as far as approving a request for German teams looking for the graves of German soldiers killed during World War I at the end of May 1941, apparently much to Zhukov and Timoshenko’s surprise and consternation. The infamous TASS denial of aggressive Soviet intentions of June 13, 1941 (Hill 2009) and a note by Stalin on intelligence from the agent “Starshina” at Luftwaffe Headquarters of June 16 claiming that “Starshina” was spreading disinformation, suggest an increasing desperation on Stalin’s part with the scenario Stalin wanted increasingly divorced from reality.

When the German invasion began, Stalin was insistent that Soviet forces counterattack immediately and, indeed, take the war to German-held territory as suggested by the May 15 plan for a preemptive strike. In a flurry of activity highlighted by Stalin’s appointment diary, extracts of which are reproduced in Hill (2009), Stalin

and the Soviet leadership started grappling with the realities of an invasion of Soviet territory. However, the seriousness of the threat to the very existence of the Soviet Union seems to have struck Stalin harder after the fall of Minsk on June 28, 1941, as his colleague Anastas Mikoian explained in an extract from his memoirs (Hill 2009). By this time, much of the first Soviet echelon facing the German Army Groups in the center and north had been destroyed or faced imprisonment.

The Soviet Union was able to focus unprecedented resources on “defense” (broadly defined) during the 1930s, led by a small decision-making elite headed by Stalin that systematically neutralized and then destroyed even potential opposition during the second half of the 1920s and 1930s. While the First Five-Year Plan of 1928–1932 was certainly not focused exclusively on defense (nor could it be given the need for broader heavy-industrial development first), by the Third plan of 1938, the Soviet Union was committing an ever-increasing share of resources explicitly to it. By the mid-1930s, Soviet military, diplomatic and economic policies were being coordinated to meet Soviet defense needs, with diplomatic policy being geared toward buying time for a strengthening of Soviet military power that ultimately would, through offensive action, be able to sweep the German and broader capitalist opposition in Europe aside and secure the revolution and advance the revolutionary cause. The threat of foreign attack on the Soviet Union, an issue that had been used as a motivational tool during the late 1920s, became increasingly real during the late 1930s. In embroiling Germany in a war in the west that had not been won by the beginning of 1941, the Nazi-Soviet Pact had apparently bought the Soviet Union time to prepare for war on its terms – or so Stalin seems to have convinced himself.

When assessing Soviet strategic policy in May 1941 – with the decision not to act on intelligence reports and to continue gradual preparations for a war to take place at the earliest in 1942 or 1943 – there can be little doubt that this policy with associated ramifications at the operational and tactical levels had extremely negative consequences for the Red Army in late June and July 1941. At the tactical level – where tactical might be deemed as involving the movement and direction of forces, typically at the unit level in battle – the desire not to provoke or give Germany an excuse for aggression prevented troops along the border from being at an appropriate and indeed elementary level of readiness, as described in detail by Glantz (1998b). In addition, the poor supply situation – even concerning fuel and ammunition for troops near the border – hampered units at both tactical and operational levels.

At the operational level – where operational is deemed to be moving beyond the tactical in terms of both time and space to involve the coordination of both the movement and engagement of units and formations with a view to a specific outcome – forward Soviet troop deployments were not suitable for the defense and lacked depth. The second echelon was not in a position to support the first. That it was not, however, may actually have saved the second echelon from the fate the first. While it is difficult to argue that the first echelon whittled down German strength in anything like proportion to the significance of losses for the Soviet Union, the second fared better.

Other than continuing preparations for a Soviet offensive war at some point in the future, the other key option available to Soviet leaders in May 1941 was a preemptive strike against German forces. Given that many Soviet units and formations were undermanned, ill-equipped, and poorly supplied, they had limited capacity for

offensive action prior to the German attack. The failed Soviet offensive in the Khar'kov region in May 1942, as analyzed in Glantz (1998a), perhaps gives some indication of what could have happened had Soviet forces attacked first in the summer of 1941. The Khar'kov operation preempted the German summer campaign of 1942, called Operation "Blau," in the south but arguably assisted the German offensive in facilitating the destruction of Soviet mechanized forces in the region. In this instance, Soviet forces did not face the same logistical difficulties that would have been faced in the preemptive strike of late May 1941. After Stalin's death Soviet generals made suggestions in memoirs and interviews as to what might have been done differently in June 1941, as discussed in Roberts (2006), but did not reach any sort of consensus.

A more defensive operational (and more broadly operational-strategic) deployment, with appropriate levels of readiness, would no doubt have maximized the impact of the first Soviet echelon in June 1941. Such an operational deployment would, of course, have been the product of a different strategic policy not predicated on war starting in earnest with Soviet offensive operations. In a work that focuses on the positive dimensions to Stalin's leadership, Roberts (2006) ignores political dimensions to the Soviet stance in the summer of 1941, where the Soviet failure to take suitable defensive measures was not just about the limits of "military-theoretical science." A defensive stance, as had been adopted prior to the Great Purges, would have been politically difficult to justify by 1941 when both the purges and the continued success of the Five-Year Plans under Stalin's leadership were supposed to have made the Soviet Union so much stronger, as Soviet leaders frequently pointed out.

As for the strategic level, defined here as typically involving the movement and direction of multiple formations and possibly a sequence of operations, and likely or intended to have impact on the opponent's ability to continue the war (or in a defensive context for a power staying in the war), it is more difficult to argue that Soviet policy was a failure on all levels. The forward deployment strategy based on the assumption of the Soviet Union getting in the first blow was a failure in that it did not. However, long-term Soviet strategic policy – preparing the Soviet Union for war against Germany since the mid-1930s – gave the Soviet Union the capacity to survive the impact of operational and tactical weaknesses early in the war, with what amounted in practice to an attritional strategy. Fresh divisions were created, thrown against the Wehrmacht, and often destroyed, and survivors and the Soviet command gained experience, even if it was acquired at a very high price. David Stahel (2009) details the impact that the apparent Soviet squandering of fresh divisions had in whittling down Wehrmacht strength and resources, where Germany was certainly not prepared for a protracted war. Soviet strategy was certainly not Fabian as sometimes assumed in the popular literature; space was certainly not intentionally given up for military advantage or even simply time, as Roberts highlights in *Stalin's Wars* (2006).

Staggering Soviet resources mobilization allowed the Red Army to sap German strength throughout the summer and fall of 1941, albeit at horrendous cost in men and materiel. Soviet losses could, however, at least in the short term, be replaced more easily than German ones. This Soviet resource mobilization was possible to a significant extent through the will of the very same man who takes much of the responsibility for the scale of Soviet defeats during the summer and autumn of 1941: Stalin. Perhaps Stalin should be given some credit for the survival of the Soviet Union, despite the tactical and operational catastrophes for which he is partly responsible?

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PART II

Fighting the War

CHAPTER SEVEN

Japanese Early Attack

BRIAN P. FARRELL

The Imperial Japanese Navy's (IJN) attack on Pearl Harbor, on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a means to an end. The US Pacific Fleet was the only strong combat-ready Western force standing between the Japanese armed forces and the imperial project Japan adopted in 1941: to secure for itself the natural resources of Southeast Asia. That project was itself a means to an end: to secure the power Japan required to prevail once and for all in the war it waged to impose hegemony in China. By 1934, the volatile groups which collectively made decisions in imperial Japan agreed the empire must build a new order in East Asia, to establish Japanese hegemony and make Japan economically self-sufficient. The road to this new order ran through China. The USA and the other major Western powers were in the way. The Japanese onslaught in the Pacific and Southeast Asia in December 1941 needs to be understood in that broader context. Four themes stand out: Japanese national policy and grand strategy, the war in China, the importance of Southeast Asia, and the American threat.

Japan responded to the Great Depression, and the devastation it wrought on the Japanese economy, by seeking hegemony and self-sufficiency. The Depression changed the balance of political power within Japan, strengthening those already insisting Japan must be more authoritarian, imperial, and assertive. The policy to cooperate with the Western powers, in a security and economic framework designed to regulate great power relations in Asia and the Pacific, was always condemned by groups who claimed it would trap Japan in an inferior position. Western powers dominated the prevailing economic order, controlling the raw materials the Japanese industrial economy required; they could, and did, compromise Japanese exports by blocking them with tariff walls. This helped assertive imperialist voices gain control of Japanese politics, who argued that Japan must use its own strength to secure its own future. That required it to change the prevailing political, military, and economic order in East Asia, by force if necessary. Two characteristics shaped that order: Chinese weakness and Western power.

Lacking any strong central government and mired in civil war, China could not prevent foreign powers from exploiting its weakness. The Chinese mainland was then, as it remains now, the center of gravity in East Asia – the dominant land mass, population center, and source of raw materials. Western powers, especially the British Empire, established important economic interests in China, especially along its coast. An important British interpretation of this international relationship was Richard Storry's *Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894–1943* (1979). Storry emphasized the centrality of China to both British and Japanese calculations regarding the international order in Asia. The American vision of China's role in the international system was somewhat different. From the turn of the century, American governments championed the policy of the "Open Door" in China, calling on foreign powers to refrain from carving out exclusive zones of economic dominance. This American policy survived the change in Japanese policy that began with the conquest and annexation of the resource-rich northern region of Manchuria in 1931–1932. This Japanese version of exclusive empire established by force clashed with the American vision of an independent China, as the pivot of an open economic order in East Asia. The diplomatic, cultural, and strategic factors that shaped this clash were powerfully analyzed by a Japanese scholar working in the United States. Iriye's *Power and Culture: The Japanese–American War 1941–1945* (1981), and *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (1987), sensitized a generation of scholars to the dynamics of this clash of national agendas. Ienaga's controversial *The Pacific War 1931–1945* (1968) emphasized a Japanese turn toward an aggressive imperial agenda, one that stemmed as much from contending forces within Japanese political life as from external circumstances.

The decision to seek hegemony in China exposed two fatal flaws in Japan's strategic position: the empire faced multiple adversaries, but had no strong central authority which could focus and coordinate high policy and grand strategy. The Emperor possessed supreme executive authority but by convention, kept "above politics," playing little role in formulating policy. Civilian governments were intrinsically weak because they could not effectively control the armed forces. The professional heads of both the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and IJN enjoyed direct access to the Emperor, and both services appointed their own government ministers, from within their ranks. No Cabinet could function without the two service ministers, so the armed forces had only to withdraw a minister to bring down a government. But the armed forces chronically disagreed about national policy and grand strategy, between and within themselves. The IJA tended to focus on the Soviet Union as the most dangerous threat. The Soviet Red Army glared across the frontier at Japanese-controlled Manchuria, menacing Japanese ambitions in China; this was compounded by bitter ideological animosity between the communist power and the authoritarian militarist empire. The IJN worried more about the USA, and a decisive battle for maritime dominance in the Pacific Ocean. These problems made it difficult for Japan to coordinate a coherent policy for imperial expansion. Japan's structural problems and their effect on foreign policy have been exhaustively analyzed. Herbert Bix revived controversy by arguing Emperor Hirohito played an active executive role in final decision making, in his book *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (2000). The issue was pursued in *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period* by Ian Nish (2002), and a British-Japanese collaboration, *A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of War to the*

Far East and the Pacific 1921–1942, by Haruo Tohmatsu and H. P. Willmott (2004). Aggressive imperialist factions within the IJA played a major role driving Japan toward hegemonic war in China. The year 1936 was an important one. In January, Japan formally withdrew from the last London Naval Conference, officially renouncing the Washington Agreements which framed regional security from 1922. Pressure for a more aggressive policy came from junior and middle ranking officers who stridently demanded that Japan flex its muscles. This *gekokujo* tendency was a consequence of the deliberate cultivation of a national cult of militarist imperialism. Two good accessible analyses are Meirion Harries and Susie Harries's *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army* (1994) and the seminal work *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States* (2006) by Asada. Such pressure triggered the February 26 incident – an attempted coup in which the plotters narrowly missed killing the prime minister. But in June, a new government accepted changes in the agreed *Imperial National Defense Policy*, defined by agreement between the armed forces. This, for the first time, designated the British Empire a potential enemy, with its important economic interests in China, lukewarm attitude toward Japanese ambitions, and imperial presence in Southeast Asia. In August, the government agreed to endorse a statement on *Fundamentals of National Policy*, which expressed the intent to expand both north and south. This obvious compromise regarding the strategic priorities of army and navy was underlined in November when Japan joined Nazi Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact to express mutual hostility to Soviet Russia. Japan's leaders were framing their policy to expand in China.

The friction this provoked between Japan and the United States is well known to American readers, but the decision to add the British Empire to the list of adversaries marked an important shift in Japanese policy – one that played a major role in the ensuing conflict. The British were the largest and strongest Western power in East and Southeast Asia, with the largest economic interests in China. The British allowed their military alliance with Japan to lapse in 1921, in favor of the Washington Agreements – partly to preserve cordial British–American relations. But the deeper reason was the changing Japanese agenda toward China, hegemony, and self-sufficiency. This, in the end, could only shatter the British position in the region. The long-standing ties between the two maritime empires complicated the decline in relations between them, however, as did British efforts to cope with an emerging Nazi Germany. A sophisticated literature addresses these problems. One important study by an American scholar, Arthur J. Marder's *Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy* (1981), analyzed relations between the two navies and their impact on the larger relationship, especially from 1936. Placing Japanese interest in the southern region in a deeper context was Henry Frei's *Japan's Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II* (1991). Also important is Antony Best's *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia 1914–1941* (2002). Bringing the scholarship together is a definitive multivolume collaboration between Western and Japanese scholars, *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600–2000*. The essays in *Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension 1600–1930* (Nish and Kibata 2000–2002), *Volume 2: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension 1931–2000* (Nish and Kibata 2000–2002), and *Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (Gow and Hirama 2003), are essential reading for serious students of both Western–Japanese relations and the Pacific War.

By deciding to expand both north and south, imperial Japan moved toward a dead end. Japan simply did not have enough power to subdue China and cope with Soviet and Western hostility in response. This reflected the inability of the Japanese government to coordinate a coherent national strategy, and the refusal of the army and navy to forge one by compromise. The navy obtained a commitment to southern expansion, adding to Japan's burdens, mainly to preserve its share of national resources, and role in national strategy, in the face of mounting army pressure for more aggressive imperial expansion. That pressure detonated the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident triggered open war between Japan and China. Bringing that war to a successful conclusion, by imposing secure Japanese hegemony in China, became the principal national objective of Japan from that point on. Good, accessible studies of the war in China remain few in number. *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations* by Caroline Rose (1998) repays reading; so does Bradford Lee's *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War* (1973). A more comprehensive and up-to-date analysis is the collaboration edited by Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven, *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945* (2010).

The war in China was the proximate cause of Japan's attack on the Western powers. That war proved beyond Japanese power to terminate. The army won victory after victory, but was pulled deeper into the Chinese hinterland and thus strained its supply lines and manpower. China was torn between nationalist, communist, and factional forces, and struggled to mount a coordinated national defense; the Japanese even found factions prepared to support them in a new order. But this very political division only complicated the problem of terminating the war: no one could deliver China to Japanese hegemony. Japanese forces became ever more brutal in their drive for conquest, searching for the threshold of pain that would terminate the conflict. The notorious rampage in Nanking in December 1937, in which IJA troops, unleashed by higher command, raped and murdered huge numbers of Chinese civilians, was followed the next year by a brutal campaign in the north denounced by the Chinese communists as the "Three Alls" strategy: Kill All, Burn All, Destroy All. Such brutality, Nanking in particular, generated strong revulsion that began to change the political climate in which the British and American governments formulated policy toward Japan. Japanese attacks on British and American naval vessels made things even worse; deemed accidental and followed by apologies, they nevertheless affronted Western public opinion. The two Western governments did not trust each other to stand fast in solidarity to confront Japanese aggression, so both moved cautiously; but secret staff talks on possible naval cooperation began as early as January 1938.

The effort to coordinate a common foreign policy and military strategy to confront Japan's war in China dominated British–American relations regarding Asia from this time. That effort has been well studied by such important works as Malcolm Murfett's *Fool-Proof Relations: The Search for Anglo-American Naval Cooperation during the Chamberlain Years 1937–1940* (1984), and James R. Leutze's *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American naval collaboration 1937–1941* (1977). Not much progress in coordination ensued. This was partly due to a familiar problem: President Franklin D. Roosevelt's reluctance to press foreign policy beyond what public opinion was ready to support. But different priorities in naval strategy also mattered. The US Navy thought in terms of concentrating its power to smash the IJN in a

decisive battle in the Pacific Ocean, possibly ignited by a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, now an American protectorate. The evolution of the navy's Plan Orange has its must-read study: Edward Miller's *War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to defeat Japan 1897–1945* (1991).

British strategy did not lend itself to easy harmonization with American plans. Based on the premise the Royal Navy was not strong enough to be everywhere at once, the British "Singapore strategy" called for the main fleet to respond to any crisis in Asia by steaming out from Europe to a modern main base in Singapore, the central position in Southeast Asia. From Singapore, the fleet would take the lead to defend British interests against a Japanese attack. By 1938, when the still unfinished base was formally opened, the "Singapore strategy" was a hostage to fortune. Its glaring weakness was exposed by deteriorating international relations: the British faced a new threat of war in Europe, which might prevent them from sending the main fleet to Singapore. But there was no real alternative, as British efforts to rearm struggled to keep pace with increasing threats. The interwar "Singapore strategy" has been systematically studied; important works include W. David McIntyre's *The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base 1919–1942* (1979), Ian Hamill's *The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand 1919–1942* (1981), and James Neidpath's *The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire 1918–1941* (1981).

The simultaneous increase in pressure from Nazi Germany and imperial Japan made the British naval staff more interested in forging combined strategy with the US Navy. They envisaged American capital ships operating from Singapore, concentrating coalition forces in a common defense; S. W. Roskill's *Naval Policy Between the Wars* (Roskill 1968, 1976) explored the interplay in British naval staff thinking between threats in Europe and hopes for cooperation in Asia, a theme pursued by Christopher Bell in *The Royal Navy, Seapower, and Strategy between the Wars* (2000). Some American naval planners showed some interest in using Singapore, notably Admiral Harold R. Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations. But Washington's feelings were mixed; many of Stark's staff regarded deploying from Singapore as overextending American forces and stretching out their supply line in front of a dangerous adversary. The central problem was that the two Western powers shared concerns about Japan's war in China, and about the threat Japanese naval power posed to their own interests, but did not see those interests as identical. British concerns focused on Southeast Asia, American on the Western Pacific. This complicated efforts to forge a common strategy.

Time ran out on this effort. By mid-1939, Europe stood on the verge of another great power war, while Japan threatened the British position in China. The IJA General Staff were convinced Chinese resistance was being sustained by financial and material aid from the Western powers. Seizing on an incident in the city of Tientsin, the IJA demanded British concessions. With war looming at home, the British could not effectively resist a Japanese attack. Concessions ensued, while Japanese forces pushed deeper into southern China, seizing the large offshore island of Hainan. But at the same time, the IJA provoked a major battle with the Soviet Red Army along the northern frontier of Manchuria by probing this adversary; the Soviet threat pinned down substantial Japanese forces guarding the border. The Red Army soundly thrashed the IJA in these clashes around Nomonhan. Edward Drea closely investigated

this campaign in *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (2003). The whole Japanese establishment was then caught flat-footed when their German ally concluded a nonaggression pact with the Soviets. This agreement cleared the way for Nazi Germany to launch what became World War II in Europe on September 1, 1939, and forced the Japanese government to resign. Because of these adverse developments, Japanese leaders sat still in autumn 1939, waiting to see what would happen in Europe. *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia 1939*, by Alvin Coox (1990), analyzed connections between these events. The larger interplay between Japan's war in China and the new war in Europe produced, in due course, the Japanese decision to wage war on the Western powers – and the grand strategy by which Japan launched that war. Two turning points in the war in Europe shaped the collision between Japan and the West. In June 1940, German armed forces drove the British Army off the continent and forced France to capitulate. In June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, launching total war to destroy the Soviet state. Japanese responses to these turning points pointed Japan toward war with the West – and toward Southeast Asia.

In 1940, all of Southeast Asia, except Thailand, was controlled one way or another by Western powers. The Philippines were an American protectorate. General Douglas MacArthur commanded the Philippines Army bolstered by US Army forces and the naval bases on Luzon Island were home to the US Navy's Asiatic Fleet. French Indochina comprised Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, garrisoned by small French military forces. The Netherlands governed the vast archipelago now known as Indonesia, then the colony of the Netherlands East Indies, with forces even less adequate to secure such a vast area. Burma, Malaya, and northern Borneo were British colonies or protectorates. As a result, from June 1940, an unprecedented window of opportunity opened up in front of imperial Japan. French, British, and Dutch territories were important sources of such strategic raw materials as rubber and tin; British and Dutch territories included Asia's largest oil reserves. But the Dutch were now helpless; their homeland was occupied by Nazi Germany, leaving their colonial forces utterly dependent on help from allies. American forces in the Philippines were weak. The US Pacific Fleet was a potent force, but was based on the west coast of the United States. Beyond that, the United States only now began to prepare for possible war; the nation remained divided over how to respond to developments overseas, and more concerned about Europe than Asia. French authorities in Indochina opted to accept the orders of the government in Vichy that capitulated and cooperated with Nazi Germany. And the British were now forced to defend their home islands against the threat of invasion from a much stronger enemy, leaving little to spare to bolster their forces in what they called the Far East. The Japanese took note. They were also impressed when the American Congress passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act; by Japanese calculations, when this planned expansion of the US Navy was completed in 1944, Japanese naval power would be no more than 30 percent of American; Ken Kotani (2005) examines this problem in his chapter in Daniel Marston's excellent *The Pacific War Companion*. The combination seemed persuasive: the resources Japan needed lay there for the taking in the south, but the window of opportunity would not stay open indefinitely.

The armed forces and government all agreed the raw materials of Southeast Asia must be secured. But striking south meant exposing the north and, worse, provoking

the Americans. On July 27, a Liaison Conference at Imperial General Headquarters forged a delicate compromise. Titled “Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation,” (Japanese Monograph Series, n.d.) the document proclaimed:

The Japanese Empire will strive for the immediate settlement of the China Incident by improving internal and external conditions in keeping with the changes in the world situation and, at the same time, will solve the southern area problem by taking advantage of opportunities. Changes in politics, with emphasis placed on measures for the southern area, will be decided in consideration of various conditions, internal and external.

The primary objective was to secure the oilfields in British and Dutch territory. The main military target was the British, the strongest power in the region. But the navy remained anxious about American intervention, and pressed hard for measures to secure the resources without resorting to military invasion – these measures included persuasion, enticement, threats, and intimidation. All parties agreed there were four scenarios which would compel Japan to go to war against the Western powers: a falling out between the British and Americans, a total cessation of American exports to Japan, any major British or American reinforcement of the region, and any American deployment of capital ships from Singapore. This list nicely summarized both the disagreements between the armed forces and the mixture of danger and opportunity that influenced these discussions. The army pressed hard for a firm commitment to southern expansion, notwithstanding the risks, and imposed a strong tilt on the compromise. These decisions were recorded in Japanese Monograph Number 146, *Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War*, Part II:

As the settlement of the China Incident is generally completed, armed strength will be used where necessary insofar as various internal and external conditions permit, to solve the problems of the southward advance ... In employing armed strength, efforts will be made to limit the war adversary to Great Britain insofar as possible. However, thorough preparations for the commencement of hostilities against the United States will be made as it may prove impossible to avoid war with that country. (Farrell 2005, pp. 59–60)

This committed imperial Japan to establishing control over Southeast Asia, in order to achieve the strength to terminate its war in China. The open question was whether or not the Western powers would fight to prevent this. Testing the waters, the Japanese cajoled their German ally into persuading the French colonial government to allow Japanese forces to occupy bases in northern Vietnam. This was ostensibly to sever supply routes to China, but also brought Japanese forces closer to the Dutch and British territories further south, as Iriye has noted (Iriye 1987).

The American response was rapid and consequential. On September 27, President Roosevelt embargoed the export of scrap iron to Japan. This shot across the bow produced immediate retaliation: Japan joined Germany and Italy to conclude the Tripartite Pact, calling on the parties to assist each other should any be attacked by a power not already involved in either the “European War” or the “China Incident” – that is, the USA. Few topics in American history have been studied so exhaustively as the Roosevelt administration’s response to Japanese expansionism from the summer of 1940; an important accessible study is Waldo Heinrichs’s *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (1988). Other studies of note

include Warren F. Kimball's *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (1991), and Jonathan G. Utley's *Going to War with Japan 1937–1941* (2005). The point to bear in mind is that American policy also had to consider the interplay between the war in Europe and approaching trouble in Asia. The Roosevelt administration tilted from the start toward Europe as the greater concern; there is no better way to study this problem than to work through Warren F. Kimball's magisterial edited work *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence* (1984). Less well known to American readers is the subsequent Japanese response to developments.

Despite German failure to invade or subjugate the United Kingdom, the Japanese remained confident there was little the British could do to bolster their defensive position in Southeast Asia. They had good reason. The British Chiefs of Staff acknowledged in August there was little they could do to strengthen the inadequate defenses of Malaya and Singapore while the UK faced possible invasion, and estimated the British position in the Far East would remain vulnerable through 1941; in November, the Japanese received copies of that very report from their Axis allies, who seized them from a British merchant ship before they could be destroyed. This intelligence coup, and the impact of intelligence on preparations for war in general, is superbly analyzed by Richard J. Aldrich in *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (2000). Strengthened by the knowledge they would enjoy strategic superiority, the IJA General Staff intensified planning – begun in August – for operations in Southeast Asia. In December, they established a unit in Taiwan – codenamed Taiwan Army Research Department – to gather information about the region in general and jungle warfare in particular, in order to prepare war plans, and a battle doctrine, for operations in Southeast Asia. The unit threw itself into its mission, sending officers to conduct extensive personal reconnaissance and espionage trips in Malaya and Singapore. Senior German officers also urged Lieutenant-General Yamashita Tomoyuki, leading a liaison mission to Berlin, to persuade his superiors to cripple British power by conquering Malaya and Singapore; they thought it might take five divisions well over a year to do the job, as Akashi (2002) noted in his chapter in Brian P. Farrell and Sandy Hunter's edited collection of essays *Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited* (2002).

This did not take into account something the Axis Powers did not know: the British and American decision to concentrate on Germany first as the more dangerous enemy, and adopt a strategic defensive posture against Japan. This grand strategy, one of the fundamental decisions of the war, emerged in March 1941 from secret staff talks in Washington about possible strategic cooperation if – read when – the United States entered the war. The British decision had already been imposed, by the course of the war in Europe; the American decision, while never unanimous, proved decisive. These decisions and their ramifications have an extensive literature, including Mark Stoler's *The Politics of the Second Front* (1977) and Brian P. Farrell's *The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy 1940–1943: Was There a Plan?* (1998). In retrospect, these decisions made it even more difficult for the Western powers to forge a common strategy to defend Southeast Asia before it was too late. Men on the spot tried to do just that. But Washington refused to endorse anything more than agreements on minor technical matters, such as exchanging radio frequencies. The American domestic political debate over foreign policy remained an important obstacle. So did the hard fact that while the Western powers had a common interest in maintaining Western

dominance in Southeast Asia, they did not coordinate, before 1940, their defense policies with that in mind. The consequences of that divergence were analyzed by Brian P. Farrell (2010) in “By the Seat of the Pants? Allied Strategy and the Japanese Onslaught in Southeast Asia December 1941–May 1942,” published in Tokyo in the volume *Strategy in the Pacific War: NIDS International Forum on War History: Proceedings* (NIDS 2010).

As a result, despite some effort by the British and Americans to reinforce Malaya and the Philippines respectively, Southeast Asia remained very vulnerable. The problem then changed dramatically when the German armed forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. This attack, the turning point of World War II, compelled the Japanese to determine the nature of their national policy and grand strategy once and for all. Their gaze turned decisively to the south.

Imperial General Headquarters discussed the situation on July 2. Long deliberations produced an agreement to pursue two tracks simultaneously: negotiate with the USA to avert hostilities; prepare for war against the Western powers. The elastic compromise was summarized in the document *Outline of the Empire's National Policy to Cope with the Changing World Situation*:

Regardless of whatever changes may occur in the world situation, Japan will adhere to the established policy of creating a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and thereby contribute to the establishment of world peace. As before, Japan will strive for the settlement of the China Incident, advance toward the Southern Area in order to lay the foundation for her self-support and self-defense, and, depending upon the situation, settle the northern issues.

If it became necessary, “Japan will not hesitate to declare war against Britain and the United States.”

This document, recorded in Japanese Monograph Number 150, *Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War*, Part IV, reflected the complications marking the “drive to the south.” The Japanese government concluded its own nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in February, but the IJA General Staff still saw the Soviets as a major threat that could pin down large Japanese forces. Efforts to secure more raw materials from Southeast Asia by intimidation did not succeed. Discussions with the American government regarding China only brought out the disagreements between the parties. But national policy was defined: Japan would establish a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, to replace the international order in Asia built by Western imperialism. This would unify Asia under Japanese hegemony; the southern area would be part of the “resource area,” from which Japan would draw the raw materials it required to develop its economy to self-sufficiency. Now that the Soviet Union was fighting for survival, the Japanese leadership made a fundamental decision. Rather than strike north to combine forces to destroy the Soviet Union, Japan would take advantage of the German invasion to pursue its own objectives through the southern advance. The armed forces moved swiftly, forcing French authorities in Indochina to allow the IJA and IJN to occupy bases in southern Vietnam and Cambodia. This put them within striking distance of Thailand, Malaya, and Singapore, and, supposedly, would bolster pressure on the Dutch to increase exports to Japan. But instead, it provoked a decisive response from the Roosevelt administration,

which, on July 26, imposed an economic blockade on Japan. The British and Dutch followed suit. This put Japan and the West on the collision course that exploded into war in December 1941.

Japan's leaders now faced a moment of truth. Japanese revisionism still portrays this as Japan being forced to go to war by an American ultimatum, a pistol pointed at its head. Such an argument has not found much favor with Japanese academic historians. But exponents do attract some attention from segments of the wider Japanese public. Major works include Nakamura's *The Road to the Greater East Asia War* (1990) and Kobayashi's *On War* (1998). Such interpretations have long been powerfully influenced by American revisionism, which accused Roosevelt of sacrificing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in order to lure Japan into provoking war. The standard revisionist work was Charles Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War in 1941* (1948); a more recent supporting study was Robert Stinnett's *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* (1999). Simply glancing at the raw data would support the Japanese revisionist argument. Japanese experts all agreed the economic blockade would force Japan to deplete its stocks of strategic raw materials, especially oil, in little more than a year. But that raw data must be examined in context. The reason the Western embargo was such a dire threat was because Japan insisted on waging war to subjugate China, burning up resources – making it vulnerable. There was an alternative, in principle: curtail or abandon offensive operations in China. The IJA and IJN simply refused to do this. This is one of the great questions of World War II, indeed of the twentieth century. Most Japanese leaders were well aware how daunting it would be to wage war against the United States that boasted an industrial economy some ten times the size of their own, and an all but invulnerable homeland. Yet they chose to risk war with the United States rather than face the consequences of standing down in China. Why?

The literature on the formulation of Japanese policy in 1941 is extensive, including accessible collections of primary sources. Two important studies are *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, edited by Nobutaka Ike (1967), and *The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II*, edited by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (2004). There are also volumes from the extensive *Japanese Monograph* series, written by senior surviving Japanese officers who, working under the auspices of Allied intelligence in postwar Japan, tried to reconstruct Japanese policy and the conduct of the Pacific War; relevant volumes include the subseries *Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War*, Parts I–V (compiled by Rear Admiral Tomioka, General Headquarters, from official documents and private records). The conclusions reached in Tokyo in the second half of 1941 are clear. Two were outright mistakes in calculation, influenced by wishful thinking: first, American society was too commercial and effete to wage total war to prevent the transformation of Asia, and second, Germany would win its war in Europe, thereby changing the balance of power in Asia. Two still beg for explanation: Japanese society would collapse in revolution if imperialism failed in China, and Japan could become strong enough to wage war against the United States by seizing, and exploiting, the resources of Southeast Asia. The former is mystical, the latter chilling. During discussions about the American economic blockade in late July 1941, the senior economic official of the Japanese government, the president of the Planning Board, gave the following assurance: Japanese production would decrease at first, but once Japan started to

exploit the resources of Southeast Asia it could make itself strong enough to fight off an American counteroffensive and reconstruct Asia. He “felt it necessary to submit to the Government and to Imperial General Headquarters a report of the resources it would be necessary for Japan to mobilize in the event of war, and urged them to execute a war aimed at the acquisition of resources in line with these demands” (Japanese Monograph Number 150, *Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War*, Part IV). Because Japan would not relent in China, it must start a war against the USA in order to make itself strong enough to survive that same war.

This cavalier rationale shaped Japanese grand strategy for war against the West, and attack plans to implement it. Negotiations with the Americans continued until the day war broke out, but this gap could not be bridged. On September 3, the American government presented four principles for further negotiation, which, boiled down, insisted Japan cease and desist in China. On September 6, another Imperial Conference ratified a new “Outline for the Execution of the Empire’s National Policy,” which the IJN defined as a “shift in emphasis in national policy from political to military strategy.” They were correct. From this point, Japanese policy leaned heavily toward preparing for war, for which the navy blamed the army. But the IJN closed the last possible loophole by refusing to agree to attack the British and Dutch alone, in hopes this might delay or avert American intervention. The navy insisted the US Pacific Fleet would attack from the flank after Japanese forces invaded Southeast Asia. If it must wage war to secure Southeast Asia, then Japan must confront all its Western enemies as a single foe. When a new government led by General Tōjō Hideki concluded in late October that the Americans were dragging out negotiations to buy time to prepare for war, the die was cast – war preparations moved into high gear.

Notwithstanding preliminary planning done by both armed forces, substantial preparations and detailed plans only really kicked in from September 1941. The cardinal decisions underpinned grand strategy: Japan must overrun all of Southeast Asia then establish a strongly fortified line of bases from which it would repel all counteroffensives. The main fleet would patrol and support this line like a guard dog supporting a fence. Behind this security perimeter, Japan would harness the raw materials of Southeast Asia, build up its national power, impose hegemony on China, then wear down Western counteroffensives to the point where the United States, in particular, came to terms with a new Asia. The limits of Japanese power shaped plans to execute that grand strategy. That is, while the entire navy was available for this war against the West, the main adversary it must defeat, the US Pacific Fleet, was in the Central Pacific, not Southeast Asia. As for the army, because of the need to watch the Soviet Red Army in the north, prosecute the war in China, and maintain a strategic reserve at home, it could only assign 11 of its 55 combat divisions to this expanded war. These two problems complicated what was always going to be a daunting force-to-space ratio to overrun such a large area. The IJA took the lead planning operations in Southeast Asia, organizing them around two principles of war: speed and economy of force.

Planners concluded Japan must launch an all-out offensive from the start and attack relentlessly, to seize and hold the initiative, divide the different Western forces in the region from each other, prevent them digging in strongly enough to stop the advance, and overrun the area before the Allies could send in strong reinforcements. This must all be done without suffering heavy casualties because some divisions would

be needed in more than one area. That limitation also meant Japanese invasions must proceed in sequence. Covered by strong air forces, which would gain control of the air, Japanese ground forces would invade and overrun Thailand, Malaya, and Luzon; once firmly established, they would move on to overrun Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The most pressing strategic problem determined the final details of the Japanese attack plan: the relationship between the invasion of Southeast Asia and the threat posed by the US Pacific Fleet. And that problem was only finally resolved in late October.

While the navy was united on the need to fight the Americans, it was badly divided on how to achieve this. The Naval General Staff wanted to deploy some of the striking power of the fleet aircraft carriers in the southern operations. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, the principal battle element of the navy, believed the striking power should be concentrated in a surprise attack on the US Pacific Fleet, at its forward base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Yamamoto and his staff believed a surprise attack by carrier-borne aircraft could catch the aircraft carriers and capital ships tied up, like tethered goats, to the dockyard. By crippling the only strong battle-ready American force the IJN could buy precious time, to allow Japanese forces to overrun Southeast Asia without interference. Yamamoto, by threatening to resign, forced the Naval General Staff to give in, and allocate the navy's main striking power, six fleet carriers, to his planned attack on Hawaii. This allowed army and navy planners to finalize detailed plans for the southern advance, and also shaped those plans. The evolution of Japanese grand strategy and attack plans was analyzed in detail, and set in context, by H. P. Willmott in *Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942* (1982). Another important study is *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941*, by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie (1997). Their analysis emphasizes the incoherence of Japanese grand strategy, right to the eve of the Pacific War.

Japanese attack plans proceeded from a formal Naval Operations Plan, submitted on October 20. This outline pulled recent decisions together. Without strong carrier-borne strike aircraft, the army could not directly invade any strongly defended position – particularly Singapore, with its array of coastal artillery. But in order to guarantee three to one superiority in the air, the army would transfer some of its air corps from Manchuria. So strengthened, Japanese ground forces would advance on Singapore and Manila from the north, protected by the air umbrella. Fourteenth Army was given 53 days to overrun the Philippines, Twenty-Fifth Army 100 days to take Singapore; the whole operation would conclude within 150 days, culminating in the occupation of Burma and Java.

Twenty-Fifth Army's attack on southern Thailand and Malaya was the crucial campaign. Yamashita, one of the IJA's most experienced and able field commanders, assumed command on November 6. According to standard procedure, he finalized plans already drafted by his staff but in the process confirmed a vital adjustment. The first draft attack plan called for invading southern Thailand, using Thai neutrality to prevent any British attempt to disrupt the landings, then building up a strong force before advancing, some five weeks later, on Malaya. Senior officers transferred from the Taiwan Army Research Department persuaded their colleagues to accept a radically different Operational Outline, one based on a calculated risk: to seize the initiative by advancing immediately and relentlessly, driving the enemy back without pause, to

prevent them from regrouping or digging in. This posed the very real danger the army would race ahead of its supply lines and bog down, should the enemy retreat in good order or make an effective stand. But it matched the need for speed and economy of force, and rested on the conviction Twenty-Fifth Army would outfight its opponent. It was also backstopped by two strong force multipliers: control of the air and dominance at sea. Twenty-Fifth Army was organized as a task force to overrun Malaya, deploying three of the best divisions in the army – the 5th, 18th, and the Imperial Guards – reinforced by independent tank, artillery, and engineer units. The campaign plan was to shatter the initial defense by an all-out assault, then win a race to Singapore: a race to overrun the island before strong reinforcements could intervene. As Farrell has noted in explaining this operation, Yamashita issued his final operations order on November 23 (Farrell 2005). This bold strategy to storm garrison forces in Malaya and Luzon turned out to be well calculated to exploit serious Allied weaknesses. MacArthur was recalled to active US Army service in July, and some American combat units were sent to bolster his command. But his largely Filipino army was still too weak, and ill-prepared, to defend such a large territory against a determined invasion. Much the same can be said of Malaya Command, which faced still another handicap: it was not free to concentrate its forces to try to exploit whatever natural advantage the ground provided. MacArthur was at least free to prepare a fallback plan: to retreat if necessary to the jungle-covered mountains of the Bataan Peninsula and force the enemy to try to starve him out, buying time for a possible relieving force.

Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival, general officer commanding Malaya Command, had much less latitude. His mission was to hold the naval base in Singapore, ostensibly to allow the main battle fleet to operate from it when it steamed east to confront Japan. The fleet was of course not available by 1941, fighting hard in Europe. But the much-publicized resolve to hold “Fortress Singapore” and defeat Japan with the “Singapore Strategy” was seen by Australia and New Zealand, not to mention the colonial populations in Southeast Asia, as essential to their own security. To hold the empire together, the British had to hold Singapore. To do that, British forces had to keep any invader out of range of the naval base. By 1941, given the range of modern aircraft, that meant holding the entire Malayan peninsula. To compound this problem, the Royal Air Force (RAF) tried to enhance its capability to keep any invader at bay by building airbases up country in Malaya, on the east coast and in the north. But the war in Europe prevented the RAF from deploying strong enough forces to use those bases properly. By December 1941, RAF Far East remained far below the strength the British Chiefs of Staff identified in 1940 as required to defend Singapore. Its empty bases, however, must be denied to any invader. So Malaya Command found itself the front line force defending Malaya and Singapore – but broader complications forced Percival to spread out his army, to defend airbases and to keep an invading force as far from Singapore as possible. This presented the Japanese the chance to divide their enemy and defeat him in detail, greatly reducing the risk of their own “driving charge” strategy (Farrell 2005, chs. 4 and 5).

The American defense of Luzon and British defense of Malaya were both further undermined by belated reinforcements on which, for no good reason, high hopes were placed. When the US Army decided to deploy a combat wing equipped with its brand new heavy bomber, the B 17 Flying Fortress, at Clark Field in Luzon, planners in Manila and Washington became far too optimistic, thinking in terms of defeating

any Japanese invasion by bombing the bases from which it came. And when Prime Minister Winston Churchill forced the Royal Navy to send not a battle fleet but a small squadron of two capital ships to Singapore, to try to deter the Japanese and impress the Americans, theater commanders in Singapore welcomed the squadron, which arrived on December 2, 1941, as a “game changer.” While the Japanese took both reinforcements seriously, they also took effective countermeasures. Neither of these steps proved to be more than speed bumps to the Japanese advance – making the shock all the greater when Allied defenses quickly crumbled. The unfortunate dovetailing of final plans and preparations by the Japanese and the Allies has been carefully studied. Useful works include Brian P. Farrell’s *The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940–1942* (2005), Clifford Kinvig’s *Scapegoat: General Percival and the Defence of Singapore* (1996), Henry Probert’s *The Forgotten Air Force: The Royal Air Force in the War Against Japan 1941–1945* (1995), and Richard Connaughton’s *MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines* (2003). These studies were able to draw from a wider pool of primary sources released to national archives, to form a “third wave” of scholarly interpretation. Together they documented three points of note: the sheer audacity of the Japanese offensive, with its finely calculated margins of force and risk, at every level; the abundant intelligence available to the Allies warning of Japanese intentions and capabilities; and the striking failure of the Allies to coordinate their defensive campaigns to any significant degree.

The Japanese attacks on the Western powers, which actually began not at Pearl Harbor but at Kota Bharu in northeastern Malaya, three hours before Yamamoto’s aircraft struck their targets, were among the boldest and most wide-ranging synchronized offensive operations in military history. Strategically, they ignited a war Japan could never win, and was never likely to survive. But operationally, they caught the Western Allies divided and unprepared, militarily, politically, and psychologically. To borrow a later phrase, the “shock and awe” generated by the Japanese offensives knocked the already physically dispersed American, British, and Dutch defending forces badly off balance. This allowed the Japanese to run major risks as they charged ahead on sometimes very strained supply lines. MacArthur’s B-17 contingent was battered on the ground before it could engage; the Royal Navy’s Force Z was destroyed at sea on the third morning of the war, the first time capital ships in the open sea were sunk by air attack alone. The Fourteenth Army underestimated its opponent, after MacArthur declared Manila an open city and retreated into Bataan in January 1942. The Filipino-American army exploited strong ground to put up a stiff defense, forcing the Japanese to reinforce the operation, and sparking strong pressure on Washington to rescue the garrison. But American losses at Pearl Harbor, and President Roosevelt’s decision to confirm the “Germany first” decision as the basis of grand strategy, were a fatal combination for the defense of the Philippines. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to escape, but his army could not. It finally surrendered on May 6, 1942, after a staunch defense of Bataan, and the fortress island of Corregidor, that did much to stiffen Allied morale.

The truth of the matter was that the Japanese could afford to run risks – which they did often – and make mistakes – which they did rarely – and still advance in Southeast Asia, for two reasons. First, they seized the initiative and prevented the defenders from regrouping, physically and mentally. Second, because they dominated the airspace and sea-lanes, they controlled the theater of operations. The US Asiatic Fleet

tried to combine forces with Australian, Dutch, and British naval squadrons to defend the Java Sea, but Allied forces were outnumbered and outgunned. Barring a couple of local tactical successes, the Allies could not pin down a three-pronged Japanese advance into the Dutch East Indies, ending with surrender in Java on March 8, 1942.

The Allies made one belated effort to try to coordinate a common defense of Southeast Asia by setting up a unified theater command. British General Sir Archibald Wavell was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Southwest Pacific, assuming command on January 7, 1941. Wavell was given command of all Allied forces – somewhat indirectly regarding MacArthur’s army in Luzon – and ordered to hold the “Malay Barrier,” a line of positions running from Rangoon in Burma, through Malaya, Java, and on to New Guinea. After stopping the Japanese, he was to counterattack and repel them from the area. This was never going to happen. Wavell’s command fell apart the day he officially took over, at the central position on which the whole Allied defense of Southeast Asia rested – Malaya.

The Japanese “driving charge” shattered British Empire naval and air forces, and sent Percival’s dispersed ground forces reeling back in confusion, within the first five days of the campaign. Yamashita seized and held the initiative, giving his enemy no time to regroup. By trying to hold the Japanese as far as possible from Singapore for as long as possible, Percival presented his army to be defeated piecemeal. Better trained and prepared Japanese infantry, covered by powerful air forces, did just that. When the 11th Indian Division was overrun at Slim River in central Malaya on January 7, this forced Malaya Command to break contact and make a strategic retreat. That allowed the Japanese to win the race to Singapore, which they isolated on January 31, then invaded, and conquered on February 15. Thus established in the central position, Japanese forces went on to drive the Western Allies from the entire region of Southeast Asia by mid-May 1942. These operations are analyzed by a large literature, including H. P. Willmott’s *The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies February to June 1942* (2008), Paul S. Dull’s *A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941–1945* (2007), and Henry P. Frei’s *Guns of February: Ordinary Japanese Soldiers Views of the Malayan Campaign* (2004). Such studies significantly reinforce the “third wave” of analysis that documents how completely unprepared the Allies were to cope with a Japanese offensive prosecuted with more nerve and skill than they anticipated. They also suggest how important this failure to anticipate turned out to be. A very recent work, *The Loss of Java* by P. C. Boer (2011), documents a cardinal fact in abundant detail: the Japanese did not have the numbers or firepower to prevail as quickly and completely as they did had the defense been close to competent, let alone coordinated or resolute.

This “third wave” of scholarship raises the question of further reading. Those wishing to dig deeper into the topic of Japan’s attack on the Western powers have an obvious advantage if they read Japanese. For such research, the essential source is the 102 volume series of official history produced, through the direction of the Military History Department of the National Institute of Defense Studies in Tokyo, from 1966 to 1980: *Senshi Sōsho* (戦史叢書). Very few have been translated. More accessible to English readers is the Japanese Monograph series noted above in this chapter. This series was produced after the war under the supervision of the Allied military government of occupation of Japan. Based on surviving official and personal records, written by surviving senior officers, these two series are as close as we can get to an

archival record of Japan's decision to attack the West, and its prosecution of that offensive. Many volumes of the Japanese Monograph series (n.d.) can be accessed online at www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/index.html and www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/index.html.

A number of published works provide either excellent starting points, or in-depth exploration, for various aspects of this topic. For the British–Japanese dimension, see the first three volumes in the series produced by the Anglo-Japanese Project, *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600–2000* (Nish and Kibata 2000–2002; Gow and Hiram 2003). For Japanese policy formulation in 1941, read the edited collections produced by Nobutaka Ike (1967), *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, and Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon (2004), *The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II*. For the IJN, consult Asada's (2006) *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*. For the IJA, start with Edward Drea's (2003) *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army*. And for a general introduction to the topic as a whole, and its larger context, read Daniel Marston's (2005) *The Pacific War Companion*, particularly the essays by Raymond Callahan, Ken Kotani, Ishizu Tomoyuki, and Dennis Showalter.

Despite the fact that much has been written, from many different vantage points, about this topic since December 1941, there are promising directions for future research. The most interesting is the most perverse: intelligence and its influence on strategy and operations, especially regarding appreciations of Japanese intentions and capabilities. Much good work has made it clear that the sheer audacity of the Japanese grand strategy, cutting margins as finely as they did in so many respects, helped lull Allied political leaders and military commanders into a false sense of security. But we struggle still to understand the root causes of such dire underestimation of the enemy. The coin has two sides. It remains unclear why the Japanese armed forces, which showed such audacity and imagination in the first six months of the Pacific War, remained so predictable thereafter in their battle-fighting doctrine on land, at sea, and in the air. The IJN and IJA failed miserably to adapt to changing conditions. The conventional wisdom that this was a classic case of "victor's disease" needs closer scrutiny. Finally, there is the catastrophic Allied failure to coordinate any kind of common regional defense before December 1941. The common interest of the Western powers in pooling their strength to maintain what had become a precarious ascendancy in the region is crystal clear in retrospect. The influence of domestic politics on Roosevelt's strategic foreign policy does not completely explain this failure to pull competing imperialisms together. Such questions all remain open to determined research.

Whatever way one approaches it, the Japanese Early Attack can only be understood by placing it in context. Doing so, four points stand out. First, the objective was to rescue the failing policy to reconstruct the international order in Asia by imposing Japanese hegemony in China. It was about China, the fatal policy from which Japanese leaders would not relent. Second, the attack on Pearl Harbor was expressly designed to clear the way for attacking Southeast Asia, as well as framing a "decisive battle" with the US Navy for control of the Pacific Ocean. Pearl Harbor was neither sideshow nor main event – the operations were related and must be studied as such. Third, the war in Europe determined both the Japanese decision to strike south and the favorable

conditions in which it could do so. Timing always matters. Finally, so does cohesion. Japan's armed forces never resolved the systemic problems that made it so difficult to formulate national war policy and grand strategy. But in December 1941, they faced a coalition even less ready to coordinate policy with strategy, and whose forces were dangerously dispersed. The Japanese were able to exploit these conditions. Thereafter, however, the Allies learned how to pull together as a military coalition and pursue a coherent grand strategy. The Japanese did not. In fact, they moved in the other direction, concluding the Allies were much weaker, and Japan much stronger, than was the case. The Japanese Early Attack thus stands out as an inspired example of bold military strategy – which rested, however, on a fatal misunderstanding of the real basis of military power and led Japan to ultimate disaster.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

War and Empire: The Transformation of Southern Asia

GARY R. HESS

World War II transformed Southern Asia – the area stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Philippine Islands and comprising at the time about one-fourth of the world’s population. Prior to 1940, the empires of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States dominated the region. Germany’s conquests of France and the Netherlands in spring 1940, and its pressures on Great Britain, meant that only the United States could restrain an opportunistic Japan’s “southward advance.” Ultimately Japan’s attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor triggered a series of invasions that overran Southeast Asia and threatened India. Britain retained control of India only by suppressing that country’s nationalist movement. Japan and the United States both sought to define the future of Southern Asia. In the name of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese established their empire over Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the United States challenged the British, French, and Dutch assumptions of a postwar imperial restoration by espousing “the end of empire.”

Scholarship on the Pacific War has informed the ways that these monumental changes in Southern Asia are interpreted. A generation ago when virtually all British, American, and Japanese documents had been opened to scholars, four major books broadened thinking about the war in Asia: Christopher Thorne’s *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan* (1978), W. Roger Louis’s *The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945* (1978), Akira Iriye’s *Power and Culture* (1981), and John W. Dower’s *War Without Mercy, Race and Power in the Pacific War* (1986). These works focus on related themes. The element of race, central to Dower’s book but also prominent in Thorne’s, as well as his brief study *Racial Aspects of the Far Eastern War* (1980), profoundly influenced both sides’ propaganda, perceptions of the enemy, definition of objectives, and the ways that they fought. As Dower observes, racial hatred drove the intensity of combat, leading all armies to a “kill-or-be-killed” mentality. Contrasting sharply with Dower’s approach,

Iriye argues that despite the intensity of the war, Japanese and American officials anticipated eventual postwar economic and political reintegration of the two countries, which included a common interest in anticolonialism in Southern Asia. Thorne and Louis examine tensions within the Anglo-American alliance, Thorne focusing on a broad range of political and military issues and Louis concentrating on imperialism; in both cases, the postwar status of Southern Asia figures prominently. More recent scholarship – notably Gerald Horne’s *Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (2004) and two books by Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *The Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941–1945* (2005) and *Forgotten Wars, Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia* (2007) – examine a decade of warfare and the prominent role of Asians in determining the fate of their countries.

Other works cast the racial experience during World War II in a broader context: Marc Gallichio’s *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (2000) and Penny M. von Eschen’s *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937–1957* (1997). Another important study, Andrew Rotter’s *Comrades at Odds* (2000), provides insight into the influence of cultural considerations, including race, on Indo-American relations, which first became prominent during the war. Finally, Harold Isaacs’s classic study of American perceptions of China and India, *Scratches on our Minds* (1958), remains invaluable for understanding the wartime and postwar relations.

Aided by such significant studies, examining Southern Asia from 1941 to 1945 – a singularly important “slice” of that region’s history – underscore the complexities of the interplay between allies, between enemies, and between imperialists (Western as well as Japanese) and the peoples whom they governed. The following description of Japan’s conquests draws from Bayly and Harper (2005), Weinberg (1994), and Zeiler (2011).

By virtually eliminating US naval power from the Pacific, the attack on Pearl Harbor enabled Japan to establish control of much of the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. In a matter of ten weeks, the Japanese military startled the world as it moved with speed and efficiency to build a vast empire. Tokyo’s vision of a Japanese-dominated Asia – the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere – was realized. True to plan, the Pearl Harbor attack coincided with air raids on other American possessions – the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island – as well as on the British colonies of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Burma, and the occupation of Thailand. On December 10, a Japanese air attack on the British fleet off Malaya resulted in the sinking of the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* – which the British had just dispatched to buttress their naval base at Singapore. The American force on Wake Island finally yielded to Japan’s overwhelming strength by surrendering on December 22. Three days later Hong Kong fell.

Japan’s conquests resulted from skillful planning and execution. Coordination of air and naval power facilitated the landing of troops at key points from which they advanced with relatively little resistance. The British and Dutch discounted Japan’s military power while exaggerating their own and expected the support of natives. In the defense of the reputedly impregnable naval base at Singapore, the indifference, if not the incompetence, of British military leaders bordered on the scandalous. Invading Malaya on December 8, Japanese troops advanced steadily down the coast. They landed forces at Singapore on the night of February 8–9, 1942, and after overcoming

initial resistance captured the city and naval base from an outmaneuvered and demoralized British force. Within a week, the British surrendered with the Japanese taking 60,000 prisoners. The fall of the symbol of British naval supremacy was a humiliating defeat, which Prime Minister Winston Churchill rightly considered one of the worst moments in British history.

Simultaneously, the Japanese attacked the Netherlands East Indies and then moved on to other conquests. With the Imperial Navy in control of the sea, bombers from the carrier force that had led the assault on Pearl Harbor established control of the air. With the principal island of Java isolated, the Imperial Navy overwhelmed Dutch, British, and American ships in the Java Sea and landed troops on March 1, 1942. As in Malaya, the defenders were ill-prepared and soon demoralized. Within a week, the Dutch surrendered, handing over some 95,000 prisoners. From their base in Java, Japan extended its authority over the other islands in the Indonesian archipelago.

The last two conquests – the Philippines and Burma, at the eastern and western extremes of the Co-Prosperity Sphere – had important political and strategic implications. The Philippines stood as the exception to the easy Japanese conquest as American-Filipino defenders held out until early May 1942. And Burma was critical as a link to India and China.

The defense of the Philippines has been the subject of considerable scholarship critical of the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, the commanding general of the United States Army Forces in the Far East who was based in Manila. Historians have not contended the islands could have been held, but they have found that MacArthur failed to assess the strategic situation accurately and made decisions that weakened defense and hastened defeat. MacArthur's principal biographers – D. Clayton James (1975), Michael Schaller (1989), William Manchester (1978), and Carol Petillo (1981) – approach his career from various perspectives but all fault his leadership at this critical moment.

First, MacArthur's prewar plan to defend the entire coast, which reversed War Plan Orange's limited defense strategy, was based on unjustified optimism in America's capacity to train a large Filipino army. Despite MacArthur's assurance that the reinforced 100,000-man Philippine force could defend the islands, in the moment of battle they proved ill-prepared and ill-equipped. Second, in the confusing events surrounding the Japanese raid on Clark Field on the first day of the war, MacArthur was responsible for the vulnerability of the air force, which was easily attacked by the Japanese. His orders that morning were contradictory and indecisive – as detailed in William H. Bartsch's *December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor* (2003) – leaving him responsible for the devastating Japanese assault. Third, MacArthur, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, seemed incapable of accepting the loss of the Philippines. Schaller (1989) stresses the prewar cockiness of MacArthur and his staff that the Americans and Filipinos would easily repel any Japanese invaders. Then despite the effects of the Pearl Harbor and Clark Field raids and the loss of Wake Island and Guam which eliminated American air and naval power from the western Pacific, MacArthur expected reinforcements. This delayed falling back on the original war plan to defend only Bataan and Corregidor, which, if begun earlier, would have permitted a more orderly withdrawal and maintained lines of supply. MacArthur opposed the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor, criticizing both General Edward P. King and General Jonathan Wainwright respectively for defying orders by doing so.

From his new base in Australia, MacArthur held to the illusion that he would soon be put in command of a large army to liberate the Philippines, thus fulfilling his famed promise: "I shall return." How can his behavior and unrealistic expectations be explained? To Manchester (1978) and Schaller (1989), MacArthur's arrogance and megalomania blinded him to US interests in a global context. A unique sense of responsibility to the Philippines reflected, as Petillo (1981) emphasizes, a deep psychological identity with, and dependency on, his adopted homeland. To return in triumph "became his obsession – and his redemption" (p. 217).

The fall of the Philippines marked the last foothold of the Western powers in Southeast Asia to become part of the Japanese Empire. By that time, the Japanese were consolidating their conquest of Burma, the last of the British forces having withdrawn in April.

A major objective of the Japanese invasion of Burma was to sever the Burma Road. This had been the major supply line to the Chinese Nationalist government (Guomindang) of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Aided by Thailand's decision not to resist, the Japanese army moved rapidly into Burma, outmaneuvering the British forces, capturing Rangoon on March 8, 1942, and cutting off the Burma Road. Shortly afterward a newly organized Burma Corps of 27,000 British and native troops managed a fighting withdrawal into India.

The Allied military disaster in Southeast Asia did not produce any urgency to dislodge the Japanese. Indeed the region was relegated to a low military priority. Military operations were the responsibility of the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI), which was hurriedly established during the Japan conquest. It represented the military link between South and Southeast Asia. It was also the source of sharp divisions among the Americans, British, and Chinese.

The United States, by default, determined Allied strategy in the Asian war. Reflecting longtime US planning for a two-front war, the primary focus was the defeat of Germany. And within the "second priority" of fighting Japan, Southeast Asia (aside from the Philippines) was considered the least important. The US Navy's Pacific island campaign promised the most direct means of defeating Japan through the application of classic "strength against strength" military doctrine. The secondary military campaigns sought to achieve important political objectives. The liberation of the Philippines would fulfill MacArthur's promise to "return" and atone for the failure to defend the islands in 1941–1942. Military assistance to China would strengthen its resistance and postwar status. As a result of these other objectives, American planners gave scant attention to liberating Southeast Asia, assuming that the success of the island campaign would force the Japanese to abandon their mainland empire.

Britain had different priorities, principally the restoration of European imperial control. Recognizing that no major operation could be undertaken before the end of the European war, the British relied on guerrilla operations, with its Special Operations Executive working with native anti-Japanese groups, most notably in Burma, Malaya, and Thailand.

The British and Americans differed over the status of China. Considering the weak Guomindang to lack the prerequisites of a major power, Britain opposed including China in CBI before acquiescing under American pressure. Adding to the British dismay, Jiang Jieshi became a voice of anticolonialism and openly sympathized with

India's nationalists. Almost as annoying to the British was the American effort to accommodate Jiang. Churchill was thus contemptuous of Jiang whom he met with considerable reluctance (and at Roosevelt's insistence) at the Cairo Conference in November, 1943.

The Allied bickering disrupted military operations. When the Japanese cut off the Burma Road, the American Air Force, operating from Assam in northeastern India, launched the so-called Hump flights over the Himalayan Mountains to China. General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of US Army forces in CBI, directed the treacherous air supply program. A fractious inter-allied struggle soon ensued. Stilwell had little respect for Jiang, who seemed content to let the Americans defeat the Japanese while he prepared for renewed warfare against the Chinese Communists. Jiang consistently demanded more from the Western allies: greater supplies by air, an early Anglo-American reconquest of Burma, and a new overland supply line originating in India. The British, never enthusiastic about the Hump operation, declined to improve the airfield in India or to upgrade the rail line that took supplies from the seaport to the airfield. The United States supported the construction of a new land supply route starting in Ledo in northeastern India, moving through northern Burma, and connecting with the northern section of the Burma Road in China. The British resisted, but at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, they reluctantly acquiesced. The construction of the 478-mile Ledo Road and oil pipeline winding its way through the Himalayas was begun in October 1943 but not completed until January 1945 (by which time the Burma Road had been reopened). Given the endless bickering in CBI, Gerhard Weinberg has aptly written that "it is nothing short of a miracle that the Allies were ever able to accomplish anything in this theater" (Weinberg 1994, p. 639).

As the history of CBI underscored, differences over postwar Asia persistently plagued inter-Allied relations. American leaders – officials, scholars, journalists, and other opinion-makers – assumed that the Japanese conquest meant the end of Western imperialism. As Singapore fell, the influential columnist Walter Lippmann wrote that the Western powers needed to abandon "an obsolete and unworkable white man's imperialism [and] in this drastic reorientation of war policy, leadership ... must be taken by the United States." (Lippmann 1942). In a 1942 Memorial Day address, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles made anticolonialism an imperative of the Allied cause: "The age of imperialism is ended ... The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as whole – in all oceans and in all continents" (Hess 1987, p. 47).

These sentiments represented the tradition of American "exceptionalism" – a topic of considerable scholarship. Two representative works – Michael Hunt's *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (1987) and Tony Smith's *America's Mission* (1994) place wartime objectives in historical context. Both stress the importance of Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership. Hunt contends that promoting liberty as a function of national destiny took hold early in the American republic, but had lost its force in the post-World War I disillusionment over Wilsonianism. "The activist conception of national greatness at last recovered its hold on foreign policy," Hunt writes, "gain[ing] a powerful new champion in Franklin D. Roosevelt" (Hunt 1987, pp. 145–146). Smith similarly argues that by espousing "policy favorable to the growth of nationalism and hostile to imperialist ambitions ... Roosevelt was the modern embodiment of traditional American liberal democratic internationalism" (Smith 1994, p. 114).

Roosevelt indeed embodied the anti-imperial tradition. Prior to his election as president in 1932, he had become a staunch critic of turn-of-the-century American imperialism. He thus embraced the Good Neighbor policy and pressed the cause of Philippine self-government through the Tydings–McDuffie Act of 1934. At a press conference in March 1941, Roosevelt was unequivocal: “There never has been, there isn’t now and there never will be any race on earth fit to serve as masters of their fellow men. ... We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood” (Rosenman 1950, pp. 3, 118).

World War II provided a test of Roosevelt’s commitment to anti-imperialism which was considered vital to American interest. First, as the Welles statement underscored, US leaders saw the “end of imperialism” essential to the credibility of the Allied cause. At the Placentia Bay meeting in August 1941, where the Atlantic Charter was formulated, Roosevelt told Churchill that he was

firmly of the belief that if we are to arrive at a stable peace it must involve the development of the backward countries ... I can’t believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery, and the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward colonial policy. (quoted in Wilson 1991, p. 108)

Second, imperialism begat instability. As the Western empires were falling, Roosevelt linked the Japanese conquest to an outdated imperialism. According to his son Elliott, Roosevelt said that “Americans [were] dying in the Pacific” because of the “short-sighted greed of the French, the British, and the Dutch” and promised that at war’s end America would not be “wheedled into ... accepting any plan that will further France’s imperialistic ambitions ... or [those of] the British Empire” (Roosevelt 1946, pp. 115–116). Third, the tide of history favored the self-determination of peoples. It was essential that the United States identify with Asian peoples and not with the weakened and discredited European powers. Less than a month before his death, Roosevelt made the point baldly when he told an adviser that the United States could not afford to be hated by over one billion Asians.

However unequivocal his anticolonial conviction, Roosevelt had to balance its realization with the politics of wartime. Churchill spoke not only for his country’s imperial interests but also for those of France and the Netherlands in his steadfast opposition to what the British considered naive and pious American meddling in their affairs. Anglo-American wartime collaboration was essential to victory, so anticolonialism was tempered. Roosevelt wrote: “I dream dreams, but am at the same time an intensely practical person” (quoted in Burns 1970, p. 609).

Historians have differed in their assessments of Roosevelt’s anti-imperialism, which had its most important manifestations in Southern Asia. To James MacGregor Burns in *Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom* (1970), Roosevelt disappointed Asian nationalists for his equivocations and the contradictions between his idealism and policies. To Robert Dallek in *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (1979), Roosevelt correctly kept winning the war as his overriding priority, which necessitated Anglo-American cooperation. To Warren F. Kimball in *The Juggler: Franklin D. Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (1991), Roosevelt forthrightly pressed the anticolonial agenda and his compromises ought not to obscure his role in advancing American interests with the forces of nationalism. To Christopher Thorne in *Allies of a Kind*

(1978), Anglo-American differences over colonialism were superficial; both Roosevelt and Churchill sought fundamentally to preserve a Western-dominated Asia. To Gary R. Hess in *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950* (1987) the “end of empire” and “business-as-usual” objectives of the Americans and the British were significant, and, like Kimball, argues that the American position, however compromised and however paternalistic, reflected a sounder understanding of the forces at work in wartime Asia.

Roosevelt, the “practical idealist” confronted an immediate challenge in India. A possible Japanese advance beyond Burma threatened to link German and Japanese forces and influenced a crisis between the British and the All-India National Congress (INC). Led by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the INC, which enjoyed considerable international stature, strongly identified with the Allied cause, but demanded independence. British opinion was divided between those who favored concessions to win Indian support for the war effort and those who rejected negotiations at a time of vulnerability in both Europe and Asia. Churchill emphatically embodied the latter sentiment; a staunch imperialist, he was contemptuous of India’s culture, especially Hinduism, and of the INC leadership, especially Gandhi.

Under pressure to accommodate the Indians, the Churchill government in March 1942 dispatched a mission headed by Sir Stafford Cripps to present a proposal to the INC leadership. The British plan, however, amounted to postponing a political settlement until after the war. The INC thus dismissed the Cripps Plan, with Gandhi characterizing it as a “post-dated cheque on a failing bank.” Roosevelt cautiously intervened, proposing a vague plan to Churchill and sending Louis Johnson, a former assistant secretary of war, as his “personal representative” to India. Johnson worked for a compromise, but neither the British nor the INC was prepared to negotiate the fundamental issue of sovereignty. After the departure of the failed Cripps Mission, the INC in August 1942 adopted the Quit India resolution, demanding immediate independence as the price for India’s support of the war effort. As protests, mostly nonviolent, erupted throughout the country, Roosevelt proposed to Churchill an Allied guarantee of independence and offered American mediation of British–INC differences. Ignoring such pleas, Churchill ordered the suppression of the INC and the arrest of hundreds of its leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, who spent the next two years in British prisons. In Parliament, a triumphant Churchill boasted that order had been restored and the Indo-Burmese frontier secured.

So in the end Roosevelt backed off, not challenging Churchill’s assertion of British power. Given India’s importance as the symbol of the Allied commitment to self-determination, historians have considered whether Roosevelt, despite his boldness on challenging Churchill, might have pressed the Indian cause more forcefully. In the most recent book on the subject, *Quest for Freedom: The United States and India’s Independence*, Kenton Clymer (1995) sees Roosevelt earning the respect of Indian nationalists for his efforts. Articles by Sarah Graham (2009) and Dennis Merrill (2000) stress the limited American capacity to change British policy. More critical conclusions on Roosevelt’s policy – stressing Indian disillusionment, particularly the INC leadership, with the US deference to the British – are provided in earlier works, including those of Gary R. Hess *America Encounters India, 1941–1947* (1971) and the two volumes of M. S. Venkataramani

and B. K. Shrivastava, *Quit India: The American Response to the 1942 Struggle* (1979) and *Roosevelt, Gandhi, Churchill: America and the Last Phase of India's Freedom Struggle* (1983).

The experience of the India–British impasse underlined that the “end of empire” would not be easily achieved, but the United States did not abandon the cause. With Roosevelt’s encouragement, the Department of State pressed for a plan of transforming postwar Asia with the American role of “enlightened” colonial policy in the Philippines held up as a model for the Europeans. To make clear American expectations that the promise of the Atlantic Charter would be realized, the State Department issued – to the considerable annoyance of the British – the US Declaration on National Liberation which called for an international process through which colonial powers were committed “to prepare their dependent peoples for independence through education and self-government, and to publish timetables for the process” (Orders 2000, p. 72). That premise of conditional imperial restoration guided State Department planning until late in the war.

Meanwhile, Roosevelt was convinced that the “end of empire” had to be achieved somewhere during the war. On a few occasions in 1942, Roosevelt expressed doubt whether all of the French empire should be restored with specific references to Indochina. After the India crisis faded, he advocated establishing a postwar international trusteeship. In a meeting of the Pacific War Council in December 1942, Roosevelt stated that since the people of Indochina were not anxious to see the French return and China did not covet the area, “plans could be made with regards to the postwar disposition of the territory ... It is positively refreshing that none of the Big Powers wants Indochina” (Hess 1987, p. 71.). In early 1943, Roosevelt told Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other officials that France should lose Indochina. In a meeting with an appalled British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on March 27, he asserted that Indochina should be placed under an international trusteeship. In sum, if India would not represent the realization of the Allied commitment to anti-imperialism, Indochina would have to serve that purpose.

Moreover, to Roosevelt, France had forfeited its claim to great power status. He was disdainful of France for its inept defense against Germany and the collaboration of the Vichy government, which had led colonial authorities in Indochina to succumb to Japanese pressures. Roosevelt also heartily disliked Charles de Gaulle (the feeling was mutual) and had little sympathy for his Free French movement. Moreover, Roosevelt was convinced, on the basis of a very sketchy history of Indochina (as “taught” by Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong) that France was the worst of the colonial powers in Asia; Roosevelt repeatedly asserted that Indochina was in worse condition than before the French takeover. Roosevelt airily dismissed the evident contradiction (as pointed out by Eden, Hull, Welles, and others) between his trusteeship scheme and earlier US statements promising the return of France’s colonies, claiming that such promises had been intended only for North Africa.

Roosevelt pursued his Indochina plan in meetings with other Allied leaders. En route to the first Big Three meeting in Teheran in November 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met with Jiang Jieshi in Cairo. At both conferences, Roosevelt’s tactic was to isolate the British on colonial matters. At Cairo, he had a lengthy discussion with Jiang, who readily agreed that the French should not be restored and that an interna-

tional trusteeship, including China, should be responsible for its implementation. At Tehran, he enlisted Soviet Premier Josef Stalin's support. As summarized in the conference record:

The President ... remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they ever had been before. ... He added that he had discussed with [Jiang Jieshi] the possibility of a system of trusteeship for Indochina which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period, perhaps 20 to 30 years. Marshall Stalin said he agreed completely with this view. (US Department of State 1961, pp. 482–486)

While Roosevelt pursued his Indochina plan, the Department of State refined its objective of conditional imperial restoration. As the war turned decidedly in the Allied favor, Hull and other officials became increasingly concerned about the ambitions of the British, French, and Dutch. The establishment in 1943 of the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) under a British Commander meant that the liberation of most of Southeast Asia would be British-led. In Washington, representatives of the Free French and the Netherlands government-in-exile pressed US officials for a role in the liberation of their colonies. To seize the initiative before it was too late, Hull recommended to Roosevelt on September 8, 1944, that the United States preempt the political agenda by insisting that the British, French, and Dutch issue “early, dramatic and concerted announcements ... making definite commitments to the future of Southeast Asia ... [with] specific dates when independence ... will be accorded [and] ... specific steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule” (Hess 1987, p. 108).

This was a bold proposal – a clear reaffirmation of the commitment to anti-imperialism – but Roosevelt rejected the State Department recommendation. Perhaps he considered it too bold and too disruptive an initiative. He remained, however, committed to the Indochina trusteeship, which must have seemed more attainable.

Despite failing health and many pressing issues, Roosevelt pursued his plan. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, he raised the Indochina issue again with Stalin, but did not discuss it with Churchill. In off-the-record comments after the conference, Roosevelt told reporters how his idea had been approved at one time or another by Stalin and Jiang, but not by the British; Churchill was “mid-Victorian on all things like that ... [so] better to keep quiet just now” (Hess 1987, p. 142).

On March 15, Roosevelt had a lengthy discussion with Charles Taussig, an adviser to Hull and a longtime Roosevelt confidante, which represented his final comments on the trusteeship issue. After stating that Indochina had to be taken away from France, he modified his position. As reported by Taussig, Roosevelt was prepared to accept France as a trustee provided that it was committed unequivocally to independence. By the time that Roosevelt reaffirmed his position, a small group of American military personnel in Indochina had established contact with the Viet Minh, the communist-led nationalist movement which was poised to assert independence at war's end. The Americans and Vietnamese shared a common cause of resisting the Japanese and the Americans identified with the aspirations of the Vietnamese.

So Roosevelt's commitment to Indochina's progression toward independence through a trusteeship arrangement remained firm until his death a month later. Combined with the fulfillment of the US commitment to Philippine independence,

the Indochina trusteeship – whether administered by France or an international agency – would have been a powerful statement of the “end of empires” objective.

Meanwhile, the State Department, disappointed by Roosevelt’s rejection of its September 8, 1944 initiative, made no effort to define a special agenda for Southeast Asia. Thus, in the final formulation of the United Nations Charter, the United States compromised its earlier “end of empire” vision. In the Declaration of Non-Self-Governing Territories, the US delegation at the San Francisco Conference, after considerable heated discussion within its ranks, accepted “self-government” and rejected “independence” as the ultimate obligation of imperial powers.

The subsequent significance of Vietnam to the United States has engendered considerable scholarly interest in the implications of the wartime relationship. To some scholars, notably Hess (1987), Kimball (1991), Louis (1978), and Gardner (2000), the United States missed an opportunity to identify with the nationalist cause as it gained strength and proclaimed independence in September 1945. Other scholars raise questions about Roosevelt’s approach to Indochina. Thorne’s (1978) skepticism of American anti-imperialism includes an indictment of the trusteeship scheme. In a similar argument, Mark Bradley in *Imagining Vietnam and America* (2000) sees the trusteeship scheme as essentially imperialistic, embodying conventional Western thinking about the “backwardness” of the Vietnamese which left them “unfit” for independence without decades of “preparation.” In *The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh, and de Gaulle in a World at War*, Stein Tønnesson (1991) focuses on the interaction of international and local developments. Tønnesson sees Roosevelt as unequivocally committed to the trusteeship plan and also contributing inadvertently to the power vacuum that enabled the Viet Minh to seize power after Japan’s surrender. In *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam*, Mark Lawrence (2005) usefully explores how the “conservative” opposition within the Department of State challenged the dominant “liberal” anti-imperialism of the war years and worked successfully by war’s end for restoring France’s status as a major power which included an intact empire.

While the Allies spent three years contemplating the postwar status of Southeast Asia, the Japanese firmly controlled the region. The heady conquest of Southeast Asia presented the Imperial Government with the enormous task of governing another 150 million people, which brought the total population of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to 400 million. This expanded empire constituted, as Jack Snyder underscores in *Myths of Empire* (1991), a classic case of “overexpansion.” Japan was overcommitted militarily, the costs of holding territory outweighed its benefits, and the vastness of the empire inevitably generated strong opposing forces. Japan’s capacity to consolidate its position was limited further by the need to commit resources to the fighting in China and the Pacific. The scholarship of Dullfer (2003), Duus (1988, 1996), Goto (1996), Gruhl (2007), Hotta (2007), Lau (2003), Peattie (1996), Reynolds (1994, 1996), and Storry (1979) illuminates Japan’s Southeast Asian empire.

Japan’s imperial planning provided the blueprint for a coherent colonial policy. As Peattie (1996) writes, Japan’s economic expansion in Southeast Asia had been accompanied by the assumption of an eventual “southward advance.” The New Order in Asia, announced in November 1938, foresaw Japanese-led Asian peoples replacing the Anglo-American imperial “order.” It assumed Asian cultural, political, and economic

commonality and rationalized expansion as a liberating force. That claim had first been evident in the Manchurian Crisis in which Japan presented the state of Manchukuo as an expression of popular will; and in China proper Japan made certain that the occupation government at Nanking embodied nationalist characteristics. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, formally adopted in August 1940, expanded the concept of the New Order, speaking of the inevitable uniting of all of East and Southeast Asia as constituting a new epoch in world history which was based on Japan's collaboration with native peoples in the interest of ending Western domination. In October 1943, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu (sounding much like Sumner Welles) told the Diet that the "war is to us a war of national liberation ... a war for justice to combat aggression. It is a war for liberation" (Duus 1996, p. xxvi).

Had Japan integrated that promise into its rule of Southeast Asia, it might have transformed the region into a sphere of "Asia for the Asiatics" under its leadership. The Japanese could have capitalized on their impressive victory over the Western powers, which ended the myth of Western superiority. As Storry (1979) details, Japan, since its emergence as a world power, had persistently undermined that myth; and the conquests of 1941–1942 punctuated that role. Asians often welcomed the Japanese as "liberators." The shattering of the idea of Western superiority was especially vivid in Singapore and helped inspire the emergence of a strong nationalist elite. As one of that group put it: "The defeat of the British colonial power at the hands of the Japanese ... left us in no doubt that the British were not invincible. Nationalism was rife ... Indeed it was a national awakening and emergence from a political twilight zone" (Lau 2003, p. 189).

The coming of the Co-Prosperity Sphere to Southeast Asia was, however, far from benign. Its ideology was based on a crude racial hierarchy: it was against white supremacy while extolling Japanese supremacy. As Dower writes, "the operative language of the new sphere was in fact premised on the belief that the Japanese were destined to preside over a fixed hierarchy of peoples and races ... [It was] the destiny of the Japanese [to be] the 'leading race' ... eternally" (Dower 1986, p. 8).

This crude racism influenced all aspects of Japanese rule. At its worst, it was manifest in barbaric acts of an uncontrolled military, which quickly alienated native peoples. Japan's brutality against the Chinese was widely known among Southeast Asians, many of whom assumed that they would be spared such treatment since they were being "liberated" from Western imperialism. They soon learned otherwise. Although Westerners were the principal targets of Japanese vengeance, the native peoples were also victims of rape, imprisonment, cruelty, and senseless slaughter. Intimidation became a governing practice. A Military Affairs Bureau directive affirmed the need to relentlessly remind the natives of their relative status: Japan was the "older brother" who should not be considerate of the "younger brother" lest signs of kindness weaken Japan's predominance.

Despite the clarity of its mission, the Imperial Government had difficulty adjusting to the task of administering Southeast Asia. The Army and Navy, as the agents of empire, had little interest in colonial administration. Late in 1942, an Imperial Ordinance established the Greater East Asia Ministry, which brought a degree of coherence to imperial policy. It promoted the "independence" of Southeast Asian countries and regional cooperation. The high point of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was Japan's invitation to fifty Asian nationalists/collaborators to the Greater East Asia

Conference which was held in Tokyo in November 1943. Important in giving the conference a degree of legitimacy were Japanese concessions to nationalist aspirations: Burma and the Philippines were granted "independence" in August and October 1943 respectively and the Japanese-fostered Free India government headed by Subhas Chandra Bose was duly recognized. Also represented were Manchukuo and the Nanking government of occupied China.

At the conference, the Japanese promulgated the Greater East Asia Declaration, which was intended as a response to the Atlantic Charter. Its appeal to Asian peoples embodied the familiar themes of anti-Westernism/anti-imperialism, mutual interests of Asian peoples, and regional cooperation. These measures underscored that the Japanese had come to recognize the importance of co-opting nationalists, involving natives in the colonial administration, developing cultural programs, and promoting a sense of nationhood. This belated liberalization was driven by the reversal of Japan's military fortunes and by the growing strength – thanks in part to American and British support – of guerrilla movements within the Southeast Asian countries. Granting "independence" thus brought indigenous support without risking control. That contradiction plagued the "independent" governments as disillusioned native leaders persistently sought greater authority than the Japanese permitted.

Japan nonetheless contributed to the strengthening of nationalism – a consequence of both intended as well as unintended consequences of its policy. First, and most basically, popular resentment over the harsh imposition of Japanese authority led to a strong undercurrent of anti-Japanese sentiment, which encouraged many leaders to anticipate the end of all imperialism, Japanese as well as Western. They sometimes did this by opposing the Japanese through guerrilla warfare and at other times by collaborating with them, but very few Southeast Asian leaders accepted the proposition of long-term Japanese control. Second, given the enormous task of administering their empire – as Goto (1996) details in his analysis of the complex interaction of Japanese with native elites – the Japanese had to recruit more natives into government service. In the "independent" governments, natives filled virtually all offices. This involvement of native peoples proved significant for it created a class of indigenous administrators whose experience would strengthen later nationalists' claims that their peoples were "prepared" to govern themselves.

Japan's imperial policy varied from country to country depending on its political-economic significance and the particular internal conditions. The Japanese exerted their most significant influence in Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines and the least in Indochina and Malaya.

Thailand's unique status as the region's only independent nation provided a test of Japan's commitment to self-determination. Reynolds (1994, 1996) emphasizes the awkward relationship, beginning with Japan's fostering a sense of solidarity with Thailand, ever since it had been the only League of Nations member to abstain from the otherwise unanimous approval of the Lytton Report condemning the takeover of Manchuria. With Thailand's history of accommodating itself to dominant regional powers, Japan exploited the opportunity for collaboration. Besides offering no resistance to the Japanese invasion, Thailand entered into an alliance with Japan and declared war on the United States and Great Britain. The Japanese had no reason to change the established Thai government, but failed to use it as a model of Pan-Asianism. Instead, Japan's overbearing presence undermined Thailand's sovereignty

and generated ill will. When Japan attempted to use Thailand as a pillar of solidarity at the Greater East Asia Conference, Premier Phibun Songkhram refused to attend, thus lessening the credibility of the enterprise.

In the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese had been cultivating Indonesian nationalists for a decade. As the largest, most populous, and richest in mineral resources country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia was the strategic prize of the “southward advance.” Recognizing the intransigent nature of Dutch colonial policy, the Japanese had sought through various means throughout the 1930s to identify with the Indonesian elite. Japan exploited the strong anti-Dutch sentiment, which had been intensified by the lengthy imprisonment of Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta among other nationalist leaders. Hence, Indonesians generally welcomed the Japanese forces in December 1941 and the nationalists quickly became collaborators. More so than elsewhere, the Japanese consciously built a sense of nationhood. They purged hundreds of Dutch civil administrators, provided the opportunity for Indonesians to gain administrative experience, and promoted nationalism by making Indonesian the national language, introducing propaganda techniques and mass political movements, and bringing thousands of Indonesians into army and paramilitary units. These developments facilitated Sukarno’s consolidation of a growing nationalist movement. Although the Japanese never fulfilled their promise of independence, they left Indonesia poised to proclaim it at war’s end.

In Burma, the Japanese were initially supported by many Burmese, led by Prime Minister Ba Maw, and the Burma Independence Army (BIA), which Japanese agents had helped train. Japan consolidated its power by eliminating the more strident elements of the BIA, renaming it the Burma Defence Army (BDA) with limited internal security responsibilities, and enhancing the collaborator Ba Maw’s credibility by modifying some of the hardships of the occupation and putting in place a wholly Burmese puppet government. Japan considered “independence” a means of stabilizing the Indo-Burmese frontier by reducing the appeal of the guerrilla movement. Japan formally conferred “independence” in August 1943, just in time for Ba Maw to play a prominent role at the Greater East Asia Conference. While Ba Maw’s speeches spoke warmly of Japanese–Burmese cooperation, Japanese Premier General Hideki Tojo reminded him privately that “independence” resulted from the presence of the Imperial Army and that Japan would continue to provide “internal guidance.” Contrary to Japan’s expectations, the resistance movement, which was supported by British and American intelligence units, gained momentum. U Aung San established the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) and recruited the BDA as its military wing. In 1945 the AFPFL, supported by the BDA, was instrumental in forcing the Japanese out of Burma.

In the Philippines, the Japanese tried to exploit the US failure to protect the islands. During the interwar period, Japanese cultural and business missions had cultivated the image of a trusted friend. “This effort was to pay a dividend during the Japanese occupation in World War II,” Peattie (1996) writes, “when many of these same Filipino elite found it possible to collaborate with the Japanese military regime” (p. 229). Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Commonwealth, followed MacArthur into exile in Australia, telling his fellow citizens that the United States could be trusted to fulfill its promises of liberating the islands and that cooperation with the Japanese was permissible only if it did not alter loyalty to the United States.

That admonition contributed to an especially contentious postwar division over collaboration, as studies by Hartendorp (1967) and Steinberg (1966) underscore. The Japanese cultivated the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines, under the leadership of Jose Laurel, which was granted “independence” in October 1943. Recognizing Laurel’s tenuous political base, Tojo treated him more leniently than other collaborators. Japan did not insist on an immediate Philippine declaration of war, and when it finally forced the issue (in July 1944), it tolerated ambiguous language that avoided the phrase “declare war.” Laurel, however, declined to play the major role that Japan scripted for him at the Greater East Asia Conference, refusing to deliver a major address and to provide the Japanese with an advance copy of his brief remarks. The credibility of the collaborationist Laurel Government was challenged by a strong anti-Japanese guerrilla movement – the most significant in the Co-Prosperity Sphere – which brought some 300,000 Filipinos into its ranks.

In Malaya and Indochina, Japan benefited from different types of collaboration. In the former, Malaysians generally supported the Japanese who played on the traditional resentment of the substantial Chinese minority. In the latter case, the Japanese allowed the French administration to continue in nominal authority. “Thus emerged,” Dullfer (2003) aptly writes, “a kind of double colonialism, with Japanese predominance forcing France into a kind of *subdomination*.” This unique arrangement ended abruptly in March 1945 when Japan, no longer trusting the French and fearing the strength of the communist-led nationalists who were both anti-French and anti-Japanese, liquidated the French regime and established an “independent” government under Emperor Bao Dai.

Scholars have differed over the significance of Japanese rule in Southeast Asia. The earliest comprehensive history – F. C. Jones, *Japan’s New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–1945* written in 1954 under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Affairs – faults Japanese imperialism in Southeast Asia for destroying Western institutions and values and failing to bring any positive political, economic, and cultural concepts. Moreover, the Co-Prosperity Sphere contributed to instability which facilitated the postwar appeal of communism.

Jones’s book paralleled in some ways the initial postwar Japanese view, which was strongly influenced by the US occupation’s objective of building a democratic state. The premise of the Tokyo war crimes trials was to hold the Japanese military guilty of aggression and enslavement of millions of people. Saburō’s *The Pacific War* (1978), for instance, spoke of the “debt we owe to the millions who perished in the fires of war” to make known the facts of Japan’s brutal conquests as the only way “to avoid another tragedy” (Duus 1996, p. xl).

A more benign version of the empire emerged as Japanese questioned their singular “guilt.” American warfare against Koreans and Vietnamese and revisionism on the atomic bombings of Japanese cities suggested that a moral relativism governed international relations. To many of Japan’s leaders, shedding wartime “guilt” and recasting itself as a “victim” was instrumental to regaining national self-esteem. The Co-Prosperity Sphere in Southeast thus came to be seen as a justifiable response of Japan to “encirclement” by unfriendly powers and as a “necessary imperialism” which “liberated” Asians from a hundred years of Western domination. Japan’s rule thus had been a “positive force” which facilitated the emergence of postwar independent nations.

The writings of Peter Duus reflect the positive accomplishments of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and the dangers of oversimplifying the imperial record. Duus (1988) compares the transformation from an old order to a new one in Europe in 1945 to a “parallel transition ... taking place in East Asia under Japan’s initiative. Japan’s military expansion after 1941 toppled colonial regimes ... Japan’s encouragement of anti-colonialist nationalism in Southeast Asia paved the way for the wave of anti-imperialism revolutions, civil wars, and liberation movements ... that swept the region after 1945” (p. 11). Duus (1996), however, cautions against the “spell of false history [based on] the half-buried myths of the wartime empire” which prevents Japan from dealing realistically with Asian peoples who remain resentful of the brutality brought by the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (p. xlvii).

Two recent books – *Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931–1945* by Eri Hotta (2007) and *Imperial Japan’s World War Two, 1931–1945* by Werner Gruhl (2007) – respond to revisionism. Hotta contends that the ideology of Pan-Asianism was integral to Japan’s expansion and gave the war legitimacy, but it did not prevent immoral warfare and in the end deluded and strangled Japan itself. Gruhl dismisses suggestions of moral equivalency on the two sides in the war and argues that the “sheer scale of Japan’s all-out war in dimension and toll of direct death and destruction far exceeded any previous colonial ventures” (Gruhl 2007, p. 193).

When the war ended abruptly in August 1945, it quickly became evident that nationalist forces were in the ascendancy. Assertions of independence in Indochina and Indonesia and the uncompromising demands of nationalists in India and Burma challenged the Europeans’ expectation of an imperial restoration. Decolonization, thus, began. The United States fulfilled its promise of Philippine independence, and the British liquidated nearly all of its Asian empire. Within thirty months of VJ (Victory over Japan) Day, India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma (Myanmar), and the Philippines had emerged as the first newly independent nations in Asia. The United States played a prominent role in forcing the Dutch to grant Indonesian independence in 1949, but the imperatives of the cold war led to its tragic involvement on the side of the French in Indochina. The “end of empires” was thus realized albeit more rapidly than American planners had anticipated, owing in large part to the ironic legacy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

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CHAPTER NINE

CBI: A Historiographical Review

MAOCHUN YU

Writing on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the ending of World War II, the British historian John Keegan laments, “though fifty years have elapsed since it ended, the passions it aroused still run too high, the wounds it inflicted still cut too deep, and the unresolved problems it left still bulk too large for any one historian to strike an objective balance.” With that, Keegan declares with great misgivings that “the history of the Second World War has not yet been written” (Keegan 1995, p. 30). If Keegan is right and a general history of acceptable objectivity for the entire World War II has yet to be written, much less can be said of a good history for the China-Burma-India theater, or CBI, which was the most peculiar theater of military operations during the enormous global conflagration, despite decades of steady diligence of many historians.

The poverty of good quality works on CBI has been a result of many structural circumstances and deliberate human interventions within the history profession. CBI was the most convoluted theater designation of World War II, without a clearly understood and multilaterally agreed to command structure, which created a mishmash of command strife and turf battles among the Americans, the British, and the Chinese military leaders. Contemporaries often referred to CBI as to mean “Constant Bickering Inside.” Naturally, much of the historical inquiry has been done in the shadow of this command chaos, as each faction tends to reconstruct its own version of facts and its own framework of interpretations of these facts. Perhaps because of this murkiness of context, in addition to the usual Eurocentric tendency of World War II historians, the history of CBI is woefully inadequately produced and when mentioned, disproportionately analyzed. A telling irony can be found in John Keegan’s same sage lamentation about the lack of definitive history of World War II: the world-renowned historian of World War II devotes exactly one single page to the entire Pacific theater and China theater – and not a word is spent on CBI, with the rest

entirely allocated to the Eurocentric spheres of operations in western, eastern and southern Europe and North Africa!

But far more instrumental in perpetrating this lack of quality scholarship on the CBI history is the teleological and ideological bending in historical writing due not to what actually happened during the war, but primarily because of this region's dramatic and violent political developments *after* the war, namely China's loss to communist domination; the US involvement in Vietnam and its subsequent quagmire; the thorny issue of the British and French colonialism in India, Burma, and the Indo-China Peninsula and the United States as their perceived enabler and inheritor. Many leading historians of the time have joined this exercise of partisan and ideological teleology and research, and have produced voluminous works on issues ranging from the Stilwell affairs, the activities of Ho Chi-min in wartime Indo-China and their corollary to post-World War II development, and the British and French imperialism in Asia.

Unlike other World War II theaters of war, the China-Burma-India theater distinguishes itself by its lack of a unified command structure. Its titular commanding general was the US Army Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, but he never had meaningful operational control over various, multinational allied forces in the area. The British military authorities in the area did not take Stilwell's command seriously and eventually went on to create their own parallel command positions covering much of the same areas. In India, the British never yielded the command of the large British troops stationed there to Stilwell. In the British colony of Burma, the British were in control of their colonial forces, including a scattered RAF deployment; in October 1943, a brand new theater designation called Southeast Asia Command or SEAC was created to cover most of Southeast Asia including Burma, with the British Admiral Lord Mountbatten as Stilwell's superior, thus reducing CBI and Stilwell to further irrelevance. Presumably, China was the main operational zone of CBI, but China had already had four solid years of resistance against the Japanese and had already developed a military command structure tightly controlled by the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whose chief of staff now was Stilwell. As a result, Stilwell's grandiose title of the overall commander of CBI was simultaneously outranked by Chiang Kai-shek and Mountbatten.

As the Allied high command failed to clarify the command responsibilities and command conflicts between CBI and SEAC, the chain of command in the entire region fell into a chaos, with key military leaders not knowing who was to report to whom. This situation continued until Stilwell's recall in late October 1944, after which the CBI designation was eliminated and its area was split into two new commands: the China theater under US Army's Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, who focused on his role as the chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek and the commander of all US troops in China; and the India-Burma theater, under the command of US Army Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan.

This notorious command chaos in CBI provides an easy focus for military historians. Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, writing at the behest of the US Army, produced a comprehensive trilogy of survey on the CBI command travesty in the 1950s, which still remains the classics in the field. The three books, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Romanus and Sunderland 1953), *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Romanus and Sunderland 1956), and *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Romanus and Sunderland 1959)

give the official Pentagon views on the controversial US General's CBI venture, and his disastrous mission in China.

Yet far more fecund a source of the CBI's command issues has been the plethora of personal accounts by key figures in CBI on all sides. British contemporaries had a generally negative estimate of Stilwell's tenure as CBI commander. The British general William Slim, the overall commander of the Royal Army in Burma, in his popular memoirs *Defeat into Victory* (1956), had some enduring criticism of Stilwell's intransigency on command matters. Field Marshall Archibald Wavell, in command of all British troops in India, also was irritated by Stilwell's overall claim of command over areas, including India. Claire Lee Chennault, the legendary commander of the Flying Tigers and its post-Pearl Harbor corollary, the 14th Air Force, bitterly resented the Army Way in general in CBI, and Stilwell in particular. His memoirs, *the Way of a Fighter* (Chennault 1949) reflects the perspective of a key member of America's military support to China. At the center of the great command dispute with General Stilwell and the War Department officials in Washington, Chennault provides candid, often uniquely insightful, albeit bitter, recollections of his wartime exploits, stormy relationships with General Stilwell and the Washington establishment as a whole, his close collaborations with the Chinese military officials, and his frequently neglected contribution to modern air tactics and joint military operations in CBI. As Stilwell's successor in China, US Army Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer occupied a unique position to provide historical insights. His memoirs, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (1958) does just that. It presents a perspective sympathetic to China's many dilemmas. Of particular interest is the detailed account of Wedemeyer's struggle with the British over operational command in Southeast Asia.

Overall, the US Navy did not claim supremacy of command in the area, but there was a special consideration from its perspective that needed to be handled with extra care in relation to Stilwell's overarching military authority granted to him by Washington. In early 1942, Admiral King, the commander in chief of the US Navy, dispatched a mid-level officer by the name of Commander Milton Miles to China to start a relatively small joint US-China military intelligence operation that would facilitate a planned amphibious landing of US troops on the China coast. This small project, however, had inadvertently created a command loophole beyond Stilwell's control: the newly created Sino-US naval organization became the only window in the CBI theater for any military outfit titularly under Stilwell's control to escape. As a result, it ballooned very quickly into a gigantic undertaking that was officially endorsed by President Franklin Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the US Navy, and the newly created overarching US intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The new organization, called the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization, or SACO, has become the single most controversial topic for many CBI historians because of its association with the secret police of the Nationalist government. Yet, quite unfortunately, of the voluminous studies, most remain unsatisfactory or unpublished. Milton Miles's account of the SACO command, *A Different Kind of War* (1967), provides the basic background to the controversy. Miles was the US Navy's top man in China during World War II and was deeply involved in wartime military activities in China and Washington. Although somewhat disorganized, this volume provides valuable inside stories of the key events and key figures in wartime CBI, especially China. In this regard, the best nonacademic account

of the command rivalry between the navy and army in CBI during the war is Roy Stratton's *The Army-Navy Game* (1977). Stratton incorporates large amount of archival documents in the text and provides a panoramic look at SACO, OSS, Stilwell, Miles, and other key figures in America's involvement in wartime China.

Regarding Stilwell's China experience, many writers including Barbara Tuchman avoid mentioning this aspect almost altogether. It is obvious that further research needs to be done in this area, a task that should be particularly tantalizing and tempting to historians because of the vast amount of available primary sources.

Related to the study on the command dispute in the CBI theater is the vigorous debate over the legendary conflict between Stilwell and his titular boss, the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. Yet, unlike the historiography on the command issue, this debate has become much more politically charged due primarily to the equally polemical question of "Who Lost China?" More than any other issue related to CBI, Stilwell's personal conflict with Chiang over strategy, command authority, attitude toward the Chinese Communists, and his ultimate recall by President Roosevelt in late October 1944, have rankled historians since the late 1940s. Implicit in many charges against Stilwell in the immediate aftermath of his firing is the assumption that Stilwell, along with his army and more importantly State Department aides, deliberately assisted the Chinese Communists in bringing down the Chinese Nationalist Government headed by Chiang. To counter this claim, Stilwell's earliest defender, Theodore White, who was in China during the war as a *Times* magazine reporter, selectively edited a volume called *The Stilwell Papers* (1948) to prove that Chiang Kai-shek himself was to blame. To counter charges that the Democratic administration harbored Communists or communist-sympathizers in the State Department, a comprehensive tome popularly known as *The China White Paper* (US Department of State 1949–1969) was compiled by the officials and historians at the State Department. The chief purpose of this effort was to prove that the ongoing communist takeover in China had very little to do with how the Americans behaved and what American policies were implemented. Several historians have gone even further by claiming that in fact the American policies during the war were wrongheaded because they strenuously backed the Chiang Kai-shek regime and ignored the inevitable outcome of a communist takeover. Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and American Experience in China, 1911–1945* (1971) won her a Pulitzer Prize. Written at the height of the antiwar movement in the early 1970s, this popular account of Stilwell's wartime experience in China echoes the sentiment of the time, that is, the US foreign policy had been based upon an unwise policy of supporting unpopular dictators by neglecting the "progressives" which represented the future of the country the US was involved in. With this approach, this Stilwell biography portrays a temperamental general as a thoughtful, far-sighted progressive fighting against an inept and insensitive Chinese regime. Based upon selective reading of the then-embargoed Stilwell papers, it is what is not said about Stilwell in this book that is most revealing and renders this semi-hagiographical account in dire need of improvement.

In academic publications, Michael Schaller's *The US Crusade in China, 1938–1945* (1979) represents the Vietnam-era generation of young scholarship that portrays a similar American wartime attitude toward China that was, in their words, reactionary and imperialistic. A widely quoted book by PRC's official historians, Schaller's work

supplies the standard condemnation of the US and KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) wartime political and military policies. Selective and partisan in utilizing sources, it is nevertheless well written, despite the fact that much of its core argument has been invalidated by the post-cold war new materials in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. As a major work on the subject matter, a key drawback is its lack of any meaningful Chinese sources and context.

To counter the American version of the Stilwell controversies, the Taiwanese historian J. Liang (Liang Chin-tung) published a trilogy of books (1962, 1972, 1973) representing the official views of the Taiwanese Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Though painstakingly written with rich documentation, its influence has been limited due to the fact that only one of the volumes is in English and the other two are in Chinese. Unfortunately, most Western historians of wartime period do not read Chinese, including Barbara Tuchman and Michael Schaller. Of the three volumes, the *Stilwell Incident* (Liang 1973) is the better known and more influential book.

The past three decades have proved especially fortunate for the CBI historians because of the subsiding of polemical climate of opinions and the unprecedented new accesses to archival sources. Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975. His much more liberal son, Chiang Ching-kuo, brought openness to Taiwan and paved the way to a vibrant democracy. Under the able editorship of X. Qin, an unprecedented archival project in Taiwan has resulted in the compilation and publication of a massive documentary set called *The Preliminary Compilation of the Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China* (1980). Volumes I, II, and III are specifically reserved for World War II/China. This monumental documentary set includes by far the largest quantity of Chiang Kai-shek's cables, aide memoirs, conference notes, and so forth. This compilation is the most comprehensive collection of primary sources on wartime diplomacy and military cooperation. It contains rich documents related to military and intelligence operations in CBI.

In the early 1990s, the Stilwell Papers in its entirety became open to the public at the Hoover Institution. This collection had been closed until the early 1990s. Until then, only a handful of writers, most notably Theodore White and Barbara Tuchman, had been allowed to use the collection. Its opening to the public thus provides good opportunities for scholars to reevaluate the central figures of the CBI theater. Much recently, the Hoover Institution opened another treasure trove to the public: Chiang Kai-shek's meticulously kept wartime diaries. Reflecting these newly available sources and new intellectual climate of opinions, several weighty studies have been done lately to reassess the Stilwell–Chiang controversies. A leading voice in this category is Hans van de Ven's nuanced and well-researched *War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945* (2003), which portrays Stilwell as a woefully unfit and incompetent general officer in charge of a large and complex command of operations. Van de Ven's book is a tour de force reevaluating many key issues in Republican China. Particularly germane to CBI is the author's impassionate and scathing account, based upon newly opened archives, of Stilwell's culpability and responsibility in his tumultuous tenure as the commanding general of CBI, especially as Chiang's chief of staff. Perhaps an equally significant reversal of judgment is rendered by Jay Taylor whose new biography of Chiang Kai-shek, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (2009), provides by far the most balanced and most detailed account

and interpretation of the Generalissimo's wartime activities. This group of works also includes the classic biography of another key figure in the Stilwell/Chiang foray, Partrick J. Hurley by Don Lohbeck (1956).

There is another newly available source of archives that is overwhelmingly related to operations, rather than policies and strategies. The most significant among these archives are the combat and intelligence operations files. Record Group 338 (or the old designation RG 493) of the US National Archives (2001–2003) is the most complete official record group of the US Army's World War II missions in the CBI theater and its various offshoots. It includes six major file groups:

- 1 Records of the US Military Mission to China, or *AMMISCA*, starting from Brigadier General John Magruder's mission to China between July 1942 to January 1942, to General Stilwell's mission between January 1942 to October 1944, to Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer's mission after Stilwell until the war's end;
- 2 Records of US Army Forces, China-Burma-India (USAF CBI). This includes files related to Stilwell's CBI headquarters in Chungking and his "Branch Office" in New Delhi;
- 3 Records of US Army Forces, China theater (USAF CT). This is the official record group for the post-CBI China theater after Stilwell's recall, under the command of Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, Oct. 1944 to May 1946;
- 4 Records of US Forces, India-Burma theater (USF IBT), which contains files for the other post-CBI theater redesignation, the IBT, under the command of Lt. Gen. Daniel Sultan, headquartered in New Delhi, Oct. 1944 to May 1946;
- 5 Records of the US Branch of Executive Headquarters. This is the record group for the Marshall Mission to China, Jan. 1946 to Feb. 1947, headquartered in Peiping;
- 6 Records of the Peiping Headquarters Group, which is an auxiliary agency of the Branch of US Executive Headquarters, under the command of Brig. Gen Henry Byroade, Jan. 1946 to Apr. 1947.

Also at the US National Archives is a mammoth set of the OSS files, Record Group 226 (US National Archives, n.d.), that has been gradually declassified since the late 1980s. By now, more than 8,000 cubic feet of original operations files of the OSS are available to the public. Record Group 226 has led to the publication of several important books on the intelligence operations in the CBI theater. Richard Aldrich's *The Key to the South: Britain, the United States and Thailand during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929–1942* (1993), and his recent *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (2008) provide a good British perspective based upon solid research. Equally formidable is Bruce Reynolds's *Thailand's Secret War: OSS, SOE and the Free Thai Underground during World War II* (2010). Maochun Yu's *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (1997) deals with Sino-Anglo-American cooperation and confrontation over wartime intelligence operations and areas of control. For a pre-RG226 book on the OSS, Bradley Smith's *The Shadow Warriors – OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (1983) remains quaintly useful to highlight the big differences before and after the releases of the new intelligence files. Although much of it needs revision, this book has many insights on wartime intelligence that are still valuable, despite its weakness on OSS/CBI.

Representing British official perspective on this subject is Charles Cruickshank's *SOE in the Far East* (1983). This is an official history commissioned by the British government. It contains many useful archival references related to intelligence operations and its political complications in wartime CBI. Recently, there are two volumes about Chinese police and wartime intelligence that are also of value. They are Frederic Wakeman's *Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937* (1995) and *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (2003). A fascinating account of a pioneering American code-breaker's wartime experience in CBI is Herbert Yardley's *The Chinese Black Chamber – An Adventure in Espionage* (1983). Yardley was the founder of American cryptography and was hired in 1939 by the Chinese intelligence to organize a decoding unit in China against the Japanese. This is an account of his exploits in wartime China. Historians may also find it interesting to see the published diaries of Tang in mainland China. His *zai jiangjieshi shenbian – sicong shi gaoji muliao tangzong riji* (1991) is a useful perspective from a high-ranking Chinese intelligence officer working inside Chiang's headquarters. Also illuminating is the influential works of J. Qiao, *Selected Writings of Qiao Jiakai, Vol. 2, Daili jiangjun he tade tongzhi* (1981) and *weilishi zhuzheng* (Qiao 1985). A member and protégé of China's wartime intelligence chief Major General Tai Li, Qiao has been the most prolific writer on the history and activities of Tai Li during the war. The writing is decidedly sympathetic to Tai Li. Although the overwhelming majority of the narratives can be corroborated by other archival sources, some facts remain misplaced in the text and the writing can be chatty and disorganized. The primary usefulness of Qiao's writings lies in balancing the highly politicized diatribe against Tai Li by the mainland Chinese publications. A short but revealing memoir by Chen, *si ge shidai de wo* (1988) provides quite a few surprises from inside the wartime organizations of the communist intelligence. A high ranking CCP intelligence officer active overseas during the war, Chen reveals precious information on how the communist intelligence network during World War II functioned, especially in foreign aid to the Chinese Communist Party.

Aside from the military command structure issue, the differing political and economic policies, and grand strategies are the focus of several works. The British, American, and Chinese tug of war over wartime politics, postwar visions, and strategic conflicts among allies has been well analyzed by Christopher Thorne's excellent survey of the beguiling wartime relationship between Washington and London in his *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (1978). The best analysis so far of the Sino-British relationship during World War II by Chinese scholars is S. Li, *taipingyang zhanzheng shiqi de zhongying guanxi* (1994). Primarily based on wartime Foreign Office and War Office records in the United Kingdom, the author provides useful synopses on the key issues of the troubled relationship during the war.

A balanced account of the highly complex issue of wartime Sino-Soviet relations is expertly covered by John Garver's *Chinese–Soviet Relations, 1937–1945 – Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* (1988). Maochun Yu's recent book *The Dragon's War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China 1937–1947* (2006) discusses the German, Soviet, British, French, and American intelligence and military aid programs during wartime China and their profound impact on Chinese politics and society. The most revealing works on wartime finance in wartime China remain to be Arthur Young's *China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945* (1963) and *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation*,

1937–1945 (1965). The author was China's wartime chief foreign financial adviser and was an important participant in military, and especially financial, aid to China. The first volume is particularly detailed on America's failure to carry out sufficiently its promises to China for aid. The author also spares no punches at the KMT for mismanagement of the American aid. On a whole, however, Young was methodic and highly critical of the United States' military aid to China.

Historians interested in wartime politics in CBI may also find a surprise in an unpublished manuscript by Ivan Yeaton, *Memoirs of Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, USA (RET), 1919–1953* (1976). This is perhaps one of the most underrated manuscripts about wartime China by an American high-ranking officer. Yeaton was the top American intelligence officer on the Chinese Communists under General Wedemeyer, first as Wedemeyer's commanding officer in the Army's Observers Group to Mao's headquarters and then as the head of G-2 for the China theater. Two Chinese scholars have also made valuable contribution to this topic. J. Wu's *songziwen pingzhuan* (1992) provides a good account of Soong's multifaceted lobbying and diplomatic activities in wartime Washington and Chungking. D. Ren's *zhengchaobuxiu de huoban – meiyuan yu zhongmei kangri tongmeng* (1995) is the most comprehensive analysis on the wartime US military and financial aid to China from a Chinese perspective. This book, based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation, incorporates documents both from China and the US and weaves them into an intriguing portrait of wartime Sino-US military and financial relationship.

In addition, Tsou's classic *America's Failure in China, 1941–1950* (1963) is still an insightful look at US wartime policy toward China. The author is critical of the US wartime policy for its failure to stimulate a workable political solution. Another work of value in Chinese is Dai's *yangguwen liezhuan* (2004). This is a collection of biographical sketches of various important foreign advisers to the Chinese government in the twentieth century, many of whom served during World War II years. It is written by professional historians in mainland China and has a judicious selection of subject matters, although at times its treatment of such figures as Milton Miles is conspicuously politicized. A very unique memoir is V. I. Chuikov's *Mission to China: Memoirs of A Military Adviser to Chiang Kaishek* (2003). Before he went on to command the Stalingrad campaign and to gain other glories in European theater, Marshal Chuikov had been Stalin's top Soviet military adviser to the Chinese government in the initial stage of the war in China against Japan. These useful and informative memoirs give insights into the Sino-Soviet military cooperation from rare sources.

In this regard, sources are abundant and more balanced scholarly analysis is still in dire need, especially to reevaluate earlier works based upon selective use of these archival sources to suit the prevailing intellectual and political trends of the time. Foreign Office files in London contain important wartime British documents related to several major issues in military and intelligence operations in CBI. Especially useful are the cables and memos related to SOE's China Commando Group efforts in China, and wartime strategic dispute with the Chinese and American military officials with regard to operational turfs in China, Indo-China, and other Southeast Asian regions. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library (n.d.), with Roosevelt–Chiang Kai-shek wartime correspondence and presidential map room files, has most of the crucial wartime correspondence between Chiang and Roosevelt, which provides a "big picture" of the wartime strategy, command decisions, and Sino-US relationships.

Of great significance are the semi-archival sources coming out of China with regard to various aspects of CBI experience. *Wenshi ziliao* is a multipart series of memoirs, recollections, and historical documents published at the national, provincial, and local levels of mainland China where archival files are rarely available for serious historical research. As such, these publications provide the second best alternative to historical inquiry. Most authors in these publications are captured KMT generals, non-Communist luminaries and ex-KMT agents. *Zhuanji wenxue*, published in Taiwan, has been the most popular and prestigious historical journal devoted to biographical reconstruction of modern Chinese military and political history. Many of its articles are related to military and intelligence operations of World War II, especially in CBI.

Of particular importance for this purpose are personal papers of a few key players in CBI. The “James M. McHugh Papers” (n.d.) reflects the complex and intriguing wartime activities of the longest serving US intelligence officer in China with a total of 19 years of service as the US Naval Attaché in China before the Pearl Harbor attacks. McHugh’s papers have proved very helpful and illuminating, especially on British intelligence works in wartime China. Perhaps the most exhaustive compilation of original documents related to wartime financial and military aid to China and the Treasury Department’s involvement in the discussion and support of the US Army’s Burma strategy is *The Morgenthau Diary (China)*, volumes I and II (Morgenthau 1974). Supplementary to Morgenthau’s diaries is John Blum’s *From the Morgenthau Diaries, Years of Crisis, 1928–1938* (1959); *From the Morgenthau Diaries, Years of Urgency, 1938–1941* (1965); and *From the Morgenthau Diaries, Years of War, 1939–1941* (1967). These collections are important because *The Morgenthau Diary (China)* only contains material originating in 1939. Blum provides good perspective on material in the years prior to 1939 on US military and financial aid to China.

A highly valuable collection of an American commanding officer in the China theater is the *Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers* (n.d.). It provides useful context to many high dramas in command disputes and policy disagreements among the Chinese, the British, and the Americans. In addition to the declassified deciphered wartime KGB files collected in the VENONA series, the “Lauchlin Currie Papers” (n.d.), albeit scanty, primarily deals with Currie’s central role as President Roosevelt’s chief handler of China affairs during World War II. It is rich in material on Currie’s activities in organizing lend-lease resources to China, securing financial aid packages, and wartime intelligence activities. It contains quite a few revealing documents between Currie and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, James McHugh, T. V. Soong, and other key members of the China aid operations. Command turf strife and personality conflicts in CBI among the American commanders can be analyzed by looking at the “Milton Miles Papers” (n.d.). Miles was the chief architect and top representative of SACO during World War II. His complete papers are scattered at Hoover, the Naval War College, and the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. But this one at Hoover contains much of his China experience during World War II. In addition, the “Claire Lee Chennault Papers” (n.d.) is an important collection of papers on and by one of the key figures in foreign operations in wartime China.

Despite all the progress made by historians over the past decades, much still need to be done to enrich the historiography of the CBI theater. Top on the list is to enhance international cooperation in research that transcends national and parochial boundaries. Archives have become much more open, but countries involved in

this multinational conflict have widely different levels of openness. The United States has set a good example in opening many of its key wartime records to historians. Other countries have done relatively less. Still, few opportunities exist for meaningful exchange of sources and views among scholars in different countries. There has not been a CBI themed history conference or symposium open to all CBI scholars. Rather, histories related to CBI have been written in terms of history of a particular country within the CBI regions. A notable, and noble, exception has been the multiyear endeavor under the aegis of Harvard University's Asia Center which for several years, with moderate success, brought scholars of World War II from China, Japan, and the United States together to reconcile, or at least, to compare notes. Language is a reason for this dearth of attention. For example, there have been many excellent studies in Chinese and Japanese which are not available in English, and vice versa.

To a certain degree, military history should be easier to write. It deals with straightforward application of brute force, without much complication from illusive and slippery ambiguities of the *zeitgeist*, which is often obviated by wartime exigencies of life and death matters. During war time, as a general rule, the personalities involved are clearer in their strengths and weaknesses; the archives are often abundant and measured by hundreds or thousands of cubic feet for even one campaign or a single war-time agency; belligerents are more likely to enjoy national unity and popular support in war time than in peace time, making all sorts of conventional social and economic tensions less acute and pressing, thus alleviating the historian's burden of conducting complicated and often convoluted analyses of social fragmentations.

Yet, this has not been the case with the historical writings of most armed conflicts of modern times, especially those involving catastrophic carnage and destruction. Historians of the American Civil War continued to argue about the fundamental aspects of the conflict including its origin and culpability. The study of the China-Burma-India theater of World War II with its records of horrendous human carnage has proved to be a historian's further-expanding frontier territory, without a sure sight of definite ending. Hopefully in the near future, we will have a much more integrated system of historical research and openness of archives in the historiography of the China-Burma-India theater.

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CHAPTER TEN

The German Assault, 1939–1941

ROBERT M. CITINO

Call it “the onslaught,” the two triumphant years with which the German armed forces (the *Wehrmacht*) opened World War II. During this period, the Germans reeled off one decisive victory after another, a run quite unlike anything in recent memory. With its tank (panzer) formations operating as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force (Luftwaffe) circling overhead, the *Wehrmacht* smashed every defensive position thrown in its path. The world called it blitzkrieg, or “lightning war,” but that was a term the Germans themselves never used in any formal sense. By any name, it was impressive. The opening campaign in Poland (Case White) smashed the Polish army in eighteen days, although a bit more fighting was necessary to reduce the capital, Warsaw. Equally decisive was the simultaneous invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 (code-name *Weserübung*). Both enemy capitals, Oslo and Copenhagen, fell on day one to a well-coordinated combination of ground forces, seaborne landings, and paratroopers. Allied formations tried to intervene, got a quick taste of the Luftwaffe, and soon evacuated under heavy fire. One month later the *Wehrmacht* launched its great offensive in the west (Case Yellow). Here, the panzers smashed not merely the Poles or Norwegians, but the cream of the French and British armies, destroying the former and booting the latter off the continent in a frantic evacuation from the last port still in friendly hands, Dunkirk.

The pattern continued into 1941. A lightning drive into the Balkans in April overran Yugoslavia (Operation 25) and Greece (Operation Marita). When a British force arrived to help defend the latter, the *Wehrmacht* kicked it from one position to another and eventually drove it off the mainland altogether, forcing the British into their third forced evacuation in less than a year. Their destination this time was Crete, and here they got hit by a real thunderbolt, Operation Mercury, the first all-airborne military operation in history. The British evacuated under fire yet again, this time to Egypt, where they made the acquaintance of General Erwin Rommel in the Western Desert.

There was a lot of fighting yet to come, of course, and we all know the ending. Nevertheless, we should not minimize the achievement. Two years, after all, is a long time in modern war, and the *Wehrmacht* had just gotten through them undefeated. It had crushed one of its two great power adversaries, and was managing to keep the other very much at bay. The Soviet Union was still an ally. The United States might as well have been on another planet. German casualties had been minimal. Indeed, a few thousand losses among the paratroopers on Crete had led Hitler to cancel all future airborne landings. As he surveyed the strategic scene in May 1941, he believed they had become too expensive.

How soon things would change! But that is a topic for another chapter. That two year conflict in Europe from 1939–1941 was the war Hitler won.

At least three problems arise in researching the opening phases of World War II. First of all, the scholar has to be aware of the daunting task at hand. The literature on the war is enormous, larger than on any other single topic in military history, dwarfing even the American Civil War. Since the period under consideration here, 1939–1941, forms only two years of a six year war (seven campaigning seasons, actually), one needs at the very least to begin by surveying the one-volume histories of the entire conflict. A partial list today would include Gerhard Weinberg, *A World At Arms* (1994), Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, *A War to be Won* (2000), Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (2005), Evan Mawdsley, *World War II: A New History* (2009), and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Annihilation: A Global History of World War II* (2011). Each of these books has unique perspectives, offers previously untapped documents on the war's opening years, and parses the meaning of this two-year period in different ways.

If a common theme unites them, it is the notion of global war. Weinberg is the magister here. While he stresses Hitler's role in starting the war – indeed, he was an “intentionalist” on this point even before historians had coined the term – and while he gives primacy to the European conflict, he also offers wide-ranging analysis on the global linkages between war in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The opening vignette in the preface to *A World at Arms* deals not with the German invasion of Poland; instead, it describes the battle of Kohima in 1944, where the British and Indians won a decisive victory over a Japanese army invading India, and offers satirical commentary on the Indian Nationalist, Subhas Chandra Bose (Weinberg 1994, p. xiii). Zeiler and Mawdsley take much the same approach, with both discussing Japan's invasion of China and describing the fighting there in some detail well before the *Wehrmacht* crosses the Polish frontier. We have now moved the outbreak of the war, in other words, from the more traditional date of 1939 back to 1937. Mawdsley denies that it was “Hitler's war” in any real sense – in fact, he uses the phrase with a question mark. While emphasizing the German role as a “thick strand of the story,” he also contends “there were other strands to the mid-century world crisis” that led to the war (Mawdsley 2009, p. 1).

There is one other common thread. On the operational plane, none of these books argues for any special German military genius. The focus now tends to be on the fog of war and on the uncertainties of combat in even the most lopsided victory. If the Germans receive praise in any particular area, it is for a flexible system of command allowing a great deal of initiative to the lower ranks, and for tactical and operational improvisation in the field. Zeiler, for example, points out the problems the Germans

had coordinating their arms in Poland, and labels the Polish campaign “more of a proving ground for German armor at the tactical level rather than in a fully incorporated operation” (Zeiler 2011, p. 58). Mawdsley goes further in his demythologizing, arguing that “the *Wehrmacht* had stumbled upon Blitzkrieg as the means to a rapid ‘operational’ solution of a strategic problem” (Mawdsley 2009, pp. 136–137). Rather than an inspiration born of some special German aptitude for war, in other words, it was a means by which a state that was fundamentally weaker than its adversaries might be able to punch above its weight. In the modern literature, blitzkrieg no longer swaggers onto the stage, but emerges more gradually from a matrix of German strategic weakness.

The second problem highlights an aspect of military history that should strike us as curious. Far from the received wisdom on the subject, oftentimes the losers write the history. Consider the pantheon of great captains from Hannibal to Napoleon to Robert E. Lee. They are all considered to be the most gifted commanders of their respective eras, even though each of them captained the losing squad. Never has this paradox been more evident than in the post-1945 era. What we think of as “the history of World War II” is, like all histories, actually a “construct”: take a few early impressions, mix in a few post-1945 biases – some minor and some major – and then reinforce over and over again until “truth” forms. The principle ingredient in this historiographical cocktail has been the memoir, and the master source for these memoirs has been the German officer corps. The list of books to be consulted is an imposing one. It includes Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader* (1952), Hans von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles* (1956), Hans von Luck, *Panzer Commander* (1989), Erich von Manstein, *Lost Battles* (1982), Heinz Werner Schmidt (1979), *With Rommel in the Desert* (Rommel’s *aide de camp* in North Africa), Frido von Senger und Etterlin (1989), *Neither Fear nor Hope* (dealing mainly with the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, but also containing important sections on the early years of the war), and many more. And then there is the Foreign Military Studies (FMS) series (1945–1959), published by the US Department of the Army and based upon interviews with captive German generals, most of which remain unpublished but can be consulted at various archives, especially the US Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Because they did not have their personal papers or office files available to them, their testimony is not always completely reliable, and no researcher should ever rely on the FMS files without finding corroborating evidence.

The problems run even deeper than lack of documentation, however. In dealing with the delicate events of their recent past, not to mention the crimes in which they may have participated, the German generals were evasive. They left many things out altogether – their loyalty to Hitler and their enthusiasm in carrying out his racial policies, for example. They also put many things in. Indeed, the number of times that the generals claimed in their memoirs to have “stood up to Hitler” is legion. Would that it were true! Above all, however, their real reason for writing these memoirs was professional exculpation: denying responsibility for the disastrous war and shifting all blame for it onto Hitler’s shoulders. In a way, Hitler was the ideal alibi. He was dead, of course, and so could not speak for himself. He was also Hitler, the worst mass murderer of all time and thus unlikely to have many defenders eager to argue his brief. The generals could have a go at him as they liked, and usually went unchallenged.

Another factor deserves mention. The generals were now more or less permanent guests of the US or British governments, institutions that had a new security problem in the 1950s. There was a new cold war raging, but it might go hot at any moment, and the West wanted to know how to fight and beat the Soviet Union in an upcoming conflict, already nicknamed World War III even before it had broken out. But who had recent experience in fighting “the Russians”? Men like Guderian, Von Manstein, and Von Mellenthin – the generals of World War II. At a time when the US Army, in particular, was eager to learn as much as possible about the Soviet Union and its military establishment, memoirs like *Panzer Leader* (1952) or *Lost Victories* must have appeared like holy writ. Reputable publishing houses published these memoirs, all soon appeared in English translation, and the corporate view of the German officer corps became part and parcel of the Western interpretation of the war, even down to a not-so-subtle identification with the *Wehrmacht*, at least when it was fighting in the East against the Red Army. Consider these passages from Von Mellenthin’s *Panzer Battles*, in which the author describes the “Psychology of the Russian Soldier”:

No one belonging to the cultural circle of the West is ever likely to fathom the character and soul of these Asiatics, born and bred on the other side of the European frontiers ... There is no way of telling what the Russian will do next; he will tumble from one extreme to the other. With experience it is quite easy to foretell what a soldier from any other country will do, but never with a Russian. His qualities are as unusual and as many-sided as those of his vast and rambling country ... The Russian is quit unpredictable; today he does not care whether his flanks are threatened or not, tomorrow he trembles at the idea of having his flanks exposed. He disregards accepted tactical principles but sticks to the letter of his field manuals. Perhaps the key to this attitude lies in the fact the Russian is not a conscious soldier, thinking on independent lines, but is the victim of moods which a Westerner cannot analyze. He is essentially a primitive being. (Von Mellenthin 1956)

How easy it is for any educated individual to read these comments and chuckle about the gullibility of our forebears. However, things might have seemed different to a US Army officer reading them in 1956 (the year the book first appeared in English translation).

Today, historians working in the archives (and likely freed from the now-obsolete prejudices of the cold war) have proven many times over that the German memoirs are at best unreliable and at worst deliberately misleading. The critical literature is vast.

For a representative sampling, one might turn to Geoffrey P. Megargee, *Inside Hitler’s High Command* (2000), a demolition not only of the German General Staff’s morality and ethics, but its very competency as a manager of modern war, as well his next book, *War of Annihilation* (2006), which analyzes the *Wehrmacht*’s operations and crimes in the Soviet Union during the first campaigning season of 1941 and Robert M. Citino, *German Way of War* (2005) and *Death of the Wehrmacht* (2007), both of which link German warmaking in the war’s early years not to some special genius of the General Staff, but to long-term Prussian-German operational patterns. Russell Hart, *Guderian* (2006), offers a biography of the general that is unsparing in its criticism, and is especially hard on his memoirs while Dennis Showalter, *Hitler’s Panzers* (2009), places the rise of German mechanized warfare in a much broader and depersonalized context. Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, *The*

Myth of the Eastern Front (2008), deconstruct the “cult” of the *Wehrmacht* that took hold in the United States after 1945, and look especially carefully at war games and popular culture. Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army* (1991), Stephen Fritz, *Frontsoldaten* (1995), and Wolfram Wette, *The Wehrmacht* (2006), all analyze the way in which Nazi ideology penetrated the German army from the generals down to the rank and file. Finally, Mungo Melvin, *Manstein: Hitler's Greatest General* (2010), offers an evenhanded portrait of this field commander cum war criminal.

And yet, having stipulated the problems with the German memoir literature, we should also admit something else: it is impossible to write the history of the war without it. That is especially true when the subject is campaign history. Considering the original plan and intent, changes and improvisations made during the fighting, and evaluation of the outcome, getting the commander's view is essential to the historian. No one would try to write the history of Allied operations on D-day and the campaigns in Western Europe and Italy without using the memoirs of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1948), General Omar Bradley (1999), General Mark W. Clark (2007), Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery (1958), or Winston Churchill (1948–1953). And yet, it is clear today that each of these memoirs contains much that is of dubious veracity. As David Reynolds has pointed out in his book *In Command of History* (2005), Churchill's memoir says far more about the times in which he was writing it – the era in which he was a failed politician trying to reestablish his bona fides – than it does about the war itself.

Just as we cannot read Churchill out of the story for that indiscretion, we cannot write the history of Case Yellow without consulting Von Manstein and Guderian, no matter how much we might object to them on moral or ethical grounds. All memoirs are self-serving; that is why people write them, after all. When the authors are describing military operations in the field – their *métier* – they are still excellent and reliable sources. We should simply use them with caution.

A third problem is related directly to the second. Several of the most widely read and influential analysts of the war in English – B. H. Liddell Hart (1953) and J. F. C. Fuller (1923) foremost among them – bring grave weaknesses to the table as impartial scholars. In the interwar period (1918–1939), both had been soldiers advocating reforms within the military establishment, and then, after leaving the military, they had become media pundits, generating an insistent barrage of advice to the armed forces about how to conduct themselves. It was a contentious time. World War I had been, in many ways, a low point in the history of the military art: a long, indecisive, and incredibly bloody stalemate. The interwar era had seen heated debate in all the world's armies over the issue of “mechanization,” more specifically, the role that the tank and airplane would play on the future battlefield. To their advocates, they were the weapons of the future, the only means to crack open the trenches and restore mobility.

Both Liddell Hart and Fuller spent the 1920s preaching what Fuller called a “new gospel” of mobile warfare. Fuller was the more radical of the two men, a “military Luther” calling for a “reformation of war” (the title of his 1923 book), in which the traditional infantry and cavalry arms would disappear. The future of battle belonged to the tank, he said, with foot soldier and horseman nothing more than “interested spectators.” Liddell Hart was the more moderate figure. His concern was returning mobility, for without maneuver there could be no strategy. He advocated something

he called the “indirect approach” (the title of a book he published in 1941), avoiding an enemy’s strength and attacking his point of weakness. The key was not so much to destroy every last man and gun of the enemy, but to attack his equilibrium, keeping him off balance by surprise and lightning maneuver. On the modern battlefield, Liddell Hart argued, only tanks and mechanized armies had the requisite speed.

The “prophets,” as they liked to call themselves, met with opposition from those running the army. We often caricature them as know-nothings, like the chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, who once denounced a book by Fuller, then admitted he had not even read it. “It would only annoy me,” he whined. But in fact, they were probably doing the best they could with the materials they had. They were serious men who had to adhere to tight budgets and who could not waste time on fantasies like all-tank armies that had no chance of being funded.

In the aftermath of World War II, however, Liddell Hart and Fuller made absurd claims for the own importance in the interwar period, declaring that they had been instrumental in inventing a new concept of mechanized operations, that the German planners had read their works, and then had used them as the cornerstone for the invention of a radically new way of war called “blitzkrieg.” Conservatives in their own army, meanwhile, had blocked reforms at every turn, and the result was the string of defeats from 1939–1941. Liddell Hart was a particularly active campaigner on his own behalf, interviewing dozens of German generals in captivity and asking how much they knew about him back in the 1930s. In a tight spot personally and professionally (and sometimes legally), and seeking influential friends in the West, the generals were usually quite obliging, as a perusal of Liddell Hart’s *The German Generals Talk* (1979) will indicate.

While none of this is well supported by the documentary record, it is a myth that has become well entrenched in the historical literature. It plays into so many attractive archetypes: the notion of the “young man in a hurry,” the “hidebound reactionary establishment” unwilling to admit that the world it knew was changing, and of course, the “prophet without honor in his own country.” As a result it has become nearly irresistible, and not just in Britain. The list of those claiming to be “prophets” in the interwar era, who then went on to fight and write about World War II, is international. Armor theorists like Charles de Gaulle in France (1940) and Heinz Guderian in Germany (1992) as well as airpower advocates like William “Billy” Mitchell in the United States, Giulio Douhet in Italy, and Hugh Trenchard in Great Britain belong to the tribe of prophets, and all of them, as well as the numerous books about them, need to be handled with a great deal of care. While they do discuss the war, they are often arguing about something else entirely: individual reputations and roles in a long-settled doctrinal debate.

There are a number of good antidotes to this problem. In *Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?* (1991), Richard L. DiNardo offers a fresh perspective on the armor debate, pointing out that while the *Wehrmacht* did indeed “ride” off to victory in the early years of the war, it did not do so on tanks. Horses, it turned out, still comprised a shockingly large component of its supply train. And for a work that challenges the Liddell Hart myth at every turn, John J. Mearsheimer offers both reasoned argumentation and no small amount of vitriol in *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History* (1988).

Once one has read all the single volume histories of the war, and allowed for the deficiencies of the German General Staff narrative, and worked through Liddell Hart's special pleading, there is still one more problem: the literature on the individual campaigns themselves is monumental in its own right, and even keeping up with newly published material can be a daunting task.

Consider the Polish campaign. Embracing less than a single month of fighting, it has developed an enormous body of work. A logical place to start would be the belated "official history" commissioned by the Federal Republic of Germany's Military History Research Office (*Militär-geschichtliches Forschungsamt*). Available in English translation today as *Germany and the Second World War* (1990), it analyzes Case White in volume II, *Germany's Initial Conquests in Europe* (Maier, Rohde, and Stegemann 1991). Labeling this "official history" is misleading, since the term usually indicates an institutional product, under-seasoned and bland, and written with the express intention of protecting reputations. Because enough time has passed since 1945, and because the Germans understandably have no desire to protect anyone involved in the planning or prosecution of the war, they have produced a meticulously researched, scholarly, and extremely critical work. The maps are also beautiful, a crucial aspect for any operational history.

Those feeling threatened by the size (and price) of these German volumes might still find use in an older work. Robert M. Kennedy, *The German Campaign in Poland, 1939* (1956), was part of the FMS series published by the US Department of the Army and based upon interviews with captive German generals. All of the problems of the FMS series mentioned above are here in abundance. Still, Kennedy's book is worthy as a brief operational overview, and the order of battle charts and maps are quite accurate, something that is not always true in this field. Among the huge amount of popular literature written on the Polish campaign, Matthew Cooper, *The German Army, 1933–1945* (1978) takes pride of place, being especially reliable on the operational data – orders of battle, commanders, and maneuvers. In *The Polish Campaign* (1991), Steven Zaloga and Victory Madej have produced a good revisionist work with a fundamentally different point of view drawn from Polish sources and highlighting the Polish military. Holding a unique and indispensable place in the literature, it established what we might call the current consensus on Case White: a decisive and rapid victory for the *Wehrmacht*, to be sure, but not without its share of pain. And then there are the memoirs (as we have seen, virtually every German commander wrote them, even if the Poles did not get the chance), not to mention the mountain of literature generated in the professional military journals at the time the campaign was underway, the *Military Review*, produced by the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, for example, or the semi-official publication of the *Wehrmacht*, the *Militär-Wochenblatt*. Suffice it to say, one could spend the rest of one's life reading up on Case White alone.

The next great campaign of the war, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, breaks the general pattern. It is actually less well served than it should be, perhaps a reflection of a lack of tanks and the more diffuse, small-unit nature of the fighting. Still, as the world's first "triphibious" campaign – involving land, sea, and air forces working in intimate cooperation and requiring the split-second timing of more than a dozen landings over thousand miles of Danish and Norwegian coastline – it was a signal moment for the development of modern operations. Here, Adam R. A. Claasen, in *Hitler's*

Northern War (2001), has the field more or less to himself. It is a definitive portrait of German combined operations in the north, highlighting the role played by the Luftwaffe, but ranging far beyond air activity to include land and naval combat, as well as the interplay of all three arms. Another necessary work is the article by James S. Corum, “The German Campaign in Norway as a Joint Operation,” in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1998), which not only analyzes the successes of German interservice cooperation in the campaign, but also Allied failures in the same area. And once again, there are the memoirs, in this case those of the commander in chief of the German fleet, Erich Raeder, *Grand Admiral*, reprinted in 2001. It is a start, but *Weserübung* deserves more.

When we come to the great German triumph in France and the Low Countries, however, the number of essential books rapidly curves toward infinity. Case Yellow continues to fascinate historians, and it is easy to see why. Even a brief operational précis can stir the blood. The German feint from the north acting as a “matador’s cloak”; the bold panzer thrust through the forbidding Ardennes, courtesy of General Von Manstein; the Allied drive to the Dyle river in Belgium and Breda in the Netherlands, a pair of brilliant operational maneuvers – unfortunately, for the wrong side; General Heinz Guderian’s breakthrough at Sedan; the high-speed panzer drive to the English Channel and the consequent encirclement of an entire Allied force in Belgium; Hitler’s problematic halt order before Dunkirk; the heroic British evacuation: the twentieth century saw few more dramatic moments.

Perhaps it is best to begin here with the victims, the French Army (and France itself). In the 1930s Marc Bloch was one of the world’s most accomplished historians, a noted medievalist and one of the founders of the *Annales* school. In 1940, he was a reservist called to the colors as a logistical officer in the French 1st Army. He served as honorably as anyone in the brief campaign that followed, managed to escape from the great encirclement in Flanders, evacuated France on a British vessel, returned to Brittany, and eventually became a prisoner of the Germans. He would die in captivity, but not until he had written a little book called *Strange Defeat* (Bloch 1968). It is an unparalleled work: a highly underrated campaign analysis, a dissection of French politics and society before the war, and a call to action to his compatriots. The writing is peerless, whether Bloch is describing having to use a nursery school as his headquarters (“The furniture had been designed to fit the requirements of very young children”), with predictably hilarious results, or the signs of the “staff disease” that overtook so many officers as the campaign fell apart (“haggard eyes, badly shaven chins, a nervous restlessness which showed itself, in the early stages, as a feverish irritability over small things, and went on to assume the form of a forced calmness which deceived nobody”). Above all he captures the relentless pace of this first great mechanized campaign. Consider this passage. Bloch is administering a “semi-permanent fuel park” in the town of Landrecies, when he witnesses the following encounter:

One fine morning in May, the officer in charge ran into a column of tanks in the main street. They were, he thought, painted a very odd color, but that did not worry him overmuch, because he could not possibly know all the various types in use in the French Army. But what did upset him considerably was the very curious route that they seemed to be taking! They were moving in the direction of Cambrai; in other words *away* from the front. But that, too, could be explained without much difficulty, since it was only natural that within the winding streets of a little town the guides might go

wrong. He was just about to run after the commander of the convoy in order to put his right, when a casual passer-by, better informed than he was, shouted – “Look out! They’re Germans!” (Bloch 1968)

Indeed, throughout the campaign, Bloch says, the Germans “kept appearing where they ought not to have appeared.”

Where *Strange Defeat* shines, however, is in Bloch’s refusal to see the disaster as a mere matter of military technique. He analyzes the collapse not just of an army, but of a system and a way of life that he no longer regarded as capable of nurturing civic virtue. The French Army, after all, was nothing if not a reflection of the society that had formed and trained it. In that sense, Bloch may be seen as the godfather of the “new military history” of the 1960s, scholars who tried to place military activity within the broadest possible context of politics, economics, education, and society.

We still feel the ripples of his work. In recent times, for example, Eugenia Kiesling’s *Arming against Hitler* (1996) takes up the thorny problem of French military policy in the interwar era. Historians have usually painted it as one of the great doctrinal wrong turns of all time: building the Maginot Line while the Germans were forming panzer divisions for high-speed war. Kiesling argues that this is reading history backwards. Seeking the actual reasons why the French did what they did in the 1930s – rather than more chimerical notions of what they failed to do or what they should have done – she finds them in the political matrix of the Third Republic. It was, after all, a system formed originally as a reaction to Bonapartism, one that tended to distrust overly charismatic generals or overly complex operational schemes. Seen in that light, the turn to the Maginot Line and “methodical battle” made perfect political sense, and, in fact, it would be impossible to imagine the Third Republic doing anything else.

A reader seeking a more tightly focused operational study will find it difficult to choose just one. Early works, especially out of France, bear the stamp of their age, and they also tend to argue that the German victory was due to superior numbers and better equipment. No one believes that anymore, at least not since the publication of R. H. S. Stolfi’s seminal article, “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940” (Stolfi 1970), whose publication may be seen as the start of modern research into Case Yellow. Since then, Robert A. Doughty has described well the disastrous course of French war planning in *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* (1990), and Jeffrey A. Gunsburg gives us a worthy account of the fighting in the Flanders plain (i.e., *not* in the Ardennes) in *Divided and Conquered* (1979). Here the French gave as good as they got, and showed that their tactics and weaponry were not completely deficient. For German operations, one must start by reading Von Manstein (1982), the man who designed the operational plan, in *Lost Victories*, part two (“The Campaign in the West”). For the course of the operation, Florian K. Rothbrust, *Guderian’s XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France* (1990) is still an indispensable monograph, although it is essentially an essay (running to just 95 pages of text) extended by maps and documents. As always, there will be many readers who turn to Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle* (1969), a popular history but also an accurate and stirring narrative of the campaign.

Without doubt, however, the single most important book written on Case Yellow is Karl-Heinz Frieser, *The Blitzkrieg Legend* (2005). When first released in Germany

in 1995 (original title, *Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940*), it caused a sensation among those who study the *Wehrmacht* for a living. Not only was it a detailed and comprehensive look at this most successful of modern military campaigns, it also staked out some bold, even startling, revisionist terrain that called into question all of the received wisdom about Case Yellow. Hardly the inevitable victory of a blitzkrieg-oriented army, Frieser's vision of the 1940 campaign was instead filled with chance and contingency and the fog of war on both sides. It was not simply a victory of German armor, virtually all of which was vastly inferior to that of the Allies, but rather a victory for superior doctrine. Frieser moved the discussion from hardware factors, in other words, to areas of software: planning, command and control, logistics, and information.

Frieser, for example, does not think the German army planned Case Yellow as a blitzkrieg at all. Most German staff officers had a great respect for the armies of the Western allies, and they had good reason: the last time they had faced these same adversaries they got themselves four years of bloodshed and a grinding war of attrition that Germany eventually lost. Most of them expected a replay. In fact, they were dumbfounded that Hitler had dragged Germany into a war in 1939, a conflict for which the Reich was far less ready than it had been in 1914.

The rapid and nearly bloodless victory was as shocking to the Germans, then, as it was to the Allied commanders, and it cried out for a "plausible explanation." The result was the onomatopoeic term *blitzkrieg* (lightning war), a supposedly new method of war-making developed in secret by the Germans (and often attributed to the military "genius" of Adolf Hitler). As Frieser points out, the term was hardly ever used in Germany, and certainly not used in any precise or doctrinal sense. It simply sounded good – at first to outsiders, and eventually to Germans alike. *Blitzkrieg* was, in effect, an *ex post facto* construction, but one of such power that it would eventually come to blind the Germans themselves to what had happened in 1940.

But if Case Yellow was not a *blitzkrieg*, then what was it? Here Frieser made his most important contribution. Viewed strategically, the Germans lost World War II in September 1939, the day they invaded Poland and brought down the wrath of the Western powers, with their domination of the seas and their vast, resource-rich overseas empires. That certainly was the opinion of most German staff officers, and not even the rapid victory in Poland did much to improve their mood. There was no war plan for conflict with Britain and France, and the long-term prospects seemed hopeless. The operation plan for 1940, then, really was something new: an armored raid, an all-or-nothing, go-for-broke gamble, a staking of the entire fate of the nation on the play of one card – the panzer thrust through the Ardennes. It was more than an operational plan, it was "the substitute for a strategic solution that the political leadership had failed to develop." It is a point of view that has worked its way into the literature as a kind of consensus, as we saw in Mawdsley's *World War II: A New History* (above). Case Yellow, then, went well beyond "daring" – often a good thing in a commander – into the realm of recklessness. It is perhaps a sound judgment on Hitler's entire war.

Our final entry in the literature of "the onslaught" takes us to North Africa. The fight in the desert has certainly had its share in the historiography – biographies of Rommel, detailed accounts of every major battle from El Agheila to Tunis, memoirs by all the major participants. It was, and is, a mountain of books. However, much of

the literature is badly out of date, with biography still forming a major portion: Correlli Barnett, *The Desert Generals* (1982), Nigel Hamilton, *Monty* (1981–1986), John Keegan, *Churchill's Generals* (1991), Ronald Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander* (1971), *Rommel as Military Commander* (1968), and many more. See also Rommel's own memoir, based on his papers and published posthumously as *Krieg ohne Hass* (1950). Liddell Hart edited the papers in English translation as *The Rommel Papers* (1953), but for some inexplicable reason interspersed operational analysis with Rommel's letters home to his wife. The literary marriage – unlike the real one – is not happy. These are all worthy works. The best among them manage to raise enough questions about their subject to make them worth reading. Often, however, they lapse into hagiography, and their format often prevents them from going beyond the issue of personalities. Amongst the secondary literature, the body of work by Michael Carver (chief of staff for the 7th Armored Division during the campaign) is still essential reading: *Tobruk* (1964), *El Alamein* (1962), and *Dilemmas of the Desert War* (1986). Finally, three books deserve special mention in this crowded field: Wolf Heckmann, *Rommel's War in Africa* (1981), for its vignettes of the desert war from the German perspective; Hans-Otto Behrendt, *Rommel's Intelligence in the Desert Campaign* (1985), for being the only book to deal exclusively with this crucial problem; and Alan J. Levine, *The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines* (1999), for the same reason.

The sixtieth anniversary of the battle of El Alamein was the occasion for a mini-wave of new books: Jon Latimer, *Alamein* (2002), John Bierman and Colin Smith, *Battle of Alamein* (2002), and Stephen Bungay, *Alamein* (2002). Unfortunately, they did not break any particularly new conceptual ground, nor did they jump-start any new school. All are fundamentally similar works. They purport to be about the battle itself; all are in fact general histories of the entire North African campaign from the Anglo-Italian battles to Rommel's final retreat to Tunisia. None of them offers any analytical breakthrough, although they do use interviews with veterans to good effect. Indeed it is probably best to see them as the British equivalent of the American "greatest generation" genre. Latimer's work is the most scholarly. Bungay (2002) and Bierman and Smith (2002) offer solid popular histories, including a huge amount of perhaps extraneous detail on matters as wide-ranging as the identity of the real *English Patient* or a deconstruction of the desert war's greatest hit, "Lili Marlene" (Bierman and Smith, pp. 84–86). All three offer particularly vivid accounts of the crucial encounter at the position called "Snipe," where the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade decisively blunted Rommel's largest armored counterattacks on October 26th. It is difficult to recommend one of them over the others.

Rommel himself, of course, is still a hero in the West, starting with Churchill's praise of him on the Commons floor as "a great general," extending into his perceived participation in the anti-Hitler resistance, and solidified in dozens of books about his operational acumen. Today, all those aspects of his life and career are under fire by historians. Ralf Georg Reuth, *Rommel* (2005), is a recent warts-and-all biography that shows how even this revered Nazi general had an attitude toward Hitler that could only be labeled hero worship. Reuth is also highly critical of a general who cared so little for logistics or for tying his dash and drive to any meaningful strategic end. Dennis Showalter has given us a recent and typically incisive portrait in the comparative biography *Patton and Rommel* (2005), painting the latter as a "muddy

boots” tactician, praiseworthy in a battalion commander but highly questionable on the level of army or army group command.

In formulating a research agenda, we must first be humble. Anyone wishing to contribute to the operational history of World War II must realize that there has been a conversation going on now for over seventy years, that even the local public libraries are filled with relevant books, and that the job is enormous. Contrary to our usual calling as historians, which demands Rankean devotion to the archival sources, mastery of the secondary literature is one key to producing original and vital scholarship in this field.

The second, and more urgent, point is the need to cut loose from the notion of military history as a sort of “after action report.” For centuries, historians have confidently handed down judgments of all sorts, often based on very tendentious argumentation, on the conduct of operations. This army should have done that; that general should have done this. This division deployed in faulty formation; that captain dressed his company’s battle-line improperly. We have condemned commanders for being too impetuous when they ought to have hung back, and for being too passive when they should have charged in. The history of World War II is filled with such claims. In our 1939–1941, pre-Barbarossa timeframe, for example, let us consider this partial list of obvious “mistakes”:

- 1 The Polish high command’s decision in 1939 to deploy along the entire length of the border, rather than concentrate around supposedly more vital points.
- 2 The French high command’s decision to dispatch 7th Army north to the Dutch town of Breda in 1940, commonly referred to as “the Breda variant” of the Dyle Plan.
- 3 The British decision to intervene in Norway, which came to grief early and led to the first great British evacuation of the war.
- 4 The German decision to halt at Dunkirk, allowing the BEF to escape destruction and evacuate back to Britain.
- 5 The German decision to switch to “terror bombing” of cities during the Battle of Britain, which gave the Royal Air Force a respite in its darkest hour.
- 6 The British decision to intervene in Greece (largely with Australian and New Zealand troops), which came to grief early and led, again, to a hurried evacuation.

There are many more, and they continue to dominate our discussion of the war. It is easy to condemn all these decisions, along with the men who made them. But we should go deeper. Does not the frequency of these wrong turns actually prove that decision-making in wartime might be a great deal tougher than we like to assume, even for the professionally trained staff officer or planner? Is not the problem with this mistake-based analysis that it rests on a mistaken assumption of its own: that for every wartime conundrum, there is a clear and obvious solution? For that to be true, war would have to be a science with limited variables and quantifiable metrics of performance and success. If so, it sure has not been easy to come up with them. Thankfully, we already have a solution to the problem, an intellectual framework for analyzing these difficulties. It comes to us from Carl von Clausewitz, and although it may or may not be infallible, it is the most compelling we are likely to have for some time. War is filled with difficulties, he wrote. It is the realm of chance, of passion, and politics. It is a paradox. It may seem very simple, “but even the simplest thing is difficult.”

That German failure at Dunkirk, for example, analyzed and reanalyzed over the years, may also have had something to do with those brave British soldiers holding the last ditches around the port's perimeter, a story ably told by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore in *Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man* (2006). The enemy gets a vote, in other words, and at Dunkirk, the British voted "no." Perhaps it did not matter what Hitler decided to do. He was no more certain of British intentions than the British were of his.

As we analyze these great battles, filled with courage, genius, and yes, even error, we need to listen more carefully to the voice of the Prussian sage, and acknowledge the complexity of war.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Militaries Compared: *Wehrmacht* and Red Army, 1941–1945

MARK EDELE

The German-Soviet war of 1941–1945 was the decisive front in the European theater, and arguably of the entire World War II. It was here that most of the German war machine was engaged from 1941, and it was here that the spine of the *Wehrmacht* was broken, as Russian historians rightly continue to stress. Rather than recounting this war, this chapter compares the two fighting machines, focusing on four aspects: size and losses, level of mechanization, combat effectiveness, and irregular warfare as well as war crimes. Historiographical debates will be highlighted as we go along, although the space of this chapter does not allow a thorough overview. The focus is on the armies proper – the Red Army and the *Wehrmacht*, but at times we need to go beyond the confines of classical military history, as both forces functioned in the context of dictatorships and were embedded into police forces and at times volunteer militias. Both sides were also in alliance with or sponsored irregular troops fighting behind enemy lines, and these subsidiary troops cannot be simply ignored.

The trajectories of the German and Soviet armies in this war moved in opposite directions: Soviet losses were worst at the start, while the Germans lost most at the end of the war; the Soviets became more professional as the Germans struggled to maintain their level of training; the Germans cooperated with irregulars early in the war only to arrest their leaders, who turned out to be too independent; the Soviets, always suspicious of independent organizations, began with a tightly controlled partisan movement only to embrace its popularization once the general mood swung toward them. The most far-reaching difference between the fighting machines, however, was in the field of war conduct, war crimes, and atrocities. While there was no lack of criminal conduct on the Soviet side – from mass executions of civilian prisoners in 1941, to killing and maiming prisoners of war, to illegal counterinsurgency warfare, and the well-known rape, plunder, and random destruction in 1945 – it was only the German side which had a program for the systematic destruction of an entire category of people (Jews), flanked by the intended mass death of “Slavic subhumans.”

When on June 22, 1941 the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, they constituted an impressive fighting force: 3.5 million men, over 3,000 tanks, 600,000 motor vehicles, more than 7,000 artillery pieces, and in excess of two thousand seven hundred airplanes. The Soviets, however, were a serious enemy. German arrogance notwithstanding, they were, as Evan Mawdsley points out in *Thunder in the East*, “numerically much better equipped” than their adversary (Mawdsley 2005, p. 187). With somewhere under 5 million men, 77,000 artillery pieces, over 22,000 tanks and about 20,000 aircraft, they easily matched the Germans, who had to confront about half of this fighting force in the western regions. Their major problem was not numbers, but training, leadership, and strategic as well as tactical preparation for this war. The poor state and often abysmal upkeep of much of the equipment also did not help Stalin’s army.

Both sides suffered appalling losses. The data for the German and Soviet armed forces are not directly comparable, because the Soviet numbers include categories excluded from the German equivalents (notably POWs, who were not all dead), but a comparison makes two facts plain. First, the Soviet losses were far higher than those of their enemy. In the desperate half year of 1941 alone, more Soviet soldiers perished than their German counterparts during the entire war. The same is true for 1942. Secondly, the death statistics have opposite dynamics: while the Soviets lost over half of their men in the first one and a half years of war (1941 and 1942), the Germans lost close to half at war’s end, not even including those who fell in the final and desperate battles of 1945 (Krivosheev 1997, p. 94; Overmans 1999, p. 277).

Such a level of attrition could not remain without consequences. Historical debate has focused largely on the effects on unit coherence, motivation to fight, and indoctrination. The main site of this controversy so far was the *Wehrmacht*. Already in 1948 two social scientists, Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, argued that the remarkable resilience of the German troops was not rooted in ideology, but in the emotional attachment to the “primary group” of fighting mates, an institution the military tried to actively foster (Shils and Janowitz 1948). In a famous critique of this article, Omer Bartov (1992) pointed out that it took away the ideological underpinning of war conduct, particularly in the east. Moreover, he wrote in *The Eastern Front* (Bartov 2001), “this theory does not take into account the tremendous casualties sustained by the formations at the front” (p. 26). How could one speak of stable groups “in divisions which suffered between 200 and 300 per cent casualties within the space of about three years of fighting”? Under such conditions, it was national socialist ideology which both explained the apocalypse the soldiers found themselves in and gave them a reason to fight and die all the way back to Berlin. Recent research, in particularly by Christoph Rass, has in turn questioned some of Bartov’s basic assumptions and breathed new life into the “primary group” thesis, which also began to interest historians of the Soviet side, issues we shall return to below. Meanwhile, other effects should not be overlooked. The Soviets, for one, were encouraged by the immense bloodshed on their side to invest more in the training and equipment of their troops. Simply throwing in wave after wave of green soldiers could no longer be tolerated once even infantry units were seriously under strength. The Red Army should, noted Stalin in May 1942, learn to fight “as the Germans do it” (Edele and Geyer 2009, p. 370). And the generals listened to their leader. “We could no longer count upon numbers for victory but had to rely upon ability and firepower,” reports one veteran about the battles in early 1945 (Litvin 2007, p. 128).

While losses remained high throughout, these numbers have to be seen in the context of an extreme expansion of the army's personnel. Relative to the field army's size, the losses decreased even more rapidly than if seen on their own. If in 1941 nearly the entire field army was wiped out, this appalling statistic was reduced to a bit over half in 1942, to drop quickly to 10 percent by war's end. Soviet leaders clearly learned to use their manpower better as time went on. This was partially an effect of better medical services – the total number of losses, including nonfatal wounds, remained remarkably constant throughout the war, even as deaths decreased. Relative to the growing size of the army, of course, this still meant a smaller share, and a proportion, moreover, which could be restored in part to the forces after recovery (Krivosheev 1997, pp. 94, 101).

The manpower problem early in the war opened the doors for a sizable number of women to serve in outright combat roles. The story of militarized women on the Soviet side is better known than the equivalent for the adversary, but the long and the short of it was that both sides employed a significant minority of women in military roles. The Soviets could draw on a discourse of gender equality and on the practice of training some women to shoot, to fight, or to parachute, which allowed a minority to serve in outright combat roles or even to command men in battle. The Germans, who had greater ideological qualms about enrolling women in their ranks, never matched such gender radicalism, even where military necessity might have demanded it. The chief of the *Wehrmacht's* High Command (OKW), Wilhelm Keitel, noted in June 1942, that the "militarization of women" was an obvious solution (*naheliegend*), but could not be accepted because "the female soldier contradicts our National Socialist conception of womanhood" (Müller and Volkmann 1999, pp. 720–721). Ideologically coherent or not, manpower shortages forced the German Army, too, to employ female soldiers, even if the army hid this fact under the euphemism of "helpmate" (*Wehrmachtshelferin*). In the end, similar numbers served on both sides, which ironically means that the Germans had the larger share, not the Soviets. But such comparisons only scratch the surface of considerably deeper and more involved histories. Historians still have some work to do in this area, although for once Russianists are ahead of their Germanist colleagues here. The historiography on women in the *Wehrmacht* today is about at the stage reached in 1985 with Svetlana Alexiyevich's oral history of the "war's unwomanly face" (Alexiyevich 1988). Franz Seidler's monographs from the 1970s notwithstanding (Seidler 1978, 1979), there is no German equivalent for the detailed, archival exploration of life in the army by Euridice Cardona and Roger Markwick (2009), let alone the highly theorized exploration of gender in Anna Krylova's *Soviet Women in Combat* (2010).

Popular history often confronts the mechanized German juggernaut with the backwardness of the Soviet fighting machine. Recent historiography has tried to counter this misconception, both by stressing the central role of the horse in the German Army, and by focusing on the mechanized elite of the Soviet side. Both forces combined a highly mechanized core with the mass of infantry, which was transported by rail and otherwise walked, relying on horse-drawn transport. Different numbers circulate in the literature, but they all show that the bulk of the German Army, between 74 and 80 percent in 1941, were not motorized. The count of German motor vehicles was matched or even outnumbered by the tally of horses; and as truck losses began to exceed the production of their replacement by August 1941, the German Army, writes R. L. DiNardo, "became steadily less motorized. Horses would eventually have to

make up the difference” (DiNardo 1991, p. 41). Losses of machines and the reorganization of panzer groups into panzer armies (which meant the incorporation of infantry divisions) created a situation where even these most mechanized of all units relied increasingly on literal rather than figurative horsepower. By December 11, 1941, the First Panzer Army counted 15,000 more horses than vehicles.

The typical experience of German infantry in 1941, thus, was travel by train followed by seemingly endless marches, interrupted by battles. “Our march continued through the first half of July,” reports one survivor, who had disembarked his troop train at the beginning of the month.

The infantry continued to march from sunrise to sunset. Dusty, sweaty, and clammy without relief from the brutal climate, we penetrated deeper into Soviet Russia. Although it was against regulations, small panye carts, pulled by stout Russian ponies, were requisitioned to lighten the load of our field packs. As we left civilization as we knew it farther behind us, this habit became more commonplace. (Bidermann 2000, pp. 15–16)

The Soviets, too, combined horses and machines. On 1 May 1942, Stalin’s armed forces had a total of 9,325 tanks, 364,029 trucks, and 39,907 tractors at its disposal. The majority of the mobility of the 10,936,631 men and women in uniform, however, was assisted by 1,275,323 horses.

Throughout the war, this basic fact did not change. As Omer Bartov has influentially argued in *Hitler’s Army* (1992), the *Wehrmacht* underwent a process of rapid “demodernization” in 1941–1942, when trench warfare replaced the blitzkrieg. However, this state was neither permanent nor complete. War of maneuver resumed in 1942, and the German war industry managed to produce enough armored machines to keep their numbers more or less stable throughout the war. In fact, only in 1942 did the number of deployed tanks dip below their 1941 base line and in January 1945, the German tank forces counted over thousand more machines than when they attacked the Soviet Union. And each machine (and, increasingly, every antitank bazooka or *Panzerfaust*) counted for more now. As Hitler’s army retreated back to the west, the effect of what Chris Bellamy (2007) has called the “Eurasian funnel” came into play: the shortening of the front line allowed to concentrate armor and firepower more effectively than had been the case in 1941–1942.

Meanwhile, the Red Army was never put entirely on trucks and into tanks, as some assume. The growth of the number of motor vehicles – from 272,600 in 1941 to 664,400 by May 1945 – did not suffice to motorize the army, as personnel expanded even quicker (from a field army of 3.3 million in 1941 to 6.7 million in 1944). As a result of this dual process, the ratio of soldiers to automobiles did not change dramatically throughout the war, as Alexander Hill (2009) has pointed out. The coordination of tanks and infantry thus remained a problem. American and German forces also sometimes mounted tanks, but they also did have armored infantry carriers at their disposal. The Red infantry supporting armor, meanwhile, had no choice but riding into battle as “tank riders.” Nevertheless, the increased number of transport vehicles made an impact, as tank numbers were stagnant. Due to the extreme losses, the huge quantities of armored vehicles Soviet factories churned out barely replaced those destroyed in battle. By January 1944, the 1941 number was still not reached, and only in 1945 was it overcome by nearly three thousand.

Motorization was targeted toward elite units – tank armies, mechanized corps, artillery corps, guards divisions, and so forth, making up maybe 20 percent of the army. This was the “first category” army, “a modern, well-equipped and trained, first-class fighting force,” as one veteran reported with a tinge of jealousy. Like the bulk of the soldiery on both sides, Gabriel Temkin marched into battle, as he was part of the “second category” of regular foot soldiers. This Soviet infantryman’s experience at war’s end resembled what the German veteran quoted above reported about his war’s beginning. When the mechanized spearheads outran the footslogging infantry, the latter “climbed into horse-drawn wagons ... mostly requisitioned from local peasants,” to gallop after the representatives of modern warfare (Temkin 1998, pp. 139, 189). All the way to Hitler’s bunker, the Red Army remained “an extraordinary mixture of modern and medieval,” as Anthony Beevor put it colorfully in *The Fall of Berlin* (2002, p. 28).

The adversaries, thus, were rather alike in their dependence on horseshoe and boot, an incomplete modernization in marked contrast to the fully motorized Anglo-American allies. Nevertheless, while German demodernization and the Soviet opposite can easily be over-stressed, the overall trend was still in the Soviet favor. The Soviets out-produced the Germans in all fields of weaponry, in particular in smaller arms such as machine pistols and mortars, but also distinctively in terms of tanks and self-propelled guns. Increasingly, the *Wehrmacht* was out-manned, out-gunned, and out-run by a more and muscular but also somewhat more mobile enemy (Harrison 1998, pp. 15–16).

But mechanization was not all. The *Wehrmacht* began the war as a highly professional, well trained, and battle tested force. From 1941 onwards it underwent a process of de-professionalization as younger and increasingly indoctrinated recruits were thrown into battle with men they knew less well. Their officers, meanwhile, increasingly recruited from the ranks, became less capable to perform complex tactics, a weakness they compensated by National Socialist “backbone.” Christoph Rass’s careful study of an infantry division (2003, 2008), however, shows that historians should be careful not to telescope developments of the last stage of the war too far backwards. The age profile of the 253rd ID remained relatively stable throughout the war. Most losses were caused by wounds and illness, and the soldiers returned to their units after their health was restored. New recruits were trained by the division’s veterans and marched together with the returning convalescents to the field units, both of which eased their integration into the primary group. The core personnel changed only slowly, allowing the reproduction of group identity within the division and its subunits, even as generational change occurred. The officer corps, too, showed more consistency over time than might be reasonably expected and also kept a social profile quite distinct from the ranks. The promotion of privates into noncommissioned officer rank focused on middle-class soldiers in particular, and they were able to function as a bridge between the soldiery and the higher-level officers. Only in the catastrophic battles at war’s end, in late 1944 and early 1945, did the division’s coherence fall apart.

If the 253rd ID’s experience is indicative of larger patterns, then the German Army managed remarkably well to reproduce both a primary group of brothers in arms and at least part of the professionalism necessary to engage the increasingly overwhelming Red Army in a vicious fighting retreat all the way to Berlin. Periods of catastrophe – the winter of 1941–1942, Stalingrad, the destruction of Army Group

Center – were episodes in a history with more continuity than is often assumed. Only in 1945 was the *Wehrmacht's* cohesion truly broken. From the beginning of the year to war's end, poorly trained, very young, or much too old recruits fought under conditions of lack of ammunition, tanks, and artillery against an overwhelming enemy while being threatened by a leadership combining ideological overdrive with ruthless repression. Now, parallels to the situation of much of the Soviet army in 1941 could be drawn. Like in the Soviet case, some fought on with bitter determination, but such conditions also unveiled the violence lurking beneath the two military organizations.

The Soviet army, meanwhile, learned on the job. It took a while to master the conduct of the war of movement. During the fighting in 1942, commanders often still committed rather serious blunders, one of the reasons why at that point in time more than six Soviets had to die for every German and why every panzer on average took down six Soviet tanks before being destroyed itself. This gap started narrowing as Soviet troops became better trained, better equipped, and more experienced. Already early in the war, special forces such as paratroopers received extensive training before being sent to the frontline. By the time of the battle of Kursk, this was a widespread phenomenon. "First category units" at least underwent intensive combat training to get them ready for major engagements. Nevertheless, progress was slow and "second category" infantry, particularly if drafted from the "liberated" territories, continued to be used as cannon fodder. The catastrophic ratio of ten dead Soviets to one German of 1941 was never reached again, but the 3:1 of 1943 is still far from an endorsement of Soviet tactical finesse. Only in 1944 did loss ratios get more even, particularly if we take into account that it was now the Red Army which was on the attack, which tends to be more costly than defense. Other indicators also show the flat but steady learning curve. In 1941, the Soviets lost seven tanks for every German machine. In 1942, this ratio dropped to 1:6, to reach 1:4 in 1943 and 1944. Only in 1945 a relatively even ratio of 1:1.2 was reached.

Combat effectiveness is dependent not only on the quality of leadership, the level of training soldiers receive, or on their equipment and supply, but also the coherence of units. Some historians assume that there were no primary groups in the Red Army, that the high level of casualties precluded their development, and that the system of reinforcement further inhibited their growth. This thesis is likely to be true for second category units, particularly during the catastrophe of the first half year, when, as Catherine Merridale observed, "primary groups ... seem hardly to have featured in the shadow of defeat" (Merridale 2006, p. 134). Something similar happened again in the regular infantry during the mad dash after the Germans at war's end, when men in the western borderlands were quickly drafted into the fighting forces. As in the case of the parallel German discussion, however, closer study might yet qualify this thesis.

First category units certainly had an *esprit de corps* and worked on fostering it among their men. As we have already seen, an increasing proportion of losses were wounded rather than killed, who could, at least in theory, return to their units. Crack troops, such as airborne forces, frequently did so after convalescence. From March 1942, units were, as a rule, not reinforced in the line but pulled out of battle, rested, and reinforced before being sent back.

Together, these processes allowed the growth of identification with the group and wartime memoirs, and many of them are from first category soldiers, who frequently

display pride in their unit and their branch of arms. They also stress the importance of frontline friends, also implying the existence and centrality of primary groups in the Red Army. We still do not know enough about this aspect of Soviet military history to support the blanket statements often found in the literature. Research on this topic would not only have to take into account the differences between elite and nonelite units, but also the question of the role of ethnic difference. The mobilization of western borderlands people has already been mentioned, but we also know that central Asians were conscripted. As Evan Mawdsley has pointed out, “these were harder to integrate into the Red Army” than others. One solution was “National Rifle Brigades” (Mawdsley 2005, p. 214), a phenomenon slowly catching the attention of historians (Sieca-Kozłowski 2009).

A study similar to Thomas Kühne’s detailed exploration of the phenomenon on the German side (Kühne 2006) could uncover not only the extent to which different soldiers were integrated to different degrees into their primary group, but also the role of peer pressure and peer violence in this process of inclusion and exclusion. More is known about overt and institutionalized forms of coercion. Again, the German side is ahead in research here and we have no Russian equivalent of the detailed studies of the military justice system scholars of the German Army have produced. Better known are the famous blocking detachments preventing soldiers to go back without an order, an institution the Germans also used at times. There is also a general sense of historians on both sides that both discipline and punishment was extremely harsh in the German and Soviet armies. As usual, numbers are not directly comparable, but they still imply that if the Germans were harsh to their own, the Soviets were even tougher: they condemned both a larger number and a higher share of their men to capital punishment.

The fight between *Wehrmacht* and Red Army was a conventional war embedded in multiple civil wars in which both armies were only two of several warring parties. In 1941, Ukrainian, Estonian, and Lithuanian nationalists served as the Germans’ fifth column, rising up against the retreating Soviets, attacking Red Army units, executing presumed or real Red loyalists, and staging gruesome anti-Semitic pogroms. The Germans, however, did not appreciate the usefulness of such willing collaborators and were dismayed at their hopes for independence. The new masters ordered the dissolution of anti-Soviet organizations, sometimes arresting their leaders. Some of the rank and file fighters were drafted into German controlled units largely engaged in counterinsurgency and anti-partisan operations as well as the war against the Jews in the occupied territories. The Caucasus, too, would furnish potential collaborators, although they sometimes disappeared with their German kit to fight their own war.

Outside of these borderlands, the Germans were unable to capitalize in similar ways on anti-Soviet feelings. The cause of this failure was not the loyalty of the population of the Soviet heartland, as is sometimes supposed. Of course there were supporters of Stalin’s regime, but there was also no lack of grumbling, no lack of joy at the impending doom of the Bolshevik regime. “Good, the war’s begun – they’ll kill the Jews,” exclaimed Moscow automotive workers while members of the Communist Youth League got rid of their membership cards in preparation of a German arrival and wore crosses instead, as John Barber (1991) was able to document in a seminal article on popular reactions to the German invasion of 1941. And words were followed by deeds. Anti-Semitic crowds, yelling, “beat the Jews” assaulted functionaries fleeing

Moscow during the famous panic of October 1941, as Rebecca Manley has reminded us (Manley 2009, p. 112). These were all incidents *behind the Soviet lines* and one can imagine what would have happened had the Germans not been turned back before Moscow. But the repressions of the 1930s had greatly reduced the ability of anti-Stalinists to act in concert and by and large “the organs” kept a lid on the situation. Eager to avoid further fifth columns behind the frontline, Stalin’s regime, sometimes preemptively, sometimes as “punishment,” deported those nationalities it considered (not always without justification) most likely to collaborate with the invader: over 2.5 million people throughout the war, among them Crimean Tartars, Chechens, Ingush, Azeri, Finns, Italians, Greeks, Rumanians and, of course, ethnic Germans.

Given the cooperation between the *Abwehr* and the borderland insurgents in 1941, and given the overall war aims and the war crimes perpetuated by Hitler’s regime, German outrage at “illegal” Soviet warfare appears typically contrived. Moreover, not all of the fighting behind the German lines was technically unlawful. The Germans simply declared bypassed Red Army units outlaws, whether or not they remained under the control of an officer, kept their uniforms, and carried their weapons openly. The military leadership was quite aware that such actions were criminal, leading to further sophistries, and often leaving the decision about who were “bandits” and who were legitimate combat troops to the unit commanders in the field. In the end, however, behind the German lines the rule of thumb prevailed: “In cases of doubt, every partisan and Red Army man is to be shot” (Förster 1998a, p. 1203).

German legalism was on slightly firmer ground with regards to civilians with disguised arms and unmarked saboteurs and spies. While Article 30 of the 1907 Hague Convention gave some protection to the last category, which, if caught in the act, “shall not be punished without previous trial,” it did not stipulate what was to happen to civilian combatants on occupied territory. Thus, even an occupier committed to respect to the laws of warfare (which the *Wehrmacht* was not) could have conceivably executed civilians engaged in armed resistance: not every hanging and every shooting of partisans was technically breaking the *then extant* rules of warfare. Shooting civilians on the mere suspicion of resistance, however, “was clearly unlawful,” as Jürgen Förster has pointed out (1998b, p. 503).

Hostage taking and collective reprisals against whole villages suspected of supporting the insurgents were something of a gray zone. On the one hand, Article 50 of the 1907 Hague Convention noted unambiguously: “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.” On the other hand, a commission of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 listed “collective reprisals” and the killing, but not the taking of hostages, as “war crimes.” Hostage taking, and under certain circumstances even hostage execution, was widely accepted at the time as part of international common law (*Völkergewohnheitsrecht*). The same is true for “reprisals” against the civilian population, if their goal was to force the opposing side to adhere to the rules of warfare. For many in the German Army, the fact that (some) partisans fought without clear signs of distinction and often did not carry their weapons openly (which put them outside of the protection of the Hague Convention) legitimized brutality against the civilian population.

This argument, followed by many of the early German historians of partisan warfare, was shaky enough, of course, even if we ignore the question of proportionality.

Irregular warfare deprived those engaged in it from the protection of The Hague and Geneva conventions (for full texts of the relevant treaties regarding the rules of warfare, see Lillian Goldman Law Library 2008). It was, in the words of Theo Schulte, warfare “undefined by international law” (1989, p. 124). That fact, however, did not show that it was a “war crime” itself, which would have allowed reprisals against uninvolved civilians. Argued legalistically, the Germans (and those historians who follow their line of reasoning) tried to have it both ways: on the one hand they claimed that partisans were “bandits” under no chain of command and hence outlaws; on the other hand the argument for “reprisals” assumed that these could force the opposing side to adhere to the rules of warfare, which implied that the Soviet leadership did control these groups.

German tactics, then, are better understood as terror: They had the goal of squashing resistance by outrageous and disproportional use of force by an occupier only tenuously in control over enemy territory. As Keitel put it with sufficient clarity on July 23, 1941 (Trevor-Roper 1964, p. 90):

The troops available for securing the conquered Eastern Territories will, in view of the size of this area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power meets resistance, not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to resist.

It is instructive to consider the Soviet view on these matters. Their strongest argument was that the partisan movement was not, indeed, irregular warfare behind the German front, but rather lawful *levée en masse* against an aggressor. Given that the Germans never had enough boots on the ground to police the occupied territories properly, the argument went, the region behind the German frontline was not, technically, “occupied.” Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Convention defined a territory as “occupied” if “it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” The existence of partisan-controlled areas, then, showed *ipso facto* that this territory was still fought over, as the Article stated that “occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” If that was true, however, armed resistance in these territories did not have to conform to the more complex test for lawful belligerents which applied to armies (Article 1), but to the less rigid rules laid down in Article 2, which only called for carrying arms openly and respecting the customs of war (both of which the partisans, of course, disregarded if expedient).

With regards to the legality of partisan war and the German counterinsurgency tactics, then, nothing was very clear, indeed. In fact, this virtual debate between German and Soviet legal experts shows only too clearly how little help were the rules of war if considered in a political, ethical, and moral vacuum. Be this as it may, the German Army would have been well advised to practice restraint, even if only strictly instrumentally. While the partisan threat in 1941 was real, it was also relatively small, compared to what happened later. More important and contrary to the Soviet legal argument, the core of the movement was constituted by NKVD personnel and Communist Party activists isolated from, and highly suspicious of, the population. To quote Mao, this was akin to a situation where fish were stranded outside their element. German ruthlessness in counterinsurgency warfare, together with the general

conditions created by the racist war of extermination guaranteed that the fish would find their water, as already Alexander Dallin noted in his classical study of *German Rule in Russia* (1957). This connection between occupation policies, popular moods, and counterinsurgency were not unknown to some in the German officer corps, and there was no lack of argument for restraint and even, at times, local attempts to win the hearts and minds of the population, as Theo Schulte (1989) and, more recently, Ben Shepherd in *War in the Wild East* (2004) have shown. In practice, however, extreme force usually won out over other considerations, not least because the anti-partisan campaigns were entangled in the war against the Jews, an extermination campaign in which military necessity was overpowered by ideological imperatives. Successful counterinsurgency requires enough boots on the ground to provide security, and German rear units were small and poorly equipped. Together, these ideological, situational, and military reasons conspired to create a terror campaign, which ultimately would only help the Soviet side.

In the mid-1930s, the Soviet leadership had abandoned preparation for partisan war, as necessarily independently operating units were worrying the dictator, who still remembered the civil war of 1918–1921. Partisan warfare also contradicted the official doctrine that any attack would be swiftly repulsed and turned back onto the attacker's territory. Some of those who had been trained before the policy reversal essentially functioned as sleeper cells who activated themselves once the conditions were right. Insofar as they were not simply bypassed Red Army units, the "partisans" of 1941 were small groups of NKVD and party functionaries under instructions to guard against infiltration by outsiders. The result of this self-selected isolation, and the less than friendly feelings of much of the population to representatives of Stalin's regime, was a quick destruction of the Soviet underground on German occupied territory. By January 1942, only 30,000 officially recognized partisans were left of the 87,000 at the war's beginning.

Three circumstances saved the movement, as Kenneth Slepyan has pointed out in *Stalin's Guerrillas* (2006). First, the brutality of the German occupation regime turned more and more civilians against the occupiers, while the murderous conditions in POW camps encouraged encircled soldiers to continue fighting. Second, Moscow changed its tune in September 1942 and opened the – until then – strongly circumscribed movement to a broader demographic by declaring an "all people's war" against the occupiers. Third, the changing tide of war encouraged waverers to throw in their lot with what became the obviously winning side. There is some disagreement in the literature about when the tide turned. Most studies see a recovery already in early 1942, while Alexander Hill's case study of northwest Russia pushes the turning point back into the second half of 1943 (Hill 2005). The overall numbers of partisans, as registered by the Moscow authorities, imply something of a middle position. They do show a much earlier recovery than Hill's local data suggest: the 70,000 of June 1942 were still below the 1941 tally but already well above the low point of the first wartime winter. Nevertheless, the real quantum leap came after Stalingrad: 120,000 by February 1943, now well above the size of the movement at war's start and reaching 181,000 in early 1944. Increasingly, the Germans' "Eastern Front" was really two wars – one against the Red Army and the other against insurgents behind the frontlines.

But the insecurity created by partisan gangs behind the German lines also had its uses for those radicals on all levels of the German war machine who hoped for the

“final solution of the Jewish question.” “The Russians now passed an order to unleash the partisan war behind our front,” Hitler told his henchmen on 16 July 1941. “This partisan war has in some ways its advantages: it gives us the possibility to exterminate everything that turns against us (*auszurotten was sich gegen uns stellt*)” (Library of Congress 2010, vol. 38, “Trial of the Major War Criminals,” pp. 86–94, here p. 88). And the biggest enemy in the *Führer*’s warped view of the world was, of course, “the Jew,” even if in this particular case he did not stress the connection. Himmler’s now famous notation of 18 December 1941 thus explicated Hitler’s earlier utterance: “Jewish question/to be exterminated as partisans” (Gerlach 2000: 120).

Historical debate on the Holocaust has focused on several issues: the motivation of the perpetrators, the connection between the decision to kill all Jews and the course of the war, the level of resistance or cooperation of the victims in their own destruction, and the role of the *Wehrmacht* in the Holocaust. We cannot rehearse this history and historiography here. Suffice it to say that the *Wehrmacht* as an institution collaborated closely with the police and SS forces tasked with the extermination of Jews, and that many (not all) in both leadership and the ranks shared the view that Jews, partisans, and Bolsheviks were all one and the same evil in need of eradication. There are also instances where *Wehrmacht* units or individual soldiers killed Jews themselves, often under the guise of counterinsurgency or the execution of hostages. As a rule, however, such dirty work was left to the *Kameraden* of SS and police. Those quickly radicalized their practice. From the middle of July 1941, they shot all male Jews of draft age (17–45), then, a month later, they included all sexually mature males (16–65 years), and increasingly added women, children, and the aged to the list of targets as well. By September, the *Einsatzgruppen* reported whole regions “free of Jews.”

Ever since 1941, much has been made of the fact that the Germans were not alone when it came to criminal conduct. And it is true that not all uniformed criminals in this war wore German garb. When the Soviets retreated from the advancing Germans in 1941, they executed, according to archival data cited by Karel Berkhoff in *Harvest of Despair*, a minimum of 8,789 political prisoners and criminals in places of detention in the western borderlands (Berkhoff 2004, p. 14). This killing operation was, in the words of Alexander Statiev, “the most gruesome atrocity of the first Soviet occupation besides the Katyn affair.” Together with mass deportations and the scorched earth policy of the retreat, he wrote in *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*, they “caused an outrage in the borderlands” (Statiev 2010, pp. 54, 55). The much more cold-blooded and premeditated execution in several camps in the western borderlands in 1940 of what we now know were 21,857 Polish citizens only became a known fact later, once the Germans found some of the graves in the forest of Katyn in April 1943 and exploited them in their anti-Soviet propaganda.

Katyn might have been the high water mark of Soviet war crimes, but these executions in the tradition of the “mass operations” of the Great Terror were not the end of them. From the beginning of the war, Soviet soldiers, police officers, and partisans executed POWs, sometimes in gruesome ways, more earlier in the war than later. The death toll of Germans in Soviet captivity was horrendous, and the rampage in Eastern Prussia in 1945 has attracted much attention from historians and the wider public alike. The Soviets also sponsored a guerilla movement on the territories occupied by the Germans which, by the very nature of irregular warfare, could not but act in harsh and often enough illegal ways. Partisans plundered the civilian

population, executed prisoners, shot collaborators (or who they perceived as such), not infrequently together with their whole families. At times, they also burned down their houses and even whole villages. Soviet counterinsurgency in recovered territories was also marred by extreme levels of violence and frequent criminal conduct. The Soviet way of war was not prissy, and those defending their homeland from German invasion and presumed as well as real internal enemies alike did not wear kid gloves.

All of this pales, however, if compared to what the Germans did. We already mentioned the Holocaust, but the mass murder of Jews was embedded in a wider field of both premeditated and spontaneous killings. From the very planning of the campaign, the *Wehrmacht* negotiated a division of labor with the other two institutional clusters fighting this war: the army would conduct the military war, the economic organizations including the civilian occupation apparatus would take care of the exploitation of the occupied territories (essentially an economic war), and Himmler's security forces would eliminate undesirables, first of all the Jews (and thus fight the racial war). As we have already seen, these rough and ready boundaries between the different agents of destruction were considerably more porous than remembered after the war. The *Wehrmacht* did not simply keep to fighting. Moreover, it fought with exceptional brutality and great lethality. From day one of Barbarossa, the military leadership tried to push its men to greater and greater ruthlessness, sometimes against protests and always undermined by some, but ultimately with success.

The central announcements have achieved notoriety as the "criminal orders": the Decree on the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction (May 13, 1941) put disciplinary over legal consideration when prosecuting crimes committed by German soldiers, while prescribing exceedingly harsh reprisals against the population for any kind of real or perceived resistance; and the Commissar Order (June 6, 1941) demanded that Soviet political officers were to be denied the status of POWs and immediately shot upon capture. After the war, the military leadership exerted great efforts to argue that crimes had been conducted by *Einsatzgruppen*, police and SS, but not the *Wehrmacht*, which fought honorably and cleanly. This view is largely debunked today, although some participants in the discussion gave the defenders of the *Wehrmacht* a tactical advantage as they tried to replace the myth of the clean army by the countermyth of the fully Nazified army of war criminals. This view not only made the work of apologists rather easy, it was also a step back from older works such as Theo Schulte's monograph on military occupation, Christian Streit's book on POWs (Streit 1997), or Jürgen Förster's many essays.

Today, nationalists of various stripes – from German right wingers to Baltic movie makers – again attempt to assimilate the Stalinist war machine to its German cousin, constructing what Les Adler and Thomas Patterson (1970) over four decades ago have described as the vision of a "Red Fascism." Most professional historians, meanwhile, continue to stress the differences. One reason is the simple sequence of events. "The Germans attacked and occupied Soviet territory," Norman Naimark notes the obvious. "One cannot argue that this was a just war. Therefore the invaders are ultimately to blame for the brutality of the conflict, not the defenders" (Naimark 2007, p. 265). Beyond such evocations of the final instance, systematic empirical comparisons of war conduct and war aims of the opponents also suggest a differentiation of the war-making of the two totalitarian dictatorships. Christian Gerlach and Nicholas Werth, for example, note "a number of parallels between the treatment of POWs in

the Soviet Union and in Nazi Germany,” while also stressing that only in the latter case can we discern “a high-level intention to kill large numbers of Soviet POWs and a program to realize it” (Gerlach and Werth 2009). Similarly, Michael Geyer and I have stressed the essential difference between the two war-making regimes, which we both characterized as “totalitarian.” National Socialism, we wrote in a piece some critics found too hard on the Soviets, “never contemplated peace with and for its enemies.” The Soviet Union, meanwhile and despite all, was “ready to make peace with Germany and the Germans” (Edele and Geyer 2009, pp. 171, 395).

Nevertheless, a history of this war cannot ignore the deeds of the Soviets, or wave them aside as collateral damage, understandable and excusable because of the horrors of the Nazi way of war. Many of the standard accounts do just that, construing Soviet war crimes as simple reactions to what the Germans did. Recently, this approach has been questioned by some, including the author of this chapter. Easy answers are hard to come by in this debate, but historians might orient themselves at what Jürgen Förster (1999, p. 954) has written about the Germans. He sees neither a simple implementation of a preconceived blueprint, nor – as apologists of the *Wehrmacht* would have it – a simple reaction to the deeds of the opponent. Rather, the entanglement between the two sides is complex and shaped not only by a cycle of action and reaction, but also by the ways both fit into plans and hopes, preconceptions and traditions, expectations and goals. Similarly, the Red Army brought its own ideological and experiential baggage with it when it first encountered the *Wehrmacht*, as Amir Weiner has stressed in an important article (2006). Different levels of the commanding hierarchy at different times encouraged, forbade, or simply tolerated abuse of POWs and, toward the war’s end, civilians; the ranks did not always do as they were told, and they read the signals which came down to them from up high on the basis of their prior knowledge and experience, their immediate situation, and their level of understanding on what these policies entailed. Such an approach, of course, does not lend itself to simple moral tales and it is most unhelpful to nationalists constructing their past with this war in mind, but it might well be a way to bring the plight of the multiple victims of this war into the narrative while also getting a little closer at the multitude of reasons motivating the perpetrators. Despite the immense library of writing on this war, then, historians of both sides still have their work cut out for them.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

The Bombers: The Strategic Bombing of Germany and Japan

RANDALL WAKELAM

There is no lack of published material on the related issues of the Combined Bomber Offensive and the British Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, and while there were other dramatic and important uses of air forces during World War II, including the bombing of Japan, it is the bombing of Germany which captures the interest of English speaking historians and the general public above all others. Analyses of the campaign are almost legion. It has been approached in studies ranging from detailed technical histories of aircraft and equipment to philosophical works that question the morality of area bombing; there are also biographies of the leaders and commanders as well as memoirs of those who flew the missions. Some studies examine individual raids, others consider battles (a series of raids against a specific target), while yet others review the entire bombing campaign. Many weave together events and debates about policy, strategy, tactics, and equipment that cut across all levels of government and the military.

This chapter will seek to identify the most important and useful of this broad range of materials with an emphasis on strategic bombing in the European context. A short summary of salient literature on the strategic bombing of Japan will be included, but to a lesser degree because there is simply less written about this facet of the war. In looking at this broad fabric I hope to point out a number of schools of interpretation. The first deals with the value of the bombing in winning the war against Germany: did bombing do what its proponents claimed it could? Did it, could it, knock the Germans out through strategic attack? The antithesis of this theme looks at the morality of the bombing which unquestionably targeted not just war industries but the people who worked in the factories and the society in which they lived. From there it follows that there were certain key individuals who approved the concepts and made the decisions: who were they and what made them decide what they did? And what of the flyers who actually carried out the attacks; what sort of people were they? Yet another approach to understanding the bombing is to look at the organizations which had designed the

concepts and then developed the tactics and technologies to make bombing effective. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, like all history, it is crucial not to look at the bombing campaigns of the war in isolation; rather, we need to study them as part of a continuum borne of the twentieth century, and still very much with us today. That continuum has as its central focus the use of air power, in other words bombing, in resolving conflict, be it between states or factions as we have seen and continue to see in many parts of the world.

While some, both historians and students of history, might see bombing as a study in technology, I hope the foregoing will show clearly that underpinning all of the approaches to the historiography have as their central constituent the human condition.

Accounts of the bombing campaign began to appear almost as soon as peace was achieved and to examine all of them would require an entire volume. As this is not possible, this chapter looks at the recent literature, bookended more or less by a controversial popular attack against strategic bombing which took place in Canada in 1993. As part of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's three part television series called *The Valour and the Horror* (1992) which examined Canadian military disasters in World War II, an episode called "Death by Moonlight" attacked the morality of the British campaign and by extension the bombing done by the over 10,000 Canadians who flew in Bomber Command. Criticism of the bombing was reinforced, in the view of many, by the coincidental publication of the Canadian official air force history of World War II two years later; that volume is discussed below. These criticisms continue, the most recent having occurred in 2007 when veterans' groups took exception to the descriptive panel in the then newly reopened Canadian War Museum which implicitly, and to many explicitly, criticized those who had taken part in what was deemed a less than effective campaign of bombing against the German population. I have also sought to constrain the following review by looking principally at those works which make use of primary sources. These are the works that add the most to the critical discourse of the bombing. The much larger number of publications which rely on already published works, while often thoughtful and useful, can also contribute to errors of fact or misinterpretation of fact.

While only the Canadian official history falls within the timeframe mentioned above a review of the official histories of the bombing campaign is worthwhile as many of the themes mentioned above appear in these volumes.

This first history to be published after the war was the expansive seven volume study of the US Army Air Forces published between 1947 and 1958, with the volumes covering strategic bombing (among other topics) coming out between 1947 and 1951. With a truly global context *The Army Air Forces in World War II* examined geographic regions in a chronological framework (Wesley and Cate 1948–1958). Thus one needs to look across the first three volumes to understand the European experience and then volumes 4 and 5 for the war in the Pacific. Even in 1947, the authors recognized the criticisms against bombing and approached the issue in a relatively balanced fashion, reporting on what did and did not work, problems of disagreement with the British, and the long and uneven learning curve of converting untried concepts into effective practice. One particular statement is worth mention. The authors observed that both British and American results could be assessed based on a formula of "bombs on target/bombers and crews lost" and that American leaders had felt that their doctrines could work "provided requisite improvements be made

in equipment, training, and tactics” (Wesley and Cate 1948–1958, vol. 1, p. 603). Equally important, historiographically, is the editors’ comment in the introduction to Volume 2 where they suggested that trying to reconstruct accurately any air battle is problematic given the dynamic nature of the engagements in both time and space as well as the lack of any real ability to observe what has happened (Wesley and Cate 1948–1958, vol. 2, p. xii). Later in that volume another observation helps explain the imprecision of the bombing campaign itself. It was simply hard or even impossible to have accurate data as to how many enemy aircraft had been shot down, and what the impact of bombing was on industrial production when dealing with an enemy far distant from friendly observers. In these circumstances, said the writer, the tendency of the American leaders to presume that their doctrines were working was simply “illusory” (Wesley and Cate 1948–1958, vol. 2, p. 713). Volume three, published in 1953, provided some essential analysis and observation as well as continuing comprehensive record of events. In the former function the editors were open to the realities of whether or not the AAF had achieved “mission accomplished.” The stark reality of bombed cities could not be refuted, but they were aware that much of what had been written even by 1953 was colored by “personal or organizational bias.” Finding “universally acceptable causal explanations” would be problematic (Wesley and Cate 1948–1958, vol. 3, p. xxvi).

By comparison, discussion of the bombing of Japanese cities in Volume 5 (Wesley and Cate 1948–1958, vol. 5, pp. 608–627) is much less troubled. It is quickly stated that Japanese industries were situated to a significant extent within the residential sectors of cities and that given the construction materials used in Japan the logical method of attack was by incendiary munitions. The volume reports the effects of raids in terms of square miles of cities burned out or destroyed and says that this was reason for a shift in doctrine. One is left to assume that air attacks against populations and morale had become the means to victory. That said, the volume does explain in detail that a range of targets and tactics still applied. Finally, it concludes that attacks against industry were not the factor which won the war, but perversely the history does say that surveys and testimony of leaders confirmed that the effects of firebombing on civilian morale was directly related, perhaps more so than the atomic raids, to the Japanese decisions to capitulate.

The official history of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, published in 1953, provided some insight into the nature of the problems faced by RAF bomber crews at the beginning of the war (Thompson 1953). Significant losses during day operations led to raids being conducted at night and here a lack of navigation instrumentation and generally poor weather over Germany was reported in the history as having a direct impact on the effectiveness of bombing. The New Zealand history provided matter-of-fact commentary on the challenges and difficulties facing the crews and at the same time included sufficient anecdotal evidence from crew reports and interviews to give the reader a good sense of bombing missions. There are two limitations of the New Zealand publication. First, the work suffers from a lack of reference to the actual files and personages from which evidence has apparently been drawn – in this sense this “official history” reads more like an operational narrative. The second has to do with the absence of any real analysis of the bombing policies and operations; while problems are acknowledged, the reader is left to make her/his own conclusions. In this sense the work does not compare all that well with the American history’s commentary.

Published in 1961, *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945*, was the British official history of strategic bombing (Webster and Frankland 1961). This history, which the authors observe describes a new and highly controversial form of warfare, is contained in four volumes totaling over 1500 pages. Because of the highly complex nature of the topic, the authors elected to look at the campaign, by splitting it into time periods and then examining each from three angles: first, from the strategic level in terms of decisions made, second, through the study of operations (i.e., the actual conduct of bombing raids and campaigns), and finally, through an analysis of results. The work, therefore, attempts to link the operational outcomes back to the strategy. The authors did well to explain the entire experience, particularly decisions to adopt area bombing in the absence of any ability to conduct precision raids. They illuminated the evolution of strategic policy, bombing policy, bombing tactics, and techniques over a six-year period from 1939 to 1945, and showed how the government and the RAF were in 1942 forced to adopt area bombing, but how the air arm was able to return to a largely precision bombing capability. Historiographically, the authors note with some dismay that the shunning of the bombing campaign meant that by 1961, the date of publication of the official history, several key documents had not been made available for wide historical analysis, and hence “myth and misconception have grown” (Webster and Frankland 1961, vol. 3, p. 284). Without hesitation the authors did examine questions of morality as part of a full and honest discussion linked to a narrative describing the raids against Dresden (Webster and Frankland 1961, vol. 3, pp. 112–117).

Such limitations were admitted in the Australian Official History (Herington 1962) which was published the following year. It was further noted that with Australian personnel scattered across the breadth of the Royal Air Force, rather than grouped together in identifiable units and formations, the historian was left with the daunting task of trying to capture the national flavor of the war in the air while at the same time needing to represent the major actions which took place. While written in a brusque style more typical of military staff prose than history, the key elements of the bombing war were discussed adequately, but, as the author admitted, only in sufficient detail to situate Australian efforts. Such being the nature of the prose, a modern reader not familiar with some of the more controversial themes mentioned elsewhere in this chapter might miss mention of them. The discussion of the Pacific War offers virtually no discussion on the conduct of bombing against the Japanese home islands and no commentary on the use of atomic bombs against Japan. The attacks against Japanese infrastructure and the associated death or wounding of civilians receives the briefest comment.

Thirty years later, volume 3 of the Royal Canadian Air Force official history, *The Crucible of War, 1939–1945* (Greenhous et al. 1994), like its Australian predecessor, detailed the participation of the thousands of Canadians who, like other Commonwealth personnel, flew with the RAF during the war. In Canada’s case, an entire Bomber Command group, No. 6 (RCAF) Group, formed at the beginning of 1943. The Canadian history benefits from the scholarship from the 1960s into the 1980s, and makes good on some of the prior challenges mentioned by the British historians by describing the technical aspects of the bombing war in extensive detail. Reflecting the new history of personal experience, the Canadian volume also uses memoirs and biographies to portray vividly the experiences of the crews. Surprisingly, perhaps, the

Canadian history did not offer the same balanced approach seen in the British or US histories, rather suggesting in the opening paragraphs that if bombing accuracy could not be achieved then simply destroying an entire city was a viable alternative (p. 524). Curious too, that some 240 pages later the author admits that the bombing had had positive effects in winning the war (Greenhous et al. 1994, pp. 866–867).

Three other official reports also merit consideration. There are two bombing surveys, one American, one British, conducted at the end of the war, and RAF Bomber Command *Despatch on War Operations* also prepared in 1945. Considerable effort was invested in the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (US Government 1945). The series of reports (USSBS) covers well over two linear feet, although the summary document, the “Overall Report,” is just 109 pages in length. Here are contained a number of observations and general conclusions, among them that area bombing was not particularly effective, that German morale was affected but did not crack in a totalitarian regime, that US attacks were not as precise as claimed, and that air power was and would remain an important form of war fighting. The prose is balanced and the authors appear to reflect the strengths and weakness both of the bombing and their data collections challenges. The survey was produced after just four months of data collection and an additional 60 days of analysis and writing.

Understanding the survey, in terms of its impact on subsequent air warfare requires the reading of *Strategic Bombing In World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, the first analysis of the survey, published some 30 years later (MacIssac 1976). In this volume, David MacIssac claims that while the survey personnel were able to measure effects, they were not able to determine effectiveness. Specifically they were unable to judge and separate confounding effects and second and third order effects. How could one determine, for instance (and the survey admitted this), if an area attack had knocked out a key rail junction or if a precision attack had destroyed much built up area? How could one be certain if air attacks were responsible for causing German morale to waver? How could one be sure that tanks had run out of fuel because of the oil and transportation plans or simply because the German combat supply system had broken down? MacIssac broaches all of these problems and also tells the story of the survey, the personalities, and politics. The strengths and limitations of the survey become apparent from his text.

A more recent examination of the USSBS, *How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo*, seeks to get inside this survey to see to what extent it was able to answer the ongoing confusion about strategic bombing’s ability to win wars (Gentile 2001). Gian Gentile’s principal conclusion is that the survey offered “truths” rather than interpretations of factual data, and that these truths have subsequently been used as the basis for advancing arguments in support of the viability of airpower as a war-winning strategy. That the USSBS was composed in such a way derived, he believes, from the fact that it was written with a pro air power bias, despite the supposed impartiality of its authors. By comparison, Gentile states that the Gulf War Air Power Survey prepared after the First Gulf War contained no such bias. Those authors, including many historians, had understood that their role was to offer interpretation in the guise of interpretation. Gentile makes a number of other observations, reminding the reader that while the USSBS examined the impact of bombing on morale, this subject had not been intended as an assessment of

morality. He underlines that there is often confusion between area bombing of military targets and terror bombing against morale. The USSBS, he concludes, was interested in the link between the impact of bombing on morale and the subsequent loss of economic productivity because of lowered morale.

A similar British survey and contemporary commentary were published in 1998 through the efforts of the RAF Historical Branch. *The Strategic Air War against Germany 1939–1945: Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit* (Cox 1998) is, in fact, a primary document with an editorial introduction. The British survey (BBSU) had been fraught with political difficulties – in essence, by 1945 the British government wanted nothing to do with bombing or bombing analyses. Now, as stated in its foreword, access to this document allows historians, policymakers, commentators, and current air power practitioners a better understanding of what went on and what the thinking was at the time. Moreover, as also pointed out by editor Sebastian Cox, access to this document now allows for comparison between the interpretations of British and American leaders at the time. Despite these positive elements, Cox does point out the limitations of the survey. In addition to the political hurdles, BBSU documentation is not complete, as interest in the study had fallen off in the months after the end of the war. Thus, the reader is left with a less than unbiased interpretation of British bombing. This is not necessarily a bad thing so long as one understands these facts before reading the body of the report, which provides interesting data, much of which found its way into a number of other documents including the official history.

Bomber Command's own assessment of the campaign has also seen recent publication thanks to Sebastian Cox. *Despatch on War Operations 23rd February, 1942, to 8th May, 1945* (Harris 1995) is the official document that Sir Arthur Harris and his staff produced in which they described the operations carried out by Bomber Command while Harris was commander. The actual narrative was fairly short, numbering just over 30 pages, but this was accompanied by close to 200 pages of annexes and appendices describing the personnel, equipment, tactics, and results achieved, often including statistics, tables, and graphs. The great value of this volume is that it represents the most contemporary primary treatment of the Bomber Command campaign available, having been prepared and signed before the end of 1945. In it we see many important themes explored, including Harris's views on the importance of operational research, as well as some fairly muted thoughts (Harris was not known for approaching issues in a gentle fashion) on the strategic direction of the campaign.

Harris was clearly a proponent of strategic bombing as a war-winning strategy and there have been a number of recent studies that have based their arguments either for or against that paradigm. In *RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War: The Hardest Victory*, Denis Richards (1995) set out to discover whether the bombing campaign had been effective, moral or otherwise. He notes that by the early 1990s, there was not much new to tell. Thus, his goal was to explore and report as objectively as possible what had gone on, and specifically, what worked and what failed. In addition to an operational history, one which is admittedly fairly brief, the work includes other useful information, including over 300 interview summaries with Bomber Command veterans and a number of other chronologies and glossaries giving the reader a fairly comprehensive sampling of major historical data. Richards's narrative and analysis are balanced. He explains the successes and failures, the internal conflicts, and the

repercussions of raids like Dresden without emotion. Richards finds that the bombing was effective and, to the extent that any military operations generally lead to death and dislocation, the bombing directives given to Harris and his command were set to maximize the potential of the command toward winning the war.

In *Why the Allies Won*, Richard Overy (1995) identifies the major factors behind the Allies eventual victory in 1945. He includes strategic bombing among them. He recognizes concerns about effectiveness and morality, but says that in the event the need for a viable second front (necessary to aid the Russians in 1942) and the demonstrated impact on German economic potential were met, bombing was a contributing factor in victory.

Tami Davis Biddle, in *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare* (2002), takes a more philosophical and organizational slant. She argues that despite the fact that the doctrine of strategic bombing, developed without much critical analysis in the interwar period, was not working, the decision to back away from it was simply unpalatable to the air staffs who had grown up in the heyday of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell – the bombing theorists of the 1920s. The alternatives were either to press on with the poor results of 1939–1942, while trying to apply correctives, or to abandon strategic bombing as a flawed and irreparable concept. With this dual consideration as a starting point, she is then able to carry out a nuanced and highly effective analysis of the decision-making within the two air services and governments. Her work offers significant insight into the problems faced by senior war leaders and their strategies for finding victory.

In *The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany*, Robin Neillands (2001) attempts to determine why Harris and the command were so widely criticized. He compares Bomber Command with the US Eighth Air Force, since the latter claimed to be able to conduct precision bombing. Neillands explores not just what was done by Harris, “but why it was done and whether, as so often alleged by Harris’s detractors, there was any other way of [conducting effective bombing] at the time.” Neillands, in fact, focuses on the very heart of the challenge facing the senior leaders. After an extensive comparison of the two organizations, he is able to conclude that the scientific side of the air war consistently aimed at improving the accuracy of the bomber force in finding and hitting targets. He argues that electronic aids such as Gee, Oboe, H2S, G-H, and electronic countermeasures were invented to tighten up the bombing and stop the bombers scattering their ordnance at random over Germany. That was why the RAF formed the Pathfinder Force and the US Army Air Force adopted blind bombing using British navigation and target-finding equipment, set up the Striking Forces, and developed the Mustang fighter – all to improve the efficiency and accuracy of bombing in the face of the weather, flak, and enemy fighters.

Compared to these last two works, *The Killing Skies* by Simon Read (2006) is less satisfying. It aims to illustrate the efforts of Bomber Command fliers and leaders in a framework of combatants caught up in a decidedly unpleasant war, but who try to do their best within their capabilities to bring it to an end. Read recounts the entire campaign, openly addressing the problems which first confronted Bomber Command, then economically recounting what was done to resolve them. But, he also misses some of the details and conflicts of bombing policy. Typical of works based largely on secondary sources, the book suffers from long discussions that lack sources, and from a largely accurate narrative which does not offer much analysis or

conclusion. In the end, Read seems satisfied with having addressed the vilification of Harris and his crews.

By comparison, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (Tooze 2007) which has been touted as a fresh new look at the facts and, for the first time, from an economic perspective, ably demonstrates that bombing did in fact have a critical effect on the German economy and the Nazi ability to produce war materiel. Tooze points out that there has been a tendency to believe the testimony of Nazi armaments minister Albert Speer that German production continued to grow even in 1944. This was a politicized opinion, however, and one that Speer himself knew to be the case. Tooze shows that Speer set out in 1941 to propagandize production to boost the morale of German citizens and that he used a base statistic from 1941 when very low productivity had been the case. Tooze demonstrates that the RAF bombing against the Ruhr, and subsequently Hamburg in 1943, neutralized economic growth, and that had the Allies not diverted bombing efforts first against Berlin and then in support of Overlord, Germany would have faced defeat much earlier than spring 1945. He argues that the transportation and oil targets of the winter of 1944/1945 led to the quick demise of the Third Reich, but is also careful to explain that there seems no logical explanation, other than retribution, for the attacks against industrial sites which were clearly destroyed prior to the last weeks of the war (pp. 670–671).

A contrary economic interpretation is offered in *Castles, Battles, & Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History* (Brauer and Van Tuyll 2008). Economists Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll approach major events in military history from an economic perspective and attempt to establish the relative effectiveness of a tactic or force with regard to diminishing returns. The authors found that the strategic bombing of Germany was not successful based on the resources committed and the results obtained. Their analysis focuses on three metrics drawn from the stated purposes of the campaign: arms production, general economic health, and civilian morale.

A more typical analysis of bombing is to be found in Mark Clodfelter's *Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917–1975* (2010), which follows the genesis and progress of American bombing concepts from their origins in World War I. Clodfelter shows how the notion of war-winning precision bombing came to be and how it was firmly believed by aviation leaders that precision technology would allow the defeat of industrialized enemies with a minimum loss of aviators and civilians. But he also shows that the circumstances of World War II led to a modification in the concepts and allowed the rationalization of area bombing and incendiary attacks to enter into the conceptual calculus. It was better, in the minds of air power leaders, to use these approaches if that was what was needed in order to be able to show that air power could win wars. But at the same time, he provides evidence to demonstrate that there remained a firm belief in the original concept – a concept he defines as “progressive” wherein airpower could be used to end the conflict quickly with minimal losses of US flyers. Concluding with a brief look at twenty-first century conflicts, Clodfelter believes that the progressive school lacks realism – now, as then, war remains too unpredictable.

Several works approach the bombing from the perspective of the morality, or more so the immorality, of attacking civilian populations. The purpose of *The Fire: The*

Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945 (Friedrich 1992) is to examine suffering on the ground in Germany since the author, Jorge Friedrich, claims nothing much had been written about previously. This work is the translation of the book *Der Brand*, a popular German account of the bomber war. It is based largely on secondary sources and some primary. It suffers in places from an overly simplistic synthesis that misses key details or confuses timelines, potentially leaving a reader to presume that the five years of activity (particularly the evolution of bombing policy and practice) are all happening at roughly the same time. The book, like many, is neither uniquely about the bombers or the bombed; there is no easy separation.

Drawing exclusively from secondary sources, Stephen Garrett's, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities* (1993) focuses specifically on questions of morality and the RAF Bomber Command offensive. The author seeks to understand what transpired and how it was viewed by participants and those who have come after. He reviews both the events of the bombing campaign and the ethical theories and conventions that touch on military operations. He finds that the British way of war can and does tend toward inhumanity, but that in assigning culpability the evidence points not directly at the aircrew, but at those who approved the policies and authorized the missions.

In *Dresden, Tuesday, February 13, 1945* (2004), Frederick Taylor sets out to investigate the various interpretations of the events which have contributed to what he calls a myth of the wanton destruction of a city that was not a viable military target. He sets no particular purpose in his investigation other than to argue that many of our current views are based on a small handful of analyses and many skewed interpretations. He then points out the historiographical reality that much of the primary evidence and access to the locales was not possible during the forty plus years of Communist control. In conducting his dispassionate examination he provides evidence that has often been left out or edited for effect by other researchers and authors. He attempts, with considerable success, to present the circumstances as they were and as they were perceived by the participants at every level.

In *Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity or a Crime?* (2006), author A. C. Grayling seeks to understand why the area bombing was conducted as it was and what civilization should make of it. He claims that history has to be “got right” so that future generations will understand what has gone before and so that they may have a better sense of how to conduct themselves in contemporary conflicts. Grayling studies the bombing campaign against Germany (and to a much lesser extent Japan) from a moral philosophy viewpoint, examining the conduct of the raids, the experience of those bombed, and the thinking and decisions of the leaders. Harris has been pilloried, the author explains, because he supposedly stuck to area bombing despite the “fact” that he could have had his crews conduct precision attacks. Grayling, however, is inclined to give Harris some latitude up until 1944, after which precision should have been the norm. But the author still finds that the 1943 bombing of Hamburg was immoral and that therefore area bombing was similarly flawed. While to some extent biased against area bombing, Grayling nevertheless presents both sides of the story and makes good use of secondary sources.

Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (Grosscup 2006) seeks to answer the question: Why the bombing of civilians through the many conflicts

of the past one hundred years has not been labeled terrorism. Much like Hansen's work, described below, Beau Grosscup's narrative is unfortunately full of errors of fact or interpretation, thereby diminishing the value of his criticism and analysis. But he cites two commonly offered answers: bombing nations assert that they do not directly target civilians and that any civilian deaths are unintended. What then does one make of the lists of civilian casualties of bombing? Are they the result of errors, or are these numbers much lower than what might have been had there been no attempt to avoid civilian deaths? He contends that terror bombing will continue because there are two philosophical camps: one which cannot comprehend the double standard which permits bombing and the other which is able to rationalize it.

Wilfried Wilms and Williams Rasch's *Bombs Away! Representing the Air War over Europe and Japan* (2006) is a series of essays that look at the cultural interpretations of bombing during World War II. The volume focuses to some extent on the interpretations which Western society, principally the American, British, and German peoples, has used and how these are not necessarily accurate or neutral in their purpose. Examinations of literature, film, and art are made; unfortunately, however, almost half the chapters are in German and are not easily accessible. The work falls under the broad rubric of "war and memory" and obliges readers to think through the bombing campaigns from a different perspective.

As a response to the Canadian War Museum debate mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Randall Hansen's *Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942–45* (2008) represents another examination of the ethics and morality of the bombing in Europe. This treatment is flawed by the lack of primary sources, the author's clear ignorance of many facts, and the ad hominem attack he makes on Harris. Hansen is so certain of the ethics of the US Army Air Force (AAF) that he scarcely mentions the fire and atomic bombing of Japan. He explains well enough that the Royal Air Force did not set out to conduct area attacks but rather were forced down that path when it was found that daylight precision bombing led to horrific aircraft losses and that night precision bombing in 1940 was anything but precise. But from here, Hansen seems seized with the notion that Harris was driven by a desire to obliterate cities and their citizens rather than attack target systems such as oil production and transportation which would quickly cripple the German war effort. By contrast, Hansen paints the bombing campaign conducted by the US Army Air Force as the model of tactical sagacity and moral restraint. He claims that the Americans had developed precision bombing and used only that technique when attacking Germany. Where there were the occasional exceptions to this policy, he points out how generals and flyers alike found such deviations to be morally repugnant. The effect of the American attacks, says Hansen, was to achieve the crippling of German oil production and transportation over the fall and winter of 1944/1945 such that neither the German army nor air force could withstand the final Allied attacks in the spring of 1945. Oddly, Hansen only briefly mentions the two most significant area attacks ever committed – Hiroshima and Nagasaki – and when he does he offers no discussion or opinion on the morality of these raids. Hansen presents such a flawed assessment as to be largely dismissible.

In *Bombing Civilians* (2009), Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn B. Young, begin by asking "the fundamental question is why this theory of mass murder has persisted so long." The work is a collection of essays looking at the effects of and justification for bombing by various nations in the twentieth century. As such the essays provide a longitudinal

review of the circumstances related to the question asked in the introduction and will give those with a decided view on bombing cause to reflect.

Similarly, Igor Primoratz's *Terror from the Sky: The Bombing of German Cities in World War II* (2010) includes the contributions of about a dozen historians, philosophers, and ethicists. Their purpose is to discuss strategic bombing, with specific reference to World War II but also in view of subsequent and recent military actions. Their aim is to show that strategic bombing is in reality terror bombing and most definitely immoral. The book is divided into three sections: the bombing, the moral issues, and postwar debate. Based on secondary sources there is nothing startlingly new but the work is balanced and again useful in allowing for reflection on the morality of warfare.

Rightly or wrongly, the figure at the heart of all bombing discussions and debates is Sir Arthur Harris, who was the air officer commanding in chief of RAF Bomber Command from the end of February 1942 until the end of the war. It is fundamental to attempt to understand what forces, opinions, and even prejudices motivated his thinking and decision-making. Until the publication of his *Despatch* (Harris 1995), researchers and readers had to rely on his 1947 (republished in 1990) *Bomber Offensive* (Harris 1990), which has been called by Sebastian Cox, head of the RAF Air Historical Branch, a more personalized version of the *Despatch*. In his introduction to the 1990 reprint, Denis Richards states that Harris had two purposes in writing the volume. In 1947, there was already criticism that the bombing offensive had been a waste of resources and that it had been morally questionable, given the civilian casualties it had caused. Harris's first aim, therefore, was to explain to the public the tremendous problems that the Command and all its personnel, Harris included, had endured and how those issues had been resolved. The second purpose was to set the record straight as to what his crews had accomplished. Richards explains that the volume succeeded well in meeting its first task, as Harris ably described the complexity of the campaign and of the associated technical and tactical challenges. Meeting the second aim was more difficult (Harris 1990, pp. vi–viii). In *Bomber Offensive*, we can see both Harris's bluster, but also a man who was charged with making the best of a not very strong hand, which at the time constituted Britain's major offensive capability. We see that Harris was not afraid to order attacks, but that he also spent much time in trying to improve the effectiveness of his force, so that it might better contribute to defeating the enemy, while at the same time minimizing losses. In the end, some readers will decide they do not like Harris, but they will know first hand the basis for that dislike.

The most recent biography of Harris by Henry Probert, *Bomber Harris, His Life and Times: The Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris, the Wartime Chief of Bomber Command* (2001), is a response to continued negative public perceptions of Harris and the bombing campaign. Using Harris's papers from the RAF Museum, Probert seeks to examine "the manner in which [Harris] conducted his Command's affairs, the intense pressures on him, the way in which he led his men, and his relations with that host of people who were in positions to influence his activities" (p. 15). Here, as in other assessments, we see a strong character, but unlike others, we get a picture of a highly intelligent and intellectually flexible leader.

Another useful study of Harris, and more directly of the workings of the staff at Bomber Command, is Charles Carrington's 1987 work *A Soldier at Bomber Command*. A Great War contemporary of Harris's second in command and a man well connected with academe, Carrington provided his reflections of Bomber Command from his

perspective of the Army's liaison officer during much of the war. Not only was he able to comment on the various phases of the bombing war, including the desperate days of 1940, but he also provides unique insight into the workings of the headquarters and the personality and intellect of Arthur Harris, whom he deemed a strong but approachable and logical person.

Harris's immediate superior for most of the war was Sir Charles Portal of whom Denis Richards's biography, *Portal of Hungerford* (1977), covers many of the same issues that Slessor discusses (see below). Portal's participation in the bombing policy decisions and control over Harris and the bomber offensive and an analysis of the offensive are examined in three chapters. Throughout this section of the book, the complexity of war at the strategic level becomes apparent. The need for all parties to work together and to cooperate was as clear as the inability of some individuals to see other than their service needs. Portal seemed the master of finding the right solution.

There are a number of works by or about Harris's contemporaries that also provide worthwhile context and insight. Immediately subordinate to Harris was Air Vice Marshal Donald Bennett, the commander of the British Pathfinder Force. In his memoir, *Pathfinder: A War Autobiography* (1998), Bennett notes that he wrote for no particular purpose but does make mention of the apparent futility of war and the general absence of respect for humankind in both war and peace areas. With this as his context he then describes the little known or understood challenges of a single raid such as they would have been faced by an individual crew. He likens each raid to the hurly-burly of World War I naval battle of Jutland and concludes that crews did amazingly well but frequently missed the necessity for precision given the nature of area targets. He thus wonders whether area bombing was self-defeating. In *The Central Blue* (1956), Sir John Slessor spends considerable time on the origins and development of bombing. This, coming from one of Harris's professional peers and a man who rose to command the RAF in the early 1950s, is most valuable. A recent biography of Slessor, Vincent Orange's *Slessor Bomber Champion* (2006), is particularly interesting because it follows the flyer through his experiences of bombing in World War I, as well as his role in the development of doctrine in the interwar years, his air staff assignments where he directed some bombing operations and finally to his appointment as chief of the Air Staff after World War II where he dealt with questions of strategic bombing in the nuclear age. We see not only the events but also the personality and decisions of this individual across the span of the British bombing experience.

Like the Slessor volume, in *Master of Air Power General Carl A. Spaatz* (1988), David Mets traces the life and service of American General Carl Spaatz through his flying career, his years in staff positions, and his command of bombing forces in the war. Spaatz, too, went on to command his service, the newly established United States Air Force (USAF). We again glimpse the challenges faced and the character that responded to those. Likewise, Charles Griffith's short biography of Haywood Hansell Jr., *The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II* (1999), follows the life of a senior American military aviator through the interwar and war years. Hansell played a central role in developing the theories, doctrine, and practices of precision bombing and then went on to become a combat commander. The study, which draws from a variety of sources, is a biography which shows the interaction between ideas and real people, describing the organizational politics and showing the effects of combat on both the ideas and the people who

attempted to apply them. Hansell ultimately was taken out of command because his superiors felt that the strain of such appointments had an impact on both him and his unit's effectiveness.

While Spaatz, Hansell, and others served in combat, Hap Arnold was a national level commander. Dik Daso's *Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower* (2000) is a broad biography of the father of the Army Air Forces and the man in command during the war. There are some discussions of bombing concepts and operations, but the true value of the volume is in the insights into the leadership and management of the emerging air arm. A more recent study of Arnold's direction of combat operations is *Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan* (Wolk 2010), which uses extensive primary sources to look at the role of Hap Arnold in both his management of the Army Air Forces and his direct leadership of the XX Air Force in its strategic attacks against Japan. The author's purpose is to investigate Arnold's thinking – to see what he thought and how this led to the decisions that it did. He shows Arnold to be more than the intellectual lightweight that he is commonly considered to be. The book traces Arnold's thinking back to the Air Corps Tactical School's teachings and shows how his decisions about the firebombing of Japan were the real reason for that nation's defeat. The work goes further, offering a glimpse at Arnold's sophisticated thinking on the postwar world and the utility of air power.

The American bomber baron with the reputation most like that of Harris is Curtis Lemay. *Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay* (Kozak 2009) seeks to expose the true personality behind what in the mid-1960s was considered a cold and brutal air force leader. Warren Kozak looks at Lemay's full military career, where the protagonist, having used strategic bombing with effect during the war, went on to command the United States' strategic and nuclear bombing force during the early cold war.

These works all look at the great men, ideas, and events of bombing, but there are equally important volumes dealing with the flyers who went on the raids. While these aspects are woven into many of the works in each of the themes discussed in this chapter, perhaps the best academic study of the flyers' experience is Colonel Mark Wells's *Courage and Air Warfare* (1995), in which he argued that despite the technical dimensions of the air war against Germany, the bombing offensive of World War II "still rested on the individual courage, stamina and determination of thousands of men and women" (Wells 1995, p. 2). Taken together these qualities produced the "willpower" needed to overcome Clausewitzian friction. Wells argued that most of what had been written did not reveal much of the human dimension. Campaign statistics were uninformative and personal accounts of aerial combat, while "riveting," were still lacking. "Attention needs to be more closely focused on the physiological dimension of the campaign, especially topics relating to aircrew selection and classification, reaction to combat, adaptability to stress, morale, leadership and combat effectiveness" (p. 2). He concludes that aerial combatants were "motivated by a wide range of emotions" and factors. When faced with intensive operations and losses, they continued "because of a spirit of cohesion and teamwork that permeated the units and individual aircrews." But, he argued, "Combat flying was often characterized by hours of tedious boredom and great physical stress, interrupted by all-too-lengthy stretches of confusion, panic, furious activity and instant death" (p. 210).

And when this proved too much for them, some men, regardless of background or psychological screening, "succumbed."

More typical of books concentrating on the crew is Kevin Wilson's *Bomber Boys: The Ruhr, the Dambusters and Bloody Berlin* (2005), which recounts the progress of the bomber campaign through the course of 1943, or what he calls the "year of attrition." Wilson does this by adding personal accounts to the framework of the various raids and campaign in order to tell the "story of everyday heroism." This format is fairly common and is indicative of authors' attempts to show the human face of the flyers who, much like the civilians living below, were at significant risk of death.

The human face of combat also manifests itself in the selection of potential flyers and stress casualties of the bomber crews. Allan English's *Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew, 1939–1945* (1996) examines the selection and training and employment of Canadian aircrew for service in the Commonwealth air forces. In taking this human perspective of bombing, he illuminates a facet of the bombing campaign that is often ignored as historians focus more easily on the technology and actual operations. But in the current climate where we are generally more aware of post traumatic stress, his work is invaluable for seeing how one air service sought to deal with the issue both by carefully selecting potential aircrew and then dealing with those who were deemed to be waverers lacking in moral fiber (LMF). His work is all the more important because it shows clearly the limitations placed on nations for want of skilled flyers and the general lack of knowledge which senior leaders have in such matters. Little has apparently changed.

The actual daily rigors of combat operations are well detailed in Roger Freeman's *The Mighty Eighth War Manual* (2002) and the companion *The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Units, Men and Machines of the US 8th Air Force* (1986). They are similarly useful sources for gaining an understanding of actual flying operations, tactics, and technical aspects of AAF bombing. Through these volumes, the reader is able to develop a solid appreciation of the complexities of the actual conduct of a raid. Similarly, *The Bomber Command Handbook 1939–1945* (Falconer 1998) acts as a general encyclopedia for Bomber Command. Based largely on secondary sources, and unfortunately lacking citations, the work nonetheless provides good introductory narratives and data on a variety of topics including: organizations (including groups, squadrons and airfields and the actual orders of battle), training and crewing, aircraft, navigation, bombs and bombing techniques, personal equipment, and a typical raid. Also included are details of all air officers, the various awards and medals presented, and a range of vignettes of lower ranked aircrew. There is also a section detailing the current museums in the United Kingdom.

In his *Bomber Command 1939–1945*, Overy (1997) offers a multimedia examination of the day-to-day existence in Bomber Command. The book contains several data annexes and a multitude of photographs with captions; the latter give the reader an excellent visual understanding of people, places, and aircraft. The text itself is divided into five chapters that follow the development and experience with the command as well as a detailed look at the supporting functions that the command carried out in England. There also many short text vignettes providing personal experiences and observations from flyers, ground staff, and commanders. A balanced assessment of Bomber Command performance follows in the last chapter that acknowledges and

attempts to explain the basis for, and the validity of, many of the criticisms of the command's performance during the war.

The problems of precision have been dissected by a number of recent works. The 1995 collection *Air Power: Theory and Practice* (Gooch 1995) contained one important chapter written by William Hays Parks. In "'Precision' and 'Area' Bombing: Who Did Which and When?" Hays Parks (1995) provides hard data to demonstrate that whatever they called it, Bomber Command was, in fact, more accurate during the 1944–1945 period (when the bulk of bombing tonnage was dropped) than the AAF that claimed to be conducting only precision attacks.

The implications of the American performance are considered in *America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910–1945* (1995) in which Stephen McFarland makes a detailed examination of AAF bombing concepts, doctrine, and technologies, all of which were intended to ensure daylight precision bombing. But the facts proved different and the author shows how the American bombing in Germany, even if dubbed precise, lacked that very element. He goes on, if briefly, to recount the conventional and atomic bombing of Japan and how these attacks eventually abandoned the promise of precision. McFarland is not happy with these developments: the promise of precision was nothing more than a marketing promise by AAF leaders. Happily, he notes, if wars and bombing are to continue, precision attacks are now more certain, with relatively fewer losses among civilians and aviators.

In *Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive 1939–1945* (2006), Richard Davis looks at the primary statistical data available to air force planners and leaders during the war years. He takes the results of raids as they were collected and uses them to provide a detailed analysis of what actually happened. Based on this process, he counters some longstanding misconceptions and reinforces some criticisms. Like Hays Parks, he is able to show that by late 1944, Bomber Command was actually more precise than the AAF, but at the same time, Harris did not apply as much effort to the Oil Plan (a series of refinery targets deemed essential to knocking Germany out of the war) as he could have. Davis notes that while Bomber Command conducted about half of its sorties against area targets, surprisingly, the AAF also conducted 117 "city" bombing attacks, by direction, as early as 1943. The author is also able to show that reference to city attacks was dropped in postwar reports. Davis also assesses the USSBS, showing that the subordinate US reports did acknowledge the likely impact of bombing on civilian morale, but contrasts this with the British survey which categorically refutes the effectiveness of this approach.

The analysis of contemporary data has also been the basis for two recent publications. In *Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaigns* (2009), Robert Elhers follows the genesis and evolution of air intelligence from 1914 to 1945. He uses extensive primary material to show how the concepts were developed and then applied so that by 1943 there was a mature and generally effective inter-agency system for collecting and assessing data from raids against Germany and occupied Europe. He begins by pointing out a simple construct, that the basis of a successful air campaign is the ability to collect and analyze data as to the effectiveness of the bombing operations. Elhers contends that by the time the intelligence and analysis system was working effectively (in essence, by the end of 1943), the Allies had already neutralized German war capacity. The air intelligence network was able to

monitor the successes of the following 16 months and, ironically, to report on those bombing operations which due to interference from higher echelons and politicians were not effective. The author's general conclusion is that recent analyses that argue for the effectiveness of bombing in wearing down the German state are valid and that his own evidence supports this. But he says that his work goes further by showing both what knowledge the aviators actually had and what they did with it in making the bombing more effective. In some cases, decisions about what was or was not effective led to debates: support to D-day, the efficacy of transportation and oil targets, and finally the utility of morale bombing. He approaches all of these using excellent primary and secondary sources, and without editorializing.

My monograph, *The Science of Bombing: Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command* (Wakelam 2009), attempts to show how the leadership and senior staff within Bomber Command dealt with the glaring errors in bombing accuracy and the alarming losses which seemed the unenviable norm night after night during 1940 and 1941. It was the use of operational research and the willing acceptance by the staff, and more specifically by Arthur Harris, of the recommendations of his operational research scientists that allowed the Bomber Command to work slowly toward the precision bombing that the RAF had always intended. The story is also one showing the incredibly bad odds that crews faced and how here, too, there was no lack of effort to find countermeasures against flak and fighter defenses. By 1945, raids were easily as precise, and often more so than those flown by the Eighth Air Force. This volume uses extensive primary sources from Bomber Command and its Operational Research Section to show that the senior commanders had a reasonable picture of what was going wrong and that they worked hard at establishing precision capability as quickly as they could, to the extent that the Bomber Command was able to take on precision targets associated with the D-day campaign and the oil and transportation targets of 1944–1945.

So, if these efforts were going on, then why do we criticize the bombers as we do? This is the question behind *The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany* (2001) in which Robin Neillands attempts to determine why Harris and Bomber Command are so widely criticized compared to AAF operations. Neillands wants to see not just what was done by Harris, “but why it was done and whether, as so often alleged by Harris’s detractors, there was any other way of doing it at the time” (p. 4). He focuses on the very heart of the challenge facing the senior leaders. After an extensive comparison of the two organizations, he is able to conclude that the scientific side of the air war improved accuracy through many electronic aids, and that US and British navigation and bombing techniques grew more efficient and accurate.

Attempting to integrate these issues in *The Relentless Offensive: War and Bombing Command 1939–1945* (2009), Roy Irons argues that, if done properly, strategic bombing, what the British had called “the relentless offensive,” could have been effective and worthwhile. Irons points out that we tend to criticize Harris for his intransigence about both the aims of the campaign and the technical and tactical shortcomings of operations, but he says that the problems ran much deeper and that Harris actually pressed hard to correct them. Irons focuses on the defense of the bomber as the crux of the command’s problems. A properly defensible bomber, one that had a good chance of getting to the target and dropping its munitions effectively before returning home, would have meant a lower loss rate and a lower investment in

crews and industrial capacity. The simple calculus of bombs on target/aircraft lost would have improved significantly. Several thematic chapters dealing with these technical issues are followed by only a short chapter on the conduct of the offensive itself, which is unfortunately compressed and therefore somewhat confused and incomplete. A final analysis ranges over much philosophical ground and can leave readers at a loss.

All of these books, of course, look at the bombing from the standpoint of the Allied air forces, but there is also the opposition's perspective. Using German secondary sources, in *The Other Battle: Luftwaffe Night Aces Versus Bomber Command* (1996), Peter Hinchliffe provides insight using a significant range of interviews with German night fighter and Bomber Command veterans as to how the Luftwaffe organized and fought its night defensive battle against Bomber Command. Hinchliffe points out that while the technical and tactical experiences of the RAF bombers are widely described in a variety of sources, less is written about the German defensive system which frequently degraded and often severely bloodied the raiders. This work, therefore, provides a useful addition to the literature. Equally valuable is David Isby's *Fighting the Bombers: The Luftwaffe's Struggle Against the Allied Bombing Offensive as Seen by Its Commanders* (2003), a collection of some fifteen postwar interviews of Luftwaffe personnel ranging from a general to flyers, which provide some evidence of German views on their defensive systems against Allied bombers. The work is divided into several parts touching on strategic and operational issues, technology, and the application of those technologies in tactical operations. No synthesis or analysis is provided, and the fact that these interviews were not published until 2003 is unexplained. Finally, in *The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich* (2007), Donald Caldwell and Richard Muller point out that while there have been excellent histories of the night fighter force, no similar work has previously been published dealing with the day fighter defense of Germany, and that understanding that force is all the more important as these very units would otherwise have been used for air defense of the field armies. Their integrative work, which uses extensive primary sources, fills this gap.

The question of the bombing of Japan has much less visibility in English language discourse. Kenneth Werrell's, *Blankets of Fire: US Bombers Over Japan During World War II* (1996), is an engaging and, to some extent, personalized work, which examines the goals of the bombing of Japan while also incorporating questions of technology and tactics. The use of extensive primary sources and a broad range of secondary material allow the author to conclude that, while not employed as laid down in concepts and doctrine, and while not *the* war-winning weapon, strategic bombing directly contributed to the Japanese surrender. Werrell, who flew from Japan some years after the war, tackles the issues of firebombing and atomic attacks evenly with extensive evidence of decisions and events as well as assessments of the effectiveness and moral implications of these attacks.

In *Inferno: The Firebombing of Japan March 9–August 15, 1945* (2000), Edwin Palmer Hoyt focuses on the events and the assessment of the 1945 firebombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. He argues that there were two episodes during World War II that would today be considered war crimes, these being the Holocaust and the firebombing attacks against Japan. Comparing them to contemporary circumstances, he argues that attacks like the raids on Dresden and Japan would be subject to prosecution in the International Criminal Court. He claims that the firebombing was not necessary to win the war in the Pacific and that there were American leaders who

thought that a bombing campaign against strategic targets would have been viable and practical. But his larger aim seems to be to compare the events over Japan with American military actions in the Balkans which he believes to be similarly criminal.

In terms of warfare, air operations remain a relatively new form of combat and practitioners are interested in the history of the past 100 years, and in particular the concepts and experience of strategic bombing. There are the many works that examine either the concepts of strategic bombing or the whole or parts of strategic bombing campaigns, including both RAF and US Army Air Force operations. Perhaps the best short paper on the origins of strategic bombing and the RAF is Phillip S. Meilinger's "Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II" (1997), which appears in Meilinger's 1997 edited collection *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*. The author lays out the antecedents of the RAF, the issues which precipitated the notion of strategic bombing and the development of the concept during the 1920s and 1930s. *The Paths of Heaven* is a collection of papers written by the faculty of the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies and together they describe the development of airpower theory over the course of the twentieth century. While there are no chapters dealing with the conduct of bombing in World War II, Meilinger's study of the RAF as well as similar chapters on AAF bombing concepts and a shorter study of the German thinking on strategic bombing are of particular value.

A more focused set of case studies was released at about the same time. R. Cargill Hall's *Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment* (1998) examines the major aspects of strategic bombing between the early years of the twentieth century and the First Gulf War. The work has several strong points. While written as individual chapters, there is an integrative essay to draw out major themes: in essence effective strategic bombing is based on technology; air power theorists expected more from the technology that could be achieved in 1939, this leading to less than optimal effects and to the use of area bombing with its associated questions of morality. Each of these themes is explored in detail. The three chapters dealing with Bomber Command, as well as AAF operations in Europe and the Pacific, explore each of these themes. Each chapter has an extensive bibliography as well as a short bibliographic annex.

Using the March 1945 bombing of his home town of Würzburg as a case study, Hermann Knell reviews the origins and the progress of strategic bombing from 1914 onwards. *To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and Its Human Consequences in World War II* (2003) seeks to bring into focus the human suffering of those on the ground and those who were the bombers themselves. Unfortunately, because much of the analysis has to do with how bombing could be accomplished according to the author's understanding of the technology and tactics, the book demonstrates several inaccuracies of fact and interpretation such that his aim is not particularly well achieved. The complexity of the subject is also such that the narrative and analysis are too abbreviated. In the end, there is an unsatisfying conclusion that those who are involved suffered.

Another work by Meilinger, *Air War: Theory and Practice* (2003), is of fundamental importance in understanding both the bombing campaigns and the thinking of air force leaders and planners. Meilinger, a senior USAF pilot and educator, sets out to provide a primer, albeit a highly sophisticated one, for his peers. The volume is a collection of his own papers which include analyses of interwar bombing theories and some aspects of the bombing campaigns. The most important chapter, however, is a general discussion of what he calls "air strategy" in which he demonstrates the fundamental difference

between the planning and conduct of land, sea, and air operations. In the latter case, he posits that air strategy is about targeting for effect and that the key to successful air strategy lies in identifying the actual purpose (effect) to be achieved.

In *Firestorm: Allied Airpower and the Destruction of Dresden* (2006), Marshall De Bruhl presents an intriguing analysis of the Dresden raid as the focus of a study on area bombing, German terror weapons, military necessity, and public political relations. While the author seems inclined to criticize the policy and personalities behind area bombing and the attack on Dresden, in fact, he offers a neutral narrative and analysis of both events and historiography. While primary sources were used, the citation style of this popular work is ineffective in acknowledging those sources.

In *Death from the Heavens: A History of Strategic Bombing* (2009), Werrell traces the theories, experiences, and results of strategic bombing over the twentieth century. He notes that prior to World War II it had been assumed that strategic bombing could have an impact on both civilian morale and destroy strategic resources and production, and that these effects would cause an enemy to capitulate, thus saving countless deaths in battle. But, he argues that the experience proved neither of these to be the case and thus air warfare has become nothing more than a new round of attrition warfare, this time in the third dimension. The failure of strategic bombing, says Werrell, was in large measure related to the inability of technologies and human expertise to produce the results anticipated in terms of accuracy and effectiveness. Subsequent strategic bombing experience has not replicated the conditions of World War II for three reasons. First, the introduction of nuclear weapons has precluded nations from waging total war; second, technology now allows for more precise results; and third, humanity is engaged in a series of more limited wars where a general bombing campaign against the heartland of an enemy has neither been necessary nor appropriate.

Finally, Norwegian Colonel John Andreas Olsen's *A History of Air Warfare* (Olsen 2010) offers a review of air warfare over the past 100 years and puts the campaigns of World War II into context. The chapters on the bombing war are written by Richard Overy and Richard Muller and offer brief but accurate summaries of major themes, although with little mention of morality. The final section offers differing views on the future of air power and underscores that there have been major shifts in war fighting away from intense combat between major powers and alliances.

In looking for some tidy interpretations from the foregoing, it is hard to fit the historiography of World War II bombing into easily defined conclusions. Like virtually every aspect of warfare, this one is clouded with various shades of gray, and as complex and chaotic as the events were, the history is not much clearer. It is possible to summarize what happened:

- civilian morale did not crack, but seems to have been strained – some leaders felt that it could crack or that the cost of the population was too dear;
- precision was not technically or tactically practicable until the last year of the war;
- precision was ill-defined and in the case of the Army Air Force, not effective, despite such claims;
- neither the US nor the UK had intended to terror bomb;
- strategic bombing did not win the war, but degraded industrial capacity and potential and diverted some military and economic resources away from land and naval operations of the axis.

All of this suggests that more research from the middle in areas which are hard to fathom is appropriate. While we may think we know what happened in and around the concept of strategic bombing, arguably such is not the case. Recent research trying to connect strategic vision with the flawed experiences is exposing how the realities of bombing did not, or perhaps could not, align with the concepts derived after the Great War. There are a number of questions which remain at the center of debate:

- Why were bombing practices not in keeping with concepts and doctrines from the beginning of the war?
- What did the British/Americans do or not do to rectify these problems?
- Was area bombing then and/or now morally wrong?
- Did the bombing do what it claimed it could in breaking the enemy's economy and/or morale?

It is one thing to want to know what happened and how the bombing campaign was conceptualized, organized, and conducted – and how the Germans and Japanese defenders conducted their countermeasures. It is another and arguably more important matter to know why bombing was deemed an acceptable strategy. Indeed, while technology has, by the early twenty-first century, permitted the degree of precision attack against militarily relevant targets that was once envisaged, the fact that we continue to drop bombs among civilian populations remains equally true and troubling.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Scandinavian Campaigns

OLLI VEHVILÄINEN

The countries of North Europe were important to the great powers in the war because of their geostrategic location at the northern seas and also because of their natural resources, especially ores (iron, nickel, copper, and bauxite). Only Sweden succeeded in remaining neutral. Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union on November 30, 1939, and, after more than three months of violent resistance, compelled to accept a dictated peace. In June 1941 it joined the German attack on the Soviet Union in a war of retaliation. Finally, it managed in September 1944 to pull out of the war without being occupied. Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940. Both countries remained under German occupation until May 1945.

The nonaggression pact signed in August 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union offered the latter a unique opportunity to extend its influence without the interference of other great powers. Under strong political and military pressure the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were forced to sign assistance treaties with the Soviet Union and to cede bases to Soviet troops on their territories. On October 5 Finland received from Moscow an invitation to send its foreign minister or some other authorized person for discussions. Foreign Minister Eljas Erkkö persuaded Dr. J. K. Paasikivi to handle the negotiations. Paasikivi was a prominent conservative who was considered the country's leading expert on Finnish–Russian relations. At the same time as Paasikivi left for Moscow, Finland mobilized.

In 1955, Max Jakobson, a young Finnish journalist who worked as correspondent in London and later in Washington, published a book titled *The Diplomacy of the Winter War*. Using published British and German documents, he, for the first time, put the case of Finland into the context of world politics. Finland had declared that it would follow the neutral Nordic line in its foreign policy, but Jakobson (who later made a dazzling career in diplomacy) pointed out that the Soviet Union considered Finland not a part of neutral Scandinavia, but a border area of the Baltic states which had been a part of the Czarist Empire and which the Soviet Union tried to include

within the scope of its security system. Jakobson's book became widely renowned for its sharp analysis and deep understanding of international policy, as well as for its superior style.

Paasikivi visited Moscow three times. The second and third time he was accompanied by Väinö Tanner, the minister of finance. Tanner was the leader of the Social Democrats and one of the most influential members of the cabinet. The main points of their discussions with Stalin and Molotov have been known for a long time because both published their memoirs in the 1950s. Later on, Russian sources also became accessible. Polvinen (1995) has been able to use them in his brilliant biography of Paasikivi. Stalin justified the Soviet demands by appealing to the need to protect Leningrad. The Soviet Union needed a base on the Hanko peninsula to be able to close the access to the Gulf of Finland. Another demand concerned a redrawing of the frontier in the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet dictator placed little value on Finnish assertions that they would defend their country with all their might if some power tried to attack the Soviet Union through Finland. "Finland is small and weak. They won't ask for your permission," he said (Polvinen 1995, pp. 40–41). It seems that Stalin wanted to find a compromise in the negotiations. However, the Finnish negotiators were bound by strict instructions from Erkko.

Eljas Erkko had a long-standing career as diplomat and journalist. His personal papers are family property, and Ohto Manninen and Raimo Salokangas were the first who were able to use them in their large biography of Erkko. This work does not add very much to our knowledge of the negotiations in autumn 1939. The foreign minister was an adamant adherent to the neutral Scandinavian orientation. He thought that the Russians were only bluffing. They would not risk a war. Giving in to Stalin's proposals would bring Finland into the Soviet sphere of influence (Manninen and Salokangas 2009).

Erkko was not alone. The government, which consisted of the Social Democrats, the Agrarians, and the Progressives, could rely on popular opinion, which was firmly against any concessions. Timo Soikkanen published in 1984 a study about the interdependency of Finnish domestic policy and foreign politics in the 1930s. Based mainly on the press Soikkanen shows how the uniformity of the Finnish opinion was formed under the pressure of international events after August 1939. There were no domestic premises to meet the Soviet terms. The Finns had learned their lesson from the fate of Czechoslovakia: agreeing to the terms of a dictatorship opened the possibility of more demands later. Soikkanen also maintains that the Finns' obduracy can be to a great extent explained by the fact that at that moment most of them did not really think that the Soviet Union would start a war (T. Soikkanen 1984).

Nobody dared to split the national unanimity. Polvinen points out how Paasikivi, when back in Helsinki, did his utmost to convince the government that concessions were necessary to achieve a compromise; otherwise the Soviet Union could start a war, which Finland certainly would lose. But the envoy did not present his views publicly (Polvinen 1995). Paasikivi was strongly backed by Field Marshal C. G. Mannerheim, the designate commander in chief. For years the Mannerheim had preached the reinforcement of the country's defenses. Now he blamed the government for neglecting their defense strategies. The Finnish army's equipment was so deficient that Finland could not fight a war, he declared. British historian J. E. O. Screen who has written Mannerheim's latest biography stresses that Mannerheim well understood the Soviets'

anxiety about their security and wanted to use concessions to win time for Finnish rearmament (Screen 2000).

Finally, Stalin's patience was at an end. The usually cautious dictator lost his sense of reality, his biographer writes. He laughed at his Chief of General Staff Shaposhnikov's warning that a war with Finland would involve a hard, difficult, and long campaign (Volkogonov 1991). Consequently, the forces of the Leningrad Military District were assessed sufficient to carry out the offensive. An incident was fabricated in Mainila on the Finnish-Russian border. On the morning of November 30 the Red Army launched an onslaught on Finland across the whole length of the border.

Molotov claimed afterwards that it was the hostile policy of the Finnish government that had prevented an agreement from being reached. Soviet historians, in so far as they dealt with the Finnish war, contented themselves with reiterating these claims. They insisted that in the 1930s Finland had kept close political and military contacts with Nazi Germany and blamed Tanner for the failure of negotiations in Moscow in the fall of 1939. Not until Gorbachov's *glasnost*i did Russian historians begin to reassess the events leading up to the Winter War. In 1990, Mihail Semiryaga published a booklet on the "unknown war," as he called it. In his opinion, the Winter War was a consequence of Stalin's shortsighted policy. The Soviet aggression against Finland was an illegal act, and the shots fired in Mainila were a provocation (Semiryaga 1990). Russian and Finnish historians initiated a joint project on the history of the Winter War and its findings were published in Finland in 1997 and in Russia the following year (Vehviläinen and Rzheshesky 1997). This publication as well as Carl van Dyke's *The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–1940* (1997) were based on a significant amount of fresh archival materials.

In Finland much retrospective discussion has centered on whether the Finnish government should have given in to the Soviet demands. The government's unbending stance has been the object of much criticism. One of the main critics was Paasikivi, who regarded the Winter War as Erkko's war. He argued that it would have been better to avoid war through making concessions (Paasikivi 1958). This thesis has been contested. Certainly, the outbreak of war in November 1939 could have been avoided if Finland had agreed to the Soviet proposals. The course of negotiations in Moscow shows that Stalin really wanted a peaceful solution, although that had also been his aim in the Baltic republics. But what would have happened then? Would the concessions demanded in autumn 1939 have satisfied the Soviet Union, or would it have later made further demands, which Finland would have been forced to accept or reject a year later in an even less favorable situation? Manninen assumes that giving up a base on the Finnish coast would have probably led Finland down the same path that the Baltic republics took (Manninen and Salokangas 2009). According to T. S. Busujeva, most Russian historians agree at present that the Soviet aim was to establish in Finland a socialist state or to annex it into the Soviet Union in order to safeguard Leningrad and the northwestern border (Busujeva 2009).

The Soviet attack took the Finns by surprise. In the hope that the talks with Moscow could be resumed, a new government was formed. The governor of the Bank of Finland, Risto Ryti, who had a good name in the West, headed a national coalition of five parties. Tanner took the portfolio of foreign minister. As the most prominent leader of the workers' movement, he ensured the unity of the home front. Any hopes that the Soviet Union might agree to talks with Ryti's government proved fruitless.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, a "Finnish People's Government," led by O. W. Kuusinen, was established in Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk), a small locality which the Soviet troops had occupied. The government consisted of Finnish émigré communists, and it appealed for help from the Red Army. Molotov and Kuusinen signed a treaty of mutual assistance. The motives behind the establishment of Kuusinen's government have continued to intrigue historians. Was Stalin so badly informed that he really believed the Finnish workers and peasants would receive that kind of government with open arms? A. O. Chubaryan thinks that the ploy was meant to split Finnish society. Osmo Jussila has offered another explanation: the Soviet government had reverted to the methods which it had successfully used in 1918–1921 when the Red Army advanced to new areas. Since a socialist country could not directly invade another country it was necessary to camouflage the attack as bringing assistance to a revolutionary government (Jussila 1985).

Kuusinen's government was not recognized by any other country. Its main effect was to convince the people of Finland that the war was not being fought over minor alterations in the border but for the existence of the nation. A rare feeling of unity transcending all party and class limits emerged and became known as "the Spirit of the Winter War." Kimmo Rentola points out in his important study *Kenen joukoissa seisot?* how even many of the communist supporters disillusioned about the Soviet policy were ready to take up arms against the aggression (Rentola 1994).

The Finnish Government turned officially to the League of Nations with a request that the Council and the Assembly consider measures to halt the Soviet invasion. After much maneuvering at the League of Nations, a resolution was passed condemning the aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland and stating that by this act the Soviet Union had excluded itself from the organization. As Nevakivi has pointed out in *Apu jota ei annettu* (2000), this decision did not correspond with the Finnish government's wishes – the Finns had hoped that the League would act as a conciliator between Finland and the USSR. Of course, the League's actions were humiliating for the Soviet Union, and Moscow never forgot it.

For the Finns, no options remained: they were forced to engage in an unequal struggle. The Soviet leaders did not expect to meet any serious resistance – the Finns would be crushed with a massive attack within two or three weeks. However, it soon became clear that Soviet troops were insufficiently prepared for winter warfare in difficult terrain. Vihavainen and Saharov (2009) have published a large collection of declassified documents of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). The reports, which were intended only for the highest leaders, tell about deficiencies in the training and equipment of the attacking forces, inadequacies of reconnaissance, incompetence of many commanders, also about dissatisfaction among the troops. In two weeks the Soviet attack on the Karelian Isthmus was halted at the Finns' main line of defense, the so-called Mannerheim Line, which was a chain of concrete fortifications stretching from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. In *Miten Suomi valloitetaan* Manninen (2008) asserts that the Soviet troops were deployed ineffectively and could not amass a sufficient superiority at the focal point of the offensive. In the merciless battles in the forest wilderness the Finns' mobility and skills in winter warfare came fully into their own.

When a quick victory did not happen, the USSR found itself in an undesired situation. It was involved in a peripheral theater of war at a time when a great war was

being waged in Europe. At the end of January Stalin changed his mind and decided that it would be wiser to sit down at the negotiating table with Ryti's government and abandon Kuusinen (Rentola 2003). In response to the Swedish foreign minister's initiative, the Soviet government announced that it was not in principle opposed to a "compromise" with the "Ryti-Tanner government." But first the military credibility of the Soviet Union had to be restored. On February 11 the Red Army launched in the Karelian Isthmus a thoroughly prepared offensive with such a superiority of forces that it could not fail to achieve victory. Twenty-three Soviet divisions attacked nine Finnish divisions. After three days of fierce fighting, they made a breakthrough. The Finns had to give up the Mannerheim Line.

Under the guise of aid to Finland, the British and the French had started to prepare an expeditionary force whose real purpose was to cut off the supply of Swedish iron ore to Germany and open up a new front in Scandinavia. According to the plans that were drawn up in February, 100,000 British, French, and Polish soldiers were to be sent to Scandinavia by mid-April. Nevakivi has pointed out that most of those forces would be needed for the occupation of the Norwegian coast and the Swedish iron ore fields. The aid for Finland would amount to only 15,000 men without any heavy armaments (Nevakivi 2000).

The Soviet leaders and the Finnish government were faced with far-reaching decisions. If Finland actually asked the Western powers to send troops, the consequences might be unforeseeable. Hannu Soikkanen's *Sota-ajan valtioneuvosto* (1977) became the basic work on the decision-making process in the Finnish government during the war. The opinions there were divided. Tanner was appalled at the prospect of becoming involved in a war between the great powers. He pressed for accepting even harsher terms. Some other cabinet members insisted that the resistance must be continued and an appeal for aid sent to the Western powers. Sweden and Norway strictly rejected all requests of passage. The Finnish front still held, but it was near collapse. Lasse Laaksonen has shown how critical the situation was in early March. The troops were completely exhausted, the losses of officers were alarming, the artillery was short of ammunition, and there were no reserves left (Laaksonen 1999). Finally the Finnish government fearing an immediate breakthrough at the front could see no alternative but to yield to the Soviet terms. Heikki Ylikangas has tried to prove that the Finnish leaders were persuaded to reject the Western aid influenced by a confidential message from Hermann Göring, who advised them to make peace on the available terms and promised that Finland would eventually regain what it lost after Germany had won the war that would soon break out between Germany and the Soviet Union (Ylikangas 1999). This caused a dispute among Finnish historians. Ylikangas bravely defended his thesis but his line of argumentation is not very plausible. It was the fear for a military catastrophe which counted most. Germany was not trusted. It had given the cold shoulder toward Finland during the war and was considered to be an ally of the Soviet Union (Vehviläinen 2002).

The peace treaty was signed in Moscow on March 13. The southeastern part of Finland, with the second largest city of the country, Vyborg, and some areas in the north were ceded to the Soviet Union. Finland was compelled to lease to the Soviets the Hanko area for a period of thirty years. All the inhabitants of the ceded territories voluntarily abandoned their homes. Over 400,000 people moved to the western side of the new border.

It is supposed that Stalin agreed to a “compromise” with Ryti’s government because he wanted to keep the Soviet Union outside the war of the great powers and was worried about an intervention by Britain and France. On the basis of Soviet intelligence documents, Kimmo Rentola has concluded that Stalin was misled by information from Paris sources that characterized Allied plans to help Finland as much more resolute and dangerous than they actually were (Rentola 2003). In an April meeting with high-ranking officers he boasted that the war against Finland had been the first “modern” war the Soviet Union had taken part in. A “modern” war required the massive use of artillery, tanks, and air force. “We gave our army a chance to test itself in battles and to take the experience into account. It is good that our army got this chance to get this experience, not from German aviation but in Finland, with God’s help,” he said (Chubaryan and Shukman 2002, p. 272). During the following months the experience gained in the war against Finland gave rise to widespread reforms in the training, equipping, and organization of the Red Army.

The Soviet Union had gained the territories it wanted, but Chubaryan and Shukman (2002) concludes, the price turned out to be too high, and the USSR’s international authority and the prestige of the Red Army were damaged. In addition to all of that, behind the new border the USSR had earned a bitter neighbor, one anxious about its own security and thirsting for retribution.

After September 1939, the war between Germany and the Western allies was fought mainly on the sea, both sides trying to sever the other’s trade connections. With this end in view, the long coast of Norway interested both sides. The belligerent able to control Norwegian territorial waters or establish a naval base on the Norwegian coast would be in a good position to command the North Sea and the sea lines to the North Atlantic.

The Norwegian Social Democratic government, led by Johan Nygaardsvold, strived to maintain a policy of strict neutrality. This policy favored Germany, because it permitted the use of Norwegian territorial waters for transporting Swedish iron ore, considered indispensable for the German war industry. The British, for their part, wanted to close this hole in their embargo, which was their most effective weapon in the war against Germany. The first lord of the admiralty, Winston Churchill, already on September 19, 1939, took up the idea of laying mines inside Norwegian territorial waters to drive the ore-carrying vessels to the open sea.

The main problem for German naval warfare against Great Britain was its lack of Atlantic bases. In October 1939 Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the German Navy, suggested to Hitler that Germany should acquire a base on the Norwegian coast. Hitler showed little interest in this idea until December 13, when he met Vidkun Quisling, the leader of a Norwegian extreme right-wing party, Nasjonal Samling, who planned to seize power in Norway. Quisling, recommended by Raeder, warned Hitler against British plans in Scandinavia and offered the Germans his party’s assistance. Hitler ordered the OKW to start investigating how to take control of that country should it become necessary. The plans of both belligerents proceeded almost simultaneously, although independently from each other. The capture of the German supply vessel *Altmark*, which lay off the Norwegian coast, by the British Navy convinced Hitler that Norway was not able to defend its neutrality. On March 3 he ordered that *Weserübung* must be carried out before the offensive in the West.

The peace between Finland and the Soviet Union was a severe blow to the Allies. They were forced to demonstrate their ability to take the initiative and challenge Germany with some diversionary measure. After time-consuming wrangling, the British and the French finally decided to lay minefields in Norwegian waters. The Germans were expected to retaliate and strike against southern Norway and perhaps also southern Sweden. This action would offer the Allies justification for sending their troops to Scandinavia in order to extend the fighting to a new theater of war, which they thought would be advantageous to them. Troops and ships were reserved for a possible landing in Norway. That two small neutral countries would be dragged into the war did not count for much. Churchill finally got his way, and early on the morning of April 8 a minefield was laid in the approaches to Narvik. But the German invasion forces were already en route. The first ships had left their harbors on April 3.

The German invasion of Norway has been a contested subject. Were the German intentions aggressive or defensive? German historian Walther Hubatsch (1960) claimed that the British raced the Germans to Norway. The Germans got there first, but only some hours before the British. Swedish scholar Carl-Axel Gemzell (1965), however, pointed out that even during the interwar period the domination of Norway had been seen as a goal of the German Navy owing to the experiences of World War I. Grimnes (1984) considered that the German motives were both aggressive and defensive. Both types of motives interacted and it is difficult to separate them from each other. Raeder and the navy wanted to go forward with *Weserübung*, even though it might risk the loss of a great part of the navy. Hitler was concerned about an encirclement of Germany from the north. Norway must not fall into British hands, he declared. The goal of the operation was to preempt British intervention in Scandinavia, to secure the iron ore supply from Sweden, and to extend the operational basis for the navy and air force against Britain.

Another question which caused controversy was the British intentions. The Germans in 1940 published in "white books" details of captured documents which seemed to show that the British had also planned to occupy Norwegian territory. This thesis was defended after the war by the Norwegian physician Johan Scharffenberg and also by some distinguished British authors. Patrick Salmon (2003) has written an important article on the dispute which followed. When more archival sources became available, historians like Magne Skodvin in Norway and T. K. Derry (1952) in Britain were able to cut the ground under that interpretation.

A total surprise was the precondition for German success. The occupation of Denmark was included in the plan, because the Germans needed to have the Danish airfields at their disposal. The Germans hoped that both Denmark and Norway would submit to a peaceful occupation. In Denmark their hopes materialized. The Danes had no chance whatsoever to defend their country against the German Army. The Danish government protested but yielded. Through a policy of negotiation it was able to preserve the legal administration until summer 1943.

In Norway, things went differently. Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht was a pacifist who firmly believed in the rights of the neutral states. He thought that Germany had no interest in invading Norway unless provoked by the British. Consequently, he was more concerned about the violations of Norwegian neutrality from the British side than about the German activities. Several warnings about the German threat passed unnoticed, and military precautions were not increased. As Olav Riste (1966) wrote,

the night of April 8–9 caught the Norwegians completely unprepared. Their mobilization came too late and was partly miscarried. The country suffered from a serious lack of political and military leadership. Troops which had been left without clear orders laid down their arms without a fight. General Otto Ruge, the dynamic commander in chief, tried in vain to delay the German advance with his untrained and ill-equipped troops until help came from the Allies.

The German campaign was based on well-organized cooperation among army troops, the navy, and the air force. The Allied campaign in Norway was a show of incompetence. As Lunde writes, it revealed the glaring inadequacies of inter-allied cooperation and coordination (Lunde 2009). The Royal Navy failed to cut off the advance of the German forces. The British troops arriving first were inadequately armed and supplied, and without an effective anti-aircraft defense and air cover, they were unprotected against German air raids. Only in the far north, in Narvik, where the German Air Force could not be effective, did the British, French, Polish, and Norwegians have the upper hand. But just as victory loomed, the Allies decided to withdraw from Narvik in order to bring their forces to the western front, where the situation had become critical. The Norwegians felt deceived. Left alone, their troops surrendered on June 10, 1940.

After the war, Norwegians searched for explanations and for culprits. Tough criticism was directed toward the Nygaardsvold government for neglecting their military defenses and toward Koht's foreign policy. Historians have shown more understanding of the situation in which the Norwegian government found itself. Riste reminded already in 1966 that the Norwegian government's actions were inspired by an honest and keen desire to remain at peace with other nations, and they were supported by an overwhelming majority of the Norwegian people. The lack of foresight was not limited to Norway, he writes. In the 1980s an 8-volume work *Norge i krig* was published in Norway. The main editor was Magne Skodvin. The author of the first part, which deals with the German invasion of Norway, Ole Kristian Grimnes, notes that the signs of danger had not been so clear, and the British, too, misinterpreted the movements of the German warships in the first days of April.

After June 1940, German domination in Scandinavia was almost complete. The Norwegian coast offered Germany favorable bases for maritime warfare in the Atlantic. Germany had access to Scandinavian economic resources – Danish foodstuffs, Swedish iron ore, Norwegian aluminium, and Finnish copper and timber. Sweden had to limit its neutrality and allow the Germans to use their railway system for the transport of soldiers and armaments. But in Finland hopes rose that Germany would create a balance to the Soviet dominance in the north.

Few subjects have been as disputed in Finnish historiography as the course of events that led Finland to join Germany and then embark on a new war against the Soviet Union. The Russian view was – and still is – that Finland was the aggressor. The Finns, for their part, had not forgotten which side had started the Winter War in 1939. The war which broke out on June 25, 1941 was – and still is – commonly called the Continuation War, a sequel of the Winter War. After that war, the Finns were forced to condemn President Risto Ryti and seven other members of the cabinet – among them the leading Social Democrat Väinö Tanner – to long prison sentences in a war crimes trial. Their condemnation was a most traumatic event because most Finns regarded them men of honor who had served the country well

in difficult circumstances. This trauma explains why Finnish historians have had difficulty dealing with the origins of the Continuation War. A major controversy flared up when American historian Charles Leonard Lundin published *Finland in the Second World War* (1957), and claimed that Finland's leaders had intentionally steered the country into a new war against the Soviet Union but concealed the agreements made with Germany from the parliament and the people. Lundin worked mainly on the basis of memoirs. The moralizing tone in his work greatly annoyed the Finnish public. As it later turned out, Lundin, in many respects, came quite close to revealing the real state of events.

In 1961, Arvi Korhonen, who was one of Lundin's sharpest critics, published in 1961 a work on the Barbarossa plan and Finland. It was the first study based on German documents and interviews of contemporaries detailing the contact between German and Finnish military personnel in 1940–1941. Korhonen took as his point of departure Finland's desperate situation in the summer of 1940. The country's leaders, Prime Minister Ryti (after December 1940, president of the Republic) and Marshal Mannerheim, were greatly relieved when in August Germany consented secretly to deliver arms to Finland. A German request for right of transit for troops through northern Finland was granted without hesitation. During the autumn, Finland actually moved from the Soviet sphere of influence to the German orbit. Korhonen maintains that Finland's motives were merely defensive and stresses Germany's role in initiating contact with Finland. According to him, Finnish leaders did not bind the country to Barbarossa. Rather, external forces that were too powerful to resist brought the country to war. At the end of his book, Korhonen cites a sentence from the memoirs of the former German envoy Wipert von Blücher: "Finland was swept into the turmoil of great power policy like a rapid Finnish river carries away a piece of driftwood." Korhonen's critics soon called his interpretation "the driftwood theory" (Korhonen 1961, p. 340).

The most severe criticism of that interpretation came from abroad, and finally, the American historian Hans Peter Krosby sank the "driftwood theory" (Krosby 1967). On the basis of German archival sources he proved that Finland had not been a passive bystander but had actively sought out German protection. Four or five months before the beginning of Barbarossa, contact began between the Finnish and German military leadership. Together they planned the operations and timetables – according to German suggestions. Before the launching of Barbarossa Finnish leaders were all but formally bound to a war of aggression. A massive Soviet air raid on Finnish targets on June 25, 1941 gave the government the pretext to declare that the country was again waging a justified defensive war. Krosby also shows some understanding of Finland's difficult position and the motives of its leaders. He even maintains that, in summer and autumn 1940, encouragement and support from Germany helped Finland avoid sharing the fate of the Baltic countries. When the war between the two great powers broke out, Finland had no alternative but to join Germany in the hope that it would quickly beat the great eastern power (Krosby 1967).

Based on overwhelming evidence, the interpretation emphasizing the active role of Finnish leaders in approaching Germany became the consensus. In 1977 Mauno Jokipii published an important article in which he traced the beginning of Finland's orientation toward Germany to December 1940. He argued that, in winter 1940–1941, Commander in Chief Mannerheim, who had thus far pursued cooperation with

Sweden, implemented – apparently reluctantly and without alternative – a new strategy which sought cooperation with Germany. In February, deeply worried about the army's ability to defend the country against a new attack, he also forced President Ryti to adopt a pro-German position (Jokipii 1987). Jokipii attracted considerable attention because Mannerheim, who was regarded as a national hero, had been intentionally shielded from the war crimes trial and his role in the run-up to the Continuation War was passed over in silence. Jokipii drew criticism from Ohto Manninen, who pointed out that Finland's turn toward Germany was a result of a much longer process. He maintained that Finland's leaders had hoped for support from Germany since the end of the Winter War. They only detected in the autumn of 1940 that Germany was ready to offer support. Consequently, the change which led to cooperation took place, not in Finland's policy, but in Germany's (Manninen 1977).

Were Finland's leaders justified in fearing new aggression from the Soviet Union? Manninen points out that after the Winter War the Soviets directed their attention toward the southwest. To be sure, the Red Army's generals did see Finland as a probable enemy and prepared plans for the conquest of the entire country (Manninen 2008). In November 1940, during his visit to Berlin, Foreign Commissar Molotov declared that the USSR wanted to settle the Finnish question as they had done in the Baltic States. The Germans immediately relayed their version of these discussions to the Finns, reassuring the Finns that Hitler had rejected the Soviet demands.

In a voluminous work published in 1987, Jokipii proved how the contacts between the Finnish and German military started in December 1940. Based on military sources, Jokipii carefully follows the unfolding of their cooperation. Finnish decisions were made in the "Inner Circle," where Ryti and Mannerheim were the central figures. At first they sought security guarantees from Germany. Then, the vision of a rift between Germany and the USSR tempted them to expand their objectives to include the restitution of the areas ceded in the Peace of Moscow and the drawing of a new frontier in the east. On the down side, they understood that it would be impossible for Finland to remain uninvolved in a war between Germany and the USSR (Jokipii 1987). Without making any formal commitments, Finland participated in the planning of joint operations with Germany under the more transparent guise of neutrality. Three days after Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, Finland joined the enemies of the USSR.

But the "Inner Circle" was not alone. Jokipii points out that their decisions reflected the views of practically the whole political elite and, indeed, those of the majority of the people. Most Finns did not regard it as such a terrible crime to try to recoup what had been wrongly taken from them. Even the Social Democrats, the largest party in the parliament, under their leader Väinö Tanner, silently approved the course of events (Jokipii 1987). Jokipii's superb work on the origins of the Continuation War did not end Finnish discussion on the subject. Historians still debate the extent to which circumstances or the aims of Finnish leaders dictated events. Most historians conclude that in 1940–1941 Finland had no realistic alternatives other than cooperation with Germany (Meinander 2009).

In July and August 1941, Finnish troops reconquered the territory lost in the Peace of Moscow. Mannerheim rejected the German proposals to join in operations against Leningrad. Instead, the Finns launched an offensive in Russian Karelia and occupied a large area that had never belonged to Finland. A great part of the population living

there spoke Finnish or related languages. University students in particular, as well as the extreme right had dreamed of a Greater Finland that annexed "Eastern Karelia" to Finland proper. This territorial expansion was never officially declared one of the Finnish war goals, but, as Antti Laine has shown, the occupation authorities immediately started the "Fennicization" of Eastern Karelia. The goal was to prepare the region for permanent integration with Finland (Laine 1982).

In 1979–1981, Tuomo Polvinen published a three-volume study of Finland in international politics from 1941 to 1947 (Polvinen 1979–1981). It is the definitive work on the subject. The author views Finland's position from the perspective of the great powers. Among the states which belonged to the coalition led by Germany, Finland enjoyed a special status. Hitler tolerated Finnish democracy because Finland's involvement in the war was, in many respects, advantageous to Germany. The Finnish Army was in no way subordinate to the Germans but fought under its own commander in chief, who always found excuses to evade operations which did not correspond with Finnish national interests. Finland never declared war on the United States, as did Germany's allies, and it maintained diplomatic relations with that Western power until June 1944, when the American government severed them. Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941 at the behest of Moscow. Nevertheless, most Finns at the time felt that they were waging a war of their own against the Soviet Union. The Finnish government declared that the country was engaged in a separate war alongside Germany. Until quite recently, the nature of that separateness has been a matter of controversy. Most Finnish historians are now inclined to think that this expression – created during the war for political purposes – cannot be used to describe the actual state of affairs. The German 20th Mountain Army operated from northern Finland and both navies had a close association on the northern Baltic. As Manfred Menger and Ilkka Seppinen have pointed out, Finland was totally dependent on imports from Germany, which subsidized Finland with large credits (Menger 1974; Seppinen 1983).

The Finns hoped that Germany would beat the Soviet Union and crush Bolshevism, but, when it appeared that Germany would lose the war in the east, the Finns started to put out peace feelers to Moscow. However, in April 1944, the Finnish government and parliament rejected the terms proposed by Moscow, believing they could easily lead to the complete subjugation of the country by the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet army launched a massive offensive against Finland on June 9, 1944 in order to compel it to accept the terms. Its force took the Finns by surprise. When, after the collapse of the front, Finland indicated that it was willing to engage in new talks, the Soviet Union demanded its surrender. The Finnish government decided to leave the demand unanswered and sought German aid, for which it had to pay a political price. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, and under pressure from Mannerheim, who insisted that German assistance was absolutely necessary to consolidate the front, President Ryti signed, on June 26 a letter to Hitler, guaranteeing that he would not make peace with the Soviet Union without German consent. This agreement, of course, meant an end of the separate war theory. The necessity of this so-called "Ryti–Ribbentrop agreement" was controversial then, and remains controversial now. Markku Jokisipilä's thesis about the background of this agreement is one of the most important analyses of the German–Finnish relations during the war. However, his interpretations do benefit from some hindsight. Jokisipilä maintains that

Finland had already received from Germany the arms its army needed to repel the Soviet offensive before Ryti signed the agreement (Jokisipilä 2004). That is correct, but at the time, Ryti and Mannerheim could not have known that the main interest of the Soviet army would soon turn away from the Finnish front.

Jokisipilä concludes that Finland was in 1944 as in 1940, saved by the fighting spirit of its army supported by a practically unified nation. All the important political parties worked together in the government and no organized resistance movement appeared as in the other countries fighting on the side of Germany (Jokisipilä 2004). At the beginning of July the Finns halted the main Soviet onslaught at Ihantala, northeast of Vyborg, by the skillfully concentrated fire of their artillery, the tough resistance of the infantry armed with German antitank weapons, and the precision bombing of German dive bombers. This success has later been called “a defensive victory,” and it is widely believed that “the Miracle of Ihantala” saved the country. Owing to an archival discovery which Martti Turtola made in Moscow, we now know what kind of conditions the Soviets were preparing for Finland in June 1944: occupation of the country and Soviet control of government, administration, and the economy (Turtola 1994). In mid-July the Soviet Union signaled that it would be willing to begin negotiations with Finland again. Ryti resigned from presidency, and the Parliament, enacting an emergency law, elected Marshal Mannerheim as president of the Republic. He was also acceptable to the Soviet government as a negotiating partner. On September 2, Finland severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and the armistice between Finland and the Allies was signed in Moscow on September 19. Thanks to Mannerheim’s enormous prestige, Finland managed to disengage itself from the war with its internal unity unbroken. The army closed ranks behind its commander in chief and took on the difficult task of repelling German troops from northern Finland. By autumn 1944, Finland started to move to peacetime conditions.

Most of the Finnish historiography about World War II has focused on military and political history, but there are also important works about social history. Hannu Soikkanen has analyzed the unique situation of the Social Democratic party during the war. It shared responsibility in the government, and its leader Väinö Tanner loyally supported Ryti’s policy, but also tried to limit war aims and to hasten the country’s detachment from the war. The majority of the party rank and file agreed with this policy, stressed national solidarity, and supported the defense of democratic values (H. Soikkanen 1987). In 1974, a research project entitled “Finland in World War II” (*Suoma*) was established, in which several universities cooperated. The social history of wartime had a central position in its program. One of the focuses was the resettlement of the people who moved away from the areas ceded to the Soviet Union. Silvo Hietanen has published a study about the Prompt Settlement Act enacted in 1940 to assist displaced persons who were mainly Karelian small farmers. His study connects that law with the long heritage of Finnish settlement policy (Hietanen 1982). The researchers in *Suoma* also produced a three-volume work *Kansakunta sodassa* (Hietanen 1989–1992). It was the first work which in a wide perspective dealt also with the economy, society, and everyday life during wartime.

Recently, everyday life on the home front, the experiences of women and children, and the fate of prisoners of war have become interesting subjects for research. Marjatta Hietala and her group of younger historians have studied the impact of the war on

scientific research and technology (Hietala 2006). In the future, historians working on World War II should put similar questions on their agendas, especially while taking a comparative approach.

The legacy of World War II has had a deep impact on the Finnish identity. The final question for the Finnish historians has been on how Finland was able to preserve its independence, keep a political and ideological distance to Germany, and pull out of the war without being occupied. A number of American, British, German, and Swedish historians have also made important contributions on Finland's role in the war, thus broadening the viewpoint.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Naval War in the Mediterranean

BARBARA BROOKS TOMBLIN

Hostilities in the Mediterranean in World War II came slowly for the officers and men of both Great Britain's Royal Navy and Italy's Regia Marina. For nine months following the declaration of war between Germany and Great Britain in September 1939, the Mediterranean remained a calm backwater and British policy continued to be one of appeasement toward Fascist Italy. In the spring of 1940, growing concerns about Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's increasingly bellicose statements about "*mare nostrum*" prompted the British Admiralty to send reinforcements to their eastern fleet. Finally, after tense weeks following the German invasion of France, on June 10, 1940, Mussolini joined his Axis partner and declared war. The so-called "Phoney War" had ended in the Mediterranean and for the next five years Allied naval forces fought the Axis in what was the longest air, sea, and land campaign of World War II. Until the United States entered the war, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force bore the brunt of the war there, sparring for control of the Mediterranean Sea with the Italian Navy and Regia Aeronautica, joined in 1941 by the German Air Force and German U-boats. After the fall of France, the British briefly debated the wisdom of defending the Mediterranean in the face of Vichy French neutrality, with the possible intervention by Franco's Spain, and without the assistance of the French fleet. Assured by the commander in chief for the Mediterranean, Andrew B. Cunningham, that his fleet could secure the eastern basin, and prodded by the pugnacious Prime Minister Winston Churchill's determination not to lose the British imperial position in the Middle East, the War Cabinet decided on a "blue water strategy" for the Mediterranean. This despite concerns for defense of the home islands during what became known as the Battle of Britain and the increasingly grim situation facing Allied shipping in the U-boat infested waters of the North Atlantic.

Correlli Barnett (1991) argued that Britain's peripheral or "blue water strategy" was a great mistake. He labeled Malta "the Verdun of the Mediterranean" and criticized the War Cabinet for pouring scarce resources into its defense. Michael

Howard (1993), on the other hand, contends that for two years the British did not have the necessary resources to engage German ground forces on land in any other theater of the war. Furthermore, as Somerville's biographer Michael Simpson has pointed out, "Somerville himself never questioned our Mediterranean strategy in general or the necessity of sustaining Malta in particular, despite the cost in ships, planes, equipment, and lives entailed" (Simpson 1995, p. 61). In his mind, "Succouring Malta was a symbol of our general resistance to the braggadocio Mussolini just off his own coast." In *Path to Victory*, Douglas Porch (2004) stressed the importance of the Mediterranean as "World War II's pivotal theater" contending that Allied operations in the Mediterranean occupied the Allies and prevented a premature invasion of Europe in 1943. The theater was a critical proving ground for future operations in Europe and the Pacific, a point forcefully made by Samuel E. Morison who wrote, "The Mediterranean operations of 1943–1944 were a turning point in that aspect" (Morison 1964, p. xi).

Pursuing a "blue water strategy," the British committed a large share of their wartime assets to the Mediterranean, deploying two sizable naval forces, Force H at Gibraltar and an eastern fleet at Alexandria in Egypt. From these two fleet bases and the centrally located island of Malta, the Royal Navy sought to establish naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and prevent Italian naval and air forces from closing the convoy through route across the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal. The greater part of Allied troops and supplies took a safer supply route around the Cape of Good Hope, but from June 1940 to August 1942, British warships escorted numerous convoys across the Mediterranean bringing reinforcements to Malta, the Aegean, the Middle East, and to British Army forces fighting the Italians and Germans in North Africa. To accomplish this mission, and when opportunity arose to seek the offensive, the Royal Navy had to confront the fast, well armed, modern or modernized battleships and cruisers of the Regia Marina, aircraft of the Italian Air Force, the world's largest submarine forces, as well as home waters defended by thickly sown minefields.

From the beginning of the Mediterranean war, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham eagerly sought to bring the Italian fleet to action and over the next two years his ships engaged Italian surface units in six major engagements off Calabria, Punto Stilo, Cape Spartivento, Cape Matapan, and two in the Gulf of Sirte. Numerous historical accounts by S. W. C. Pack (1968, 1993), Ronald Seth (1960), Peter C. Smith (1976, 1980), and others have chronicled these surface engagements as did general histories of naval operations in the Mediterranean published soon after the war. These, however, focused primarily on naval operations, leaving issues of strategy, intelligence, and politics to others.

Allied naval operations in the Mediterranean have been the subject of a number of official histories, written, as Gerhard L. Weinberg notes, "by highly trained scholars with early and almost unlimited access to the archives" (1994, p. 924). I. S. O. Playfair wrote three volumes of *The Mediterranean and the Middle East* (1966), and British naval officer and historian, Stephen W. Roskill, authored their official history of naval operations, *The War at Sea* (1954–1960). Although they did not include notes on sources, these well-written and thoroughly researched official studies remain basic resources on the Mediterranean war. Royal Navy staff histories, *The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, Vol. 1: September 1939–October 1940* and *Vol. 2: November 1940–December 1941* (2002), composed for confidential use only, are becoming

available after more than fifty years. They enhance our understanding of operations in the Mediterranean and add to the official reports available soon after the war in the supplements to the *London Gazette*, now available online. Naturally, all of these official histories tended to cast the Royal Navy's record in the Mediterranean in the best possible light, downplaying wartime controversies, inadequacies, mistakes, and personality clashes between commanders.

Until recently, naval histories of the Mediterranean war in English have described these stirring naval actions from the British or Allied point of view. This is, in part, because works available in English about Axis operations in the Mediterranean have been scarce. In one early study, *The Italian Navy in World War II*, Marc Antonio Bragadin (1957) traced the Italian Navy's struggle to supply Axis armies in North Africa, difficulties due to oil shortages, poor aerial reconnaissance, and intelligence, and both the successes and failures of their large submarine service. Drawing upon Italian and British sources, Bragadin described the Regia Marina's successes at sea, the often heroic actions of her officers and men, and the armistice of September 1943. He argued that Benito Mussolini did not understand the importance of sea power and that his war aims suffered from frustrations and reverses at sea. Bragadin does not gloss over the navy's shortcomings, especially "disappointing torpedoes," a command structure that was so tightly centralized as to discourage initiative at sea, and poorly collected and evaluated intelligence (Bragadin 1957, pp. 11, 323–324). Most serious, was the Italian Navy's failure to obtain timely and effective air support, build an aircraft carrier, and train bombing and torpedo squadrons capable of mounting as complex an operation as the British raid on Taranto. Bragadin reserves his most telling criticism for the Italian-German error of postponing an assault on Malta that marked the beginning of the downward path of Axis fortunes in the Mediterranean. Within a month after the postponement, American air forces had begun to arrive in the Middle East, the US carrier *Wasp* was used in aircraft ferry runs to Malta, and Luftwaffe squadrons were withdrawn, at Rommel's urging, from Sicily to Cyrenaica and at Hitler's insistence to the Russian front.

The necessity of maintaining two fleets at either end of the Mediterranean compounded the Royal Navy's wartime mission and stretched available resources, sometimes to the limit. From its base at Gibraltar, Admiral James Somerville's Force H guarded the Strait, escorted twenty convoys eastward into the Mediterranean, carried out a bombardment of Genoa and mounted air attacks on Italian air bases and ports. In July 1940, despite assurances from French officials that French ships in colonial ports would not join the Axis war effort, the dubious British government ordered Somerville to present Admiral Gensoul, the commander of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran, with an ultimatum to either join the British fleet, sail to a British port with reduced crews or to the French West Indies or a US port and decommission the fleet, or scuttle his ships at Mers-el-Kebir. When negotiations failed, on July 3, 1940 Somerville reluctantly ordered his ships to open fire on the French ships sinking three of their four capital ships. Concealed in the smoke, *Strasbourg* escaped only to be spotted by one of *Ark Royal*'s aircraft. The carrier sent torpedo planes to stop the battle cruiser and HMS *Hood* briefly pursued, but she got away to Toulon. In this tragic affair, 1,300 French sailors lost their lives.

At Alexandria, Admiral Cunningham and his French counterpart Admiral Godfroy enjoyed a more cordial relationship and worked out an arrangement to disarm the

French ships and avoid a repeat of the sad affair at Mers-el-Kebir (Dannreuther 2005, p. 35). During the passage of one convoy in late November, Somerville's Force H encountered the Italian fleet. After a brief exchange of gunfire, the Italians disengaged, but Somerville chose to protect his convoy and not to pursue the withdrawing Italian force. The Admiralty appointed a board of enquiry to investigate the battle, known as the battle of Cape Spartivento, and Somerville responded with a summary of his views of the action. "And concluded it," he told his wife, "by saying that I had to resist the temptation of attempting to score a small advantage by sinking an Iti ship at the expense of achieving my object which was to pass the convoy, corvettes, and personnel through to the eastern Med" (Simpson 1995, 203). Although the Board exonerated him, the Admiralty's lack of confidence in Somerville angered him and caused resentment among his fellow officers and men.

As the Royal Navy devoted much wartime effort in the Mediterranean to the defense and supply of Malta, early histories highlighted the numerous "club runs" to the island, its heroic defense by RAF air crews, and the stoic determination of the Maltese people who endured countless air attacks which killed or wounded many civilians and destroyed homes, churches, and businesses. They also suffered from fuel shortages and from reduced rations which sometimes approached near starvation levels. Centrally located between Gibraltar and Alexandria, Malta controlled the convoy through route across the Mediterranean and served as a base for reconnaissance aircraft, submarines, and surface striking forces. Indeed, by August 1942, 38 merchantmen escorted by Force H had delivered troops and equipment to bolster British offensives in the Western Desert, Hurricane fighters, AA guns, fuel, and supplies to Malta, all with the loss of just two destroyers, two merchant vessels, a score of aircraft, and one aircraft carrier, HMS *Ark Royal*. Malta's close proximity to airbases in Sicily, however, gave Italian bombers, joined in January and February 1941 by the Luftwaffe X Fliegerkorps' dive-bomber and fighter squadrons, an easy target. When Axis air raids ended on July 20, 1943, Malta had suffered a total of 3,340 alerts since the beginning of hostilities in June 1940.

The defense of Malta and the air war in the Mediterranean have inspired a series of books. Recent additions, *Spitfires over Malta* by Brian Cull (2005), and Christopher Shores, Brian Cull, and Nicola Malizia's *Malta: The Spitfire Year 1942* (2002), have given readers a definitive picture of heroic defenses of Malta by RAF and Fleet Air Arm air crews. Over the past decade, D. A. Thomas (2004) and Richard Woodman (2000) have also added to our knowledge of the Malta convoys and *The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys: A Naval Staff History*, edited by Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, finally declassified, became available in 2006. Douglas Austin's *Malta and British Strategic Policy, 1925–1943* (2004) challenged arguments that the island was of limited value and concluded that Malta made a significant contribution to the war effort. In *Fortress Malta: An Island under Siege*, James Holland (2003) studied the siege of Malta and the defenses in detail and depicted the sea and air battles around the island. These works build on Charles Jellison's earlier study (1984) which turned a critical eye on the prewar ambivalence of the British government about defending Malta if war broke out, providing troops, anti-aircraft weapons, and aircraft for its defense or building air raid shelters and stockpiling fuel and supplies. Earlier works also papered over problems experienced in unloading cargoes and protecting newly delivered fighters from air attacks. Civilians who lived through the

siege and servicemen who served on Malta during the war are the subject of Frank Rixon's *Malta GC remembered* (2005) and more oral histories are recorded by contributors to the BBC People's War project.

In November 1940, the Royal Navy turned to the offensive in the Mediterranean. Revising a prewar plan, Cunningham's eastern fleet with the carrier *Illustrious* executed Operation Judgment, sending two waves of vintage Swordfish biplane torpedo planes to attack the Italian naval base at Taranto. The daring raid took the Italians quite by surprise and damaged three of Italy's six battleships, altering, at least temporarily, the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean. Taranto gave British morale a much needed boost, proved the utility of the aerial torpedo and Duplex pistol, vindicated the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm, and allowed Cunningham to send two battleships home. "As an example of 'economy of force' it is probably unsurpassed," the admiral wrote (Simpson 1999, p. 62).

The success of the Taranto raid, followed by an army British offensive in the Western Desert that by February 1941 had pushed the Italians out of Cyrenaica, seemed to turn the Mediterranean war in Britain's favor. In January 1941, however, recently arrived German dive-bombers, trained as anti-shipping units, located the British fleet and in just over six minutes inflicted serious damage on the aircraft carrier *Illustrious*. Captain Denis Boyd managed to conn the crippled carrier into Grand Harbor, Malta. Here despite more pounding air attacks, she was patched up and sailed for Alexandria and on to dockyards in the US. She remained out of service for a year. This left Admiral Cunningham without a carrier in the Mediterranean until the arrival of the HMS *Formidable* in March. The presence of the Luftwaffe had a devastating impact on British naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean. "In a few minutes the whole situation changed. At one blow the fleet had been deprived of its fighter aircraft, and its command of the Mediterranean was threatened by a weapon more efficient and dangerous than any against which we had fought before," Cunningham noted (Simpson 1999, p. 245).

That spring 1941, Cunningham's ships participated in the build up of British and Anzac troops in Greece. When they could not halt the German onslaught, the navy sent cruisers and destroyers to evacuate as many troops as possible from beaches and small ports along the coast. German dive-bombers attempted to stop the evacuations, but by May 1 the navy had evacuated 50,000 Commonwealth and Greek soldiers. Most went to the island of Crete, but on May 20, 1941 the Germans launched an airborne invasion using 13,000 parachutists and glider troops and 9,000 mountain troops brought in by JU-52 transport planes. They overwhelmed the defenders, seized Maleme airfield, and forced the British and Anzac troops to retreat over the mountains to the south coast. "Stick it out," Cunningham told his men, "Navy must not let Army down" and ordered Royal Navy cruisers and destroyers to evacuate thousands of troops from the coastal town of Sphakia (Simpson 1999, p. 219). In the face of repeated air attacks, the evacuation proved a costly operation that resulted in the loss of three cruisers and six destroyers bombed and sunk by Axis aircraft, as well as two battleships, the carrier *Formidable*, two cruisers, and two destroyers badly damaged. The toll in lives lost, 2,000 naval officers and men, grieved Admiral Cunningham, but the Germans suffered far more men killed in the ten days of fighting – 6,000 – and Crete turned Hitler against the future use of airborne operations (Beevor 1991).

On a brighter note, in February 1941 Force H mounted a daring and successful bombardment of the city of Genoa, approaching undetected and using air spot to shell military targets. Somerville believed that practically all of the salvoes had fallen on works, shipping, docks, and warehouses, but told his wife, "Still there is no use pretending that some innocent people were [not?] killed. War is lousy" (Simpson 1995, p. 243).

In March, 1941, General Erwin Rommel's Afrikakorps launched an offensive in the Western Desert to take advantage of British forces weakened by the withdrawal of men and equipment to Greece and Crete. The Desert Fox's armies rolled eastward threatening Egypt and leaving only the port of Tobruk in British hands. Using every available destroyer and small craft, Cunningham kept the besieged garrison at Tobruk supplied, but in June had to divert some surface ships to support the army's campaign in Syria where the British feared a rapid German advance similar to that in Crete. Admiral E. L. S. King's squadron patrolled off the Syrian coast, shelling inland targets and on three occasions dueling with "well and boldly handled" Vichy French destroyers (O'Hara 2009, ch. 8).

Force H continued to bring supplies into Malta and the island fought back against Axis supply convoys to North Africa with a hunter-killer campaign by cruisers and destroyers guided to their targets by signals intelligence and aircraft. On April 16, Captain Philip Mack's 14th Destroyer Flotilla savagely attacked an enemy convoy of five transports and three escorts off Sfax, sinking or driving all but one ship ashore. Malta celebrated the first of many victories by the Malta Striking Forces which began operating from Malta in the fall. British attacks on Axis convoys escalated and losses mounted. Rommel pleaded with OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) to provide some kind of support to supply his forces in the desert and on September 17, 1941 Hitler ordered six German U-boats to the Mediterranean in hopes of reversing the downward supply trend.

The arrival of German U-boats altered the naval war in the Mediterranean dramatically. Although they had to pass through the vigilantly guarded Strait of Gibraltar and some fell victim to patrolling Allied aircraft or anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels, the smaller German submarines commanded by aggressive captains quickly made their presence felt. Fritz Guggenberger's *U-81* torpedoed the carrier *Ark Royal* in November and less than two weeks later *U-331*, commanded by Freiherr von Tiesenhausen, hit the battleship *Barham* which sank with heavy loss of life. In all, 27 U-boats entered the Mediterranean in 1941, 16 more in 1942, and 10 in both 1943 and 1944. In his new book, Lawrence Paterson relates they "sank an impressive array of naval vessels, totaling 38 warships, one battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, one large fast minelayer, sixteen destroyers or destroyer escorts, one frigate, one sloop, one submarine depot ship, one corvette, three minesweepers, five LSTs, and two ASW trawlers" (Patterson 2007, pp. 182–183) as well as 116 merchant vessels far surpassing the record of Italian submarines. Numerous works on German submarines and memoirs of German submariners appeared after the war, but a definitive account awaited Clay Blair's detailed, well-researched *Hitler's U-boat War* (1998). Jürgen Rohwer's *Axis Submarine Successes* (1983) also provided statistics on German and Italian submarines. To compound British woes, in December, six Italian frogmen launched from a submarine penetrated the defenses of Alexandria harbor and damaged the battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant*. That same month the

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the United States entered the war, but events in the Far East compelled Admiral Cunningham to send some of his ships to reinforce the Royal Navy there.

Initially, absorbed by events in the Pacific, the United States contributed only a small number of aircraft and personnel to the Middle East and Mediterranean. In May 1942, however, the US Navy did lend the aircraft carrier USS *Wasp* to ferry aircraft to Malta which had been targeted by Hitler for extinction and since January had endured increasingly heavy Axis air raids, 2,600 alone in February. Malta's Hurricane fighters rose to defend the island, but their numbers dwindled. *Argus* and *Eagle* managed to fly off 31 new Spitfire fighters to Malta in March, but when Cunningham attempted to run in a convoy, the Italian fleet, emboldened by the Royal Navy's weaknesses, came out to fight and engaged Philip Vian's forces in the second battle of Sirte. Vian drove off the Italian ships, which suffered losses in a powerful gale, but Luftwaffe attacks sank the only three merchantmen to struggle into Grand Harbor. The arrival of only 5,000 tons left Malta desperately short of food and fuel.

In the Western Desert, Rommel's troops had pushed the British back to a line just west of Tobruk. The garrison's weary but determined defenders held out, supplied by Cunningham's destroyers and a bevy of small craft. The harrowing experiences of the little gunboats *Ladybird* and *Aphis* and the exploits of the old W and V destroyers on the legendary "Tobruk tramlines" were portrayed in one of the best early operational studies of the Mediterranean war at sea written by G. Hermon Gill. His *Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942*, published in 1957, included fine first hand accounts of Australian naval vessels in the Western Desert campaigns, during the evacuations from Greece and Crete, and in the Mediterranean until the end of 1941.

By June 1942, Corelli Barnett argues, "Britain's 'blue water strategy' was, in Michael Simpson's words, dead in the water" (Simpson 2000, p. 64). "Indeed, with just two dozen U-boats, under a thousand aircraft, and three divisions of troops, the Germans had undermined the British position," Michael Simpson states, "built up over 150 years." On June 21, Tobruk finally surrendered dealing British morale a serious blow but bolstering Churchill's case for American assistance in maintaining their position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. As Simpson put it, President Franklin D. Roosevelt managed to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bale out "the capsizing Imperial boat" (Simpson 2000 p. 64). The United States soon discovered that unlike the Pacific, where they "called the tunes to which a single enemy had to dance," in the Mediterranean they had an important ally and two major enemies (Morison 1964, preface).

The desert war raged all that summer and in August the British mounted Operation Pedestal, a last desperate venture to supply the beleaguered island of Malta. Pummeled by Axis bombers, E-boats, submarines, and minefields, only five of the fourteen merchantmen of the convoy, including the tanker *Ohio*, managed to reach Grand Harbor, but their cargoes lifted the siege of Malta. "The reward justified the price exacted," Sam Moses explained. "Revictualled and replenished with ammunition and vital stores, the strength of Malta revived. British submarines returned to the island and with striking forces of the Royal Air Force, regained their dominating position in the Central Mediterranean" (Moses 2007, p. 88).

As an Allied base, Malta would play an important part in future Allied operations against the Axis. The first of these joint amphibious ventures, Operation Torch, took

place in November 1942 when American and British invasion forces landed on the Moroccan coast and inside the Mediterranean at Algiers and Oran. Allied planners hoped the Vichy French would not contest the landings, but at Casablanca the French battleship *Jean Bart* exchanged fire with Admiral H. Kent Hewitt's warships. Ashore, French troops briefly resisted Allied advances and stopped cold an attempt by American troops in two aging coast guard cutters to secure the port of Oran. Royal Navy warships did lend gunfire support to British troops on the ground, but on November 10 resistance ended. However, Cunningham noted, "bitterly regretted that bolder measures had not been taken in Operation 'Torch,' and that we had not landed at Bizerte" where the Vichy French resident general Admiral Esteva would have welcomed Allied troops (Cunningham 1951, p. 501). Before the Allies could organize a push toward Tunis-Bizerte, Esteva allowed the Germans to mount an efficient last minute airborne operation to reinforce the Tunis bridgehead. This delayed a quick advance by the Allies into Tunisia to hook up with Montgomery's Eighth Army coming west from its famous victory at El Alamein. Fighting continued until early May 1943 when Hitler belatedly allowed his pressed Axis armies to surrender.

To prevent a possible mass evacuation of Axis forces from Tunisia by sea, Cunningham issued orders to "Sink, burn, and destroy. Let nothing pass," but in the end Operation Retribution proved a disappointing affair, writes Barbara Tomblin (2004, pp. 119–122). Destroyers picked up just a handful of rowboats attempting to flee and 130,000 Germans and more Italians went into POW camps. Hitler and the German high command had not taken the Mediterranean theater seriously and "failed to deal a mortal blow at England in a part of the world vital for her," Commander in Chief South Albert Kesselring argued. "The Allies won a total victory ... Great Britain, the classical Mediterranean power, had been able, with the aid of the Americans, to establish a jumping off place for an assault on Europe from the south" (Kesselring 1997, p. 156).

The landings in North Africa, the "most ambitious and successful undertaking of the Atlantic Fleet of the United States Navy in 1942," are ably described in *Operations in North African Waters October 1942–June 1943*, one volume in the United States Navy's fifteen volume official history written by the distinguished American historian Samuel Eliot Morison (Morison 1965, p. 13). For a time out of print, his valuable work covering Allied naval operations in the Mediterranean is once again available. Morison served with the US Navy during the war and had access not only to official action reports, but many senior commanders. Although Morison and a staff of researchers were not privy to the influence of the Ultra source of decrypts, they compiled a comprehensive narrative of events for the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, and southern France. Critics have noted that Morison's narratives contain minor errors and lack more recent sources, but with appendixes and detailed footnotes these volumes remain indispensable for scholars and students of the Mediterranean war from 1942 to 1945.

The Allies followed up their success in North Africa by securing the Italian-held islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa, and Linosa, in preparation for an invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Two British and American task forces, 2,590 ships, using a new generation of small landing craft – LSTs, LCMs, LCTs, DUKWs – put 180,000 Allied troops ashore on either side of the Pachino peninsula (Maund 1949). They experienced little opposition at first from the Italians, but stiff resistance from German troops. US

Navy destroyers duelled with German tanks at Gela and nervous AA gunners on Allied ships shot down a number of troop transporters and gliders carrying American paratroopers. In the rugged Sicilian mountains and along the north coast of the island General Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army and General George Patton's Seventh Army fought a long, brutal campaign assisted by gunfire support from Allied ships. Naval forces were, however, unable to interdict the swift evacuation of German and Italian troops across the narrow Strait of Messina, a turn of events which had never been fully explained. Morison blamed the Royal Navy's reluctance to engage shore batteries lining the Strait and also claimed that Montgomery, who distrusted naval gunfire "unless laid down at a great distance from friendly troops," failed to call for the navy's close support (Morison 1964, p. 179).

The British crossed the Straits of Messina and pursued the retreating enemy up the Italian peninsula expecting to link up with the US VI Corps and British X Corps coming ashore in early September 1943 south of Naples at Salerno. Just prior to D-day for Operation Avalanche, Allied negotiations with the Italian government produced an armistice, announced over the radio by General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Allied ships and transports were approaching the Italian shore. The Italian fleet sailed for Malta and Italian troops laid down their arms. Angered by the betrayal of their Italian allies, the Germans established a shadow government in the north and committed substantial forces to fighting the Allies in Italy.

Many Allied soldiers expected to walk ashore at Salerno into the arms of smiling, friendly Italians, but German gunners were waiting for Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army troops on D-day. When minefields delayed the US Navy cruisers and destroyers from closing toward the shore to silence German 88 mm guns, the Americans found themselves pinned down on Salerno's beaches. Commander Alfred Richards's minesweeper *Pilot* finally led in Admiral Lyal Davidson's cruiser *Philadelphia* and after a touch and go battle, assisted by naval gunfire support, the Americans gained a foothold. The effectiveness of enemy minefields came as a shock to the Americans. Mines, Richards recalled, had not been "any particular problem until this time – they were looked upon as rather insignificant barriers to the more important phases of a landing operation" (Tomblin 2004, pp. 241–242). The British landings fared better, but they did not secure the small airfield at Salerno and brutal fighting continued for days.

For Allied navies, Salerno proved a grueling campaign, costly in lives lost and ships damaged or sunk, by mines, air attacks, and 88 mm gun batteries. One hospital ship, a tug, five LCTs, a minesweeper, a destroyer, and one merchant ship were sunk and the battleship HMS *Warspite*, cruisers USS *Savannah* and HMS *Uganda*, and a merchantman put out of action by a new German weapon, the glide bomb. Although these early missiles or "glide bombs," the Fritz-X 1400 and Henschel 293, scored some notable successes against naval vessels in the Mediterranean, they garnered little attention for years from historians. Allied efforts to jam the frequencies used by Luftwaffe bombers dropping these glide bombs proved somewhat effective but did not prevent the sinking of the cruiser HMS *Spartan* off Anzio in January 1944, the troop transport *Rohna*, and LST 282 off southern France. The sinking of the *Rohna* in a convoy from Oran to Port Said on November 26, 1943 and loss of 1,135 troops was kept secret at the time and remained little known for many years. Jackson's (2002) *Allied Secret: The Sinking of the HMT Rohna*, Tomblin's 1994 article, and personal

stories on www.LandingShip.com, called attention to the Axis use of these glider bombs and has prompted more research including Roger Ford's (2000) *Germany's Secret Weapons in World War II* and the newly published *Warriors and Wizards: The Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich* by Martin Bollinger (2010).

Another incident suppressed by wartime secrecy was the tragic, devastating German air raid on the Italian port of Bari, Italy in December 1943 which sank 17 ships. The release of mustard gas from one vessel only compounded the tragedy which had caused hundreds of casualties and led to a cover-up by Allied officials. Works on HMT *Rohma* and the Bari raid such as Glenn Infield's (1971) *Disaster at Bari*, James Bennett's (1998) *The Rhona Disaster*, and Gerald Reminick's (2001) *Nightmare in Bari* form part of a trend toward unearthing tragic, little known incidents of the war.

After weeks of fighting, on September 21, 1943, Allied forces at Salerno prevailed and on October 1 troops marched into Naples. The Italian campaign, however, had just begun and the Allies continued to wage war with the Germans on the Italian peninsula and at sea in the Mediterranean and Aegean. Allied forces went on in 1944 to conduct two more major amphibious operations and US Navy and Royal Navy warships supported active operations against the Germans in the Aegean, Ligurian, and Tyrrhenian seas as well.

Of all the amphibious operations in the Mediterranean during World War II, the landings at Anzio-Nettuno (Operation Shingle) and the invasion of southern France (Operation Dragoon) generated the most controversy. Hoping to break a stalemate in the Italian campaign with a leapfrog landing north of Rome, on January 10, 1944 two Allied task forces landed Major General John Lucas's IV Corps and a British infantry division all but unopposed at Anzio. When the Germans rushed reinforcements to Anzio and resistance stiffened, however, Lucas's troops could not advance inland and soon found themselves confined to several square miles of beachhead. A stalemate ensued and for five long months the navy supported the Anzio beachhead with minesweeping, naval gunfire, AA barrages, and "using an innovative LST shuttle service" delivered supplies and evacuated wounded (Tomblin 2004, p. 348.). The campaign cost the navy dearly, the hospital ship *St. David*, cruiser *Spartan*, three escorts, a minesweeper, 4 LSTS, and a YMS all sunk and others damaged.

Operation Dragoon, the Allies' final amphibious operation in August 1944, went more smoothly. Finally agreeing on a pre-H hour naval and air bombardment and possessing ample air support, including nine escort carriers, the Western Naval Task Force commanded by Vice Adm. H. Kent Hewitt put Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch's Seventh Army forces ashore on the coast of southern France. "The invasion was designed to seize the vitally needed major ports of Marseilles and Toulon, to liberate the southern two thirds of France, and to form the lower pincer to link up with Overlord armies in the North" (Breuer 1988, p. 13). There were delays taking Marseilles and Toulon and mine clearance consumed time and resources, but the operation proved that the Allies had greatly perfected their amphibious techniques since 1942. Amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, Morison wrote, gave the British "a new respect for the fighting qualities of Americans and we learned a new truth of Emerson's dictum on 'aged England' one hundred years earlier, that in storm of battle and calamity, she has a secret vigor and a pulse like a cannon" (Morison 1975, xii.)

Compared to studies of the Pacific war, works on amphibious operations in the Mediterranean other than Morison's were few and far between until the publication of Carlo D'Este's *World War II in the Mediterranean* (1999), Lorelli's *To Foreign Shores* (1995), and Barbara Tomblin's *With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942–1945*. Tomblin's exhaustively researched account of the five major amphibious operations and minor Allied naval operations in between remains the most comprehensive. In the conclusion she offers an analysis of the various aspects of amphibious operations including naval gunfire, air support, logistics, mine clearance, and anti-submarine warfare (Tomblin 2004).

Undersea warfare in the Mediterranean over the years has enjoyed excellent coverage by British historians. From 1940, Royal Navy submarines based at Gibraltar, Malta, Haifa, and Alexandria went on patrol reconnoitering for the fleet, attacking Axis shipping, and occasionally engaging Italian naval forces. By November 1, 1942 these submarines had made 202 attacks on Italian convoys vessels and had sunk two Italian cruisers, one destroyer, and three destroyer escorts. John Wingate (1991) chronicled Malta's submarines in *The Fighting Tenth*, and Royal Navy submarine commanders Ben Bryant (1958), Alastair Mars (1971), and Charles Anscomb wrote memoirs. One of the most illuminating for naval historians is Captain G. W. G. "Shrimp" Simpson's account of his contribution as commander of the U-class submarines of the legendary Tenth Submarine Flotilla at Malta. Simpson dedicated his autobiography, *Periscope View* (1972), to the submariners of the Tenth Flotilla, "of whom more than half were killed in action." In over two years of intense activity at sea and enemy bombardment in harbor, he wrote, "I never had one single man who shirked a patrol despite our crippling casualties." In the period 1941–1944 his boats made a total of 470 attacks and sank one cruiser, three destroyers, two torpedo boats, and ten U-boats (Simpson 1972, pp. 10, 284.)

Wartime events in the Mediterranean have not generated as many personal accounts as those in the Pacific war, but the British raid on Taranto, battles of Cape Matapan and Sirte, the Tobruk run, evacuations of Greece and Crete, the Syrian campaign, and the numerous "club runs" to supply Malta have stirred intimate and often riveting accounts of the ferocious attacks in "Bomb Alley," depth charge attacks, closing ashore in the face of heavy enemy fire, dogfights with German Me109s, and just ordinary life aboard ship. Written soon after the war or years later, accounts such as those by Charles Lamb (1980), Gregory Smith (2009), Hugh Hodgkinson (1944), John Wellham (1995), Ben Bryant (1958), and Lt. John Davies (1946) remain valuable sources about the naval war in the Mediterranean.

Regrettably, few of the senior Allied naval commanders in the Mediterranean war penned their memoirs. A notable exception is Andrew Browne Cunningham, whose *A Sailor's Odyssey* (1951) remains one of the very best personal accounts of high naval command during the war in any theater. In *Action This Day*, Philip Vian (1960), a daring destroyer commander, described his wartime exploits in both naval battles of Sirte and as commander of Task Force 88 for the Salerno landings. However, neither James Somerville, his successor E. N. Syfret, nor the new commander in chief for the Mediterranean, Henry Harwood, wrote accounts of their wartime service and no memoirs or biographies have appeared on "Lumley" Lyster, Harold Burrough, John Tovey, Thomas Troubridge, G. N. Oliver, or A. U. Willis. Cunningham's leadership has been examined in biographies by S. W. Pack, George Stitt, and Michael Simpson,

but senior US Navy commanders H. Kent Hewitt, Richard L. Conolly, Frank Lowry, Lyal Davidson, Bertram Rodgers, and Alan G. Kirk remain less well known than counterparts Nimitz, Spruance, and Halsey. The only exception is a biography of Admiral John Leslie Hall, Jr. by Susan Godson (1982). The papers of H. Kent Hewitt and Alan G. Kirk are available at the US Naval Historical Center, and Hewitt, Hall, and Conolly published articles about their recollections of the Allied landings in Morocco and Sicily.

Nonetheless, in recent years historians have undertaken the important task of publishing the personal papers of two senior commanders, Andrew B. Cunningham and James Somerville. Edited by Michael Simpson (1995), *The Somerville Papers* includes not only official reports but correspondence between Somerville and Cunningham, and letters to his wife and other officials, which shed valuable light on the tactics of Force H, the intricacies and conflicts of wartime politics, and his relationship with Winston Churchill and the Admiralty. In his beautifully written introduction to the *Somerville Papers*, Simpson explains that James Somerville, who had no prior experience in aviation but had a keen interest in defense systems and technology, wanted to learn about naval aviation and “was just the man to make optimum use of the carrier” (Simpson 1995, p. 81).

Although Admiral Cunningham’s action reports and his correspondence with Somerville, Pound, and others in *The Cunningham Papers* (Simpson 1999) are at times most revealing and augment our understanding of his leadership and the events of the first crucial years of the Mediterranean war. Historians and museums, however, have not devoted enough time to recording, publishing, and digitalizing veteran commanders’ oral histories, and future researchers would do well to dig deeper into the archives of the Imperial War Museum, Churchill Centre, National Archives, and the Royal Naval Museum in Portsmouth, which all have websites and online catalogs. The dwindling number of World War II veterans makes the process of gathering and archiving memories even more crucial. In the United Kingdom, the BBC has made an enormously important contribution to the history of the war in the WW2 People’s War Project, inviting veterans and others to submit their wartime memories, diaries, and letters and photographs. This rich source of new information, which highlights the experiences of junior officers, soldiers, or sailors who witnessed so many of the Mediterranean war’s most famous engagements, has been archived and is available online to those interested in the human side of the war.

Signals intelligence made a significant contribution to British successes at sea in the Mediterranean, in countering the threat of German U-boats and alerting the Allies to sailing dates and routes of Axis convoys, but for years security prevented historians from examining the critical role of Allied intelligence in the Mediterranean. Soon after the secret of the German Enigma cipher machine became public in 1974, Ronald Lewin published *Ultra Goes to War* (1978) followed by Ralph Bennett’s *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy* (1989) which described the influence of the Ultra source of signals intelligence. F. H. Hinsley took up the cause in two fine volumes, *British Intelligence* (1984), and convincingly argued that certain of the Royal Navy’s successes at sea came as a result of these Ultra decrypts. This intelligence made the battle of Cape Matapan possible, Hinsley asserts, by giving Cunningham the information on Italian plans and strength that allowed him to ambush the Italian fleet and destroy five Italian ships. Ultra decrypts also alerted General Bernard Freyberg to the German

invasion of Greece and their airborne assault on Crete (Hinsley 1984, p. 418). "At no moment in the war," Churchill wrote, "was our intelligence so truly and precisely informed" (Lewin 1978, pp. 152). In the fall 1941, Enigma decrypts also provided Somerville and Cunningham with intelligence that German U-boats had arrived in the Mediterranean as well as their approximate patrol locations. Somerville used this information to alert Force H, but could not prevent a German submarine from torpedoing the *Ark Royal*. Despite the numerous studies of Ultra, a comprehensive examination of both Allied and Axis intelligence during World War II in the Mediterranean theater is needed to clarify, simplify, and integrate this new material.

After many years of neglect, historians are now examining in more depth the role, experience, and contribution of the Italian Navy and Regia Aeronautica. Many earlier accounts depicted the Italians as poor fighters and the "Dago Navy" as a joke, but as recent studies argue, Italian sailors fought bravely and with determination to supply Axis armies in North Africa. The Italian fleet met the Royal Navy in six major engagements and their surface forces fought in numerous minor ones. Up to the armistice on September 8, 1943, the Italian Navy lost 112 surface ships and 65 submarines and suffered a 15 percent casualty rate or 1,184 officers and 23,476 men killed.

A study of the Italian Navy and supply operations in the Mediterranean by James Sadkovich (1994) is one of the first of this new generation. Alan Levine's *The War on Rommel's Supply Line, 1942–1943*, followed in 1999 with an in-depth examination of the Allied effort to intercept Axis convoys to North Africa and the Italians, despite fuel shortages to defend them. "The Italians would often fight fiercely and skillfully to defend their supply lines and to save ships and seamen," Levine contends, both before and after Operation Torch. (Levine 1999, p. 4) In his memoirs, the German Commander in Chief South, Albert Kesselring, recalled the difficulties of supplying Axis armies in North Africa blaming the Italians' inefficient supply system and exasperating shipbuilding policy, their inability to execute a "total war," and the enemy's espionage system. Although Kesselring says they could not prove it, he suspected the times of Axis convoy sailings had been betrayed, as indeed they were by the Allied cracking of the Enigma codes (Kesselring 1997, pp. 104, 114). In their study, *The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943*, Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani (1998) drew extensively upon Italian sources to illuminate the Italian Navy and Regia Aeronautica's role in the war, their prewar building programs, and the "complex and distrustful" relationship between the Italians and their German allies. Their narrative is enhanced by accounts of Italian senior commanders and oral history not available elsewhere in English.

In 2009, Vincent O'Hara's *Struggle for the Middle Sea* appeared. In this long overdue reexamination of the surface warfare in the Mediterranean, O'Hara argues that the myth of British "moral ascendancy" and excellent propaganda that touted many naval engagement as British victories have colored previous histories of the naval war. The British did not prevail without the aid of the United States, he contends. As late as August 1942, the Italians were winning the war at sea, controlling the central Mediterranean, and supplying Axis armies in North Africa despite attempts by largely British and Dominion air and naval forces to disrupt the flow of Italian convoys to Tunisia and Libya. Only when the United States joined the war effort in the fall of 1942 with Operation Torch did the tide of war turn favorably in the Allies' direction.

The successful lodgment of Allied forces in North Africa combined with the British victory at El Alamein squeezed Rommel's armies, but with skill and determination Axis forces prevented the Allies from gaining control of the North African coast until May 1943. Furthermore, O'Hara argues that the conclusion of earlier historians, that the Germans did the real fighting in the Mediterranean, is not entirely correct. German advice, broken promises, and operational lapses hindered the Italian war effort on more than one occasion.

In his well-researched work which draws upon Italian and German archival material, O'Hara chose to focus on surface warfare and sideline the contribution of aircraft and submarines. However, until O'Hara's recent work which spans all five major nations, few histories of the Mediterranean war other than Auphan and Mordal's *French Navy in World War II* (1959) chronicled the contribution and experiences of the French Navy or Kriegsmarine, nor did they include the use of German sea power after the Italian armistice in 1943. The Allies fought a long and costly battle against the Germans in Italy following the armistice, but the small engagements and convoy work at sea have previously been regarded as sideshows. Operational histories covering the war in the Aegean and Dodecanese have also been few and far between, except for the battles for Greece and Crete which have been exhaustively studied. Charles Koburger's *Wine-Dark Sea* (1999) and Anthony Rogers's *Churchill's Folly: Leros and the Aegean: The Last Great British Defeat of World War Two* (2003) examine the conflict, as does O'Hara in his final chapters on the German Navy.

Likewise, the history of the German Air Force and Regia Aeronautica in the Mediterranean war has not been as well documented by historians. After many years, a new in-depth history of the Luftwaffe by Ted Hooton (2010), *The Luftwaffe: A Complete History 1933–45*, has attempted to cover strategies, commanders, and campaigns, including the Mediterranean, using new information and analysis. A few new personal accounts, for example, Johannes Steinhoff's *Messerschmitts over Sicily* (2004), have surfaced in recent years as well, but more archival research needs to be done to illuminate a comprehensive account of the German Air Force in the Mediterranean. Chris Dunning's *Regia Aeronautica* (1988) and *Courage Alone* (2009) have made important contributions to our understanding of the development of the Regia Aeronautica and its role in the air war. Italian airmen were no less skilled or determined than their German counterparts, Dunning argues, and many squadrons were composed of men who had fought and gained combat skills in the Spanish Civil War. Italian bombers damaged the British carrier *Eagle*, battleship *Warspite*, and destroyer *Havock* in 1940. That summer the Italians equipped some SM 79 and SM 84s to carry torpedoes and the aircraft then damaged the cruisers *Kent*, *Liverpool*, and *Glasgow* and sank the destroyers *Juno*, *Nestor*, and *Bedouin* as well as numerous merchant ships. In addition to unit histories, bases, aircraft types, and equipment, Dunning has a short chapter on the conversion of the *Roma* to an aircraft carrier (*Aquila*), and a passenger liner to a smaller escort carrier version to be named *Sparviero*. Dunning's tables of fighter aces, lists of equipment, aircraft types, and camouflage are useful. *Fiat CR 42: Aces of World War 2* (Gustavsson, Slongo, and Caruana 2009) and the online "Biplane Fighter Aces of WWII" (Gustavsson, n.d.) also provide information in English on the subject, but a thorough treatment of Italian air power during the war is sorely needed. Most lacking are personal accounts by Italian and German participants.

A decent history of Italian submarines is not yet available in English although the official history, *I Sommergibili*, was published in 1967 (Bertini 1968). Bragadin's work refers to the better-known Italian submarine victories and Greene and Massignani offer a useful chapter on Italian submarines and the undersea war, but a detailed, comprehensive account is long overdue. The Italian Navy commissioned 172 submarines in World War II and lost 90 percent of them before the armistice and two following the armistice. They were poorly designed – "noisy, clumsy, and slow, their silhouettes were too large, their periscopes too short, and they dived slowly" (Levine 1999, p. 3). "These were fatal faults in the Mediterranean, a particularly difficult sea for submarines operations." Operating in the clear and often shallow Mediterranean, Italian submarines also fell victim to the Allies' increasingly effective ASW measures, but made a significant contribution to Italy's war effort in the Mediterranean.

Larger warships of the fleet have received attention from historians as have Coastal Forces MGBs and PT boats, but few works have focused on the role and experience of smaller craft – MLs, subchasers, LSTs, LCTs, LCMs, and other landing craft. Commanded by young, volunteer officers, these LSTs and other "small fry" not only landed troops and supplies onto hostile shores, but escorted convoys, swept mines, dropped agents on enemy beaches, provided gunfire support, and contributed substantially to the success of the five amphibious assaults in the Mediterranean from 1942 to 1945. The LST Association has published accounts in their newsletter, but many rousing stories of the war in these small craft remain untold.

Although before the war both Allied and Axis commanders realized that air power would play a role in a future conflict, when war came few anticipated the impact of aerial attacks on shipping or the offensive possibilities of the aircraft carrier. Force H was built around the *Ark Royal*, Cunningham owed his victory at Taranto to the offensive power of the aircraft carrier, and when mines closed the Suez Canal and delayed the arrival of *Illustrious'* replacement, HMS *Formidable*, the fleet was all but impotent. Yet, as Barrett Tillman has argued, the role of carriers in Mediterranean has not been thoroughly analyzed. Konstam and Bryan's *British Aircraft Carriers 1939–45* (2010) and *Bombers versus Battleships* by David Hamer (1999) attempt to fill in some gaps, but Hamer's coverage includes only Crete, Taranto, and the Pedestal convoy. Nor has the Fleet Air Arm been the subject of a detailed study until MacKay's *Britain's Fleet Air Arm in World War II* (2004). Fortunately, naval aviators John Wellham (1995) and Geoffrey Morely Mower (1993) have added their personal accounts to earlier ones and their experiences supporting the army in the Western Desert offer a fresh perspective on this little known aspect of naval aviation in the Mediterranean.

Sadly, the unglamorous but crucial role of mine laying and minesweeping has been neglected by most historians. The Italians mined the Suez Canal, the waters around Malta, and laid minefields in the Sicilian Narrows. "These minefields certainly added to our difficulties," Cunningham acknowledged. "Clearing them was the navy's heaviest task after the Tunisian surrender" (Cunningham 1951, p. 511). Peter Elliot (1978) offers a limited treatment in his *Allied Minesweeping* and Tomblin (2004) addressed mines clearance in her book, *With Utmost Spirit*, but more research is needed on this important aspect of the war at sea.

Naval gunfire support in joint operations has received limited treatment by historians, but to date no comprehensive study of its development in the Mediterranean.

Morison, Tomblin (2010), D'Este, and Lorelli have addressed the contribution of warships' gunfire to amphibious operations especially in the touch and go landings in Sicily and at Salerno, but earlier in the Mediterranean conflict Royal Navy warships used their large caliber batteries against shore targets at Bardia, Tripoli, and in the Syrian campaign. Somerville's Force H also conducted several operations to bombard Italian ports and during Operation Torch Allied naval forces used their gun batteries, especially the new 5 inch 38 caliber gun, to support troops ashore.

Radar was instrumental for the Royal Navy, the US Navy, US Army Air Forces, and Royal Air Force in detecting enemy aircraft at long ranges or in poor visibility, but also came to play a role in fighter direction, navigation, and gunnery or fire control. For many years, however, studies of the Mediterranean theater failed to explore the development and use of airborne and ship borne radar. In 1993, however, Derek Howse's *Radar at Sea: The Royal Navy in World War 2* appeared. Howse focused more on the industrial research and development of radar than on its operational use and unfortunately his analysis is often obscured by details. For example, his discussion of barrage fire fails to convey a real sense of how Royal Navy warships experimented with, developed, and used barrage fire, or its effectiveness in repelling aircraft attacks on the fleet. Howse's brief tracing of IFF and radar recognition suffers likewise from obfuscation. In his summary, he does emphasize the "fast and furious" pace of radar development in 1942 and wisely concludes that "Fighter direction, whose success in the air defense of the Fleet made up for the poor showing of long-range AA gunnery, could not have happened without radar." Nor could it have been effective without the development of the PPI (Plan Position Indicator) scope which Howse writes "gave a map from which the radar situation could be interpreted without requiring specialist knowledge" (Howse 1993, pp. 128–129). By 1945, the PPI electronic plot could give commanders a picture of all aircraft above the horizon range out to 120 miles and all surface features out to the horizon range, thereby improving surface gunfire.

Although radar gave the Allies a distinct advantage in the war at sea, until after the Battle of Matapan the Italian Navy did not realize the British had naval radar. Nonetheless, they were slow to mount radar in any of their ships and, discouraged by the results, turned to the Germans for radar sets which Admiral Iachino assigned to the destroyer *Legionario*. Greene and Massignani offer a useful, if brief, discussion of Italian radar based on Italian sources, but despite its importance few works in English describe the Axis' use of offensive and defensive radar in the Mediterranean (Greene and Massignani 1998).

The Mediterranean was, indeed, as Porch states, "the European war's pivotal theater, the critical link without which it would have been impossible for the Western Alliance to go from Dunkirk to Overlord." The Allies took advantage of the Axis strategic decision to open a Mediterranean front. Italian "military inadequacies" drew the Germans into a theater where they had far more to lose than to win. They diverted German submarines from the Atlantic war and Luftwaffe units and troops from the eastern front to the Mediterranean at a "critical time," but did not allow the Axis to wrest control of the Middle East from the British. The Royal Navy and RAF kept the convoy through route and Suez Canal open, supplied the defiant defenders of Malta, countered the threat of the Italian fleet, and waged a war of attrition on Axis convoys to Rommel's army in North Africa. America's contribution of substantial assets to the Mediterranean allowed the Allies to successfully conduct five major amphibious

operations there tying down yet more Axis resources and giving the Allies “a time and place to build up their forces, audition their best leaders, strengthen their alliance, gain incremental success, and generally build up the momentum to deliver the *coup de grace* to Germany in Northwestern Europe” (Porch 2004, pp. 662, 674). Although the Germans fought a rear guard action in the Mediterranean until 1945, as O’Hara cogently notes, “by May 1945 the US Navy, despite massive forces deployed in the Pacific and heavy commitments in the Atlantic, was the Mediterranean’s dominant naval power, and it has remained so ever since” (O’Hara 2009, p. 282).

This peripheral strategy proved costly for both Allied and Axis naval forces. Aircraft and submarine attacks accounted for many ships sunk or seriously damaged, but nine nations fought a total of 55 surface engagements in the Mediterranean, the most in any theater including the Pacific. In a little over three years, the Italians sank 33 Allied warships, but lost 83 warships in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, 83 percent of them to British or Dominion naval forces. German forces sank another 43 Allied warships, their aircraft accounting for 30 percent of total Allied losses and 21 percent of Allied submarine losses. British losses in the period ending September 8, 1943 included the battleship *Barham*, carriers *Ark Royal* and *Eagle*, 16 cruisers, 48 destroyers, 32 escorts, and 41 submarines. From 1942 to 1945, the US Navy suffered warship losses as well, including destroyers *Maddox*, *Bristol*, and *Rowan*, transports, minesweepers, tugs, YMSs, LSTs, and PTs.

Although Mediterranean naval operations have been the subject of renewed research in recent years, aspects of the naval war remain understudied. Future research might include an analysis of the development of naval aviation in the Mediterranean, the influence of tactics and operations in the Mediterranean on planning and operations in the Pacific war as well as the invasion of Normandy in 1944, and a more comprehensive examination of the employment of radar, anti-aircraft defense, and naval gunfire support in naval operations in the Mediterranean.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Ocean War

ASHLEY JACKSON

The war at sea. This is a familiar phrase to scholars of World War II. But our conceptualization of the conflict is improved if we also think in terms of the war *and* the sea. Such a perspective helps dissolve false barriers between the conflict on air, land, and sea, and allows the war's numerous fighting fronts and its multitudinous global ramifications to be understood in a unified manner. An oceanic history of the war allows for the land on ocean rims, and the waters and islands in between, to be viewed as an interconnected whole, and for consideration of the manner in which navies and merchant marines were neighbors to every country with a coastline. An oceanic perspective sits naturally alongside the turn toward transnational history in the scholarship of the war, and provides a framework for understanding how the war situation in one region had a direct impact on military operations – and the livelihoods of ordinary people – in another. Even landlocked countries were marked by the war at sea, as manufactured imports dwindled and foodstuffs succeeded, or failed, to get through. Tens of thousands of vessels and aircraft were involved in the sea war (the Royal Navy alone commissioned around 3,500 trawlers and fishing vessels), as well as millions of men and women who crossed the oceans or fought upon them, above them, or below them.

The literature on the war at sea is vast and expertise seemingly boundless, though knowledge is heavily skewed in the direction of works written in English. Some books sweep World War II up in a broad account of sea power in the modern world, such as Peter Padfield's *Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World* (2009) and H. P. Willmott's *The Last Century of Sea Power* (2010). This approach allows the events, strategies, and technologies of World War II to be viewed as part of longer-term evolutionary processes. There are then global surveys of the sea war, such as Richard Hough's *The Longest Battle* (1986), Nathan Miller's *War at Sea* (1995), and Julian Thompson's *Imperial War Museum Book of the War at Sea* (1997). Stuart Robertson and Stephen Dent's *The War at Sea in Photographs* (2007) and Paul Kemp's *A Pictorial*

History of the Sea War (2000) offer summary text along with images. Jürgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hummelchen's *Chronology of the War at Sea* (1992) is indispensable, and Myron Smith's *World War Two at Sea* (1990) presents an index of sources.

An oceanic perspective allows us to consider the wartime implications of human dependence upon the sea, and the impact of this fact upon the way in which the war was fought. The sea was the key to everything, though its ubiquity often diminishes appreciation and understanding of its significance – until, that is, one stops to consider the implications of the need to traverse stretches of ocean in order to survive, to fight, and to generate wealth and power. Every American, Australian, British, Canadian, and Japanese soldier who engaged the enemy had to cross salt water to do so, and the fate of nations hung upon who could control sea access to their shores, and those of their enemies. Maritime power was the key enabler of all overseas operations, for the Axis and Allies alike. Maritime power is military, political, and economic power exerted through the ability to use the sea. For a sea power or a maritime-dependent coalition such as the Allies, command of the sea provides the strategic conditions indispensable for success in war.

Seapower – the ability to amass maritime resources and to bring them to bear whilst preventing enemies from doing the same – was an essential part of Allied victory. The Allies' capacity to maintain their merchant marines despite the shocking predations of enemy action, to defend and operate fleet trains and global convoys, and to launch enormous amphibious assaults, proved decisive. Conversely, the inability of their enemies to do these things – and the eventual severance of Germany, Italy, and Japan from all maritime resources bar those of their enemies – was a central component of their abject defeat.

Access to secure sea lines of communication defined the war, as much as massed concentrations of soldiers or the struggle for air supremacy. The importance of seaborne global logistics are the focus of books such as Catherine Behrens's *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War* (1955), W. R. Carter's *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War Two* (1953), and Robert Coakley's *The Persian Corridor as a Route for Aid to the USSR* (1990). Other books, meanwhile, examine the war record of national merchant fleets, such as Tony Lane's *The Merchant Seamen's War* (1990), Robert Carse's *The Long Haul: The United States Merchant Service in World War Two* (1965), and Mark Parillo's *The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War Two* (1993). Works such as Stephen Roskill's *A Merchant Fleet at War: Alfred Holt and Company* (1962), and William Seabrook's *In the War at Sea: A Record of Rotterdam's Largest Merchant Fleet* (1946) look at specific shipping lines that had their vessels "taken up from trade" by Allied governments in order to support the war effort. Works such as John Bunker's *Liberty Ships* (1972) reflect the importance of shipbuilding and industrial production in winning the war at sea. On a related matter, atrocities committed at sea are covered in works such as Mark Felton's *Slaughter at Sea: The Story of Japan's Naval War Crimes* (2007) and Bernard Edwards's *Blood and Bushido: Japanese Atrocities at Sea* (1991).

A great deal of material has been published on key convoy routes and the battles around them. These include Paul Kemp's *Russian Convoys* (1987), Malcolm Llewlyn-Jones's *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys* (2007), and David Irving's *The Destruction of Convoy PQ17* (1980), which describes the fate of a British convoy on route to Russia. Books such as Richard Woodman's *Malta Convoys, 1940–43*

(2000), and Peter Smith's *Pedestal: The Convoy that Saved Malta* (2002) address the efforts made by the Allies to keep the island in the fight because of its strategic position athwart Mediterranean sea routes of primary importance to both sides. Other works address the transatlantic convoys, such as Marc Milner's *North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys* (1985), and the escort forces that defended them, such as Robert Cross's *Shepherds of the Sea: Destroyer Escorts in World War Two* (2010). Brian Hussey's *The US Navy, the Neutrality Patrol, and Atlantic Fleet Escort Operations* (1991), describes the growth of American involvement in the theater. Archie Munro's *The Winston Specials: Troopships via the Cape* (2006), meanwhile, examines the convoys from Britain that sailed around Africa once the Mediterranean–Suez route has been closed by enemy action. Coastal convoys were also important for numerous belligerent powers and are addressed in works such as Nick Hewitt's *Coastal Convoys* (2008).

Other than the ability to project military and economic power overseas, be it in the form of commando raids, large-scale invasions, blockade, or the interdiction of coastal shipping, the war at sea was all about access to resources. They included basic human essentials as well as goods specifically for the benefit of war industries able to sustain a nation so that it remained standing when peace broke out. Trade needed to continue, soldiers and tanks had to be shunted around the world and distributed throughout the subregions in which fighting was concentrated and defenses built up. Overseas garrisons, air stations, and armies had to be replenished and rearmed by sea. Resources were allocated on a global scale by strategic-economic organizations such as the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the West Africa Supply Board, and the Middle East Supply Center. The resources they allocated then had to be transported, by sea, as the defense of convoys became a leitmotif of victory. For those that could mount convoys and protect them, the oceans were a highway connecting resources to battlefronts; for those that could not, the oceans became both a barrier and a threat. During the course of the war, 2,889 escorted trade convoys sailed from Britain, totaling 85,775 ships. Britain, Canada, and America kept open the transatlantic highway; sea routes to Russia, through the Arctic and the Persian Gulf, were utilized, and ports in India, Burma, and Hong Kong supplied China overland. Only seapower, and the infrastructure that supported it, could accomplish this.

Access to resources was just as important to the Axis powers. The Italian Navy's core mission was the protection of the maritime trade upon which the economy depended. It succeeded in keeping Italy connected to the Balkans and North Africa, and even after the ejection of Axis forces from Africa, it continued to protect traffic in the Aegean, Adriatic, Ionian, and Tyrrhenian seas. Germany was effectively blockaded, reduced to running solo submarine missions to garner raw materials from Japan, though the Kriegsmarine successfully protected coastal traffic and the essential trade in iron ore from Norway and Sweden.

The identification of the seas with particular theaters of conflict has become common, though sometimes contributes to a compartmentalization of the war which obscures its global and interconnected nature. "The battle of the Atlantic" is a well-known term, as is "the Pacific war" and "the Mediterranean campaign." But some of the world's most important stretches of water, such as the Indian Ocean, are usually omitted from the equation and ocean war needs to be understood in global, as well as regional, context. This is particularly true because of the fundamental principles of

seapower, of having it or not having it, and the manner in which events in one region affected those in another. Thus for the British, threats in Far Eastern waters always had to be viewed through lenses flecked with Atlantic or Mediterranean foam. Events in the North Sea, for example, such as the destruction of the German battleship *Tirpitz* in a Norwegian fjord, released significant resources to the benefit of a Ceylon-based admiral responsible for policing the Indian Ocean. Similarly, the closure of the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and all but a few urgent and expensively guarded convoys rendered the Cape route through the Mozambique Channel and Red Sea vital to the war effort in North Africa and the Middle East. And when the Allies eventually reopened the Mediterranean, the knock-on effect was that a new Pacific Fleet could be created as the British attempted to regain lost colonies and employ naval power in order to curry influence with the emergent American superpower.

A great deal of literature addresses the course of the war in the major oceanic regions, particularly the Atlantic. The Mediterranean is well covered in works such as Simon Ball's *The Bitter Sea: The Struggle for Mastery in the Mediterranean* (2009) and Vincent O'Hara's *Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean* (2009). Ashley Jackson's *War and Empire in Mauritius and the Indian Ocean* (2001), Jackson's *The British Empire and the Second World War* (2006), and Leonard Turner's *War in the Southern Oceans* (1961) address the Indian Ocean as a strategic theater. The Pacific theater has been the subject of many studies, such as William Johnson's *The Pacific Campaign in World War Two* (2006) and Jack Greene's *War at Sea: From Pearl Harbor to Midway* (1988). Titles addressing naval operations in British coastal waters include Peter Smith's *Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel* (1984) and Leonard Reynolds's *Home Waters MTBs at War: Channel and North Sea MTB and MGB Flotilla Operations* (2000). Geirr Haarr's *The Battle for Norway* (2010) examines one of the most significant naval campaigns in European waters and Richard Woodman's *The Battle of the River Plate* (2008) describes an early operation to destroy a German surface raider. Many such works focus on specific battles within the major oceanic regions. The enormous naval battles in the Pacific are the subject of works such as Bill Sloan's *The Ultimate Battle: Okinawa 1945* (2007), James Grace's *The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal* (1999), Mark Stille's *The Coral Sea 1942: The First Carrier Battle* (2009), and J. Parshall and A. Tully's *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (2005). Coverage of the naval battles in the East Indies is offered in works such as David Thomas's *The Battle of the Java Sea* (1968), addressing the destruction of Allied naval power in this region from December 1941 to February 1942.

The situation on land naturally affected that at sea. Germany's victory over France granted it strategically valuable Atlantic bases from which to mount operations, just as its success in the Norwegian campaign allowed it to threaten shipping off the Scottish coast and gain greater traction in the battles of the Atlantic and the Arctic convoys. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, whilst eviscerating the Imperial Japanese Navy, also cleared the way for the American reconquest of the Philippines. This, in turn, enabled American land-based air power to join the submarine campaign in cutting the sea routes between Japan and its recently acquired but rapidly disintegrating empire.

Ocean war involved combat at sea, attacks on enemy homelands and outposts, the protection of supply routes, and support of land operations. It featured land-based bombers, maritime patrol aircraft, and marines. But it also involved children evacuated

across the Atlantic from Britain to North America and European civilians fleeing colonies such as Singapore and Sumatra aboard anything that would float. Japanese “hell ships” transported Allied prisoners of war from Hong Kong and the Philippines to slave labor in Japan or Korea. The war at sea witnessed the evacuation of German troops and civilians from East Prussia, commando raids in the Bay of Bengal and the Aegean, flying-boat patrols across enormous expanses of the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, and African and Asian merchant seamen, among whom casualties were disproportionately high because they worked below deck and had less chance of escaping from stricken vessels.

Every stretch of sea was integral to someone’s national interests. Caribbean waters, for example, were vital not only for American coastal trade, but for transatlantic supplies of service personnel, war materiel, and food to Britain; the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea were important for the supply of oil to the British Empire and the transit of war materiel to Russia; and the air, land, and maritime operations that cleared the Italians out of East Africa secured the Red Sea, allowing convoys of troops and martial supplies to reach Middle East Command via the Cape.

The relationship between man and the ocean, and the iron laws of geography, ensured the centrality of the sea to people’s experience of the war. In many different, often indirect ways, hundreds of millions of lives were affected by what happened at sea: who was able to move across it and get ashore from it, and what food and raw materials could be transported across it, or prevented from doing so. People in Botswana and Mauritius, as well as in Britain and Japan, experienced significant dietary shifts because of changing patterns of food imports caused by decreasing availability of shipping and the predations of enemies. For the fortunate, such shortages could be mitigated by novel food distribution arrangements on a global scale – wheat shipped from Egypt or Australia, say, supplementing the diet of Indian Ocean islanders, or Spam crossing the Atlantic to the aid of British larders. Others were not so lucky; Japanese garrisons were cut off from supplies of food, weapons, and medicine as the Allies came to dominate the seas, and people facing famine in Bengal had their suffering augmented because of Allied shipping shortages and the prioritization of military supply. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese people in the Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces were massacred as a direct result of the Doolittle raids on mainland Japan, an attack launched from an American carrier in the western Pacific and described in Carroll Glines’s *The Doolittle Raid: America’s Daring First Strike against Japan* (2000). It was the failure of British seapower to defend the empire in the east that caused Australia’s historic turn toward America and condemned vast swathes of Asia to enemy occupation.

Powers such as Italy and Japan were driven to war by the desire to expand across the seas. Russia was succored by shiploads of military materiel from North America and Britain, delivered by Arctic convoys or those routed through the Persian Gulf and across the Caspian. France and Italy were liberated from the sea. China depended on the ports of India and Burma for supplies, whether delivered by road or by air via the Himalayan “hump” once they had been landed at Bombay, Calcutta, or Rangoon. Finally, belligerents required the industrial base with which to sustain oceanic war for at least as long as their enemies. In the end, the monumental American production of Liberty ships, escort carriers, and landing craft ensured that not only could the Axis powers never win, but that America could dictate Allied strategies and shape the postwar world.

Maritime power and amphibious operations were central to the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Air, land, and maritime forces combined in order to project power overseas, all dependent upon command of the seas, or at least the ability to control the sea at the point of particular raids and invasions. Russian land and air power, as is now properly acknowledged, played possibly the central role in defeating Nazi Germany in Europe, though Russia itself was sustained by the flow of military aid made possible by Allied seapower. Stalin's unrelenting demand for a Second Front in Europe acknowledged the fact that whatever the Red Army might do in the east, the Allies needed to cross the seas and put armies ashore in the west in order to ensure ultimate victory. The major Allied amphibious operations against Axis forces in Europe and North Africa are the subject of works such as Anthony Tucker-Jones's *Operation Dragoon: The Liberation of Southern France 1944* (2009), Anthony Beevor's *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy* (2010), and Duncan Harding's *Operation Torch* (2005).

In the war against Japan, air, land, and maritime forces also combined, their effective joint operations predicated upon command of the seas and the capacity to move enormous resources across them. The Japanese home islands were eventually threatened with starvation, as contact with the outside world was severed. This situation came about because of America's amphibious operations in the Central Pacific, its submarine campaign, the fleet actions between the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the deployment of land-based air power able to strike across the sea to interdict supply routes and pound Japanese outposts and cities. Amphibious operations by commandos and marines are the focus of books such as Valerio Borghese's *Sea Devils: Italian Naval Commandos and World War Two* (1995), Victor Krulak's *First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps* (1984), and Robert Lockhart's *The Marines Were There: The Story of the Royal Marines in the Second World War* (1950). Tristram Lovering's *Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea* (2007) describes amphibious operations mounted by Japanese troops, by Russians in the Black Sea, and Allied assaults on Guadalcanal and Madagascar. Peter Haining's *Banzai Hunters* (2006) describes amphibious operations on small offshore islands, rivers, and swamps in the Arakan region.

Each belligerent nation had its own maritime traditions, its own economic, cultural, and strategic involvement with the seaborne world. Each also had its own navy, which was the product and the prisoner of its mother country's history, and which possessed its own distinct missions and the doctrine and equipment with which to try and fulfil them. Thus the French *Marine Nationale* was tasked with defending the French coast, maintaining communications between metropolitan France and France *outr   mere* – France overseas, the colonial empire – and, in alliance agreement with Britain, protecting the English Channel, the western Mediterranean, and the West African region.

In order to project military power, most belligerents required blue water naval capabilities because they needed to cross oceans to engage enemies, support allies, and protect trade routes. Works on the navies of the major powers include Vincent O'Hara, Dickson and Worth's *On Seas Contested: The Seven Great Navies of the Second World War* (2010) and James Sadkovich's *Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War Two* (1990). Arthur Marder's *Old Friends New Enemies* (Marder 1981–1990) chronicles the relationship between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Royal Navy whilst Bob Wurth's *1942: Australia's Greatest Peril* (2008), offers the perspectives of

opposing governments and navies facing each other across the seas. Vincent O'Hara's *The US Navy against the Axis* (2007) highlights the underplayed role of surface combat (as opposed to submarine and carrier warfare) in defeating the Axis.

The maritime experience of Allied nations has been exhaustively covered, with a heavy focus on the main belligerents. Beyond the official histories, titles include Correlli Barnett's *Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War* (1990) and Brian Lavery's *Churchill's Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organization* (2006) from the British perspective, and Charles Koburger's *The Cyrano Fleet: France and its Navy* (1989) and Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal's *The French Navy in World War Two* (1976) from the French. The Russian Navy is covered in Przemyslaw Budzbon's *The Soviet Navy at War* (1989), V. I. Achkasov and N. B. Pavlovich's *Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War* (1981), and Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail Monakov's *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Navy Strategy and Shipbuilding* (2001).

The war history of the Germany Navy is covered in works such as Jak Showell's *Hitler's Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organization* (2009) and Vincent O'Hara's *The German Fleet at War* (2004). From its early position of maritime strength, possessing the warships, transports, and merchantmen required to operate economically and militarily in a region temporarily denuded of Allied naval power, the Japanese were strangled until they were unable to resupply or even evacuate garrisons and armies overseas. This dramatic rise and fall is covered in works such as David Thomas's *Japan's War at Sea* (1987) and Paul Dull's *Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy* (1978). Other Axis navies are addressed in works such as James Sadkovich's *The Italian Navy in World War Two* (1994).

More nations participated in the war at sea than is commonly acknowledged, and every nation and colony was affected, in some way or other, by what took place at sea, or what was not able to take place in terms of normal ocean commerce. Early in the war the maritime resources of countries such as Denmark, Norway, and Poland strengthened Britain's capacity to survive and keep vital supply lines and trade routes operating. At the same time, before the incomparable offensive and productive weight of America had entered the balance, Canada was exhorted to rapidly develop its shipbuilding capacities and to recruit and train seamen. "Alone" for eighteen months in 1940–1941, Britain relied upon the maritime resources of the "lesser" allies and neutral states. It also relied on the satellite navies of the Commonwealth, addressed in works such as C. J. Harris's *War at Sea: South African Maritime Operations during World War Two* (1991), Anthony German's *The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Royal Canadian Navy* (1990), and David Stephens's *The Royal Australian Navy* (2001). During this period the British and Dominion navies were fully stretched keeping open the trade routes to the Americas, Africa, and Australasia, whilst also fighting in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, a pan-Commonwealth perspective captured in Gordon Smith's *The War at Sea: Royal and Dominion Navy Actions in World War Two* (1989). The Dutch Navy continued to fight even after the conquest of the European homeland and the Dutch East Indies. Dutch warships provided useful capabilities to the British Eastern Fleet based on Ceylon for the remainder of the conflict (specializing, for instance in the submarine insertion of British agents into Japanese occupied territories in order to link up with resistance movements).

Many books examine different classes of warships, including overviews in reference works such as Francis McMurtrie's *Jane's Fighting Ships of World War Two* (1997),

and a focus on specific classes. Works include Erminio Bagnasco and Mark Grossman's *Regia Marina: Italian Battleships of World War Two* (1986), Chester Hearn's *Carriers in Combat* (2005), William Garzke and Robert Dulin's *Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War Two* (1996), and Eric Lacroix and Linton Welles's *Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War* (1997). Submarine warfare is addressed in general works such as Peter Padfield's *War Beneath the Sea: Submarine Conflict* (1997) and Erminio Bagnasco's *Submarines of World War Two* (2000). Many books focus on the war against the U-boats, including Kenneth Wynn's *U-Boat Operations of the Second World War: Career Histories* (1997, 1998). Michael Wilson's *A Submariners' War in the Indian Ocean* (2000) offers a view of patrol operations in the Indian Ocean. Works focusing on submarine warfare in the Pacific include Carl Boyd and Yoshida Akihiko's *The Japanese Submarine Force and World War Two* (2002), John Alden's *US Submarine Attacks during World War Two* (1989), and Clay Blair's *Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan* (2001).

Secure sea lines of communication and the projection of maritime power depended on adequate infrastructure, especially networks of ports. The war had a particularly heavy impact upon those who lived near ports and coastal regions. People were drawn in to the war industries created or expanded by martial activity in port cities such as Colombo, Kiel, Portsmouth, and Valletta; many people in such places experienced enemy bombing because of the strategic significance of the ports, and slave laborers were recruited into Japanese factories such as those producing the Mitsubishi "Zero" naval fighter. Regions such as Alabama and Chittagong were important because they manufactured ships or supplied merchant sailors – as elucidated in works such as Yousuf Choudhury's *Sons of the Empire: Oral History from the Bangladeshi Seamen* (1995). Even in backwaters such as Devon in rural England, people were evicted from their homes as the coast was used to train American forces ahead of the D-day landings, and the Scottish coast was used as a training ground for new types of amphibious soldiers, such as commandos.

Ports were points of egress for evacuating forces, such as the British and French soldiers taken out of Dunkirk, or those lifted from Berbera and evacuated to Aden as the British left Somaliland in the face of Italian invasion. North African ports such as Benghazi and Tobruk were prized by both sides as they dictated who could receive supplies in order to sustain desert offensives. Because of their high value, ports and strategic waterways were prime targets for enemy mine-laying and bombing attacks; the Suez Canal was periodically mined, and the Americans deposited over 25,000 mines in Japanese ports. Alexandria was attacked to great effect by Italian frogmen and British canoeists achieved significant effect in an attack on Bordeaux. Colombo, Darwin, Pearl Harbor, and Rangoon were visited by Japanese aircraft, Dakar by British and Free French warships, and Singapore, already heavily bombed by the Japanese, was subsequently targeted by Australian and British Special Forces. Elsewhere, St. Nazaire was attacked in order to disable its dry dock; Taranto was visited by British torpedo bombers; and Tokyo was raided by Doolittle's Mitchell bombers. Islands became key strategic points requiring the development of extensive military infrastructure and bases such as Truk in the Pacific, Port T at Addu Atoll in the Maldives, and Ascension Island in the Atlantic were developed for the purposes of sheltering warships, basing aircraft as they transited oceans, or extending the range of naval vessels and maritime patrol aircraft. Works examining the development of such

bases and military operations around them include Peter Doling's *From Port T to RAF Gan: An Illustrated History of the British Military Bases at Addu Atoll* (2003) and Klaus Lindemann's *Hailstorm over Truk Lagoon: Operations against Truk by Carrier Task Force 58* (2005).

Other types of physical infrastructure were essential for mounting operations at sea. Dry docks, oil tanks, magazines, headquarter facilities, and all attendant transport, storage, and communications systems were needed to marshal convoys and to refuel, replenish, and repair warships. Freetown, Halifax, and Liverpool were vital bases for protecting sea routes between Britain and the Americas, and Britain and the Cape route to the East. German submarines operated from the Penang after its capture by the Japanese, whilst British flying-boats patrolled Indian Ocean sea lanes from anchorages in places such as Diego Garcia and the Seychelles. After the Italian defeat in East Africa, the port of Massawa was cleared and prepared for Allied use by American engineers. Mombasa and Trincomalee were rapidly developed for an escalating strategic role once Singapore had fallen. Durban was the assembly point for the invasion of Madagascar, an operation to prevent Axis forces using its ports. Karachi grew in importance as an offloading point for, among other things, Allied aircraft joining the war in the China-Burma-India theater. Numerous books address the war's impact upon specific ports. Arthur Marder's *Operation Menace: The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair* (1976) examines the Anglo-Free French raid on Dakar, and Roger Branfill-Cook's *Moment of Destiny: One Day in Oran* (2008) offers an account of the British attack on the French fleet after the armistice with Germany. Paul Kemp's *Liverpool and the Battle of the Atlantic* (1993) describes Liverpool's role as command center for the battle of the "western approaches," whilst James Essex's *Victory in the St Lawrence: Canada's Unknown War* (1984) and Michael Gannon's *Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany's First U-Boat Attacks along the American Coast in World War Two* (1990) look at the war's impact on key North American ports and shipping routes.

In fighting the war at sea, a nation's maritime history influenced affairs at every turn, shaping a navy's doctrine, equipment, tasks, and ethos. For example, while more globally focused in 1939 than any other navy by virtue of Britain's possession of the world's largest empire, the Royal Navy's ability to meet the challenges of war was hampered by the restrictions on the fleet imposed by interwar naval limitation treaties, and operated significant numbers of legacy platforms from World War I. Likewise, Germany's lack of colonies or any sort of overseas base infrastructure – and its naval weakness vis-à-vis Britain and France – determined that it would practice *guerre de course*, relying on elusive supply ships to sustain merchant raiders and U-boats at rendezvous points in the Atlantic or the Southern Ocean.

Prewar factors shaped the responses of navies. The lamented loss of naval bases in Ireland meant that protecting the western approaches became a chronic challenge for the Royal Navy. For the Soviet Navy, the interwar purges meant that it lacked experienced officers and adequate education and training, which accounted for its weakness in key areas, such as the employment of submarines. The Royal Navy had only gained control of Britain's neglected naval air arm from the clutches of the RAF on the eve of conflict, which partially accounts for the difficulties the British experienced in the field of maritime aviation. On a more positive historical note, America's lack of bases in the Pacific led to the development of fleet self-sufficiency

and long range capabilities before the war had begun. The US Navy evolved task force and fleet train concepts that the Royal Navy, later in the war, struggled to adopt, having traditionally relied upon an extensive network of bases scattered across the globe, resources that were not available when the British Pacific Fleet began to operate as an American task force. In contrast, although the British lacked sufficient escort vessels when war broke out, previous experience and foresight meant that the machinery necessary to establish the global convoy system was in place.

Another historical influence on the war at sea was the trouble that inevitably ensued when the war a nation had planned to fight did not materialize, or when a navy's doctrine and planning was wrong from the start. The interplay between events on land and at sea was frequently in evidence. The fall of France greatly changed the war the British Navy had to fight, requiring among many other things the creation of a new fleet (called Force H) based on Gibraltar to make up for the loss of the French squadron in the western Mediterranean. In the Far East, the loss of Indo-China contributing directly to the sinking of HMS *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* in the Gulf of Siam, described in Richard Hough's *The Hunting of Force Z* (1999), because Japanese bombers extended their range when granted bases in Vichy Indo-China. In the Italian case, it was understood that the country could not stand the strain of a lengthy war of attrition. But in the summer of 1940 Mussolini gambled that the war was all but over and that Italy needed to be a belligerent in order to claim its share of the spoils. But Germany did not triumph, and because of this Italy and its navy were sucked into just the type of war they had planned to avoid and could not hope to win. The Japanese, meanwhile, though experienced in regional operations, were never able to adapt to the maritime demands of a vast and rapidly acquired colonial empire and a war zone stretching across the entire Pacific and into the Indian Ocean.

Historic traditions influenced the manner in which navies fought the war, and all navies had their blind spots. The secret, usually, was how to adapt to the situation as it was and how best to learn from mistakes. The Imperial Japanese Navy stuck inflexibly to a belief in decisive battle at sea, allowing its merchant marine to be decimated through lack of commerce protection doctrine and its submarine force to pursue "high value" warship targets rather than molesting Allied trade. Even the US Navy had to learn some bitter lessons about commerce protection and the art of convoy, as German U-boats operated to great effect off the eastern seaboard in early 1942.

Oceanography was another factor defining national experiences of the sea war. Russia maintained four fleets in separate theaters – the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific. The requirements of defending the gulfs of Finland and Riga, shoring up the Dardanelles, or interrupting Japanese sea lines of communication in the Sea of Japan or the Sea of Okhotsk presented very different challenges. The Baltic Fleet delivered troops to Leningrad; the North Sea Fleet supported troops on the Rybachii Peninsula; the Black Sea Fleet succored Odessa during its siege; and, when Russia commenced hostilities with Japan, the Pacific Fleet supported landings on the Korean peninsula, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. Different powers viewed the same stretch of ocean in different ways. For the British, the Mediterranean was always configured as an east-to-west corridor linking Europe to the East via Suez. The Italians, on the other hand, who lived there, conceived of the Mediterranean from north to south, a sea linking the homeland to a new empire in Africa.

A further factor shaping a country's capacity to engage in ocean warfare was its ability, or inability, to keep step with technological changes and the manufacturing demands of sea warfare. This is the subject of works such as Kenneth Poolman's *The Winning Edge: Naval Technology in Action* (1997). The literature has a notable focus on naval weapons, as in John Campbell's *Naval Weapons of World War Two* (2002), Mirosław Skwirt's *German Naval Guns* (2005), and Anthony Newpower's *Iron Men and Tin Fish: The Race to Build a Better Torpedo during World War Two* (2006), and radar, as in Norman Friedman's *Naval Radar* (1981), Yasuzo Nakagawa's *Japanese Radar and Related Weapons of World War Two* (1997), and Derek Howse's *Radar at Sea* (1993).

Germany was unable to make good the loss of U-boats and their crews, or to keep pace in the development of new U-boat types as Allied antisubmarine warfare techniques improved and the Atlantic "air gap" was inexorably narrowed. Japan had paid too little attention to its scientific and technological base and its shipbuilding industry was targeted by American bombers, so that when Tokyo realized that developing new weapons of exceptional quality was the only answer to America's waxing sea power, it was unable to develop them in sufficient quality or quantity. Instead it engaged in a war of attrition that it was certain to lose whilst American submarines accounted for over five million tons of Japanese merchant shipping. Having won a massive, resource-rich empire in the twinkling of an eye, Japan proved incapable of running a maritime empire for economic profit, and incapable of defending it against the revolutionary type of naval warfare unleashed against it by America.

Another major infrastructural and technological investment was the provision of intelligence-gathering facilities. Intelligence and code breaking have received extensive coverage in the literature. One of the main themes is the effort to break German codes in order to fight the battle of the Atlantic, addressed in works such as David Kahn's *Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the Germany U-Boat Codes* (1991) and David Syrett's *The Defeat of the German U-Boats: Battle of the Atlantic* (1994). The use to which deciphered intelligence was put is the subject of works such as Patrick Beesly's *Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre* (1977) and John Winton's *Ultra at Sea* (1988). The Axis were not without their successes against Allied intelligence, elucidated in works such as Jak Showell's *German Naval Codebreakers* (2003). Regarding the Pacific, works such as John Prados's *Combined Fleet Decoded: American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War Two* (1995) and Ken Kotani's *Japanese Intelligence in World War Two* (2009) describe the struggle for intelligence superiority.

Another key field of technological competition was maritime aviation. Works such as Peter Smith's *The Sea Eagles: The Luftwaffe's Maritime Operations* (2001), Hata Ikuhiko and Izawa Yasuho's *Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War Two* (1990), Barrett Tillman's *US Navy Fighter Squadrons in World War Two* (1997), and Ron Mackay's *Britain's Fleet Air Arm* (2004) describe the work of national maritime air forces. Others relate to the work of particular aircraft, such as Kenneth Poolman's *Focke-Wulf Condor: Scourge of the Atlantic* (1978) and Arthur Banks's *Wings of the Dawning: The Battle for the Indian Ocean* (1996), which looks at the work of Catalina and Sunderland flying boats. Other books look at particular theaters in which shore-based air power was significant in the war at sea, such as Jon Sutherland's *Air War Over the Nore: Defending England's North Sea Coast in World War Two* (2010).

and Christina Goulter's *A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command's Anti-Shipping Campaign* (1995). Books such as Clark Reynolds's *The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy* (1992) and Robert Stern's *Fire from the Sky: Surviving the Kamikaze Threat* (2010) address different aspects of the use of air power in the Pacific War.

As the various navies of the world had different missions, political leaders had widely differing views of the sea and the purposes of naval power. Churchill believed in the historic use of British sea power for flanking manoeuvres and as a way of engaging enemies dominant on land, though consistently underestimated the significance of the advent of air power on naval manoeuvre. In his desire for constant offensive action, Churchill failed to understand adequately that a fleet "in being," such as the Eastern Fleet, was not necessarily "idle," and it was fortunate for Britain that in a democratic system the Admiralty and the Chiefs of Staff had sufficient power to contest and shape the Prime Minister's strategy. American political and military leaders disputed whether the enemy across the Atlantic required attention ahead of the enemy across the Pacific, and questioned their British ally's apparent obsession with the Mediterranean. Hitler was fixated on the European continent, and thus relegated the importance of the navy in relation to land and air power – and in an undemocratic political system, the prejudices and blind spots of Germany's leader magnified the significance of German mistakes. In early 1939 Hitler told his admirals that he would not need the ambitious new Z-Plan surface fleet, built around battleships and aircraft carriers, until the mid-1940s. When war came, therefore, the Kriegsmarine was not ready to fight the Battle of the Atlantic, and had to depend too heavily on the submarine service and the doctrine of tonnage warfare.

A great deal of material reviews the role of particular individuals and the war at sea, including William Tuohy's *America's Fighting Admirals* (2007), Stephen Roskill's *Churchill and the Admirals* (1977), and Bennett and Bennett's *Hitler's Admirals* (2004). Works relating to individual officers are legion, works on some of the more senior officers include E. B. Potter's *Bull Halsey* (1985) and *Nimitz* (1976), Agawa Hiroyuki's *The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto* (1979), Keith Bird's *Erich Raeder* (2006), Thomas Buell's *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance* (1974), John Winton's *Cunningham* (1998), and Donald MacIntyre's *Fighting Admiral: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville* (1961). Naval strategies and the military and political processes that formulated them are the subjects of works such as Michael Howard's *The Mediterranean Strategy* (1968) and H. P. Willmott's volumes on the Indian Ocean and Pacific (1982, 1983, 2002).

As well as a legion of memoirs written by individuals involved in the sea war, voices "from below" are to be found in the numerous general books chronicling the experiences of sailors. These include Anthony Master's *War at Sea* (2004), John Winton's *The War at Sea: An Anthology of Personal Experiences* (1967), Jean Hood's *Submarine: An Anthology of First-Hand Accounts of the War Under the Sea* (2007), David Isby's *The Luftwaffe and the War at Sea as Seen by Officers of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe* (2005), David Evans and Raymond O'Connor's *The Japanese Navy in World War Two in the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers* (1986), E. T. Woolridge's *Carrier Warfare in the Pacific: An Oral History Collection* (2000), and Ian Hawkins's *Destroyer: An Anthology of First-Hand Accounts of the War at Sea* (2005). Other books look specifically at the evolution of the officer corps in wartime and the training of sailors, such as Donald Chisholm's *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and*

Development of the US Navy's Officer Personnel System (2001) and Brian Lavery's *In Which They Served: The Royal Navy Officer Experience in the Second World War* (2008).

Maritime cooperation between nations was crucial to ultimate success or failure. The Anglo–North American alliance was highly effective in protecting transatlantic convoys and then clearing the region of enemy submarines and surface raiders. It was also successful in launching massive amphibious assaults in North Africa, Italy, and France which provided object lessons in inter-service and inter-allied cooperation. The Italian Navy, to its own great cost, managed successfully right until the end of Italy's war to supply the Axis armies in Africa, its losses compounded by the penetrability of its German ally's codes and signals. The Italian naval effort benefited Germany, tying up such significant Allied resources in the Mediterranean that German U-boats in the Atlantic reaped great benefits, and keeping the Mediterranean closed and thereby obliging the Allies to use the much longer Cape route connecting east and west, making it very difficult for them to generate the resources with which to invade fortress Europe. But east of Suez, Germany and Japan proved incapable of forging a successful alliance and joining hands across the Indian Ocean in order to cut the British Empire's vital supply lines. Instead, they squabbled over zones of demarcation, though the most significant fact was that no one at the heart of national decision-making in Berlin or Tokyo cared enough about the region to understand and exploit its potential.

Other powers had a better grasp of the global nature of strategy in a world war. The British War Cabinet appreciated the maritime dimensions of the struggle from the outset, the need to secure resources (such as those of the French colonial empire) and to deny them in turn to the enemy. This required blockade in order to starve the enemy of resources and the dispatch of troopships, both tasks dependent upon sea power. Every land campaign had a crucial maritime dimension, even if it was less visible or reported – the RAF and Royal Navy's ability to destroy Axis supply ships attempting to reach North Africa from Europe, for instance, having a crucial bearing upon the Desert War, and the Royal Navy playing an understated role in the Battle of Britain and the plans for British defense if the Luftwaffe triumphed in the air.

By 1945, the Allies had inflicted crushing defeats on the navies of their enemies and driven German and Japanese trade from the high seas. They had successfully harnessed their industrial power and converted it to martial effect, and were able to use their maritime power to push back enemy armies and liberate the conquest empires of the Axis powers. They could strike at the homelands of their enemies from the sea with growing impunity. The only answers were despairing attempts to fight off their amphibious landings, or to make the kind of suicidal attacks typified by the kamikazes and the final mission of the battleship *Yamato*.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Maritime War: Combat, Management, and Memory

KEVIN SMITH

Maritime warfare in World War II required managerial as well as martial success; while the latter has dominated the literature, more recent scholarship has overtly provided an integrated view. Both popular and scholarly studies of maritime warfare in World War II have begun with analyses of the effort, primarily by submarines, to conduct commerce warfare against merchant vessels. They have emphasized the endeavors of escort ships and aircraft to convoy those merchant vessels and crew to their destination. American interdiction of Japanese shipping in the Pacific theater has been properly overshadowed by examination of the German attempt to interdict Allied supply lines and the Allied (British, American, and belatedly acknowledged Canadian) escorts' response. Peter Padfield's justification for his disproportionate focus on the "Battle of the Atlantic" in *War Beneath the Sea* (1996) will serve here: "the German U-boat campaign was the most potentially decisive aspect of submarine operations in the Second World War ... the US submarine campaign had equal potential, but in the event the service was only one of three unstoppable US naval arms" (p. vii). Three central topics arise in this examination of the existing scholarship and its trends: the importance of integrating managerial and martial aspects of the struggle, the ongoing centrality of certain key wartime controversies in the scholarship that developed after the revelations in the 1970s about signals intelligence, and the rising relevance of social and cultural perspectives as scholars delve into the backgrounds and experiences of crewmen and examine how maritime warfare is remembered.

A natural wartime tension existed between viewing maritime warfare as a battle to be waged between escorts and submarines and as a managerial challenge to guide the cargo vessels safely to port, preferably without engaging submarines. Tactics varied, as attitudes oscillated between these two poles amid changing wartime conditions. In the classic early example of the failed pursuit of victory in combat at the expense of managerial success, Winston Churchill disastrously experimented with sailing merchant vessels capable of 12–15 knots independent of convoy in order to release escort vessels

to aggressively seek and destroy submarines. Admiral Karl Dönitz's determination to manage his wolfpacks' combat via radio transmission exposed U-boats to discovery via traffic analysis and high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF) as well as code breaking. His fear that human intelligence (not signals intelligence) was the source of Allied espionage reinforced his micromanagement tendencies; these helped discourage the sort of reflection via operations analysis that might have acknowledged the possibility of code breaking. Dönitz did not have the requisite number of submarines needed to force convoys to encounter his blockade when war began; the Allies lacked the needed warships to provide transatlantic escort. German conquests, and Soviet and American belligerency, created new opportunities and challenges. British survival in the first (largely "British") phase of the Battle of the Atlantic owed much to managerial improvements, alongside gallant anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The logistically premature, yet politically and diplomatically necessary, decision to invade North Africa helped shape the crisis of 1942–1943. Yet while Dönitz could deploy enough U-boats to force repeated ASW engagements, so also the Allies had developed a gallery of tactical and managerial innovations that facilitated not only successful escort of convoys to destination but active pursuit of submarines, culminating in the deployment of hunter-killer squadrons and transatlantic air cover that decimated Dönitz's force. Thereafter, Allied lines of communication were no longer seriously threatened, though Allied forces had to strive to maintain their superiority until the very end. As these examples make clear, martial and managerial elements should not be divided but rather intertwined in analyses.

This wartime tension has – at least at first glance – been resolved in the historiography of the Battle of the Atlantic almost entirely in favor of a focus upon warfare. Any casual glance at the titles of scholarly tomes, as well as popular histories, leads the reader to examinations of *War at Sea*, *The Hunters*, *The U-boat War in the Atlantic*, *The Battle for the Convoys*, *The Offensive against Germany's Submarines*, *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping*, and *The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943*. The initial discussion of management issues in official histories such as C. B. A. Behrens's *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War* (1955) and Richard Leighton and Robert Coakley's *Global Logistics and Strategy* (1955–1968), and also in Martin Doughty's *Merchant Shipping and War* (1982), were generally not integrated into the broader narrative of maritime warfare in the first generation of scholarship. But the scholarly tide has turned toward a more balanced assessment that recognizes that the mix between martial and managerial emphases in the battle of the Atlantic ebbed, flowed, and overlapped. Indeed, throughout the battle, effective management was central to effective war-making. In his excellent article, "The Battle of the Atlantic" (1990), Marc Milner recognized the need to integrate logistics, management, and other organizational issues into the broader narrative of maritime war, emphasizing that close escort was the "last line of defense" that fought to defend a convoy if "all else" failed (p. 47). Maritime warfare must be set in multiple broader contexts, including transportation infrastructure (including dockyard turn-round and swiveling of the British railroad network based on London to reorient to the west coast ports), technological developments (including code breaking, HF/DF, weapons development (e.g., hedgehog, Leigh Light), and radar), diplomacy (including British efforts to sway Roosevelt to allocate US merchant shipbuilding to British control and US Army efforts to demand priority for troop deployment over civilian imports), and grand strategy (the impact of offensive operations, including stripping escort vessels from

other routes to protect Torch convoys as well as the use of cargo vessels as floating warehouses in North African and South Pacific bases with inadequate port facilities). As I showed in *Conflict over Convoys* (Smith 1996), British dependence upon allocations of American-built merchant ships to sail (especially but not exclusively) Atlantic routes and supply British imports and military operations stemmed from several causes. Britain did not improve output in the most visible managerial sphere: ship-building. This was the result of a conscious and fateful decision to avoid domestic labor disputes and, therefore, depend on American goodwill and the skill of British diplomats to extract shipping allocations. Alan Jamieson's *Ebb Tide in the British Maritime Industries* (2003) contextualized the familiar story of the decline of Britain's maritime industries over a longer period, asserting rather than examining the impact of World War II; Lewis Johnman and Hugh Murphy (2002) focused on British ship-builders' examination of American yards for potential contracts, examining part of the work of the British Merchant Shipping Mission in the United States.

The maritime consequences of German conquest of continental Europe (loss of traditional (conquered) nearby sources and German access to French and Norwegian bases) and commitment to supply logistically expensive Mediterranean military operations from 1940 onward all ensured that, despite Clay Blair's protestations to the contrary in *Hitler's U-boat War: The Hunters* (1996), Britain had many ships but lacked sufficient shipping capacity. Shipping capacity was reduced as surely by these managerial difficulties as by U-boat attack. Thus, the relative importance of sinkings in the battle of the Atlantic with regard to shipping capacity (though not to the crews who perished and their loved ones) has always been overemphasized.

In one notable case, ships with refrigerated capacity were rerouted from Argentina and New Zealand to import meat from the United States in order to save shipping capacity, but when the US Secretary of Agriculture failed to ensure that the promised meat was delivered, the ships were loaded with general cargo (a waste of specialized shipping capacity) and thereafter diverted to move troops. Ships were lost in bad weather; in some cases this was caused by loading steel onto ships that were not built to carry it in order to boost British imports of this vital raw material. These are just a few examples of the kind of managerial decisions that could reduce shipping capacity and slow utilization of cargoes – the best measure of success in the battle of the Atlantic. British officials labored to overcome hurdles in their railroads and dockyards. They reoriented their import program to redefine and then exclude nonessentials. These managerial adjustments saved shipping capacity as surely as technological innovations applied in combat; the challenge for historians is not so much to compare the savings but to integrate separate narratives. Britain's sense of urgency and awareness of higher US standards of living created tensions with American managers who struggled to impose efficiency on a populace wary of governmental control.

Strategic decisions interacted with maritime warfare. The British war economy and Allied strategy were mutually interdependent, and both were dependent upon the availability of shipping transport. Operations in the Mediterranean diverted British shipping capacity. In *Conflict over Convoys* (Smith 1996), I argued that the "logistically premature military adventures of autumn 1942 diverted shipping and supplies from cross-Channel preparations to the South Pacific and Mediterranean throughout 1943 and 1944" (p. 235). Mark Stoler challenged my argument, contending that "adherence to logistical realities ... could well have precluded the launching of any

major Allied offensives in 1942 or 1943, with possibly catastrophic consequences for public support of the war and Allied unity." He speculated that "logistical chaos was [perhaps] a necessary price of Allied victory" (Stoler 1998, p. 1225). Indeed alliance diplomacy and domestic politics did require the invasion of North Africa. But in doing so, Allied statesmen and chiefs of staff did not grasp the arcana of shipping management and failed to adjust the subsequent pursuit of strategic objectives to the logistical realities aggravated by this decision. Thus American officers demanded British ships for military deployments even as British shipping managers demanded American ships for British imports. Britain thereby nimbly leveraged logistical weakness into strategic influence as late as 1943, but at the cost of American resentment of suspected British chicanery when British civilian needs postponed the deployment of American troops to Britain for cross-channel operations until victory in the Battle of the Atlantic could be achieved that spring. The process of allocating American-built merchant ships and its outcomes affected Allied strategy and the process of developing that strategy. Thus the management and conduct of maritime warfare not only was a prerequisite to Operation Overlord, it shaped the decision-making process that led to the invasion. I suggested that another indirect byproduct of Torch was the death of millions of Indians due to famine, a ghastly outcome of (at least in part) managerial failure in maritime warfare. This issue has been nearly invisible in scholarly treatments of maritime war; in Madhusree Mukerjee's blistering indictment of Britain's India policy in *Churchill's Secret War* (2010), she contended that overt racism in London privileged protection of excessively high stocks in Britain at India's expense long after shipping became available.

Thus martial and managerial factors repeatedly interacted; a holistic study of maritime warfare merits consideration of both categories. Yet though the earliest studies occasionally acknowledged material factors explicitly, generally the overt focus has remained on combat between escort vessels and submarines and the resulting fate of convoys of merchant vessels.

The extensive literature stressed strategic and tactical issues, from the official historians onward. *The Battle of the Atlantic* in Samuel Eliot Morison's series *History of United States Naval Operations* (1947) and Stephen Roskill's *The War at Sea* (1954) provided crucial initial narratives. The official British perspective on merchant shipping management was Behrens's *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War* (1955). She referenced efforts to clear internal transport congestion and expedite merchant ship repair, but wrote without access to American records. There is no US official history of American merchant shipping; US war shipping administrator Emory Land's memoir (1958) is best ignored. Because the Allies sought not only to deploy supplies and troops for direct military purposes, but also sought to sustain the British war economy, a number of books from the British civil series are useful but rarely consulted; most valuable is Keith Hancock and Margaret Gowing's *British War Economy* (1949). See also Günther Hessler's (1989) *The U-boat War in the Atlantic*, written from the German staff perspective at the behest of the Admiralty without knowledge of code breaking – though publication was delayed until 1989. Eric Grove prepared an introduction for the second edition of another official history, *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack upon Shipping* (1997). The best memoirs, like *U-boat Killer* (Macintyre 1957) and *Convoy Escort Commander* (Gretton 1964), and novels like *The Cruel Sea*

(Monsarrat 1951) and *Das Boot* (Buchheim 1973), in contrast, dramatically illuminated the human cost of maritime warfare.

The revelation in the 1970s that the Allies had penetrated German wartime communications marked a crucial turning point. While the Allies' official historians had written with knowledge of the Ultra secret, they could not directly reference it. Broader narratives of signals intelligence made extravagant claims, but historians of the battle of the Atlantic gradually moved toward a more judicious consensus. Historians have mined memoirs and archives and integrated code breaking to portray the struggle's key tactical and strategic aspects. Succinct overviews by Terry Hughes and John Costello in *The Battle of the Atlantic* (1977) and Dan van der Vat in *The Atlantic Campaign* (1988) attracted broader audiences; Jürgen Rohwer published several influential articles and books, including *The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943* (Rohwer 1977). His summative article (Rohwer 1999) concisely reviewed scholars' efforts to integrate signals intelligence into their narratives. Patrick Beesly's *Very Special Intelligence* (1977) provided a valuable practitioner's view; the third (posthumous, Beesly 2006) edition has been nicely enhanced by up-to-date contextualization in the literature. While Padfield's treatment of *Dönitz* (1984) has drawn some criticism, his *War Beneath the Sea* (Padfield 1996) is the best comparative analysis of Atlantic and Pacific submarine warfare in a single volume, with stirring accounts of combat between escorts and submarines. His acerbic assessments did not spare any flag officer in any service. He nicely summarized early German problems, including torpedo failures that foreshadow the later American struggle and the continuing problems with interservice cooperation with the Luftwaffe. He cautioned against overvaluing Ultra, and concluded that British submarines' effort against Rommel's supply lines deserve mention in discussion of Montgomery's triumph. He suggested that Paukenschlag's success fortuitously saved the Ultra secret by providing Dönitz with an alternative explanation for Allied difficulties. After decades of relative silence, Canadian historians have sought to rescue the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) from obscurity, and if possible from odium as well. In *North Atlantic Run* (Milner 1985) and *The U-boat Hunters* (Milner 1994a), Marc Milner has led the charge, and certainly accomplished the former in shifting discussion toward a mid-Atlantic narrative of the battle without ignoring Royal Navy activity, while explaining the causes of the failures evident in Macintyre's dismissive memoir. Milner described RCN leadership's distraction in seeking a balanced fleet including postwar cruisers and destroyers as well as the monumental tasks of simultaneously training sailors for ASW and building a navy virtually *ex nihilo*. In 1943, he acknowledged, RCN efforts were quantitatively important and qualitatively poor. Milner indicated the influence of RCN experience on US naval decision-making in 1942: early Canadian struggles to protect weakly escorted convoys influenced the US Navy to avoid sending out convoys without sufficient escort.

For sound operational reasons, RCN units often focused in 1941–1943 on protection of convoys while British and American units, especially in 1943, focused more frequently on hunting and killing submarines (and thereby gaining the lion's share of the credit for successful ASW). By the time RCN units were actively engaged in killing submarines, public and political interest in kills had faded amid what was perceived to be and eventually became victory in the battle of the Atlantic. Milner's early research was conveniently summarized in James Sadkovich's useful comparative volume

Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War II (1990), which also featured important essays by Keith Bird on the German Navy and Mark Parillo on the Japanese Navy. Milner's most recent book, *Battle of the Atlantic* (2003), distilled his arguments and aimed at a broader, popular audience. His work has been recently reinforced by the long delayed official Canadian history. Alec Douglas has led this effort, resulting in two beautifully produced volumes, *No Higher Purpose* (Douglas 2004) and *A Blue Water Navy* (Douglas, Sarty, and Whitby 2007). These copiously documented the RCN's transformation and thoroughly contextualized its early difficulties. Occasionally the tone is defensive, for example, in response to criticism of the RCN defense of HX 133 in June 1941 which "scarcely did justice to the achievement of these little warships, pushed to the forefront when only partly trained and seriously under-equipped" (p. 205). The first title is derived from the Canadian government's 1943 assertion that the "Canadian Navy can serve no higher purpose" than responsibility for convoys in the northwest Atlantic (p. 630).

Two collections of essays published amid 50th anniversary commemorations offered valuable insights in assembling a variety of perspectives: Timothy Runyan and Jan Copes edited *To Die Gallantly* (1994). This volume valuably combined operational analyses of individual convoy battles, personal accounts by civilian witnesses of combat, a striking assessment of the influence of Mahanian thought on the combatant navies, and, most notably, two differing but civil assessments of the USN's response to Operation Paukenschlag. That issue had received renewed attention with the publication of Michael Gannon's *Operation Drumbeat* (1990). Wartime RN criticisms had been echoed in official treatments on both sides of the Atlantic by Morison and Roskill. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch had offered a measured assessment in *Military Misfortunes* (1990) of a "failure to learn" from British experience. But Gannon inflamed the debate with a powerfully drawn but often intemperate indictment of Admiral King's failure to provide escorts for US East Coast convoys in early 1942 (p. 59). Gannon's book benefited from interviews with U-123 commander Reinhard Hardegen, but his invention of conversations undermined his credibility. Also, he did not acknowledge powerful arguments in King's defense: congressional appropriations for escort vessels had been belated and insufficient, and the USN suddenly faced a two-ocean war. In "The US Navy and Operation Roll of Drums, 1942" Robert Love (1994) insisted that King had pressed for escort construction and was not opposed to convoy, but had commitments to Pacific operations and troop movements. Thus, King's "controversial" response had to be understood in the context of "American global strategy, competing theater demands, [and] institutional history" (Runyan and Copes 1994, p. 95). In introducing *To Die Gallantly*, Dean Allard (1994) minimized the importance of Paukenschlag losses in relation to the overall war effort and criticized Dönitz's concept of tonnage warfare, asking "Was there really any prospect that the simple sinking of merchant ships, without regard to the geographic importance of the areas in which those losses occurred, could win the war for Germany?" (p. xxi). This was an important criticism of Dönitz, but did not account for the impact of Paukenschlag on tankers and therefore British oil stocks. In that same volume, Milner (1994b) made the particularly telling point that the Americans really should have learned the lessons provided by earlier Canadian experience in their inshore waters, reinforcing Gooch and Cohen's argument regarding the USN's failure to learn from the RN.

Clay Blair weighed in as well. In his magisterial two-volume treatment of the battle of the Atlantic, *Hitler's U-boat War* (1996, 1998), Blair generally privileged narrative over analysis, seeking to bludgeon with mind-numbing detail any who would suggest that the German submarine actually posed a realistic threat to Allied communications. He dismissed Churchill's assertion that the only thing that worried him was the U-boat peril. While his microscopic examination made his massive volumes a useful reference work for individual escort/submarine duels, and his work has often been cited as the summative work on the battle of the Atlantic, his approach to Paukenschlag flailed at straw men. He attacked those (unnamed) historians who would label King and other responsible USN officers as "fools or knaves or worse," while typecasting the RN and the US army as "brilliant and infallible warlords" (Blair 1996, p. 691). No branch or nation had a monopoly on genius or idiocy, as Padfield carefully demonstrated. Indeed in his criticism of Dönitz's decision to launch Paukenschlag, Blair acknowledged that the shallow continental shelf made attacks off the US East Coast difficult, but he did not discuss the role that the presence of a more active defense would have played in forcing submarines to maneuver and lose opportunities for attack.

Elaborating on Milner's argument, the official Canadian historians also weighed in on Paukenschlag, referencing Love's approach. "Although the best work on the subject, Love suggested – but did not stress – the central issue, which was that Admiral King would not remove his destroyer squadrons from their principal task of standing by to escort the capital ships in the Atlantic Fleet" (Douglas 2004, p. 394n). Comparing loss rates in that period in Canadian and American waters, they insisted that the most significant explanation for relative Canadian success was the existence of Canadian coastal convoys: "by grouping even small numbers of ships together they reduced the opportunities for U-boats to find them ... though underequipped and undertrained, fulfilled their primary task simply by being present" (p. 389). The US Navy prioritized transatlantic convoy for troopships over coastwise convoy for cargo vessels. The Royal Navy generally relied on troopships' superior speed and zigzagging, and sailed troopships independently. Dependent on imports, Britons were willing to accept the minimal (though real) risk to troopships. Here again the martial and managerial intersect. No historian has sought to quantify exactly, or even approximately, how many escorts a World War Two troopship convoy "needed." Doing so is a prerequisite to further research into Admiral King's choice to reject the British conclusion that a weakly defended cargo ship convoy offered better outcomes than independent sailing and that therefore troopships might reasonably have been safe with a weaker escort.

In the second, more voluminous collection of essays, Stephen Howarth and Derek Law also stepped beyond the typical focus on combat in memoirs and general narratives in *The Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945* (1994). They examined comparative training and organization, operational research, historiography, and contributions of other nationalities beyond the major combatants. In a comparison of Allied perspectives that closed with a historiographical review, W. J. R. (Jock) Gardner suggested that "it is possible that a post-Ultra period may now be starting, in which a more balanced view may now be coming into sight" (Howarth and Law 1994, p. 528). Several scholars have, indeed, offered increasingly judicious assessments of the relative contribution of Ultra to victory. In *Seizing the Enigma* (1991), David Kahn detailed in an accessible narrative the story of how the Enigma machine worked and the valiant efforts to

capture machines and codebooks. He concluded that the solution of the German naval Enigma was only one factor in winning the battle of the Atlantic, but that it substantially shortened the course of the war, thereby saving countless lives – on both sides. In a series of articles before and after publication of *The Defeat of the German U-boats: The Battle of the Atlantic* (1994), David Syrett painstakingly tracked the role of communications intelligence in specific skirmishes, culminating in an analysis of combat in the summer and autumn of 1943. Victory was not simply achieved but had to be sustained. He superbly integrated the impact of the long delayed arrival of Very Long Range (VLR) aircraft and HF/DF. A close examination of his battle-by-battle analyses rewards the careful reader; his detailed analysis of HX 239 in May 1943 demonstrated that the Allies could be successful even when Germany had the upper hand in code breaking.

Kathleen Broome Williams complemented Syrett's meticulous analysis in *Secret Weapon* (1996). While repetition and speculation occasionally obscured her points, she integrated a narrative of the independent American development of seaborne HF/DF equipment with its tactical deployment. Land-based direction-finding equipment had been rendered almost entirely irrelevant by German victories in Norway and France and the extension of operations into the mid-Atlantic. Equipment powerful enough to detect transmissions at a distance yet portable on ships was essential, for information gathered by shipborne HF/DF could be "interpreted and used immediately" (p. 11). Here Anglo-American rivalry actually benefited the Allied war effort, as the Americans adopted a French-produced system. Dönitz had underestimated the dangers of centralized control via radio, but not only because messages could be read with timely code breaking. The mere act of sending a message was dangerous. Even if it could not be read, traffic analysis and HF/DF enabled escorts to gain a more precise bearing on a radio transmission, thereby contributing to "an accumulation of small, incremental advantages" that gave the Allies the upper hand. She adeptly described how HF/DF provided a trump card in the "wizard war" of comparative technological development: "because the Germans never suspected the cause of this ominous change, HF/DF never became a part of the spiral of development and counter-development" (p. 44). HF/DF played one more vital role after the war alongside radar as an effective cover story for success achieved by code breaking. Richard Goette (2005) explored the VLR controversy, illustrating maritime warfare advocates' continuing agitation at the privileged position of the Combined Bomber Offensive in retaining VLR B-24 Liberators vis-à-vis deployment in mid-Atlantic convoy defense.

Gardner's densely packed *Decoding History* (1999) definitively depicted the complexity of maritime war, seeking a higher-level synthesis. He rigorously examined the multilayered interaction of the many relevant factors. Although the term "Battle of the Atlantic" will never disappear, he recognized that whereas historians generally describe several battles in the course of a campaign, there were several campaigns in the course of this "battle." He carefully situated these campaigns amid the strategic direction of the war. He usefully identified eight separate phases of the struggle and described the importance of timing from the tactical to grand strategic level (from timely code breaking to the Germans' failure to strangle Britain before American industrial power could be brought to bear). He emphasized various economic and industrial dimensions. Thus "there was considerably more to the shipping balance than convoy warfare in the narrow sense" and "performance at sea cannot be considered

the sole arbiter of Allied progress.” He concluded that “it is also difficult to argue that intelligence ... played any significant part in” the building of and allocation of cargo shipping (p. 46). He brilliantly dissected Dönitz’s managerial mistakes. Gardner placed technology and signals intelligence into perspective with two case studies. Thus Rosie the Riveter and “Ivor the Intellectual in a hut at Bletchley were the human faces of two large and complementary Alliance assets” (p. 41). He concluded that Ultra is best seen as a member of an ensemble production than a theatrical superstar, “no mere member of a chorus but neither was it a star shining above all others.” Thus, the occasional representation of Ultra as *deus ex machina*, perhaps unavoidable given its delayed revelation, “deserves to be put thoroughly and finally to rest” (p. 218).

Surface warfare has generally, and correctly, received pride of place in the Pacific theater. Nonetheless, USN submarines, after a slow start generally attributed to faulty torpedoes, proceeded methodically to constrict Japan’s supply lines far more successfully than German efforts to close the Atlantic. Blair’s *Silent Victory* (1975) has become the standard treatment alongside Jasper Holmes’s earlier *Undersea Victory* (1966); certainly popular histories continue to focus upon individual captains. Padfield’s standard *War Beneath the Sea* (Padfield 1996) usefully included submarine warfare in both theaters, but disproportionately focuses on the Atlantic. In *The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II* (1993), Parillo overcame the destruction of Japanese records to examine Japanese merchant marine and ASW policy and implementation, exploring factors such as limited raw material allocations to the merchant marine, use of low-security codes, and especially the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) disparagement of convoy protection. R. A. Bowling’s (1994) analysis of the global Mahanian obsession was glaringly relevant in Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida’s analysis of *The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II* (1995). Not only did the IJN fail to protect its convoys, but it remained fixed on deploying its submarines as adjuncts of main battle fleets against the most difficult targets possible: high speed warships accompanied by capable escorts, strictly rationing torpedoes for use against high-value targets. IJN submarines were therefore underutilized in commerce warfare and ineffective in main fleet operations.

The USS *Indianapolis*’ fate was a rare exception: “Japan’s submarine force never had a chance to prove itself as a strategic arm, but was always subordinated to local needs and tactical situations” (p. 190). In a 1999 article, Boyd illustrated the critical role of Allied interception of both German and Japanese communications in tracking and sinking a Japanese submarine engaged in bringing crucial raw materials to Germany. In a 2004 article, Dienesch offered a revisionist view of improved US performance, attributing it to “the successful integration of an effective system of surface search radar into the submarine fleet” and calling for further research (p. 29). In *Tracking the Axis Enemy* (1998), Alan Harris Bath contrasted the extraordinary intimacy of Anglo-American-Canadian naval intelligence collaboration in the Atlantic with dismal failure in the Pacific as competing national interests, difficult personalities, and postwar ambitions impeded cooperation.

Milner’s assertion in “The Battle of the Atlantic” (1990) that “the winter of 1940–41 was the only time in the war when the German Navy had a good chance of achieving a decisive result against Britain” cautioned against hyperbolic assessments of the crisis of 1942–1943 (p. 49). But it does rest upon confidence that enough merchant seamen could be found willing and able to go to sea amid horrific losses on the US East Coast

in early 1942 and in the mid-Atlantic in early 1943. Their stories (for such a disparate group of sailors there could never be one "story") have been related in many memoirs. Whether the narrative focuses on individual crewmen or compilations of stories, they emphasized heroism. In *At All Costs*, Sam Moses (2006) offered a stirring tale of Norwegian-American Fred Larsen who helped crew the *Ohio* to Malta. Unfortunately, Moses managed to accomplish what might have been thought impossible: he exaggerated the importance of the retention of Malta to the war effort by turning it into the hinge of the alliance with Stalin.

Broader narratives included John Bunker's focus on the American merchant mariner's individual experiences in *Heroes in Dungeness* (1995), Mike Parker's *Running the Gauntlet* (1994), an oral history of Canadian merchant veterans, and John Slader's *The Fourth Service* (1994), recounting the British merchant marine experience. Parker provided brief introductions and then let the veterans speak for themselves. This essentially unfiltered access to the voices of veteran crewmen lacked sufficient context for sailors' perspective 50 years after the fact. Not only are there factual errors in their retelling, but selective memory affects their recollection. These books shared a vision of the merchant mariner as hero; certainly they were, but this perspective, focusing on gallant deeds at time of crisis, does not do justice to the totality of their experience nor explain how the ships remained crewed. Richard Woodman's tributes to merchant crewmen, especially in his books on *The Arctic Convoys* (1994) and North Atlantic route, *The Real Cruel Sea* (2004), differed by providing clearer operational context.

Tony Lane's *The Merchant Seamen's War* (1990) offered unparalleled intellectual rigor among such descriptions; he looked beyond the "rhetoric of stoicism" to recognize that most narratives have "been emptied of the routine and prosaic qualities of everyday life" in favor of one in which "merchant seafarers are allowed only to be heroic defenders of the nation," displacing stories of "real people leading recognizably real lives." Rather, "seafarers' behavior was constrained more by the culture of their community than by the demands of war" (pp. 5, 7). Analyzing the age and place of origin of crewmen, racial divisions, depictions in contemporary news coverage and films, the everyday experience between attacks, discipline, the experience of losing a ship and being taken prisoner, Lane contextualized his study in the British myth of World War II as a people's war in which class divisions broke down, arguing rather that in the maritime war "the longer the war continued, the more divided Britain became" (p. 8). Such men "went on doing their job because in war, as in peace, they had to earn a living and it was simply unfortunate and couldn't be helped that going to sea had become so much more dangerous" (p. 9). White (1995) examined the social characteristics of seafarers who served in ships that landed in Canadian ports, emphasizing that "racial, ethnic, and national distinctions ... were aspects of the convoy system that were regarded as relatively unimportant at the time, and they have remained more or less unexplored ever since" (p. 20). Opportunities remain for a far more methodical investigation of merchant seamen, especially Americans. Timothy Mulligan's thorough analysis of the U-boat service offers important insights and revisions of prior perspectives. Following a biography of the only submarine captain shot trying to escape, *Lone Wolf* Werner Henke (1993), Mulligan undertook a thorough analysis of the training and service of surviving U-boat veterans based on over a thousand questionnaires. Based upon the responses, Mulligan looked beyond the aces to ordinary crewmen's geographical

origins, occupational background, religious affiliation, and educational and socio-economic status in *Neither Sharks nor Wolves* (1999). This extraordinarily valuable study definitively overturned the myth of a “children’s crusade” among U-boat crews and commanders in the war’s final year. Mulligan also painstakingly reviewed the question of Dönitz’s orders regarding treatment of survivors. Wartime destruction of many personnel records forced Mulligan to rely on these questionnaires and therefore upon the filtered memory of these veterans. For example, their recollections of their degree of affinity for Nazism may have (even unconsciously) been diminished. Mulligan subtly identifies with the warrior ethos of U-boat veterans and might more forcefully have pressed his examination of Dönitz’s unwavering determination to continue sending submariners to their deaths. Heinrich Walle’s examination of Kusch’s execution in *Die Tragödie des Oberleutnants zur See Oskar Kusch* (Walle 1995) should be reviewed in light of Mulligan’s findings on Nazism in the U-boat arm and Erich Topp’s controversial memoirs, translated as *The Odyssey of a U-boat Commander* (1992). Axel Niestlé, in *German U-boat Losses* (1998), and Rohwer, in *Axis Submarine Successes* (1983), have authored important reference works on submarine warfare from the German perspective. For example, Niestlé provides a complete listing of U-boat losses and causes where known, drawing upon archives in combatant nations. His rigorous standards for determining the fates of lost U-boats increase the number of those lost due to unknown causes, illustrating the indeterminate outcome of some encounters. No discussion of memory and maritime war can ignore the single most important book published on maritime war since 1990: Michael Hadley’s *Count Not the Dead* (1995), an examination of the popular image of the submarine in Germany. This was an intellectual history of how Germans have thought about the U-boat and a social history of how they have expressed those thoughts and reacted to them in fiction, nonfiction, and film. Hadley traced fascinating continuity and change. German submariners were once “knights of the deep” like World War I ace Otto Weddigen who unfailingly fought by prize rules, and unquestioned heroes of 1939–1941 like Günther Prien and Otto Kretschmer. Buchheim, a wartime propagandist, changed the paradigm with the publication of *Das Boot*. Buchheim caught the *Zeitgeist*: German submariners had been tragic victims. His perspective sparked fury among veterans, most of whom remained proud of their service and loyal to Dönitz. Hadley summarized the complexity of their pride in serving (Nazi) Germany:

The sense of abiding loyalty to the state is still a source of satisfaction to many former submariners today. Not that they had remained loyal to National Socialism, which they now regard to have been a passing phenomenon, but loyal to the higher calling of duty in the national service. (Hadley 1995, p. 105)

In *Wolf* (1997), Jordan Vause rendered a series of thoughtful, nuanced portraits of U-boat commanders, understanding from the outset that contested memory challenges broad generalizations. Certainly U-boat crewmen, however apolitical they may or may not have been (and Mulligan’s depiction seems affected by the passage of time), were fighting for Hitler. But of course the Allies also practiced unrestricted submarine warfare in World War II. While historians have long wrestled with the morality of area bombing in the service of a just cause, American literature on the

submarine war against Japan has generally extolled the courage of American crewmen who overcame faulty torpedoes and delivered America's retaliation against a wicked enemy that launched a sneak attack. There is no comparable evaluation of the portrayal of American submarine warfare in nonfiction, fiction, and film. Roger Dingman has taken the first important step in *Ghost of War* (1997) with his balanced, thoughtful, and incisive examination of the destruction of the *Awa maru* by Elliott Loughlin's *Queenfish* in April 1945. Japanese leaders capitalized on their brutality toward American prisoners of war and the consequent pressure of American public opinion to extract safe passage for the *Awa maru* to convey relief supplies to American POWs, then loaded it with vital raw materials and VIP passengers for the return trip. Loughlin sank the Japanese vessel. In strictly legalistic terms, the presence of contraband cargo violated the terms of the agreement, but this nuance did not shape the way the incident has been remembered. Seeking to avoid retaliation against POWs, American negotiators promised compensation. This promise was not kept. The incident faded from American memory, but has repeatedly been memorialized in Japanese novelizations, documentaries, and films. "The Japanese knew and enshrined in their public memory an Awa maru story that reinforced an image of themselves as the ultimate victims in the Pacific War," writes Dingman (1997, p. 149). He explains how Admiral Lockwood shaped postwar US memory of the Silent Service in *Sink 'em All* (1951), and set the context for a needed review of the portrayal of American submarine warfare in popular culture. A specific ethical issue sheds light on the need for comparative analysis. American Dudley "Mush" Morton, Briton Anthony Miers, and German Heinz-Wilhelm Eck shot at survivors in the water; Miers received the Victoria Cross, and Eck was executed as a war criminal. Morton did not survive the war, but his executive officer, Richard O'Kane, survived a grueling ordeal as a POW, was highly decorated, and retired as a Rear Admiral. There are of course distinctive aspects to each incident; Eck fired on *civilian* merchant seamen, whereas Miers and Morton fired on troops. By failing to define atrocities carefully, Tony Bridgland missed an opportunity in *Waves of Hate: Naval Atrocities of the Second World War* (2002) to deliver a targeted analysis. For example, as Mulligan points out in *Lone Wolf*, Werner Henke "fell victim to a propaganda legacy of World War I" (p. 216). Henke had been falsely accused of war crimes for shooting survivors in lifeboats in a propaganda broadcast; when captured by the USN in 1944, he signed an agreement to cooperate with his captors to avoid extradition to the British who were supposedly preparing to try him. Henke was determined not to stand trial, and was shot trying to escape. Notably, this issue is not part of public memory about Allied submarine warfare. The administration of victors' justice to Eck is no surprise (though Dönitz received different treatment), nor is the absence of a feature film about Allied atrocities, but the fact that no historian has examined American cultural construction of the submarine and its uses is an omission warranting redress.

Duncan Redford has undertaken this task, though only for Britons, in *The Submarine: A Cultural History* (2010). He contends that "weapon systems ... are cultural constructions" (p. 7). He examines the meaning of the submarine in British society. Before World War II, "the British understood their world in such a way that unrestricted warfare could not fail to be abhorrent to them" (p. 126). But the British Navy altered its understanding in early 1940: he depicts "a complete reversal of the British corporate attitude to unrestricted warfare from one of disdain to that of

enthusiastic participation” (p. 142). This acceptance within the navy created a dilemma for the broader culture. States Redford,

the use of unrestricted submarine warfare during the Second World War by all major combatants, threw up a paradox for the British in their assimilation of the experience of submarine warfare: how to celebrate the successes of their own submarine force while castigating those of their enemies who were using essentially the same mode of warfare? It seems that this paradox was dealt with by simply ignoring it, or rather the British use of such “ungentlemanly” methods. As a result, British accusations of “piracy” or general maritime beastliness by the Axis powers are conspicuous by their absence after spring 1940 when Britain declared “sink on sight” zones. (Redford 2010, pp. 150–151)

British submariners went still further, as some commanders flew the Jolly Roger on return from successful patrols: “the submarine service had enthusiastically embraced the piracy image that, in the First World War and interwar period, had been used with such great effect to stigmatize submarine warfare” (p. 152). Yet wartime films made no direct reference to British conduct of unrestricted submarine warfare, for “British submarines had to be seen as a morally acceptable as well as a militarily acceptable weapon ... and conform to pre-war ideals regarding attacks on non-combatants” (p. 213). Amid Redford’s excellent analysis of this shift in British attitudes, he does not discuss Miers’s case – reference to Miers only appears in a note. Three submarines were named after wartime submarines whose captains had won Victoria Crosses; one was Miers; Redford served on the latter day *Torbay*. Nonetheless, Redford’s book marks an important step in the ongoing reintegration of military history into the historiographical mainstream. Gardner and Redford have suggested paths for ongoing investigation. While many combat narratives exist, we still await the ambitious one-volume history that situates either Pacific or Atlantic maritime warfare in its necessary industrial, managerial, social, strategic, technological, and cultural context, building on the works of the scholars discussed herein. Among these subspecialties, the contextualization of American unrestricted submarine warfare in historical memory is the most significant current gap in the maritime history of World War II.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The Middle East and World War II

SIMON DAVIS

Current historiography on the Middle East in World War II is copious but so dominated by great power context as to be tacitly shunned by predominant anti-Orientalist scholarship, rooted in endogenously focused cultural theory and comparative long durations (Cole and Kandioti 2002). This problem, criticized by Gerges (1991), has ensured that social, economic, cultural, and micro-historical methods emerging on the war overall (Reynolds 2001) have inadequately addressed this region. Peter Mansfield's *A History of the Middle East* (1991, p. 219) asserts typically "political life was frozen for the duration of hostilities," implicitly dismissing them as without dynamic significance. Meanwhile Occidentalists prioritize cold war-era politics, and crucially undervalue World War II crucible of contemporary regional currents (Kimball 2001).

Undeniably, the war in the Middle East was largely Britain's, confronting the Axis, after which it, to paraphrase Dean Acheson, "lost so much, so stupidly and so fast" to indigenous revisionism in bipolar superpower context. So, 1939–1945 is perceptible merely as the ephemeral apex of what Gallagher (1982) called Britain's "decline, *revival*, and fall" a process Jackson (2006) confirms to have centered on the region. Contemporary geopolitical conceptualizations of the Middle East (Davison 1960; Smith 1968) were indeed British-originated. They were institutionalized under what Darwin (1999) calls its "undeclared empire" there after 1918, however much this was a gimcrack creation, financially, administratively, and morally, perforce compromising with such numerous interlocutors as France in Lebanon and Syria, Zionism in Palestine, American oil firms in Iraq, the new Turkish Republic, dynasts from Egypt to the Persian Gulf, and ever-latent popular, tribal, and religious dissent. In the 1930s, evolving nationalism, Islamic populism, the fascist powers (Cohen and Kolinsky 1992), and even Japanese trade expansion (Shimizu 1986) compounded British unease. However, World War II enabled Britain to apply unprecedented command-economic powers, assumed during its war of national survival (Jeffrey 1999, pp. 318,

326) not just to defeat the Axis but finally reconstruct the Middle East as a durable post-India platform for long-term global power.

Winston Churchill (1959) asserted the region as second only to Britain itself in importance (vol. 3, pp. 420–426): in 1941, he consolidated by invading Iraq, the Vichy Levant, and Iran. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's May 29 Mansion House speech clarified accompanying "guided development" policies and intraregional cooperation under a Cabinet-ranked Minister of State in Cairo. Wilmington (1971) shows how Britain's Middle East Supply Centre (MESOC) facilitated these objectives, funded by Lend Lease, therefore making US assent crucial. Silverfarb (1994) and Sassoon (1987) examine particulars in Iraq; Gallagher (1987) and Vitalis (1996) suggest resulting Anglo-American frictions in Egypt, as I have in the Persian Gulf (Davis 2009). British fiduciary, trade, industrial and agricultural programs, in fusing imperial state with private economic interests, aroused comparably "corporatist" American counter-policies (Painter 1986), particularly over Saudi Arabian oil. Best analyzed by Stoff (1980) and Karlsson (1986), these reflected systemic antagonisms (Dobson 1986) that qualified the "special relationship" of Churchillian mythology.

Current forms of American engagement with the Middle East arose here, not, as Louis (1984) and Little (2003, pp. 4–8, 11) convey, from a harmonized cold war-motivated transference of Britain's imperial role and mentalities. This US epiphany blended economic self-interest with liberationist ideals (Baram 1978; Brands 1991) advanced by the Roosevelt administration in ways describable as "new deal internationalism." Cumulative reports of Britain cornering regional economic prerogatives, to common American and local disadvantage, finally led President Truman to scotch "guided development" by ending Lend Lease in August 1945 (DeNovo 1977; Godfried 1987). British appeals for renewed cooperation foundered against enduring US desiderata – indigenous sovereignty under United Nations provisions and open economic doors (Hearden 2002; Borgwardt 2005). Without this, Britain's military-political position became untenable during subsequent crises. This is the war's principal outcome for the Middle East: encouraging local state-builders to transcend British tutelage en route to American mandated postcolonial status (Davis 2009, pp. 317–321). But this puts the postwar cart before the wartime horse. What follows will synthesize current thinking on the latter, notwithstanding many gaps on war-induced social, economic and cultural change probably influencing this paradigm shift.

New social constituencies were challenging the status quo by 1939. Eppel (1998), Wien (2004), and Dawisha (2005) show Iraqi elites, whether or not pro-British, beset by younger, nationalistic, Pan-Arabist professionals and technocrats eager for new directions, including but not limited to fascism. Schumann (2004) and Nordbruch (2009) confirm Lebanese and Syrian intellectual pluralism as has Gershoni (1999) for Egypt. Al-Awaisi (1998) also notes the Muslim Brotherhood's anti-imperialist but not necessarily pro-fascist position on Palestine, Britain's key regional legitimacy problem. Gershoni and Jankowski (2010) importantly confirm how in Egypt, despite orthodoxies (Vatikiotis 1986) on failing liberalism, far-right sympathies were in the minority.

Palestine's Arabs rebelled in 1936 against Jewish immigration, which was swollen by Polish, Rumanian, and German anti-Semitism, and British opacity, under metropolitan Zionist pressure, toward Palestinian self-government. Zionists insisted Britain's mandate existed only to facilitate the Jewish national home. But after many

contortions, Britain's May 1939 White Paper backtracked, promising independence in ten years under Arab majority governance while reducing immigration. Cohen (1978) condemns this as appeasement that reneged on Jewish rights out of fear of mass Arab defection to the Axis.

An associated argument, reiterated by Herf (2009), is of pro-Nazi, viscerally anti-Semitic Arab leadership, embodied by Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini. But Elpeleg (1993) shows Haj Amin as reactively propelled by events into rebellion and, in defeat, toward Hitler, Britain's enemy. Nafi (1997) confirms essential Arab-Axis ambivalence: anticolonial passions praised fascism but were as likely to be disillusioned as further-inspired. Wildangel (2004) confirms Arabs spurning fascism as anti-Islamic, imperialistic, and racist. Indeed, Metzger (2002, pp. 150–176) describes the Abwehr's Admiral Canaris as being so disappointed in the exiled Haj Amin and radical community in Beirut that he ordered German agents in 1938 to suspend subversive pro-nationalist activities.

Yet much is made of German activism, especially Fritz Grobba, a Wilhelmine spirit seeking vindication as minister in Baghdad (Nicosia 1986; Schwanitz 1996; Mejcher 2003; Dietrich 2005). But Berlin neglected his efforts, notably for trade and military-industrial relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Germany's consulate general and pro-Arab émigré community in Palestine were similarly frustrated (Nicosia 1985). As Yisraeli (1971) shows, Hitler despised all Semitic peoples, using the Middle East mainly as leverage for British quiescence in Europe. He saw in Palestine a depository for Jewish Germans, which was precisely what Arab nationalists opposed. German diplomatists strove principally to outdo the Nazi Party's overseas political department and SS/SD for Hitler's favor, so, through the 1934 German-Zionist Ha'avara accords, they expanded Jewish emigration, while the rival Gestapo and SD worked with more extreme Zionist factions. All told, domestic Nazi racism trumped pro-Arab policy (Melka 1969; Polkehn 1976; Schölch 1982; Nicosia 1989). Even during the war Hitler routinely dismissed the Middle East as a peripheral, Italian concern.

Initially, Mussolini neglected Italy's longstanding Middle East ambitions (Smith 1976; Segré 1988; Michaelis 1992) until reviving them after 1930 and seeking ideological reinvigoration by launching fascism's "imperial and racist phase" (De Grand 2004). Radio Bari propagandized (Williams 2007) in Arabic against Britain and France, but audiences remained leery of Italian imperialism, brutality in Libya and Ethiopia, empty words over Palestine, and effete elite-level politicking. So Mussolini sought British rapprochement, in the 1937 "gentlemen's agreement," 1938 Red Sea protocols and dialogue through 1939 over Hitler's war-mongering. Encouraged by navy and air force ideologues, he nonetheless remained bellicose and covetous toward French interests (Knox 1982; Mallett 1998). Even then, Italian un-readiness, and army and royal opposition, meant that until Germany's attack in the West, Mussolini delayed his "parallel war," being forced into action by fear of a unilateral Nazi peace (Knox 1982, 2000; Corvaja 2008, pp. 108–109). Yet, as Salerno (2002) shows, his crude posturing had already precipitated Anglo-French abandoning of appeasement. Italy's April 1939 invasion of Albania, to Hitler's ire, also impelled Turkey toward the Allies (Güçlü 2003).

Nevertheless, British over-extension by simultaneous Japanese, Italian, and German pressures, detailed by David Omissi (1992), Lawrence Pratt (1988), and Kolinsky (1999), had initially necessitated conciliating Mussolini and indigenous Middle Eastern

grievances. With UK air defense and the fleet being modernized, the region's vital sea, airways, oil, and bases were protected only by small interim forces. Consequent appeasement (Kennedy 1976) was a venerable British diplomatic technique, notorious only after Munich. Moreover, Morewood (1996) and Morsy (1984) challenge Cohen by arguing that the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, by affirming base rights and political relations (albeit on somewhat reduced British terms) regularized, rather than compromised, British standing. Elsewhere, multilayered initiatives began to rally local friends, such as the Hashemites, Iraq's "old gang" and 'Abd al-Aziz al-Saud (Macdonald 1977; Silverfarb 1983; Loewenstein 2000; Dietrich 2005, pp. 466, 475–477).

Britain did not appease but crushed the Palestine rebellion (Norris 2008) and when inter-communal talks failed, it imposed its White Paper. Beaten Arab leaders, save Haj Amin, acquiesced while Zionist imprecations, blocking all previous policy amendments, were ignored. In September 1939, the Jewish community, to paraphrase Ben Gurion, had to support the war on Hitler as if there was no White Paper but resist the White Paper as if there were no war. Cooperation with Britain (Penkower 2002) reflected obvious fear of Nazi invasion, lingering hope of refuge in Palestine for persecuted Jews (Ofer 1990), and wartime opportunities to change British policy or, failing that, mobilize American support against it (Davidson 2001).

France, meanwhile, wavered in Lebanon and Syria between repression, inter-ethnic divide and rule, and partial self-government. It reneged in 1938 on full independence while organizing with Britain against Italy. Thomas (1998, 2005) details French imperial underdevelopment, beyond supplying men and materiel to the metropolis, while surveillance and minority "troupes spéciales" (Bou-Nacklie 1993) held the Levant down. Turkey was courted by handing it the multi-ethnic Syrian province of Alexandretta, arousing more Arab nationalist ire. Nonetheless, France's colonial-level Army of the Levant and North African forces permitted minimum British "self-sufficiency" in Egypt, helping reinforce the Western front. During the phony war France nonetheless urged Balkan operations, seaborne and air attacks via Turkey on the Baku oilfields, which during the Nazi-Soviet pact were supplying Germany (Richardson 1973).

Despite seeing little fighting, the war embroiled this "northern tier" of Turkey (Macfie 1989) and Iran. Turkey sought safety in "active neutrality" (Deringil 1989). Britain wanted an alliance (Weber 1979). Germany opposed this, assigning a prestigious ambassador, Von Papen, in 1939 (Roth 1996) and large trade credits, seeking not only key resources like chromium (Gül 2006) but later to use the Straits against the USSR, and, unsuccessfully, Anatolia for attacking the British. Turkey's supreme fear was of Stalin; in October 1939, fortified by the Nazi-Soviet pact, he conveyed desires to control the Straits. Already unsettled by Italy, Turkey concluded a defense treaty and chromium contracts with the Allies but it exempted itself from war with the USSR and frustrated Allied designs on Baku. In May 1940, Turkey refused to declare war on Germany, citing Britain's inability to provide arms or protection. By June 1941, before Operation Barbarossa, it had signed a nonaggression and friendship treaty with Germany, having allowed Vichy arms into pro-Axis Iraq. Thereafter, German ships sailed through the Straits. Deep intrigues (Seydi 2004a, 2004b) continued on Turkish soil for the rest of the war (Olmert 1987; Seydi and Morewood 2005; Tamkin 2009). Turkey accepted British aid, promised Churchill it would join the war, but did so only in February 1945, until when it claimed Istanbul's vulnerability to German bombing and that fighting would draw unwelcome Soviet forces into its

territory. In late 1944, frustrated, Britain implied it might indeed accommodate Stalin after all (Sitki Belgin and Morewood 2004). Thus, Turkey broke with Germany but turned to the Americans, whose munificent presence, ironically, Britain had encouraged to tilt events its way (Cossaboom and Leiser 1998).

Iran could not avoid Anglo-Soviet invasion, on August 25, 1941 (Eshragi 1984a, 1984b). In the 1930s, Reza Shah had encouraged German trade and industrial ties to counter British pre-eminence in oil and finance and out of a fear of the Soviets above all. He revived US–Iranian relations when the Nazi–Soviet pact threatened to play him into Moscow’s orbit, only to be caught between Stalin and the British after Operation Barbarossa. They demanded he expel Iran’s German community and surrender its trunk arteries to northward Soviet Lend Lease shipments from the Persian Gulf. His refusal sealed Iran’s fate (Beaumont 1981). German support was ineffectual (Schulze-Holthus 1954). President Franklin Roosevelt stayed aloof, reassured of Allied bona fides when Churchill signed the outwardly anti-imperialist Atlantic Charter. Iranian resistance collapsed (Stewart 1988), Reza Shah abdicated, and Iran’s national state was dissipated by resurgent grandee factionalism, the popular Left, centrifugal ethnic forces (Abrahamian 1982; Azimi 1989), economic paralysis, and hyperinflation (Eshragi 1984a, 1984b; McFarland 1985).

Britain tied help from its Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) to pro-sterling currency controls, only feeding areas vital to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and Soviet supply clearance until Iran capitulated (Dadkhah 2001). But by late 1941, Britain needed American resources (Mottet 1952). Iran convinced US observers it deserved reconstructive military, civil, and economic aid, under what Roosevelt was to dub “an unselfish American policy” (Davis 2006). American historians discern arch anti-Soviet implications (Mark 1975; Kuniholm 1980; McFarland 1980) but this mission arose from anti-British concerns that unwittingly provoked Soviet counteraction and future cold war confrontation by advancing development through American oil exploration up to the Iranian-Soviet border (Fawcett 1992).

In ways which suggest pragmatic limits rather than revolutionary grand designs in Stalin’s Middle Eastern policies, the USSR was characteristically touchy, as with Iran and Turkey, over its historically vulnerable marches and approaches (Resis 1981). However, during the great purges he had withdrawn the USSR’s Arab-world outposts, which in the 1920s reached as far as Jeddah and Yemen (Baldry 1984). For most of World War II, outside Iran, regional communist parties remained marginal (Botman 1988) and Soviet diplomats only returned, in consultation with Britain, to Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq after December 1943 (Ginat 2002). Too much should not be made of potential Soviet expansion deeper into the Middle East and toward India, at Britain’s expense, which was pushed by Germany during the abortive November 1940 Berlin talks. Foreign Minister Molotov replied by outlining Soviet desires to control Batum, Baku, areas “in the general direction of the Persian Gulf,” and the Turkish Straits. But these were limited desiderata, consistent whether Moscow was pro-Axis or an ally, although later catalysts of early cold war frictions, to some extent with Britain, but more with the United States (Roberts 1999). Nevertheless, Stalin seems to have had few programmatic ideas for further regional expansion and doubted the receptiveness of Arab peoples to Soviet interests, whatever Kuniholm (1980) and other cold warriors have claimed. His priorities were for zones of control in Eastern Europe, which he pressed on Germany, as he would on his future allies,

while declining to divert Soviet geopolitical energies southwards; Hitler replied with Operation Barbarossa (Gorodetsky 1999).

After France fell and Italy declared war in June 1940, German commanders considered finishing Britain off indirectly with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern offensives. Without Spanish, Vichy or Turkish help, Hitler preferred to destroy the USSR first (Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel 1995, pp. 173–204). By contrast, Britain's Middle East Command (MEC) was reinforced to preserve at least one active land theater (Playfair 1955–1966, chs. 4, 13). Over a million Indian, Australasian, South African, British, and Free French personnel deployed, sustained by extensive new command, support, and industrial complexes (Dovey 1989a; Jackson 2006, pp. 97–143). This decision, which Howard (1968, pp. 13–15) attributes to Churchill's "romantic idées fixes" proved controversial among memoirists, scholars, popular media, and even libel lawyers (Reynolds 2005).

Churchill (1959) claimed virtuous war leadership, providing massive, excellent forces yet being failed by successive MEC commanders, Wavell and Auchinleck. Decisive victory at El-Alamein in autumn 1942 came from his inspired choice of new commanders, Montgomery and Alexander. Barnett (1960) challenged this, alleging Churchill's strategic folly, obliviousness to inferior equipment, field organization, training and tactics, ignorance of modern desert warfare, dilatory strategic directives, and prioritization of political effect over military advisability. Such was the case when Britain entered Greece and East Africa in spring 1941. To cover his errors, Churchill traduced any officers who resisted his impulses or demanded better MEC training, supplies, and operational reserves. When cross-reading British, Indian, and Commonwealth military histories (Long 1952–1966; Playfair 1955–1966; Bharucha 1956; Pal 1957; Roskill 1960, 1977; Murphy 1961; Richards and Saunders 1993) they sustain Barnett, amid extensive partisan literature (Warner 1981; Hamilton 1981; Greenwood 1990; Fort 2009): recent works tend to exonerate Montgomery's predecessors while properly emphasizing grueling military practicalities (Latimer 2002; Barr 2006).

Britain's campaigns were checkered by political interference, intra-Commonwealth disputes, mercurial command appointments and reorganizations, complacent planning, coordination, field intelligence and communications security, and replacing experienced divisions wholesale. These factors repeatedly exposed green Allied troops to trial and error against the seasoned Germans (who drafted replacements into standing frontline formations). Despite near-victory over Italy in 1941, these failings allowed the Axis to reconquer Libya, enervated Britain's subsequent offensives, and invited preemptive attack and near-rout in May–June 1942. Its class-ridden officer corps, dominated by tank-borne cavalymen, obstructed German-style integration with infantry and antitank units and also undermined Auchinleck, a mere Indian Army career-officer. Resulting losses fell disproportionately on Australians and New Zealanders, exacerbating home-government pressures for their recall against Japan; British armor frequently let them, Indian, and Free French units down in action. Exposed, mobile fighting led to massive equipment losses and surrenders in summer 1942 that briefly jeopardized Britain's huge lodgment and encouraged Mussolini to embark for his ceremonial entry into a panicky Cairo.

Nevertheless, high attrition and wastage also sapped the Axis. Auchinleck held Egypt in July, covered by prodigious air and naval counter operations, while the Malta

base interdicted Axis supplies. But Churchill sacked him and his staff in August. After arriving, Montgomery broke up the guards/cavalry “trades union,” and improved Auchinleck’s plans with new training, briefing, deception, air-ground integration, field-maintenance techniques, and massive reinforcements. In November, his Eighth Army overran imaginative but under-resourced Axis defenses, using concentrated air and artillery-supported infantry assaults, and accepting heavy attrition. He then linked up with Anglo-American forces advancing from Morocco and Algeria after Operation Torch, a conjunction which forced Axis capitulation in Tunisia in May 1943.

On the Axis side, the North African war broke Italy’s capabilities (Knox 2000; Alvarez 2001). At first Mussolini rebuffed German help (Corvaja 2008, p. 134) but accepted Rommel’s small contingent in early 1941, which grew into the legendary *Panzerarmee Afrika* (Lewin 1977). Recent analyses (Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel 1995; Boog 2001; Reuth 2004; Hoffman 2004; Kitchen 2009) qualify Rommel’s reputation, criticizing his careerism, counterproductive contempt for the Italians, gambling away of theater security in pursuit of glory, disobeying command directives before failing strategically, and exhausting Axis fighting power (as well shown by Martin Kitchen at the soldiers’ level) and finally himself. In mid-1942, he dissuaded Hitler from assaulting Malta rather than Egypt, which could not be replenished. At this crucial moment, his expert radio intercept unit was captured; the British also closed damaging leaks from the US Embassy in Cairo and cracked German Enigma codes after a gap of months that resulted in the retrieval of the initiative in the intelligence war.

Throughout, Ultra decrypts (Hinsley 1993, chs. 5–6, 13–14, 16) revealed Axis overextension and German distraction. The British nevertheless struggled, attracting Soviet and US criticism (Stoler 1989, pp. 94–128) for delaying victory in Europe. Barnett (1991, p. 377) accuses Britain of strategic bankruptcy. But this assumes survival against Hitler as the sole objective, where Britain was also dualistically advancing neo-imperialist goals. With this in mind, Churchill persuaded Roosevelt to accept “closing the ring” on occupied Europe from the Middle East (Heinrichs 1988; Sainsbury 1994, pp. 21–28) by initiating US forces via Torch (Funk 1974). This Porch (2004) vindicates as, if not immediately decisive, “pivotal” to Allied victory. In Egypt, the leading nationalist party, Wafd, which negotiated the 1936 treaty, aligned with Britain against King Farouk, royalist notables, and pro-Axis officers (Sadat 1957). Egypt had not declared war, even when Italy invaded in 1940. But German follow-up was ineffectual (Dovey 1989b). Britain’s ambassador, Miles Lampson, stifled Egyptian elite opposition, forcing Farouk on February 4, 1942 to restore Wafd leader Mustafa Nahas as premier. But in the longer term, this coup aroused powerful animosities, culminating in the 1952 revolution and Suez crisis (Smith 1979). Morsy (1989, 1994) elaborates on how internal Wafd feuds and scandal-mongering toppled Nahas in 1944, reviving violent, internecine politicking. With army leaders interned and British policy makers tired of Lampson’s “rows,” Farouk recovered his arbitrating role. The Muslim Brotherhood, on which current studies (Lia 1998) end in 1942, continued to emerge as a popular force. But cultural, social, and occupational change under British occupation and their mass implications are still only partly investigated (Beinin and Lockman 1987; Owen and Pamuk 1998).

In Iraq, Britain’s position was assailed by (Silverfarb 1986, chs. 11–12) nationalist army officers led by Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh’s Golden Square and younger radicals

attracted to the dissident notable Rashid Ali al-Gailani, who opposed the pro-establishment "old gang" led by Nuri as-Said. Premier Nuri broke with Germany in September 1939 but dared not declare war (Warner 1979). The Italians remained in Baghdad, fomenting intrigues aggravated after October by Haj Amin's arrival from Beirut (Qazzaz 1976). Popular sympathy kept him free. Yet, despite his supposed pro-Nazism, contact with Britain in summer 1940 produced a draft pro-Allied declaration in return for accelerated Palestinian independence and a rebel amnesty. Nuri helpfully offered war with the Axis and two combat divisions (Khadduri 1962; Nevo 1984). But Churchill, a skeptic on the 1939 Palestine White Paper, balked; he preferred Jewish interests to pro-Arab deal-making. Disillusioned, Haj Amin (DeLuca 1979), Iraqi nationalists, and even Nuri, reopened channels to Berlin. By April 1941, with Britain retreating in Libya and Greece, the Golden Square gambled on German assurances, made Rashid Ali premier, putting Nuri and the Hashemite Regent to flight.

Until early May, Rashid Ali acknowledged British base and transit rights and sought Turkish mediation, which Wavell, amid the Greek debacle, favored, as did British diplomats (Kedourie 1966). But Churchill, backed by India Secretary Leo Amery, refused, and he assembled British and Indian invasion forces (Playfair 1955–1966, vol. II, ch. 9; Churchill 1959, vol. III, pp. 253–266). Germany's response was sluggish: intra-military–Abwehr–SD–diplomatic frictions and the Crete campaign delayed Hitler's orders for three weeks; Vichy cooperation, vital for access via Lebanon and Syria, was confirmed too late to prevent Iraq's surrender, despite German agents securing arms and airfields and a Luftwaffe base at Mosul (Schröder 1980; Mallman and Cüppers 2006, pp. 77–83). Rashid Ali and Haj Amin fled on May 31 to careers as rival, desperately extreme, Axis propagandists (Elpeleg 1993, pp. 63–73).

In early June, again over Wavell's protests, Churchill ordered Vichy Lebanon and Syria taken. Commonwealth and Indian, Free French, Transjordanian, and Palestine Jewish forces faced stiff resistance, which ended on July 14 (Playfair 1955–1966, vol. II, Ch.10; Churchill 1959, vol. III, Ch. 18; Mockler 1976; Gaunson 1984) after Vichy Druze troops mutinied (Bou-Nacklie 1994; Nordbruch 2009, pp. 96–102). British also prevailed over Axis agents with nationalist groups (Dovey 1991): subsequent Free French administration, liaising with Major General Edward Spears, was correspondingly undermined by his sympathy for local independence (Roshwald 1986). Reinforced by the MESC, British officials cultivated Lebanese and Syrian leaders to the point of open defiance in autumn 1943, having them released from French detention and reinstated in government. Although Spears eventually succumbed to Foreign Office displeasure, his legacy soured postwar Anglo-French relations (Roshwald 1990; Zamir 2005). De Gaulle was further embittered by Allied–Vichy negotiations prior to Torch; Free French agents, probably abetted by British intelligence, restored his primacy by assassinating Vichy deputy premier Admiral Darlan, whom the US favored, in December 1942 in Algiers (Verrier 1991; Thomas 1996). But despite this, Britain marginalized France in the Middle East itself, ultimately preventing de Gaulle's armed intervention against Lebanese and Syrian independence in summer 1945 (Bou-Nacklie 1993; Thomas 2000; Dueck 2006).

Yet, if Britain thwarted French colonialism, it alienated American sympathy for its own ambitions despite soliciting partnership in guided development. US officials, notably James Landis in Cairo, condemned palpable British self-aggrandizement

(Davis 2009, ch. 5 and 6). In bellwether Saudi Arabia, Britain did not expropriate American petroleum rights as such but enveloped them in sterling-area provisions compromising their dollar-based market status. US action followed after December 1942 to secure ARAMCO, the American concessionaire, although how was disputed between advocates of US government versus private ownership (Randall 1983; Painter 1986). American political interventionism also contested civil aviation, telecommunications, commercial, fiduciary, agricultural, infrastructural, and military modernization questions (Gormly 1980; Mejcher 1982; Davis 1997).

Reconciliation over oil even raised talk in Washington of seizing British assets in Kuwait and Iran to repay Lend Lease. Churchill's influence over Roosevelt waned after the Tehran conference of late 1943. The following spring, Britain conciliated while it still could: the 1944 Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement followed which protected both sides' concessions, and regulated markets and development. But the agreement also aroused American industrial opposition and the document was withdrawn from the US Senate. Subsequent American corporate consolidation within ARAMCO, breaking certain obligations to sterling-based Iraq, was negotiated between the firms concerned after the Foreign Office conceded to State Department pressure, fearing an unwinnable "oil war" if it did not concede. This diluted British regional oil dominance, rooted in Iran and Iraq, allowing Saudi dollar-oil to prevail in postwar European markets (Stoff 1981; Painter 1984; Davis 2009, pp. 238–243). Generally harmonized Anglo-American Middle Eastern interests and responsibilities, promised to the April 1944 Stettinius mission to London, were nonetheless thwarted by lingering British presumptions of junior US political status in return for measured economic openings. American resentment influenced President Truman, sustaining US insistence upon the MESC's liquidation in autumn 1945 and future hostility to British-sponsored regional institutions and planning (Davis 2009, ch. 8).

These included the League of Arab States after March 1945, with the United States blocking British initiatives at San Francisco for its collective status within the United Nations Organization. The League was further diminished by member-state leadership rivalries (Porath 1986; Thornhill 1998). Britain also hoped to redress Palestine's problems via Jewish statehood within a federal Arab League state system. Arab rejection was a barometer of its faltering regional credibility. While shunning Haj Amin, delegates firmly separated Nazi crimes against the Jews from compromise with Zionism (Schölch 1982, pp. 669–672).

In Palestine, Britain extended rural Arab-orientated "development and welfare"; bypassing mainly urban Jewish communities, it curtailed land expropriations and encouraged Arab civil participation (El-Eini 2006). Wartime military industrialization remitted most Arab peasant debt via wage labor, skilling, and service development (Owen and Pamuk 1998, pp. 69–71) and relieved pressure to alienate land. But Arab socioeconomic evolution was accompanied by a fragmentation of traditional leadership (Khallaf 1991), which was still factionalized over whether to cooperate with or resist Britain and the Jews. Nadan (2006) insists Britain bungled in arbitrarily trying to modernize peasant farming, claiming this aggravated communal crises and undermined Palestinian Arab socioeconomic cohesion prior to war in 1948.

Meanwhile, Jewish Palestine, as Monty Penkower (2002) and Nadia Ofer (1990) summarize best, was radicalized by British obduracy over the hated White Paper and prohibitions on refugee entry. Para-militarism revived, in 1940 bombing the refugee

ship *Patria* to compel its passengers ashore, killing 268 people. Extremists also collaborated with Germany on illegal immigration, in Abraham Stern's case proposing a Nazi-aligned Jewish state fighting Britain as the main enemy (Heller 1995, pp. 85–91). But mainstream Zionism pragmatically cultivated Churchill, lobbying for Jewish units in Allied armies and claiming openness to statehood within a regional federation while nonetheless propagandizing against Arab suitability for leadership (Zweig 1986; Kolinsky 1999, ch. 10). Local British officials remained hostile to Zionist ambitions as inevitably subversive (Cohen 1976). Britain's War Cabinet vacillated. Initiative passed to radical Zionists in America (Ovendale 1989; Davidson 2001) whose May 1942 Biltmore program demanded a Jewish Commonwealth embodying, as per US war aims, freedom and international justice. American support rallied, eventually influencing Presidents Roosevelt and Truman despite escalating terrorism, particularly when, in November 1944, the Stern group murdered Britain's minister of state, Lord Moyne, in Cairo. Henceforward, Britain wavered between repression and the need to curry American sympathy and subsidization by self-restraint.

By the war's end, Britain's position was increasingly chimerical, although historians led by Louis (1984) see it as still supreme (Balfour-Paul 1991; Davis 2009, Ch. 6–8), unable to demarcate with either the US or USSR (Ginat 2002), meet local economic aspirations, or reconstruct military-political privileges in locally cooperative form. In February 1945, at Yalta, the Americans rebuffed Eden's efforts to mediate over northern Iran, asserting license to restore Iran against morally comparable British and Soviet aggrandizement. This hardened Soviet attitudes, leaving Britain little choice than pro-US alignment in the consequent Azerbaijan crisis. American unilateralism was further evinced when, after Yalta, President Roosevelt met Kings Farouk, 'Abd al-Aziz, and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in Egypt but neglected to inform Churchill beforehand. Furthermore, in May 1945, Iraq's hitherto pro-British regent and Nuri toured America seeking economic partnership beyond the sterling area (Davis 2009, pp. 195–205, 220–223). With Britain incapacitated by what Lord Keynes called a financial Dunkirk, its Middle Eastern projections entered a phase of morbid uncertainty. Pragmatic US acknowledgement of Britain's residual military value for anti-Soviet containment (Hahn 1991; Little 2003) was never at the expense of New Deal internationalist-style regional independence and development (Davis 2010), a dichotomy which implicitly determined postwar British regional atrophication.

Future research directions on the Middle East and World War II are potentially rich and diverse, reflecting the relative neglect, noted above, of social and economic aspects region-wide and locally, along with political developments in the individual Arab countries, and micro-historical military history – particularly for Italian forces, in English. On critical local, social, and economic issues, I would suggest a promising start could be made in the extensive records of Britain's Middle East Supply Centre (MESCC) at the National Archives in London. These have not been comprehensively examined since Martin Wilmington's 1971 study, which is itself generalistic and frequently anecdotal. Because of this body's vast scope and intensive engagement in so many sectors, in so many countries, its readily accessible material opens many doors into indigenous social and economic formation as impacted by the Allied presence in the region. Archival work in the current Middle East is an uncertain enterprise, with the possible exception of the well-run Israel State Archives, which hold many records

of the British Mandate period, many of which, particularly in material areas of daily life marginal to Zionist–Palestinian confrontations, have yet to be examined seriously. Even in other territories, valuable British wartime social and economic records can be expanded into indigenous context, using historical literary and journalistic sources, more widely available than in official archives, in synthetically reconstructive ways suggested by the subaltern studies methodologies currently reshaping ideas on historical consciousness and colonial-era India (Chaturvedi 2000).

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Western Front, 1944–1945

CHRISTOPHER R. GABEL

The Western Front of 1944–1945 was the main effort of World War II for the Anglo-American alliance. Even prior to Pearl Harbor, the Americans and British established the foundations of a formal alliance and agreed that the guiding strategic principle of their coalition would be “Germany First,” meaning that the alliance would secure the defeat of Germany before turning its full efforts against the Japanese. Obviously, “Germany First” implied an Allied invasion of Europe, and the logical place to do that would be the part of the continent nearest to Great Britain. Although the timing and nature of this invasion was a matter of considerable debate in 1942–1943, there was little doubt that the Allies would open a Western Front in the war against Germany.

When the invasion and liberation of Western Europe finally occurred, it was the most important theater of the war for the Western allies, but it cannot be said that it was the main effort of the war against Nazi Germany. Operations on the Eastern Front, which lasted a horrendous four years, ground down the German war machine well before the Allies ever landed in Normandy. That being said, the Western Front was much more than a minor sideshow. It figures prominently in all English-language surveys of World War II, and there are a number of excellent monographs focusing specifically upon the Western Front. Some representative titles can be found in the “Further Reading” section appended to the end of this chapter.

Among the more important resources for a scholarly examination of the Western Front are the official histories prepared in Great Britain and the United States after the war. For the British, Ellis wrote two volumes under the title *Victory in the West*. Volume 1, *The Battle of Normandy* (Ellis 1962) and volume 2, *The Defeat of Germany* (Ellis 1968), encompass the entire Allied effort on the Western Front, with emphasis given to the strategic and tactical facets of British operations. On the American side, the “Greenbook” series, officially *The United States Army in World War II*, covers the army’s entire war effort in 76 volumes, ten of which focus specifically on the Western Front. (Individual titles in this series are cited in the appropriate sections

that follow.) The “Greenbooks” are not only an important resource for understanding American operations, but also represent an excellent source for basic information on German operations – the authors of these volumes had full access to the extensive German military archives captured at the close of hostilities.

The array of contending forces, or “order of battle,” on the Western Front is mind-boggling by modern standards, though not nearly as large as the numbers found on the Eastern Front. The Allies opened the Western Front on D-day, June 6, 1944, with eight divisions and 133,000 ground troops. By May 7, 1945, when hostilities ceased, they fielded 91 divisions – 61 American, 13 British, 11 French, 5 Canadian, and 1 Polish. These divisions came under the control of seven field armies (plus two army headquarters not currently engaged in operations), which in turn belonged to three army group headquarters. The total number of Allied ground troops came to more than four million.

The number of German forces opposing the Allied array is less easy to calculate. Personnel records are woefully incomplete, and the Germans often counted as “divisions” depleted formations that were little more than battalions in effective strength. On D-day, the Germans had approximately 61 divisions in the western theater of war, though many of these were under strength, and 33 lacked transport. (By contrast, there were 164 divisions facing the Soviets on that date.) By January 1945, the German contingent on the Western Front had grown to 80 divisions, though once again many of these were badly depleted.

The story of the Western Front in World War II, as told from the Allied perspective, is in large part the story of coalition warfare. Sometimes characterized as the most successful coalition in history, the Anglo-American alliance owed much of that success to the dedicated efforts of political and military leaders to maintain the coalition. Roberts (2009) offers a “group biography” of the four men most responsible for shaping the alliance and providing the ultimate guidance for Western Front operations – Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their top military advisers, Field Marshal Alan Brooke and General George C. Marshall. Marshall and Brooke both held seats on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which consisted of the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff and which was the coalition’s highest military authority. The Combined Chiefs of Staff passed its directives for the Western Front to the supreme Allied commander of the European theater, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Eisenhower exercised command over the Western Front through the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which is the subject of Forrest Pogue’s “Greenbook,” *The Supreme Command* (1954). A standard biography covering this phase of the general’s career is Stephen E. Ambrose’s *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (1970). Another key resource is *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years* (Eisenhower 1970) edited by Alfred D. Chandler. As these sources make clear, Eisenhower’s task was a daunting one. He, however, did hold certain advantages that not all commanders enjoy. First, he had the luxury of organizing his command while out of contact with the enemy, and of selecting the date for starting the campaign in Europe. Second, he had the advantage of drawing upon the experience and the key personnel from two theaters of operation, the European command, which he assumed in February 1944, and the Mediterranean theater, where he had exercised supreme command from November 1942 through 1943.

Eisenhower needed all the help he could get for he was the focal point of the coalition. He faced challenges to the alliance from both above and below. Whenever the Combined Chiefs of Staff deadlocked along national lines, they tended to avoid making any decision, and simply allowed Eisenhower to deal with the fallout. From below, Eisenhower continually refereed the squabbles and rivalries of his subordinates, both British and American. Some of these issues were personality driven; some reflected the competing national interests that are to be found within any coalition. Often criticized by the British for his lack of combat experience and allegedly weak grasp of military strategy, Eisenhower was, by most accounts, a master of coalition warfare. His memoir, *Crusade in Europe* (Eisenhower 1948), is itself an exercise in consensus building and coalition maintenance. Dwight's grandson, David Eisenhower, provides a somewhat more candid assessment of the supreme commander's challenges in *Eisenhower at War 1943–1945* (1986) which also details the general's specific techniques of effective coalition command.

Among the measures that Eisenhower employed at SHAEF was to make optimism a matter of official policy, a trait that ultimately carried him to the presidency. Eisenhower personally assumed responsibility for any missteps that might occur within his headquarters. These measures kept the coalition focused on mission accomplishment rather than on recriminations over perceived failures. He exercised command by consensus, assuring that both coalition partners had a voice in all decisions. Organizationally, Eisenhower provided for consensus by making SHAEF a wholly integrated headquarters, with American and British officers working side-by-side irrespective of nationality. Moreover, wherever the chief of a staff section was British, his deputy was automatically an American, and vice versa.

Whereas Eisenhower integrated Americans and British officers throughout SHAEF, he attempted, as far as possible, to separate the fighting forces of the coalition partners. This was in part a matter of practicalities, for the British and American forces differed in their tactics, logistical systems, and staff structures, making it impractical to merge combat elements. Moreover, the British and Americans differed in their concepts of military command. The British model, as championed by Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, was to be extremely thorough and methodical with the objective of minimizing risk. When preparing for battle, Montgomery promulgated a detailed master plan to which all subordinate elements were expected to adhere. Montgomery insisted on the careful completion of logistical and administrative arrangements prior to firing the first shot. The battle plan itself typically involved massive expenditures of firepower – Montgomery believed in expending artillery shells rather than lives. He realized, as did his political superiors, that Britain was at the end of its manpower reserves by 1944, and that the British Army on the Western Front was the last army Britain would be able to raise. Two resources offer detailed analyses of Montgomery's way of war. Nigel Hamilton's *Master of the Battlefield* (1983) provides a laudatory account, whereas Hart (2007) is inclined to be more judgmental.

By way of contrast, American commanders tended to be less methodical, more opportunistic, and to allow greater initiative to their subordinates, though considerable variations in command style existed among American leaders. For example, General George S. Patton, Jr., favored freewheeling operations in which the greatest mistake a subordinate could make was to fail to advance. On the other hand, General

Courtney H. Hodges tended to me more methodical than Patton and exercised more centralized control.

In any event, British officers schooled in the Montgomery system of command, when placed under the control of an American headquarters, were often distressed by what they perceived to be needless haste and inadequate planning. Americans placed under British command complained of being over-supervised, and felt frustrated by the slow tempo of operations. In sum, Eisenhower was well advised to separate British and American combat elements whenever possible.

The policy of separation had important political benefits as well. By giving each nationality a distinct geographical area of operations, Eisenhower assured that the British and the Americans shared the pain and the triumphs of war equitably. Moreover, he recognized that sending one's son off to war is hard enough; sending him off to fight and possibly die under the command of a foreigner might be too much to ask.

The chain of command emanating downward from SHAEF changed considerably in the course of the campaign. At the time of the Normandy invasion, Eisenhower exercised command over three main subordinates, all British: Admiral Bertram Ramsay, in charge of all Allied naval elements for the invasion; Montgomery, who commanded all ground elements; and Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who headed the combined British and American tactical air forces ("tactical" air operations are those conducted in close conjunction with the ground forces). As the campaign on the Western Front progressed, and the ground elements pushed inland, Ramsay's naval forces reverted to national control. In September 1944, with three army groups operational, Eisenhower himself assumed the role of overall ground forces commander. Leigh-Mallory's headquarters became redundant when each of those army groups received its own tactical air force.

Of the Allied army groups on the Western Front two are well represented in the historical literature while the third is not. The British 21st Army Group under Montgomery is capably examined in Ellis's two volumes (Ellis 1962, 1968) cited above. Montgomery's perspective, complete with his often pointed opinions, is ably represented in Nigel Hamilton's *Monty: The Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976* (1986). The American 12th Army Group, activated at the time of the breakout from Normandy, came under the command of General Omar N. Bradley. The official "Greenbooks" thoroughly detail 12th Army Group operations, while its commander produced two memoirs – *A Soldier's Story* (Bradley 1951) and *A General's Life* (Bradley and Blair 1983). The 6th Army Group is less well known. General Jacob L. Devers, its American commander, stands in need of a scholarly biographical treatment. His obscurity is due in part to personal antipathies that existed between himself and Eisenhower. The "Greenbook" covering 6th Army Group's war appeared only in 1993 and was written by Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, titled *Riviera to the Rhine*.

The echelon of command below army group was the field army. Here again the scholarly coverage of army commanders is uneven. Indeed, the colorful and flamboyant Patton, commanding the Third US Army in the 12th Army Group, is the only Allied army commander to be extensively studied. The standard reference for Patton's experience on the Western Front is volume 2 of Martin Blumenson's *The Patton Papers* (1974), though several biographical treatments also exist. Of particular value in addressing the gap with regards to the other Allied army commanders is *Patton's*

Peers: The Forgotten Allied Field Army Commanders of the Western Front, 1944–1945 (English 2009) by John English.

Patton's fellow army commanders in 12th Army Group were Hodges, First US Army, and General William H. Simpson, Ninth US Army. Simpson's relative obscurity is due in part to his own aversion to publicity, and to the fact that his army spent part of the campaign under Montgomery's British 21st Army Group. Hodges, who represented 12th Army Group's main effort, has yet to receive a full scholarly biography. John T. Greenwood, however, has produced an excellent resource – *Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First US Army* (2008). Within 6th Army Group, Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, commander of Seventh US Army, is also a virtual unknown who avoided the public eye and lacked the recognition afforded some of his peers. General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, who led the French First Army, is well known in France, but less so in English-language sources.

The formations coming under Montgomery's 21st Army Group were the Second British Army, commanded by General Miles Dempsey, and First Canadian Army (a hybrid British-Canadian organization) under General Henry D. G. Crerar. The Second British Army is well represented in the literature, by virtue of its close association with Montgomery, but its commander is another relatively unknown figure. Dempsey avoided publicity during the war, and has yet to receive a full biography. The First Canadian Army is the subject of Stacey's official history (1966), and a more recent work by Copp (2006). English (1991) offers a pointed but well-reasoned critique of Canadian generalship. Crerar himself recently received biographical treatment in Dickson's *A Thoroughly Canadian General* (2007).

Rounding out the array of Allied field armies on the Western Front are the First Allied Airborne Army, consisting of British and American airborne divisions, and Fifteenth US Army. The airborne army conducted only two operations in the campaign (Market-Garden and Varsity), while Fifteenth US Army was an occupation force. These were commanded, respectively, by the American lieutenant generals Lewis H. Brereton and Leonard T. Gerow.

In sum, the echelon of army command has been inadequately explored in the historical literature. With very few exceptions, the same can be said for corps and division command. In many cases, potential biographers have little to work with beyond prosaic official documents.

Understandably, perhaps, German commanders on the Western Front are even less well known in the English-language sources. The top military commander, Adolf Hitler, is of course thoroughly studied. By 1944, Hitler was not only head of state and leader of the Nazi Party (a virtual state within a state), but was also *de facto* commander in chief of all the armed forces, and actual commander in chief of the German Army. Such a range of responsibilities would be virtually unmanageable in a smoothly functioning bureaucracy. In the organizational nightmare that was Nazi Germany, effective leadership was an impossibility. It is not surprising that Hitler became the scapegoat of the German war effort. True, by 1944 he was immersing himself in detail better left to his military subordinates, and frequently rejected their professional advice. And yet it must be acknowledged that there were occasions when Hitler was right and the generals wrong. Moreover, there was never any lack of professional officers eager to do his bidding, even when some of their colleagues raised objections.

The assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 only confirmed Hitler's growing distrust of the German officer corps. Ian Kershaw's recent work, *Hitler, A Biography* (2008), contains some reasoned and nuanced insights on Hitler as military leader.

Hitler exercised command over the Western Front through Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Once an office in the War Ministry, by 1944 OKW had become a headquarters parallel to the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), the German ground forces' top command. Nominally, OKW was a joint headquarters coordinating all three services – army, navy, and air force – but in practice those forces reported directly to Hitler. In 1944–1945 OKW concerned itself principally with the war in the west, while OKH ran the Eastern Front. Field Marshal William Keitel headed OKW, with General Alfred Jodl as his operations officer. These two were noted more for their sycophancy than for their military expertise. Keitel's memoirs (1966) are available in English.

The top German command on the Western Front itself was Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West) under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge supplanted von Rundstedt briefly in July/August 1944). As the campaign progressed, von Rundstedt receded in prominence as OKW (meaning Hitler) exercised increasing control over operations. OB West controlled two army groups at the beginning of the campaign – Army Group B, which bore the brunt of the fighting in Normandy, and Army Group G, responsible for southern France and the Biscay coast. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel commanded Army Group B during the Normandy invasion, with two field armies under his control – the Fifteenth and the Seventh. When Rommel was injured in an air attack, Von Kluge assumed command of Army Group B in addition to his OB West responsibilities. After Von Kluge's suicide, Field Marshal Walter Model took Army Group B. Army Group G, under General Johannes Blaskowitz, controlled First Army on the Bay of Biscay coast and Nineteenth Army on the Mediterranean coast of France.

Of the German commanders in the west, only Hitler and Rommel are extensively studied in English-language sources. Other key German leaders are discussed in Von Mellenthin (1977) and Mitcham (1990). Various campaign-oriented volumes in the US Army's "Greenbook" series provide solid overviews of German plans and operations on the Western Front.

"Doctrine" is the term used to describe a military organization's recognized methodologies for waging war. Doctrine is usually assumed to be the official "best practices" for the organization, and as such can be found in published "field manuals." But "doctrine" can also encompass the techniques that evolve at the front lines during combat. Military doctrine within an organization changes over time, and it varies from organization to organization. On the Western Front, American doctrine differed from the British, and both differed from German practice.

US Army doctrine in World War II centered upon the "infantry-artillery team." Infantry formations, from division down to platoon, all consisted of three subordinate infantry elements plus a fire support element. The generic assault tactic, practicable at all echelons, was for supporting weapons (artillery at division, machineguns and mortars at lower levels) to suppress the enemy while one infantry element fixed him, a second element maneuvered around a flank, and the third stood in reserve to reinforce the assault or exploit success. The American infantry division numbered about 14,000 men, and over 2,000 motor vehicles. The entire division could move

by vehicle with the attachment of six truck companies. In addition to transport vehicles, infantry divisions on the Western Front normally had the support of an attached battalion of 45 tanks (few German panzer divisions of 1944–1945 had as many tanks as did a US infantry division).

The armored division was a late addition to the American ground force, first appearing in 1940. It was a combined-arms formation, typically consisting of three tank battalions, three battalions of infantry riding half-tracks, and three battalions of self-propelled artillery, totaling approximately 11,000 men. Armored doctrine stressed mobility, and postulated that the proper use of armored formations was in highly mobile operations against the flanks and rear of enemy formations. Doctrine notwithstanding, circumstances on the Western Front frequently demanded the employment of tanks in direct assaults. A handy source for American doctrine and organizations is Forty's *US Army Handbook, 1939–1945* (1998). Michael Doubler ably analyzes doctrinal innovation and adaptation in *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945* (1994).

British and Canadian formations were larger than their American counterparts. The British infantry division numbered 18,000 men; the armored division totaled nearly 15,000. Doctrine differed as well. Anglo-Canadian doctrine relied less on maneuver and more on firepower. By 1944, doctrine prescribed that attacks would start with heavy, destructive bombardment by artillery (and, often, airpower). The assault itself consisted of infantry and armor methodically advancing behind a “rolling barrage” of artillery fire that shifted forward on a prearranged schedule. These techniques reflected a refinement of methods used in the closing stages of World War I. One of the better resources for information on British organization and doctrine is a US War Department manual outlining the characteristics of the British Army for the benefit of the American troops in Europe. This manual has been reprinted as *The British Army in World War II* (US War Department 1990).

British and American doctrines focused primarily on the tactical level of war – how to run the immediate battle in progress. Allied commanders were not particularly imaginative at what has since come to be called the “operational” level – the structuring of separate battles into campaigns that achieve theater objectives. This deficiency showed itself in August 1944 when Allied commanders struggled to close the “Falaise Pocket” around the German Seventh Army. Neither of the Allies had a well-refined doctrine for conducting large-scale encirclement operations. Allied commanders learned such things on the job.

Allied doctrines tended to be “terrain-oriented,” in that battle plans frequently focused upon securing specific geographical objectives. By contrast, German doctrine was traditionally more “force-oriented,” meaning that battles focused upon the defeat of specific enemy formations, rather than the capture of terrain features. In a legacy that dates back centuries, German doctrine called for bold, rapid, decisive action. The operation of choice since the mid-nineteenth century was the *kesselschlacht*, or “cauldron battle,” which involved the encirclement and annihilation of the opposing force. On those occasions where the enemy held the initiative, doctrine prescribed a flexible defense-in-depth, in which forward elements gave ground until the attacker lost momentum, whereupon the Germans launched their own counterattack to restore the front.

The German doctrines of bold, offensive action and flexible defense-in-depth required a significant decentralization of authority so that local commanders could

seize upon fleeting opportunities without waiting for orders from above. The ethos of decentralized authority also allowed the Germans rapidly to constitute *kampfgruppen*, which were *ad hoc* battle groups specifically tailored to meet immediate requirements on the battlefield. Additionally, the German Army showed an uncanny ability to rebuild shattered combat formations into effective fighting forces, even under the most difficult of circumstances. Lucas (2002) offers a useful introduction to German organization and practice.

By 1944, German divisions varied enormously in composition and strength. Five years of warfare had left many divisions badly depleted and structurally incomplete. On paper, the 1944 German infantry division had fewer men than the American (13,000 versus 14,000), but was equal in artillery and actually superior in machine guns and other automatic weapons. German panzer (armored) divisions at this stage in the war had four battalions of infantry but only two tank battalions. In practice, few German divisions on the Western Front ever reached their prescribed strength.

Nearly as debilitating as the prevalence of understrength units was the incompatibility of German military doctrine with Nazi ideology. Most notably, the army's concept of decentralized authority stood in diametric opposition to the Nazi Party's "Führer Principle," under which one man decides and all others execute. Hitler's proclivity for "micromanaging" military operations might have been militarily counterproductive, but it was true to Nazi precepts of leadership. Moreover, by 1944, Hitler routinely issued orders prohibiting his troops from yielding a single foot of ground, forcing the German Army to become a "terrain-oriented" force, and precluding the possibility of executing an elastic defense-in-depth.

Popular analogies notwithstanding, war is not a sporting event, and any belligerent who willingly enters into a war knowing that the conflict will be a "fair" fight, is acting irresponsibly. An important part of strategy is to accrue as many "unfair" advantages as possible prior to engaging in combat. Although Germany was, overall, the aggressor in World War II, it was the Allies who held the initiative on the Western Front. Accordingly, the Allies were careful to "stack the deck" as far as possible before initiating operations. Perhaps the most notable Allied advantage was in the field of logistics. By 1944, the Allies vastly exceeded Germany in all areas of military production, and thanks to the Allied victory over the U-boats in the "Battle of the Atlantic," that material bounty was able to reach the theater of war in relative safety.

Equal in importance to the problem of production is that of distribution, and here the Allies were somewhat less successful. The logistics plan for the invasion of Normandy and the subsequent campaign had no margin for error and lacked the flexibility to accommodate unforeseen operational developments. The massive logistical organization supporting the American forces, designated Communications Zone (or COMZ), was bloated and notoriously inefficient. Shortages at the front became more pronounced the farther the Allies advanced, despite the mountains of supplies piling up along the coast. Ironically, part of the distribution crisis arose from the effectiveness of the Allied pre-invasion bombing campaign, which devastated the very rail system that the Allies needed once they moved inland. Waddell (1994) offers an insightful analysis of logistical accomplishments and shortfalls. Roland G. Ruppenthal wrote the "Greenbook" covering logistics during the campaign in France – *Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941–September 1944* (1953).

Whereas Allied forces suffered shortages due to problems in distribution, German logistics verged upon systemic collapse by the time the Western Front opened. Germany never fully mobilized its industrial potential for war, due in large part to the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the Nazi regime. By 1944, the Allied strategic bombing campaign had hit its stride, further exacerbating German production problems. German forces on the Western Front were notably less mobile than their Allied counterparts. The great majority of German divisions in World War II were neither motorized (truck-borne) nor mechanized (possessed of armored vehicles), relying instead on rail and animal-drawn wagons for transportation and logistical distribution. Even the best-equipped divisions in 1944 lacked a full complement of motor vehicles. At the time of the Normandy invasion, many of the German divisions in France lacked even horses and wagons. By the summer of 1944, those elements that did possess motor vehicles were often short of fuel, thanks to Allied bombing of the German petroleum industry and, later that year, to the loss of the Romanian oilfields upon which the German war machine relied heavily.

Underlying these problems was a general failure within the German Army and Nazi regime to accord the necessary level of attention to logistics. Nazi ideology valued willpower more than it did materiel. Within the army itself, logistics planning sometimes looked more like wishful thinking than hard reasoning. Nor did the German Army dedicate nearly enough competent officers and men to logistical functions, choosing to send the best and the brightest exclusively to combat units. Sometimes cited as an excuse for Germany's defeat on the Western Front, the Allied superiority in materiel came about because the Allies simply and resoundingly outperformed the Germans in planning, production, and distribution of the means of war.

The Allies enjoyed an advantage in military intelligence that was nearly as lopsided as the one they held in logistics, due largely to the efforts of the British. Many factors contributed to the Allied intelligence effort, including the information provided by active "resistance" groups in German-occupied Europe and, by 1944, Allied air superiority, which facilitated aerial reconnaissance. The most dramatic intelligence breakthrough for the Allies was Ultra, a British system for decrypting, analyzing, and distributing German top-secret radio messages. Ultra remained a secret until the 1970s, when Lewin (1978) and Bennett (1979) provided early analyses of Ultra's impact. An indispensable resource for understanding the role of intelligence on the Western Front is Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations* (1988, vol. 3, part II).

Broadly speaking, Allied commanders on the Western Front held a clear picture of the location and movement of German forces. Less clear to them were German intentions. The German Ardennes counteroffensive of December 1944 came as a surprise not because the Allies lacked knowledge on German forces in the area, but because Allied intelligence analysts generally misinterpreted the purposes to which those forces would be committed.

The Allies did not hold all of the advantages. One area in which the Germans enjoyed a degree of superiority was in the quality (as opposed to the quantity) of weapons on the battlefield. German machine guns were superior to those used by the Allies, having a higher rate of fire, and were generally employed more effectively. Most dramatic was the German superiority in tanks, particularly in tank-versus-tank combat. The Germans, by virtue of three years of combat on the Eastern Front, had

evolved a generation of tanks that were especially suited to combat enemy tanks, being armed with large-caliber, high-velocity guns and carrying heavy, sloped armor. Generally speaking, Allied tanks lacked the firepower or armor to fight them on equal terms, being designed for mobility rather than slugging power. Books on World War II weaponry are legion, many of them written specifically for hobbyists and war-gamers. As such, they actually tend to be quite reliable in terms of technical details. Osprey Publishing, in particular, is noted for its wide offerings, too numerous to mention here, on the weapons, uniforms, and equipment of the World War II soldier. The Lucas (2002), Forty (1998), and US War Department (1990) studies cited above offer a sound introduction to German, American, and British weapons, respectively.

Many historians also credit the Germans with an overall advantage in the quality their armed forces, although not all would agree. Willmott, in his excellent survey of World War II, denounces the “pernicious myth of German military excellence,” pointing out that the Germans managed to lose not one but two world wars in the same century (Willmott 1989, p. xi). He goes on to observe that “German military genius was in fighting, not war.” In other words, German forces were usually quite proficient in the conduct of individual battles. When it came to structuring battles into effective campaigns, German performance was uneven. And at the highest levels, German national strategy for World War II bordered on the delusional.

It is probably true that the individual German soldier on the Western Front was more highly motivated than his Allied counterparts. He was, after all, defending his homeland from invasion. He came from a society that was decidedly more militaristic than either British or American culture. Moreover, the young recruit of 1944 had grown from childhood on a steady diet of Nazi propaganda and organizations, such as the Hitler Youth. When he joined his military unit, what he lacked in combat experience he often made up for in ideological commitment.

As for the German officer corps, it possessed, as a group, all the combat experience one could ask for, in theaters of war extending from the Pyrenees to the Volga, and from the Sahara to the Arctic Circle. Although not all officers were members of the Nazi Party, many were more supportive of the Nazi agenda than their postwar apologists cared to admit.

At the upper end of the scale of combat proficiency were the *Waffen Schutzstaffel* (SS) units. By 1944, the Germans fielded SS divisions, corps, and (nominally) field armies. *Waffen SS* divisions, which belonged not to the German government but to the Nazi Party hierarchy, consisted of party ideologues at all ranks, and received the best weapons and equipment that Germany had to offer. At the lower end of the scale were *Volkssturm* units, first raised in October 1944. These were essentially militia units, composed largely of old men, young boys, and the medically unfit. Equally problematical were the large numbers of non-German troops who populated many of the army’s logistical formations, and even some combat units. A large proportion of these were Soviet troops captured on the Eastern Front and impressed into German service.

On the Allied side of the Western Front, troop motivation was a recognized problem in the British ranks. Many soldiers were engaged upon their third major campaign, and lacked a militaristic tradition, a supremacist ideology, and even a sense of defending directly their embattled homeland. A number of veteran formations with fine combat records, most notably the 7th Armoured Division of “Desert Rat” fame,

lost their former effectiveness. Moreover, the British high command was well aware that the empire was down to its last army. Not only were the British unable to raise new formations, but by 1944, they were unable to replace losses in existing units. In the course of the Western Front campaign, the British found it necessary to dissolve two divisions and use the personnel as replacements in other units.

American combat formations suffered from a replacement crisis as well. The War Department had underestimated probable casualty rates, particularly in infantry units, and had failed to establish an adequate pool of individual replacements. By autumn 1944, the American armies on the Western Front were combing out their support elements and non-infantry combat forces for individuals to be retrained as riflemen. For the individual replacement, thrown into combat with inadequate preparation, his first day of battle was often his last. Palmer, Wiley, and Keast (1948) cover the replacement crisis in the "Greenbook" entitled *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*.

On the other hand, Ambrose (1997), drawing upon extensive first-person accounts, paints a laudatory portrait of the "GI" in *Citizen Soldiers*. Bonn (1994) explores the performance of American forces in the Vosges campaign, where they did not enjoy all advantages they had elsewhere. *The GI Offensive in Europe*, by Mansoor (1999), illuminates the considerable versatility and durability displayed on the Western Front.

In sum, the debate over the relative merits of the German and the Allied soldier will likely continue. What is clear is that by 1944, the best Allied formations were able to fight the best German forces on relatively equal terms. Moreover, any analysis of this topic must always take into account one simple fact – no American or British commander in World War II could ever drive his troops as relentlessly as German commanders were expected to do. Discipline in the German Army became particularly brutal in the wake of the failed assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944. From that time to the end of the war, any soldier (or civilian, for that matter) who failed to do his utmost on behalf of the Fuhrer faced the prospect of drumhead court-martial, if not execution on the spot. Among the coalition fighting Germany, only the Soviets practiced a comparable level of brutality toward their own people.

The first phase of the Western Front campaign encompassed the fighting in Normandy from June 6 through July 1944. At nightfall on D-day, the Allies had eight divisions on French soil, as opposed to some 66 German divisions in the western theater, with the realistic prospect of 28 of those German formations being present in Normandy within two weeks. Only if the Allies built up their force levels faster than the Germans could the invasion succeed. The British experience at Gallipoli in World War I and the Allied near-disaster at Anzio earlier in 1944 suggested the fate awaiting an invader who lost the race to build up. To succeed, the Allies needed to expand their lodgment area to accommodate more forces and, above all, they needed ports on the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas to accelerate the influx of men and materiel. Accordingly, during the Normandy phase of the campaign, Eisenhower pressured his ground forces commanders to keep moving inland, no matter how stubborn the German defense. Eisenhower's insistence upon a continuous advance brought him into conflict with Montgomery, whose forces could not withstand prolonged attrition, and who in any event considered Eisenhower to be his inferior as a strategist. The Germans themselves compounded Eisenhower's problems by contesting every foot of ground, as opposed to the mobile defense-in-depth that the Allies

expected. Indeed, Von Rundstedt, the theater commander, favored such a mobile defense. It was Rommel, as army group commander, who implemented the stubborn, relatively static defense. Hitler complicated the conduct of the defense by involving himself personally in tactical matters, such as when he retained personal control over critical reserve forces prior to and during D-day. Moreover, a brilliant Allied deception effort, code-named Operation Fortitude, slowed the influx of German reinforcements by maintaining a (fictitious) American army group opposite Calais during and after the assault in Normandy. Nonetheless, for weeks the campaign hovered on the brink of stalemate as the British forces struggled to capture Caen and the Americans ground through the difficult “hedgerow” country toward Cherbourg and St. Lo against a tenacious German defense. Perhaps the best analysis of strategy in this phase of the conflict is D’Este’s *Decision in Normandy* (1983). More recently, Beevor (2009) delivers a pointed critique of the Allied high command in Normandy. Harrison’s “Greenbook” *Cross-Channel Attack* (Harrison 1951) remains a standard reference for American operations.

The race to build up ended in dramatic fashion in the last week of July, when the Allies broke out of their lodgment area and embarked upon an exploitation that carried them across most of France and Belgium in the space of a month. The pursuit showed the Allied forces at their finest – mobility, firepower, and airpower played out to the fullest advantage. Blumenson’s “Greenbook,” *Breakout and Pursuit* (1961), explores this remarkable phase of the war. McKee (1964) offers a classic account of Montgomery’s prolonged but ultimately successful attempts to break through at Caen, while Blumenson (1993) critiques the Allied efforts to encircle the German forces at Falaise in *Battle of the Generals*. In a decision that defies stereotypes of stodgy Allied generalship, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley were unanimous in opting to forego a planned pause at the Seine River, electing instead to press the pursuit to the limit. The pause at the Seine was intended to allow for the establishment of a logistical infrastructure – ports, depots, and railroads. Pressing ahead with the pursuit involved the establishment of an ad hoc logistical system, called the “Red Ball Express,” in which supplies came over the beaches at Normandy and traveled by truck directly to the fighting troops. When the Allies achieved their breakout, Hitler also deviated from stereotype (after one failed counterattack at Mortain) by authorizing the withdrawal of German forces from France.

Although the Allied leaders all agreed on exploitation and pursuit, the form that the pursuit should take caused serious dissension. Montgomery, cognizant of his declining role in the coalition over time, argued that his army group should be designated the main effort for one “narrow thrust” aimed at the heart of Germany, in an effort to win the war immediately. Eisenhower opted instead for a “twin thrust” or “broad front” approach in which all forces pressed ahead. He doubted the logistical feasibility of a deep single thrust, and recognized that such an operation involved unwarranted risks. To this day, Eisenhower’s detractors pillory him for missing an opportunity to end the war in 1944.

The breakout from Normandy, and the pursuit that followed, showcased to maximum effect the synergistic potential of well-coordinated air-ground operations. Gooderson’s *Air Power at the Battlefront* (1998) traces the evolution of the Allied air-ground team from its origins in the Mediterranean theater to its full flowering on the Western Front. Heavy strategic bombers contributed to the breakout battles with

“carpet bombing” of German positions. In the fluid conditions of the pursuit, fighter-bombers of the tactical air forces assigned to each army group provided speedy, responsive, close air support to the rapidly advancing Allied columns. Meanwhile, ground forces overran German radar positions and airfields, which in turn facilitated the strategic bombing campaign over Germany.

Allied optimism notwithstanding, the pursuit across France and Belgium did not mark the end of the war. The Allied advance stalled, or reached its “culminating point,” in the general vicinity of the German border. Operation Market-Garden, a joint airborne-ground assault designed to catapult 21st Army Group across the Rhine, ended in defeat at Arnhem. No military force could hope to advance so fast and so far as the Allies had without encountering supply difficulties. Ruppenthal (1959) analyzes the supply situation at this stage of the war in *Logistical Support of the Armies Volume II: September 1944–May 1945*. Not until the great port of Antwerp opened to traffic in November 1944, following a prolonged and bitter struggle to clear the Scheldt estuary, would the supply situation stabilize. Meanwhile, the Germans underwent a remarkable resurgence. The success of the Allied advance actually simplified German defense planning, for there are only two good corridors for passing from France into Germany – the Maastricht-Aachen corridor and the Lorraine gateway. Fixed fortifications protected each of these avenues. Moreover, the Germans were able to replace many of the losses suffered in France. The Allied invasion of the Riviera in August 1944 entailed the removal of many Allied forces from Italy, which in turn freed up German divisions to defend the Franco-German frontier. The Germans also redoubled their manpower mobilization efforts, combing out navy and air force personnel for conversion into ground troops, and lowering the standards for the conscription of civilians. These measures resulted in the creation of fifteen new *Volksgrenadier* divisions. Two of the “Greenbooks” recount the subsequent fighting along the frontier, which was some of the most difficult combat experienced by Allied troops in the war – MacDonald’s *The Siegfried Line Campaign* (1963) and Cole’s *The Lorraine Campaign* (1950).

Ever the opportunist, Adolf Hitler recognized, as early as mid-September, that the Allied pursuit had culminated, and ordered a counterattack in a last bid to wreck the Allied coalition. By the time the attack came in December 1944, the Allies had 65 divisions spread along a 500-mile front. *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (1965), the “Greenbook” by Hugh Cole, is one of many thorough examinations of the campaign that followed. In one of his most controversial decisions of the war, Eisenhower gave command of all American forces on the north side of the penetration to Montgomery, including the First US Army. Montgomery then had the bad grace to imply publicly that he personally rescued the Americans from their strategic blunders. This unfortunate incident left a permanent scar on coalition relationships.

After halting and reversing the German Ardennes counteroffensive, the Allies closed on the Rhine River all along the line in early 1945. By the end of March they held three major bridgeheads on the far bank. The Germans expected Eisenhower to take the cautious step of linking the bridgeheads before proceeding eastward. Instead, Eisenhower surprised them by sending Allied forces charging deep into Germany from each of the bridgeheads. As recounted in MacDonald’s *The Last Offensive* (1973), many German elements continued to fight bitterly, at times fanatically, but any overall German strategy dissolved. On April 25, 1945 American troops made first contact with Soviet forces at the Elbe River.

The key strategic issue in this last stage of the campaign was Eisenhower's decision not to push on and capture Berlin. Hotly debated for decades, this issue has lost much of its significance since the end of the cold war. In any event, Eisenhower saw little to be gained by expending American and British lives to conquer territory within the designated Soviet occupation zone. On the German side, the final "strategy" of World War II was to surrender to the Western allies rather than to the Soviets. Eisenhower rebuffed all overtures for a separate peace, and on May 7, 1945 General Alfred Jodl, representing Hitler's successor, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, signed an unconditional surrender at Eisenhower's headquarters. The Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov hosted a similar event at his headquarters near Berlin two days later.

The outcome of World War II on the Western Front set the stage for the cold war. The zones of advance for the Allied 21st, 12th, and 6th Army Groups translated broadly into the occupation zones for Great Britain, the United States, and France, respectively. The "Grand Alliance" in the war against Germany, the Soviet Union included, became the core of the newly established United Nations, providing four of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The human cost of the Allies' war against Germany defies comprehension. Throughout its involvement in World War II, the United States suffered approximately one million battle casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) in 45 months of combat. Of this total, roughly 60 percent were incurred during eleven months of fighting on the Western Front. British, Canadian, and French losses were proportionate to the American casualties. German losses will never be known with any degree of certitude. The suffering of civilians in both friendly and enemy nations has just recently become a major subject of inquiry, as evidenced by Hitchcock's *The Bitter Road to Freedom* (2008).

Was the struggle worth the cost? Although it was clear, long before D-day, that Germany was going to "lose" World War II, it was far from certain that the Western allies would be among the "winners." Counterfactual speculation suggests many possible outcomes for the war in Europe, and few of these speculative scenarios favored the political and moral ideals that formed the core of Allied war aims. Considering the bleak prospects confronting the world just four years earlier, the Allied victory on the Western Front represented nothing less than a triumph for Western civilization.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

Battle Fronts and Home Fronts: The War in the East from Stalingrad to Berlin

KENNETH SLEPYAN

This chapter examines the German-Soviet war following the Battle of Stalingrad to the surrender of Nazi Germany. Like the Eastern Front itself, this is a vast topic, and so this work concentrates on some of the main issues in the historiography of the war: the relationships between the two dictators and their respective military commanders, the qualities of the *Wehrmacht* in comparison to the Red Army, and how these factors affected key military operations. In addition, some attention will be paid to the home fronts, particularly regarding the nature of popular mobilization and the population's attitudes toward their respective regimes.

At the risk of relying on an overused term, the historiography on the Soviet-German war has undergone a paradigm shift in the last two decades. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, most available sources were German-based, either from archives or from the memoirs written by German commanders. No Soviet records were accessible except the relatively few captured by the Germans, and Soviet secondary accounts and memoirs were highly politicized and sanitized. Hence, most histories were written from the German "perspective." These works argued that the Soviets' numerical and material advantages, and Hitler's untimely, unprofessional, and unwanted interventions in military operations were the reasons for the Soviet victory. In the popular literature and culture, as Ronald Smelser and Edward Davies have shown, the prevailing image of the war after the Battle of Stalingrad was that of German soldiers desperately holding the line against innumerable Soviet human-wave attacks that eventually overwhelmed the outnumbered defenders. According to this version the *Wehrmacht* fought a clean and tactically brilliant war against a powerful but primitive foe (Smelser and Davies 2008). Professional historians also shared this view. As late as 1986, noted German historian Andreas Hillgruber remarked that

Looking at the winter-catastrophe of 1944–45, the historian is left only one position ... He must identify with the concrete fate of the German population in the east and with the desperate and costly efforts of the German Eastern Army ... which sought to defend the population of the German East from the orgy of revenge of the Red Army, from the mass rapes, the arbitrary murders and the indiscriminate deportations. (Hillgruber cited in Bartov 1996, p. 74)

This one-sided reading of the Eastern Front began to change with the publication of John Erickson's two-volume history of the Eastern Front *The Road to Stalingrad* and *The Road to Berlin*. Erickson's masterful reading of the available primary and secondary sources provided an operational history of the war from the Soviet perspective and was a needed corrective to the more German-centered historiography (Erickson 1975, 1983).

Beginning in the 1980s two important developments emerged that significantly transformed the study of the Soviet-German war. First, historians began an intensive examination of the *Wehrmacht's* conduct on the Eastern Front covering the ranks from the top generals to the lowest *landser*. Omer Bartov's works, particularly *The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare* (Bartov 1986), and *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich* (Bartov 1991) detailed the actions of German soldiers in the east, increasingly shaped by a Nazified worldview. Bartov, Hannes Heer, Stephen Fritz, Klaus Naumann, and Jurgen Förster, among others, destroyed forever the idea that the *Ostheer* (Eastern Army) fought a "clean" war and only the SS and Red Army were responsible for the Eastern Front's unprecedented violence and brutality. On the contrary, their findings indicated that the German Army from top to bottom, even from the very beginning of Operation Barbarossa as Geoffrey Megargee (2006) shows, was thoroughly implicated in the Nazi leadership's efforts to wage a "war of annihilation" against the Soviet Union and its peoples.

The second major development was the opening of Soviet archives and the end of censorship (at least temporarily) that came first with *glasnost* and then with the fall of the Soviet Union. While significant restrictions remain, Western and Russian historians have had unprecedented access to wartime records. Beginning with the pioneering work of David Glantz and his frequent collaborator Jonathan House, a new picture of the Red Army emerged. They argued in their operational history of the war, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*, that Soviet operations, rather than supposedly relying on human-wave attacks in the second part of the war following Stalingrad, became more sophisticated as the war progressed. By the war's end Soviet generals had become masters of "deep battle" operations, essentially beating the *Wehrmacht* at its own game (Glantz and House 1995). Works by Richard Overy, Evan Mawdsley, and Chris Bellamy, among others, also employing newly published Soviet archival materials and memoirs, have further contributed to redressing the historiographical imbalance. As knowledge of Soviet operational military history has increased, so too has our understanding of the experiences of Red Army soldiers. Several fascinating secondary works, most notably Elena Seniavskaia's *Frontovoe Pokolenie* [The front generation] (Seniavskaia 1995), Catherine Merridale's *Ivan's War* (Merridale 2006) and Roger Reese's *Why Stalin's Soldiers Fought* (Reese 2011) have investigated the everyday lives and psychologies of Soviet soldiers as they battled their way from the river Volga to Berlin.

Following these developments a new focus has appeared: the direct analytical comparison of German and Soviet aims, methods, and experiences fighting World War II.

As Mark Edele and Michael Geyer note in their article “States of Exception: The Nazi-Soviet War as a System of Violence” (2009) the German-Soviet conflict should be understood not as “German or a Soviet affair, respectively, but as a ferocious and brutal antagonism in a wider field of European global war” while “knowledge of the German war, deep and vast as it is, can only become insight if and when it is matched and, indeed entangled with the knowledge of the other side.” Although acknowledging important differences in the Soviet and Nazi approach to the war, Edele and Geyer argue that two sides had similar objectives in that they both fought two types of war: an interior war, a “civil war” designed to remake their own societies “in a war of excisions,” and a war between the countries a “war of destruction” (Edele and Geyer 2009, pp. 346, 347, 348).

Several recent popular histories written by respected academic historians have emphasized the similarities between the regimes and their approach to the war, and just as critically, the experiences of populations living in what Timothy Snyder has referred to in his eponymous history, the “bloodlands” between Berlin and Moscow. Snyder stresses the need to understand the policies and actions of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in relation to one another, and the difficulty of separating Nazi and Soviet crimes when considered from the perspective of the people living there (Snyder 2010). Likewise, in his *No Simple Victory*, Norman Davies argues from a humanist perspective that this comparison demonstrates that the Nazi-Soviet war was nothing more or less than the “clash of two great evils” whatever their ideological differences:

In this regard, a balance sheet between Hitler’s Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union is worth outlining ... Morally, the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 was no more blatant than the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. A war crime such as the [Nazi] murder of eighty-six American POWs at Malmédy is dwarfed by the Katyn massacre where up to 25,000 POWs were murdered. The Nazis’ “Final Solution” had no parallel. But there were any number of Soviet atrocities, including mass deportations and repressions and man-made famines, that fit the criteria for crimes against humanity. (Davies 2006, pp. 68, 72)

While Snyder’s and Davies’s works rely primarily on narrative to conduct their comparisons, a more theoretical and analytical approach has also recently emerged, what might be called a “neo-totalitarian school.” While rejecting the mechanistic definitions and cold war era political connotations of earlier conceptualizations of totalitarianism, neo-totalitarians recognize the importance of messianic ideologies in shaping regime practices, and the genuine belief on the part of leaders, regime stakeholders, and ordinary citizens alike that they were building – or were caught up in the building of – new civilizations; and finally, the willingness of these regimes to use extreme violence to accomplish their objectives. This focus has led neo-totalitarians to examine not only the beliefs and actions of political and social elites, but also to consider how the thoughts and experiences of daily life shaped and were shaped by broader political, social, and economic developments (Geyer and Fitzpatrick 2009).

Any assessment of the high commands in both countries cannot be done in isolation: neither Hitler nor Stalin, nor their leading generals functioned as individuals, but as part of larger wholes. Given the extraordinary people involved, it is understandable and necessary to concentrate on personalities; at the same time it also must be

remembered that these individuals operated within institutions and institutional structures. Hence, the relationships between Hitler and Stalin and their respective military leaders reflect more broadly each regime's approach to the war.

As Evan Mawdsley notes in his general history of the war, *Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941–1945*, from the beginning of the war, the German military command lacked a rational command structure. Indeed, despite the existence of multiple high commands – Armed Forces High Command (OKW) and the Army High Command (OKH) – there was no single organization in charge of grand strategy to coordinate the actions among the various fronts and theaters. Instead, and by his own design, Hitler himself fulfilled this function. The German generals, adhering to a military tradition that focused on operational and tactical planning at the expense of strategic thought, aided and abetted this process (Geyer 1986; Mawdsley 2005). As the German strategic position deteriorated in 1942–1943, Hitler took on more direct authority leading to what the editors of the sixth volume of the ‘semi-official’ German history *Germany and the Second World War* have described as the paralysis of the “regime’s decision-making centre” (Boog et al. 2001, p. 1230). General Staff officers, such as Franz Halder, who, while heavily implicated in the *Wehrmacht*’s racialized conduct of the war since the commencement of Barbarossa, still retained a sense of professional independence, were replaced by even more Nazified generals who fully supported Hitler’s worldview and approach to the war. The absence of formal coordinating structures and the tendency of the military leadership to radicalization followed the same general trend as the Third Reich’s civilian institutions (Kershaw 1997).

An important aspect of the analysis of German military leadership centers on Hitler’s interventions at the operational and tactical levels. In their postwar memoirs, leading generals such as Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein complained bitterly that Hitler’s interference in their operations, particularly his “stand-fast” orders, crippled their ability to defeat Soviet penetrations by waging a “mobile defense.” Historian Richard Evans maintains that although the war was lost in any case, nevertheless Hitler’s interventions significantly hamstrung the generals’ efforts to halt, or at least delay, the advancing Red Army. Mawdsley, however, doubts that even Manstein’s “mobile defense” tactics would have had a significant effect on the fighting, given the already chaotic German command structure, the *Ostheer*’s shortages of men and material, and the Soviets’ increasing operational and tactical abilities (Mawdsley 2005; Evans 2009). Moreover, as Robert Citino points out in *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich*, even during the war German operations had lost their shine: “the campaign plan for Stalingrad (1942) looked like someone at the briefing had dropped the notes and hurriedly tried to reassemble them; the offensive toward Kursk (1943) was a lumbering strike at the most obvious spot on the map” (Citino 2005, p. 269).

Certainly, by the last years of the war, historians largely agree that Hitler and his generals shared similar strategic views toward the war in the east: total victory or total defeat. A negotiated peace to end the war was not considered an option. Whether the Soviets would have agreed to some kind of deal is, of course, doubtful, but as Citino, Edele and Geyer, Mawdsley, and Ian Kershaw all note, the shared mindset of all-or-nothing, including the willingness to engage in an apocalyptic *Endkampf* (final battle), reveals that Germany’s leadership (both military and political) were committed to pursue – and be subjected to – cataclysmic violence in the conduct of the war. Evans observes that while the older generals – those born in the

1880s – were less predisposed toward Nazism than their younger counterparts, they nevertheless shared a powerful nationalism imbued with racist notions of their enemies as “half-Asiatic Russia,” that girded their determination to fight on to the bitter end. Förster (2008) has shown in his contribution to the ninth volume of *Germany and the Second World War*, that after the defeat at Stalingrad, the *Wehrmacht* generals intensified the armed services’ Nazification to bolster the soldiers’ fighting spirit. Echternkamp (2008) notes in the same volume that many of the officers involved in the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler adhered to his belief that Germany’s *Lebensraum* lay in the east and shared his racial views toward Slavs, Jews, and other alleged “inferiors” even if they ultimately believed that Hitler’s murderous policies were destroying the army’s values and honor (Förster 2008; Echternkamp 2008). Thus, while the details are debated, the current consensus among historians is that under the pressure of total war, the German leadership became increasingly radicalized. As Hitler became the center of the strategic decision-making process, the quality of the German military leadership declined even as it became more politicized and ideological.

The Soviet case presents a fascinating contrast to the German example. Unlike the German Army, with its long independent history and which was brought under Nazi control through a long process of *Gleichschaltung*, the Red Army was the product of the Soviet state. Historians widely agree that the relationship between Stalin and his generals changed significantly during the war. The Soviets moved in the opposite direction from their German counterparts as the dictator, while still playing the central role, nevertheless acquiesced to greater delegation of authority and to the increased professionalization of his military commanders. At the beginning of the war, with the purge of tens of thousands of officers only few years in the past, Stalin remained highly suspicious of the Red Army. Commissars countersigned military orders, political appointees held command authority over professional officers, and in the most extreme instances, commanders and their subordinates were executed for real or perceived failures. Beginning in autumn 1942, however, Stalin initiated a series of policies that reflected both the military’s growing prestige and his own trust of – or perhaps recognition of his dependence on – his military professionals: the abolition of the post of political commissar, the return of gold braid for officers and shoulder boards for all ranks, and the restoration of traditional officer ranks. Taken together, these actions indicate the lessening of ideology as a means of control and motivation, quite the opposite of what was taking place simultaneously in the *Wehrmacht*. Stalin also developed effective working relationships with his top commanders and advisers, such as Georgii Zhukov, Aleksandr Vasilevskii, and Aleksei Antonov, and willingly took their advice. Bernd Bonwetsch argues that this was in part due to Stalin’s own evolution as a military commander and strategist (Bonwetsch 1997). In *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953*, Geoffrey Roberts asserts more enthusiastically than most historians that the awarding of the marshal’s rank to Stalin in 1943 reflected the “reality of Stalin’s supreme commandship, his domination of military decision-making structures, and his central, indispensable position in the Soviet war machine” (Roberts 2006, p. 162).

Yet, as Roberts also reminds us, Stalin could rely on the advice of his generals because they also improved as the war continued. Mawdsley argues the Soviet victory at Stalingrad was achieved not so much by capitalizing on German blunders as has often

been claimed, but because the Soviet generals proved superior to their German counterparts, executing successfully the encirclement operations they had tried but failed to accomplish earlier in the war. David Glantz contends further that far from the image of ponderous, clumsy, and unimaginative commanders portrayed in German generals' memoirs, Soviet generals, particularly those leading the elite tank armies, displayed initiative, independence, and skill in their craft (Glantz and House 1999; Mawdsley 2005).

The evolution of the Red Army's institutional structures further contributed to its successes. As with Hitler and the *Wehrmacht* generals, personal relationships remained very important. Unlike the German high command, however, which was unable to establish a rational decision-making structure, the Soviets did construct an effective system for managing vast operations involving multiple *fronts* through the institution of the *Stavka*, which used plenipotentiaries to coordinate their actions, albeit under Stalin's supreme coordination. As David Stone observes in his 2010 essay "The Red Army," "This flexibility maximized the skills of the Red Army's most talented commanders by moving them to key sectors, while easing the burden on individual front commanders by providing them with direct oversight" (Stone 2010, p. 136). In effect, the Soviets were more successful than the Germans in establishing the command structures necessary to fight a total war. As in the case of Nazi Germany, the Soviet command structure was itself a reflection of the larger political system, which as Martin Malia points out in his survey of Soviet history, *The Soviet Tragedy*, "was operating in its natural element" in wartime (Malia 1994, p. 289).

This analysis of the two regimes' top military and political leaderships indicates some striking similarities and differences. Both were inextricably linked to the abilities (and disabilities) and personalities of their respective great dictators, and in this, Stalin proved to be the superior leader as he came, albeit grudgingly, to accept his own fallibility, learned from his earlier mistakes, and relied more frequently on his military professionals who themselves were acquiring more expertise. The Red Army generals remained "Stalin's commanders." However, they did gain Stalin's respect and established a certain if limited corporate sphere, which while still tied to the Soviet regime, possessed more professional independence and prestige than they had at the beginning of the war. In contrast, Hitler amassed ever-more authority while the *Wehrmacht* generals became more ideologically and professionally attached to the Nazi state, succumbing to "strategic wishful thinking" as the war continued (Boog et al. 2001, vol. VI, p. 1229). They were still capable of impressive operations, particularly at the tactical level, however, they too had become "Hitler's generals."

After Stalingrad, the *Wehrmacht* was in a state of irreversible decline while the Red Army was reaching its peak. Although German troops remained generally superior at the small unit level (though even this assessment became less valid in the war's final months), by the summer of 1943 it was the Red Army that possessed numerical, material, and even doctrinal superiority. In numbers alone, the differences were striking: in the spring of 1943, the Red Army totaled nearly 5.8 million soldiers, 6,000 tanks, and over 20,000 guns compared to Germany's 2.7 million men, 1,330 tanks, and 6,360 artillery pieces. By late 1943 Soviet forces had grown to 6.4 million men, while German troop strength was a little less than 2.5 million, with an additional 700,000 Allied troops of varying quality.

Omer Bartov has argued that the loss of equipment amounted to a "demodernization" of the eastern army, which took place as early as the end of 1941, and became a

chronic feature of even the most technologically advanced panzer formations later in the war. Moreover the devastating meat grinder that was combat on the Eastern Front meant that units were destroyed only to be reconstituted before they were destroyed once more. This continuous destruction, Bartov contends, meant that the soldiers' "primary groups," the small groups that hold units together through their intense personal bonds, could not form. Instead units were held together by iron discipline and intense political indoctrination. These factors accordingly contributed to the barbarization of warfare in the east (Bartov 1986, 1991).

As apt as Bartov's characterization of demodernization may be, Edele and Geyer point out that the barbarization of warfare occurred well before Bartov's demodernization was apparent. Another element of Bartov's thesis that has been challenged is the fate of the eastern army's primary groups. In his detailed study of the 253rd Infantry Division, Christoph Rass demonstrated that a combination of unit recruitment from a specific localized area, the training and dispatching of replacements to the field army as units, the return of wounded soldiers to their original units, and the continuity provided by a core group of veterans, particularly NCOs, maintained unit cohesion, even when under immense pressure from the Red Army in 1943–1944. Only when the links between the replacement and field armies were broken in late 1944 did the *Wehrmacht* begin to fall apart (Rass 2008).

One element on which there is general agreement is the *Wehrmacht's* increasing reliance on ideology. This was one result of the Nazification of the high command discussed above. Generals such as Gotthard Heinrici and Ferdinand Schörner put much stock in indoctrination to bolster the troops, which only intensified after the failed assassination attempt of July 20, 1944. As Jürgen Förster puts it, "Hitler and the Party were attempting, with the help of 'political soldiers', to overturn the laws of a war of attrition through fanaticism and faith. The *Wehrmacht's* commitment to National Socialist ideology became, in the autumn of 1943, a tactical weapon in the defence against a superior enemy" (Förster 2008, p. 613). However, the reliance on ideology to overcome the Soviets' material advantages was terribly costly. Historian Jörg Echternkamp contends that this policy contributed to devastating losses in 1944–1945, during which "two-thirds of all German soldiers who died in the war were killed" (Echternkamp 2008, p. 49).

The primacy of ideology over practical planning, and the loss of equipment and trained personnel meant that the German Army in the field was becoming less able to fight with the tactical sophistication that a "mobile defense" advocated by Manstein required. As Mawdsley points out, the lack of resources meant the end of the *Wehrmacht's* "elegant operations." Fighting, instead, became a series of desperate improvisations as the soldiers struggled to hold back the Soviet tide.

Unfortunately for the Germans, the Red Army was coming into its own. In less than two years since the commencement of Barbarossa, the Red Army had undergone an appalling yet effective metamorphosis as its forces were repeatedly destroyed, rebuilt, and reorganized. By 1943 the main ingredients for the Red Army's successes in the last years of the war, particularly the composition of its armored forces, were in place. As John Erickson has observed, the Red Army was becoming two distinct forces, "an army of quality," about one fifth of its total strength, consisting of the tank armies, Guards units, and other well-equipped and trained formations, and "an army of quantity" to fill out the line and back-up the strike forces (Erickson 1983, p. 84).

The core of the “army of quality” comprised the newly developed tank armies and other mobile elements such as the cavalry-mechanized groups and Guards’ formations. These units, along with the creation of artillery and air armies gave Soviet commanders the power to concentrate massive firepower at key points at the German line to achieve and exploit breakthroughs.

The massive expansion of Soviet war industry made these units possible. Rather than concentrating on complicated and expensive weapons systems, such as long-range bombers and battleships, the Soviets produced enormous quantities of small arms, artillery, tanks, and tactical aircraft (fighters and close-support). Lend-lease equipment in the form of trucks, jeeps, food (especially fats), and medicine kept the Red Army mobile, fed, and healthy (relatively speaking), and supplemented the Soviet concentration in arms production. Although as Mark Harrison and John Barber show, this concentration on military production, over 60 percent of GDP in 1942, was unsustainable for the long-term, it lasted long enough to enable Soviet soldiers to enjoy an increasing superiority of arms and firepower over their foes and which further fed their confidence in the Red Army, the Soviet state, and their belief in ultimate victory (Barber and Harrison 1991; Harrison 2010).

Compared to the numerous studies on the experiences and mentalities of the ordinary German soldier, there has been very little written about his Soviet counterpart. These works have often been framed by the question of the soldiers’ ideological loyalty to the regime, to Stalin, and to the USSR as a whole. In the latest multivolume “official history” of the war, Russian historian I. A. Poliakov credits Soviet citizens for their deep patriotism and love for the *rodina* (motherland), their support of the Soviet social order, their hatred of the enemy, and their realization that they were engaged literally in a life or death struggle for their existence (Poliakov 1999). The only element of Soviet official histories missing from this formulation was the people’s love for Communism and the Communist Party.

Other historians have developed more nuanced understandings of what motivated Soviet soldiers to fight. While the promise of victory might breed its own positive rationale for fighting, the extraordinary losses the Red Army continued to suffer in the last years of the war, including 70 percent of its sick and wounded in the years 1943–1945, and 50 percent casualty rates by units participating in breakthrough operations, indicate that ordinary soldiers’ motivations cannot be taken for granted. This question becomes particularly important when examining the behavior of Red Army soldiers once they crossed into Germany, especially regarding the atrocity of mass rape and accompanying murders.

Recent studies, taking advantage of the post-Soviet publication of soldiers’ memoirs, material collected by veterans’ organizations, websites devoted to war remembrance, as well as increased – but certainly not unrestricted – access to Soviet archives provide a more complex view of “why Stalin’s soldiers fought.” Catherine Merridale suggests that the most important reason was the personal bonds among Red Army soldiers. While friendships were frequently short-lived due to the extraordinary high level of casualties (it was rare for a soldier at the front to serve more than three months before becoming a casualty or being promoted), soldiers formed primary groups held together by “fierce” friendships. Merridale cites one soldier as saying “It’s enough for a person to be with you two to seven days for you to know his qualities, all his feelings, the things it takes a year to know in civilian life” (Merridale

2006, pp. 199–200). Other historians concur that in the Red Army, personal ties and motivations were generally more important than official propaganda and ideology in inspiring soldiers to fight. Indeed, perhaps the greatest success of Soviet propaganda was its ability to intermingle state-sponsored themes of patriotism, particularly love for a usually undefined “motherland” (which without an adjectival descriptor could mean anything from the Soviet Union itself to a soldier’s home village or district), defense of family, and desire for revenge with the soldier’s own personal desires, so that the two often became inseparable (Seniavskaia 1995; Kirschenbaum 2000). For many Russian soldiers, “rodina” became strongly associated with Russia, what it meant for non-Russian Soviet soldiers and civilians requires more investigation.

Another factor often cited in older accounts of the Red Army, themselves based substantially on German sources, was the role of fear and coercion in keeping Red Army troops in the line. Most notable were the so-called blocking units established to prevent the panicked flight of soldiers as well as other orders stemming from the disastrous defeats of 1941–1942, which criminalized surrender and forbade unauthorized retreats. Yet despite the horrific image of retreating soldiers machine-gunned by NKVD personnel, popularized by movies like *Enemy at the Gates* (2001), according to Reese (2011) in his study of Soviet soldiers’ motivation, the importance of fear in maintaining the Red Army’s cohesion is “essentially a myth.” Instead, the blocking units, armed only with small arms and often composed of poorer-quality troops, only detained escaping soldiers, sending them off to higher authorities for punishment. Although approximately 158,000 troops were executed during the war, Reese contends that this extraordinary discipline had relatively little impact on whether soldiers fought or fled. Other factors, such as general morale, effective leadership, and a sense of achievable war aims were far more important in keeping the troops in the line.

In contrast to the German experience, historians generally agree that communist ideology was much less important to the Soviet soldier. While millions of Red Army soldiers joined the Communist Party during the war, this did not necessarily signify an intensification of *ideological* identification with the Soviet regime as occurred in Germany during the same time. Soviet political training during the war was remarkably bereft of ideological content; rather Party and Komsomol members were instructed in the duties and responsibilities of Communists to the Party and the State, and not on the theoretical intricacies of Marxist class conflict and proletarian revolution. This is not to say that political control and surveillance were absent. Red Army soldiers remained subjected to extensive political lectures from Red Army political officers, as well as intense overt and covert surveillance. Those deemed to be politically unreliable could expect to be interrogated by the counter-espionage agents of the NKVD and SMERSH. However, the lectures themselves were generally regarded as boring and the soldiers’ ideological worldview by and large did not conform to an orthodox understanding of the finer points of Marxism-Leninism. To the extent that ideology motivated soldiers to fight, by 1943 it focused on the aim of destroying fascism, of building a better world, including, perhaps, an end to collective farms in their own country, hopes for a more relaxed socialism, and for a new era of brotherhood and justice (Merridale 2006; Reese 2011).

Red Army soldiers were also consumed by hatred and a desire to avenge their losses. Soviet propaganda was ambiguous regarding the treatment of the German people: while soldiers were reminded that they were at war with fascism, not ordinary

Germans, they were also urged to kill Germans at every opportunity and to avenge the tortures and killings of their loved ones by the German occupiers. On this point, the Red Army troops needed no official promptings – they had seen the atrocities with their own eyes as they regained Soviet territory. Once in Germany, according to Mark Edele and Michael Geyer, the emotions of “fear and hate, anger and revenge, entangled as they were with a confused but potent mix of leader cult, socialism, nationalism, religion, and love for those near and dear” could not be contained. Thus, they argue, the mass rapes and murders should be seen as part of the escalation of violence that was an integral part of the war on the Eastern Front (Edele and Geyer 2009, p. 392). Merridale also points to the drive for revenge in which German women became surrogates for punishments directed not only at German soldiers, but also against their own wives and girlfriends whom they suspected of infidelity. Whatever the exact reason, it is estimated that certainly hundreds of thousands (and possibly up to two million) German women of all ages were raped, many of whom, along with their male companions, were murdered. Yet even with these horrific crimes, as Edele, Geyer, and Mawdsley observe, there was an important difference between the Nazi and Soviet atrocities: as brutal as they were, the mass rapes did not define Soviet policy toward Germany; in contrast the crimes committed on Soviet soil by the *Wehrmacht* and other institutions were integral to Nazi plans for the future of these territories and their populations.

New research and new materials have also altered our understanding of military operations during the years 1943–1945. Because of the scale of the campaigns and space constraints, this chapter is limited to covering only a few topics: the uncovering of “unknown Soviet operations” on the Eastern Front, the controversies surrounding the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, and the greater appreciation for Soviet operational sophistication as demonstrated during Operation Bagration, the Red Army’s 1944 summer offensive aimed at Army Group Center.

David Glantz, probably the foremost American specialist on the Soviet military in World War II, argues that the dramatic battles fought at Stalingrad, Kursk, Berlin, and in Operation Bagration have obscured the fact that the Red Army was engaged in other campaigns that on any other front would have been regarded as epic in scale, but have been largely forgotten or ignored by both Western and Soviet/Russian historians. Moreover, because many of these campaigns resulted in heavy losses with few if any gains, Soviet authorities and official historians found it best to mention these battles briefly, if at all. For example, Glantz has revealed that during the unfolding of Operation Uranus, the encirclement of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Red Army launched Operation Mars with the objective of encircling and destroying the German Ninth Army, capturing Rzhev, salient jutting toward Moscow, and subsequently advancing to Smolensk. As Glantz demonstrated in his study of the battle, *Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Defeat in Operation Mars, 1942*, the Red Army suffered over 70,000 men killed and missing out of a total offensive force of over half a million troops but failed to accomplish any of its objectives. Despite its size, the offensive was essentially erased from Soviet accounts of the war largely to preserve Zhukov’s reputation (Glantz 1999).

Glantz argues that the dramatic battle at Kursk, the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives, and the Red Army’s drive to the Dnepr River have also veiled similar operations during the summer–fall 1943. These include offensives in the Northern

Caucasus, the Donbas region, Belarus, the Leningrad region, the Kiev region, and southern Ukraine. These operations, often the outgrowth of other better-known campaigns, were customarily ignored by Soviet historians for political or military reasons. As Glantz notes, they often occurred at the tail end of earlier offensives, enabling the Germans to defeat the exhausted and weakened Soviet forces stretched beyond their resources (Glantz 2005). Uncovering these “forgotten battles” not only reminds us how vast the scope of the fighting was on the Eastern Front, but also of the strength and limitations of the Red Army during this period of the war: powerful enough to launch very successful initial operations, but not strong enough to meet ambitious follow-up targets once the main objectives had been accomplished. Glantz’s work further reaffirms the role politics has played in shaping the historiography of the Nazi-Soviet war on both sides of the battle line.

Far from being a “forgotten battle,” the German offensive at Kursk, Operation Citadel, has become the focus of numerous debates, ranging from the significance of the offensive, to its timing, to the losses suffered by the respective sides. Until the 1990s, the Battle of Kursk was viewed as Germany’s last great attempt to defeat the Soviet Union with a grand summer offensive. According to this interpretation, the aim of Citadel was to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces in the Kursk bulge, followed by either an advance toward Moscow or to the south to regain the territory lost after Stalingrad (Overy 1997). This view has come under considerable revision in the last decade. Glantz and House (1995, 1999), Mawdsley (2005), and Bellamy (2007) argue that the German leadership, including Hitler, realized that the *Wehrmacht* lacked the resources for any such strategic offensive. Instead, Citadel’s objectives, despite Hitler’s grandiose rhetoric, were much more modest: pinch off the Kursk salient, destroy the significant Soviet forces located in it, and shorten the German defensive lines. The German leadership also believed that a victorious offensive was necessary to shore up the morale of Germany’s wavering Axis partners. Hence, Kursk’s significance was less strategic in a military sense than was previously thought; at the same time, the timing of the offensive in the summer, the unprecedented concentration of armored forces, and the use, once again, of blitzkrieg tactics, gave the offensive more psychological meaning, especially to the Soviets who remained understandably anxious about the consequences of a third German summer offensive.

The offensive had originally been planned for early spring after the spring thaw and rains were over to take advantage of perceived Soviet weakness; however Hitler, who himself was becoming increasingly nervous about the operation, decided to delay Citadel until more panzer units were re-equipped with new Panthers, Tigers, and Ferdinands that were coming into production. In the meantime, Soviet forces in the Kursk bulge undertook extensive preparations to withstand the offensive, including building an elaborate defense system 175 miles in depth. Perhaps even more impressive, Soviet military commanders prevailed on Stalin to restrain his impulse to attack the Germans first as he had done at Kharkov in May 1942 with disastrous results. This patience reflected the growing maturity of Stalin and his commanders, as well as their increased confidence in the Red Army troops to withstand the German onslaught (Glantz and House 1999).

The actual battle has also become a source of contention as more documents and materials from German and Soviet archives have become available. Once cited as history’s “greatest tank battle,” the dramatic confrontation on July 11, 1943 between

the German panzers of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and Red Army tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka has been downgraded both in the size of the forces engaged and in its ultimate significance. Not only have historians debated the size of the armored forces involved, but they have also argued over what precisely happened on the battlefield. The dispute has taken on a nationalist element. The German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser argues that Prokhorovka was the site of a massive Soviet military blunder as confused Soviet tank crews drove their tanks into a deep antitank ditch, while Russian historian Valeriy Zamulin contends that Frieser and other Western historians have misread the evidence and that Prokhorovka remains a great Soviet military triumph (Frieser 2007; Zamulin 2011).

Whatever happened at Prokhorovka, there is no debate on the outcome of Kursk itself: the *Wehrmacht* suffered a resounding military and psychological defeat the consequences of which were far more significant than Citadel's relatively modest objectives. On July 13, faced with heavy losses, no breakthroughs, and the need for reinforcements from the east after the Allied landing at Sicily, Hitler ended the offensive. Despite the fact that the Soviets had numerical superiority in all respects and had months to prepare for the German onslaught, there was a belief shared among Germans and Soviets alike based on the two previous years, that the Germans owned the summer and would be able to crash through the Soviet defenses. The ability of the Red Army to repulse the German blitzkrieg forever undermined the notion of so-called German superiority. This last point is crucial, for even if historians debate the extent to which Kursk should be seen as a real "turning point" in the war given Operation Citadel's actual aims and the extreme unlikelihood of Germany's winning the war at this late date, they agree that the battle was a real psychological turning point for both the Soviets and the Germans. Everyone could see that the strategic initiative had irrevocably switched to the Red Army.

The fighting in the summer and fall of 1943 ushered in several important dynamics that characterized the fighting on the Eastern Front until the end of the war. For David Glantz, these Red Army offensives saw the return of "deep battle" operations, in which the new tank armies and other mobile elements, combined with massed artillery and airpower, broke through German defenses, at times advancing hundreds of miles. Moreover, these offensives were often staggered to keep the Germans off-balance and to prevent them from readily shifting their reserves. Second, Stavka now made sure that attacking fronts had sufficient resources to obtain their objectives in contrast to earlier offensive operations. The Soviet command continued its practice, as we have seen, of continuing offensives after they had achieved their initial goals to the point of eventual defeat. Yet even these temporary failures did not lead to strategically important setbacks as they had earlier in the war.

From the end of Kursk to the spring of 1944, the Soviets continued offensive operations, concentrating their efforts in Ukraine, which was cleared in an eight-month campaign, although all sectors of the vast front were targets of attack at one time or another. While not all of these offensives were equally successful, taken together they demonstrated the Red Army's increasing prowess. The ultimate display of the Red Army's power was its June 1944 offensive against Army Group Center, Operation Bagration.

As Glantz and House as well as several other historians have pointed out, the plan and execution of Operation Bagration bore striking similarities to Soviet concepts of

“deep battle” developed during the 1930s. Richard Overy has described it as “perhaps the best example of the Soviet operational art during the entire war” (Overy 1997, p. 290), while Walter Dunn has called it a “Soviet blitzkrieg” (Dunn 2000). The plan called for multiple encirclements of German forces executed with the close cooperation of armor, infantry, and airpower to achieve surprise and rapid movement. Raids by aircraft and partisans just prior to the attack hampered activities in the rear. Using a massive deception plan and staggering the timing of the individual attacks, the Germans were caught off-guard, compounding the impending disaster. Also indicative of the Red Army’s growing sophistication and Stalin’s trust in his commanders was the refusal of Generals Konev and Rokossovskii to alter their respective operational plans to conform to Stalin’s ideas. John Erickson records an incident at a planning conference in which Stalin initially demanded that they change their plans. He eventually conceded to their expertise, saying about Rokossovskii, that he liked generals who knew their business and stood by their convictions (Erickson 1983, p. 203).

The attack began on June 22, the third anniversary of Operation Barbarossa. Five Red Army fronts consisting of over 2.4 million men, 5,200 armored vehicles, 36,000 artillery pieces, and 5,300 aircraft smashed into Army Group Center’s 792,000 troops and 900 tanks. At the key assault points the Soviets concentrated a 10 : 1 advantage. All the developments that had shaped fighting on the Eastern Front since Stalingrad came into play – from the performances of the respective leaderships and armies to the quality and quantity of the soldiers and their equipment. Soviet forces broke through the German defenses, bypassing the areas of strong resistance and moving rapidly through the difficult and swampy terrain of eastern Belarus. In just twelve days from the beginning of Bagration, the Red Army regained much of Belarus, including Bobruisk, Vitebsk, and the capital city of Minsk. By the end of July, the Red Army had reached the Vistula River and the outskirts of Warsaw, an advance of over 300 miles. Army Group Center, the eastern army’s main force, suffered a greater defeat than Stalingrad, with 25 divisions destroyed and 300,000 men lost, not including an additional 100,000 in the following weeks. Army Group Center’s commander, Field Marshal Ernst Busch exacerbated his troops’ plight by enforcing Hitler’s March 1944 Order No. 11 that “fortified places” must be held at all costs, and forbade maneuver to deal with Soviet breakthroughs; however, as was pointed out above, the Germans lacked the armored forces to conduct a mobile defense in any case. The German high command was stunned by the Red Army’s ability to mount a sustained offensive operation, expecting that the drive would exhaust itself after a 125-mile advance as had occurred in previous operations. In further testimony to the Red Army’s power, offensives in the south swept through the Carpathian Mountains into Romania and Hungary while in the north, Soviet forces penetrated East Prussia.

The last year of the war brought no lessening of the cataclysmic violence of the preceding years – indeed, the intensity only increased. The attempted assassination of Hitler by some members of the German establishment was in part due to their recognition of Germany’s hopeless military situation. However, the Third Reich’s top political and military leaders refused to admit to any defeat, insisting on fighting until the bitter end. In a military sense, the Allies’ final victory was a foregone conclusion, with the only real questions being what the costs of that victory would be and how the respective Allied spheres of influence would be determined. The costs on the Eastern Front continued to be extraordinarily high, especially when compared to

the fighting in the west. In the 1944–1945 battles to clear the Eastern European countries of Axis forces, the Soviets lost 1,100,000 men compared to the Americans' 60,000 and the British's 40,000 to liberate France and the Benelux countries (Mawdsley 2005).

After having been stalled on the Vistula since late summer 1944, the Red Army began its final series of offensives on January 12, 1945. By late January, Soviet troops crossed the Oder River and in the north had isolated German forces in East Prussia. South of the main thrust aimed at Berlin, the Red Army advanced into central Europe, taking Budapest in mid-February and Vienna by mid-April. On April 16, the final operation against the German defenders of Berlin commenced. Its objective, the capture of Berlin, was again a foregone conclusion. On April 30, Hitler committed suicide and the Soviet flag was raised over the Reichstag, symbolically marking the fall of the city, although fighting in Berlin continued until May 2. In the meantime, Soviet and American forces had linked at the Elbe River on April 25. The last significant operation, the taking of Prague, was completed by May 9. On May 8 the remnants of the Germany's armed forces surrendered thus ending the war in Europe.

Despite the fact that Stalin's Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were among the most repressive governments in history, they nevertheless succeeded in retaining the support of their respective populations. This support was due, in large part, to the specific characteristics of the war fought on the Eastern Front, most particularly the way in which both populations came to see the war as an apocalyptic struggle requiring total national and individual commitment.

In the case of the Third Reich, recent historiography as demonstrated in the work of Evans, Förster, Kershaw, and others, has stressed the German people's determination to keep fighting even when it became obvious that the war was lost. German support for Hitler and the Nazi regime remained high so long as Germany was winning the war. After Stalingrad, however, the first signs of disaffection became visible not only toward the government, but toward Hitler. This discontent grew as the scale and intensity of Allied air raids increased in 1943–1944. Even as the Allies advanced into Germany itself and the destruction acquired apocalyptic proportions, the war continued.

The last months of the war saw a dramatic escalation of violence visited on German society. Not only did the intensity of the Allied bombing increase, but the wrath of the Red Army came down on German civilians, especially women. The East Prussian town Nemmersdorf, among the first of the German population centers to be taken by the Red Army, became synonymous in Nazi propaganda, and among the general public, with rape and murder. Millions of German refugees streamed west in horrible conditions attempting to flee the advancing Soviets. Less well known but no less significant was that Nazi authorities increasingly used terror methods that had been employed in occupied Europe, particularly in the east, to combat what they regarded as emerging defeatism among the population. In his examination of German society under Allied bombing, Ralf Blank cites the Gestapo's use of special units modeled on the infamous *Einsatzgruppen* in the fall of 1944 to combat youth gangs such as the Edelweiss Pirates. Hence, Blank notes, the techniques of mass murder that had been developed in the east were "now being applied on the home front" (Blank 2008, pp. 401–402).

The radicalization of the home front extended to production as well. Historians have often credited Albert Speer, Hitler's architect turned armaments minister with

pursuing an “apolitical” policy of “rationalization” to boost German war production. According to this interpretation, as exemplified by Rolf-Dieter Müller’s contribution to the fifth volume of *Germany and the Second World War*, Speer sought to expand production and his own administrative empire, with seemingly little regard for ideological matters (Müller 2003). Yet as Adam Tooze demonstrates in *Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*, Speer was far from the apolitical technocrat that he later claimed to be. On the contrary, he was heavily invested in the Nazi worldview. His armament program was based not only on the rationalization of production but also its radicalization, including heavy reliance on extraordinarily coercive labor practices, using German and especially foreign and concentration camp workers to achieve production increases. While German production was indeed boosted, the main increases came too late, in 1944 after the war was already decided, and relied too much on easy-to-produce but obsolete equipment (Tooze 2006).

Yet, despite all this, the German people, like the *Wehrmacht*, remained committed to the war almost up to the very end. The question remains why, especially since after the twin disasters of the summer of 1944 – the Normandy invasion and the catastrophic defeats in the east – it was clear that the war was lost. Some historians emphasize continuing ideological support for the regime, which was intensified, at least temporarily, after the failed July conspiracy. Armin Nolzen has pointed out that despite popular images of Nazis fleeing the Allies and leaving German civilians to suffer the consequences, most Nazi officials remained at their posts and continued to carry out their orders, including executions of POWs, forced laborers, and deserters/defeatists, until it was impossible to do so any longer (Nolzen 2008). Jörg Echternkamp argues that popular commitment was built on an idealized notion of an Aryan “community-in-arms” which linked the German people to the Nazi regime through their shared suffering, even as marginalized populations were subjected to the most extreme persecution. This determination was such that Echternkamp believes that had the plotters of July 20 succeeded in assassinating Hitler, a new “stab in the back” legend could very well have arisen. As the Allied forces closed in loyalty to the regime and the determination to keep fighting were maintained by Nazi propaganda emphasizing “strength through fear” which warned Germans what would happen to them if Nazi Germany were defeated (Echternkamp 2008). Peter Fritzsche also concurs that fear of defeat and a return to the plight of 1918 served as a further source of identification with the regime (Fritzsche 2008).

Others, however, are much more skeptical about popular support for the regime. Richard Evans asserts that the Allies’ use of atrocity propaganda to weaken support for the Nazis was counterproductive since all it did was remind Germans of atrocities committed in their name by the Third Reich. While for some, this meant that Germany *had* to keep fighting to avoid Allied revenge, others more fatalistically believed that devastating air raids and other horrors visited on Germany were themselves divine retribution, and that they should rightly expect the same kind of treatment they had given others. As the bombings destroyed city after city, popular support waned, held in check by intensifying regime terror (Evans 2009). Ian Kershaw also dismisses the interpretation that the German population enthusiastically supported the regime, contending that by late 1944 this had pretty much evaporated among the general public. The answer as to why Germans continued the struggle, according to Kershaw,

is to be found in the structural role that Hitler performed in the Third Reich. While fear of the Allies, and especially of the Soviets, the increased power of the Nazi Party, and the intensification of terror all played their parts, Kershaw argues that as long as Hitler was alive, the charismatic bonds that he had created among elites meant that they would keep fighting. The irony, of course, was that Hitler himself had ceased to be a charismatic figure long before his death (Kershaw 2011).

In the Soviet Union during the years 1943–1945, the question of popular mobilization and support for the regime occurred in a very different set of circumstances. Many historians see this period as a crucial turning point in the ongoing relationship between the Soviet state and its citizens, as the threat to the regime receded and final victory became inevitable. In the first half of the war, most historians agree that the regime went into what could be termed “survival mode,” jettisoning the most overt references to communist ideology and imagery in its propaganda. Jeffrey Brooks, for example, in his study of the Soviet press, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, has shown that even Stalin essentially disappeared from Soviet newspapers in 1941, not to reappear in a significant way until after Stalingrad. Significantly, Brooks argues, Stalin’s place was taken over by other heroes, particularly ordinary Soviet citizens, thereby temporarily undercutting Stalin’s leadership cult (Brooks 2000). The 1930s phenomenon of using images and figures from Russia’s historical past to legitimate and define the Soviet Union, what David Brandenberger has termed “national Bolshevism,” was intensified in the war years as communist symbolism and rhetoric were downplayed (Brandenberger 2002). Emphasizing this return to the Russian national past, Steven Merritt Miner discusses in his work, *Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945*, how the government turned to the Orthodox Church to win popular and international support (Miner 2003). In her article, “Our Cities, Our Hearths, Our Families: Local Loyalties and Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda,” Lisa Kirschenbaum shows how personal experiences, hopes, fears, and suffering became merged with official calls to defend the *rodina*, forming yet another foundation for popular support of the war and for the Soviet government (Kirschenbaum 2000). Because of this emphasis on Russian and personal themes during the first half of the war, Richard Bidlack has argued that the regime implied that permanent reforms would be implemented after victory was won (Bidlack 2010).

After Stalingrad, and especially after Kursk, however, Stalin reemerged in public view. He became closely associated with the Red Army’s victories and was awarded (or rather, awarded himself) the rank of “Generalissimus,” thus elevating him above the growing pantheon of Soviet marshals. While the Communist Party as an independent institutional actor remained relatively weak, its public status and its role as a “transmission belt” between the Soviet leadership and the people remained strong, as citizens, especially Red Army soldiers, sought Party membership. As Soviet lands were regained, officials reimposed Soviet institutions and structures, in particular the Communist Party apparatus and the generally detested collective farms. Soviet citizens, and even partisans and underground activists, who had experienced German occupation, had to account for themselves to the NKVD. Those found wanting were stripped of their posts, and not infrequently sent to camps in the east. The return of a more “Stalinist” narrative to the war did not mean the end of Russian-themed propaganda, however. Rather, as Brandenberger argues, by 1945 many Russians had come

to conflate Russia with the Soviet Union, thus fusing Russian and Soviet identities. It should be pointed out, however, that scholars such as Serhy Yekelchuk have shown that Ukrainians and other nationalities also used the war to celebrate *their* national heroes within a Soviet context (Yekelchuk 2002).

Most historians have focused on whether Soviet citizens expected and wanted reforms, or if the victory so legitimated the Soviet system and Stalinist rule that the population by and large accepted the regime as it was. Supporters of the former view, such as Bernd Bonwetsch, Jeffrey Brooks, Steven Miner, and Elena Seniavskaia, argue that the harsh and brutal nature of the war forced civilians and especially *frontoviki* (front-line soldiers) to rely on their own initiative to accomplish goals and to survive. It also created, in Brooks's words, "an imagined civil society" independent from the state (Brooks 2000). This self-reliance during wartime translated into a desire for more freedom and independence after the war. Moreover, for many the failure of the regime at the beginning of the war and the huge losses suffered by the Soviet populace to secure victory only proved the bankruptcy of the Stalinist system and the Communist Party. The reemergence of Stalinism in the postwar period was only a temporary delay in the push for liberalization. As Seniavskaia terms it, the "front generation" was also the "generation of the Twentieth Party Congress" in reference to Nikita Khrushchev's speech formally ushering in his de-Stalinization program (Seniavskaia 1995, p. 158). Yet other historians have questioned the extent to which the extraordinary brutality and harshness of the war facilitated the development of openness and cultural relaxation. In *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* Amir Weiner argues that Soviets viewed the war as the natural culmination of the "Bolshevik purification drive" initiated by the Revolution. The experience of war normalized military values and behaviors among Red Army veterans, who, in the postwar period, became the key link between the government and the population as they came to dominate rural political and economic life. These values conformed to essential elements of Stalinism (Weiner 2001). While acknowledging that the war gave Soviets a new sense of personal responsibility and freedom, Elena Zubkova notes that many citizens could not imagine an alternative to the Stalinist order. "Such was the contradictory role of the victory, which brought both the spirit of freedom and the psychological instruments thwarting the further development of that spirit, the instruments that perpetuated the supremacy of the alleged architect of victory" (Zubkova 1998, p. 33).

Little question exists that the war validated the main features of the Stalinist economy in the eyes of the leadership even as this confirmation blinded officials to the system's defects. Evan Mawdsley, for example, argues that the linking of victory to the Soviet system made it all but impossible to reform the system, even when its weaknesses and inefficiencies were becoming apparent (Mawdsley 2005). Mark Harrison observes while the regime was able to acquire, produce, and distribute the necessary food and material production necessary to win the war, the costs of victory were so great that long-term Soviet economic prospects were significantly weakened (Harrison 1998).

This comparison of Soviet and Nazi Germany battlefronts and home fronts indicates a very interesting dynamic. While both regimes certainly could be labeled totalitarian in their aims, and both showed a complete disregard for the human and material costs of the war so long as it was won, their approaches to the war differed in

some fundamental ways. For the Nazi regime, the last two years saw an intensification of every aspect of its policies, from the political indoctrination of its armed forces and population to ever-more extreme methods of waging war. The Soviets were no less extreme in their methods. However, the Soviet armed forces became more professional and less subject to purely political oversight, quite in contrast to their German counterparts. And even as the war validated the Soviet system, some of its citizens, paradoxically, contemplated the possibility of a less repressive and more open society after victory.

As this survey has indicated, one of the most important developments in the historiography of the war has been the breakdown of the artificial distinctions between battle and home fronts and also those separating national histories from each other. The integration of battle and home fronts has been especially productive in the German case building as it does on the already rich national historiography of the Nazi period. A particularly exciting trend in Soviet historiography has been a new focus on the non-Russian, and particularly the non-Slavic, peoples of the Soviet Union. As of yet there has been very little coverage outside the immediate war zone and Russia. Rebecca Manley's *To the Tashkent Station* (Manley 2009) is a notable exception, however, her main focus is on the experiences of evacuees (almost all Slavic or Jewish) in wartime Tashkent. The ways in which non-Slavic nationalities experienced the war is a theme that must be developed and integrated into the national and transnational wartime historiographies.

The last two decades of historical research on the Nazi-Soviet war have been quite fruitful, both conceptually and in the number of studies produced, in large part because of the unprecedented access to Soviet-era materials. This access should not be taken for granted as the Russian government recently has taken steps to reimpose Soviet-type restrictions on researchers to preserve "The Great Patriotic War" as a source of national pride and memory. Given the freedom of veterans and others to publish, this is ultimately a quixotic gesture, but one that has already unfortunately hampered historical investigations. It is also testimony to the power and importance that this conflict has for today's and future generations.

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CHAPTER TWENTY

German Defeat

NEIL GREGOR

How does one write the history of defeat? Where has that history been produced – in what institutional contexts, in what disciplinary fields, in what literary and historical genres, and by whom? What, exactly, is the object of study, and what, therefore, constitutes its historiography?

In a literal sense, the history of defeat is, after all, the history of a moment. In the conventional archive of political and military history, it was registered by the formal capitulation signed by General Jodl at Reims on May 7, 1945, which came into effect the next day; for an iconic visual corollary one might look to the famous raising of the Red Flag on the *Reichstag* by a Soviet soldier on April 30, the restaged image of which was published in the Soviet Union on May 13. In terms of “classic” historical literature, one might refer to Hugh Trevor-Roper’s *Last days of Hitler* (Trevor-Roper 1947): this has been occasionally augmented, but not superseded, by subsequent accounts of life in the bunker (Joachimsthaler 1996; Fest 2004; Frank 2005), alongside accounts of the Dönitz regime (Steinert 1969; Padfield 1984). The occasional appearance of books on the final agonies of the regime testifies, however, as much to the interplay of commercial publishing imperatives and the fascination of *fin de siècle* popular culture with the Third Reich as to the growth of anything that might meaningfully be described as a discreet historiography of that moment.

Defeat was also, however, a process. As a term used to distinguish a specific period of the military conflagration, distinct from that covered by other chapters in this *Companion*, it may most usefully be applied to the period between the summer of 1944 and the capitulation nine months later. The near simultaneous collapse of the German army group “Center” on the eastern front (which precipitated the rapid disintegration of the German army in that theater of war and paved the way for the Red Army’s march on Berlin) and the successful launching of the Second Front (which, if less significant in terms of the land war itself, effectively ended the capacity of both the German navy and the Luftwaffe to wage offensive war) marked the crucial moment at

which the Nazi “New Order” began to collapse. Momentary pauses caused by comparatively minor German counter-attacks, by weather conditions during the winter of 1944–1945, by geographical barriers such as the Rhine, and by logistical pauses on the part of the allied armies as they prepared for the final assault on German territory could not mask the inevitability of the final outcome even if, seen from the vantage point of that winter, the war still had to be fought and finally won.

The inevitability of this defeat was underlined by the massive intensification of allied bombing of German towns and cities in 1944–1945. In the last six months of the war, not only most major German cities but also countless medium- and small-sized towns were subjected to a ferocious military onslaught from the air that left hundreds of thousands dead, millions homeless, and the towns and cities themselves often literally razed to the ground. These events have generated a voluminous literature that has done much to illuminate the interplay of the political, military, and social history of the last months of the war, and which, as this chapter will describe, has evolved in line with changing interpretations of the nature of the Third Reich, and its relationship to the German people, more generally.

German defeat was also, however, more than just a process, the history of which can be captured simply by recovering the chain of military events that led to the signing of the capitulation document, and the war’s attendant political and social effects. German defeat in World War II had an unmistakably epochal quality. The causes and consequences of military defeat were not those which attended the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century, but embraced the collapse of a political system, the disintegration of the territorial integrity of the German *Reich* and, as far as the subjective experience of the German population was concerned, marked an extended period not just of political rupture and physical suffering but also of profound ethical and psychological disorientation from which it also took many years to recover. To this extent, images of leading Nazis in the dock in postwar trials, of German women removing rubble in the immediate postwar years, or of German prisoners of war returning from captivity often years after the cessation of hostilities also form part of the iconography of defeat. Furthermore, they provide another visual reminder that the history, and therefore historiography, of that moment encapsulate something much broader than a narrow chain of political, diplomatic, or military events leading up to May 8, 1945, the slow empirical researching of which exhausts the historian’s role.

To the contrary, the historiography of German defeat, understood in these broader terms, also serves as a prism through which one can map some key shifts in scholarly understandings of mid-century German history more broadly. These include not only the collapse of the Third Reich itself, but also the processes by which Germany underwent the transition from fascist dictatorship to postwar democracy or renewed dictatorship and its citizens transformed themselves from the *Volksgenossen* of the Third Reich to the democratic citizens of the Federal Republic or the new socialist citizens of the SED-state. It is on this level, arguably, that scholarly debates have been at their most compelling. This is so not only because of the rigor of the research which underpins them: the political and ethical ramifications of the argument, not only for Germans but for other war-torn transitional states, are so much greater than those embodied in the antiquarian or pornographic recuperation of histories of violence as an end in itself which has characterized so much writing on this subject, as indeed on war in general.

As these remarks imply, we are dealing not with one but with a number of historiographies, each with a different timeframe, each animated by a different set of questions, and each evolving, as often as not, quite separately and as part of quite distinct wider discourses on mid-century German history. The multilayered quality of the historiography of defeat that these different temporal foci has engendered is compounded, however, by at least two other factors. The first is what one might loosely and imperfectly term a distinction between “amateur” and “professional” history writing. The second reflects the customary separation of military history as a subdiscipline from other subdisciplines such as social or cultural history.

As far as the former is concerned, it is worth noting that perhaps the bulk of the historiography of German defeat, or at least the bulk of the empirical evidence upon which more synthetic analysis is based, is represented by local studies of the fall of individual cities, towns, and villages conducted by amateur authors from the locale concerned. These usually highly detailed accounts are rooted in an entirely positivist understanding of the relationship between archival trace and historical facticity. They often draw on the oral testimony of local notables to underpin claims to authority and authenticity which rest, implicitly, on the local origins and knowledge of the author concerned, and on the many years that person has spent gathering material (Arntz 1984; Kunze 1995). Often, these qualities are precisely what combine to ensure that the ensuing work both reproduces and perpetuates the apologist narratives of conventional local wisdom, contributing to a distinctive local memory discourse rather than to scholarly concerns as such. They usually stand out, indeed, for the thoroughly decontextualized quality of their narratives, which make few, if any, connections, between the local experience of the end of the war and the wider dynamic of a genocidal war of annihilation, and for the insistent presence of narrative tropes which enforce, for example, simplistic distinctions between an innocent, decent local citizenry seeking to save its village from last-minute destruction and the radical, violent proclivities of a fanatical minority indulging in a final frenzy of terror. Such tropes have enjoyed a remarkable degree of longevity in this genre of literature. The local experience of victims of Nazism, such as forced laborers, meanwhile, is usually glossed over or reduced to anecdotes about plunder. At the same time, the best of these have captured testimony and reconstructed events locally in a manner which have allowed social historians to reflect more purposefully on the history of defeat as lived experience than would otherwise have been the case.

As far as the latter is concerned, the slow, partial, and imperfect reconnection of military history to the wider methodological concerns and debates of the discipline embodied in the advent of the “new military history” notwithstanding, until comparatively recently writing on the military defeat of Germany rarely offered much more than a largely descriptive account of the progress of allied troops, the retreat of German troops, and the attendant movement of the front. This approach was paralleled by a narrative account of the successive capture and surrender of German towns and cities, often consisting of little more than lists of dates and places, in which the historical actors which formed the object of study were either commanders or the armies and local subunits which they commanded. Such histories rarely, if ever, engaged in analysis of the wider social, political and ideological frameworks within which such movements occurred – beyond noting Hitler’s insistent refusal to

countenance retreat and the presence of intensifying terror toward German soldiers and civilians in the latter stages of the war – and they often appeared to do little more than reproduce the gaze of strategizing generals in the war itself (see, for example, Brückner 1987; Lakowski 1994).

Among older official histories, the tradition-building function of regimental accounts, combined with a tendency to write the history of warfare without killing – itself a reflection of the need of postwar societies to close down the experience of massive wartime violence – was largely to blame. More recently, such accounts sometimes reflect the commercially focused imperatives of a genre of history writing driven by the demands of the market – particularly evident when the volume concerned contains route maps enabling the touristic retracing of the front. In other cases, the institutional locus of the military academy, with its emphasis on strategic study in pursuit of military planning insights, is evident. Either way, a few isolated examples notwithstanding, the conventional narrative habits of traditional military history have served this field particularly badly. By continuing to prioritize the military unit, rather than the individual soldier, as the actor, the military history writing of this period has perpetuated what is ultimately a largely fictitious sense of the organizational and operational functionality of German army units in the final months of the war. These were in an advanced state of disintegration insofar as they still existed at all. Likewise, the continued insistence on organizing the narrative around the notion of a “front” implied a degree of operational unity and order which is belied by the historical realities on the ground, and certainly does nothing to capture the subjective experiences of soldiers themselves.

Similarly, until comparatively recently, the majority of accounts of the intensification of allied air raids in the final months of the war exhausted themselves in lists of the dates of air raids on particular cities, of the growing tonnage of bombs dropped month by month, of the numbers of casualties suffered and the extent of physical destruction wrought, which did much to catalog the destruction but little to analyze it, still less capture the experience of it. Indeed, any wider comment tended to focus on assessing the strategic efficacy – and, implicitly, the moral justification – of area bombing and the attendant civilian casualties, in a manner which bespoke the presence of emotive memory traces of the bombing war among an older generation of German scholars in particular. Thus Gerd R. Ueberschär asked in 1985 of the raids on southwest Germany:

What moved the Anglo-Americans still to carry out these heavy raids in November and December 1944, at a point when the western front had reached the Rhine and there could already be no doubt concerning the military victory of the allies? How had it come to the total “war of the bombers”?

to which he answered:

At the start of the Second World War on 1st September 1939 there were no internationally recognised treaty agreements limiting the pursuit of air warfare. Although the governments in Berlin, London and Paris had supported US-President Roosevelt’s call in September 1939 not to mount air raids against civilian populations, it soon became evident that military measures would not stop before attacks on civilians. (Ueberschär 1985, p. 15)

What seems a blandly factual statement concerning treaty obligations between the belligerent powers embodies a narrowly legalistic understanding of the legitimacy of military actions through which the conservative apologetics of an earlier generation echo. The simple distinction between innocent civilians and military protagonists is at historical odds with the anchoring of the Nazi regime in the widespread, if clearly far from universal popular acclaim of broad sections of the German population. By constructing Berlin merely as the location of one of a number of governments at war, it is informed by an implicit sense of the symmetry and reciprocity of military violence, legitimate and otherwise, which belies the unique quality and dynamic of the war. An apparently sober descriptive account is thus freighted with the political and ethical concerns of a highly charged memory discourse, rather than driven by any meaningful attempt to acknowledge the inter-relatedness of the political, military, and social histories of the era, and their connections, in turn, to histories of experience and subjective perception. Most problematic of all in this respect, as late as 1994, experts at Germany's prestigious Military History Research Center in Freiburg still felt able to write of allied air raids as "terror raids" (*Terrorangriffe*), reproducing uncritically the discourse of the Third Reich itself as they did (Müller and Ueberschär 1994).

For these reasons, then, it is less accurate to speak of a single historiography of German defeat than of a series of distinctive traditions of writing about that experience. In part, this reflects the fact that warfare, and twentieth century warfare in particular, have customarily generated a wide variety of genres of historical writing, each with their own conventions and audiences, each animated by somewhat different problems and concerns. However, the absence of an identifiable single historiography of German defeat also reflects the inherent difficulty of conceptualizing "defeat" as a coherent object of study. The circumstances under which soldiers were forced or chose to stop fighting, or when and how civilians experienced the moment of occupation by foreign troops, varied hugely, depending on time, place, and context. As Ian Kershaw writes, the fact that "the history of the Nazi regime in its final months is a history of disintegration" poses particular problems for historians, as "trying to blend the varied facets of the fall of the Third Reich into a single history ... amounts to trying to write an integrated history of disintegration" (Kershaw 2011, p. xvi). How, then, have historians sought to order these highly varied, thoroughly disparate, geographically and temporally diverse experiences into overarching, coherent accounts of German defeat; what narrative themes have these been organized around; and how, in broad terms, have these evolved?

Most obviously, the category of "morale," with its attendant focus on social, political, and ideological cohesion, has retained a central role in studies of the collapse of the Third Reich; conversely, many studies have sought to document the gradual loss of that cohesion in processes described, variously, with the vocabulary of disintegration and atomization. These shifting perspectives on the extent to which the regime was able to maintain its political, institutional, and ideological cohesiveness, and on the extent to which these had begun to dissolve at any given point, map quite clearly onto broader shifts in the historiography of the Third Reich. In particular, there has been a clear shift over time away from stressing the disintegrative tendencies of the regime and the extent to which ordinary Germans began to detach themselves from their ideological and emotional affinities to the regime in favor of an account which stresses the ongoing commitment of ordinary Germans to the war and the

regime until comparatively late in the day. This reflects the shift away from the classic "structuralist" historiography of the 1980s and toward emphasizing, as scholars are now generally more wont to do, the consensual, cohesive qualities of the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* at war.

In one classic statement of the older line, Hans Mommsen argued that while the Nazi regime had been able to maintain its stability for a short time, it was no longer capable by its late stages of doing so, for

it began to disintegrate into individual satrapies ruled by *Gauleiter* and territorial commissars and into isolated chains of command which could be held together by appeals to the mythical "will of the Führer" and by the belief that Germany was engulfed in a fight for its very existence as a nation.

Mommsen argued that "on the surface, this process of internal disintegration appeared to be a direct result of the extreme pressure of war on the system," but that "the tendency had been inherent in the structure of the Nazi movement from the start and only took effect under conditions of total war" (Mommsen 1991, p. 186). Similarly, speaking of the tendency in the last year of the war to devolve power away from Berlin and toward regional and local plenipotentiaries, Klaus-Dietmar Henke argued in his 1995 study of the American occupation of Germany that "in the last months of the war, as the development was characterized by regionalization and isolation in broad areas of the state and society, the *Gauleiter*/Reich Defence Commissioners were, on paper, 'absolute leaders' or at least 'the actual commanders' in their territories." These developments were

the opposite of a tightening up or a simplification of the *Reich* administration ... the basically normal chaos of competencies and the "fundamental abnormality" which had always characterized the Führer state evolved in the last quarter year of the war into a complication of power structures at local level which had a paralysing impact. (Henke 1995, pp. 823–824)

The corollary of this disintegration of the regime and its apparatus was a gradual process of detachment of the people from their political and ideological affinities to the regime which, according to both exponents of this older historiography and some more recent accounts, set in during 1943. Such detachment arose in the wake of Stalingrad and with the first major air raids on German cities, which led to increasing pressure on the food supply and other physical and existential stresses for the German population. Thus Henke emphasized the gradual decline in morale from the middle of the war onwards, speaking of the "irreversibly declining legitimation of the Nazi regime from 1943 at the latest" and stressing that "the Stalingrad disaster marked the end of the 'mobilisation capacity' of the regime, as the burden of the war and the hardships of the bombing war made themselves felt in as yet unaffected regions of the Reich" (Henke 1995, p. 813).

Such arguments have been supported by local studies of German cities in the last two years of the war. In a study of the impact of the declining war situation on popular behavior and attitudes in Nuremberg, I argue that "the years 1943 to 1945 were characterized by an ongoing process of dissolution of communal administration and party authority" and that this process of administrative and political dissolution "was

accompanied by, and indeed tended to reinforce, a more fundamental dissolution of civil society.” I suggest that “the allied bombing was responsible for a serious decline in the morale of the German civilian population from 1943 onwards, and a corresponding crisis of self-confidence in the Nazi party, which was unable to contain the disintegrative tendencies in motion” (Gregor 2000, pp. 1065–1070). Writing of the impact of the major bombing raids on Hamburg in July 1943, Joachim Szodrzynski similarly suggests that

the erosion of the *Volksgemeinschaft* emerged on the back of such everyday problems. A regime which had come to power with the promise of asserting German interests with all means could not in the medium term refuse to satisfy the basic material needs of a population which was being placed under ever greater burdens. (Szodrzynski 2005, p. 647)

It should be emphasized that even in the slightly older literature there was strong recognition of the gradual quality of the disintegration of the regime and of ordinary Germans’ support for it; the majority of the literature stressed that the processes of collapse accelerated greatly only toward the end. Even scholars as closely associated with “structuralist” historiographical perspectives and with arguments concerning the capacity of broad sections of the German population for *Resistenz* (that is, their relative imperviousness to the material and ideological offerings of Nazism) as Martin Broszat and colleagues, stated quite clearly in a classic volume that “the Goebbels *Durchhaltepropaganda* and the demands for heroic struggle to the last also continuously called forth new forces for the regime, and the relentless hail of bombs from the allied squadrons also caused, alongside growing war-weariness, reflexes of anger, defiance and patriotic solidarity,” underlining further that “the mood of the population in the last years of the war was thus characterized by fundamentally conflicting feelings.” He emphasized that

only when the war broke through into Germany itself in 1944/45 and a leadership concerned only for its own survival continued the fight until the last minute even in the west, and despite the massive superiority of the western allies, did the willingness of the mass of the population to continue fighting rapidly disappear. (Broszat et al. 1990, p. xxviii)

Similarly, in a more recent account of the “Indian Summer” of the Third Reich, Mommsen’s emphasis moves away from mapping the disintegration of the Third Reich and toward accounting for how the regime “apparently survived the accelerating military crisis until its ultimate demise in May 1945 and how the Nazi leadership still continued to mobilise remarkable defensive resources” (Mommsen 2001, p. 110). In this sense, the polemical hostility articulated by some recent histories toward an older literature reflects a widespread tendency to caricature that generation of scholarship rather than to represent it accurately. This is so either in the sense that much recent writing critiques what it imagines an older generation of literature to say rather than that what it actually says, or in the sense that it exaggerates the difference between older accounts and its own arguments in the process of carving out rhetorical space for its own perspectives.

Nonetheless, more recently, there has been much greater emphasis on the ongoing effectiveness and functionality of the Nazi regime at war, even in the latter stages, and

of the cohesiveness of the society it sought to mobilize. The older literature, especially that which emerged from the projects pursued at the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich in the 1970s and 1980s, tended to stress the limits of Nazism's capacity to penetrate German society, and thus the comparative ease with which Germans could be separated from their political attachments to the regime. Yet the more recent general literature (Gellately 2001; Fritzsche 2008) has tended to stress the capacity of the regime to anchor itself firmly in German society, and to mobilize the resentments, hatreds, and aggression of the population behind its project, and thus the ongoing support of the great majority of people for the war, even in its very last phase.

On the one hand, to the extent that it has facilitated a renewed focus on the question of why so many Germans kept fighting under such objectively hopeless conditions, this interpretative turn has brought new insights. As John Zimmermann argues, too much previous work on the German collapse in the west, for example, was conditioned by general assumptions regarding the "invincible superiority of the opponent in a 'normal war'" situation, in which the *Wehrmacht* fought on professionally in the face of inevitable defeat. This sat in implied contrast to the fundamentally different war of genocidal annihilation that had been fought in the east. The new research, by contrast, has underlined that the *Wehrmacht* was a mass social organization embedded in German society at large, that soldiers fighting in the west had been conditioned by their socialization in the Third Reich as much as those fighting in the east, and that they were as influenced by Nazi "virtues" of hardness, necessity, and mercilessness as their colleagues on the eastern front. Thus, "not for nothing did young people socialised during the Nazi era show precisely that fanaticism that the military and political leadership had hoped for – males and females in equal measure, moreover" (Zimmermann 2009, p. 466).

On the other hand, much of this literature, which sits within what I have tried to describe elsewhere as the "voluntarist turn" (Gregor 2005) in writings on the Third Reich, rests on an over-homogenizing perspective on German society which fails to distinguish adequately either between the residual fanaticism of the party cadres and the population more widely, or between different segments of a population among whom, Nazism's ambitions to dissolve them notwithstanding, many forms of social distinction remained. It fails, in other words, to differentiate adequately between different groups of Germans. Others therefore seek a more complex set of explanations for what they also see as the remarkable resilience of both the German troops and much of the German population. Michael Geyer argues that "Germans soldiered on and effectively continued to do the regime's bidding between 1942 and 1945 ... And, as we recall, it was not as if the Germans were simply slaughtered. They fought tooth and nail; the home front did not collapse; mass murder continued" (Geyer 2006, p. 56). Asking why this was, he offers four answers. The first was "fear of enemy revenge ... Fear was pervasive and malleable ... there was a deep conviction that a nation that had committed otherwise unspoken atrocities could not but expect retaliation" (pp. 56–57). Second, according to Geyer, the notion of "holding out" was not just an empty propaganda slogan, but was rather "invested with a remarkable sense of pride and self-assertion." Fighting on, and holding out, became a virtue in itself. Thirdly, Geyer cites the key factor of terror, often underestimated in recent synthetic accounts of the Third Reich, yet particularly crucial in the final phase, although as he notes, "terror only worked inasmuch as it was linked to more mechanical

forms of social and institutional coercion" (p. 61). Finally, "with nowhere to go but to work and fight, Germans did work and fight" (p. 63). In other words, in the given context, there was little option. In Geyer's words, "the fourth observation addresses the peculiar kind of solidarity of the Germans at the end of the war ... the amply documented fact is that German soldiers and civilians really rather persevered by sticking together because it seemed the best way to survive" (pp. 63–64).

As Geyer implies, Germans could thus draw on a range of ideological and mental frameworks to underpin their ongoing willingness to fight, and were simultaneously motivated by a wide variety of situational pressures when choosing when to do so and for how long. His arguments find echoes in a series of key pieces by Nick Stargardt, who notes that Germans did indeed detach themselves from Nazism in response to its failures, but that "it was this same sense of military failure and vulnerability that convinced many that the war had indeed become a defensive war for Germany's national existence. It was here that a deeper basis for national legitimacy was to be found than whether Hitler remained personally popular" (Stargardt 2008, p. 382). Most recently, Ian Kershaw has also sought the explanation of many Germans' apparent willingness to continue fighting in a more complex mix of causes. He emphasizes the absence of effective centers of resistance after the failure of the July 1944 bomb plot and the further concentration of power in hands of party radicals and loyalists – Himmler, Goebbels, Bormann, and Speer; the expansion of party control over military actions through the formation of the *Volkssturm*; the ongoing presence of loyal generals (both National Socialist fanatics and battle-hardened "fighters"); and the wider presence of cultures of loyalty amongst functionaries schooled in traditions of obedience and loyalty to party and state. Finally, and crucially, Kershaw also stresses, like Geyer, the role of violence born of a fanaticism which, in the peculiar context, seemed to spiral out of control simply by following its own logic. Nonetheless, like all of the most compelling accounts of this period, Kershaw emphasizes the diversity of experience in this last phase and their irreducibility to simple slogans of cohesion or racial solidarity.

At the same time as some historians have moved toward re-emphasizing the more cohesive dimensions of German society in the latter phases of the war, or the presence of elements of fanaticism which enabled the war effort to be sustained, others have sought to revise the idea that the German state itself underwent a process of disintegration in the latter phases of the war. They suggest instead that the Nazi regime's constantly evolving internal structure represented a capacity to adapt flexibly toward new challenges and to mobilize the resources and energies of the Reich and its population behind its murderous activities to a remarkably effective degree – even under conditions of imminent defeat. Jürgen John argues that such an approach reflects the desire to ask "not only about lines of conflict and destructive dynamism, after the tendency toward fragmentation, divergence and disintegration, but also after efficiency and integrative power, after self-mobilising and shaping dynamism, after complementary, cooperative and system-stabilising effects" (John 2007, p. 34). Indeed, Rüdiger Hachtmann has argued that the Third Reich witnessed the emergence of a "new form of statehood" (*Neue Staatlichkeit*) based on new regional models which blended state and party offices in personal union, which drew on networks of local and regional activists, cutting across traditional and inherited bureaucratic or institutional barriers, and providing a flexible,

dynamic, adaptive system capable of significant “leadership of the people” (*Menschenführung*) deep into the war. For Hachtmann,

future research on Nazism would do well to distance itself from the obsolete dictum of the disintegration of the state and the alleged instability of the Hitler dictatorship in favor of examining the structures of the “new form of statehood” of the Third Reich and its dynamic stability, and establishing its contours more precisely through regional and local examples. (Hachtmann 2007, p. 78)

In John’s words, too, what matters, ultimately, is “how the Nazi regime could hold out to the bitter end and undertake and sustain for years a war of aggression and destruction of gigantic proportions” (John 2007, p. 34). In similar vein, Thomas Saarschmidt has argued that “precisely because the structures [of the Nazi state] detached themselves from binding definition, they proved themselves to be that much more adaptable, when it came, in the course of preparing for and pursuing war, to reacting flexibly to constantly new challenges” (Saarschmidt 2007, p. 20). According to this strand of recent writing, this capacity to adapt to crisis and mobilize resources survived almost down to the end. As John argues,

the question of what actual effect the expansion of the competencies, functions and empowerment of the *Gaue* and *Gauleiter* in 1942/43 had in the extreme situation of 1944/45, with the intensification of the air war and the approach of the fronts can only be answered with exact research – made onerous by the difficult situation regarding the documents. (2007, p. 55)

Nonetheless, “the suspicion suggests itself that precisely in this situation they made their contribution to the brutal mobilisation of the remaining resources and to extending the war to the bitter end” (John 2007, p. 55).

It is perhaps true that the old historiography did not take sufficiently seriously the peculiar qualities of the new governmental system which emerged out of the old or – taken on its own terms, and measured by its own ambitions – its organizing, mobilizing capacities, and thus its ability to marshal its dwindling resources in pursuit of its final crimes and in organization of national self-defense in 1944–1945. Yet arguably, notions of a “new form of statehood” overstate the capacity for self-reproduction of this system, especially under conditions of looming defeat, in that they simply understate the debilitating impact the material consequences of massive military violence had on the system’s capacity to shape its own agendas – which were, ultimately, reduced to ad hoc crisis management responses doomed to failure. They take the administrative vocabulary of Nazi sources too much at face value, overstating its descriptive quality and thus the degree of control which the agency concerned actually had over the situation outside. In taking the language of improvisation as capturing the responses of the Nazi regime to the war-induced collapse of infrastructure, services, and supplies, they overstate, for the late phase of the war, the system-specific nature of local responses to an increasingly chaotic situation which merely reflected the same kind of desperate self-help on the ground witnessed in other war societies too. In this context the vocabulary of improvisation reflected the veneration of the “politics of the will” in the Third Reich, and is thus indicative of the ideological mindsets of its authors rather than of organizational realities outside of the text.

A more balanced assessment is offered by Dietmar Süß, whose comparative study of the British and German experience of bombing underlines that much of what can be said about how the Third Reich organized itself for war had a less system-specific quality than might be assumed, and reflected instead the wider pressures and demands total war placed on modern industrial states more generally. As far as the balance between mobilizing and disintegrative tendencies of the regime in the face of impending defeat is concerned, Süß notes that

for a short phase of the air war this form of communal polycracy and newly created special offices for the “defence of the Reich” could contribute to ensuring that, despite the erosion of bureaucratic authority the dysfunctionality and weak capacity for direction at the centre could be compensated for by the concentration of forces in the communes ... [However] with the radicalisation of the air war it became clear that no deployment of resources, however forceful, and no party, however active, was in a position to withstand the superior power of the allies. (Süß 2011, pp. 233–234)

A number of additional points may be made concerning the shift in emphasis away from stressing the disintegrative tendencies of the regime, and its gradual mental abandonment by the people as defeat loomed, and toward stressing its capacity to mobilize resources and maintain popular morale and support. The first is that it needs to be read alongside recent literature on the experience of the *Wehrmacht* in the last year of the war which emphasizes the profundity of the military collapse itself. In his 2007 study of the German army in the final year of the war, Andreas Kunz, for example, underlines that “the collapse of the army group Centre in *Weissrussland* [represented] the most significant defeat in German military history, and thrust the eastern front into its death agony” (Kunz 2007, p. 68). Meanwhile, “the consequences of the invasion battles and the subsequent fighting in retreat from France shook the organisation of the *Luftwaffe* and the navy to such an extent that these were no longer capable of military operations in any total strategic sense” (Kunz 2007, p. 72). The implication here is clearly that the fundamental military collapse had occurred, and that the pace of German defeat was dictated, from this point onwards, far less by German resistance and far more by Allied prerogative than the image of a dynamic, flexible, fanatical regime mobilizing its resources effectively to the end would suggest.

As Kunz makes clear, the rhetoric of fanaticism in the leadership cadres of both regime and armed forces in the final year of the war did not describe the mentalities of soldiers on the ground, which were far more complex, and certainly could not substitute for the massive depletion of manpower and materiel suffered by the *Wehrmacht* from 1943 onwards, which made the outcome of the war inevitable. He underlines that “along with the development of personnel losses one can also read from the material equipment of the military organisations how far the *Wehrmacht* was capable, by the middle of 1944, of continuing the war.” Crucial to note, according to Kunz, is the fact that

the statistical conjuring of the Speer Ministry, which announced the high point of armaments end production for the whole of the war in the summer of 1944, masked the material losses on the eastern front, which since the late summer of 1943 had reached the scale of the catastrophe of Stalingrad every quarter year. (Kunz 2007, p. 197)

The second point to note is that this shift in emphasis toward discerning German political, ideological, and social cohesion down to almost the end of the war does justice neither to the massive fluctuations in morale which occurred in the second half of the war nor to profound local and regional variations. Variations in what scholars argue or describe in respect of individual case studies of German cities, in particular, reflect regional and local variations in historical experience and do not necessarily require a shift in historiographical emphasis as a whole. Most obviously, it mattered greatly whether a city experienced its first major air raids, or its main moment of destruction, in 1943, in mid-1944, or in early 1945. Overarching narratives both of disintegration and atomization on the one hand, or of political and ideological cohesion on the other, arguably do not capture either the regionally or temporally varied complexities of the processes whereby the Third Reich collapsed, and probably cannot do so.

Above all, however, much recent work demonstrates how inadequate the simple juxtaposition of the categories cohesion and disintegration is when seeking to capture the experience of the unfolding collapse on the ground. While both categories have heuristic value when analyzing very situation- and context-specific behaviors toward the end of the war, their broader deployment in an either/or mode of argument swiftly produces a false debate. Continuing to fight, or continuing to work, after all, did not necessarily mean support for the war. Likewise, support for the war, if it did exist, did not necessarily mean ongoing support for Nazism, but could be born of more generic nationalist or patriotic frames of thought, or of the desire to defend one's homeland in a more local sense. Moreover, it did not have to be born of any of those things. Equally, a desire for the end of the war did not necessarily equate to a desire for the end of Nazi rule. Desire for an end to the war did not necessarily mean wishing defeat on oneself; in the specific situation of the closing phase of the war, survival became an end in itself, the attendant behavioral patterns devoid of wider political or ideological comment and reflecting, instead, the demands of a situation with its own peculiar dynamic. As Wolfgang Franz Werner argued (Werner 1983) for workers, continuing to work in factories, even in the most objectively pointless of situations as far as restoring production in the interests of the war effort was concerned, was motivated by the retention of daily routines and the desire to keep one's head down to avoid being sent to the front. Jill Stephenson, in her key study of the home front in Württemberg, argues that "by early 1945, most Germans were looking not for a heroic death but merely for an end to the slaughter at the front and the bombing at home" (Stephenson 2006, p. 313). Kunz has also argued that self-preservation was the main motive: "in many cases the perceptions and social actions of people revolved only around the direct existence of the individual. It was only perceived existential threats and yearning for the end of the war that provoked people out of their widespread apathy" (Kunz 2007, pp. 236–237). Most recently, Kershaw has argued what while Germans were still fighting on in March 1945, "the readiness should not, however, be mistaken for widespread popular commitment to the German war effort." He acknowledges that "in the east, it is true, fear of the Soviets was a strong deterrent to defeatism and willingness to surrender" but reminds forcefully that "for most people, however, whether in the army or among the civilian population, there was simply no alternative but to struggle on under the terroristic grip of the regime in the dwindling parts of the Reich that were still not occupied" (Kershaw 2011, p. 256).

As Dietmar Süß also underlines, the processes of making sense of what had happened during the final massive spiral of violence and destruction as it was experienced by Germans in the last months of the war often reflected disruptions to inherited notions of time, space, locality, and routine rather than reflections on the nation-state, or the race, and its fate.

Included in this for example were extensive accounts of destroyed street trams, of bomb craters one had to pass on the way home, of burning rows of houses, the lost buildings of one's childhood and worklife, and of the changed sense of time, insofar as journeys which had been easy to make in peacetime now took much, much longer in the chaos of the bombing war or were no longer passable at all. (Süß 2011, p. 408)

The period contained many experiences better accessible through environmental history or the history of the senses than with the more conventional tools of political, military, or social history, however subtly deployed. Writing of the bombing of Dresden, Süß records how "in Dresden after the heavy raids of 13. and 14. February 1945 there lay after a very short period of time a sweet-ish smell over the city – the smell of decomposing corpses, which even just about overcame the stench of burned flesh" (Süß 2011, p. 478). This, in turn, was swiftly followed by outbreaks of disease. Indeed, it may be that the further exploration of environmental, sensory, or medical history may provide more compelling insights into the social and cultural experience of defeat, in all its variety, intensity, and complexity, than modifications or revisions of our existing frameworks of interpretation gained through the further pursuit of more conventional approaches. Environmental history also provides one clear means of transcending the divide between before and after the moment of national capitulation – a moment which had comparatively little significance in a number of respects – and thus into exploring the epochal dimensions of defeat.

Arguments concerning the extent to which the German population was able and willing to distance itself from Nazism before the end of the war have fed, in turn, into wider arguments about the relationship between Nazi Germany and the post-war successor states, and on the place of defeat in the wider transformations of German political subjectivities in the wake of war. These, in turn, have affected assessments of the extent and speed with which, after the war, Germans in the west were able both to embrace liberal democracy and acknowledge the crimes of the Nazi era.

Typical of an older literature, Broszat and colleagues argued that the battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of an extended period of exceptional upheaval which, while containing its own short-term dynamics, and while marked by a very open-ended quality, marked in retrospect a moment of transition, transformation, and incubation in which the nascent outlines of postwar society were discernible. In his account,

the upheaval between Stalingrad and currency reform gained its revolutionary dimension not just through the destruction of the German Reich, the loss of the eastern territories and the emasculation of the old aristocratic upper class, but also through the evacuations, which had already begun in the last years of the war and the massive population movements in the form of flight and expulsion, which shook up the whole of German society, removed almost everywhere the old confessional, social and cultural segregation and ultimately created a strongly levelled-out "emergency society" (*Notstandsgesellschaft*)

in which, in retrospect, the contours of the middle class society of the Federal Republic can be recognized. (Broszat et al. 1990, p. xxvi)

In a similar vein, Henke argues in respect of developments in the west that the American occupation of Germany marked

the central period in a phase of catastrophe and transformation marked by the symbolic dates of Stalingrad and currency reform, which contained the end of a Germany loaded with irredeemable traditional baggage and at the same time the beginnings of a more modern, homogeneous and more liberal new Germany in the west. (Henke 1995, p. 25)

Indeed, those who argued that the Nazi regime succeeded only imperfectly in penetrating German society and anchoring itself ideologically among the people, and therefore saw the German people as detaching themselves quite swiftly and extensively from their superficial commitment to the regime, were building an argument – usually implicit, sometimes explicit – about the extent to which, by the time of the formation of the Federal Republic, Germans had already re-orientated themselves toward embracing democracy. The more recent literature, by contrast, with its stress on the extent to which Nazism did maintain a firm hold on the German population until late in the war, implies – and indeed articulates – a greater degree of skepticism concerning the speed to which Germans were able to jettison this ideological baggage and embrace democracy in the wake of defeat. Here, the emphasis is far more on the residual elements of nationalism, authoritarianism, anti-Communism and, indeed, though to a lesser extent, anti-Semitism. This literature has tended to stress that it was less the constitutional settlement of 1948–1949 than the long transformation of West German political culture in the 1950s and – especially – the 1960s which led to the firm embrace of a liberal democratic political culture.

A third way between these two positions is suggested by the recent study of Richard Bessel on Germany in 1945. Bessel argues, in line with much other recent work, that although the situation was difficult, German morale and commitment to the war still held up at the end of 1944: “as the year 1945 dawned it still seemed possible for Germans to hope that the war might somehow be fought to a stalemate” (Bessel 2010, p. 13). At this point, Germans were engulfed in a final massive maelstrom of violence: from within, in the form of a final vicious intensification of Nazi terror, and from without, as German military casualties reached their highest point of the whole war, the bombing war peaked with the destruction of German towns and cities on an almost daily basis, and the refugee crisis began. As a result,

where once the Nazi regime had enjoyed the overwhelming support of the German people, it now was seen to have betrayed them and left them to face mortal danger. This in turn provided a way for Germans to divest themselves of association and identification with Nazism. The sufferings of 1945, and particularly the fate of millions of Germans in the east, purged them of their identification with Nazism. (Bessel 2010, p. 89)

The war, according to Bessel,

was the moment of a profound shift in German mentalities and public culture – away from nationalism and admiration for the military to more pacifist and personal

perspectives. The mentalities that had made possible the establishment of the Third Reich and had provided the basis for broad popular support for National Socialism evaporated. (Bessel 2010, p. 145)

This reaffirmation of the significance of 1945 marks an important challenge toward a historiographical consensus which, perhaps compensating excessively for an older exculpatory insistence within Germany on 1945's status as a complete "zero hour," a moment of rupture across which no continuities spanned at all, has tended to argue strongly for the presence of allegedly "restorationist" continuities between the Nazi era and, in their own ways, each postwar German state. The experience of both the war as a whole and of the crescendo of violence which accompanied defeat, together with a knowledge of the crimes perpetrated by Germans during the Third Reich, was, indeed, crucial to what gave the condition of citizenship in the postwar years its peculiar quality, most visible in the visceral hostility to rearmament, militarism, nuclear weapons programs, and foreign military intervention present in both states in different ways after 1945.

Nonetheless, if Bessel is right that events at the end of the war almost literally bombed Nazism out of the German population, it does not follow that democracy was bombed into them, or that Germans woke up ready to embrace democracy (or, for that matter, the KPD/SED) immediately the war was over. In this sense, too, it may make better sense to think of defeat as constitutive of a much more extended era, lasting at least into the late 1950s. Indeed, a considerable wave of social and cultural history writing in the last ten years has emphasized that the two postwar Germanies are not best understood as cold war societies, or as post-Nazi polities, much as they were both of these things, but specifically as postwar societies. Again, the studies have operated on a variety of levels, ranging from a pan-European discussion of the aftermath of defeat into which an account of Germany is embedded, to micro-studies exploring the impact of the collapse and its legacies on individual social groups or communities. Of the former, Bessel and Dirk Schumann's comparative collection on *Life after Death* (Bessel and Schumann 2003) takes as its theme the long legacies military violence had for postwar European social and political life. As far as studies of Germany itself are concerned, Klaus Naumann's edited collection *Nachkrieg in Deutschland* (Naumann 2001) incorporates the findings of several monograph studies of the period. As Naumann underlines,

at the centre of social life in the postwar period stood sacrifice, suffering and destruction. Their significance, recognition and "overcoming" were at the centre of the contestation of meaning, of material conflicts of interest, and social-political visions in which the outlines of a new model of social and political order were tested and fought out. (Naumann 2001, p. 9)

While the precise timespan of the immediate "postwar" period remains contested, as indeed does the best way to periodize postwar German history in general, it is clear from most recent studies that the postwar era can be regarded as lasting considerably beyond the currency reform of 1948 which the Institute of Contemporary History took as the end-date for its study of the years of collapse and subsequent upheaval. While, for example, studies of evacuation which focus on the legislative reaction of the Federal Republic to the demands of German evacuees take 1953 – the year of the

Federal Evacuation Law – as their cutoff point (Klee 1999), studies focused on the social experience of the evacuees and their postwar pursuit of return to their bombed out cities take the story into the early 1960s (Krause 1997).

Some of the most interesting work on the legacies of war, and particularly of defeat, take the form of studies of veterans and their efforts to adapt to peacetime while making sense of the appalling experiences of violence they had endured (and enacted). Svenja Goltermann takes psychiatric records of former soldiers as a starting point for exploring the difficulties former German soldiers had in finding a language with which to comprehend, verbalize, and communicate what they had seen and done during the war. This was particularly the case given the absence, in the immediate postwar years, of an acknowledged discourse of trauma which a later generation used to account for the difficulties both military and civilian veterans of war (and genocide) encountered in the wake of their limit experiences of violence (Goltermann 2009).

Frank Biess's comparative study of the treatment of returning POWs in East and West Germany similarly argues that the public confrontation with the personal effects of the war lasted until the mid-late 1950s, before both states, and particularly West Germany, started to transform themselves into something recognizably different as reconstruction took its course and political and institutional cultures and mental landscapes transformed themselves with it. Biess's conclusions, and his arguments regarding periodization, are confirmed by my micro-study of Nuremberg in the postwar years. I seek to integrate a social-historical analysis of the experience of veterans into a wider account of their interactions with other "victim" groups – refugees and expellees, evacuees, the homeless, and the victims of Nazism – as each sought material and moral recognition in the transition from war to peace. Here, too, I suggest that the late 1950s marked a period of transition from a recognizably postwar society dominated by the material legacies of war to a society in which contestation of the past and its legacies became more and more a cultural process (Gregor 2008).

As Biess also reiterates in respect of veterans, "the onset of the postwar period coincided only in a very literal sense with the unconditional surrender of the German military on May 8, 1945. Long before the end of the war, ordinary Germans had begun to experience the consequences of defeat" (Biess 2006, p. 19). Such assertions regarding the social history of the era of defeat have, finally, been reaffirmed by a number of key accounts of the memory culture of the early Federal Republic too. Thus Malte Thiessen, in his study of memories of the bombing in Hamburg, underlines that many of the memory tropes visible in the immediate postwar years were formed in the immediate aftermath of the major bombing raids on Hamburg, in 1943, that is, during the Nazi era itself (Thiessen 2007). Similarly, the important comparative study of the memory of the bombing of Kassel and Magdeburg by Jörg Arnold underlines that the shaping of the memory of urban bombing was dependent not only upon the West and East German contexts of each postwar society, but on the timing of the bombing during the war itself. Thus, cities which experienced major air raids comparatively early on began the social and cultural processes of imparting meaning to the experience of war during the Third Reich itself, reaching for language which left its traces in the postwar years, while in cities which experienced their main moment of destruction in the multidimensional chaos of early 1945 the overwhelming shock and disorientation engendered by collapse meant that the work of memory only meaningfully began after the war (Arnold 2011). Studies of postwar memory thus

also confirm how little sense it makes to treat defeat as a moment in time, and how important it is to recognize it, rather, as an extended era containing a multitude of different experiences – varied in both temporal and spatial location, varied in their impact on individuals, and varied in their long-term political and cultural legacies – the historiography of which correspondingly incorporates a very wide variety of accounts of violence, upheaval, chaos, transition and reflection, accounts which, of necessity, resist reductionist synthesis.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Southwest Pacific

MARK ROEHRS

If the shattering of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 opened up the global phase of the Pacific War, then the Southwestern Pacific portion of the conflict began with the destruction of the long-range bomber force in the Philippines on the same day. While the image of those wrecked planes is not nearly as iconic as are those of the blasted and burning battleships or wrecked aircraft in Hawaii, the elimination of that force, one which both political and military planners had assumed would render extensive Japanese operations in the Central and South Pacific untenable, opened the way for Japanese expansion into the so-called Southern Resources Region. The coordination of the Pearl Harbor attack with air raids in the Philippines and amphibious landings in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies was all part of a plan to unite the industry and leadership of Japan with the vital resources and manpower of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The stakes in the desperate fighting that followed over the next three years, often at the extreme limit of the combatants' manpower and material resources, were nothing less than the survival of the American, British, Dutch and Japanese Empires. That being the case, the relative obscurity of the Southwest Pacific theater in historical surveys of the war is surprising.

Between December 8, 1941 and March 1, 1942, the successful campaigns of the Japanese Navy contrived to make the assumptions of prewar planning a reality, reducing at least the naval component of the Pacific War to a showdown between the United States Navy and itself. The relatively easy destruction of the British *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off the coast of Malaya, on December 8–9, 1941 by Japanese land-based aircraft, shocked battleship proponents and vindicated the warnings of airpower advocates who had argued that even fully maneuverable and self-defending warships would be vulnerable to airborne assault without sufficient aerial protection. The Allies' inability to coordinate properly and support their responses to the Japanese offensive across the Pacific produced humiliating results. Outdated equipment, underestimation of the capabilities of the enemy, and lack of previous united maneuvers

resulted in heroic, though doomed efforts to stall the Japanese advance. Clear proof of these Allied shortcomings became abundantly evident in the disastrous Java Sea action of February 27–28, 1942, in which a mixed force of American, British, Dutch, and Australian cruisers and destroyers was completely annihilated in a series of surface actions against a similarly composed Japanese force.

It was not just the Allied naval presence that disappeared from the Pacific during the first three months of the war, though. The list of Japanese victories included nearly all of the colonial possessions of the once mighty British, French, Dutch, and American empires. Before the end of 1941, Hong Kong, Wake, and Guam were lost. The New Year brought the fall of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and the northern portion of New Guinea. Fearing an invasion of their own northern coast, Australia demanded the return of two of its divisions then fighting the Nazis in the Middle East.

At the war's outset, Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific generally proved inferior to the Japanese in both equipment and preparation. Benefitting from campaigns conducted in China since 1937, the air forces of both the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy gained valuable experience in air-to-air combat and in close aerial support of both land and sea operations. In addition to this, both services developed modern fighter escorts that were arguably superior to anything in both the European and Pacific theaters in 1941, and especially the navy's Mitsubishi A6M Zero. The Zero was the most maneuverable, longest range, fighter plane in the world at the time, though its shortcomings in armaments and armor would be revealed as the war progressed. John Lundstrom's *The First Team* (1984) and John Burton's *Fortnight of Infamy* (2006) explain parallel aspects of the same period of the opening months of the war. The initial encounters between Allied warplanes and their Japanese counterparts were often very costly learning experiences for the Allied pilots. Lundstrom relates how the American Navy made use of aggressive, though relatively peripheral, strikes against Japanese outposts in the opening months of the war to inflict some damage and gain experience. At the same time, Burton explains how the Japanese successfully destroyed the Allied planes and pilots stationed throughout the Central and South Pacific at the beginning of conflict, and thus assured the success of their naval and amphibious operations. In mid-1942, after their tremendous success at Midway, the Americans removed a significant number of their veteran pilots from combat duties and employed them as instructors, consultants, and leavening for new aircrews and aircraft designers, virtually assuring a steady flow of well-prepared flyers and superior aircraft. In *Fire in the Sky*, Bergerud (2000) explains how Allied technological and training advancements not only successfully matched the power and performance of every category of Japanese fighter and bomber, but by 1943 resulted in the production of aircraft models that outperformed their Japanese counterparts in every respect. In the meantime, however, Allied strength in the Pacific remained in danger of imminent collapse.

By April 1942, the sole remaining outpost of the Western imperial powers was the Filipino/American garrison fighting on the Bataan peninsula, on the island of Luzon. This presumed stronghold of prewar planning had been resisting a Japanese invasion since December 10, 1941 and was approaching the end of its reserves. According to original prewar plans, the Philippines were to be relieved by the sixth month of the war. The defenders of Bataan and Corregidor approached that limit with no sign of

relief in sight. Even their commanding officer, along with his family and staff, had withdrawn from the islands during the previous month. Ostensibly retreating to Australia where he would take command of a relief force, General Douglas MacArthur's departure struck many as the final depressing scene of a poorly conducted campaign. MacArthur arrived in Australia to find not only no relief force waiting, but also none likely to arrive for quite a while. In the meantime, his departing orders to Major General Jonathan Wainwright – to fight to the last man – also went unfulfilled as the garrison on Bataan surrendered on April 9, and was followed on May 5 by the capitulation of the defenders of Corregidor. The fall of the Filipino/American positions on Luzon not only represented the end of the Western imperial presence in the Central Pacific, but also happened to coincide almost precisely with Isoroku Yamamoto's prescient prediction that success at Pearl Harbor would allow him to run wild in the Pacific for six months.

One of the original and ongoing controversies of the Pacific War revolves around the personality and performance of MacArthur. The brash and outspoken general had the reputation of being a shameless self-promoter with a mixed career before 1941. A decorated veteran of World War I, as well as the commanding officer of the US forces during the encounter with the Bonus Marchers in Washington DC in 1932, MacArthur also had served as the army chief of staff before resigning his commission in 1936 to become the head of the Philippine Army. MacArthur was called back to active duty in July 1941 and was commanding all Allied forces in the Philippines when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. His reaction to that event and his subsequent actions prior to leaving Corregidor for Australia constitute the bulk of the truly controversial aspect of MacArthur's generalship.

What is certain is that hours after receiving word of the Japanese attack, MacArthur's air forces were nearly all caught parked wingtip-to-wingtip on the ground and destroyed by Japanese aerial assault. Furthermore, after a disastrous and abortive effort to fulfill his promise to hurl the Japanese back into the sea should they attempt amphibious landings, MacArthur resorted to a defensive posture on the Bataan peninsula and the island of Corregidor that he had previously labeled defeatist and therefore made little provision for. After several months of slowly being ground down by Japanese land forces, at President Franklin Roosevelt's order, on March 11, 1942 MacArthur escaped from Corregidor via PT boat and B-17 and retreated to Australia to take command of the Allied ground forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Eugene Rasor's *The Southwest Pacific Campaign, 1941–1945* (1996) and *General Douglas MacArthur* (1994) provide invaluable aid in dealing with both the MacArthur situation and the Southwest Pacific theater in general. Rasor rightly points out D. Clayton James's *The Years of MacArthur 1941–1945* (1975) as the best and most balanced of the works he surveyed. However, balance is not a quality that typifies most MacArthur biographies. According to Rasor, "Much more common is hagiography; indeed, that stance is a virtual genre" (Rasor 1994, p. 20). Most of the biographies produced by the general's staff members fall into this category. The emphasis of these works most often concerns justification and celebration of MacArthur and his actions in the first days and months of the Pacific War.

Recently, both William Breuer's *MacArthur's Undercover War* (1995) and Geoffrey Perret's *Old Soldier's Never Die* (1996) have swelled the chorus of MacArthur advocates, primarily advancing the position that MacArthur remains an under-appreciated

commander. Whether relying exclusively on earlier favorable sources, or through reinterpreting crucial events and discounting critical historians' appraisals, they have further developed the contention that it was those around MacArthur who really either failed in their perceptions of, or duty to, the general. This group includes Generals George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Lewis Brereton, Admiral Thomas Hart, President Franklin Roosevelt, and the entire Australian Army.

Less celebratory, but still generally favorable MacArthur biographies include Stephen Taaffe's *MacArthur's Jungle War* (1998), Richard Connaughton's *MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines* (2001), William Bartsch's *December 8, 1941* (2003) and Richard Frank's *MacArthur* (2007). These authors agree that there was plenty of blame to go around for the debacle that occurred in the Philippines on December 8, 1941. Taaffe and Frank argue that MacArthur was brilliant, but made several poor judgments. Like most apologists, Frank emphasizes the weakness of MacArthur's lieutenants, without emphasizing that MacArthur handpicked them, often because they never contradicted or outshone him. Taaffe seems to have trouble reconciling the real magnitude of the controversy, calling the New Guinea campaign central at one point, almost immediately after referring to it as a sideshow. Likewise, at one point he discusses the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) command as a theater of the war larger than just Douglas MacArthur, while at the same time he lumps the entire sector together with terms like "MacArthur's forces," "MacArthur's navy," and "MacArthur's troops."

Bartsch and Connaughton both spread blame liberally. This apportioned MacArthur some of the responsibility, such as when Connaughton accuses the general of being rendered "catatonic" by the news of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Both agree, however, that it was a combination of bad luck, poor judgment, and a flawed response system from the bottom to the top, and that laying the blame even primarily at MacArthur's door is incorrect.

Probably the most damning evaluations of MacArthur come, understandably, from Australians. Generally feeling under-appreciated by historians, and certainly the recipients of faint praise from the general himself, Australian forces during the war, and Australian historians and biographers since have had little positive to say about the Supreme Commander SWPA. Jack Galloway's *The Odd Couple* (2000), a dual biography of MacArthur and Australian General Thomas Blamey, is scathing regarding MacArthur's failures, claiming that as a result of the un-preparedness and consequent devastation of the Philippine air defenses on December 8, "by any measure of military competence, MacArthur deserved to be sacked in disgrace" (Galloway 2000, p. 20). Galloway goes on to further condemn the general as a shameless self-promoter, who lied to secure and advance his own interests, often at the cost of his troops and his post, and ultimately secured command of the SWPA as a result. "The general had fought the Philippine battles in the newspapers with reports of ghostly fleets sunk, ethereal generals committing hara kiri in frustration, thousands of phantom Japanese slain and victory after victory right up to his final defeat by a numerically inferior force" (pp. 116–117).

Approaching the general from a different perspective, Russell Buhite's *Douglas MacArthur* (2008) examines the general not only as a military commander, but also as a diplomat and significant character in the politics of East Asia. Borrowing from the work of Michael Schaller, in a comment with serious implications for MacArthur's

reputation, Buhite condemns the general by stating that his “regard for facts was always subordinate to his desire for self promotion” (Buhite 2008, p. 53). Even with that said, Buhite presents what is probably the most balanced overall appraisal of MacArthur.

He was, in fact, a deeply flawed personality whose behavior throughout his career, on both military and diplomatic matters, and in whatever capacity he served, clearly reflects those flaws. This is not to say he was without complexity, without intellectual talent, without insight, without some of the qualities of greatness. (p. 2)

After the capitulation of the Philippines, the fate of Australia became the focus of both Japanese and Allied efforts in the Southwest Pacific. While the Japanese did not possess the resources to invade successfully and occupy the continent, it became crucial to the safety of their Pacific empire that the Allies be denied easy access to the harbors and airfields of the northern Australian coast for use as a forward staging area. To this end, both the Americans and the Japanese focused their efforts on the communication and supply lines stretching across the Pacific from California, to Hawaii, to the islands of the South Pacific, and then on to Australia.

The first direct Japanese threat to this lifeline was the projected reduction and capture of the Australian base at Port Moresby, on the Southern Coast of New Guinea. Capture of that strategic harbor, combined with the powerful air station the Japanese were developing at Rabaul, insured dominance of the sea and skies around northern Australia. Allied convoys, operating at the extremity of their range, and without benefit of land-based aerial protection, would be subject to devastating interception. Both sides realized the gravity of the situation and it is no surprise then that the United States hazarded two-thirds of its remaining carrier forces in the Pacific on the blocking operation that came to be known as the Battle of the Coral Sea. Bruce Gamble’s *Fortress Rabaul* (2010) provides an excellent survey of the thinking and strategies of both the Japanese and the Allies related to the Southern Pacific region in the months following the Pearl Harbor attack and how the base at Rabaul became the focus of both sides.

The best available source of Japanese strategic thinking at this point, and throughout the remainder of the war comes from the diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, translated and published under the title *Fading Victory* (1991). The Battle of the Coral Sea and its indecisive outcome are fully discussed in a separate essay in this collection. What was clear after the battle, however, was that failure of naval forces to secure Port Moresby meant that the war in New Guinea would be conducted primarily on the ground from this point forward. It was also evident to Japanese military planners that the result of Japan’s far-flung successes of the first months of the war was an operational area too large for proper coverage by Japan’s available resources. Battle fronts, ranging from the Indian-Burmese border to the Aleutian Islands, proved more than the Japanese war-machine could cover. The Japanese needed to consolidate their conquests as rapidly as possible, or risk destruction in detail by the combined might of Allied arms. Yamamoto realized Japan’s vulnerability and used the knowledge to force acceptance of his Midway operation in hopes of breaking American carrier might before it could exploit Japan’s exposed perimeter.

The devastation of the Japanese primary offensive carrier forces at Midway meant that Japan would henceforth rely even more heavily on land-based aircraft and an

interwoven network of strong island positions coordinated to withstand Allied incursions. Significantly, not every island in a chain, indeed, not even every part of the islands chosen, needed to be occupied. The islands would serve as bases for airfields and supply depots. To that end, it was far more important to hold the appropriate strategic locations on certain vital islands than it was to control vast areas of terrain. In fact, in some key confrontations in the Central and Southwest Pacific, the airbases and their immediate surroundings proved to be island strongholds within the larger island terrains themselves. Nowhere was that more the case than along the northern coast of New Guinea. In addition to these island bases, however, it would also be critical for both sides to maintain a battle fleet capable of supplying and supporting these unsinkable, if also immobile, air bases.

By summer 1942, the Japanese were ready to make another attempt to capture Port Moresby, only this time the conquering force would have to approach its target overland. On July 21, a Japanese Army force under the command of Major General Tomitaro Horii undertook the capture of bases on the northern New Guinea coast, including the strategic villages of Buna and Gona, and then attempted to force a crossing of the Kokoda Trail. The trail, a footpath through the New Guinea jungle, some of the densest jungle on earth, and across the Owen Stanley Mountain range, with peaks as high as 13,000 feet, ran through forbidding terrain. A simple crossing would have been difficult enough, but carrying out a fighting advance in which all supplies and equipment had to move forward on the backs of the combat troops appeared virtually impossible. Many historians, including Japanese scholars, have written about a phenomenon suffered by the high command in Tokyo in early 1942 known as "Victory Fever." This is the euphoric sensation often accompanying rapid or extensive military successes. The Japanese military had enjoyed both rapid and extensive success during the opening months of the war with the Allies, and while the navy had suffered its share of setbacks in 1942, the army still had not been bested by the Westerners. Some historians have attributed Horii's confidence to this condition. Certainly the actual conditions of the trail and the challenges of long-range jungle warfare in such a hostile environment could not have inspired such optimism.

Australian defenders of the trail traded space for time, as they inflicted what casualties they could on the advancing Japanese, but primarily allowed for the development of air and ground support to build up at Port Moresby. The deployment of the veteran Australian divisions returned from fighting in the Middle East, in conjunction with the establishment of air superiority, proved crucial. Also aiding the Allies was the attrition suffered by the Japanese as a result of disease and insufficient supply during their assault on the defending forces. The terrain of the Kokoda Trail also contributed. These factors, in addition to stubborn Australian defense, combined to force Horii to order retreat on September 24, 1942 after having advanced to within twenty-five miles of Port Moresby. Already low on food and ammunition, and without hope of relief or reinforcement, the withdrawal became a slaughter as the veteran Australians and the forces of nature and disease combined to annihilate the Japanese force. General Horii himself became a victim of the retreat when he drowned attempting to cross a river swollen by the onset of the rainy season. The Australians, and their native porters, pursued the Japanese back across the Kokoda Trail and into their defensive perimeters along the northern coast of Papua.

Indeed, starting with the battle for the Kokoda Trail and continuing on through the entirety of the New Guinea campaign, the Allies were to enjoy one advantage that the Japanese never were able to exploit effectively; the assistance of the local population. Native New Guineans, or “Fuzzy Wuzzies” as they were dubbed by the Australians, provided invaluable aid to the Allies, who relied on native knowledge of the inland terrain and surrounding waters throughout the campaign, and were also significantly dependent on native carriers, both for moving ammunition and equipment to the front, and wounded to the rear. Along with a very good discussion of the numerous services provided to the Allies by native populations, Judith Bennett’s *Natives and Exotics* (2009) also relates that Native New Guineans formed the Pacific Islands Regiment and fought alongside the Australians in every one of their New Guinea campaigns except Milne Bay. Sean Brawley, Chris Dixon, and Beatrice Trefalt’s *Competing Voices From the Pacific* (2009) record one Australian poet’s immortalization of these efforts in a poem that concluded “May the mothers in Australia, When they offer up a prayer, Mention those impromptu Angels, With the Fuzzy Wuzzy hair” (Brawley, Dixon, and Trefalt 2009, p. 115). The Australians even created a bureaucratic agency specifically for dealing with the natives called the Australia New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). This unit was quite successful maintaining, and even improving Allied–native relations as the war progressed. Failure on the part of the Japanese to exploit even the smallest amount of anti-imperialist sentiment in New Guinea, and thereby gain the assistance of the natives, constituted a clear failure and was in no small part responsible for many of the hardships that followed.

At the same time that the Japanese were trying to force the Kokoda Trail, they attempted an amphibious approach to Port Moresby. Success hinged on the capture and development of Milne Bay on the extreme South Eastern tip of New Guinea. This time, however, the Australians arrived first and the Japanese failed to exploit their advantages in both numbers and resources. By early September, the Australians received reinforcements and successfully repulsed the Japanese while the valuable airfields at Milne Bay were completed and rushed into service. The combined efforts along the Kokoda Trail and at Milne Bay were the first battles in an impressive campaign waged by Australian forces against the Japanese over the next two years. Some of the best research on the Pacific War over the last decade and a half has covered the Australian effort in the SWPA. While all of these studies of the Australian story of the Pacific War acknowledge a debt to the earlier work of David Horner’s *High Command* (1982), Peter Brune’s *A Bastard of a Place* (2003) detailing the Australian campaign in Papua is an excellent addition to this scholarship. Also quite good for gaining the Australian perspective are John Coates’s *Bravery above Blunder* (1999), Alan Powell’s *The Third Force* (2003), and Michael McKernan’s *The Strength of a Nation* (2006).

For the remainder of 1942 and most of 1943, MacArthur relied heavily on the Australian divisions under his command to carry the war to the Japanese. Alternating with American forces, the Australians launched leap-frogging amphibious assaults, during which the Allies overran, isolated, and destroyed Japanese forces, often superior in number to themselves. And, as historians of the Australian effort are quick to point out, they did this while receiving only faint praise from SWPA headquarters; that is when MacArthur was not berating them for not making quicker progress, while remaining personally ignorant of the fighting conditions they faced.

The period between March and September 1943 was a quiet one in terms of combat operations in the Southwest Pacific theater, though it proved to be the decisive interlude of the war. As H. P. Willmott's *The Second World War in the Far East* (2004) explains, between December 1941 and March 1943, the military forces which began the war fought each other to the point of exhaustion. From the Japanese standpoint this was a critical dilemma. Their plans for victory in the war depended on a speedy conclusion and negotiated settlement. They had failed to achieve both. During these crucial six months in mid-1943, which witnessed relatively little fighting, the Japanese lost the war. Allied reinforcements and innovations introduced into the Pacific during the summer 1943 proved to be the decisive factors for victory. Nowhere is this reality more clear than in naval and air power. But also, in terms of logistical services and material abundance, when the fighting resumed in earnest in the fall, it was more a question of when rather than if the Allies would prevail in the Pacific. This is not to say that the bulk of the fighting was over. Indeed, just the opposite was true. As the Japanese moved from an offensive posture to one of defense, they dug in, reinforced their holdings, and attempted to exact as heavy a price as possible from the advancing Allies.

When major combat actions resumed in the fall 1943, the Allies enjoyed superiority in all categories of the conflict. At sea, new aircraft carriers replaced those lost in earlier fighting along with whole new classes of carriers. Similarly, the battleships lost at Pearl Harbor had been more than made up for in repair and replacement ships. Along with these were new cruisers and destroyers, brand new classes of amphibious assault vessels, and an armada of supply ships carrying the bounty of American industry across both the Atlantic and the Pacific that supplied Allied efforts across the globe. In the air, new classes of fighter and bomber planes rolled off the assembly lines at Grumman, North American, Boeing, and Douglas, producing aircraft designed to destroy the Axis air forces and deliver the war to the enemy's homeland. The story of this wartime production and its impact is related in numerous volumes, but for the Southwest Pacific theater in particular see Bergerud's *Fire in the Sky* (Bergerud 2000) and William and Sandra McGee's *Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII* (2009) discussions of air and sea innovation and operations. Also, in addition to this storm of steel must be added the millions of uniformed soldiers now available to Allied commanders.

Utilizing this material abundance to greatest effect proved another challenge to Allied strategy in the Pacific. The divided command, created at the war's outset, meant that two separate forces were contending for the resources allocated to what had been determined by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill to be the theater of second priority in the war. And while Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King had been successful at maintaining a steady flow of shipping and personnel for the naval effort in the Central and South Pacific, MacArthur never ceased complaining that his command was constantly given short shrift. Now, however, both forces would be receiving reinforcements and supplies at a rate that Japan could not have delivered to its own army and navy even at the height of its power. And while MacArthur and Nimitz rarely took special pains to coordinate their campaigns, the result of simultaneous drives through the Central and Southwest Pacific would be to deny the Japanese the ability to concentrate their energies against either arm of the Allied advance. Consequently, Japan would never again enjoy a numerical advantage either on land or at sea, and would suffer piecemeal destruction.

The Allied advance through the Central and South Pacific as initially envisioned was a mirror image of the Japanese conquest of that region during the first months of the Pacific War. Peripheral outposts were to be eliminated or isolated en route to assaulting the major advance bases Japan had established at Truk and Rabaul. Using combined air, sea, and ground forces, the Allied commanders intended to overwhelm and capture these bases. After these strongholds were reduced, the Allies would establish their own forward bases to launch coordinated attacks ultimately aimed at assaulting the Japanese home islands. The first iteration of this strategy was Operation Cartwheel, which was to include amphibious assaults against the islands of the Solomon group as well as capture of the Japanese bases along the northern coast of Papua in preparation for the destruction of the Japanese ground and air bases at Rabaul on the neighboring island of New Britain. Both the struggle for Guadalcanal and the fighting on New Guinea along the Kokoda Trail and at Milne Bay laid the groundwork for that strategy.

Although technically within the mandate of SWPA until late 1943, MacArthur delegated the planning and execution of the Cartwheel advance through the Solomon chain to the navy. Admiral William Halsey was in overall command of the naval and marine forces tasked with reducing the Japanese bases in the Solomons. Halsey and MacArthur's relationship was one of mutual respect, and the general mostly allowed the Admiral to get on with the campaign without interference. As the bulk of the equipment and personnel involved in that theater belonged to the navy and Marine Corps, MacArthur's hands-off approach proved a wise decision and prevented potentially distracting interservice squabbles.

Aside from a few popular titles, the combat in New Guinea during the period between November 1942 and November 1943 has witnessed little meaningful scholarship on the part of American historians. Not surprisingly though, this is not the case in Australia, as the bulk of the ground fighting during this crucial year of the war was accomplished by the "Diggers." The Australian divisions returned from duty in North Africa to be deployed directly into some of the densest jungles on the planet. Their training and discipline proved crucial in the Allied advance in Papua. While American units like the 32nd and 41st divisions received hard lessons and vital experience in jungle combat, which made them excellent fighting units later in the war, the Australians provided seasoned troops in critical situations time after time during those crucial first months.

The failure of the overland route to Port Moresby served to reinforce in the minds of the Japanese the importance of Buna and Gona. The Japanese took advantage of the density of the jungle, surrounding swamps and general impassability of the local terrain to develop a network of strong, mutually supporting, inland-facing defenses. The Australians were tasked with taking Gona while the Americans focused on Buna. When Major General Edwin F. Harding, ground commander of the American 32nd and 41st divisions, asked for artillery or a supporting naval bombardment, he was informed that the coastal waters were too dangerous and no ships were available anyway, and in this theater "the artillery flies." While both statements were essentially true, officers on the ground and many historians since have pointed out that even a modest bombardment or the presence of some field artillery would have done much to reduce the Japanese positions before the infantry was engaged. As it was, conditions kept the flying artillery grounded far too often and the frontal assaults launched by

the infantry without heavy weapons against the fortified Japanese positions resulted in substantial losses. Allied efforts to capture the villages began in November, and the Australians were able to capture Gona in December and then aid the Americans in capturing Buna and the nearby village of Sanananda in January. In the meantime, MacArthur, unhappy with Harding for failing to advance aggressively enough, replaced him at the end of November with Major General Robert Eichelberger.

Part of the difficulty faced by the units assaulting Buna and Gona was faulty intelligence. MacArthur's intelligence team, under the command of one of his so-called "Bataan Gang," Brigadier General Charles Willoughby, estimated that Buna and Gona were only held by 1,500–2,000 troops in hastily prepared field entrenchments, and that there would be little attempt on the defenders' part to make a strong stand. The Allies also suffered from a lack of proper maps and detailed information about the surrounding terrain. Poorly interpreted intelligence and lack of detailed maps continued to plague SWPA throughout the Papua/New Guinea operations.

As would be the case with nearly every island and stronghold captured in the Pacific, even before the combat ceased, military engineers were securing, improving, and developing new airbases. In fact, in nearly every Allied operation, the airfields were the primary targets of the opening stages of each offensive. In this regard, the Allies proved far more adept at coordination of resources than the Japanese ever managed. The efforts of the engineer battalions along with the improvement of MacArthur's air forces, known as the Fifth Air Force, commanded by General George Kenney, systematically worked to reduce and eventually eliminate Japanese air superiority in the SWPA by fall 1943. Lex McAulay's *MacArthur's Eagles* (2005) provides a good, if rather narrow, study of the accomplishments of Fifth Air Force, especially in the final reduction of the Japanese air threat in the South Pacific as a result of the raids of late 1943 and early 1944. For a more complete examination of both the general and the Fifth Air Force though, see Thomas Griffith's *MacArthur's Airman* (1998).

The fighting around Gona and Buna taught the Allies other lessons as well, especially concerning the microbial dangers of the equatorial jungle. Attrition of the ranks due to illness was a major concern for all of the forces involved in New Guinea. Along with the malaria that was endemic to the area, soldiers also suffered from tropical dysentery, dengue fever, scrub typhus, jungle rot, and fungal infections. The bites of mosquitoes and mites plagued all of the combatants and led to casualty rates of over 100 percent for many units, as soldiers were admitted repeatedly for recurring bouts of malaria, fever, and typhus. Jungle rot produced open sores between the legs and in the armpits of soldiers, sometimes exposing both flesh and bone and occasionally requiring amputation. Exposure to the numerous bodies of standing water could also result in fungal infections in soldiers, which caused a great deal of discomfort and could destroy the eardrum. Of these conditions though, by far the most pervasive and debilitating was malaria. Once contracted, the disease could not be cured and could only be contained. The preferred treatment for malaria was quinine, but after Japanese forces overran Java, the natural source of that substance was no longer available to the Allies. As a substitute, Atabrine was developed. However, soldiers hated the Atabrine and often avoided taking it as side effects included a horrible taste and a yellow shading of the skin. Preventative measures, including aerial spraying of potential combat areas with DDT, eventually brought the occurrence of disease within tolerable levels,

though existence in the jungles was never pleasant. Additionally, all of these maladies must be considered along with the psychological strain and disability produced by jungle combat. For a good, concise discussion of the challenge of disease, both physical and mental, in the Pacific, see Bennett's *Natives and Exotics* (2009) and William Bruce Johnson's *The Pacific Campaign in World War II* (2006). However, the most descriptive source for information on the diseases of the Southwest Pacific theater is often soldiers' memoirs. The stories related by the actual combatants, often recalled from the distance of fifty to sixty years after the events, are shocking. Memoirs like Francis Catanzaro's *With the 41st Division in the Southwest Pacific* (2002) relate tales of returning to combat as the walking wounded, often still suffering from open sores, infections, and even temperatures running as high as 103 degrees (39.4°C). The only respite for weary soldiers was often the only marginally more livable rear areas carved out of the jungle, such as the coastal supply depots, airstrips, and support facilities built by the ubiquitous Seabees.

The experiences of Gona and Buna also reinforced in American commanders the preference to expend firepower instead of lives. Tanks and field artillery, only added to the combat zone near the end of these first operations, became a fundamental element of every subsequent encounter. New weapons systems were also developed or expanded, including the development of the .30 caliber carbine, a lighter weight firearm for the infantry, flamethrowers, for use against bunkers, and napalm, dropped by air. Also, though never to the extent that MacArthur wanted, naval support came to play a greater role in the amphibious campaigns that followed. Finally, interdiction of Japanese supply lines became a top priority for SWPA command, especially Fifth Air Force.

Like the Japanese, Allied plans for controlling New Guinea focused primarily on the coastal regions. Port Moresby, Milne Bay, Gona and Buna were all located along the fringes of the island. And while the interior jungle fighting along the Kokoda Trail had been a significant element of the opening hostilities, the trail itself was not the objective, but rather the bases at its northern and southern termini. A significant exception to this coastal concentration rule was the village of Wau in the interior of Papua north and west of Buna. The Australians held the tiny outpost from the war's outset and not only fought a creative and desperate action during January 1943 to hold the position, but also successfully developed an airbase there which, when combined with the growing air strength at Port Moresby and Milne Bay, provided a vital staging point north of the Owen Stanley Mountains for anticipated operations against Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen.

The Japanese abandonment of Guadalcanal, along with their defeats at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda, combined with a devastating blow at sea to cause the Japanese high command to reconsider the value of continued reinforcement of the theater. Between March 2 and 5, an attack group containing Australian piloted Bristol Beaufighters, along with P-38s, A-20s, B-17s, and B-25s from the Fifth Air Force, engaged a convoy of eight destroyers and eight transports filled with reinforcements and supplies headed to Lae from Rabaul. The resulting action demonstrated how much the scales had tipped in the Allies' favor in the waters surrounding New Guinea. The P-38s, modified with extra drop fuel tanks for enhanced fighting range, proved more than a match for the protective screen of Zeros accompanying the flotilla. The resultant absence of a fighter screen allowed the bombers free access to the Japanese

ships. The Beaufighters, sporting enhanced nose armaments designed specifically to deliver deadly strafing attacks, raked the convoy, while the A-20s, B-17s, and B-25s joined in the strafing, but also employed a new attack technique called “skip-bombing,” in which high speed, low flying bombers literally skipped their bomb load across the water like stones into the hulls of enemy ships. The combined attack, known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, resulted in the destruction of the entire convoy, including 15,000 troops as well as more than thirty aircraft. The cost to the Allies was one bomber and three fighters. Daytime domination of the skies by Allied aircraft, in conjunction with nighttime torpedo operations by PT boats, meant that by summer 1943 supplying or reinforcing the Japanese troops in New Guinea was no longer a practical consideration.

The next Japanese strong points along the coast of Papua were the villages of Salamaua, Lae, and Finschhafen. During August, the Japanese had reinforced Salamaua and brought its troop strength to over 8,000 men. Though MacArthur’s intelligence did not report that many troops, the decision was made to bypass the obvious target and land behind it at the village of Lae instead. Once again, the Australians would make up the bulk of the landing forces with elements of the American 32nd and 41st divisions also participating. The Allies landed at Lae on September 2 and caught the Japanese almost completely unprepared. The surprise was so total and the resulting isolation of Salamaua so effective, that the Japanese quit their positions around that village and began an overland retreat to Finschhafen. Most of the Japanese eluded the Allies and were able to take up defensive positions around an area called the Sattleberg. The Australian 9th division, approaching both overland through the Markham Valley and by amphibious landing, caught the Japanese in a pincer and in a series of very costly battles, admirably recounted by Brune and McKernan, between September 22 and October 1 defeated and drove the defenders from their positions. Once again, the Japanese attempted an overland retreat, this time with disastrous results, as most of the force died due to starvation or disease. However, the Allied capture and rapid improvement of the airbases around these three villages placed the Fifth Air Force in a position to support the final drive to isolate and neutralize Rabaul.

The combination of Allied successes on the battlefields of New Guinea and Halsey’s “island hopping” in the Solomon Islands, in conjunction with the full mobilization of American industrial production and innovation at home, worked to transform the Southwest Pacific conflict during the summer and fall 1943. As Willmott (1983) and Bergerud (1997) have pointed out, increased numbers and varieties of aircraft, along with spare parts and repair facilities, meant that SWPA enjoyed air superiority from this point on in the war. American ship production allowed for SWPA to acquire its own fleet, albeit one without aircraft carriers, in order to provide material support and crucial firepower for future operations. By the end of 1943, the newly christened Seventh Fleet under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, VII Amphibious force under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, the Sixth Army under General Walter Krueger, along with Kenney’s Fifth Air Force combined to outclass and outnumber the Japanese in every category.

This changed materiel situation in the Pacific brought about strategy changes as well. As late as July 1943, MacArthur was still calling for not only the isolation, but also an assault upon and reduction of, Rabaul. At that time, the general was planning

for an invasion of the Philippines to begin in the spring 1945 as the last rung in the ladder of victories leading eventually to the Japanese home islands themselves. Nimitz's proposed 1944 Central Pacific drive altered those plans. Nimitz was preparing to assault the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Island chains in late 1943 and 1944, as well as pushing for a navy-based plan that called for an invasion of Formosa as the final staging area for the assault on the Japanese home islands; he would bypass the Philippines almost completely. The first step in that planning was the isolation, but not reduction of Rabaul, and then the neutralization of Truk Harbor through aircraft carrier based aerial attack. All of this was to be accomplished on a much shorter time schedule than that currently envisioned by SWPA. The final confirmation of this threat to MacArthur's plans came at the Quadrant conference in August 1943, where it was decided that Rabaul could be safely isolated and bypassed.

Summer 1943 also witnessed the emergence of a truly effective American submarine force. The improvement of submarines, and especially the development of reliable firing mechanisms for American torpedoes, resulted in the destruction of substantial numbers of Japanese merchant ships. The Allied submarine effort based in Perth, Freemantle, and Honolulu had only enjoyed modest success to that point of the war. The story of American submarines in Australia and the Southwest Pacific, as related in David Jones and Peter Nunan's *US Subs Down Under* (2005) is one of trial and error, and eventual stunning success. During 1943, Allied submarines accounted for over one million tons of Japanese shipping, a figure that would grow dramatically during the final eighteen months of the war. The already over-stretched and under-supplied Japanese empire of the Central and South Pacific could not overcome or replace losses of that magnitude. But it was not just the soldiers in the field who suffered. If Japanese merchantmen could not supply the frontline troops, neither could they bring the resources of the empire back to the factories of Japan. Hardship and deprivation became the common lot of both Japanese soldier and civilian as the war progressed.

As 1944 opened, MacArthur increased the pace of the New Guinea campaign. The addition of the 1st Marine Division and the 112th Cavalry, along with several other units, meant that MacArthur could rely exclusively on American units to conduct future ground assaults. Indeed, it is ironic that MacArthur, who always complained at the navy's unwillingness to place naval units under his command, had always refrained from placing American Army units under Australian command. Though officially commander of ground operations, and MacArthur's Australian adjutant, General Thomas Blamey rarely commanded American units in combat. Initially, due to the lack of available American units, but later through the development of Alamo Force, a special command under General Krueger, and then with the creation of Sixth Army, MacArthur had always kept the Americans separate from the Australian forces. Now, MacArthur would leave the Australians behind to secure the remaining Japanese positions on New Guinea and in the Dutch East Indies, while he pressed on with the isolation of Rabaul and opened the approaches to the Philippines.

The final encirclement of Rabaul was accomplished between December 1943 and April 1944. In January, American marine and cavalry units seized Arawe and Cape Gloucester on the western edge of New Britain opposite the Japanese base on the island's northeastern tip. Massive air raids on Rabaul in October, November, and February, as described by MacAuley, resulted in the loss of hundreds of irreplaceable Japanese aircraft, thus neutralizing the base as a threat to further Allied operations.

American capture of the Admiralty Islands, northwest of New Britain, followed in March. And in one of the most impressive displays of deception and isolation of a major Japanese force, Sixth Army forces captured five hundred miles of New Guinea coastline by seizing Hollandia in April. A massive campaign of deception, in conjunction with faulty assumptions on the part of the Japanese about the capabilities of American aircraft, combined to convince the defenders that the main strike would come at Wewak, halfway between Finschhafen and Hollandia. However, long-range American fighters and bombers devastated the Japanese air defenses at Hollandia, and then with the help of two loaned aircraft carriers from Nimitz's force, MacArthur affected the landing of a major ground force several hundred miles to the rear of the dug-in Japanese at Wewak.

Significant fighting remained ahead of the Allied forces on New Guinea, but MacArthur now rushed to meet an October deadline for beginning the liberation of the Philippines. Krueger and Barbey often found themselves with multiple campaigns under way at the same time. Many troops, and some commanders, complained that MacArthur declared major combat operations completed prematurely and often removed vital forces too quickly. This was definitely the case during the Wakde and Biak campaigns of May 1944. Once again, relying on faulty intelligence, invasion and combat were initiated without overwhelming superiority. At both Wakde and Biak, Japanese forces had chosen to forgo contesting the beachhead and instead built up substantial inland defenses. The combined effect of underestimation of enemy strength and overly optimistic announcements of completed operations left the troops on the ground facing significant opposition without adequate support. While Wakde fell relatively quickly after the Americans arrived, fighting on Biak dragged on into late June. The troops at Biak were forced to fight without substantial reinforcement and sufficient naval and air support because MacArthur had already initiated operations on the island of Noemfoor and near Sansapor on the Vogelkop region of New Guinea in early June. The fighting at Biak resulted in some of the heaviest American casualties of the New Guinea campaign.

The successful conclusion of these campaigns by late August meant that MacArthur was ready to coordinate operations with Nimitz and lead an assault on the Philippines in October. However, MacArthur and the Sixth Army's departure from the Southwest Pacific in October did not represent the end of combat operations in the theater. Australian forces continued to clean out pockets of Japanese resistance in New Guinea and opened up new campaigns in the Dutch East Indies. More so even than the rest of the Southwest Pacific campaign, this is the forgotten combat of the war. As Allied forces continued their advance toward the home islands of Japan, and places like Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa drew the public's attention, Australian forces continued to fight in the isolated and bypassed sectors of the war. Australian forces successfully conducted a campaign in Borneo. Fighting between May 1 and July 21, 1945 destroyed the remaining Japanese forces on that island, liberated several prisoner of war camps, and secured the strategic oil fields and refineries at Balikpapan.

The campaigns in Papua and New Guinea never received the high profile attention of other, more famous venues of the Pacific War. There was little that was either romantic or glamorous about the hard fought, disease ridden, filthy, infantry combat that took place on that jungle covered island. Neither the command structures in Tokyo nor in Washington ever placed the Southwest Pacific at the top of their priorities

or planning. Obviously though, this was not the case in Canberra, and Australian's outrage at the neglect of their countrymen's contribution to the victory in the Pacific War is understandable, as is the focus of their historians' studies on the Papuan campaign. However, the fact remains that it was the Japanese, who by choosing Guadalcanal and not Port Moresby as the focus of their life-and-death struggle in the South Pacific, and Saipan and not Rabaul as the base that justified risking the heart of their Pacific Fleet, who relegated the Southwest Pacific theater of the war to a secondary front. Just as it was an Allied decision to defeat Hitler first and therefore treat the European theater of the war as primary, which relegated the entire Pacific campaign to secondary status. The battles that changed the course of the war, aside from the Solomons, which SWPA only oversaw in the most remote fashion, were those fought in the Central Pacific and closer to Japan's home islands. MacArthur himself seemed to recognize this fact when he abbreviated the combat on New Guinea in his rush to return to the Philippines, and thereby involve himself in the decisive campaigns of the final stages of the war. None of this, however, detracts from the tremendous suffering and sacrifices made by those Japanese, Australian, American, and native forces who fought both nature and one another in the jungles of the Southwest Pacific from 1941 to 1945.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

The Military Occupations of World War II: A Historiography

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

In June 2005, Conrad Crane, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel with a PhD in history from Stanford University, published an article in *Military Review*, a professional military publication, entitled: “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won.” Phase IV is military jargon for an occupation. Crane stated, “National objectives can often only be accomplished after the fighting ends; a war tactically and operationally won can still lead to a strategic defeat if transition operations are poorly planned or executed” (Crane 2005, p. 28). If war is about creating a better peace, if only from the perspective of the victor, then military occupations play a key role in determining the final political outcome of a conflict. A review of the literature about the occupations that followed combat operations in the Pacific theater of World War II makes it clear that these periods are vital to understanding the political impact and historical meaning of this conflict.

Although most people think of the Allied occupation of Japan that started in 1945 and ended in 1952 when they think of occupation and World War II in the Pacific, the fact of the matter is that the Japanese ran several occupations during the war itself. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, American scholars Willard H. Elsbree and Harry J. Benda studied these events and developed the transformation thesis, which focused primarily on the domestic histories of the various nations of Southeast Asia that the Japanese occupied. Elsbree and Benda argue that Japanese rule gave the region a coherence it had never enjoyed before, energized a new cast of leaders, and accelerated nationalism in the various occupied nations (Elsbree 1953; Benda 1955, 1956, 1958, 1965a, 1965b). Alfred W. McCoy, one of Benda’s former students, organized a conference to test this thesis. The results were mixed. Five of nine chapters in the resulting anthology, *Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation*, rejected central elements of the Elsbree–Benda position. The authors of essays on Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Burma, Thailand, and even McCoy in his contribution on the Philippines, show that the leadership class of these nations essentially remained the same after the

war as it had been before the war. Essays on Indonesia and Malaya, however, support the Elsbree–Benda transformation thesis (McCoy 1980).

These political studies, although very good, showed little concern about the military occupations themselves. This emphasis began to change in the 1980s and 1990s. The proceedings of an international conference published as *Japan in Asia, 1942–1945*, show that local concerns and issues of specific bureaucracies of the Japanese government and military came to dominate the decision-making process rather than what was in the best interests of the Japanese war effort (Newell 1981). Another conference focusing on what is now termed “public diplomacy” came to similar conclusions. In *Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during World War II*, a collection of essays on Japanese information operations in the newly conquered territories, the authors make it clear that Japan was ill prepared for its new acquisitions. This becomes evident in the chapters on Indonesia, Java, Thailand, Malaya and Singapore, and the Philippines. There were several reasons for this failure, but major ones include a lack of planning, little experience, and limited understanding of the customs and languages in the region (Goodman 1991). The eight contributors to the Paul H. Kratoska edited anthology, *Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia: Studies in the Economies of East and South-East Asia*, show that the Japanese were not prepared to govern their newly conquered territory. Essays that focus on Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaya show that Japanese administrative bungling lead to famine despite ample production in other parts of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (Kratoska 1999). In *A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia 1941–1945*, Nicholas Tarling has a broader focus but comes to similar conclusions. Tarling makes it clear that the Japanese did little prewar planning for their occupations and were caught between two conflicting impulses: the desire to present themselves as liberators from European colonialism, while at the same time controlling the region for the benefit of Japan (Tarling 2001). Both of these interpretations are kind compared to the collective view that emerges from another Kratoska edited anthology, *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories*. These essays cover the entire range of the empire from Manchuria in the north to Burma in the south. They also include issues like “comfort women” that worked in military run brothels. After reading this book it is difficult to take any view other than that the human capital of the new empire counted for little in Tokyo (Kratoska 2005).

The first detailed study of Malay came in 1983 with Cheah Boon Kheng’s book. Kheng is primarily interested in studying the impact of the occupation on Malaya, and only eighty of his three hundred pages focus on military administration. His study ratifies the Elsbree–Benda argument. The Japanese provided the first coherent government for the nation, and relied on Malays far more than the British had, which opened up opportunities for younger individuals. Not all was good, though. “The greatest overall change produced by the Japanese administration was in the area of race relations. Although the Japanese did not deliberately foster racial conflict between Malays and Chinese, their policies had this effect” (Kheng 1983, p. 55).

The Kratoska edited anthology, *Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation*, challenges that view. The occupation did not remove the prewar leadership, but it did create significant new divisions within an already divided nation along the lines of religious conviction among Muslims and immigrant status among

the Chinese. The essays in this volume draw upon Japanese, Chinese, and Malaysian sources and show that the Japanese victory over the British went wrong during the Phase IV operations that followed (Kratoska 1995). Kratoska then offered a detailed study of Malaysian economics and politics of his own that went further. Drawing upon a wide range of Malaysian, British, and Japanese sources, he takes a different view. He argues that Japanese pursued occupation policies that were inadequate and poorly conceived. The region was an economic drain to the Japanese and the occupation was more important in denying resources to the Americans and the British rather than being an asset to the Japanese Empire. He also argues that the Japanese presence had little long-term impact on Malaysia's development (Kratoska 1997).

Another British territory that the Japanese captured was Hong Kong and that colony saw little study until Philip Snow produced *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation*. Snow shows how officials of the two imperial powers worked together to maintain order in the colony after the transfer of power. The British police stayed on duty in the early days of the occupation before the Japanese had the manpower to establish their own authority. The Japanese conducted scant administrative planning to deal with problems after the military victory and electrical power and public utilities remained inoperative afterwards. This confusion did little to endear the Japanese to their new subjects. By the standards of the Imperial Army, the Japanese ruled with a light touch during their first year and a half in power. As the occupation continued, however, Japanese officials began to plunder the colony for all it was worth, using progressively harsher tactics to suppress resistance to their rule (Snow 2003).

The occupation of the Philippines is the Japanese occupation that historians have examined the most. Much of this early scholarship focused on issues of resistance and collaboration. Elmer Lear offered the first full-length history of the Japanese occupation. A soldier in the US Army that reconquered the archipelago, he conducted many interviews with leading Filipino officials. There was resistance, but there was collaboration as well. The rebels were quite successful and Japanese administration in the Philippines existed only in the major cities and towns despite efforts to project power into the countryside (Lear 1961). Resistance to Japanese rule was widespread and even extended into education (Lear 1967). A. V. H. Hartendorp's study is less than comprehensive, despite its title – *The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines*. Hartendorp spent most of the war at the Santo Tomas Internment Camp in Manila. The majority of his coverage focuses on the events behind the wire and his bitterness toward the Japanese is still evident some twenty years later (Hartendorp 1967). David Steinberg offers a more nuanced view. He finds that the extent of collaboration varied, but the leadership class agreed to work with the Japanese because it was in their own interests and because they thought cooperation would best serve the nation (Steinberg 1967). Despite its name, Theodore Friend's *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929–1946* has little to do with the Japanese occupation. It is primarily a study of relations between the United States and the Philippines, and the question of independence (Friend 1965). The Japanese used brutal tactics when there was resistance, but Maria Felisa A. Syjuco says little beyond that simple fact (Syjuco 1989).

Scholarship on the Japanese presence in the Philippines began to change in the early 1990s. Scholars began examining issues other than collaboration or resistance, although these topics did not disappear. In the captured territories, Japan made a wise decision

to pursue a policy of agricultural self-sufficiency. Japan itself imported food before the war, so the policy was in the best interests of both occupied and occupier, but the war got in the way. Francis K. Danquah shows that insurgent attacks on the transportation system on the islands and a lack of merchant ships made it impossible to take advantage of the massive agricultural resources of the Philippines (Danquah 1990).

A group of Filipino and Japanese historians formed the Forum for the Survey of Records Concerning the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. Their focus on issues of governance and policy formulation put Japanese officials at the forefront of the story. Originally published in Japanese in 1994, the anthology, *The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction*, appeared in English in 1999. The chapters in this study examine mining, cotton production, rice production, religion, and the experiences of Japanese expatriates living in the Philippines. In addition, the members of the Forum included a long guide at the end of the book on the location of material in Japan, the Philippines, the United States, and Australia related to the Japanese occupation (Ikehata and Jose 1999).

In Java, the experience of occupation was different than what the Filipinos experienced. There was a greater willingness to work with the Japanese. Benda sees the Japanese occupation being innovative and largely successful through a divide and conquer approach. Japan's rule was also less harsh than what transpired in the Philippines, although that is a relative description (Benda 1958). Benda dominated early views of this region, but that dominance began to fade in the 1980s. In *The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan against the West in Java and Luzon*, Theodore Friend used multilingual, multinational sources and an interdisciplinary approach to offer a comparative approach to the Japanese occupations. Friend argues the subject peoples shaped the occupations as much or more than the conquerors. The Indonesians were eager to be rid of their Dutch masters and worked with the Japanese, while the Filipinos already enjoyed a good deal of self-governance under the Americans and saw little new in the Japanese (Friend 1988).

Shigeru Sato's book on the occupation of Java points the blame at both incompetent Japanese and Indonesian administrators. Although the wartime occupation is remembered for famine and forced labor, very little rice and few laborers ended up in Japan. The Japanese, he argues, had a positive political agenda for the region, but were not prepared to govern alien territory and turned to Indonesians who simply were not capable or interested in looking out for the welfare of the public. Political rivalries and preparation for postwar independence were more important. These factors combined with war profiteering and a breakdown in the transportation system led to famine (Sato 1994).

While these military occupations are important, the best-known and most significant Phase IV operation of them all was the Allied occupation of Japan. The literature is vast and multilingual, but the most important works have appeared in either English or Japanese. The major themes that emerged from this literature was a dominate focus on the United States, the influence of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and a view of the occupation as exportation of the New Deal, which represented a dramatic break in Japanese history. Introductions to this period are plentiful. Robert E. Ward and Frank Joseph Shulman's bibliographic guide, *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952*, is the first place students should begin. This book covers not only work in English, but also those published in other European languages. With

organizational charts, annotations, and a list of key figures in the occupation, it is more than a bibliography. In short, the reader will learn a great deal about the occupation itself in addition to the literature on the field (Ward and Shulman 1974). For readers looking for an introduction to the basic facts, there are several places to start. Two important essays are Makoto Iokibe and Herbert Passin's contributions to *Showa: The Japan of Hirohito* (Iokibe 1992; Passin 1992). John Curtis Perry's *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* is exactly what its title suggests (Perry 1980).

As impressive as the English-language literature is, the amount in Japanese is even more extensive than what has appeared in English. The Japanese-language counterpart to the Ward and Shulman guide is *Nihon Senryo Bunken Mokuroku* [A bibliography of the Allied occupation of Japan] (Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai 1972). Eiji Takemae's *GHQ* is a short introduction to this era for the Japanese-language reading public (Takemae 1983).

Scholarship on the occupation changed in the 1970s. Until this time, work on the occupation had been dominated by scholars who had been in Japan during that seven-year period and wrote accounts that were a blend of memoir and academic study (Dingman 2009). As a new generation of scholars moved to the forefront, Old Dominion University and the MacArthur Memorial, the museum and archive that holds MacArthur's papers, sponsored eight conferences between 1974 and 1991 in Norfolk, Virginia. At each of these meetings, individuals from a number of different fields explored specific aspects of the occupation (education, economics, art, etc.) and the published proceedings are useful tools for assessing scholarship on this period. These conferences drew scholars from both Japan and the United States with a small smattering from other nations, primarily the United Kingdom (MacArthur Memorial 1976; Redford 1977, 1980; Burkman 1982).

At the same time, Japanese historians began producing numerous studies on the occupation. These scholars formed a scholarly organization, the Senryoshi Kenkyukai [Japanese association for the study of the history of the occupation] that holds annual conferences with participants from foreign nations. Work on this era focused on US–Japanese relations and the policy development process inside the US government. The result was that for the first time since the establishment of US diplomatic history as a field of historical inquiry, the best work in a particular topic was being done by foreign scholars in a language other than English. In a number of different publications, Iokibe argues that a series of issues – including bureaucratic divisions within the US government, domestic politics, and Americans understanding of the recent past – shaped basic US policy aims (Iokibe 1975, 1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1985). Marlene J. Mayo comes to similar conclusions (Mayo 1980, 1984). Howard B. Schonberger's views are slightly different. He sees the occupation as highly contingent on personality and that domestic politics and lobby groups were more influential than MacArthur or the Washington bureaucracy (Schonberger 1989).

Many historians saw the occupation fitting into larger patterns in US foreign policy. They view the occupation as part of the cold war and argue that factors external to Japan were major drivers of policy. Igarashi was an early pioneer in this regard (1976a, 1976b, 1981). Akira Yamagiwa (1976) and Schaller (1985) came to similar conclusions about the occupation.

One of the first projects the US military performed in Japan was to demilitarize their former foe. This effort was a serious one and in an immediate sense required the

destruction of war material and the demobilization of Japanese soldiers and sailors (Smith 1997). In a more long-term sense, demilitarization was a major theme of the entire occupation. Meirion and Susie Harries argue that the political efforts to demilitarize Japan was a major focus of the occupation and involved issues other than the immediate demobilization and disarmament of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Demilitarizing efforts included purging prewar leaders, reforming education and religion, the rewriting of the constitution, and the holding of the Tokyo war crimes trials. Meirion and Susie Harries believe this effort was largely successful despite other impulses to rebuild Japan as an asset in the cold war (Harries and Harries 1987). Ronald H. Spector shows that the collapse of Japanese imperial power in East Asia did not usher in an era of peace and stability. Instead it raised important questions about who would govern these many nations, and there were many claimants to power who were more than willing to use force to assert their authority (Spector 2007). While the occupation is generally seen as a peaceful period in both the English- and Japanese-language literature, it could easily have turned out differently as Ikuhiko Hata (1984) makes clear. Both the army and navy were planning to initiate insurgencies against the occupation. The trip wire was a move against the emperor.

As a result, one of the most important issues in the planning process was the fate of Emperor Hirohito. Robert E. Ward devotes significant attention to wartime planning, including what to do about the monarch and the monarchy (Ward 1981, 1984). Nakamura (1989) examines the activities of Joseph C. Grew on the fate of the emperor. Grew had served as US ambassador to Japan for 10 years prior to World War II and after returning to the United States served as director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, and then toward the end of the conflict was the undersecretary of state, the number two position in the State Department. Grew believed that the monarchy should be preserved for postwar stability. The ambassador made a distinction between the monarch and the monarchy. While he thought Hirohito was a decent man, he assumed he would have to take responsibility for a war he had opposed and abdicate. Nakamura's evidence shows Grew's influence in 1945, but extending it into the constitution revision process is another story (Nakamura 1989). Hal Brands confirms that MacArthur was not the key player in this drama: "MacArthur played a role in this process, at times, an important one, but his actions were not so influential or unexpected as many have come to believe" (Brands 2006, p. 305).

The fate and status of the monarch and monarchy were closely tied to legal and constitutional reform in Japan. These topics were the focus of one of the first Norfolk conferences (Redford 1977). Much of the literature has been trying to determine authorship of the new constitution and Article Nine, which demilitarized Japan. Hata has argued that the article was the joint creation of Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara and MacArthur (Hata 1976). Tanaka (1979) also sees Shidehara and MacArthur working together to create this section, although his exact sequence is different than Hata's.

Shoichi Koseki's (1997) study moved the discussion away from Article Nine. Originally published in Japanese in 1989, he approaches the constitution from a cultural view. He recognizes that since the ancient Greeks created the political concept of democracy various peoples have had very different views of what it was and was not. Koseki looks at how Japanese leaders tried to take American ideas of democracy and

explain them to the public. He contends the document is a “mosaic” that draws from several different legal traditions (Koseki 1997, pp. 3–4).

Kyoko Inoue (1991) offers a significantly different approach and a unique interpretation with *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*. Her book is a linguistic study, but it adds a good deal to the historical debate. Inoue shows that the constitution was a Japanese document, not simply a translation of an English-language original, and that there was a good deal of give and take between its American and Japanese authors. As a result, concepts such as sovereignty and democracy were muted in the Japanese version because of verb conjugation and word selection (Inoue 1991).

Tetsuya Kataoka (1991) offers a much different view. Looking at the same historical material, he advances a right-wing nationalistic critique of the document. He attributes the constitution to Douglas MacArthur: “he wrote the constitution but assiduously maintained the fiction that the Japanese choose it of their own free will” (Kataoka 1991, p. 8).

Ray A. Moore, who translated Koseki's book into English, and Donald L. Robinson make a different argument in a book of their own. They contend that there was a partnership between American and Japanese officials in the writing of the new constitution. MacArthur had faced some resistance in Tokyo, but he was far more afraid of interference from Washington and that he might lose control of political reforms. As a result, he ordered his staff to draft a model constitution and then pretend it was a Japanese-initiated effort. Many Japanese politicians wanted to implement political change and were willing to cooperate with MacArthur's staff in order to implement this new constitutional order (Moore and Robinson 2002).

Japanese politics was another issue of fundamental importance. Even though this topic was crucial importance to outcome of the occupation of Japan, it was one in which historians of Japan dominated. Eiji Takemae's (1970) account of US labor policy is an extremely broad study that examines the entire occupation. Takemae shows that US officials expected a political neutral labor movement, while Japanese union leaders expected to be more like their European counterparts. Junnosuke Masumi's (1985) *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945–1955* is an important study that looks at not only the occupation, but the years before the founding of the Liberal Democratic Party. Before the creation of this center-right political party there was a real possibility that the socialist alternative to the center-right political order would come to pass. There was no social/political revolution because both government and business leaders made real concessions to the less radical, more cooperative enterprise unions (Masumi 1985). Joe Moore argues the trade unions represented an angry agitated force in Japan and that there should have been a social revolution. He sets out to explain why this never happened (Moore 1983).

Another trend that started during that decade was a challenge to the view that the occupation represented a dramatic break in Japanese history. John Dower, in his biography of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, finds that the prewar Japanese liberals continued to exert power during the early postwar period. He also advances this basic theme in a collection of essays that he published (Dower 1979, 1993). Chalmers Johnson also makes an argument for bureaucratic continuity in Japanese industrial policy in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry during the interwar, war, and occupation periods (Johnson 1982). Moore, a student of Dower's, argues there was a good deal of continuity in labor politics, despite appearances to the contrary

(Moore 1983). Sheldon M. Garon in an examination of the staff of the Home Ministry shows impressive staying power of the average bureaucrat. "What emerges is the story of how the social bureaucrats perpetuated both themselves and their policies in the postwar period." During the occupation, these bureaucrats wanted to prevent chaos by being honest brokers between labor and capitol, but when unions grew almost overnight that plan went away. "Confronted by an unparalleled threat to the existing political and economic order, surviving social bureaucrats in the Ministry of Labor and conservative parties abandoned any hope they might have had of forging a 'sound' union movement. Henceforth, labor administration concentrated on containing a labor movement that already existed" (Garon 1984, pp. 442, 454–455). Kenneth J. Ruoff in his book on the Japanese monarchy also shows that while the role of the throne changed during the occupation period, the political and constitutional roles remained the same (Ruoff 2001). An important challenge to these views came from Aaron Foresberg. He effectively refutes revisionists who see continuity between prewar and postwar Japan. Rejecting Johnson's argument, Foresberg argues that the cold war and US efforts to promote international economic integration that continued well into the 1950s were equally crucial (Foresberg 2000).

Another concurring debate was that over the "reverse course." The idea that there had been a change in policy in 1947–1948 had long been a factor in the Japanese-language literature. In 1980 Peter K. Frost initiated a major historiographical debate when he attacked this concept. Frost chose instead to use the metaphor of changing gears. He argued that MacArthur worried that after the occupation the Japanese would simply repeal reforms they found objectionable, so his ideas were always to implement new policies that were not too radical and that would not develop social and political pressure that would bring about revision (Frost 1982). Takeshi Igarashi, Michael Schaller, and Howard B. Schonberger – all who were present at the conference where Frost made his arguments – have offered significantly different views (Igarashi 1979, 1986; Schaller 1985; Schonberger 1989).

One of the results of all this scholarship was the shrinking status of Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of Allied powers or SCAP. Biographies of the general are a small subfield unto themselves. The literature before 1970 perpetuated the early idea that MacArthur had made the occupation himself. In the 1970s Japanese scholars began the assault on the general's status (Sodei 1974). William Manchester ignored this growing trend with his biography, *American Caesar*. This book has the best title of any MacArthur biography and is the best known. Manchester argues that MacArthur "had a free hand in charting Japan's course." The title of his book was no accident: "SCAP was in effect an absolute monarch." Although MacArthur was conservative and had surrounded himself with like-minded individuals, he got them to initiate liberal reforms: "SCAP's staff followed him blindly, often despite their deeply held conservative beliefs." Like it or not, he was an American proconsul: "He was the last of the great colonial overlords" (Manchester 1978, pp. 469–470).

The biggest blow to the general's influence came from his most detailed biographer, D. Clayton James. In the third and final volume of this biography, James makes it clear that policy for the occupation was developed in Washington, DC long before the war ended. "Despite his carefully nourished image of power, the constraints on him were many" (James 1985, p. 17). Michael Schaller's biographical study of MacArthur's role in Asia between 1935 and 1951 is far more critical than that of James. He argues

that MacArthur resisted implementing reform initiated in Washington until 1947–1948 when he pushed serious economic changes in an effort to garner political support for his presidential campaign. When that effort failed, his power in occupation policy matters faded (Schaller 1989). Geoffrey Perret agrees that most policies were developed in Washington and that MacArthur did the implementation, but what the general did that was key was allow the Japanese to put these new programs into action. He also insisted on treating Japan with a sense of fairness that set the foundation for postwar friendship and alliance (Perret 1996).

The life of MacArthur's successor, Matthew B. Ridgway has seen little research. During his brief tenure in Tokyo, Ridgway did little other than try to convince Yoshida, unsuccessfully, to increase military expenditures (Stoffer 1998).

Emperor Hirohito, on the other hand, remains a controversial figure. There are two English-language biographies of him by historians and they come to very different conclusions. According to Stephen S. Large, the emperor believed that "a constitutional monarch should always abide by and not interfere with the decisions reached by his government." When he intervened in public affairs it was because others were threatening the order and stability of the constitutional system he was dedicated to preserve (Large 1992, p. 82). In a review, Akira Iriye writes that Large's biography is "the book to read if one is to gain a systematic understanding of Emperor Hirohito's role in modern Japanese history" (Iriye 1994, pp. 542–543). Herbert P. Bix offers his readers a much different view. He sees a monarch who was an active and influential player in Japanese politics both before and after the war. *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* won Bix the Pulitzer Prize. Although the majority of the book focuses on the emperor's wartime actions, he takes the story into the occupation. Bix, however, gets carried away with the shrinking MacArthur argument when he argues that the emperor often challenged, circumvented, and influenced the general (Bix 2000). Ben-Ami Shillony notes in a book review, "The author accepts the evidence that fits his theory, but discards that which contradicts it" (Shillony 2002, p. 144). *American Shogun*, a dual biography of MacArthur and Hirohito has an interesting title and premise, but breaks no new ground (Harvey 2006).

Since the occupation lasted for seven years, it moved into almost every area of Japanese life from "A" agriculture to "Z" zaibatsus (monopolies) with many other topics like gender and religion in between. American missionaries tried and failed to bring Christianity to Japan. This effort failed despite strong support from MacArthur. This topic is a major exception to the shrinking MacArthur view of the occupation. Historians of Japan have continued to accord a dominant role to the general in this area (Wittner 1971; Moore 2011).

Education was another major focus of the occupation and it has received significant attention. Nishi's *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952* is the type of book that many scholars often aspire to write, but never do. Nishi manages to put himself at the center of the debate on the nature of the occupation and his book broaches a number of issues other than education. His study has problems in that facts are often wrong and a number of interesting issues end up as dead ends, but it is important in that it shows the difficulties that both American and Japanese officials had in developing a consistent educational policy that serviced the aims of democracy while respecting the wishes of the Japanese people. There was much compromise and some authoritarian implementation of policy that

reduced to various degrees the effort to democratize the country. Nishi's criticisms are inconsistent, but generally he comes down on the side of those wishing for more reform rather than less (Nishi 1982). Edward R. Beauchamp, on the other hand, believes the Americans were largely successful in implementing educational reforms that advanced democracy (Beauchamp 1987). Yoko H. Thakur examines textbook reforms during the occupation and supports this view. She argues that textbook reforms had an enduring impact on the nation. "The Occupation reform of history textbooks left an invaluable legacy for Japanese history texts, not only in terms of content and approach but also in terms of the textbook system itself. The SCAP aimed at demilitarization, democratization, and decentralization of the textbook system" (Thakur 1995, pp. 277–278).

The creative arts represent another area in which the occupation intruded and became a popular topic of investigation in the 1980s. The various forms of culture that the Americans attempted to influence ranged from journalism to film and literature to the theater. Literary critic Jun Etō argued that the occupation went too far. He claims that American censorship did great and lasting damage to the Japanese creative arts during the occupation period (Etō 1980, 1981, 1989). With this charge in the air another MacArthur Memorial Conference assembled to examine the influence of American censorship. The papers and panelists examined journalism, broadcasting, theater, art, political cartooning, and film (Burkman 1988).

Many of those present at the conference disagreed with Etō's point of view. Jay Rubin calls the occupation a period of great creative surge in modern Japanese literature. The Americans did censor Japanese writers, but never to the extent of the Imperial Japanese government (Rubin 1985, 1988). Marlene J. Mayo's study of radio shows the influence the Americans had, but ultimately the medium helped "promote and preserve Japan's national culture" (Mayo 1988, p. 74). Rinjiro Sodei (1988) in his examination of political cartooning during the occupation turns Etō's argument on its head: "I would say that the Occupation period was the last hurrah for political cartoons in Japan" (p. 99). Kyoko Hirano's (1992) study of the Japanese film industry comes to conclusions similar to Rubin's. The American censors were often arbitrary and inconsistent, but their legacy was generally a positive one. This era was more liberating than oppressive.

Historians have also examined the matters involving the stage. During the occupation, there was an effort to bring in foreign plays that promoted democracy. David G. Goodman states that these plays dominated Japanese culture for a time just as Etō claims, but they then quickly faded in importance (Goodman 1988). Shiro Okamoto looks at kabuki, and also disagrees with Etō. The title of his book, makes his thesis clear: *Kabuki o Sukutta Otoko: Makkasa no fukukan Fobian Bawazu* [The man who saved kabuki: MacArthur's aide-de-camp Faubion Bowers] (Okamoto 1998). James R. Brandon challenges that position. In a 110-page article, he argues that the Shochiku Company, the major kabuki producer, successfully resisted the American agenda with a "classics-only" policy. While Brandon ignores Etō's argument, his position would tend to reject the critic's main thrust (Brandon 2006).

Studies in other areas generally came to views that rejected Etō's position. Art, architecture, and antiquities were preserved, and despite some turmoil, the occupation era was one of great activity (Waterhouse 1988). Censorship took place in professional Japanese publications, such as medical journals, but was generally constructive (Nishimura 1989).

In the 1990s scholars began examining the impact the occupation had on the average individual by exploring topics such as religion, the interaction between American "GIs" and the Japanese public, and the experiences of demobilizing Japanese soldiers. "The Grass Roots" impact of the occupation was the focus of the last Norfolk conference in 1991 (Nimmo 1992). At the end of the decade, Yukiko Koshiro examines how racism on both sides affected the occupation. She sets out to examine what happened to this hostility. This book explores a wide range of issues such as occupation policies, biracial children, the new Japanese constitution, and US immigration policies. Long story made short: American and Japanese prewar and wartime views on race did not just disappear overnight. Leaders on both sides, though, ignored or bypassed disturbing issues in order to foster postwar harmony. The Japanese pushed a view that made them superior to other Asians, while Americans adopted this view as their own. Then they slowly accepted the idea that the Japanese were something of an equal (Koshiro 1999).

The occupation of Japan was an Allied endeavor, a fact which often gets overlooked even in the other nations that participated. At one time or another British, Indian, Australian, and New Zealand military units were stationed in Japan, primarily on the southern tip of Honshu, the main Japanese island, and Shikoku, the smallest of the main islands. The official historians were generally positive in their evaluations of the forces that served in Japan (Gillespie 1952; Singh 1958). Official historians, though, generally keep a narrow focus on the organizations they are charged with studying, since they are writing for an audience interested in assessing and learning lessons for future performances.

Several decades would pass before historians moved beyond these studies. A series of small conferences took place in London, England, which all focused on the experiences of the nations of the British Commonwealth during the occupation (Nish 1983, 1986, 1991). The MacArthur Memorial held two conferences in Norfolk on the international context. The first was dedicated to examining the impact of nations other than the United States. There was disagreement on specific issues, but they generally found that global influences had an effect on the occupation. The question was to what degree. Papers at this conference included Sino-Japanese relations, Anglo-American relations, Australian foreign policy, US-Canadian relations, Japanese foreign policy, the peace treaty with Japan, and US-Japanese foreign policy toward China and Southeast Asia (Burkman 1984).

The second of these Norfolk conferences was dedicated to the impact of the Korean War (Nimmo 1990). The final speaker at that conference, Roger Dingman, summarizes the conference in an article he published three years later. The Korean War had an impact on Japan, but not a major impact. American and Japanese leaders had already committed themselves to a trans-Pacific partnership. The war increased the speed of Japan's recovery, but it did not fundamentally alter its direction (Dingman 1993).

It took several years, but scholars began building on the proceedings of those conferences. Some used elements of the British contingent to examine other political and diplomatic issues. Anne Trotter's account of New Zealand's experiences focuses more on the diplomatic aspects and is a story that makes Wellington the central focus. She argues that the occupation of Japan was a major transformation in the small country's foreign policy orientation, but as she admits, "The Occupation and the peace treaty were essentially 'American shows' and New Zealand's part in the drama

was very small” (Trotter 1990, p. 183). Jeffrey Grey offers up a mixed assessment in his biography of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, the Australian in command of the British Commonwealth force in Japan. While giving Robertson a good deal of praise for getting along well with MacArthur and doing a good job of staying engaged with the media as home governments reconsidered the utility of deployment in Japan, Grey states, “Overall BCOF was a failure” (Grey 1992, p. 178). Laurie Brocklebank in his study of the New Zealand contingent agrees with Grey’s overall assessment. He sees New Zealand’s presence in Japan as an effort to help shore up British power in the Pacific, which was vital to the Commonwealth nation. It was, however, a failed effort. British power was fading, and the experience in Japan had little impact on the Kiwis. “For New Zealand and New Zealanders, occupation was of little long-term consequence. Few gained much appreciation of Japanese society and culture. Japan continued to be seen as a major threat to New Zealand’s security, and relations between New Zealand and Japan remained distant” (Brocklebank 1997, 214). James Wood, in an account of the Australian force in Japan, offers a slightly more optimistic assessment. The Australian government had grandiose political aims in 1945, but was unable to sustain these because of opposition from the British, New Zealand, and US governments, but also due to issues internal to Australia. The public was tired and the opposition, which took control of the government half way through the occupation era had different objectives (Wood 1998).

Studies that examined the entire British Commonwealth Occupation Force came to different conclusions. Roger Buckley shows that the Britain was quite aggressive in its foreign policies toward Japan during this era in an effort to halt its decline in power and the Japanese often preferred to deal with the British rather than the Americans. The British were more flexible in their attitudes than the Australians, but were never willing to risk their relationship with the United States over Japan’s future (Buckley 1982). Peter Bates, a former British Army officer who served in Japan, contends “the overall picture is a patchwork” (Bates 1993, 227). The British were better equipped and supplied than the Americans. While it was excluded from policy formulation because of Foreign Office mistakes, the British force earned MacArthur’s appreciation as a supplement to US units. Bates also argues that the force represented a positive professional achievement on the part of the four nations that comprised the force (Bates 1993). George Davies, a New Zealand dentist, turned academic administrator, turned historian, comes to less qualified conclusions about the British contribution: “Within the limits imposed on its activities BCOF was a highly successful operation” (Davies 2001, p. 311). He notes that the Commonwealth soldiers dominated southern Honshu and Shikoku and effectively implemented demobilization in the region, which included the destruction of military equipment and the repatriation of Japanese veterans. Other duties included rebuilding transportation systems, upgrading public health facilities, and providing disaster relief to Shokoku following a major earthquake and typhoon. The Australians also had an impact in policy formation. They were primarily responsible for developing land reform policies that MacArthur implemented. The occupation also had a lasting impact on several of the Dominions. Japanese studies grew in popularity in both Australia and New Zealand in the postwar period (Davies 2001). Takemae sees the multinational, multiracial nature of the Commonwealth force being very significant in transmitting a message of racial equality and democracy (Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002).

The fate of some of the smaller islands was a topic that saw detailed investigation in the 1990s and 2000s. Small though they were, some of their names were quite famous – in particular, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The United States maintained a military government on these islands into the 1970s, raising questions about the nature of the occupation and the US–Japanese alliance that followed. The story of these islands shows that there was a profound fear of a resurgent Japan hostile to the United States and that Americans had to hedge their bets. This argument raises significant challenges to the view that the cold war shaped the occupation of Japan and considers this period as a conclusion to World War II (Sarantakes 2000; Eldridge 2001, 2002, 2003).

Major studies of the occupation appeared in the 1990s and early 2000s that presented impressive nuanced and synthesis of all this literature. The first came from Richard B. Finn, a retired US Foreign Service Officer, who spent roughly half his career on US–Japanese issues, including five years in Japan during the occupation. Despite this personal background, Finn avoids interjecting his own personal experiences into this account. His book is a descriptive history of the entire occupation using both English- and Japanese-language sources. Finn challenges much of the received wisdom. Instead of seeing the occupation as a period of reform and then conservative reaction, he shows that there were five distinct phases: first, there was a period of tense, simmering hostilities. “World War II was not over. Nor could it be said – yet – that Japan was ready to give up” (Finn 1992, pp. 2–3). The second period was one of cooperation, limited though it was. A third phase of Japanese political instability followed. The fourth phase was another period of political reform following the emergence of Yoshida Shigeru. The fifth and final period was the negotiations for a peace treaty. Finn argues that many of these changes had little to do with the cold war, as many have argued, but reflected instead the changing economic fortunes of the two nations and the efforts of the US government to cut expenses. Rejecting the “shrinking MacArthur” studies of the 1970s and 1980s, Finn argues that the personalities of MacArthur and Yoshida were key in forming a partnership that was critical to the success of this endeavor. If one goes back to the role of Phase IV operations that Crane offers in his article, much of this analysis makes sense.

The second book was John Dower’s *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. Dower spends a good deal of time examining the lives of the average Japanese. “I have tried to capture a sense of what it meant to start over in a ruined world by recovering the voices of people at all levels of society” (Dower 1999, p. 25). He does this through an examination of cultural and social developments. His sources are creative and impressive: police files, children’s games, popular songs, cartoons, films, and novels. He presents a mosaic, reminding his readers there was no “single or singular ‘Japanese’ response to the defeat” (Dower 1999, p. 25). The result is an impressive study of Japanese pop culture, economics, politics, and diplomacy as well as US policy. Dower is good at handling the oversized ego of Douglas MacArthur and how the general used the ambiguous end to the war and the uncertain future of the monarch to compel reform. This book richly deserves the three major awards it won: the 1999 National Book Award, the Pulitzer Prize for 2000, and the Bancroft Prize in 2000.

There are weaknesses, though. Dower talks little about land reform or the peace settlement. He is also of two minds on the occupation. He generally believes the

occupation should have done more and that the Americans reversed course and undermined earlier efforts at democratic reform. Yet, he also states, "Postwar Japan was a vastly freer and more egalitarian nation than imperial Japan had been" (Dower 1999, p. 561).

Eiji Takemae, Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann are the writing/translating team behind *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*. Although Takemae is listed as the sole author and Ricketts and Swann are credited as translators and adopters, this book is significantly different from the Japanese original. It is nearly three times the size and cites many books published since 1983. The book that these three produced is stunningly informative. It includes organizational charts of MacArthur's command, over 70 photographs (including headshots of several of minor, but influential figures), and nine different maps. The first section of the book is a detailed description of the organizational structure and operation of MacArthur's headquarters. Even specialists will learn from reading it. The bulk of the book, though, is an impressive narrative and analysis of the occupation. Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann reject the continuity argument that Dower and others put forward in the 1970s. "The Occupation was responsible for the dissociative impact of the postwar reforms on Japan's prewar social structure and cultural traditions." They are also clear that this would not have happened without the Americans. "This transformation would have been impossible without the overarching authority of the Supreme Commander" (Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002, pp. xlii–xliii). They, however, advance some of the newer ideas as well including the "reverse course" argument – but Takemae sees that change as limited. This new emphasis constrained some reforms, but had no chance of returning Japan to its pre-1945 structure. They also contend that the cold war and international politics played key roles in shaping the occupation. The author and translators give the Japanese a good deal of agency in this account, but they examine a number of other topics including the British Commonwealth presence, welfare reform, public health, race, and the role of overlooked groups including American women, Japanese-Americans, African-Americans, and Japanese civilians who worked for MacArthur's command.

If military occupations including the Allied occupation of Japan are considered as a part of the war effort, then certain conclusions become clear. Crane's contention becomes very powerful. World War II shows that Phase IV operations are often key in converting operational military success into a strategic or military victory. The real question is how and the studies cited in this essay make it clear that occupations that followed combat operations, particularly the one in Japan itself, were crucial in determining the legacy of combat.

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Further Reading

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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ending the Pacific War: The New History

RICHARD B. FRANK

In 1945, and for approximately two decades thereafter, no significant American controversy attended the use of atomic weapons to end the Pacific War. A national consensus assembled around three basic premises: (a) the use of the weapons was justified; (b) the weapons ended the war; and (c) that in at least a rough utilitarian sense, employment of the weapons was morally justified as saving more lives than they cost (Walker 1990, 2005; Bernstein 1995). The historian Michael Sherry branded this as “The Patriotic Orthodoxy” (Sherry 1996).

Beginning in the mid-1960s challenges appeared to “The Patriotic Orthodoxy.” The pejorative label “revisionists” was sometimes pelted at these challengers, but a more accurate term is just critics. The critics developed a canon of tenets that, in their purest incarnation, likewise formed a trio: (a) Japan’s strategic situation in the summer of 1945 was catastrophically hopeless; (b) Japan’s leaders recognized their hopeless situation and were seeking to surrender; and (c) American leaders, thanks to the breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes, knew Japan hovered on the verge of surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation. The critics mustered a number of reasons for the unwarranted use of atomic weapons, but the most provocative by far marches under the banner “atomic diplomacy”: the real target of the weapons was not Japan, but the Soviet Union (Walker 1990, 2005; Bernstein 1995).

These two rival narratives clashed along a cultural fault line most spectacularly in the “Enola Gay” controversy in 1995 over the proposed text of a Smithsonian Institution exhibit of the fuselage of the plane that dropped the first atomic bomb. Ironically, just as this public spectacle erupted, new evidence emerged in three areas. While Japanese historians found the “atomic diplomacy” thesis congenial, many experienced discomfort to the degree the thesis obscured or even absolved the emperor and the militarists of responsibility. These scholars delved into archives and newly available sources to provide a far more nuanced portrait of decision making in Japan. Concurrently, the declassification of radio intelligence-related information fundamen-

tally transformed understanding of American decision-making. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union liberated startling disclosures about Soviet plans. What follows is a short exploration of how this vastly enhanced body of evidence points to new insights and interpretations reflected in a trove of publications dated from 1995 (in addition to those cited below, see Newman 1995; Maddox 1995, 2007; Bix 2000; Allen and Polmar 2003; Hasegawa 2007; Miscamble 2007; Kort 2007; Malloy 2008; Rotter 2008; Campbell and Radchenko 2008).

In January 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt publically fixed the American war aim as the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis Powers. The US Department of State’s Committee on Post War Programs (Japan) emphasized the potent legal significance of “unconditional surrender” in November 1944: “While there may be different interpretations as to just what is meant by ‘unconditional surrender’, there would seem inherent in the expression the right of the victors to impose whatever items they wish upon the vanquished.” The committee went on to add: “The unconditional surrender of Japan would make it possible for the United Nations to assume supreme authority with respect to Japan and to exercise powers beyond those given a military occupant by international law” (US Department of State 1963, pp. 1275–1285). By 1945, planners, armed with the critically enhanced legal authority that “unconditional surrender” afforded, fashioned a breathtakingly radical plan for an occupation and internal reordering of Japan and German that would assure that these nations never again posed a threat. “Unconditional surrender” thus was not merely a slogan or a readily disposable diplomatic card; it formed the indispensable foundation for an enduring peace (Dallek 1979, pp. 373–376; Gilbert 1986, pp. 300–301, 309–310; Pearlman 1996, pp. 1–8).

The newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) bore the duty of devising a military strategy to secure the national war aim. The navy, led by the commander in chief, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, had studied war with Japan for decades. One fundamental principle that emerged from this analysis was that an invasion of the Japanese home islands was the path of absolute folly. The navy concluded the US could never project a sufficiently large trans-Pacific expeditionary force to overwhelm the Japanese. Further, the alternately steep or soaked terrain of the home islands would negate American advantages in firepower and mobility. Any invasion thus would produce politically unacceptable casualties. But the US Army, led by General of the Armies George C. Marshall, believed the critical element was time. Hence, as explained in Richard Frank’s *Downfall* (1999), the army advocated an invasion of the Japanese home islands as the swiftest means of ending the war (pp. 20–37).

In April 1945, after nearly a year’s worth of bitter argument, the JCS reached not a consensus but a highly unstable compromise. The ongoing Navy-preferred strategy of bombardment and blockade would continue at greater intensity until November 1945. At that point, it would merge with the army vision: a two-phase *initial* invasion of Japan (Operation Downfall) aimed first at Southern Kyushu about 1 November (Operations Olympic), and second at the Tokyo region about 1 March 1946 (Operation Coronet).

The JCS formally adopted a paper providing the rationale for this plan. That paper noted in effect that no Japanese government had surrendered to a foreign power in Japan’s history, a span of 2,600 years. No Japanese military unit had surrendered in the entire course of the Pacific War. Therefore, the JCS concluded that there was no guarantee the US could find a Japanese government that would surrender and even if it did, that Japan’s armed forces would comply with the surrender order; thus, the JCS

identified the ultimate American nightmare. It was not “the invasion of Japan,” but the prospect that there would be no organized capitulation of Japan’s government and armed forces. Indeed, “the invasion of Japan” only encompassed a fraction of the potential costs of finally subduing Japan if the US and its allies had to defeat Japan’s armed forces, estimated at about 4.5 to 5 million strong, in the home islands, on the Asian continent, and across the Pacific (Joint Chiefs of Staff 924/15, 25 April 1945).

Comprehending this fundamental point is the first vital step to understanding why the highly emotional debate over potential casualties to end the war is misguided. Without certainty of complete surrender of Japan and her armed forces, there was no predictable scenario for the length and severity of the final phase of the war. Given that situation, American (and Allied) casualties could run anywhere along a vast continuum, from the hundreds of thousands to well more than a million. At a critical point in August 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson pointed out to President Harry S. Truman that absent compliance of Japan’s armed forces with a surrender order, the US could face campaigns *outside* the home islands where casualties could equal twenty Iwo Jimas or Okinawas – analogies sketching a loss range of 600,000 to just below one million (Stimson 1945).

The second issue that makes the hotly charged casualty debate problematic is that there was no reliable method of predicting casualties in 1945 even for discrete campaigns. Such estimates were always problematic because of the multitude of variables that affected casualties, many of which could not be accurately known in advance. Most of the stabs at “casualty estimates” for final campaigns avoided precise numbers for the type of analogy Stimson presented to Truman in August 1945. The lack of a guarantee for an organized capitulation of all of Japan’s armed forces, coupled with the absence of a valid model for individual campaign casualty projections, left military and civilian officials alike adrift with well-merited fears of frightful losses roused by war experienced to date – and common sense. The prime manifestation of this situation emerged in preparations for inducting vast numbers of draftees and for the training of massive numbers of infantry replacements to allow the armed forces to absorb over a million casualties for the year after May 1945. The fear of huge losses was both real and reasonable and undoubtedly animated American leaders even if an exact projection remained elusive (Frank 1999, pp. 134–139, 339–343).

Unfortunately, in 1945 Japanese leaders did not perceive their situation as catastrophically hopeless. On the contrary, they devised a military–political strategy they called the *Ketsu Go* (“Operation Decisive”) that they confidently expected would deliver their version of a satisfactory end to the war – one that would preserve the ultranationalist and militarist old order in Japan. *Ketsu Go* contained a fundamental premise: Americans, for all their material power, possessed only brittle morale. Japanese leaders believed that by defeating or inflicting high casualties on the initial invasion of the home islands, they could break American morale and secure a negotiated end of the war to their taste.

Shrewd staff work deduced that the US would choose to invade rather than only follow a strategy of blockade and bombardment. Since American combat power depended vitally on air and sea components, not massive ground forces, and as more than half the US air strength was ground-based, the Japanese calculated that an invasion must come within range of American air bases ashore. Further appraisal projected that by mid-summer 1945, the US would occupy Okinawa. Simple calculations of

American fighter-plane range from Okinawa showed the target for the first invasion would be Southern Kyushu. A glance at the topographic map of Kyushu readily yielded the likely invasion beaches. The Japanese conducted a huge buildup of forces in Japan, but concentrated their units to meet an invasion in Southern Kyushu and around Tokyo – precisely the two initial American invasion targets. The Japanese were confident in the prospects for *Ketsu Go*.

In the spring, Japan implemented a series of national laws designed to form a seamless unity of the armed forces, government, and the people. All males aged 15 to 60 and all females aged 17 to 40 were drafted into a huge national militia. With Okinawa as the prototype, these individuals were mustered into units to serve in combat support and then combat roles. In June, an Imperial Conference (one held before the emperor) formally sanctified the *Ketsu Go* “Fight to the Finish” strategy. The staff papers presented to the policy makers in preparation for this conference also told them something else: even if *Ketsu Go* produced a military and diplomatic success, the nation’s desperate food situation by the winter of 1945–1946 would kill vast numbers of people. *Ketsu Go* thus involved the virtual obliteration of meaningful distinctions between combatants and noncombatants within the homeland and contemplated stupendous numbers of Japanese casualties, not just those on the battlefield (Butow 1954, pp. 99–102; Frank 1999, pp. 95–96, 350–352; Drea 2009, p. 250).

As historian Robert Butow pointed out in 1954, the fate of Japan rested in the hands of only eight men (pp. 9–10). These were the emperor and his principle adviser Marquis Koichi Kido and an inner cabinet of the government of Admiral Kantaro Suzuki called the “Big Six”: Prime Minister Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister General Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Chief of the Army General Staff General Yoshijiro Umezu, and Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Soemu Toyoda.

There is no record whatsoever that any of these eight men proposed a set of concrete terms or circumstances in which Japan would capitulate prior to Hiroshima. More significantly, none of the seven survivors (Anami committed suicide), even after the war, claimed that there was any specific term or set of terms and circumstances that would have prompted Japan to surrender prior to Hiroshima. The evidence available shows that in June, a memorandum from Kido to the emperor proposed that the emperor intervene not to surrender, but to initiate mediation by a third party. The mediation would look to settle the war on a general framework that echoed the Treaty of Versailles: Japan might have to give up her overseas conquests and experience disarmament for a time, but the old order in Japan would remain in charge. Certainly, there would be no occupation and no internal reform (Butow 1954, pp. 112–115; Bix 1995, p. 212; Frank 1999, pp. 96–98).

At the emperor’s bidding, Japan initiated tentative steps to secure the Soviet Union as a mediator to procure a negotiated end to the war – but not to surrender. The feeble effort went nowhere. The “Big Six” never agreed on what terms might be offered to the Soviet Union to act as mediator, much less on terms to end the war. Nor did the emperor intervene decisively to lay down terms for mediation or for ending the war.

This brings us to the role of “Magic,” the code name for the massive Allied code-breaking effort. The products of code breaking were delivered daily to senior leaders in two documents. One with the self-explanatory title of “The Magic Diplomatic

Summary,” the other called “The Magic Far East Summary” addressed military developments. It is important to understand that “Magic” not only shines light into what American policymakers knew, but it also provides a priceless source of authentic insight into Japanese diplomatic and military matters.

Because President Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes and the members of the JCS were at the Potsdam Conference in Germany during crucial days of July 1945, one important historical question has been whether the “Magic Summaries” with their revealing evidence were actually seen by policymakers at the time. A report contained in the National Archives collections on radio intelligence discloses that a special detachment was established in 1944 to deliver the two summaries. The distribution list was identical for both the “Magic Diplomatic Summary” and “Magic Far East Summary” – in other words, any party receiving the one also received the other. Special messengers customarily personally delivered the daily edition of each summary from a locked pouch. At the same time, the messengers recovered the prior day’s edition. All but one file copy was destroyed (Department of the Navy, n.d., SRH-132).

During the Potsdam Conference, the summaries continued to be forwarded by courier from Washington. Communications logs reveal this normally took three days. But when evidence appeared of the emperor’s support for a diplomatic initiative to the Soviet Union, arrangements were made for prompt forwarding of radio intelligence for Truman through his chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy. Leahy got the accelerated intelligence via the dedicated secure radio links in place for such transmission to the JCS (Frank 1999, pp. 240–241, 413n).

The “Magic Diplomatic Summary” divulged a series of messages from Japanese envoys in Western Europe eager to present themselves to American representatives as “peace entrepreneurs.” But “Magic” demonstrated that not one of these individuals acted with official sanction. Some accounts have highlighted the exertions of these “peace entrepreneurs” as demonstrating Japan’s proximity to surrender, but the reality is that they were valueless as an indicator of the thinking of Japan’s leaders – and American leaders knew this from “Magic.” Another stream of messages from diplomats of neutral nations in Japan showed four messages suggesting Japan might be prepared to surrender, but these were overwhelmed by no less than thirteen that did not (Alperovitz 1995, pp. 29–30; Frank 1999, pp. 106–108, 240–241, 244).

The key evidence on just how close Japan was to peace prior to Hiroshima then and now is the exchange between Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow and Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo on the only diplomatic initiative that carried official sanction. Sato’s dispatches read like a cross-examination on behalf of the American government. Sato ridiculed the notion that the Soviets would assist Japan by mediation. He challenged the bona fides of the whole effort, pointing out the official policy of Japan was the “Fight to the Finish” ratified at an Imperial Conference. Who then authorized his efforts? Togo’s evasive reply – he could not claim the super-secret probe represented the policy of more than the tiny inner elite – cited vague authorization from some “directing powers.” But Sato’s main theme was terms. In what remains as the most incisive rebuttal to later arguments about Japan’s proximity to surrender, Sato underscored that if Japan was serious about ending the war, she must present a set of terms. Without them, Sato warned it would be impossible even to arouse Soviet interest in mediation (Frank 1999, pp. 221–232, 235–238).

Togo could not provide terms for the fundamental reason that the men who controlled Japan could not agree on terms. Togo stated emphatically on July 17, 1945 that Japan “was not seeking the Russians’ mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender.” Sato then sent two messages that prompted the most significant exchange of the dialogue. He flatly told Togo that Japan’s best realistic hope was for unconditional surrender, modified to the extent of permitting the continuation of the imperial institution. The editors of the “Magic Diplomatic Summary” appreciated the supreme importance of this message and made it clear that this was the proposition to which Togo responded on July 21 – but that response was an emphatic rejection. Togo did not provide even a hint that a guarantee of the imperial institution would be a useful step toward securing Japan’s surrender. This evidence puts a stake through the heart of the argument that only a failure to provide guarantee of the imperial institution prevented a Japanese surrender before Hiroshima. Perhaps even more telling about this controversy is that this exchange has been in the public record since 1978 but has never been addressed by any of the critics.

But the futility of diplomacy was not the only information “Magic” revealed. Side-by-side with a relative freshet of diplomatic intercepts was a torrent of military intercepts. These intercepts carried enormous political implications because of the dominant role of Japan’s uniformed leaders in dictating national policy. The military intercepts, without exception, demonstrated that Japan was girding for an Armageddon battle. Worse yet, the intercepts revealed an appalling picture of the buildup on Kyushu exactly at the planned November landing sites for Operation Olympic. As one intelligence officer noted, instead of the original projection that the invaders would heavily outnumber the defenders, “Magic” now demonstrated the attackers would be going in at a ratio of one-to-one, which, as one intelligence officer phrased it, was “not the recipe for victory” (Frank 1999, pp. 197–213, 273–277).

Accompanying the release of the “Magic” intercepts was the revelation of their impact on top American officers. General Marshall sent a message to the senior army officer in the Pacific, General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur, on August 7, basically asking whether Olympic still appeared viable in light of the new intelligence. MacArthur replied that he did not believe the intelligence and that, therefore, the invasion plan was still valid. Admiral King seized upon this exchange to ask for the view of the senior naval officer in the Pacific, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz. But King well knew that since a private message in May, Nimitz had withdrawn support for the proposed invasion. Thus, the plan to attack Kyushu in November was under siege in what proved to be the final days of the war – not because it appeared unnecessary but because it appeared unthinkable to anyone who credited “Magic” (CINCPAC, n.d.).

In another important revelation about American military policy, a new targeting directive for the strategic bombing campaign was issued on August 11. It reoriented the attacks away from urban incendiary attacks that had struck 64 cities in Japan and placed priority on attacks on Japanese transportation, particularly the rail system. What was not appreciated by American planners, who merely attempted to replicate the lessons of the bombing campaign in Europe, was that a combination of demographics, food shortages, and the destruction of all other means of mass transportation translated into the fact that rail bombing promised to bring on mass famine in Japan.

An atomic bomb virtually destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. In the early morning of August 9, the Soviet Union entered the war with a massive offensive in Manchuria pitting over 1.5 million Soviet troops against about 713,000 Japanese (Glantz 2003, pp. 40, 60). A few hours later, a second atomic bomb inflicted tremendous damage on Nagasaki. The issue of the number of immediate and latent deaths caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forms its own controversy and is a highly politicized matter in Japan. A short discussion of the evidence and the arguments may be found in Frank's *Downfall* (1999, pp. 285–287) which concludes that the number is huge, but that the plausible range of deaths fell between 100,000 to 200,000. Recently, historian John Dower characterized fatality figures of 130,000 to 140,000 for Hiroshima and 75,000 for Nagasaki as the “most recent and generally accepted estimates.” This yields a range of 205,000 to 215,000. Dower notes figures as high as 390,000 have been presented, but like Frank, finds these speculative (Dower 2010, pp. 199, 500n). Basically, as Frank explains, figures over the low 200,000 range are of dubious providence as they depend upon using highly speculative population totals for Hiroshima and Nagasaki (for example, Hiroshima numbers vastly above the number of persons entitled to a rice ration) paired with obviously selective “survivor counts.”

It took 24 hours for Tokyo to learn of the damage to Hiroshima and the American announcement that it was caused by an atomic bomb. The reaction of Japan's uniformed leaders to the news demonstrates that far from being completely unmoved, they instantly erected not one, but two, lines of defense against the American claim. First, they argued that whatever struck Hiroshima, it was not an atomic bomb. Second, even if it was an atomic bomb, the difficulty of manufacturing fissionable material to power the weapon meant the US could not have that many bombs, or that the bombs would not be that powerful – and maybe international pressure would dissuade the US from further employment of such weapons. The reasoning about the weapons themselves was the fruit of Japan's own efforts to build an atomic bomb. These exertions provided no useable weapon but did instruct Japan's leaders in the difficulty of producing fissionable material. This revelation also demonstrates the futility of any single demonstration of an atomic weapon (Freedman and Dockrill 1994, p. 203).

The Big Six finally met for the first time to contemplate ending the war in the morning of August 9. According to Admiral Toyoda, the meeting started with what he characterized as a “bullish” attitude for continuing the war (Asada 1998, pp. 490–491). During the meeting came word of the Nagasaki bombing, news that struck at the arguments dismissing or downplaying the threat posed by the American atomic arsenal. By the end of the marathon session, the Big Six split. Two or possibly three members were prepared to accept unconditional surrender with the sole additional term (“one condition”) of a guarantee of the continuation of the imperial institution. Three, perhaps four members held out for “four conditions” for surrender: continuance of the imperial institution, Japanese self-disarmament, Japan to conduct “so-called” war crimes trails, and no occupation (Butow 1954). This meeting is customarily presented as ending in a three to three split. There is credible evidence that Navy Minister Yonai actually sided with the four conditions, not the one condition offer (Frank 1999).

When Prime Minister Suzuki met with Kido after this session, Suzuki presented the “four conditions” as the agreement of the Big Six. This was presumably because the

Big Six could only act on unanimous agreement, and the “four conditions” were the lowest common denominator of concord. Kido found the “four conditions” offer acceptable. Since Kido was the alter ego of the emperor, does this damn the emperor and Kido as firm allies of the most recalcitrant elements in the Big Six? Probably not, for the more compelling alternate explanation is that the emperor and Kido remained profoundly concerned about whether Japan’s armed forces would comply with the surrender (fears that events swiftly confirmed were well-grounded), and the “four conditions” offer carried the approval of the military members of the Big Six – above all War Minister Anami.

When word of the “four conditions” offer spread to the handful of other leaders within the inner elite, several immediately confronted Kido with the argument that the allies would treat such a response as tantamount to a refusal to surrender. Sometime in the afternoon of August 9, the emperor agreed (Frank 1999, 291 and notes). That night an Imperial Conference was conducted. Key military members insisted that the war not only must but could continue. The chief of the Imperial Army General Staff, General Umezu, whose opinion the emperor respected, insisted that Soviet intervention was unfavorable but did not invalidate *Ketsu Go*. After listening to extended debate, the emperor announced his support for the “one condition” offer.

But then the story took another twist exposed by the new history. As communicated to the United States and its allies, the Japan’s official message conditioned acceptance of the Potsdam declaration on “the understanding that the said declaration does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as Sovereign Ruler.” As American State Department officials immediately recognized, and later Japanese historians pointed out, this was not just a request for maintenance of a constitutional monarchy. The “prerogatives ... as Sovereign Ruler” language under Japanese law actually set as the pivotal Japanese condition for surrender that the allies agree to supremacy of the emperor not only over any Japanese government, *but over the commander of the occupation*. In other words, any proposed reforms would be subject to the emperor’s veto.

Despite the keen interest of American officials in deploying the emperor’s authority to secure the surrender of Japan’s armed forces, they had no intention of permitting the emperor to be the final arbiter of the occupation program. Accordingly, the response (named the Byrnes Note after Secretary of State James Byrnes) stated that “From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the supreme commander of the allied powers.” The note added that the ultimate form of Japan’s government would be “established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people” (Frank 1999, pp. 296, 301–302; Bix 2000, pp. 516–519; Hasegawa 2005, pp. 199–200, 343–344n).

While the Byrnes Note implied much, it did not, as sometimes charged, oblige the occupation authorities to retain Emperor Hirohito on the throne. The Potsdam Proclamation guaranteed that the Japanese people would ultimately choose their own form of government, a proviso that plainly allowed for the continuation of the imperial institution if this is what the Japanese people chose. The Byrnes Note only clarified that the emperor as well as Japanese government would be subordinate to the supreme allied commander of the occupation. Not only does the plain language of these two key documents not support the theory that the United States and its allies promised to retain Hirohito on the throne to secure the Japanese surrender, as John

Dower has pointed out, early on in the occupation the US made it clear to Japanese officials that the surrender had been unconditional and “by initially keeping deliberately vague the future status of both the imperial institution and Emperor Hirohito personally, they were able to more effectively pressure the Japanese elites into actively cooperating with basic initial reform edicts” (Dower 1996, n. 34). Dower further elaborated that there was never any serious consideration of deposing Hirohito much less trying him as a war criminal. This was not, however, because of any legal guarantees, but because of the theory and policy developed before the surrender at MacArthur’s headquarters that the emperor could be used as a “wedge” between the “militarists” and the “people” to obtain surrender and then to implement occupation reforms (Dower 1999, pp. 277–301).

It took a second Imperial Conference and second intervention of the emperor on August 14 to accept the Byrnes Note. On August 15, 1945, the Emperor broadcast by radio his decision to the Japanese people and the world (Butow 1954, pp. 207–208, 248; Frank 1999, pp. 314–315, 320; Hasegawa 2005, pp. 238–240). But the war had not ended. Soviet combat operations continued in Manchuria. Moreover, the Soviets unleashed an amphibious assault on the Kuril Islands – which thanks to other new revelations we now know was in preparation for a landing by Soviet forces on Hokkaido, the northernmost home island. Only fierce Japanese resistance on Sakhalin Island and President Truman’s insistence on meticulous adherence to prior agreements saved Hokkaido from Soviet invasion and probable occupation. Had this happened, almost certainly the Soviets would have obtained some occupation zone in a divided Japan (Frank 1999, pp. 322–324; Glantz 2003, pp. 280–307; Hasegawa 2005, pp. 271–285).

Soviet intervention leads to an important factual and moral issue which the critics of the use of atomic weapons habitually treat with silent. Sources stand divided on how many Japanese nationals fell into Soviet hands and how many of these perished. They agree, however, that both numbers are very massive. When Dower first addressed the issue, he reported Japanese government figures of 1.3 million Japanese nationals falling into Soviet hands, with 374,041 (including approximately 60,000 civilians) unaccounted for after Soviet repatriation of the others (Dower 1986, pp. 298–299, 363n). Nimmo calculated that 2.7 million Japanese entered Soviet captivity and ultimately 347,000 died or were never accounted for (Nimmo 1998, pp. 115–117). Takamae (2002) stated that the Soviets captured 1.7 million Japanese, of whom no ultimate accounting could be provided for some 300,000 to 500,000 (these figures do not include combat deaths). In his more recent work, Dower provides a range of 1.6 to 1.7 million Japanese falling into Soviet custody, and implies number of dead or unaccounted for totaled 400,000. Included in this figure were 179,000 civilians and 66,000 military personnel who died in the first winter after the war in Manchuria (Dower 1999, pp. 50–51).

What these studies point to is a conclusion absent from the customary debates: Soviet intervention probably killed more Japanese, including more noncombatants, than the atomic bombs. Further, as noted it would have been virtually impossible to deny the Soviets an occupation zone if they seized part of Hokkaido. Based on what happened on the Asian continent, any Soviet occupation would have produced its own further massive death toll. The failure to acknowledge these facts, of course, creates the false impression that Soviet intervention cost only the lives of military personnel whereas atomic weapons also killed large numbers of noncombatants.

Another vital element of this history customarily evaded by critics of the use of atomic weapons is that, affirming the fears in both Tokyo and Washington, the compliance of Japan's armed forces with the surrender was far from automatic. Much attention has been paid to a failed military *coup d'état* mounted by mid-grade officers on the night of August 14–15 in Tokyo. Far more significant were two other events. Two of the three major overseas commands of the Imperial Army, one in China and the other Southeast Asia, announced they would not comply with the surrender order. Between them, they controlled a quarter to a third of all Japanese military personnel. Then the Japanese defenders in the Kurils – who defied a direct order from the emperor to halt – came very close to crushing the initial Soviet landing. On August 19, there was near panic in Tokyo over the fear that news of such a “victory” in the Kurils would cause an unraveling of compliance with the surrender. It was touch and go for at least five days after August 15 before it became clear that Japan's armed forces would all surrender (Frank 1999, pp. 326–329; Hasegawa 2005, pp. 271–285).

As the discussion of the number of Japanese dying in Soviet captivity or potentially dying in a Soviet occupation zone indicates, the moral dimensions of the end of the Pacific War cannot be overlooked – but they harbor far more complexity than usually recognized. The moral controversy habitually pivots around deaths from atomic bombs versus potential lives lost in an invasion and the conventional air attacks. But a meaningful debate must significantly expand these horizons.

The strategy supported vocally by the US Navy (and quietly by many Army Air Force officers) of bombardment and blockade is rarely addressed outside the context of the incendiary raids on Japanese cities. In reality, that strategy ultimately aimed to compel the surrender of Japan by killing or threatening to kill Japanese by the millions through starvation. Thus, this strategy represented the most draconian American means of ending the war – not the much more attenuated capabilities of existing atomic weaponry. On August 11, the new targeting directive to the B-29 commands aimed to shift priorities from incendiary attacks to bombing Japan's internal communication system. Given the matrix of Japan's desperate food shortage and the supreme importance of the rail system for moving food from surplus to deficit areas, the rail-bombing scheme threatened to plunge Japan into true famine that may have compelled surrender, but at a cost of many hundred thousands or millions of lives.

Another neglected topic is the deliberate choice of Japan's leadership in the spring of 1945 to obliterate the distinction between combatants and noncombatants with the creation of the mass militia of male and female adults. That ruling elite also adopted *Ketsu Go* knowing that even if it succeeded, the inevitable consequences included mass deaths from starvation in 1945–1946.

Yet another conspicuous lacuna in the discussions of the moral questions surrounding the end of the war arises from the failure to provide a cost accounting for Japanese and other Asian civilians due to Soviet intervention. The numbers of Japanese civilian deaths in Soviet hands has been noted. But abstaining from use of atomic weapons and permitting the Soviets to achieve their goals means almost certainly that all of Korea would have fallen into the Soviet orbit, and subsequently the regime of Kim Il Sung and his heirs. That presumably means no Korean War, but at the cost of a dire fate for the Korean people. The Soviets also would have presumably landed on Hokkaido and undoubtedly would have been entitled to impose a Stalinist apparatus on Japanese occupation zone, sharply boosting the Japanese death toll.

Finally, such exercises customarily omit any consideration for the fact that the number of Asians dying each day under Japanese occupation totaled from over three thousand to perhaps six thousand or more in China alone. Total monthly deaths for those trapped under Japanese domination, overwhelmingly Asian non-combatants, certainly reached 100,000, and may have approached 200,000. In *Imperial Japan's Defeat*, Werner Gruhl (2007) calculates total Allied dead per week in 1945 was 113,000 (Frank 1999, pp. 162–163; Gruhl 2007, pp. 19, 62, 205). Thus, speculations that the war could have been ended without atomic weapons in a period of weeks or months after mid-August 1945 all involve ignoring the reality that this requires accepting larger numbers of deaths among actual noncombatants.

In sum, the “moral” universe reflected in a vast swath of the critical literature on the end of the Pacific War reflects not a comprehensive scrutiny of all relevant considerations, but effectively erects a hierarchy of victimhood in which the sole segment of humanity entitled to absolute immunity from harm comprises a group of combatants and noncombatants in two cities of the aggressor nation. The death and suffering of actual noncombatants in the victim nations – not to mention Japanese noncombatants falling into Soviet hands or Japanese adults converted into combatants or offered up as famine victims by the callousness of Japanese leaders – are customarily not even mentioned.

The conventional dispute over the causes of the Japanese surrender pits the atomic bombs against Soviet entry, but there was more at play than just these two events. After the war, preserving Hirohito’s seat on the throne animated a Japanese effort to conceal or downplay two other factors. The first was that the emperor, Kido, and others feared something more than atomic bombs or Soviet intervention. On August 13, Navy Minister Yonai labeled the bombs and Soviet intervention as “gifts from the gods” because, he disclosed, “this way we don’t have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances.” Yonai’s comment explains a telling but veiled admission by the emperor. In both the imperial rescripts (proclamations) issued by Emperor Hirohito, the famous one of August 15 broadcast by radio to the whole nation, and the less well known one to the armed forces on August 17, he alludes to the “domestic” situation. These are all references back to the issue raised by Kido in June: the deteriorating situation brought on by blockade and bombing could trigger an internal revolt that would topple not only Hirohito from his throne, but also destroy the whole imperial institution.

The second issue the Japanese were eager to conceal was the uncertain compliance of the armed forces with the surrender. Keeping Hirohito on the throne after the war required that any question be stilled about the possibility of an internal revolt by disgruntled subjects, or that the armed forces might ignore his orders. It was only later disclosures from “Magic” and long concealed Japanese sources that dragged these factors into full light.

The next important point to understand is that the conventional view that ending the war required only one decision in Tokyo reflects a myopic vision that confuses a near miraculous deliverance as an inevitable outcome. Ending the war, or more precisely ending all *combat*, really required two steps: someone with legitimate authority had to make the political decision that Japan would surrender and then Japan’s armed forces had to comply with that decision. Finally, the surest guide to analyzing what

ended the war is to look at the contemporary evidence, not recollections withered by time or distorted by postwar agendas.

The fact is that the legal government of Japan, the Suzuki cabinet, of its own accord never agreed to surrender on acceptable terms. The legitimate authority that produced the surrender of Japan was the emperor. Looking at his contemporary statements, he repeatedly underscored three points. The first of these is concern over the "domestic situation." He also explicitly cited two military factors: inadequate preparation to resist the expected American invasion and the vast destructiveness of atomic and conventional air attacks. In making the most important decision of his life in the early morning of August 10 that Japan should surrender, there is no evidence whatsoever that he mentioned Soviet intervention – not just the official records which might well be deemed suspect as subject to manipulation, but nowhere in the myriad secondary and tertiary sources such as diaries of lesser officials where such admissions (like Yonai's comments to his aide on August 13) would have been documented if they existed. In the imperial rescript broadcast on August 15, he referred to atomic bombs, but made no reference to Soviet intervention.

The August 17 imperial rescript to the armed forces is silent on atomic weapons, but does refer to Soviet entry into the war. Does this signify that Soviet entry, not atomic bombs, was the real reason for surrender? The answer rests in understanding that ending the war required two steps. At the same time the emperor ordered the rescript of August 15 prepared, he also ordered drafting of the rescript to the armed forces that was issued on August 17 – a powerful piece of evidence on his doubts about compliance. Toshi Hasegawa's *Racing the Enemy* (2005) makes the important point that both rescripts were prepared at the same time, but the rescript to the armed forces was not issued for several days (Hasegawa 2005, pp. 240, 250). As the diary of the vice chief of staff of the Imperial Army indicates, both he and other top officers doubted compliance with a surrender order even from the emperor. Events, as we have seen, soon validated their doubts. Once the circumstance and timing of the August 17 rescript is understood, the reason for highlighting Soviet intervention over the atomic bombs is obvious: Soviet intervention directly threatened and was understandable to recalcitrant overseas commanders; atomic bombs were not understood and posed no similar threat to overseas commands.

In this analysis, the primacy of place goes to the atomic bombs over Soviet intervention. They moved the emperor and without his intervention, the surrender process would have never started. But Soviet intervention was also important. It is the factor that weighs heavily on enforcing compliance with the surrender and without such compliance the fighting would not have halted. Both of these factors, however, worked jointly with the cumulative effects of the blockade and bombardment strategy that undermined the confidence of key leaders about the preservation of the imperial institution in the face of revolt from within.

What then beckons as topics for further exploration? One important issue is exactly how complacent Japanese uniformed and civilian leaders were over the prospect of massive civilian deaths from starvation in 1946, even if *Ketsu Go* achieved its goal of a negotiated peace. This is closely connected to the real role of the "domestic situation" as a key catalyst pushing Emperor Hirohito, Kido, Yonai, and other leaders to ending the war in August 1945. Even with only the evidence now available, it seems reasonable to foresee future discussions of these events moving beyond a rigidly confined

controversy over the primacy of atomic weapons or Soviet intervention in obtaining the surrender of Japan and her armed forces. A search of the archives of the former Soviet Union may yield information on the numbers and fate of the hundreds of thousands of Japanese who remain missing in Soviet captivity in 1945. Finally, further exploration of the multiple implications for other Asian peoples of the continuation of the war for weeks or months beyond August 1945 would add vital context to what promises to be a long enduring controversy.

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PART III

Multinational and Transnational Zones of Combat: Strategy

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Axis Coalition Building

RICHARD L. DiNARDO

World War II might be described as a conflict fought by contending coalitions. The Allied coalition, however, has received far more attention than its Axis counterpart. In looking at the Axis as a coalition, however, one sees relatively few similarities to its Allied counterpart, while the differences are far starker.

The Axis, like many wartime coalitions, was created largely after the onset of war. The Axis, in both its construction and organization, reflected Adolf Hitler's approach to the conduct of foreign policy, his ideology, and his sense of opportunism. In his magisterial survey of Hitler's prewar foreign policy, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*, Weinberg (1970) notes that Hitler consistently sought to avoid multilateral diplomatic arrangements. Instead, Hitler preferred a series of bilateral relationships, each of which he could adhere to, modify, or break as he desired (Weinberg 1970, pp. 2–3).

The ideological aspect of Hitler's foreign policy was manifested in two ways. Hitler's ideology played a critical part in the alliance with Italy. In *Hitler's Second Book* (2003), the unpublished manuscript Hitler dictated to his publisher Max Amann in the summer of 1928, Hitler advocated an alliance with Benito Mussolini's Italy (pp. 175–223). The idea of an alliance with Italy was largely based on ideology, as it would be an otherwise unnatural arrangement. Italy and Germany had been on opposite sides in World War I, and the two countries, as DiNardo (2005) pointed out in *Germany and the Axis Powers*, had little else in common (pp. 24–25).

The second way in which Hitler's ideology was manifested in his foreign policy was in its goals. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler (1971) outlined what he saw as the need for Germany to secure territory to allow it to claim its rightful place as a world power (p. 643). In his *Second Book*, Hitler expanded on this considerably, as well as on Germany's foreign relations in a broader context. Although put forth more by implication than by explicit pronouncement, Hitler made it clear that Germany must become a world power. This was clearly consistent with his racially based ideology.

Aside from Hitler, there were two other elements that were deeply involved in the creation of the Axis. The first was the German Foreign Ministry. While the loyalty of Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Hitler was assured, there was some question about the career foreign service personnel. Nonetheless, although senior German diplomats such as Constantine von Neurath and Ulrich von Hassell did not necessarily share Hitler's longer-range goals – and in Hassell's case later actively opposed him – they certainly agreed with Hitler's desire to overturn the Versailles settlement (Weinberg 1970, p. 49).

The German military also played a major role in the conduct of Hitler's foreign policy. One of the key forms of diplomatic currency was arms, especially tanks, aircraft, and other types of heavy equipment. The handling of negotiations regarding these kinds of items was left to the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) in general, and often to the individual services for particular details.

The matter of who was responsible for what was further confused by the muddled lines of authority in Hitler's Germany. As Kershaw (1998–2000) noted in his two-volume biography *Hitler*, the *Führer* preferred that people have relatively undefined parameters in terms of their jobs. The maze of overlapping authorities served to make Hitler the indispensable man (Kershaw 1998–2000, pp. 529–530). Furthermore, a number of people in Hitler's government held several positions. Heinrich Himmler, for example, aside from being head of the SS, was also chief of the German Police. In terms of the economic aspects of foreign policy, the key individual was Hermann Göring. Aside from being the Minister for Aviation and the commander of the *Luftwaffe*, Göring was also head of the Four Year Plan, thus giving him some considerable influence when it came to arms production. In addition, Göring had a number of international contacts, such as Mussolini's aviation minister, Italo Balbo (DiNardo 2005, pp. 28–29).

The creation of the Axis really began with Hitler's courtship of Mussolini. This was based both on ideology and on Hitler's conception of how foreign policy was made. For Hitler the formulation of foreign policy was the province of a country's leader who, as Hitler indicated in those meal time monologues known as his *Tischgespräche*, published later in English as his *Table Talk* (2000), would be the leading personality in the country (pp. 10, 49, 121). In this regard, Hitler always had a great deal of admiration for Mussolini.

Hitler and Mussolini met for the first time in Venice on June 14, 1934. Described in detail by Corvaja (2001) in *Hitler and Mussolini: The Secret Meetings*, their first meeting was an encounter that could not be described as successful by any measure. Hitler, distracted by the impending climax of the clash between him and the head of the Nazi Party SA (*Sturmabteilung*), Ernst Röhm, cut a very poor figure in comparison to Mussolini, then at the height of his power and prestige (Corvaja 2001, p. 32). The *Duce* also proved to be a most patronizing host to his German guest. Relations were further strained by the attempted coup of the Austrian Nazi Party against the government of Engelbert Dollfuss. The Austrian government survived, although Dollfuss, a personal friend of Mussolini, was killed.

These problems did not prevent Germany and Italy from drawing closer to each other. Mussolini's desire to expand Italian power in the Mediterranean was bound to bring Italy into conflict with France and Britain. Tensions were exacerbated by the British and French reaction to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. The imposition of sanctions by

the League of Nations against Italy, instigated by Britain and France, while ultimately ineffective, enraged Mussolini. The conflict over Ethiopia effectively precluded any possibility of a combination of Italy, France, and Britain against Germany (Weinberg 1970, p. 269). The ultimate result was the conclusion of the alliance between Germany and Italy on October 23, 1936. Interestingly, it was Mussolini who used the word "Axis" to describe the Italo-German alliance, suggesting that all the other countries in Europe would revolve around it (DiNardo 2005, p. 27).

The second member of the Axis was Japan. The story of the relationship between Hitler's Germany and imperial Japan involved a series of ups and downs. Germany sought better relations with Japan initially for economic reasons. The relationship between Germany and Japan steadily improved as both countries were drawn closer by tension with the Soviet Union. Germany and Japan, along with Italy, signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, a treaty theoretically directed against the Soviet Union, but in reality nothing more than a symbolic gesture (Corvaja 2001, p. 69).

In Japan's case, tension with the Soviet Union broke out into open warfare along the border between Soviet controlled Mongolia and Japanese dominated Manchuria. The ensuing fighting resulted in two severe drubbings of the Japanese by the Red Army. The Japanese, however, evaded attempts by Ribbentrop to bring Japan into a formal alliance with Germany. The Germans were also annoyed by what they regarded as unwelcome attempts by Japan to mediate between Germany and Poland (Weinberg 1970, pp. 601–602).

German–Japanese relations were considerably strained when Hitler radically altered course and dispatched Ribbentrop to Moscow to sign the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. Hitler, as always playing his cards close to the chest, gave no indication to the Japanese government that he was even considering such a move. Consequently, the Japanese government was rather embarrassed by the pact. German success in 1939 and 1940, however, facilitated Japan's expansionist policy in Southeast Asia. In addition both Germany and Japan had strained relations with the United States and the Soviet Union by that time. Thus, on September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy, and Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact. The treaty effectively divided the world between them, with Germany and Italy being predominant in Europe while Japan would enjoy similar status in the Pacific. The three partners also pledged to come to each other's aid if "attacked," although the definition of the term was to be determined later. The Tripartite Pact marked the effective high point of Japanese participation as part of the Axis. Although Hitler regarded the pact as a method by which the United States could be effectively contained by means of the Japanese Navy, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano (who was also Mussolini's son-in-law) thought that Japan was too distant to be of any practical assistance to the European end of the Axis (DiNardo 2005, pp. 93–94). Military events proved Ciano right especially later in the war. Although Japan was a member of the Axis, the treaty with Germany formed what Meskill (1966) accurately described in the title of her book, *Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance*. In fact, the inclusion of Japan in the Axis provided a boon of intelligence to the Allies. Boyd (1993) noted in his book, *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945*, that the Japanese military attaché to Germany, General Oshima Hiroshi, sent voluminous and informative reports on Germany back to Tokyo, which were decoded and read by the Allied intelligence services (p. 39).

German relations with its other Axis allies were determined as much by circumstance as by ideology. Sheer circumstance determined, for example, how Finland ended up as a member of the Axis, as well as its conduct as a member of the Axis. In the Soviet-Finish War of 1939–1940, Finland, owing to a stout defense commanded by Field Marshal Karl von Mannerheim, defied Stalin for months and gained sympathy in the international community, as outlined by Warner (1967) in *Marshal Mannerheim and the Finns*. Ultimately, however, Finland was forced to cede territory to the USSR (p. 183).

Although conscious of Finland's desire to regain its lost territory, Germany approached Finland cautiously in early 1941, asking what Finland's attitude would be in the event of a military confrontation between Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the government of Risto Ryti said it would remain neutral if such an event came to pass, the possibility was also held out that if attacked by the Soviets, Finland would fight by Germany's side against Soviet Russia (DiNardo 2005, p. 102). The Ryti government was finally informed by Hitler on the evening of June 21, 1941 that Germany would indeed attack the Soviet Union the next day. The Finns expected that they would be drawn into the war on the German side because of some action by the Soviets. The expectations of the Ryti government proved correct. After major Soviet air attacks were launched on June 25, 1941 against Finnish cities, including Helsinki, Finland declared war on the Soviet Union the following day (DiNardo 2005, p. 106).

Romania's participation in the Axis is inevitably tied up with that of Hungary. Just as Germany sought to overturn the Versailles Treaty, Hungary desired to reverse the Treaty of Trianon (1920) by which Hungary ceded territory to Romania and Czechoslovakia. The territory lost to Czechoslovakia was regained after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by the Munich agreement. Hitler and Mussolini, acting as arbiters, returned Slovak territory to Hungary in 1938 with the First Vienna Award (Weinberg 1970, p. 472).

For Romania, 1940 proved to be as disastrous as 1920 was for Hungary. Romania was forced to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. Romania's discomfiture was increased immediately after this when Hitler arbitrated the Second Vienna Award, mandating that Romania return half of Transylvania to Hungary. The new Romanian leader, Marshal Ion Antonescu, indicated that while he would abide by these agreements for the time being, he would seek to reverse these verdicts (DiNardo 2005, p. 96). Once it was effectively stripped of a huge chunk of territory, Romania's only means of getting these lost lands back was by alliance with Germany. In addition, Romania was Germany's main supplier of oil, while Germany, as pointed out by Pearton (1971) in *Oil and the Romanian State*, had supplanted France as the main purveyor of weaponry to Romania. The trade of oil for arms was the basis for the Oil Pact signed by Germany and Romania on 27 May 1940 (p. 251). The Germans also provided military assistance in the form of the German Military Mission to Romania, plus some army divisions to deter further Soviet encroachment on Romanian territory.

German relations with Romania were made somewhat more complex by the presence of other organizations, most notably the SS. The bone of contention here between Germany and Romania was the large ethnic German community in Romania, which represented a pool of manpower that could be tapped for recruits by either the SS or by the Romanian Army. Ultimately that issue was solved by the

German minister in Romania, Manfred von Killinger, using Nazi ideology to persuade SS Chief Heinrich Himmler to cut back on his recruiting efforts (DiNardo 2005, p. 101).

As with all the other Axis powers, Hitler only informed Antonescu of the coming attack on the Soviet Union a few days before the event. Like the Finns, the common expectation between the Germans and the Romanians was that the Soviets would provide a *casus belli* that would bring Romania into the war. Again, the Soviet Union lived up to German and Romanian expectations, launching air attacks on the Romanian oil fields at Ploesti and Romania's major Black Sea port, Constanta. Fortunately for the Axis powers, the Soviet attack was successfully fended off by the German and Romanian air defenses (DiNardo 2005, p. 110). Shortly thereafter, Romanian and German forces joined Operation *Barbarossa* by attacking into Bessarabia across the Pruth River.

Over the next several months, Romania recovered all of the territory lost to the Soviet Union the preceding year. Other territories would also be given to Romania, but this matter is invariably related to the issue of Hungary.

Of all of the active members of the Axis, perhaps the least willing was Hungary. Although Hungary was also caught in the grip of a virulent nationalist mood, marked by the emergence of an indigenous fascist organization, the Arrow Cross party, the country was not entirely comfortable with an alliance with Germany. In addition, although Hungary had its share of anti-Semites, many Hungarians, including the regent, Admiral Mikos Horthy, were disgusted by Germany's genocidal policies towards Jews in occupied Poland.

Nonetheless, Hungary was drawn into Germany's orbit because of the concern that a closer Romanian relationship with Germany would result in a reversal of the Second Vienna Award, as well as foreclosing any possibility of Hungary regaining the rest of Transylvania from Romania. The first outcome of this concern over Romanian-German friendship was the involvement of Hungary in the overrunning of Yugoslavia. Eby (1998) makes clear in his book *Hungary at War* that this choice by the Horthy government led to the suicide of Hungarian Foreign Minister Pal Teleki (p. 15).

Initially, Hungary was not slated to play any part in the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet bombing of the Hungarian town of Kassa, however, brought Hungary into the war. The scale of Hungarian participation was kept to a minimum by the Horthy government so that the Hungarian presence on the eastern front in 1941 was limited to the Carpathian Army Group, a force whose size was only two corps (DiNardo 2005, p. 122). Relations between Hungary and Romania proved a nonstop diplomatic headache for Hitler. Although both Romania and Hungary committed forces to combat against the Soviet Union in 1941, the simple fact was that both countries were more interested in fighting each other than the Russians. As Axworthy, Scafes, and Craciunoiu (1995) pointed out in *Third Axis/Fourth Ally*, this antagonism between Hungary and Romania broke into open fighting in 1942 (p. 73). The bone of contention between the two was, of course, Transylvania. As Case (2009) showed in her book *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II*, both countries regarded Transylvania as the "cradle" of their ensuing respective historical development (p. 10). In addition, Romania sought better relations with the minor German satellite states of Slovakia and Croatia, which the Hungarians greeted with considerable concern, fearing diplomatic encirclement.

Hitler desperately sought to keep Romania and Hungary from going to war with each other, especially with the war against the Soviet Union dragging on. To mollify Romania's desire to reverse the Second Vienna Award, Hitler allocated the area along the Black Sea coast up to Odessa, called Transnistria, to Romania. Equally cynically, Hitler calculated that the Romanian troops required to garrison the territory would mean that they would not be available for operations against Hungary (DiNardo 2005, p. 130). In an attempt to attain some settlement between Romania and Hungary, Hitler enlisted Mussolini's aid. Meeting on 29 April 1942 at Klessheim, the two dictators agreed to create a commission headed by Ribbentrop and Ciano, which would come up with a solution amenable to both Romania and Hungary. In the end, however, these efforts came to naught. The two minor Axis allies would remain at odds throughout the war.

The other country that joined the Tripartite Pact early on was Bulgaria. Like Germany, Bulgaria was a defeated member of the Central Powers in World War I. As such, Bulgaria sought some degree of revision of the postwar settlement. The Bulgarian government of King Boris saw its opportunity and thus joined the Tripartite Pact on March 1, 1941. Bulgaria's actual participation in the war, however, was limited to some participation in the overrunning of Yugoslavia and Greece in the spring of 1941. Because of the strong pro-Russian (not necessarily pro-Soviet) sentiment in Bulgaria, its forces played no part in the invasion of the Soviet Union (DiNardo 2005, p. 93).

Several other German allies are also worthy of mention, even though they were not formally part of the Axis. They might be described as Hitler's creations, in that they were the result of Germany's conquests, both diplomatic and military. Slovakia was created by Germany's occupation of the rump state created in the aftermath of the Munich agreement. Croatia was born through the German destruction of Yugoslavia in the Spring 1941. Although both countries later signed on to the Tripartite Pact, their participation in the Axis was minimal, extending to the fielding of very small forces to serve on the eastern front.

Another country that was a creation of Hitler's was Vichy France. Born of Germany's crushing victory over the French, Vichy France comprised what was left of France that was not occupied by the Germans. Headed by the aged Marshal Henri Petain and Pierre Laval, the Vichy government collaborated with the Germans, especially in pursuing anti-Semitic policies. Vichy France and Germany also agreed to cooperate with each other at a meeting on 30 October 1942, marked by the photographed handshake between Petain and Hitler. In reality, as Peter Jackson and Simon Kitson (2007) argue in "The Paradoxes of Vichy Foreign Policy, 1940–1942," in the book of essays edited by Jonathan Adelman, *Hitler and His Allies in World War II* (2007), the ability of the Vichy government to undertake a foreign policy that was anything other than impotent was virtually impossible (p. 115). Never even a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, Vichy France was ultimately occupied by the Germans in December 1942, and Petain was removed. A Vichy government was maintained by the Germans in Sigmaringen, limping along until the Allies officially put Vichy out of its misery in 1945.

The final country towards which Hitler made serious attempts to enlist as an ally was Spain. This began with Hitler's aid to Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War. Germany provided material support in the form of the Luftwaffe's Condor

Legion, thus providing Franco's Nationalist forces with air power in sufficient quantity and quality to perform a variety of tasks (DiNardo 2005, p. 29).

Diplomatically, Spain did eventually join the Italo-German alliance, but carefully avoided any commitment to joining the Axis in the war. Hitler's meeting with Franco at Hendaye on October 23, 1940, well described by Goda (1998) in *Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path toward America*, proved singularly unproductive (p. 105). Hitler sought Spanish entry into the war against Britain, in return for the relatively limited gain of Gibraltar, while ignoring Spain's interest in colonies in northwest Africa. Franco responded with a list of raw materials, foodstuffs, and arms so vast as to virtually guarantee a German refusal. With neither dictator backing off, all the meeting resulted in was a vague promise by Franco that Spain would enter the war at some unspecified time in the future. Franco's Foreign Minister, Serano Suner, proved equally impervious to Ribbentrop's blandishments (Kershaw 1998, p. 330). Ultimately, Franco was able to avoid becoming embroiled in the war. Spain's involvement was limited to the dispatch of the Blue Division to serve on the eastern front. Christian Leitz argues with much justice that the relationship between Germany and Spain amounted to no more than a "quasi-alliance" (Leitz 2007, p. 186).

Normally, coalitions are created around the concept of all members sharing a common interest. While this will generate a certain degree of tension among the members of the alliance, a common interest will also generate shared commitment and compromises that can smooth out problems. The Axis was a clear departure from this practice, and this contributed much to the alliance's ultimate defeat and dissolution. None of the members of the Axis shared a major common goal. While Hitler sought to extend dominion first over Europe and then later the world, Mussolini's desires were centered around the Mediterranean. The major objectives of Antonescu and Horthy revolved around each other as opposed to the Soviet Union. Finland's participation in the Axis was based solely on the desire to regain territory lost in the Winter War of 1939–1940. Japanese aims in the Pacific were in no way related to German aims regarding Europe and America.

Italy, Finland, and Japan all pursued the concept of "Parallel War" vis-à-vis Germany. Although all of them fought a common enemy alongside Germany, each did so on its own terms, often keeping its ally in total ignorance of its intentions. The most notable example of this was Mussolini's ill-considered invasion of Greece, sprung on Hitler as payback for the *Führer's* previous surprises with which the *Duce* had to put up (Corvaja 2001, p. 171). For his part, Hitler kept his Axis allies in the dark as to when he would attack the Soviet Union. Germany and Japan conducted their wars in relative ignorance of the other's progress. In the summer of 1943, for example, OKW chief Wilhelm Keitel admitted to having little to no knowledge of the course of affairs in the Pacific (DiNardo 2005, p. 177).

Hitler managed the Axis in keeping with his general approach to foreign policy. There is no Axis equivalent to the meetings of the Allied "Big Three" (Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin) at Tehran in November 1943 and at Yalta in February 1945. In this regard, looking at Hitler's schedule in the spring of 1943, after the Stalingrad disaster, is most instructive. Instead of having all of his allies meet with him together at one time, a series of bilateral meetings were arranged. Over the course of April 1943, Mussolini, Antonescu, and Horthy all trooped over to

Klessheim for meetings with Hitler, but at no time were all of them in the same place at the same time.

Matters were made worse by the fact that the leaders coming to see Hitler had diametrically opposed ideas as to dealing with problems at hand. Mussolini desired a separate peace with the Soviet Union to allow for a concerted effort against the western Allies. Antonescu sought precisely the opposite course, a peace with the western Allies to allow maximum resources to be directed against the now looming Soviet threat (DiNardo 2005, p. 191).

The lack of a common purpose on the part of the members of the Axis contributed to the dissolution of the alliance, especially after the fortunes of war had turned against Germany. After Stalingrad made the reading of the tealeaves easy, Germany's allies sought to abandon the war and the Axis under the best circumstances they could. The country that was most fortunate in this respect was Finland. Convinced by early 1943 that Germany was losing the war the Finns, with urging by both the United States and Sweden, began looking for a means by which they could leave the war. Although it took time, Finland was able to sign an armistice and later a peace agreement with the Soviet Union in September 1944. Although Finland had to accede to the territorial losses suffered in the Russo-Finnish War, support from the United States insured that Finland would not become a Soviet satellite. Finland was also required to sever all relations with Germany, a demand with which Finland complied (DiNardo 2005, pp. 180–182).

Another Axis member that tried to defect as early as possible was Hungary. Peace feelers to the Allies were put out in early 1943, an act that outraged Hitler and earned Horthy a great deal of abuse at Hitler's hands at their very acrimonious meeting at Klessheim in April 1943 (Kershaw 1998, p. 582).

Hungary retracted these peace feelers, but eventually restarted them. Ultimately Hitler put an end to Hungary as a member of the Axis by occupying the country and arresting Horthy and his family. The Germans set up a puppet government under Ferenc Szalasi, leader of the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross party (DiNardo 2005, p. 189). Like a number of the other puppet governments set up by the Germans, the Szalasi government was moved to Germany, while Budapest was besieged by the Red Army. Like the rump Vichy regime, the Szalasi government was captured. Szalasi and a number of his cohorts were tried and executed (Eby 1998, pp. 296–297).

In the cases of Bulgaria, Romania, and Italy, they all ended up changing sides. Bulgaria switched sides as soon as the Red Army, following the Soviet Union's declaration of war, moved into Bulgarian territory in September 1944. Romania remained an active part of the Axis until the summer 1944, but after Stalingrad, most Romanian forces were withdrawn. Another disaster was suffered in the Crimea in spring 1944. By that time the Antonescu government had been severely weakened, and the relationship between Antonescu and the Romanian royal family had deteriorated considerably. After the Soviet victory at Jassy on August 20, 1944, King Michael acted three days later. The King dismissed Antonescu, appointed General Constantine Sanatescu as prime minister and announced that Romania had joined the Allies (Axworthy, Scafes, and Craciunoiu 1995, p. 179).

The twin disasters at Stalingrad and in North Africa had severely damaged Mussolini's position. As it became clear that the Allies were going to press further with offensive action in the Mediterranean, Italo-German relations steadily deteriorated,

accompanied by an abundance of mutual recriminations. Italy's sagging fortunes persuaded Mussolini's opponents and the royal family to make its move when the Allies invaded Sicily. Mussolini was voted out of power at the Fascist Grand Council meeting on the night of July 24, 1943, the *Duce* was dismissed from his office the following day by King Victor Emmanuel III. Mussolini was then placed under arrest (Corvaja 2001, p. 320).

The new Italian government, headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, began immediate negotiations with the Allies with regard to Italy's switching sides. It quickly became clear, however, that the Badoglio government would not make such a move without Allied forces on the ground in Italy itself. Plans were made, however, and when the Allies landed at Salerno and Calabria on September 9, 1943, the King, Badoglio, and his ministers fled by ship to the British base at Malta. Italy then switched sides, renouncing the Tripartite Pact and going over to the Allies (DiNardo 2005, p. 179).

Italy's defection came as no surprise to Hitler. After Mussolini's dismissal Hitler ordered plans drawn up for the occupation of Italy under the ironic code name of AXIS (Kershaw 1998–2000, vol. II, p. 600). After Italy's defection, these plans were put into effect. In addition, Hitler dispatched a commando team led by SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny to free Mussolini from his captivity at the hotel atop Gran Sasso Mountain, a mission successfully accomplished on September 12, 1943 (Corvaja 2001, p. 328).

Now freed, Mussolini decided to recreate a fascist government, although this could only be done with German help. Nevertheless, Mussolini pressed ahead and created the Republic of Salò. All it provided, however, was an indigenous administrative authority for those areas held by the German military. From a diplomatic perspective, it meant nothing; the final meetings between Hitler and Mussolini were nothing more than mere exercises in mutual psychotherapy.

As the German position in Italy collapsed, Mussolini sought to flee north with them. Caught by Italian partisans, Mussolini was executed, along with his mistress Clara Petacci and former Fascist leader Achille Starace, on April 28, 1945. Their bodies were then hung from some scaffolding in the great square of Milan, captured in one of the most famous photographs of World War II.

Japan, of course, ended up fighting a parallel war all by itself against the Allies, with the exception of the Soviet Union, which only entered the war on 7 August 1945. Any type of coordination was out of the question, as both Germany and Japan kept each other in the dark as to the state of affairs in their respective wars. Aside from some economic assistance in the form of raw materials delivered from Japan by submarine and technical plans for weapons, cooperation between the two original signatories of the Tripartite Pact was almost nonexistent (Adelman 2007, p. 78).

Ultimately, the coalition built by Hitler reflected not only his approach to foreign policy, but also the method by which he ruled Germany. The conduct of foreign policy at times fell prey to competing interests, some of which ended up in direct opposition to the aims of that policy. The activities of Gotlob Berger, Himmler's chief recruiter of manpower for the SS, often served to fray relations with those countries, most notably Romania and Finland (DiNardo 2005, p. 183).

Aside from the chaotic conduct of policy, Germany and its Axis allies had aims that rarely coincided and often conflicted with each other. In the end, the Axis lacked an overarching vision or purpose that served to bind its members together. Like a sand castle, it may have looked strong, but could not withstand even a moderately strong tide.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Strategies, Commands, and Tactics, 1939–1941

TALBOT C. IMLAY

The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 took no one by surprise. Adolf Hitler might not have wanted a war with Britain and France at this precise moment, but he was determined to destroy Poland by military means regardless of the response of decision makers in London and Paris. British and French leaders, for their part, certainly did not seek a war, but they would not – and could not – stand aside if the *Wehrmacht* marched into Poland. For Soviet leaders, the question by summer 1939 was not so much whether there would be a European war in the very near future but rather what would be the Soviet Union's role. Lingering questions on this score disappeared in late August with the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, as Josef Stalin opted to accept Hitler's proposal to partition Poland and additional areas of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of domination. In Rome, Benito Mussolini appeared more disappointed than surprised by the outbreak of war, principally because Italy was in no position to intervene actively at Germany's side. Across the Atlantic, the Americans had long accepted the likelihood of a European war. Following the Munich conference in September 1938, the Roosevelt administration had abandoned the search for international disarmament in favor of national rearmament, a clear sign of its declining faith in the possibility of peace.

In a deeper sense, the war also came as no surprise. In all the major countries, a variety of people – General Staff officers, civilian bureaucrats, commentators of various sorts – had been thinking about the nature and course of a future war for the past twenty years. Unlike before 1914, moreover, this activity did not focus solely on the opening battles between opposing armed forces. Rather, taking the Great War as a model, planners and pundits adopted a more comprehensive vision, one that reflected the belief that the next war would be a lengthy and grueling affair demanding the mobilization of national resources on a massive scale. A future war, in short, would be a “total” war. To be sure, not all participants hoped that such a war would become a reality, though some certainly did. But whether welcomed or not, World

War II broadly resembled interwar predictions: the war in Europe lasted six years, during which tens of million of people would be killed, entire cities and regions laid to waste, and nations and societies pushed to their limits, if not beyond.

And yet World War II held more than a few surprises. For the participants involved, the course of events often differed in important respects from what they had expected. The defeat of France in spring 1940 is probably the most obvious example, but other surprises included the relatively limited number of civilian (as opposed to military) casualties before spring 1941, which belies the description of the war as a whole as “total.” One purpose of the chapter is to explore the “surprising” nature of World War II, particularly during its opening phase (from September 1939 to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941), by examining three important aspects of warfare: strategy, command, and tactics. For each of these aspects, the war in Europe proved to be a haphazard, improvised, and uncertain affair. A second and related purpose of the chapter is to suggest promising directions for future research. A good deal of recent scholarship points to the unanticipated nature of the European war during 1939–1941. But while valuable, much of this scholarship focuses on single countries. Needed are more multinational studies that compare developments across countries or that trace the interaction of developments between countries. Such studies would help us better to understand how the different nations and armed services conceived of future war as well as why they waged the war that they did.

Strategy is a contested term. Numerous definitions as well as multiple qualifiers exist, such as “grand” strategy or “military” strategy. Rather than engage in a definitional debate, for the purposes of this chapter strategy refers to how political and military leaders conceived of using the resources (military and other) of the nation to achieve victory. For these leaders the key question was how to win the war.

It is generally accepted that the major belligerents went to war in 1939 with what Robert Young, referring to the French case, termed a “long war” strategy (Young 1978a). Drawing lessons from the experience of 1914–1918, French and British planners believed that the next war would be a lengthy one in which the weight of economic resources would be decisive. Since Germany possessed a head start in rearmament and thus an immediate military advantage, Anglo-French strategy, articulated during staff talks in spring 1939, called for a defensive posture during the opening phase of the war. Avoiding rash and costly offensive action, Britain and France would mobilize the superior economic resources of their empires while weakening Germany through the judicious application of economic warfare (principally by blockade). When, at some undefined moment, the balance of strength tipped decisively in their favor, the British and French armed forces would take offensive action, dealing a series of war-winning military blows to Germany. The precept behind this strategy was that time was an ally. As a 1939 Anglo-French planning paper concluded: “Once we had been able to develop the full fighting strength of the British and French Empires, we should regard the outcome of the war with confidence.” Or as Anglo-French propaganda claimed during 1939–1940: “we will win because we are the strongest” (Imlay 2004, p. 333).

Germany’s leaders also conceived of a long war. Several decades ago, Alan Milward argued that the Nazi regime pursued a “blitzkrieg strategy” predicated on limited but concentrated rearmament that would permit the *Wehrmacht* to win quick wars against its adversaries, thereby obviating the need for a more thorough mobilization of the

economy and of the German people (Milward 1977). Owing to the work of Christoph Buchheim, Adam Tooze, and Richard Overy among many others, it is now clear that Nazi Germany rearmed in depth as well as in breadth in order to prepare the Reich for the war of imperial conquest that Hitler sought. As the regime devoted an increasingly larger share of national revenue and resources to arms production, civilian standards of living steadily fell from the mid-1930s, even if 1942–1943 marked the beginning of a more drastic decline (Overy 1994; Tooze 2006; Buchheim 2010). More generally, as Andreas Hillgruber argued long ago and Adam Tooze recently confirmed, Hitler thought in terms of an eventual intercontinental war with the British Empire and the United States, though he likely believed that this global clash would come after his death (Hillgruber 1981; Tooze 2006). In any event, a series of short wars was not what the Nazi regime envisaged.

From the massive scope of Soviet rearmament programs beginning at the end of the 1920s, it appears that Moscow also conceived of a long war (Harrison 1985; Stone 2000). Indeed, as Joseph Maiolo (2010) contends in *Cry Havoc*, the Soviets were the first power to embark on a sustained rearmament effort, and in this sense can be said to have triggered the arms race before World War II. In a recent article, James Harris argues that Moscow's decision was driven by the ideologically rooted perception that the Soviet Union was surrounded by aggressive enemies determined to crush Bolshevism (Harris 2007). For Stalin, the ultimate success of the revolution would depend on the Red Army's ability to overwhelm the military forces of the capitalist world. The Soviet Union, in other words, was locked into a lengthy and existential struggle with the outside world that would be waged by both military and nonmilitary means. As for the United States, given that its potential intervention in a European war would require the massive expansion of its puny armed forces together with an extensive conversion of industrial production, it too conceived of war as a lengthy affair. Although, when it came, the American military and economic mobilization would inspire universal awe (and some fear) due to its speed and extent, in 1939 this performance lay well in the future. For both Americans and non-Americans, the wise and safe assumption was that it would take a great deal of time before the United States became, in Paul Koistinen's words, the "arsenal of World War II" (Koistinen 2004).

The sole exception to the belief in a long war was Fascist Italy. MacGregor Knox and John Gooch have both convincingly shown that, despite Mussolini's grandiose ambitions of creating an empire in the Mediterranean, Italy simply lacked the resources to wage a lengthy war of conquest (Knox 1984; Gooch 2007). When Italy entered the war in June 1940, Mussolini did so in the belief that Britain was doomed and that easy pickings were to be had in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Even then, Davide Rodogno notes, quick victories were essential, for otherwise Italy risked becoming completely dependent on its German ally – as, in fact, turned out to be the case (Rodogno 2006).

The widespread belief in a long war, however, did not long survive the outbreak of the conflict. Robert Young and Peter Jackson among others have emphasized the absolute importance of Britain for French planners, with the result that the history of interwar French strategy can be summarized as the determined pursuit of a British alliance (Young 1978b; Jackson 2000). Yet French strategic calculations were also based on the existence of a strong eastern front against Germany, which would not only force the *Wehrmacht* to disperse its strength, but also deprive the Germans

of access to the resources of Eastern Europe needed to fuel their war effort. Significantly, with the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, followed by Poland’s rapid defeat, French hopes for an eastern front collapsed, and with them a pillar of its long war strategy. Almost immediately, as Talbot Imlay has argued, French political and military leaders began to question the assumption that time favored the Allies, as the fear mounted that Germany would expand its sway over Eastern Europe. Worse still, the French began to brood on the nightmare scenario of a permanent German-Soviet alliance against which the Allies would be powerless: a German-Soviet partnership would constitute an economic and military colossus, one that would easily sweep aside French resistance. Interestingly, British officials, who were in constant contact with their French counterparts, began to share their ally’s fears that time was enemy. Thus, in March 1940, the Joint Planning Committee, which reported to the Chiefs of Staff, announced that “Time ... is on our side only if we take the fullest possible advantage of it. It is essential ... that we should pass to the offensive at the earliest possible moment” (Imlay 2003, p. 109).

Growing fears that time was an enemy are worth underscoring in light of the popular view of the period from September 1939 to May 1940 as one of Anglo-French passivity – a view reflected in the labels “Phony War” and “*Drôle de guerre*.” Yet rather than passivity, these nine months witnessed a radicalization of military strategy as the French and British sought with growing desperation to weaken the Germans decisively and even to defeat Germany before it became too powerful. As early as fall 1939 French planners had proposed landing an expeditionary force somewhere in the Balkans with the aim of rallying the region’s military forces to the Allied cause and thereby creating a second (eastern) front. When this proved impracticable for political and logistic reasons, the Allies turned to military action in Scandinavia in the hope of cutting exports of Swedish iron ore, which French and British planners had convinced themselves were absolutely essential to Germany’s war economy. In April 1940, the British and French would undertake military operations in Scandinavia, only to find themselves outpaced by the Germans who intervened with greater speed and force. Meanwhile, the increasingly desperate search for some means to win the war culminated in the spring of 1940 with preparations to bomb the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus. The tortured logic behind the so-called “Baku project” was that the total destruction of the oil fields would deal such an economic and psychological blow to the Germans that they would be incapable of continuing the war. Baku, in other words, presented itself as the panacea to the Allies’ strategic woes (Imlay 2004).

In the end, the German offensive in the west in May 1940 killed the Baku project. Although it is impossible to know what would have happened if the Germans had not attacked, the fact that both the British and French were seriously considering pushing the Soviet Union into the war is significant in itself. Put simply, a Soviet entry into the war on Germany’s side in 1940 would have been a catastrophe, potentially creating the German-Soviet colossus that the Baku project was meant to obviate. From this perspective, France’s military defeat in 1940 appears as a strategic blessing rather than a complete disaster. The loss of its principle ally left the British with no choice but to revert to a long war strategy, even if this now amounted to waiting (and praying) for the United States to enter the war. In spring 1940, what did not happen was arguably as (if not more) important than what did happen.

The French and British were not alone in revising their thinking about a long war. During the 1930s, when Hitler spoke of preparations for a future war, he cited the early to mid-1940s as a target date. That Nazi Germany found itself in a European war in September 1939 has prompted Richard Overy to argue that Hitler miscalculated British and French reactions to the attack on Poland (Overy 1998). Yet it is not clear if Hitler actually thought that the war started prematurely. Political scientists such as Dale Copeland and Darryl Press have portrayed Hitler as a rational actor, carefully and objectively weighing the present and future strategic balance before making decisions concerning war and peace (Copeland 2000; Press 2005). This portrayal, however, flies in the face of an immense amount of historical scholarship on Nazi Germany, which depicts Hitler – and his regime – as profoundly motivated by ideological-racial premises. Similarly, as Bernd Wegner has suggested in a stimulating article, Hitler’s conception of history – and thus of unfolding time – was riddled with personal, national, and racial apocalypticism (Wegner 2000). As time went on, Hitler appears to have become increasingly convinced that he could not wait, that it was now or never. More concretely, as Williamson Murray and Adam Tooze argue, given its limited resource base, Germany could not win a long war against a coalition of powers, which included not only a fast rearming Britain and France, but also the United States whose immediate military unpreparedness was counterbalanced by its huge industrial potential (Murray 1984; Tooze 2006). Time, in short, was not necessarily an ally. If Hitler wanted to create his empire, he had to do so quickly, which meant defeating France (and Britain) and then the Soviet Union in rapid order. Whatever the starting date, the endeavor was always going to be a huge gamble, which arguably appealed to Hitler and his apocalyptic worldview. But, in light of Germany’s head start in rearmament, it also made sense to provoke a European war sooner rather than later, before the other powers caught and overtook Germany.

At the outset of the war in September 1939, Stalin almost certainly believed that time was an ally. Yet this calculation was based on the assumption that Germany and the Allies would exhaust themselves in fighting one another, an assumption that the *Wehrmacht*’s stunning military victories in the summer of 1940 destroyed. Afterwards, the Soviets faced a dilemma: time was needed to prepare the Red Army for a possible confrontation with the Germans, yet time would also allow Germany to become stronger by harnessing the economic resources of Western Europe. This dilemma has prompted Viktor Suvorov among others to claim that Stalin, in 1941, was preparing to launch a preemptive war against the Germans, a claim that has not survived closer scrutiny (Suvorov 1990; Pietrow-Ennker 2000). The Soviets, it is safe to say, had no desire to provoke a war; to the contrary, they sought to appease Germany through economic concessions. That said, the time dilemma nonetheless existed, which perhaps helps to answer the question that has preoccupied scholars: why did Operation Barbarossa catch the Soviets completely by surprise? Uncertain about whether time favored the Soviet Union, Stalin, as Evan Mawdsley contends, sought certainty in the belief that a German attack was too big a gamble even for Hitler (Mawdsley 2005). If so, it proved to be a near-fatal mistake.

Overall, growing doubts about the wisdom of a long war strategy among the principal powers points to the importance of time in the calculations of decision makers. The question of whether time was an ally or an enemy was one that could not be avoided and one whose answer could have decisive consequences. This is a subject

on which more work is needed. Joseph Maiolo, in his recent study of the arms race, identified time as a critical component in the decisions for war during 1939–1941 (Maiolo 2010). But Maiolo's focus on the arms race alone arguably encourages the view of decision makers as rational actors, coldly (though not always calmly) assessing their country's absolute and relative military strength. While the arms race was certainly a factor, calculations of time were infused with a variety of political and ideological considerations. Hitler's apocalyptic conception of time offers one example. But French and British assessments were also influenced in this sense, most notably in the growing suspicion of a "totalitarian" alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union – a suspicion that blinded them to the real nature of Hitler's aims. To understand the strategic thinking in different countries during 1939–1940, scholars need to pay attention to both the "rational" and "irrational" elements in calculations concerning time.

The belligerents expected a war to be not only long but total. Affirmations abounded during the interwar period regarding the comprehensive scope of a future conflict in which entire nations and societies would be pitted against each other. Victory, it was believed, would go the side that mobilized its resources the most thoroughly and effectively. In preparing for a possible conflict, planners thus worked in the "shadows of total war," to cite the title of a recent edited volume (Chickering and Förster 2003; also see Förster 2002). However, Roger Chickering, in his influential article, "Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept," has questioned the analytical value of the term total war (Chickering 1999). In the case of World War II, no belligerent devoted the totality of its resources to the war effort, though the Soviet Union probably came closer to doing so than others. In France, for example, well before the war military planners had become aware of the powerful political obstacles to any thoroughgoing transformation of the nation (Imlay 2008). During 1939–1940 both the French and British governments sought to limit the expansion of their war efforts, in part to husband their strength but also in larger part to avoid the political and social consequences believed to accompany a more extensive mobilization of resources. From 1940 onwards, Britain would be compelled to direct a larger proportion of its national wealth to the war, but even then this effort peaked at 55 percent in 1943. Access to imperial and American resources no doubt helped to spare the British the need for a more drastic mobilization of resources. But, as Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett maintain, in an advanced economy such as Britain's, it is doubtful that the burden of war spending and production could have been significantly increased without inducing chaos (Broadberry and Howlett 1998). As for the United States, despite the wartime rhetoric, it had no need to approach a total war model: the government succeeded in producing massive amounts of armaments while maintaining a thriving civilian economy. Even the Nazi regime appears to have been reticent to launch Germany into an all-out war. As Peter Longerich has shown, when Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels pronounced his famous total war speech in February 1943, he hoped to prod Hitler into endorsing a sharp change of wartime policy that would impose far greater sacrifices on the German people (Longerich 1987). After almost four years of conflict, the principal problem for Goebbels was that Germany was not waging anything near a total war.

Chickering is thus right that important gaps existed between the rhetoric and reality of total war. When it came to mobilizing resources, no belligerent pursued a

“total war” strategy. Yet this does not mean that the concept is without value. Chickering himself points to total war as an idea type against which reality can be measured. But the concept is perhaps more useful as a means of thinking about how different political regimes conceived of war. In a path-breaking article in 1984, MacGregor Knox argued that Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy both viewed war in revolutionary, transformative terms: war would not only be decisive in forging a new Nazi or Fascist man (and woman) and society, but would also fuse together people and regime into a cohesive community worthy of ruling the empire built through conquest (Knox 1984). Even if this war-propelled transformation was never likely to be total, the ambition itself is noteworthy, for it shaped the type of war the two regimes waged. For Britain and France, by contrast, the war was meant to be preventive rather than transformative – it was waged to prevent major changes abroad and at home. British and French leaders did not seek to remodel their people and societies, and to the extent that they preached national unity, it was for the duration of the war and not beyond.

There is more to this difference than the obvious point that Germany and Italy were revisionist powers and Britain and France status quo powers. Thomas Zeiler recently described World War II as a war of “annihilation” in which the infliction of mass death and destruction colored the conduct and aims of all the major belligerents (Zeiler 2011).

This argument, however, risks neglecting important differences in how various countries and political regimes conceived of war. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were exceptional regimes in that they welcomed war, viewing it as an ideal condition that they hoped to turn into a natural one. One result is that neither recognized any principle that might restrain the escalation of violence and destruction. For Britain and France (and the United States), by comparison, war was an unnatural condition that had been forced upon them and that must be ended as quickly as possible. To be sure, the view of war as a necessary evil could be used to justify large-scale violence against civilians, as the British and American strategic bombing campaigns illustrate; but it could not completely erase the principles upon which modern liberal democracy rested, which included the acceptance of a private sphere and respect for individual rights. More to the point, these principles pointed to limits on the waging of war, most obviously in terms of the burdens that governments could impose on their own populations, but also perhaps on the violence that they could inflict on foreign populations. Bomber raids certainly killed hundreds of thousands of Germans and Japanese, but neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to enslave and mercilessly exploit entire populations.

From this perspective, the Soviet Union appears as something of an anomaly. As Timothy Snyder recently reminded us, the Soviet regime was revolutionary in nature and outlook, and clearly prepared to wield mass terror to further its aims (Snyder 2010). That said, Soviet leaders conceived of war differently from their German or Italian counterparts. War was not something to rejoice in but rather a hardship to endure, a view that would be strongly reinforced by the Soviet Union’s unparalleled suffering during 1941–1945. This tragic view of war helps to explain why the Soviet Union did not provoke a major war (even if it did start small wars, against Finland for example) before 1941 or after 1945.

What this discussion of strategy suggests is the need for a broader treatment. Generally speaking, scholars have approached the subject largely in terms of the military preparations for war of the different countries: numerous studies exist on

rearmament, military plans, or the effectiveness of armed forces. But in considering how different countries prepared for and waged war, attention also needs to be paid to the political-ideological factors that informed, when they did not determine, the calculations of political and military leaders.

In his important study *Command in War*, Martin Van Creveld approaches the subject of command in terms of controlling armed forces on the battlefield (Van Creveld 1985). Although this is clearly an essential element of command, this chapter focuses on two other aspects of the subject whose influence during 1939–1941 is sometimes overlooked: the balance of power between political and military authorities within a country; and the balance of power between the different military services.

At the heart of the first aspect is the question of who is responsible for determining how a country's military forces will be used. A frequently voiced principle is that the military should be subordinate to political authority in general and during wartime in particular. "War," as Georges Clemenceau famously pronounced, "is too serious a business to be left to the military." Without a tight rein on their activities, military leaders risk losing sight of political realities – those at home as well as those abroad. In Clausewitzian terms, the ultimate danger is that war becomes an end in itself, demanding ever greater resources and provoking ever greater destruction, rather than an instrument of rational policy. Years ago, however, D. C. Watt implicitly challenged this principle, pointing out that much of the radicalizing impulse leading up to the war in Europe came not from military but from political leaders (Watt 1975). Watt's study ends in 1939, but it is possible to apply his insight to the early years of the war, and even beyond.

The German case represents something of a model for the radicalizing influence of political leadership. Much of the recent scholarship on the *Wehrmacht* focuses on its complicity in the horrendous crimes of Nazi Germany. The *Wehrmacht*, Omer Bartov concluded, was "Hitler's army" (Bartov 1991; Förster 2007). In the Nazi regime's early years, however, the military remained an independent political force, thanks in large part to the influence of President Hindenburg. Seeking to reassure army leaders, Hitler claimed that the *Wehrmacht* constituted one of two "pillars" of the Nazi state, the other one being the Nazi party. Although the army's political subordination to the regime increased during the 1930s, during 1938, as Klaus-Jürgen Müller has shown, leading staff officers considered a coup out of fear that Hitler was driving Germany into a war for which it was unprepared (Müller 1980). During late 1939–early 1940, with Hitler eager to launch the *Wehrmacht* against Western Europe, German military leaders questioned the riskiness of such a strategy, with some once again contemplating a political coup. But grumbling was not limited to strictly military issues. While Jochen Böhrer and Alexander Rossino have rightly underscored the widespread violence inflicted by the *Wehrmacht* on civilians during the Polish campaign, it is also true that a handful of officers protested against these atrocities (Rossino 2003; Böhrer 2006). Significantly, during the planning and preparations for Barbarossa, neither the operational nor racial elements of the enterprise provoked protests from military leaders. By 1940–1941, it appears, the regime had succeeded in transforming the *Wehrmacht* into an instrument of its policy. How precisely this happened, however, remains a subject for future research.

Fascist Italy offers another case of the dominance of political authority over the military. Mussolini possessed extensive executive power over the armed forces, which he used to press for Italy's entry into the war on Germany's side as soon as possible.

As John Gooch showed in his recent study, *Mussolini and his Generals*, many military leaders, well aware of the reality of Italy's unpreparedness for war, were far less enthusiastic about a conflict, even if some of them would be tempted by the possibilities that Germany's stunning military victories in 1940 appeared to offer (Gooch 2007). Ironically, with Italy's entry into the war, both Mussolini's ability to maintain his domination over the armed forces and the latter's ability to resist its complete subordination depended on Italy's military success in its "parallel war." The series of Italian military defeats during 1940–1941 was thus a disaster for both. One result was that the continued existence of the Fascist regime and of the armed forces themselves came to depend on the overall course of the war – a course over which neither Mussolini nor his generals could exert much, if any, influence.

For the most part, the political authorities remained firmly in command in Britain. Much of the scholarship on Britain continues to center on Neville Chamberlain. But as Michael Howard pointed out long ago, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) quickly emerged as a leading policy voice following Munich, prodding the government to take more active measures to prepare for a possible war, including a renewal of the alliance with France and the issuing of guarantees to Poland and Romania (Howard 1972). But with the outbreak of war, the military chiefs returned to the more familiar role of advising the government. During 1939–1940 they generally counseled prudence, for example, seeking to tame the aggressive enthusiasm of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. As faith in the long war strategy declined, the COS did join the call for military action to weaken Germany; but their assessments of the possibilities never grew completely divorced from military realities. The COS thus remained skeptical about the military feasibility of the Baku project, though less so about the longer-term consequences of provoking the Soviets. Afterwards and for much of the war, the COS would continue to act as a restraining influence on Churchill, who in May 1940 became prime minister.

The French case, by contrast, is more complicated. In a groundbreaking biography of the French General Maxime Weygand, Philip Bankwitz drew attention to the fraught nature of civil–military relations during the 1930s (Bankwitz 1967). With the outbreak of war relations between military and political leaders worsened. Although the military was legally subordinate to the government in the overall conduct of the war, the growing loss of faith in a long war strategy brought tensions to the boiling point. Faced with strong political pressure inside and outside of Parliament to do something, the government of Édouard Daladier pressed the military to come up with a viable plan for military action against Germany. If anything, Daladier's replacement by Paul Reynaud in March 1940 only increased this pressure, as the continued survival of Reynaud's government depended on putting an end to the "Phony War." For Maurice Gamelin, as Martin Alexander details in his study of the French generalissimo, nothing could be worse than Allied military operations in far-away places since they risked weakening Anglo-French strength in the west, which Gamelin rightly recognized to be the decisive theatre (Alexander 1992). But Gamelin fought a losing battle to keep attention focused on the Western Front, eventually acquiescing in the Scandinavian operation (and even manifesting interest in the Baku project) as the best of a number of bad options. In the end, what saved Gamelin from having to accept further "diversions" was the German offensive in the west.

The Soviet Union constitutes an exception to the generalization concerning the radicalizing effect of political domination. Having undergone a bloody purge of its officer corps during the late 1930s, the Red Army, by 1939, was completely subordinate to Stalin. This situation, however, did not produce a radicalization of military planning. Interestingly, as the Suvorov controversy indicates, Soviet military leaders were more offensive-minded than Stalin in 1940–1941, suggesting in some cases preemptive military action to disrupt what they rightly feared were German preparations for an attack. But, as Glantz and House (1995) and Mawdsley (2005) make clear, Stalin not only furiously rejected such suggestions but prevented military leaders from readying the Red Army for the oncoming onslaught. It was only after the disastrous military reverses in 1941 that the balance of power shifted somewhat towards the military, as Stalin was forced to recognize the value of military expertise.

Generally speaking, it is safe to say that the military was a restraining force in most countries, seeking to dampen the aggressive impulses of its political superiors. Indeed, in the case of Germany, a regime dominated by the military would likely not have pushed Europe into war. This point is worth considering in light of the arguments of political scientists/international relations scholars such as John Mearsheimer and Dale Copeland that “systemic” factors would have triggered a war, regardless of who ruled in Berlin (Copeland 2000; Mearsheimer 2001). But the bigger point to make is the need to pay greater attention to the political as opposed to the military side of the political-military equation. In the end, armed forces were largely the instruments of their political masters, which raise the question of how the political leadership in the different countries induced and/or coerced the military to do its bidding.

The second aspect of command that helped to shape the initial phase of the war in Europe was the balance of power between military services. Numerous case studies exist on the individual services, which, when viewed together, indicate that, in all the belligerent countries with the exception of Britain, the army enjoyed a dominant position during 1939–1941. Although this dominance did not go uncontested, it proved impossible to overthrow, largely because navies and air forces could not present a convincing plan for winning the war.

In Nazi Germany, the army occupied pride of place, accounting for over 50 percent of military spending in 1938–1939. To be sure, the Luftwaffe under Hermann Göring garnered a great deal of publicity, while the navy enjoyed Hitler’s occasional favor, most notably in 1939 with the decision to embark on a massive (and unrealistic) expansion plan: Plan Z. But from the beginning, as James Corum and William Murray have shown, the Luftwaffe was designed principally to support the army in battle; accordingly, it created little capacity for strategic bombardment, a fact that would become glaringly apparent during the Battle of Britain (Murray 1983; Corum 1998). As for the navy, limited resources and persistent ambiguity about its wartime mission risked turning it into a bystander. In his recent biography on Erich Raeder, Keith Bird emphasizes the interest of the German Naval Staff – and even some army planners – in a Mediterranean strategy in 1940–1941 as a means of knocking Britain out of the war (Bird 2006). The navy’s obvious weakness, however, undermined the arguments in favor of this strategy, even if it was always unlikely that Hitler would have agreed to it, eager as he was to turn against the Soviet Union. The preparations for Barbarossa, in turn, consolidated the army’s predominance, helping to ensure that the navy would lack the resources needed to wage the Battle of the Atlantic and the air force the

resources needed to support the army and to defend the Reich against Anglo-American bombers. In the end, the dominance of the army meant that it remained the principle instrument of Hitler's war of imperial conquest. It would bear the brunt of the burden, and on its successes and failures would depend the entire endeavor.

Even more so than in Germany, in the Soviet Union the Red Army enjoyed unrivalled predominance among the three services. The navy was insignificant as a military force, while the air force had been designed primarily to support the army. Though Stalin kept a tight reign on developments, the Red Army's privileged position allowed the General Staff to impose its vision of a future war on Soviet military planning. As Lennart Samuelson has shown, moreover, since the 1920s this vision entailed the use of mechanized and motorized armies deployed on a massive scale (Samuelson 1999). Looking ahead, what is striking is the symmetry between the Soviet and German conceptions of land warfare, whatever the considerable differences in practice. And it is this symmetry that contributed to transforming the war in the East into what Glantz and House (1995) have aptly termed a clash of titans.

In Fascist Italy, by comparison, the air force and navy posed a more serious challenge to the army's dominance than in Germany. For example, as the work of Claudio Segrè among others suggests, the link between air power and fascist modernity strengthened the air force's claim to resources (Segrè 1987). At the same time, however, efforts to develop simultaneously (and largely independently) the three military services in the context of Italy's relatively limited financial and industrial resources amounted to a recipe for disaster. Both the air force and the navy proved too weak to offer on their own a credible strategy for victory in a war; at the same time, neither could provide much help to the army. The overall result was that Mussolini's imperial ambitions in the Mediterranean necessarily depended on the army's ability to wage rapid wars of conquest – a task that the army was in no condition to fulfill.

As in Germany and the Soviet Union, the army dominated the three military services in France. As Robert Young has argued, the air force was particularly weak, a result of poor political and industrial choices as well as its inability to carve out a clear military mission for itself, even after it gained its independence from the army in 1928 (Young 1978b). The navy, while far from insignificant, also remained relatively weak for much of the interwar period – a situation that fueled its politicization. Despite Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan's portrayal of Admiral François Darlan, the naval chief, as a loyal servant of the government, the latter's firm belief that the navy had been ignored helps to explain his alienation from the Republic and his decision to join Vichy (Coutau-Bégarie and Huan 1989). That said, the navy was not powerless. If the army's dominance meant that it could stamp its vision of a decisive battle on the Western Front on French strategy, the unattractive prospect of another bloodbath in the west provided Darlan with an opportunity during 1939–1940 to propose military operations in areas where the navy could play a leading role. More generally, this challenge to the army would continue under Vichy, but this time on terms far more favorable to the navy.

In terms of army dominance, Britain constituted a clear exception. During the 1930s, the army occupied a subordinate position to the air force and navy, a status that reflected geographic realities as well as the determination of British political leaders to avoid a repetition of 1914–1918, when a large expeditionary force had fought on the continent. The army, accordingly, became the Cinderella service,

starved of resources and denied a clear-cut mission. As Michael Howard and Peter Dennis have explained, all this began to change in 1938–1939, as the British government took the decision to oppose further German expansion, if necessary by war (Howard 1972; Dennis 1972). An army now seemed indispensable, not only to fight in Europe but also to reassure allies, most notably the French. Thus in the early months of the war the Cabinet envisaged a British Army of 55 divisions. Yet while it is true that from 1938 the British began to create a sizeable army, it is questionable whether this represented the revolution in British strategy that is sometimes claimed. For one thing, Britain was already committed to building and maintaining considerable naval and air forces, which, given finite resources, limited the army's potential share. Equally important, the aversion to large-scale land warfare persisted throughout the war. The military thinker and writer, Basil Liddell Hart, famously insisted that there existed a "British way in warfare," centered on the use of naval (and later) air power, leaving the burden of land warfare largely to others. Although scholars such as David French and Brian Bond have criticized Liddell Hart's contention, its value as a description of Britain's military experience during 1939–1945 should perhaps be reconsidered (Bond 1980; French 1990).

Overall, there is a need for more studies of interservice rivalry within different countries during the 1930s. The prospect and then reality of war offered opportunities as well as threats to armies, air forces, and navies. Knowing more about how the military services responded to these opportunities and threats will help us to understand better why each country waged the type of war that it did.

The last aspect of warfare considered, that of tactics, encompasses how military forces are used in battle. In terms of scholarship, tactics has become a leading – if not the leading – subject in the military history of World War II. This popularity is somewhat ironic given the economic and industrial superiority of the Allies, which seemingly made their ultimate victory inevitable. Yet a focus on tactics underscores the open-ended nature of the early phase of the conflict, when the United States was still neutral and the economic-industrial balance between the Allies and the Axis was less skewed. In the case of the Germans (as with the Japanese), tactical prowess contributed mightily to their surprising military victories during 1939–1941. Afterwards, the *Wehrmacht's* tactical-operational skills helped Nazi Germany to hold out for three more years against an overpowering global coalition that included the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain.

Much of the scholarship on tactics concentrates on Nazi Germany and the blitzkrieg. If almost all scholars reject Milward's idea of a blitzkrieg strategy, there is a lively debate concerning blitzkrieg as a tactical development. The earlier view, propounded by German generals in their memoirs and well represented by the work of Len Deighton, is that the German doctrine revolutionized warfare (Deighton 1979). First against Poland in the fall of 1939, and then against Western Europe in the spring–summer of 1940, the Germans inflicted decisive military defeats on their enemies in a matter of days or at most weeks. The contrast with the trench warfare of 1914–1918 could hardly be starker. Through the combined use of armor, motorized infantry, airpower, and radio communication, the *Wehrmacht* succeeded in punching large holes in the enemy's front through which it advanced headlong with the aim of enveloping entire armies. Thus in May 1940, German armored spearheads broke through French lines in the Ardennes and then raced to the Channel, outflanking and cutting off the Allied armies that had advanced into Belgium. Although the fighting would continue for several

weeks and the Germans would suffer numerous casualties, the Battle of France was effectively over. Blitzkrieg had restored mobility to the battlefield, seemingly allowing the Germans to wage rapid and successful military campaigns.

More recently, however, the argument that the Germans possessed and employed blitzkrieg tactics in 1939 and 1940 has been challenged. In a debate-changing study, Karl-Heinz Frieser argued that in spring 1940 the Germans were as surprised as anyone by the speed and extent of their military success in Western Europe (Frieser 2005). Indeed, for Hitler and his generals, the attack in the west amounted to a huge and extremely risky gamble. Not only did the Germans possess fewer tanks and airplanes than the British and French, but the *Wehrmacht* envisaged a lengthy military campaign in which casualties on both sides would be high. Though the Germans hoped to outflank the Anglo-French armies in Belgium, they did not expect such a rapid and decisive victory. Building on Frieser's study, Ernest May argues that, in the end, the interaction of several unpredictable developments provided the Germans with victory: a brilliant military plan on the German side and a series of errors on the Allied side, most notably the dispatch of the best Allied units (plus the reserves) into Belgium and the failure to defend the Ardennes region. Underpinning everything, May concludes, was a colossal intelligence failure on the part of the Allies – a failure that might easily have been avoided through better and more rigorous analysis (May 2000). France's defeat, it seems, owed more to luck than a magical formula called blitzkrieg.

For Frieser, it was only after their surprising success in the west that the Germans begin to talk of blitzkrieg, in effect imposing a retrospective coherence on what was a far messier story. Worse still for the Germans, they began to take their propaganda for reality, convincing themselves that they had, indeed, found the secret to military success with blitzkrieg. This hubris would influence the preparations for Barbarossa, blinding planners to the logistical, operational, and strategic difficulties involved in an invasion of the Soviet Union. Rather than carefully considering these difficulties, the Germans placed their faith in the *Wehrmacht's* ability to win a quick and smashing victory – a blitzkrieg victory. When this proved elusive in summer–fall 1941, the *Wehrmacht* was forced to wage a lengthy, slugging match against the Red Army which it could not win.

Should we conclude, then, that blitzkrieg was little more than a creation of German propaganda? The short answer is no. As the detailed research of James Corum and Robert Citino suggests, while it is true that clearly defined blitzkrieg tactics did not exist in 1940, the Germans nevertheless had developed tactical-operational practices that, when viewed as a whole, constituted something new (Corum 1992; Citino 1999). During the 1920s and 1930s, the German Army placed great emphasis in its training on surprise, mobility, and flexibility, particularly of small groups, as well as on individual initiative. This training reflected lessons drawn from 1914–1918, when the German Army strove to develop tactics that could overcome the stalemate of trench warfare. The overriding goal was to avoid getting bogged down: soldiers were instructed to bypass obstacles and to keep moving forward, exploiting rather than consolidating initial successes. As Dennis Showalter argues in his recent study, *Hitler's Panzers*, this program inspired the development of armored doctrine in which tanks became the offensive spearhead of a far larger army comprising, for the most part, of infantry divisions with limited mobility (Showalter 2009). More broadly, from the beginning the Germans sought to impose a rhythm of operations on the enemy that would keep him confused and on the defensive, robbing him of the ability to regroup.

The point is not to draw an admiring portrait of German tactical-operational practice. Indeed, there is much to criticize. As is apparent from the growing scholarship on its complicity in the worst crimes of the Nazi regime, the *Wehrmacht* was always more than simply a military machine (Hartmann, Hürter, and Jureit 2005). Although more research is needed on the links between the *Wehrmacht*'s military effectiveness and its participation in Germany's racial-ideological war, it is unlikely that two were completely unconnected. Equally pertinent, the Germany Army's concentration on the operational level left its leaders blind not only to moral issues but also to larger strategic considerations. By 1943, if not earlier, tactical brilliance could only put off the moment of defeat (and prolong the death and destruction); it could not prevent it. But these criticisms notwithstanding, there is a strong case to be made that the Germans went to war in 1939–1941 with tactical-operational practices that emphasized surprise, speed, concentration, and mobility. Whether or not one labels this blitzkrieg is less important than the point that the *Wehrmacht* had developed a novel type of warfare that would prove extremely effective during 1939–1941.

Scholarship on French and British military doctrine and tactics highlights the novelty of German practice. As Robert Doughty has convincingly argued, the French Army during the interwar period prepared to fight “methodical battles” – large, set-piece encounters modeled on those of World War I (Doughty 1985). The emphasis was on control. Offensive action would be planned in detail, with each military unit assigned a timetable and precise objectives. Staff officers would conceive and direct the entire operation; officers and soldiers in the field were expected to follow the plan and not to improvise. Offensives would commence with artillery barrages, followed by limited advances by the infantry. Tanks would not act independently but would be attached to the infantry, providing protection to the latter as it advanced. Any territorial gains would be consolidated, after which the whole machine would be reset for the next battle. More recently, Eugenia Kiesling has nuanced Doughty's proposals somewhat, pointing to the political and material constraints under which the army operated during the interwar period (Kiesling 1996). Similarly, Martin Alexander, in an important article, shows that the French Army fought with greater zeal and effectiveness during the Battle of France than is often thought (Alexander 2007). Yet despite these points, Doughty's overall description of French doctrine appears accurate: the French Army trained itself to act in a delayed, prudent, and methodical manner.

The problem with the doctrine of the “methodical battle” was that it left the French Army ill-prepared for the type of war that the Germans waged in 1940. Indeed, as Marc Bloch's famous inquiry into France's defeat highlights, one of the most striking aspects of events is the confusion that reigned on the French side (Bloch 1946). The French Army appeared unable to grasp the rapidity of developments; officers and soldiers were always at least one step behind the Germans, desperately trying to play catch-up, a situation that bred despair and panic. Once again, regardless of whether one uses the term blitzkrieg, the *Wehrmacht* in 1940 was faster, bolder, and more flexible than the French Army.

The French, however, were not the only one caught off-guard by the Germans. In 1940 the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) suffered from many of the same shortcomings as the French Army. To be sure, the biggest problem with the BEF in 1940 was its small size: at the outbreak of the Battle of France it counted ten infantry divisions and one armored brigade. But size aside, the British Army's tactical and operational

practice proved to be as rigid as that of the French, and this despite innovative thinking and even training during the 1920s. In the early phases of the war, writes David French, the British Army possessed an overly centralized and hierarchical command system that proved no match for the more flexible, mobile-oriented *Wehrmacht* (French 2000). Like their French counterparts, British officers were discouraged from taking the initiative or from thinking on their own. Plans were to be executed, not questioned or revised. Fortunately for the British, the air force – and Fighter Command in particular – did not suffer from these defects. Not only had Royal Air Force begun to develop effective tactical and operational practices against bomber attacks during the 1930s, but during the Battle of Britain it showed itself capable of quickly adapting to changing conditions. The question, then, is why the army was so conservative?

Interestingly, the Red Army's tactical and operational practices during 1939–1941 were not imprisoned in the framework of the “methodical battle” or its equivalent. In general, Soviet military planning was as offensive-minded as the German, if not more so. As Mawdsley argues, however, a chasm existed between the Red Army's plans and its capabilities (Mawdsley 2005). Soviet officers and soldiers lacked the education and training as well as the equipment to combine armor, motorized infantry, and air power into a hard-hitting, mobile, and flexible weapon. This chasm proved disastrous in 1941 as entire Soviet armies were enveloped and captured by the Germans. In time, the Red Army would adapt, improving its tactics and operations, but the process would be long, costly, and never fully complete.

In the end, the *Wehrmacht*'s tactical and operational capabilities during 1939–1941 were unique. The armed forces of no other country could match the Germans unit for unit and soldier for soldier. To understand why this was so requires more research, not simply on developments in Germany before and after World War I, but also on those in other countries. One possibility is more comparative studies, such as that of Beth Kier for Britain and France (Kier 1997). Another possibility, illustrated in Mary Habeck's study of German and Soviet tank doctrine, is a more transnational approach that explores the exchange of ideas and practices between national armed forces during the interwar period (Habeck 2003).

This chapter began with the suggestion that, if World War II in its broad outlines corresponded to prewar predictions, the opening phase of the conflict in Europe contained several surprises. In terms of strategy, as the belligerents began to question the assumption of a long war, they grew attracted to risky military operations. Although for the Allies an operation such as the Baku project would likely have spelled disaster if undertaken, for the Germans high-risk gambles produced spectacular results in spring 1940. Meanwhile, before 1941 warfare in Europe generally fell short of the rhetoric concerning total war – and, for some belligerents, would continue to do so until 1945. In terms of command, the dominance of political over military authority in most countries fostered uncertainty, since political-ideological considerations often overrode the more cautious calculations of military professionals. Similarly, the onset of war created new opportunities as well as threats for armies, air forces, and navies, calling into question the sometimes-fragile balance of power between the military services within each country. The resulting institutional struggles between services lent an added element of uncertainty to military planning that could lead to unexpected results. Finally, in terms of tactics, no one – not even the Germans – predicted the stunning success of blitzkrieg in 1940 and 1941.

The surprising nature of developments during 1939–1941 points to the critical importance of the early phase of the conflict, before the balance of economic and demographic resources tipped so decisively against the Axis. Tactics, for example, had a far greater impact on the course of the war in 1939–1940 than in 1943–1944. Although a good deal of scholarship exists on the period from 1939 to 1941, much of the work focuses on individual countries and even individual military services. There is thus a need for studies that adopt a broader approach that encompasses several countries. Such an approach could be comparative, interactive, transnational, or some combination of the three. But the more important point is to move beyond single case studies. Only then will it be possible to understand why the early years of the war held so many surprises as well as why the conflict as a whole did not.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

British and American Strategic Planning

EARL J. CATAGNUS, JR.

The historiography of British and American strategic planning in World War II is relatively small compared with the voluminous literature on other subjects of the war. With the exception of the official histories, World War II strategic planning is usually embedded within larger works to support a thesis, rather than being the object of study. Scholars have addressed topics of interest to fields other than military history by using the context of strategic planning; for instance, diplomatic historians have examined the so-called Anglo-American “Special Relationship” or origins of the cold war by examining high-level strategy sessions at conferences and other meetings. This does not mean that the quality of scholarship is lacking, in fact, it is quite the contrary. Some of the most brilliant minds in the historical profession have tackled this difficult subject. In a classic case of quality *over* quantity, the historiography is laden with innovative methods and critical assessments firmly rooted in deep intellectual reflection. There are several reasons for this dearth of academic inquiry into British and American strategic planning in the last world war.

First, determining what constitutes “strategy,” and by extension “strategic planning,” is difficult. This is connected to another problem for historians and military professionals when they attempt to delineate the levels of war – tactical, operational, and strategic – and their overlap. Where does one stop and the other begin? Can they coexist? At what size of a military unit does a movement become tactical, operational, or strategic in nature? The logical conclusion to such thinking yields the questions: What really is the difference between tactics, operations, and strategy? Is this not just a synthetic framework used to bring some semblance of order to the chaotic nature of war? How, then, can a study of the *planning* of something that is unnatural produce a narrative that is, in a Foucaultian sense, historically true? Thus, most historians are unwilling to deal holistically with strategic planning without placing it in a context of a larger historical question.

Second, adding to the above quandary is the elusive definition of strategy. Stemming from the Greek words *strategia*, translated as “office of the general,” and *strategos*, meaning “general,” strategy has evolved from a simple term to one that invokes volumes of abstract political, economic, and military *theory*. Strategy is no longer a position, or office, but a *method* for solving problems. In the context of war, strategy has taken on a highly technical definition that seeks to encompass all aspects of modern warfare to include diplomacy, industry, transportation, information management, and manpower mobilization. In general, as the complexity of war increases, so does the contemporary definition of strategy. This makes a standard classification difficult. It is with this in mind, that historians usually begin their works by discussing strategy in terms that define its boundaries relative to their specific theses.

Third, most strategies are based upon an accepted theoretical paradigm created by military intellectuals operating on the periphery of the civil-military establishment. These military intellectuals use history to support their theoretical assumptions. Whether it be the US Navy’s obsession with a Mahonian engagement with the Japanese in the Pacific, the US Army’s perverse focus on a Clausewitzian war of annihilation against the *Heer*, or Britain’s acceptance of B. H. Liddell Hart’s indirect approach for maintaining their empire; most British and American strategic decisions before and during World War II were grounded in theory. Too often, the strategic theorist’s use of history is flawed, and garners criticism from academic historians. Fearing the label “military intellectual,” historians are reluctant to engage in histories of “strategy.” These histories could be misplaced into the same category of scholarship as the strategic theorists. Rather, historians are more comfortable with studies concerning “ways of war.” Here, strategy is discussed in a narrative that uses it as evidence for a national trend in warfare.

Lastly, because strategic planning, especially in the years since the world wars, has grown exponentially in sophistication, the scope of strategic histories has blossomed. In a true Weberian sense of progress, the bureaucratization needed to plan national strategies has matured into organizations that are too large for any one study to analyze effectively. Whereas an examination based on the modern definition of strategy in the Franco-Prussian War could successfully be completed in one volume, it would be an impossibility to do so in the context of World War II. Historians must divide World War II history of strategic planning into manageable parts, and deal with them in detail. An exception to this is the official historians who were tasked with producing the state-sanctioned narrative. Even in these official histories, however, World War II strategic planning is divided among many volumes that vary according to chronology, geography, and subject.

In keeping with the historiographical trend, key words in the lexicon of strategy must be defined. The current hierarchical conception of strategy will be used throughout this review chapter. National strategy, or grand strategy, is the overarching coordinating method by which a state uses to achieve its policy objective. In the context of World War II, that policy objective was victory. Victory, however, had different meanings for different people. There are three subordinate strategies contained within a national strategy – political, economic, and military. All three are used to manage an aspect of a state’s national power. Much of that power is directed towards undertakings that are far from battlefields. Using diplomacy to secure a state’s neutrality, organizing industrial manufacturing, and logistical planning for supplying an army and navy are all within the realm of political, economic, and military strategy.

Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age is the seminal work on the historical maturation of strategy. This collection of essays, edited by Paret (1986), was inspired by an earlier edition of the same name compiled during the beginning years of World War II. In his introduction, Paret describes the reasons why historians are reluctant to write histories of strategy. Focusing mostly on historians' apprehensions towards being called presentists, he supports the assertions made above. The ensuing work demonstrates that the history of strategy formulation must take place within a narrative that blends theory with practice, peace with war, and civilian bureaucracies with the military. The twenty-eight essays are separated into five thematically and chronologically organized parts. They are consecutively titled, "The Origins of Modern War," "The Expansion of War," "From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War," "From the First to the Second World War," and "Since 1945." Interestingly, the subjects of the essays transition from individual strategists and theorists to sweeping movements in collective strategic thought. In effect, the anthology reflects the progressive complexity of war. Some of the essays are historiographically dated, but no study of strategic planning can begin without first examining it. Since they cover most aspects of British and American strategic planning, rather than addressing the essays piecemeal here, they will be referenced with the relevant literature throughout.

As mentioned above, strategy is based on theoretical paradigms that are embedded within a military's culture. The practitioners of the military arts and their elites generally do not create these paradigms. Rather, until they publish their ideas, strategic theorists are relatively obscure, and only find fame if senior commanders are sympathetic towards them. Most strategic theorists are extremely popular with the laymen public, which may indicate why politicians are usually familiar with them, and the military is so willing to accept their influences. Historians have long tried to find continuity within military intellectualism and wartime strategic decisions. Thus, a body of literature surrounds luminary theorists such as Clausewitz, Mahon, B. H. Liddell Hart, and J. F. C. Fuller, and their influence on World War II strategic planning.

Christopher Bassford's *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America* (1994) attempts to provide a corrective to the misinterpretations of Clausewitz's sway over Anglo-American strategic thought. In the British case, Bassford maintains that both Hart and Fuller, the preeminent British military intellectuals of the interwar period, misrepresented Clausewitz. They did so with lavish critiques that were levied more to demonstrate their superior cognitive intelligence than to provide a criticism of the subtle nuances of Clausewitz's thoughts. Naval strategist Julian Corbett and military strategist Spencer Wilkinson were proponents of the Prussian's theories, but Bassford argues there was no tangible proof that Clausewitz had any influence upon British strategy during World War II.

Bassford writes a parallel narrative describing how Americans received Clausewitz's *On War*. He argues that although Clausewitzian terminology was part of the doctrinal vernacular during the interwar period, there is no clear evidence that World War II strategy was shaped by *On War*'s principles. Bassford suggests that when army officers did use Clausewitz they focused almost exclusively on *On War*'s more aggressive military maxims. Usually these concerned the destruction of the enemy's armed forces as the principal aim in war, and neglected any mentioning of political factors. Michael R. Matheny's *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945*

(2011) effectively argues against Bassford. He contends that Clausewitzian principles were deeply entrenched in the operational and strategic thinking of the interwar and World War II US Army. In either case, Clausewitz's presence was felt.

Bassford's discussion is intriguing, however, he fails to examine how the *response* to the Clausewitzian discourse affected British strategy. If Clausewitzian principles were not followed because he was perceived as an advocate of total war, did the British consciously develop strategy that was antithetical to Clausewitz? If so, does that not constitute a Clausewitzian influence, albeit a negative one? Similarly, Bassford avoids a thorough discussion of the US Army's misreading of Clausewitz. The army's oft-repeated phrase that the sole military object of war was to concentrate exclusively on the destruction of the enemy's armed forces had served, according to historian Russell F. Weigley, as the intellectual justification for many of the military's strategic decisions during the war.

In contrast to Clausewitz's arguable influence on World War II strategic planning, Alfred Thayer Mahan's cannot be understated when discussing the US Navy. An entire chapter in Russell F. Weigley's seminal *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (1973) was dedicated to Mahan's strategic principles and how they were seared into the psyche of American naval officers during World War II. He maintains that senior naval leaders' strategic thinking never strayed far from Mahan. Focusing on Mahan's larger assertion that sea power could be decisive in war, Weigley declares that the American victory in the Pacific was evidence of the supremacy of Mahanian strategic theories.

Philip A. Crowl's essay, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" (1986), offers a critique of the prevailing wisdom that Mahan's influence over the US Navy was the foundation for victory in the Pacific. In an essay that follows the evolution of Mahan's theories on sea power, Crowl demonstrates that American naval officers were not only fascinated with Mahan, but were cultish in their adherence to his prescription for naval victory. He maintains that although the navy's prewar planning centered around a Mahonian decisive battle with big gun capital ships, Pacific strategy took a much different course. Crowl concludes the essay with a suggestion that the navy's obsession with Mahan may actually have hindered their development of modern ships, strategy, and tactics.

The British appreciation for Mahan was slightly less than their American cousins. According to Peden in *Arms, Economics, and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs* (2007), the experience of the anticlimactic Battle of Jutland during World War I, the fiscal constraints due to rising defense costs, and the acceptance of the "Limited Liability" strategy for protecting the empire all pushed the Royal Navy away from Mahan during the interwar period. Instead of a climactic battle, the Royal Navy believed the blockade to be the surest and most cost effective way to victory. The blockade, as will be discussed below, was considered by contemporary strategists as a natural outcropping of a particular British way in war.

B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller were the most vocal critics of the British Army's performance in World War I. Both served during the war, and saw the carnage that was the Western Front. Believing it was their duty to rectify the past by changing the future prosecution of war, they "took up the pen" and used their prolific writings to attack the British political-military defense establishment. They both were champions of armor. It was their belief that large tank formations striking deep into

the heart of the enemy's communication zone could bring about strategic level decisive results. Unlike Clausewitz and Mahan, Hart and Fuller were contemporaries of the world wars, and thus were able to actively engage developing trends in defense policy. Traditional scholarship contends that their influence was negligible. Upon closer examination this does not appear to be an accurate conclusion.

Brian Holden Reid's *Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart* (1998) is an attempt to place Hart and Fuller's ideas within the context of a much larger epistemology. He reconciles his previous work, *J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker* (1987), with that of Bond's *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought* (1977) to create a nuanced narrative that places Hart and Fuller within a discourse of military intellectualism. Building from Reid's work, one can see that this discourse did affect both British and American military thinking, especially strategic thinking.

Fuller, who was the British armor expert during World War I, sought to create a science of war that would take away the reliance on "military genius." A science could be taught, experimented with, and improved upon. Military genius, which was too often realized in a circumstantial moment, could not. As an offshoot of this, Fuller created the principles of war. The principles of direction, offensive action, surprise, concentration, distribution, security, mobility, endurance, and determination were adopted near wholesale by the US Army, and taught at the Command and General Staff Course and the Army War College. In *The American Way of War*, Weigley (1973) maintains that they guided army commanders throughout World War II, and many strategic decisions were rooted in their application.

Hart is of significant interest because his strategic conception, named the "indirect approach," was adopted as British strategy during the interwar period. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain read one of Hart's books and recommended it to Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha in 1937. Afterward, Hart was brought in as an adviser to the secretary, and, for a short period, had a directing effect on the course of Britain's political and military strategies. It is under this guise that Hart was able to facilitate Parliament's adoption of the "Limited Liability" policy. The Limited Liability strategy was built on what was the *popularly accepted* history of the British Empire. This history, as propounded by Hart, showed how imperial defense was best served when it operated on the periphery of European wars, and did not send massive armies to the European mainland.

Hart's strategic theories centered upon noncommittal, indecisive, lengthy wars of political and economic attrition that did not fit well with American ideas for waging war. Since the naval blockade was the centerpiece of Hart's indirect approach for Britain, the US Navy wanted little to do with it. The indirect approach did not mesh with a Mahanian battle of capital ships. Hart's writings concerning tactics, not strategy, were far more important to the American army. Army schools republished Hart's writings concerning offensive "soft-spot" tactics, and "islands of defense" tactics. Whether these doctrines were effectively employed during World War II is a historiographical debate that requires far more discussion than this chapter can provide.

Hart, rather unconsciously, initiated a historiographic tradition that has grown exponentially in recent years. In 1932, Hart published *The British Way in Warfare* that levied a critique on Britain's continental policy during World War I. He argues that Britain's involvement in military expeditions to Europe was a historical aberration. Traditionally, Britain abstained from sending armies to fight on the continent, and

used the naval blockade as its decisive military action. In parallel, Britain withheld allegiance to any belligerent until it became evident that an alliance was necessary in order to maintain the balance of power. Hart describes strategy in terms of a national tendency developed over the course of a state's entire existence. It was the *British* way of conducting war, not Caesar's Gaelic War strategies or Napoleon's Prussian campaign plan applied to the British condition. Hart, in an effort to argue for his strategy of the indirect approach, unknowingly developed a historical methodology.

The "way in war," or "way of war" approach to the history of strategy formulation is the method that many historians are most comfortable with. Although "way" and "strategy" could almost be interchangeable in this context, strategy is too much associated with the active conduct of war. For most historians, strategies are employed only during war, and constantly change according to wartime circumstances. In contrast, a way of war is not bounded by periods of conflict. A way of war is timeless and is only confined to the synthetic boundaries that the historian defines. There is no Western strategy of war. There is, however, a Western way of war. Surprisingly, the modern definition of national strategy includes all the elements of a way of war. National strategy is not restricted to periods of belligerency or "all things" military, and could very well be used as an analytical tool in much the same way as a way of war.

Way of war historiography arose in the late 1960s and 1970s during a time when military history was challenged as an academic discipline. Social history, guided by the *Annales* and Marxist schools, reigned supreme. In response, military historians expanded their field of inquiry. They created new military history that highlighted the social and cultural aspects of any subject related to the military. "Blood and guts" operational histories were shunned, and histories of strategy and strategic planning were placed in that category. Ways of war studies, however, were highly attractive to military historians attempting to maintain their discipline's academic credibility. Showing the continuity of military thought through nationally constructed social and cultural structures featured characteristics that were appealing to both the *Annales* and Marxist schools. The lengthy periodization of such works reflected the *longue durée* of the *Annales* approach. The discussion of nationalism's effect on foreign policy engaged Marxist historians who sought to dismiss nationalism in their pursuit to validate their economic deterministic view of historical progress.

There has been a virtual explosion of way of war scholarship in the past decade that crosses disciplinary lines. Social and political scientists often invoke the term "way of war" to add authority and a certain amount of popular flair to their studies. It appears that military historians accomplished the mission of reaffirming their academic legitimacy. The problem with all way of war scholarship is the lack of a standard definition. As an example, a way *in* war and a way *of* war are generally considered synonyms, but their differences could be distinctive depending upon perspective. The argument provides the meaning and the narrative the context. It can represent anything to anyone as long as an explanation is well argued. Due to this, the term became popularized, and its significance has been greatly diluted.

Continuing with the historiographic discussion, the first historian to challenge Hart's conclusions was Michael Howard. In *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars*, Howard (1972) exposes the flaws in Hart's popularized history. First, he shows that maintaining the balance of power at *all* costs was crucial to the security of the empire. He then connects

the above argument to Britain's critical need to maintain the security of the British Channel. Howard concludes by outlining Britain's strategic predicament from pre-1918 to 1939. He determines that there was no choice but to commit to a policy that sent expeditionary forces to Europe at the outbreak of World War II. This was done in a way that was practical, and designed to minimize the resources expended. Churchill's peripheral strategy in the Mediterranean was indicative of this approach. It was a method that Howard understood well, since he wrote the official British history *Grand Strategy, Volume IV: August 1942-September 1943* (Howard 1968) that explored Churchill's reasoning. Howard's 1975 pamphlet *The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal* was a direct criticism of Hart. Building upon his previous works, Howard attacks Hart for his assumption that sea power, as projected in the form of a blockade, was decisive. Here, Howard depicts Hart as naïve, and tells a tale riff with British expeditionary forces landing on hostile shores to bring successful conclusions to conflicts (Howard 1975).

Brian Bond's *British Military Policy between the World Wars* (1980) further attacked Hart suggesting that if there was a British way in warfare prior to World War II, then it was shattered due to continental enemies that had global reach. Expanding Bond's thesis, French (1990) in *The British Way in Warfare, 1688–2000*, dismisses outright both Hart and Howard for the inherent rigidity of their arguments. Hart and Howard were on opposite ends of the strategic spectrum. One refused to acknowledge Britain's strategic requirement for a continental commitment while the other rejected any notion that there were times when a continental commitment was not necessary. French establishes himself as the realist of the group, and finds the middle ground between the two. Where Bond saw discontinuity, however, French, like Hart and Howard, saw continuity. The British way in warfare, according to French, was adaptive. He effectively shows how both Hart and Howard were correct, but only when the strategic circumstances were right for either's approach.

In a series of essays amassed in *The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956, Essays in Honor of David French* (Neilson and Kennedy 2010), the more significant aspects of French's works are explored. Of the fourteen, one essay is of particular interest to this review. The essay "Some Principles of Anglo-American Strategic Relations, 1900–1945" by Greg Kennedy (2010) determines that the British and American alliance blossomed between 1914 and 1943. The Anglo-American coalition grew in a strategic environment controlled by unwritten guidelines. These "principles" were primarily concerned with diplomatic positioning, not combined war planning. Political elites directed the relationship, but public opinion was its driving force. A source of constant tension was Britain's imperialism. Throughout the Anglo-American alliance Americans were unwilling to aid the British in their pursuit of maintaining their empire. This was most evident in the resistance to any British attempts to control the Pacific strategy in World War II. Kennedy suggests that Americans considered their war against the Japanese as a righteous one. Any attempts by the British to tarnish that noble cause with imperial intentions were immediately shut down.

Russell F. Weigley traces the American's vacillation of emphasis between political and military strategies in *Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall* (1962). According to Weigley, there was a paradoxical nature to American military thinking. Americans considered themselves anti-imperialistic

and peaceful, however, the military was continuously charged with either policing an empire, or prosecuting wars of annihilation. Weigley explains how this tension affected the army in both its composition and strategy. During World War II, mobilization, specifically conscription, was hotly contested and often pitted strategic planners against their political masters. Balancing the political necessity to maintain public support for a policy of unconditional surrender, the economic need for workers in factories, and the military's manpower requirements oftentimes brought politics to the fore, and sent military necessity to the rear.

The most comprehensive discussion on the American way of war is Weigley's *American Way of War*. Although there are other histories, Weigley's continues to be the standard by which all others are compared. Weigley is critical of American strategists during World War II, especially in the Mediterranean and European theaters. He criticizes the American way of war that focused on destruction as the only way to win. Destruction was the reason for a military, and all facets of the enemy's war-making capabilities were sanctioned targets. The grinding battles of attrition in Europe were designed within an overarching strategy that concentrated solely on the annihilation of the German army. The strategic bombing campaigns sought to destroy German and Japanese industries as well as crush civilian morale. This was strategy built upon war's most primal traits. It was brutish, anti-intellectual, and caused unnecessary casualties. Weigley asserts that the war's most successful strategy was prosecuted in the Pacific theater. The relative harmony between political, economic, and military strategies kept casualties to a minimum. It did so by using highly skilled logistics planning to execute bold strategic maneuvers intended to confront Japanese weaknesses with Allied strengths. Edward S. Miller's *War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (1991) confirms Weigley's contentions. While doing so, he provides the depth of scholarship that Weigley lacks. The multivolume *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volumes I–XV* by Morison (1947–1962) complements the above two works with its exhaustive study of the Pacific theater's naval operations.

In general, the British and American ways of war literature is rich with historical analysis. It merges theory with practice across time and space to give deeper meaning to the perceived *ad hoc* strategic planning that occurred during war. Ways of war studies are rooted in periods of peace in an effort to show continuity, or discontinuity, in the strategies that were developed when an entity was at war. In essence, a way of war is the intellectual wellspring from which all tactical, operational, and strategic plans are drawn. It is a pool of collective understanding between politicians, military officers, and the public. All are versed in its most basic tenets, and share in its acceptance. A way of war is developed over decades and centuries. It is inherently conservative and resists modification. Any strategic plan that strays too far from a nation's way of war is almost certainly doomed. Only in wars of national existence do politicians, military officers, and the public combine collectively to permit a rapid change to an established way of war. Oftentimes, those alterations are immediately reversed upon the successful conclusion of hostilities. Remnants remain, but most wartime innovations and adaptations are inserted into a way of war through a slow, linear evolution, that is, if they are implemented at all.

Strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum. Besides being fundamentally guided by a nation's way of war, it is influenced by a number of other factors. The strategic

situation, organization of planning staffs, economic limitations, and the personalities of leaders all affect the products that strategic planners develop. World War II historians concentrated on these influences, and developed studies intended to ascertain which one affected strategy most. Typically, the British and American official histories of strategic planning fall into these loosely defined categories, however, they are written in a chronologically driven narrative. Generally, academic historians studied these limiting factors as well, but not comprehensively.

Writing in 1946 and faced with the aftermath of World War II, historian Sigmund Neumann, one of the original authors published in the 1943 *Makers of Modern Strategy*, presents a European strategic situation that was highly volatile. He argues that the conclusion of World War II signaled the end of a much larger "Second Thirty Years War." In his *Future in Perspective*, Neumann (1946) describes Europe as being in a state of perpetual conflict and revolution since the outbreak of World War I. Neumann maintains that between 1914 and 1945 Europe was never at "peace." Rather, the violence of battle transitioned into the violence of diplomacy, and then once again into the violence of battle.

Neumann saw nationalism, imperialism, and "international anarchy" as the root causes for this continuing conflict. Rampant nationalism was not unique to Germany as, according to Neumann, some immediate postwar scholars suggested. It was spread throughout the countries of Europe, and their resistance to "internationalism" was a principal cause of World War II. Imperialism continued after World War I and empires such as Britain and France maintained colonial possessions, even adding new ones through the redistribution of Germany's colonies. Germany's aggression was always that of an empire, ever searching on an imperial quest for what Hitler later called *Lebensraum*, or "living space." Neumann contends that "international anarchy" was caused by the nineteenth century's laissez-faire market capitalism carried over into the interwar world economy. This economic competition was the reason for imperialism, and the fuel from which nationalism flourished.

In the Pacific, the United States and Japan were locked in a cycle similar to that which Neumann describes in Western Europe. After a brief halt in the 1920s, Japan's imperialistic ambitions of the early twentieth century resurfaced. The collapse of the Western financial system in 1929–1930 ushered in a new era of economic and political instability in Japan. Ultra-nationalists seized upon popular discontent to champion the virtues of imperial expansion. They claimed only the acquisition of new territory would both alleviate the strain of an over-populated Japan and elevate it to an equal status as that of the United States and Great Britain. Their cry fell on sympathetic ears in the Japanese military, specifically the army. Initiating advances into China, the army placed Japan on a collision course with the United States who, along with Great Britain, were the *de facto* protectors of China's open-door policy.

Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II (1992) is a collection of essays edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett that deconstruct how the Allied and Axis Powers developed their assessment of the strategic situation in the years leading up to World War II. Paul Kennedy's essay, "British 'Net Assessment' and the Coming of the Second World War," (Kennedy 1992) describes the intricacies of Britain's civil-military partnership in addressing imperial defense policies. He critiques the process of net assessment, and determines where its weaknesses and strengths were. Kennedy rejects previous historians, specifically F. H. Hinsley's *British Intelligence in*

the Second World War: Its Influences on Strategy and Operations, Volumes 1–3 (1979–1988), who suggests there was organizational harmony among government, military, and intelligence agencies. Rather, he opines, there was considerable conflict between the Admiralty, Imperial General Staff, Treasury, intelligence agencies, various ministers associated with defense, and the prime minister. The conflict, however, did not cripple its functioning. The civil-military partnership evolved and produced war-time strategic assessments relatively easily even when faced with a turnover in personnel.

Christman (1992) in “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment” contends that the lack of experience in civil-military strategy formulation was caused by Roosevelt’s leadership style. It is an accepted historical fact that the United States was grossly underprepared when confronting the British on strategic issues at the beginning of the war. Christman attributes the American condition to Roosevelt’s unwillingness to create a civil-military body for war planning prior to 1940–1941. Roosevelt was reluctant to relinquish control in matters of strategy, refused to give guidance to his commanders and diplomats stationed abroad, and often sidestepped official bureaucratic channels for communication. This planted the seed of doubt in his senior advisers, diplomats, and military commanders. There was never any certainty to what the president thought policy should be. Throughout the war, Roosevelt continued to make decisions that stunned his allies and military commanders alike.

It is important to note that prior to World War II only Great Britain had a coherent national strategy and the bureaucratic organizations to sustain it. After the Boer War in 1902, the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) was created to maintain coherency between the strategies of the army and navy in an austere budgetary environment. The committee combined the prime minister, his cabinet ministers, and senior naval and military officers into one organization. Positioned within the parliamentary hierarchy in purely an advisory role, the committee guided the empire’s defense policy until the outbreak of World War II. Surprisingly, a history dedicated to the CID has yet to be written.

After Winston Churchill became prime minister in 1940, he dissolved the CID and created the War Cabinet. Members of the cabinet included the foreign secretary, civilian administrators of the War Office, minister of production, the admiralty, and the air ministry. A notable difference between the CID and the War Cabinet was the underrepresentation of the Treasury in the latter. Fiscal concerns were of primary importance to the CID. There was a strong feeling among the civilian ministers that fiscal responsibility was crucial, if not the most important, component to the defense of the empire. This was not to be the case when hostilities broke out in 1939. In a war of national existence, fiscal constraints were all but forgotten. The development of this policy and the evolution of British strategic planning organizations are detailed in N. H. Gibbs’s *Grand Strategy, Volume I: Rearmament Policy* (1976).

In contrast to the British, the United States did not have any standing war planning body of political-military officials prior to World War II. The joint army-navy board was created after World War I, but it did not incorporate any civilian politicians and it was a relatively inconsequential organization until the mid-1930s. Unlike the British, Americans were reluctant to combine civilian and military officials together in policy forming bodies. Although it may seem counterintuitive, it was a logical precaution for a country fearful of standing militaries. With the exception of a few critics, both politicians and military officers were in agreement to keep their organizations separate.

Politicians thought this separateness restrained the power of the military while officers welcomed it with a belief that politicians had no business in dictating military strategy and operations. This bred a bureaucratic rivalry between the State Department and the army and navy. Neither was willing to engage in planning where one could exert more influence over the other. This continued American inexperience in civil-military cooperation was a recurrent problem when dealing with their Anglo counterparts.

Histories concerning the development of American war planning staffs are more numerous than their British equivalent. Perhaps this is because British planning organizations grew over decades whereas the American's emerged virtually overnight. The *US Army World War II* historical series, the "Green Books," contains several histories dealing with war planning organizations. Produced by some of the most preeminent World War II historians, the Green Books are the most scholarly of all the American official histories. Although great care was taken to reduce overlap, there is considerable amount of repetition. A sequential reading of the histories shows that a full one-third of the information was covered elsewhere in an almost identical fashion. Mark S. Watson's *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (1950), Ray S. Cline's *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (1951), Louis Morton's *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years* (1962), and James E. Hewes, Jr.'s *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963* (1975) all fall prey to this criticism. Nonetheless, each offers an in-depth analysis of their particular niche of the World War II strategic environment.

The Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff along with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were created at the beginning of the war to direct the military strategy of the two nations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff was a collection of British and American officers that were responsible for coordinating the two allies' war efforts. Presiding over the Combined Chiefs were Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The history of the Combined Chiefs has not been written, and is only found within other works. Encompassing the senior military commanders for their respective services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a manifestation of a vision that General George C. Marshall brought with him when he became Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Joint Chiefs worked directly for the president. All major strategic decisions were made in Washington, DC. Personalities dominated the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning process. *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II* by Stoler (2000) complemented with *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Against Japan* by Hayes (1982) are two of the better histories that explore the relationships that defined national strategy during the war. Maurice Matloff and Edward M. Snell's *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942* (1953) and Maurice Matloff's companion volume *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* (1959) are the official histories dealing with the cooperation of Britain and the United States at the national strategy level.

On December 29, 1940 when delivering a speech over the radio, President Roosevelt called the United States the "Arsenal of Democracy." Rightly predicting that America would have to be the industrial powerhouse for its allies if it entered the war, Roosevelt set a goal that was staggering to contemplate. The management of resources alone was mind-boggling. Thus, the economic strategy of the United States was just as important, if not more, than its military strategy. *The Army and Industrial Manpower* by Fairchild and Grossman (1959) and *The Army and Economic Mobilization*

(Smith 1959) both document how the army in the continental United States directed the acquisition of the enormous influx of men and materiel. *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943* (Leighton and Coakley 1955) and *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945* (Leighton and Coakley 1968) by Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley recount how the army managed the vast array of resources needed to prosecute the world's first and only global war.

Paul A. C. Koistinen's series of books on the "political economy of American warfare" tie together political and economic strategies to produce a single narrative. *Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920–1939* (Koistinen 1998) and *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945* (Koistinen 2004) are by far the most comprehensive examinations of the United States' economic strategy before and during the war. Showing continuity in economic strategic thinking, Koistinen presents a counterargument to the prevailing wisdom that the American military was unsophisticated in its approach to warfare prior to 1945. In a similar methodology, Peden's *Arms, Economics, and British Strategy* (2007) details the influence that economic strategy had on British imperial defense.

There is a significant amount of "guess-work" when developing strategies. Determining the timeline for a campaign or battle, or assessing the enemy's future intentions are, at best, educated guesses, and oftentimes are wrong. Coupled with this, strategic plans are fleeting, changing as political and military leaders assume command, and bring their own strategic flair with them. British and American strategists produced many studies and plans that were a mere intellectual exercise due to changing circumstances that rendered them undesirable. Whether it is a politician or officer, the strategic leader plays a prominent role in the planning process. They direct the course of action, and their command ensures that the course is followed. Their swiftness, or lack thereof, in improvising as situations change often brings about victory or defeat. Thus, many histories of strategic planning focus on the senior leadership.

The political leaders, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, have been thoroughly examined. Churchill's *The Second World War, Volumes 1–6* (1948–1953) recounts in extreme detail his view of the war, but it must be balanced by a methodical reading of academic biographies. *A Companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt* edited by Pederson (2011) provides a comprehensive examination of the scholarship concerning the president. The distinction between political and military strategies becomes blurred when discussing senior military command. At times, General Dwight D. Eisenhower's supreme command in the European theater as well as General Joseph Stilwell and General Albert C. Weidemeyer's command in the China-Burma-India theater dealt with politics more than military strategy. Forrest C. Pogue's *The Supreme Command* (1954) examines Eisenhower's struggle to maintain a unified effort in a theater of war filled with egotistical general officers from many different nations. *Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace* by Perry (2007) expands upon Pogue's work and explores the political connection between the Washington command post and Eisenhower's European command. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland's three-volume work concerning the China-Burma-India theater describes in detail the problems that Stilwell and, after his relief, Weidemeyer confronted (Romanus and Sunderland 1953, 1956, 1959). The edited volume, *Command Decisions* (Greenfield 1960), summarizes the

most important strategic decisions for the entire war, and explains the political, economic, and military strategic conditions that informed them.

As this chapter illustrated, the historiography concerning British and American strategic planning is small compared with other World War II histories. Writing a history of strategy is difficult, and is often avoided by most scholars. This belies the fact that some of the more renowned historians chose to partake in studies that engaged this particular field. The review is by no means comprehensive. It highlights some of the scholarship in an effort to provide a historiographic context from which critiques can be made. In the end, this chapter demonstrates that the history of British and American strategic planning is a highly technical field, and one that deserves continued study.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

Wartime Conferences

MARK A. STOLER

Allied military and political leaders met numerous times during World War II to discuss both military strategy and plans for the postwar world. The best known of these meetings were those attended by the Allied heads of government as well as their military and political advisers, but important meetings of those advisers without their government heads also took place throughout the war. A historiographical account of these conferences provides a sense of the global reach of the participants, as well as of the topics they explored and upon which they decided policy.

The Allied conferences receiving the most historical attention were the three tripartite summit meetings between the leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt attended the first two of these meetings: at Tehran from November 27 to December 1, 1943 (code-named Eureka), and at Yalta, from February 4 to February 11, 1945 (code-named Argonaut). With Roosevelt's death in April 1945, his successor, Harry S. Truman, met Churchill and Stalin at the third and final conference in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam, from July 17 to August 2, 1945 (code-named Terminal), though Churchill lost the British elections midway through the conference and was replaced by his successor, Clement Attlee.

Although not receiving as much historical attention as these three tripartite meetings, a far greater number of equally important summit conferences took place between two rather than three of the Allied leaders. Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow twice – August 12–15, 1942 (code-named Bracelet) and October 9–18, 1944 (code-named Tolstoy). Churchill and Roosevelt met on ten additional occasions: at Placentia Bay off the coast of Argentinia, Newfoundland, from August 9 to 12, 1941 (code-named Riviera); in Washington, DC, from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942 (code-named Arcadia); in Washington again from June 19 to June 25, 1942. They also convened at Casablanca from January 14 to January 24, 1943 (code-named Symbol); in Washington for a third time, from May 12 to May 25, 1943 (code-named

Trident); from August 14 to August 24, 1943 at Quebec (code-named Quadrant); at Cairo from November 22 to November 26, 1943, just before the Tehran Conference (code-named Sextant I); and in Cairo again after Tehran from December 4 to December 6 (code-named Sextant II). They then met in Quebec for a second time from September 11 to September 16, 1944 (code-named Octagon); before the Yalta Conference, from January 30 to February 3, 1945 at Malta (code-named Cricket); and briefly after the Yalta Conference on February 15, 1945, aboard the US warship *Quincy* anchored in Great Bitter Lake at the southern end of the Suez Canal where Roosevelt had previously met with the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek also attended the first Cairo meeting, while Canadian Prime Minister William MacKenzie King attended the two Quebec meetings.

Senior military and political advisers accompanied the leaders at these meetings. Those advisers also met separately during these conferences, and the British and American military contingents did so formally as members of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff – an organization formed at the 1941–1942 Arcadia Conference and composed of the British and American air, naval, and ground chiefs as well as a military representative of each leader. At all other times, the Combined Chiefs met in Washington, with members of the British Joint Staff Mission representing their chiefs who remained in London. The three wartime foreign secretaries, Anthony Eden, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Cordell Hull, met formally and by themselves only once – in Moscow in October 19–30, 1943. Roosevelt did not ask Hull to accompany him to any of his summit conferences, but Roosevelt's close adviser, Harry Hopkins, often filled Hull's role at these conferences. Hull's successor, Edward Stettinius, attended the Yalta Conference and his successor, James Byrnes, attended the Potsdam Conference. Ernest Bevin similarly replaced Anthony Eden at Potsdam after Churchill's mid-conference electoral defeat. Furthermore, Eden met with Stalin as well as Molotov in Moscow in December of 1941 and with Roosevelt as well as Hull in Washington in March of 1943, while Molotov, in May–June 1942, met with Churchill and Roosevelt – as well as Eden and Hull – in London and Washington, and with Truman in Washington in April 1945.

The bilateral and trilateral summit conferences held from 1941 through 1943 focused primarily on military issues and disagreements as the Allies attempted to come up with a unified strategic plan to defeat the Axis Powers, whereas attention shifted in the 1944 and 1945 summit conferences to postwar issues. Nevertheless, numerous postwar issues were discussed during the 1941–1943 meetings as well, while strategic discussions similarly took place during the 1944–1945 meetings.

The major strategic issues discussed during the 1941–1943 summit conferences focused on the relative weight to be given to the European, Mediterranean, Pacific, and Far Eastern theaters. Although the Allies officially agreed to a strategy of defeating Germany before Japan, they disagreed as to whether to have Anglo-American forces focus immediately on invading northern France as desired by the Americans and the Soviets or whether to concentrate first on North Africa and the Mediterranean as the British desired. This dispute dominated almost all Allied conferences during this time period and was not resolved until the Tehran Conference in November of 1943. The Allies also discussed, during these and later conferences, how much attention should be given to the war against Japan and in which theaters, as well as the terms for eventual Soviet entry into that conflict. Major postwar issues discussed during the

summit conferences included the occupation and treatment of Germany, the future boundaries and government of Poland and the rest of Europe, and the creation of a new postwar international organization. The first Anglo-American summit conference off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941, which took place prior to American entry into the war, also resulted in the creation of the Atlantic Charter – a statement of postwar aims that served as the basis for the formal Grand Alliance as announced on January 1, 1942, during the Arcadia Conference; while that second Anglo-American meeting in Washington soon after Pearl Harbor resulted in the creation not only of the Combined Chiefs of Staff but also other bodies and policies that defined the Anglo-American “special relationship” during the war.

High-level Allied representatives also met without their political leaders on numerous occasions. As previously noted Eden, Molotov, and Hull met from October 19 to October 30, 1943 at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference. From July 1 to July 22, 1944, other Allied representatives gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to plan for the international postwar financial system (a meeting that resulted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and from August 21 to October 7, 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington to plan the postwar United Nations organization. Representatives also met in San Francisco on April 25 to June 26, 1945 to draft that organization’s charter. And throughout the war, individual American and British military chiefs met with each other as well as with their field commanders, as did their heads of government.

Most, if not all, of these meetings are mentioned and analyzed within general histories of Allied wartime strategy and diplomacy as well as the memoirs of the participants, but few book-length studies of many of the conferences have been written or published. Indeed, a striking fact given the large number and importance of these conferences is how little detailed historical attention some of them have received. The three meetings of the “Big Three,” especially the one at Yalta, are the exceptions in this regard. But many of the numerous Churchill-Roosevelt meetings, as well as the two Churchill-Stalin meetings, remain relatively understudied.

The major exception to this generalization, the February 1945 Yalta Conference, received both early and extensive analysis. This was the direct result of the Soviet-American conflict, the cold war, that began almost immediately after World War II ended (if not while it was still in progress) and the ensuing attacks on the deceased Roosevelt, once the conference results became known, for having naïvely appeased Stalin. Yalta also became a major issue in American domestic politics at this time. Indeed, it quickly acquired, in D. C. Watt’s words, “a connotation of shameful failure, if not outright treason, matching that attached to the Munich Conference of September 1938” (Watt 1989, p. 79).

Some of the earliest critiques of Yalta came from domestic conservatives who had opposed Roosevelt’s New Deal and anti-interventionists who had opposed US entry into World War II. Illustrative of this group was journalist Chamberlin (1950), who, in his *America’s Second Crusade*, blasted Roosevelt not only for manipulating the American people into a needless war with nations that were not military threats to the United States, but also for fighting that war as an unlimited crusade through his policy of unconditional surrender rather than a limited conflict to restore the balance of power, for refusing to follow a military strategy which would have placed Anglo-American instead of Soviet forces in key areas, and for naïvely and immorally attempting to appease

Stalin at what he labeled “The Munich Called Yalta” that gave the Soviet dictator control of most of eastern and central Europe as well as China. The United States thereby lost the peace “while the war was being won” (Chamberlin 1950, pp. 206, viii).

Critics of US behavior at Yalta were by no means limited, however, to those who had opposed US entry into the war. While Stettinius (1949) defended the president in his *Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference*, some of Roosevelt’s other wartime advisers and British associates, as well as internationalist-minded journalists, voiced views similar to Chamberlin’s. These included former ambassador Bullitt (1948) in a *Life* magazine article appropriately titled “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace,” former head of the wartime US military mission in Moscow General Deane (1947) in his *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia*, American journalist Baldwin in his *Great Mistakes of the War* (1950), Australian journalist Wilmot in his *The Struggle for Europe* (1952), and Churchill in *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* – the sixth and final volume of his wartime memoirs (1954).

As the cold war heated up in the years 1949–1952 and exploded into a frustrating and bloody hot war in Korea, the number and ferocity of these attacks increased. Indeed, Roosevelt’s wartime policies in general and his behavior at Yalta in particular became a major issue in American politics and a focal point of Republican attacks, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy and others on the Republican Right Wing, on the Democratic Party. These attacks were fueled by the 1949 Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb, and a series of spy cases that included State Department official Alger Hiss who had attended the Yalta Conference, and they were both a cause and a consequence of the great Red Scare of these and ensuing years.

As a result of the anticommunist assault and the Republican victory in the 1952 elections, the State Department under Congressional pressure released and published in 1955 the official US records of the conference as a special volume in its *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, and far earlier than it would have done (if at all) without this political furor (United States Department of State 1955). That in turn led to a flurry of historical works on the conference – and eventually to publication of additional World War II summit conference volumes as a special subseries with the *Foreign Relations* overall series (Theoharis 1970; Botts 2011).

Contrary to the expectations of many, publication of the Yalta Conference documents in 1955 did not result in any major revelations of American naïveté or treason. To the contrary, John Snell, Forrest Pogue, Charles Delzell, and George Lensen in *The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the Balance of Power* (Snell 1956), made extensive use of these and other recently available documents in an effort to dispel the myths about the conference that had arisen in the previous decade by analyzing the meeting within the context of its time. By February 1945, they argued, Soviet military power rather than American appeasement, naïveté, or treason had given Stalin physical control of Eastern Europe and the potential for control of large areas in the Far East. Furthermore, Soviet military assistance was still needed by Great Britain and the United States, both of whom were near the bottom of their manpower pool. Given these facts, western concessions to Stalin at Yalta were minimal. The McCarthyite charges of betrayal and treason, Pogue concluded, were “manifestations of national immaturity” and a refusal to place facts within their historical context (Snell 1956, p. 207).

Nevertheless, such charges continued, with some claiming that Roosevelt had always had a secret, deliberate policy of helping to expand Soviet power or arguing that communist spies and fellow travelers had duped the gullible President (Crocker 1959; Kubek 1963). Furthermore, aside from *The Meaning of Yalta*, most of the early defenses of American wartime diplomacy at Yalta and throughout the war exhibited an odd duality, for many of the authors agreed with the charges of naïveté leveled by Bullitt, Baldwin, and Wilmot if not with the more extreme charges of the Chamberlins and the McCarthyites. Indeed, they were part of the Realist critique of American foreign policy in general and a key component of American self-perception. Furthermore, most of Roosevelt's defenders had, by this time, become cold warriors themselves and therefore could not defend the cooperative approach toward Stalin that Roosevelt had attempted at Yalta, and indeed throughout the war. In the process of defending Roosevelt against his extreme critics, they thus wound up attacking him on some of the same grounds used by those critics.

This duality was evident in the first major histories of the Grand Alliance, McNeill's *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict* (1953) and Feis's *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The War They Fought and the Peace They Sought* (1957). Both works defended Roosevelt on the same grounds as the authors of *The Meaning of Yalta*, yet simultaneously berated him for his behavior at Yalta and his general naïveté regarding Stalin. So did most other works on US wartime diplomacy published during the 1950s and early 1960s (Armstrong 1961; Tang 1963; Smith 1965). In doing so, they reflected the cold war consensus that by this time had come to dominate American politics.

As that political consensus was shattered by events during the 1960s and 1970s, most notably the Vietnam War, so was the historical consensus by the rise of a new school of Roosevelt defenders and a second new school of interpretation known as New Left revisionism. These years also witnessed major declassifications of World War II documents in the United States and Great Britain, as well as publication by the State Department of both its annual *Foreign Relations* volumes for the war years and additional wartime conference volumes covering all of Roosevelt's meetings with Churchill and Stalin (United States Department of State 1960, 1961, 1968, 1970, 1972). The result was an outpouring of scholarly works on Allied wartime diplomacy in general, and on the Yalta Conference in particular.

Led by Roosevelt Library Director Emerson (1958–1959) and army chief historian Greenfield (1963), as well as other government historians producing the army's massive official history of the war, the Roosevelt defenders argued that Roosevelt's wartime policies and strategies had been highly realistic rather than naïve and that he had clearly controlled his military advisers rather than vice versa. Going further, Snell, in *Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War*, concluded that Axis rather than Allied leaders had been guilty of acting on the basis of illusions and that a new global balance of power based on Russia and the United States was inevitable if the Axis Powers were to be defeated. Given that fact, Roosevelt's admittedly illusory hope of postwar cooperation with Stalin had been "virtually imposed by necessity" and his specific policies were highly realistic and pragmatic given the wartime circumstances he faced (Snell 1963, p. 212). Divine and Roosevelt biographers Burns and Dallek reinforced these conclusions by emphasizing in their works Roosevelt's pragmatic private comments and actions – both in general and in

particular at Yalta – rather than public comments that had been designed to protect his domestic flank (Divine 1969; Burns 1970; Dallek 1979).

New Left revisionists also challenged the prevailing cold war consensus on US wartime diplomacy in general, albeit with a very different emphasis on aggressive US behavior both during and immediately after the war. In regard to Yalta in particular, Clemens, in her detailed book-length analysis of the conference (1970), directly challenged the prevailing image of Rooseveltian appeasement and naïveté by concluding that Stalin rather than Roosevelt had made most of the concessions at the conference and by blaming Truman for reversing Roosevelt's cooperative policy that had worked.

By no means did everyone agree with Clemens, and the publication of her volume did not end the debate. Indeed, whether or not one accepted her analysis and conclusions depended to a large extent upon whether one considered Stalin and the Soviet state he controlled a normal national leader and nation with whom one could negotiate, or an abnormal one with whom traditional diplomatic compromise was not possible. It also continued to depend to a large extent upon the related factor of one's politics, and by the 1980s conservatives and neoconservatives, reinforced by Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency, the demise of détente, and the revival of the cold war were restating and reaffirming the earlier assault on Roosevelt at Yalta.

Highly illustrative of this renewed attack were a series of articles in the neoconservative journal *Commentary* in 1985 – the fortieth anniversary of the war's end – by Churchill's personal secretary Colville, whose diaries had just been published (Colville 1985a), and by Kristol, Kirkpatrick, Abel, and Nisbet. Colville blasted Roosevelt in virtually the same terms as had Bullitt, Wilmot, Baldwin, and others more than three decades earlier. While the three Allies had won the war, he argued, the Soviets had won the peace as a result of Roosevelt's naïveté, his "complete sellout to Stalin" at Yalta regarding Poland, the narrowly military and apolitical perspective of his admirals and generals who took over as his health declined, and the anti-British bias of most US policymakers that resulted from their negative view of colonialism (Colville 1985b). Kristol (Kristol et al. 1985) supported Colville a few months later by labeling Yalta one of the United States' three "major and costly" foreign policy mistakes, as did Kirkpatrick by noting that the postwar United Nations so central to Roosevelt's behavior at Yalta had been based on a wartime "falsification" regarding the nature of the Soviet Union. So did Abel, who blasted Roosevelt for the "terrible" decisions Colville had described, and Nisbet who accused the President of "credulity" regarding Stalin, "pathetic ignorance of political history and geopolitics" and "colossal naivete" (Kristol 1985, pp. 25–28, 50–52, 56–70, 73–76).

Roosevelt's defenders quickly responded. In the *New York Review of Books*, Draper (1986) attacked this "Neoconservative History," which he bluntly labeled, in a thinly veiled reference to McCarthyism, another effort to make history "serve current political extremism" – in this case neoconservative ideology and its hatred of liberal internationalism. Making extensive use of previous defenses of Roosevelt, as well as Kimball's recently published complete Churchill–Roosevelt correspondence (Kimball 1984), he argued that the Red Army rather than Roosevelt had given Stalin control of Eastern Europe and that "the Western allies did not give away anything at Yalta that they actually had; they did get some promissory notes which they could not cash in once Stalin decided to stop payments." At the same time, Leffler questioned whether Stalin had been the only one to "stop payments," noting that each power

had disregarded parts of the Yalta accords and that the United States had used supposed Soviet violations as a “convenient lever” to excuse its own (Leffler 1986, p. 117). The debate continued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s (see for example Nadeau 1990 versus Edmonds 1991).

As previously noted, by this time, the State Department had published additional wartime documents, both in its annual *Foreign Relations* volumes (United States Department of State 1959–1969) and in six additional conference volumes that covered the other Big Three summit meetings at Tehran in 1943 (United States Department of State 1961) and Potsdam in 1945 (United States Department of State 1960), as well as all the bilateral Anglo-American wartime conferences (United States Department of State 1968, 1970, 1972). Both the United States and Great Britain had also declassified most of their World War II archival records and completed major official histories of wartime strategic planning and diplomacy (Matloff and Snell 1953; Butler 1957–1972; Matloff 1959; Woodward 1971), while the Soviets had published their minutes of the three tripartite summits (USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1969; Beitzell 1970). The result was an outpouring of World War II scholarship, much of it centered on these conferences. Feis in *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (1960) and Mee in *Meeting at Potsdam* (1975) produced monographs on this third and last Big Three Conference that focused on its role in the coming of the cold war. And in the 1980s, Eubank in *Summit at Teheran* (1985), Mayle in *Eureka Summit: Agreement in Principle and the Big Three at Tehran, 1943* (1987) and Sainsbury in *The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943: The Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences* (1985) all published volumes that analyzed this first and previously neglected Big Three meeting (Franklin in 1969 had called for greater study of this conference) as having sketched out in general terms, and in some cases virtually decided, many of the major issues at Yalta. In doing so, these historians, in effect, argued that this first Big Three meeting was at least as important as the more famous one at Yalta. And in fitting in with the previously discussed tenor of the 1980s, both Eubank and Sainsbury heavily criticized Roosevelt’s behavior vis-à-vis Stalin at Tehran in terms similar to the previous criticisms of him at Yalta, though the British Sainsbury did so with a clear and detailed emphasis on the understandable differences between US and British policies toward Russia at this time. Numerous additional volumes on Yalta were also published during this decade, including a large and varied collection of papers delivered at a conference in Italy (Olla 1988), De Senarcens’s *Yalta* (1988), and Buhite’s *Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy* (1986), the last of which was highly critical not only of Roosevelt’s behavior at the conference but also of summit conferences in general. In 1988, Nisbet’s *Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship* repeated and amplified his 1986 assault on Roosevelt, albeit with Tehran replacing Yalta as the place and conference where Roosevelt “played essentially the role Chamberlin had at Munich” and where the cold war had begun (Nisbet 1988, p. 12).

While all three of the tripartite summit conferences thus received book-length treatment during the 1960s through the 1980s, very few of the monographs published during these years focused exclusively on any of the Churchill-Stalin or Churchill-Roosevelt summit conferences. Articles by such scholars as Resis (1978), Ross (1981) and Siracusa (1979, 1981), as well as general works on Anglo-Soviet wartime relations, did analyze the two Churchill-Stalin meetings, and Beitzell in *The*

Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain and Russia, 1941–1943 (1972) used the recently published *Foreign Relations* conference volumes and other published documents to analyze all the summit conferences of 1942–1943. But with the exception of Wilson's *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941*, a detailed study that was published in 1969 (and reissued with major revisions in 1991), and both Eubank's and Sainsbury's chapters on the Moscow and Cairo Conferences within their Tehran volumes (Eubank 1985; Sainsbury 1985), no archivally based book-length study of any of the other Anglo-American summit conferences, or the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, or the two Churchill-Stalin meetings, appeared during these years.

Instead, a number of volumes appeared that focused on the numerous diplomatic as well as strategic conflicts within the Anglo-American wartime "special relationship," conflicts that Churchill had downplayed or ignored in his memoirs but that had been revealed within the *Foreign Relations* conference volumes and the archival openings of the 1970s. Other works analyzed a single issue or event at some of these conferences. Kimball and others focused on the Morgenthau Plan for Germany that had been discussed and briefly accepted at the second Quebec Conference, for example (Kimball 1976), while for the 1943 Casablanca Conference, numerous works focused on Roosevelt's famous enunciation of unconditional surrender at the meeting's closing press conference. In each case, the focus was not really on the conference itself, however, but rather on the broader history of the specific issue involved – that is, Allied plans and disagreements regarding the surrender and occupation of Germany in the case of both the Morgenthau Plan and the unconditional surrender policy.

Far from accidentally, many of these volumes followed the same historiographical pattern as the works on Yalta, with Armstrong's early *Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy in World War II* (1961) highly critical of the policy and O'Connor's later *Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surrender* (1971), as well as numerous articles, strongly defending it (Chase 1955; Balfour 1979; Campbell 1985). Similarly, a huge scholarly debate erupted during these decades over the atomic bomb issue at the 1945 Potsdam Conference, one that continued into the 1990s (Walker 1997) and continues to this very day, but the only books published on the entire conference during this time were the previously cited volumes by Feis (1960) and Mee (1975). Villa saw a link between Roosevelt's agreement at the first Quebec Conference to an Anglo-American partnership in atomic energy and Churchill's agreement to an American commander for the invasion of northern France (Villa 1977–1978), but no study analyzed this entire meeting. Nor did any full volumes appear on either of the two Churchill-Stalin meetings in Moscow, the second Quebec Conference in 1944, the Casablanca Conference of 1943, either of the two Cairo Conferences of 1943, or any of the three Churchill-Roosevelt wartime conferences held in Washington from 1941–1943.

Studies of important wartime meetings that did not involve any heads of government followed similar patterns in regard to a focus on broader issues as opposed to a specific conference. Gardner (1956), in *Sterling Dollar Diplomacy*, had emphasized the Bretton Woods Conference and Russell (1958), in *A History of the United Nations Charter*, had focused on the San Francisco Conference in her larger study of wartime planning for a new international organization. Eckes (1975) in his *A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971*, Van

Dormeal's *Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System* (1978), and Campbell (1973) in his *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944–1945* similarly did so in their studies of these issues, but with greater emphasis on both Anglo-American conflicts and internal US disagreements. So did Woods (1990), in his later study of Anglo-American wartime efforts to create an international economic order and interdependent world economy, and Aaronson (1996) and Zeiler (1999) in their later studies of US trade policies that culminated in the postwar International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The remaining gaps have been partially filled over the last twenty years, but only partially. Woolner (1998) edited a collection of papers on the second Quebec Conference presented at the Roosevelt Library to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of that meeting, and Bercuson and Herwig (2005), in their *One Christmas in Washington: The Secret Meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill that Changed the World*, analyzed the critical but seriously understudied Arcadia Conference of December 1941–January 1942. Hilderbrand (1990), similarly in his *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security*, analyzed that 1944 meeting to plan for the postwar international organization, while Schild (1995) in *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944*, analyzed both conferences with an emphasis on US intra and inter-departmental decision making. Dobson (1991, 2011) has filled another gap regarding the 1944 International Aviation Conference within his larger studies of Anglo-American conflict over international aviation. And Heiferman has recently published the first book-length study of the first Cairo Conference in *The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang*, with a notable emphasis – as revealed in the subtitle – on Asia and the roles of the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang rather than just Churchill and Roosevelt (Heiferman 2011).

Wilt (1991) analyzed the importance of the strategic decisions reached at the Casablanca Conference while Kimball devoted a chapter to that 1943 meeting within his larger work on Roosevelt as wartime statesman (Kimball 1991), but to date no book-length study has appeared on the conference. Nor have any appeared on the Churchill-Roosevelt meetings in Washington in June of 1942 and May of 1943 as well as Quebec in August of 1943 and September of 1944 (save for the previously cited Woolner collection of papers), or on either of the Churchill-Stalin meetings of 1942 and 1944 in Moscow. The second 1943 Cairo Conference probably cannot be analyzed separately from the first as well as the Tehran Conference, as the brief Churchill-Roosevelt meetings at Malta and Suez in 1945 cannot be treated apart from the Yalta Conference. But these other conferences between two rather than three of the Allied leaders still call for additional and detailed study. So does the 1943 Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference.

Yalta has continued to get the lion's share of attention. Indeed, the total number of published pages devoted to that conference may very well be greater than the pages devoted to all the other conferences combined. And while much of the scholarship continues to defend Roosevelt's behavior at the conference and to properly view it as a wartime rather than a peace conference, in the popular mind as well as to neoconservatives it remains a tragic and disreputable peace conference that led to the cold war. Former President George W. Bush (in a speech at Riga's guildhall, May 7, 2005) aptly summarized this view when he asserted that the Yalta agreements

“followed in the unjust tradition of Munich” and the 1939 Nazi–Soviet Pact. The resulting “captivity of millions in Central and Eastern Europe will be remembered as one of the greatest wrongs of history.”

Ironically, two scholars were at that time working on new, detailed, book-length studies of Yalta, both of which, when published in 2010, directly challenged this view. Plokhy’s *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (2010) defended Roosevelt’s diplomacy and rejected the idea that the conference led to the cold war, while Harbutt’s highly revisionist *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads* (2010) attempted to refocus the entire debate on “structural” terms rather than personalities and to emphasize in this regard the previous Anglo-Soviet accord regarding the division of Europe that the United States sought to alter at Yalta. The extent to which these new works will change scholarly opinion of the Yalta Conference remains to be seen. It is highly doubtful, however, that they will alter its highly negative image, or its centrality, in the popular mind.

As previously noted and emphasized, Yalta was far from the only wartime conference – or arguably the most important. Two other trilateral and numerous bilateral summit conferences as well as a number of non-summit meetings took place during the war. These conferences were a critical component of Allied strategy and diplomacy, and the successful resolution of Allied conflicts that occurred during these meetings played a major and perhaps decisive role in enabling the Allies to win the war. That fact is often forgotten in the emphasis on Yalta and the cold war, even though extensive scholarship since the war ended has made it abundantly clear. That scholarship has also filled in many gaps in our knowledge of these conferences. But other gaps still remain.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

The US War Against Japan: A Transnational Perspective

AKIRA IRIYE

The war between the United States and Japan in the Pacific was part of a global conflict and must therefore be understood as a chapter in contemporary world history. To focus on just the two countries – as I did in *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945* (Iriye 1983) – therefore would be rather misleading. I tried to provide a more multinational context in *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (Iriye 1987), but this book deals almost entirely with decision makers in various capitals and discusses how they sought to situate their respective nations in changing geopolitical equations. Since then, the scholarly literature has steadily moved in the direction of transnational history, namely, a perspective that stresses the interconnectedness among nations and regions of the world and, at the same time, to go beyond states and nations as units of analysis. Transnational history differs from international history, a long established field that examines how nations engage in military, diplomatic, and economic affairs with one another. Transnational history explores cross-border phenomena like migrations and diseases as well as nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions, and ethnic identities. As yet very few studies of the war between the United States and Japan have sought to incorporate this new perspective, so that the field is wide open for fresh contributions. In this chapter, I shall deal with some of the scholarly literature on the origins of the Pacific War, the battles fought, and the ending of the conflict, and suggest ways in which the subject may be further explored, where possible in the transnational perspective.

Quite clearly, the origins of the war between the United States and Japan cannot be understood purely in the bilateral framework. Books, such as my *Pacific Estrangement* (Iriye 1972) and Michael Auslin's *Pacific Cosmopolitans* (Auslin 2011), emphasize the overall picture of the initial friendship (from the Perry expedition to the end of the nineteenth century) that was followed by a period of estrangement and eventual conflict, which in turn was replaced by a solid alliance after World War II. But

such shifts and turns can only be fully understood if other countries are brought into the picture. The roles played by Britain, Russia, and other countries at every stage of the story are of critical importance, and historians have carefully examined how they, in addition to the United States and Japan, have contributed to the evolution of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Regarding the origins of the US-Japan war specifically, Lowe (1977), Louis (1978), Reynolds (1982), and others have traced the making of an Anglo-American partnership that sought to limit Japanese ambitions in Asia, while the implications of Japan's alliance with Germany for the former's relationship with the United States has been chronicled by Friedlander (1967) and Schroeder (1958), among others. And *Threshold of War* (Heinrichs 1988), Waldo Heinrichs's monograph on Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to come to the aid of the Soviet Union after Germany attacked the country in June 1941, with far-reaching implications for Washington's strategy toward Tokyo, still remains the key study of the subject. Some writers have paid attention to the overall international "system" that provided the setting for the crisis: imperialism, the Versailles system, the Washington system, and so on that defined some sort of global or regional order, a system that was now being challenged by Japan (Iriye 1965, 1987).

What has not been sufficiently examined is the role of China in this drama. Most scholars today would accept the verdict of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo that "the attacks on Britain, the United States of America and the Netherlands were promoted by the desire to deprive China of any aid in the struggle she was waging against Japan's aggression" (Totani 2008, p. 97). Despite the criticism (still widely heard in Japan and to a degree in the United States) that the trial was an instance of "victors' justice," most historians in the two countries and elsewhere would seem to agree that the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan in 1941 must ultimately be traced back to Japan's aggression against China and defiance of the League of Nations that had begun ten years earlier. In other words, the origins of the US-Japan war may be summed up in three simple sentences: Japan invaded China. The United States came to the aid of China. Japan attacked the United States to prevent its assistance of China.

Despite the overriding importance of China in the origins of the war between the United States and Japan, few historians have given that country more than passing reference when describing "the road to Pearl Harbor." Japan's surprise attack on Hawaii (carried out even before a formal declaration of war) was such a dramatic event that scholars as well as nonacademic writers have examined virtually every detail about it, ranging from reasons for Japan's planning for a war that its leaders knew could not possibly be won to the question of whether President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew in advance of the attack and intentionally kept the information from the commanders in Hawaii. Perhaps because of the shock of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on US soil, popular attention in the United States has remained focused on the element of surprise. Just as those attacks led to the targeting of terrorists as the nation's primary enemy, Pearl Harbor resulted in prioritizing Japan as the enemy to be defeated in the Pacific. Such a focus inevitably causes one to lose sight of China's role in the origins of the war. But to ignore China is not only intellectually indefensible but, as Dryburgh (2000) explains, also unjust in human terms inasmuch as the Chinese suffered far more than Japanese or Americans during the war.

The failure of most historians of the Pacific War to put China as the key factor in the evolution of US–Japan relations may be attributable to a number of factors. One may be the tendency to bilateralize international history; more monographs exist of bilateral than multilateral relations. There are, for instance, studies of US–China and of China–Japan relations, but fewer studies of US–China–Japan relations. Part of this may be the language problem; few have the ability to read primary material in both Chinese and Japanese. (And, it may be added, no study of prewar Japanese foreign policy would be satisfactory unless Korean primary and secondary material were utilized, but outside of Korea only a tiny handful would seem capable of using all three East Asian languages.) In addition, there has been the paucity, at least until recently, of primary and secondary sources in China (Kirby and Chen 1999). Even today there seems to be less primary material available in China than in the United States or Japan regarding the origins of the Pacific War. But more and more documents have been published, both in Taiwan and in mainland China, and a number of historians have made use of them. Most of them, however, have tended to focus on the war against Japan and less on “China and the origins of the Pacific War,” which is the title of the English-language work by Youli Sun. That book, published in 1993, still remains the only comprehensive English-language treatment of the subject, but it is in need of being brought up to date on the basis of documents that have since been made available.

More fundamental, however, seems to be the tendency on the part of historians of international relations to dwell almost exclusively on geopolitical issues, that is, to conceptualize world affairs in the framework of “the rise and fall of the great powers.” Interstate conflict is put in the framework of some world (or regional) order that is allegedly constructed and maintained by these powers until one or more of them challenge it and seek to establish an alternative “system.” China was not a great power in that sense in 1941, and so its role tends to be neglected. It is seen as having been a passive actor, an object of US or Japanese policy, and not even the key factor with its own “agency.” In the geopolitical framework, the powers like Germany, the Soviet Union, and Britain appear to have been of more decisive importance than China. That may be why a number of historians have viewed Southeast Asia, in particular the British and Dutch colonies, as having been a more decisive factor in determining the state of US–Japan relations in the fall of 1941. Schroeder (1958) and Crowley (1966) have argued that China was not the key obstacle to compromise between the United States and Japan, and that the bilateral relationship did not become seriously threatened until Japan sought to extend its sway over Europe’s Asian colonies in order to establish a new order in East Asia. Behind such an interpretation is the assumption that the crisis in Asia and the Pacific was fundamentally one of balance of power. A rising power, Japan, was challenging the regional order, and the United States was determined to resist such an attempt. At this level of analysis, the crisis in the Pacific is seen to have been still another episode in the struggle for power among the major imperialist states, just as the conflict in Europe pitted German imperialism against the status quo oriented nations (Iriye 1993).

And yet China did figure prominently at the final stages of US–Japan negotiations in November 1941 when officials from the two countries met in Washington to see if war could somehow be avoided. The “Washington conversations” have been objects of extensive study, although none would seem to have surpassed Robert Butow’s *Tojo*

and the Coming of the War published more than fifty years ago (1961). The Japanese offered to desist from attacking the European colonies in Southeast Asia in return for resumption of petroleum shipments from the United States, but President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected the deal, instead presenting the “Hull note,” which insisted, among other things, that Japan withdraw completely from China. The Japanese saw the note as tantamount to an ultimatum and decided on terminating all negotiations and going ahead with an attack on Pearl Harbor, although, as Asada has noted, some naval leaders were reluctant to commence hostilities at that juncture (Asada 2006, pp. 284–285). As the most recent and authoritative monograph on these final days before the war – Takeo Iguchi’s *Demystifying Pearl Harbor* (2010) – points out, the “Hull note” was not strictly an ultimatum according to international law, and the Japanese could (or should) have continued their negotiations with the State Department. Ultimately, however, as Iguchi notes, the question of China would have stood in their way. But the Japanese then, and many scholars since, have tended to view China as only one part of the developing geopolitical equation. In a 1941 collection of essays by Japan’s specialists on the United States, to take one example, the contributors unanimously pointed out that the conflict between the two countries was one that pitted Japan’s new order against the regional system being developed by the United States (Institute for Pacific Affairs 1941). In such geopolitical determinism, there is little room for China.

But if we set aside geopolitical determinism and incorporate more transnational factors into the picture, we shall no longer be able to ignore China. For instance, despite Japan’s superiority in geopolitical terms, it can be argued that the Chinese had developed much thicker networks of personal and community connections with their counterparts elsewhere. In part these were products of what Robin Cohen has called “Chinese diaspora” (1997). Since the nineteenth century, millions of Chinese had left their homeland to work or settle permanently in distant lands, thus creating their own communities with ties to those who remained behind. They established various types of connections with the host countries, ranging from participating in their wars to bringing their food, language, and ways of life to them (for an excellent recent study of Chinese laborers in Europe during the Great War, see Xu 2010). Although there were overseas Japanese as well, their number and range of activities were much more limited than those of overseas Chinese, and yet the implications of this for the development of international relations have not been explored at all. For instance, how Chinese and Japanese in the United States dealt with one another and with the American hosts during the late 1930s into the early 1940s would form an important aspect of the story of the Pacific crisis.

Likewise, the roles played by Americans and Europeans in Asia and the Pacific are an important aspect of the transnational history of that era. Warren Cohen’s *The Chinese Connection* (1978) was a pioneering monograph in this context, showing how American missionaries, business people, and journalists in East Asia contributed to the making of US–China–Japan relations in the 1930s and beyond. These people constituted what we today call “non-state actors,” namely individuals and private associations that are not part of the state apparatus. Even in a decade that saw an unprecedented growth of central governmental authority, in the democratic countries no less than in totalitarian states, transnational personal and professional connections remained. In the United States, many of them actively campaigned on behalf of

China, condemning Japanese aggression and atrocities and calling for the boycotting of Japan's products, while a smaller number sought to retain, or restore, a friendly relationship with their Japanese counterparts. In *Advocate of Understanding*, Taylor (1984) documented the activities of one such individual, Sidney Gulick, who fought for immigration reform, believing that it would improve relations between the two countries, a subject that is further elaborated in Izumi Hirobe's *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice* (2001), while Tomoko Akami's study of the Institute of Pacific Relations, *Internationalizing the Pacific* (2001) shows that until the late 1930s there remained active interest on the part of Americans, Chinese, Japanese, and others to continue non-state conversations to contribute to the lessening of tensions.

We may put such efforts in the context of transnational intellectual communication. Scholars, journalists, and educators play transnational as well as national roles, and how they understand other countries and how they impart that understanding to their fellow citizens is an important subject of study in international and transnational history. What were American and Japanese intellectuals saying about the developing crisis in US-Japanese relations? What about their counterparts in the rest of Asia or in Europe? An intellectual history of the "road to Pearl Harbor" will not only enrich our understanding of the origins of the Pacific War but may also provide a clue to the resumption of trans-Pacific scholarly exchanges after the war.

It would be easy to dismiss all such transnational connections as having in the final analysis been of little consequence. However well intentioned, these non-state level contacts did not prevent Japan's continued war against China or its attack on the United States. But that would be a superficial reading of history. An examination of the social and cultural settings in which the Pacific conflict took place would not only broaden our understanding of the war's transnational dimensions but would also enable us to establish a connection between the war and the postwar periods. Just to cite one example, Cemil Aydin's *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* (2007) helps put in historical and global context Japan's pan-Asianist propaganda that provided a key ideology for the nation's war with the United States and the European democracies. There was a rich history of anti-Western thought in Asia and the Middle East that had developed in parallel with the dominant Western ideologies of democracy and capitalism as well as imperialism and racism. See also Eri Hotta's *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War* (2007). Another interesting study in this connection is Gerald Horne's *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (2005), which shows that many of the African American intelligentsia as well as colonized populations in Asia held nuanced views toward Japanese inroads into Europe's Pacific empires. Although the vast majority of Asians and Muslims refused to identify with Japan, making the latter intellectually as well geopolitically isolated, Aidyn and other scholars have emphasized that anti-Westernism did not disappear but if anything grew stronger after World War II. We shall need to put this aspect of the US-Japan conflict in the context of the longer history of the complex relationship between West and non-West, as well as between the white and nonwhite races. We need more studies like Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds's *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (2008), which stresses the global dimension of race prejudice from the mid-nineteenth century onward.

The preceding observations regarding the origins of the Pacific War would apply to the actual fighting itself. The military history of the US-Japan war has been written

about by innumerable authors and turned into movies and television documentaries in the two countries. Here again, however, the relative absence of China is rather striking, as is that of transnational phenomena. It is true that most battles between US and Japanese forces took place in the Pacific with little or no involvement by Chinese, but we should remember that China's Nationalists (Guomindang) as well as Communists were constantly engaging the Japanese, whose troop strength exceeded one million. Thus the Chinese were tying Japanese forces down on the continent and were indirectly assisting US military efforts elsewhere. Moreover, various US personnel – diplomatic, military, intelligence – were sent to the mainland and worked closely with their Chinese counterparts. As numerous studies of wartime US diplomatic missions in China have shown, the relationship between the two sides was far from smooth, and in the field of intelligence Maochun Yu has revealed that not only the Nationalist and Communist operations but also US diplomatic, military, and intelligence (OSS) missions frequently worked at cross-purposes (Yu 1996). Most of these studies have tended to focus on the US side of the picture, and we shall need fresh monographs that frontally treat Chinese endeavors.

Any battle is a human drama, involving the question of life or death for every individual soldier. Many veterans of World War II have left their memoirs and been interviewed for the edification of posterity. Now that the wartime generation is passing from the scene, historians may be well advised to compare such personal accounts in various countries and not only measure the depth of a soldier's hostility toward his enemy but also consider other aspects of the relationship. The treatment of prisoners of war in the Pacific, for instance, needs much fresh study. The usual picture of the Japanese soldier is that he was taught to die rather than to surrender and be taken prisoner. As Edward J. Drea's *Japan's Imperial Army* (2009) documents, from the turn of the twentieth century the Imperial Army of Japan taught its soldiers to fight to death. But there are few studies of those Japanese, military or civilian, who did surrender and were taken prisoner. Roger Dingman's recent book, *Deciphering the Rising Sun* (2009), cites instances where Japanese prisoners of war and their American captors sometimes became aware of their shared humanity, motivating some of the latter to develop an expertise on Japanese history and culture. The Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war, in contrast, has not received adequate scholarly attention. On the continent of Asia, much has been written about Japanese atrocities toward Chinese and other nationals, including the institution of "comfort women." These topics, much like the Holocaust in Europe, became objects of serious scholarly inquiry only in the 1960s and the 1970s, reflecting the awareness that scholars must concern themselves with human rights violations even as they discuss military strategies and battles (Fogel 2000; Stetz and Oh 2001). What such studies suggest is the multifaceted nature of war in which armed fighting is only an aspect. That would be true of all wars, but World War II involved unprecedented numbers of civilians who were not engaged in actual fighting but who were just as deeply involved as aggressors or as victims.

American and Japanese civilians as aggressors and victims – this is the framework for John Dower's influential book, *War Without Mercy* (1986), in which he documents wartime American images of Japan, an overwhelming portion of which was negative and hostile. The majority of Americans saw themselves as victims of Japanese treachery and brutality and caricatured their enemy in exaggerated fashion. (The internment

of Japanese Americans – as well as Japanese immigrants who were not citizens because US law had forbidden their naturalization – is a subject that has been extensively treated by historians, but the fact that even supporters of civil rights such as the American Civil Liberty Union remained silent shows the depth of wartime emotions.) The Japanese, on their part, countered with equally extreme perceptions of their American and European enemies (Japanese images of Chinese were of somewhat different character, a subject that awaits systematic study). Such a phenomenon, of course, was nothing new. In the age of “total war,” the whole country must be mobilized, not just militarily but also psychologically. Studies of the Great War have shown that as soon as war came in August 1914 the hitherto friendly and even cosmopolitan newspapers and magazines in various countries transformed themselves almost overnight into nationalistic media, echoing governmental propaganda and distorting the national character and history of the respective antagonists (Neiberg 2010). At the bottom there is the phenomenon of press censorship as well as the issue of how much information is imparted to people during war. Governmental propaganda, public education, even the entertainment industry such as movies all play a role in disseminating images of the enemy.

A not insignificant footnote to the story of wartime relations is the treatment of diplomats, journalists, and others who happened to be in the enemy country when war came. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and his staff in Tokyo and their Japanese counterpart in Washington were given diplomatic protection, although they were confined to their embassy compounds initially and then moved to other locations before being sent in neutral ships to the east coast of Africa for an exchange. This process was meticulously carried out, showing that even in times of war some aspects of international law are observed, especially when neutral countries are willing to serve as intermediaries (see Corbett 1987). An extremely interesting biography of one Japanese diplomat who was married to an American and was interned together with her is offered by Jeans (2009). There was also a sizable American population in Japan-occupied China and Southeast Asia, as well as Japanese civilians in wartime Europe. Few studies exist of their fates, but an interesting monograph documents of how over one hundred Japanese diplomats, businessmen, and other civilians as well as their families were captured in Europe after Germany's surrender and brought over to Bedford Springs, PA, in the summer of 1945 (Barbeau 1981). They were confined to the hotel compounds but were otherwise treated decently, sometimes to the annoyance of the local population who were not very pleased with the sudden appearance of enemy civilians in their midst. We shall need more studies like this to deepen our understanding of how combatant nations deal with one another.

But combatant nations not only deal with one another but also with the nationals of other countries with which they may ally themselves or which they may occupy. The US alliance with Britain in the Asian war has been analyzed expertly by Christopher Thorne, whose *Allies of a Kind* (1979) remains the best study of the subject. As the book's title indicates, Thorne shows that even as they forged a winning coalition against Japan and against Germany, the two nations were often at odds on issues such as the future of the British colonies in Asia or the position of China after the war. We shall need more studies of this kind with respect to the other allies of the United States, such as the Netherlands and the Soviet Union (too often the wartime US–USSR relationship is put in the context of the origins of the cold war, a simple-minded and misleading conceptual framework).

In the meantime, both US and Japanese forces occupied overseas lands in the process of their fighting. For the United States, most of these lands were in Europe – France, Austria, Germany – but in the Pacific, too, its marines and soldiers landed in various islands, many of which had been “mandates” under the League of Nations, and turned them into bases from which to attack the Japanese mainland. One country that they reoccupied was the Philippines, which had been promised independence by the United States (in 1934) and even by Japan (in 1943) but some of whose leaders and people continued underground resistance against Japanese. The relationship between Americans and Filipinos has been examined in the context of the US Pacific strategy, but we shall need more studies of interpersonal relations, for instance, between Filipino immigrants in the United States and their American hosts, or between Filipinos and Americans in Australia and other parts of Asia and the Pacific. Likewise, the interactions between Japanese occupiers, both military and civilian, and the occupied population of the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia (Dutch East Indies), Burma, and elsewhere await extensive treatment. Some impressive monographs do exist, for example, those included in *The Japanese Colonial Empire* edited by Myers and Peattie (1984). More recently, Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper have coauthored an important study of the British colonies in Southeast Asia during the war (Bayly and Harper 2006). In addition, Kenji Goto, a specialist in Japan–Indonesia relations, has published, in English, an important monograph discussing the impact of the war on Indonesian politics and society (Goto 1997). Through these studies, it is possible to enrich our understanding of the US-Japan war in areas rather remote from both countries. Grant Goodman, who served in the Philippines during the war, has edited a diary of a Filipino student in wartime Japan, providing yet another perspective (Goodman 1979). The student wrote in Tokyo in July 1944: “To think that we have been spared the many sufferings of those fighting at the fronts and those undergoing the harrowing experiences of daily bombings is indeed a matter for thanksgiving” – the kind of perspective we would not normally achieve if we ignored such sources (pp. 168–169). Combined with instances like the “rape of Manila” that a Filipino historian has called “the Warsaw of Asia,” all these events and episodes contribute to our understanding of the transnational character of war (Escoda 2000).

All wars, however, must eventually come to an end, and so the enemy combatants’ preparations – strategic, political, psychological – for the ultimate peace are very much an integral part of the study of a war. The US-Japan war is no exception. “*What Future for Japan?*” by Janssens (1995) provides massive documentation regarding US preparations for post-surrender Japan in which officials as well as academics took part. My book, *Power and Culture* (Iriye 1983), compares “postwar planning” in Washington and Tokyo and note an interesting paradox, namely that while they were engaged in a fierce struggle in the Pacific, civilian policy planners in the two capitals were developing ideas about the postwar era that were not always incompatible but were sometimes even quite close. For instance, neither American nor Japanese planners imagined that China would emerge as a major power immediately after the war, envisaging instead a situation in which the Soviet Union would come to play a more crucial role in the region. Here again, such an interpretation tends to pay insufficient attention to what the Chinese themselves were saying and thinking. Xiaoyuan Liu has filled this historiographic gap by publishing his *A Partnership for Disorder* (1996). The book shows that the Chinese authorities were if anything even more interested in

the emerging shape of postwar Asia. Yukiko Koshiro, on her part, has published a scholarly but controversial essay, "Eurasian Empire" (2004), on the postwar role of the Soviet Union as perceived by Japanese leaders. She argues that at least some Japanese military and diplomatic officials were keen to make use of the growing power of the Soviet Union as a counterweight to the United States. But here, too, we shall need fuller documentation from the Soviet side. In any event, these studies point to the importance of going much beyond the bilateral (US–Japan) relationship even when we discuss how the two nations prepared for the ending of their war.

Before the ending of the war, of course, there were brutal battles in the western Pacific and on Japanese territories such as Iwoto (Iwo Jima) and Okinawa, as well as merciless bombings of Japan by the US air force, culminating in the dropping of atomic bombs. In all such instances, not just the military but the civilian population was directly involved. Many of the latter were small children then and thus still remember those experiences. The two recent Hollywood movies on the Iwo Jima campaign – Clint Eastwood's *Flags of Our Father* (2006) and *Letters from Iwo Jima* (2006) – are notable as they suggest the common humanity of Americans and Japanese even as they prepared for and fought a life and death struggle. The even more fierce fighting in Okinawa awaits similar treatment, and in the meantime it continues to divide Japanese politics and public opinion since the islands collectively called Okinawa were kept by the United States after the war until 1972 and also because, even after their reversion, they have continued to provide naval and air bases to the US military. The people of Okinawa feel they were victimized by mainland Japan both during and after the war, the more so because the civilian population was targeted for attack by the invading forces and received no protection from the defending Japanese army. That the Okinawans' perspective on the war is different from other Japanese' is thus understandable and should caution us against over-generalizing about "Japan" – or for that matter about "the United States" or any other country. The geographical location of where one lived during the war made a great deal of difference, and that would even be true of the United States despite the fact that it was never bombed or invaded. Histories of American local communities' mobilization for war are quite numerous and they may provide an important key to linking the local to the national and to the global.

Even before the battle of Okinawa in June 1945, air raids on the Japan mainland had started, climaxing in the devastating bombing of Tokyo in March that year. Given that by June most major cities in Japan had been reduced to ashes, with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, one may wonder whether the mutually calamitous fighting on Okinawa was really necessary. In US strategy, the Okinawa campaign was envisaged as a prelude to the invasion of the island of Kyushu, which was expected to be even more devastating. In reality, of course, the war came to an end before such an assault took place. Could it have ended even before the Okinawa campaign? The burden on ending the war lay with the Japanese, in particular the emperor and his advisers, and scholars and nonscholars alike in both countries have long wondered why Japan's decision to end the war was not made until August. Should not the emperor have decided to sue for peace in the spring of 1945, before the Okinawa battle, if not sooner? In retrospect the answer seems obvious; it would have spared the Japanese as well as Americans so much pain and destruction if the hostilities had been terminated before March. There is much documentary evidence to indicate that by

early 1945, if not earlier, the emperor and some court officials realized that the war's tide had turned and that sooner or later it would have to be brought to an end. But even if the emperor and his entourage had decided on ending the hostilities, could they have imposed their will on the armed forces? Would the army and the navy have readily accepted a truce, when they had been taught – and in turn had taught the people – to continue to fight until the last man?

The relevant question in this context, as numerous scholarly writings have noted, concerned the question of peace terms. The United States and its allies had insisted, since the Cairo conference of 1943, on the unconditional surrender formula, which even the Japanese advocates of an early end to the hostilities found difficult to accept. Hence the search for a formula to end the war short of an unconditional surrender. By spring 1945, the emperor and the court, as well as a number of civilian officials, were inclined to the view that Japan should offer to lay down arms on just one condition, the preservation of the imperial institution (Iriye 1983). If such an offer had been made, however informally, would the United States have accepted it, which would have meant diluting the unconditional surrender formula? We all know that President Harry S. Truman rejected any idea of altering the formula. But if Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived, would he have been more flexible? In retrospect, it would have to be argued that, since he died on April 12, any Japanese offer for a conditional surrender would have to have been made earlier in the year. Perhaps the month between the Tokyo air raid of March 10 and Roosevelt's death of April 12 might have been critical, but that would only have allowed one month's negotiation. We know, on the other hand, that Japan's actual surrender came only after a couple of days of telegraphic exchanges in August, but that speed was a product of altogether different circumstances: the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the war. Absent these developments, even Roosevelt might not have been able to persuade himself, his advisers, his nation, and his allies to end the Japanese war on the basis of anything other than unconditional surrender. The fact remains that the Japanese leaders' failure to decide on peace in early 1945 was to cost the nation, as well as the United States, a tremendous loss of lives.

In any event, the strategic bombing of Japan, as well as of Germany, which destroyed whole cities and caused death and injury to hundreds of thousands of civilians, many of whom women, children, and the aged too old to be in the armed forces, has been discussed in great detail in connection with the decision by Tokyo and Berlin to surrender. It can be argued that these bombings, culminating in the dropping of atomic bombs, were not just the end of the story but also the beginning of a new chapter in military history – indeed in modern world history. Why President Roosevelt, who had condemned the Axis powers' strategic air raids in the 1930s, should have condoned such action during the war is not simply a moral or even a strategic question but also has relevance to what was to follow the war. For one thing, as Conway-Lanz (2006) has shown in *Collateral Damage*, strategic bombing obliterated the distinction between combatant and civilian and made mockery of the idea of “noncombatant immunity,” which had been codified in international law. The question of “collateral damage” was to arise during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and it was daily being reported today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, this is one transnational aspect of any war; as nations seek to inflict maximum damage, the distinction between combatant and noncombatant is obliterated, something that was already apparent during World War I but became much more blatant during World War II.

The magnitude of collateral damage was most graphically demonstrated when atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, ushering in the age of nuclear weapons. Combined with poison gas and other chemical and biological weapons, nuclear arms altered the nature of fighting, especially since they affect not just living humans but also the natural environment as well as future generations – if there are to be future generations. The genetic impact of these weapons is an area of inquiry in which historians must collaborate with scientists and medical experts. Indeed, the recognition that historians of international relations and of science and medicine must work together to elucidate transnational themes may be one of the most important intellectual consequences of World War II. In any event, the awareness of the awesome impact of nuclear weapons gave rise to a powerful movement after the war in which scientists frequently played key roles, as having been chronicled by a number of scholars (Evangelista 1999). In this sense, too, the wartime strategic bombings signaled not just the end of a story but also a new beginning, with implications for the course of transnational history into the future.

In the context of the US-Japan war, it took the Japanese leaders a while to recognize the destructive power of what they called “the new type bomb,” and they prohibited the press to describe it or the damage it caused in detail. (The US forces occupying Japan likewise kept Japanese observers away from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a few years, and the question of how public understanding (or misunderstanding) of atomic bombs in the two countries mutually reinforced each other will require further monographic treatment.) Within a few days, however, Japan’s top leaders became aware that the nation would have to expect further bombings by the new weapon. Whether this awareness lay behind Tokyo’s decision to surrender, or whether it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific War, coming just before the second atomic bomb was dropped, that played a more crucial role has been discussed endlessly by scholars and nonscholars alike. The controversy provoked by the publication of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s *Racing the Enemy* in 2005 is a good indication that specialists remain divided. In this book, Hasegawa argues that Truman’s decision to drop the bomb had a great deal to do with his expectation of an impending Soviet entry into the war, and that Joseph Stalin, on his part, was determined to intervene in the war as soon as possible before the conflict came to an abrupt end because of the US use of atomic weapons. He was anxious to send Soviet forces to Manchuria and to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, islands that had been lost to Japan after the war of 1904–1905. The Japanese, in the meantime, were quite inept in dealing with both the United States and the Soviet Union and delayed the decision to surrender until the second bomb had been dropped and Soviet forces had entered the war. The use of Soviet material makes Hasegawa’s book a more satisfactory monograph than the earlier accounts that did not consult them, but its publication has not stopped historians from further debate (see Asada 2007, pp. 207–208, for an example). It would perhaps be best to accept the three momentous events – the atomic bombings, Soviet entry into the war, and Japanese surrender – as simultaneous developments that, on the other hand, could have taken different shape if the Japanese leaders had decided to terminate the hostilities before August 1945. By waiting until mid-August 1945 to do so, they became part of the fateful moment that gave birth to the atomic age and to the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as nuclear powers.

Here again, however, historians must not lose sight of the nongeopolitical aspects of the ending of the war. The atomic bombings were not just a strategic decision but involved deeply moral questions. Strategy might be comprehensible in national or international terms, but morality is a transnational matter that concerns humanity on the whole, not just individual nations and decision makers. Hasegawa's *The End of the Pacific War* (2007) raises a question of morality concerning the Japanese emperor's decision to end the war: "What motivated Hirohito was neither a pious wish to bring peace to humanity nor a sincere desire to save the people and the nation from destruction ... More than anything else, it was a sense of personal survival and deep responsibility to maintain the imperial house" (p. 135). The implication of such an assertion is that people – in Japan and many other countries – had suffered for the sake of the preservation of the imperial institution. That is a moral proposition whose implications are not limited to the Japanese emperor. The misery suffered by Japanese in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, for instance, was also a product of his indecision about ending the war quickly, but it had its parallels in Europe. Huge numbers of Japanese civilians and soldiers were taken to Siberia, not to be repatriated until many years after the war, while hundreds of thousands of civilians were abandoned by the military and had to endure hardship before returning home. The story of Japanese repatriation is very well described in a recent book by Lori Watt, *When Empire Goes Home* (2008), but the phenomenon can be put in the global context. The war's end in Europe, as well as in Asia, resulted in the redrawing of maps, and more than ten million Germans were expelled from Silesia and other parts of what used to be part of their country that were now incorporated into Poland. Any war results in migrations, generating refugees and orphans in the process, a very transnational phenomenon that requires further study.

The study of any war would be incomplete unless its impact on subsequent history was included. Paul W. Schroeder's masterful volume, *The Transformation of Europe* (1994), for instance, explores how the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent postwar order transformed European politics. Likewise, historians and political scientists have written about the post-1945 world order, mostly in the framework of the origins of the cold war. In the Asia-Pacific region, I have argued that what resulted was not so much a cold war as a new order, what I termed the "Yalta system" in which the United States and the Soviet Union each held fairly well-defined spheres of influence and where China reemerged as a unified state (Iriye 1977). But these are rather mechanistic exercises in geopolitical thinking, and it would be more fruitful to look at the transnational aspects of the postwar world. The just-mentioned repatriation of Japanese and Germans, for instance, may be understood as a part of transnational migrations that came to constitute a key theme of post-1945 history. But there were many other transnational phenomena that shaped people's lives and countries' destinies after the war. Globalization – or, more accurately, re-globalization – of the world economy was clearly a major phenomenon of postwar history, as were the manifold activities by international organizations, both state-centered and nongovernmental. Many such organizations actively promoted transnational causes such as the eradication of diseases, the wellbeing of refugees, safeguarding against human rights violations, the protection of the natural environment, and the promotion of cultural exchange.

None of these phenomena, of course, arose from scratch after World War II but had their prewar antecedents. Therefore, it would be important for historians to

establish a connection between prewar and postwar developments and to put the war in that context. Economic re-globalization, for example, has been traced to the wartime conference at Bretton Woods, but it would not be too far-fetched to add the Axis aspirations in that direction as well. Although of greatly different orientation from the US initiatives during the war, Germany's pan-Europe and Japan's East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere both held transnational significance. Some architects of these wartime blueprints were to play important roles in the internationalization of Germany's and Japan's economies after the war. If regional organizations like the European Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations – as well as the appropriately named Trans-Pacific Partnership that is being negotiated among the nations in the region – are to be viewed as key transnational phenomena today, surely World War II could be understood as a milestone in that story. Likewise, while postwar Japan (as well as Germany) renounced the excesses of wartime chauvinism, their embrace of cultural internationalism was not entirely an abrupt departure. Not only had Japanese intellectuals, artists, and journalists been involved in exchange activities before the war, through the League of Nations and through their own organizations, even during the war they espoused the cause of cross-cultural communication in East Asia (Iriye 1997). The same individuals who had been engaged in such activities would participate in the programs sponsored by UNESCO and by American foundations to promote educational and intellectual exchanges. There are, of course, much more obvious linkages between wartime American internationalism and postwar global developments. To the extent that the war ushered in an "American century," it brought nations and peoples of the world together economically, socially, and culturally, the process which might not have taken place if the United States had stayed away from the global conflict – or would it, even if the nation had not combined its military power with its cultural influence? That, too, would be an interesting question to explore.

Transnational themes, then, have proven more resilient than geopolitics in shaping how people live. We, therefore, should not just view a geopolitical event such as World War II as the major story in which other, nongeopolitical themes are mere footnotes, but rather reverse the equation and relate it to the long history of transnational developments. Certainly, scholarly collaboration across boundaries is a key theme of transnational history, and the cooperation of historians from many countries in examining the US war against Japan has been one of its striking examples.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

World War II and Communication Technologies

JAMES SCHWOCH

Transformations of communication technologies during World War II occurred so rapidly and completely that World War II may seem as impenetrable to scholars of communication technologies as that classic motif of engineering: the black box (Cauer, Mathis, and Pauli 2000). The differences and developments in communication technologies wrought are vast, when one first looks at the interwar period, and then at the cold war.

The sensation of staring at an impenetrable black box – or rather, a seemingly endless series of black boxes – is brought on by an overwhelming cascade of new technical developments and breakthroughs; wartime research in a multitude of areas, some of which was utilized during the war itself and more of which had a greater application during the cold war; and deep expansion of networks, of communication systems, and new communication devices used across the planet by the warring powers. Thus, opening and exploring the bewildering horde of black boxes representing communication technologies associated with World War II means delving into scientific frontiers, national war policies, science and engineering across alliances, and the various responses and counter-responses at a range of scientific, political, and social strata. Given the complexity and the need for a pragmatic approach, this brief chapter – which should be regarded more as a research note than a full chapter – discusses recent research regarding communication technologies and World War II in two broad categories: technologies and nations.

A notable and recent effort to capture the technological developments in communication leading up to World War II is Aitor Anduaga's *Wireless and Empire: Geopolitics, Radio Industry, and Ionosphere in the British Empire, 1918–1939* (2009) which is mainly an intellectual history of physics and atmospheric research activities in the UK prior to World War II. Anduaga's research points to some implications for global spectrum policy and military telecommunication during the war. The reorganization of military intelligence with communication technologies, cryptanalysis,

and signals intelligence as core attributes during the war was immense. However, this was not immediate, but a process that grew sporadically throughout the war. John Patrick Finnegan finds that in the case of the USA, military and signals intelligence was not fully effective until the last months of 1944 (Finnegan 1998).

Scholars of the history of technology and communication have also focused on the relationship between advanced communication development and censorship. For instance, as Rockett (2000) has shown, censorship of American films in Ireland dated back to the 1920s, often on moral grounds. And the wartime Emergency Powers Act, designed to protect Irish neutrality during the conflict, also led to the censorship of films such as *Casablanca* in Ireland. Robert MacKay's article, "Being Beastly to the Germans" (2000), examines how the BBC developed procedures to filter and censor German composers for its musical programs during World War II. Other scholars like Friset (2001) and Sweeney (2001) have shown how the censorship of mail, post, and communication enforced over German detainees held in the USA began several months before the American declaration of war in December 1941; by summer 1941, German detainees in the USA had their mail opened and censored. After American entry into the war, detainees were supplied with letterforms that were designed to be folded into an envelope, could contain only 24 lines of writing, and were glazed to make writing impossible to hide. And Garay's article, "Guarding the Airwaves" (1995), demonstrates how the Federal Communications Commission, the Defense Communications Board, and the Office of Censorship all worked to police domestic airwaves during the war, and also monitored American airwaves for propaganda.

Other trends in communications research have focused on broadcast technologies, specifically television and radio. Kristen Haring's *Ham Radio's Technical Culture* (2007) includes discussion of ham radio activities in relation to World War II, while Elizabeth L. Enriquez's *Appropriation of Colonial Broadcasting: A History of Early Radio in the Philippines, 1922–1946* (2008) provides an outstanding discussion of the impact of, and resistance to, both USA and Japanese broadcast colonialism during World War II, with a decision to "appropriate the USA style" rather than "appropriate the Japan style" of radio broadcasting and entertainment by the Filipino radio industry and its audiences. There is also Mike Conway's recent book, *The Origins of Television News in America* (2009), which adds to literature on American television news during the war. Conway ably reveals the emergence of American television war reporting in New York City, demonstrating that war stories had a significant impact on shaping the storytelling techniques of news as told from the TV studio. Uricchio (1990) has addressed the development and use of broadcast technology in Germany, showing how German research in television technologies had, near the end of the war, developed a television system designed to operate a guided missile or bomb, although this was not made field operational.

Von Geldern (1995) and Ahiska (2010) have each argued that the waging of war for European radio broadcasting produced not only normative national network programming, but also various conflicts and stratagems including clandestine or false-flag broadcast stations, and the need to protect radio stations and national network capabilities as a strategic wartime asset of national defense and identity. Adding to this assessment, Falk (2004) and Schwoch (2009) have shown how postwar attempts at applying wartime television distribution technologies included experiments from 1945 into the early 1950s with Stratovision, a system of airborne television

transmitters capable of sending a TV signal for home reception beyond the range of a terrestrial transmitting antenna. Finally, the American military extensively utilized film and radio in its Army Information and Education Division, as well as in the Armed Forces Radio Service, as Culbert (2002) and Morley (2001) have shown.

Other research has focused on the development of electronic information networks. Daqing Yang's *Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883–1945* (2009) provides rich, compelling detail on Japanese telecommunication in Manchukuo and occupied China in 1930s, showing how that spread into Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 1930s and 1940s (until 1945); Krysko (2011) offers a related and important perspective on Asian broadcasting and telecommunications with a reading that brings in American foreign policy. David E. Nye's *When the Lights Went Out: A History of Blackouts in America* (2010) and Daniel Headrick's article, "Strategic and Military Aspects of Submarine Telegraph Cables 1851–1945" (2009), are also useful contributions to this growing literature. Headrick's opus *The Invisible Weapon* (1991) remains a highly influential work that continues to shape the study of war and global media twenty years after its publication, and is fundamental to understanding communication technologies in the context of the war. As Alvarez (2007) concludes in "Trying to Make the MAGIC Last," all evidence suggests that nothing about the end of World War II suggested the prudence of returning to prewar practices of communication and signals intelligence; indeed everything about World War II pointed toward the continued expansion of such intelligence capabilities. Scholars such as Jenner (2008) have pointed to US–UK relations as evidence of this development. In the face of compromised signals intelligence in the Middle East, the USA and UK formed a strategic alliance in signals intelligence with the Travis–Strong Agreement in 1943. This agreement formalizes a strategic relationship in global electronic intelligence capabilities that continues to this day and now encompasses the so-called "Five Eyes" of the USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Other scholars have taken different directions, by focusing on communication technologies like telephony and their impact on World War II. In 1940, directives by Roosevelt to the FBI discreetly authorizing telephone surveillance (wiretaps) in specific cases of suspected espionage and treason became a vehicle for the FBI to expand wiretap capabilities beyond these cases and opened the door to secret domestic wiretaps, unreported to the White House. At the end of the war, as Athan Theoharis argues in *Abuse of Power: How Cold War Surveillance and Secrecy Policy Shaped the Response to 9/11* (2010), the Attorney General and FBI succeeded in surreptitiously expanding its wiretap authorization to include domestic individuals and entities self-defined by the FBI as generally subversive.

The development and growth of global electronic communications during, and especially after, the war resulted from the interactions of research laboratories, the militarization of industries for war, and electronics communication industries. Radar is one prominent example; however, this interaction touched virtually every imaginable application of electronic communications research and applications from basic research pursuits to manufacturing and end-user applications. For an excellent overview, see Frederik Nebeker's *Dawn of the Electronic Age: Electrical Technologies in the Shaping of the Modern World, 1914–1945* (2009), especially chapters 9 and 10. There is also Stephen Phelps's *The Tizard Mission: The Top-Secret Operation that Changed the Course of World War II* (2010) on the UK delegation to bring radar technology using

cavity magnetron to USA during World War II, as well as Robert Buder's comprehensive examination of the politics and personalities that brought radar to global fruition (1998.)

In conclusion, over the course of human civilization, a range of social factors have shaped the emergence and uses of communication technologies. World War II is a period when the influence of science and politics upon communication technologies is particularly visible. Like other social factors – gender, demographics, economics, and art, for example – the influence of science and politics is continually present in the contours of global communication technologies. Military conflict consistently realigns the prism of communication technologies in ways that allow observers to observe keenly the seminal impact of science and politics upon global media in both the past and the present.

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CHAPTER THIRTY

Of Spies and Stratagems

JOHN PRADOS

Before World War II ended, it was already clear that intelligence had played a significant role. Public investigations of Pearl Harbor were already underway in the United States. The success of the Japanese surprise attack on America's main naval base in the Pacific implicated spies – suspected Japanese agents. The secret contributions of code breakers to American victory at Midway had been mentioned in newspapers. Contributions of shadowy intelligence/diplomatic missions to the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa later in 1942, and to the Italian surrender the next fall were bruited about. The Nazi surprise invasion of Russia, the secret of D-day, the failure to foresee the German offensive at the Battle of the Bulge – all bore relation to intelligence work. And the initial treatments of the main US spy organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), were in the works in both book and movie form.

There could be no doubt that big stories lay beneath the surface of wartime military operations. Today, almost six decades later, looking back at how the intelligence history of World War II emerged is an interesting exercise all of its own. The story of the history involves individual integrity, government secrecy rules, declassification of records, the determination of historians to explore these matters, and the effort to reframe our understanding of the war in light of the emerging evidence.

Due to the variety of pertinent issues that need coverage, this chapter offers no more than a first-order synthesis. Nevertheless, the time has come to begin this work. No doubt before a fully rich literature is articulated, there will be entire books devoted to the state of intelligence studies. Two important limitations need to be stated here: first, this survey will confine itself to books. There is excellent source material in periodicals and journals but to include it would make this chapter far more unwieldy than it already is. Second, the chapter must also be confined to English-language sources, which will be the most accessible to this audience. It will open with a general discussion of the chronology of the emergence of the record. This includes remarks on writing about German, Soviet, and Japanese intelligence. It will then turn to a

thematic discussion of works on particular areas of World War II intelligence, with primary focus on the Anglo-American contribution. Finally it will take up the question of the state of the field.

It did not take long for some wartime exploits of the spies to emerge. In the American case, the first significant books on the OSS appeared in 1946 – and must have been on the typewriter at the very moment that organization was disbanded. These books, Stewart Alsop and Tom Braden's *Sub-Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage* (1946), and Corey Ford and Alastair McBain's *Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of the OSS* (1946), set one mold for the first wave of World War II intelligence literature. Those books were personal accounts, primarily based on recollection and a certain number of war stories from comrades. This continues to be a vein in the literature, progressively extended to new subject areas as will be seen.

But from the beginning, there was another track to the wartime story, one impelled by dispute, one which brought out the first official records. The Pearl Harbor controversy extended to every aspect of the Japanese attack and its prelude, and beyond command issues and military matters lay intelligence performance, specifically a charge that the ultra-secret code breakers had missed the Japanese preparations for the attack, with disastrous consequences for the US Navy. This explosive charge led to multiple inquiries, replete with congressional hearings and a massive investigative record – covered in the press and soon published by the US government. (Much more limited, but still a documentary source, and no doubt impelled by pride of accomplishment, was the appearance of the official OSS manual on selecting agents, published in 1948.)

Something of a canyon opened in the literature on the war. While the shadow war loomed behind the scenes of military exploits, the reality of intelligence activities remained secret, with participants reluctant to acknowledge how much intelligence had assisted them. For example, Sir Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, published a massive six-volume memoir of the conflict between 1948 and 1953. Churchill (1948, 1949, 1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1953) made stunning use of documents, liberally quoting from minutes, cables, and directives, and reprinting a host of them. We know today that Churchill based many actions on intelligence, particularly the products of code breakers deciphering Nazi messages, and of a sophisticated British counterespionage system in which apprehended German spies and played them back against Berlin, distributing false information. But these matters go entirely unmentioned in the Churchill memoirs. Yet a number of Churchill's subjects, ranging from his prewar warnings against German rearmament, to his coverage of techniques critical to winning the Battle of Britain, or the later fight against Nazi V-weapons, to his coverage of assorted military operations, were ones in which intelligence proved critical. Still, David Reynolds has shown, in an extensive examination of the construction of Churchill's volumes titled *In Command of History* (Reynolds 2005), that they were scrubbed by ghostwriters and government review panels to eliminate any revealing intelligence references. It was impossible to avoid all intelligence discussions, but accounts could minimize or omit sensitive matters and where necessary attribute knowledge of certain things to sources other than the true ones. Many senior officers followed the same principal. The memoirs of British Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery (1948) and of the American generals Dwight D. Eisenhower (1948) and Omar N. Bradley (1951) took the same approach.

Meanwhile these considerations did not apply to former adversaries, where similar veins of revelation developed. On the German side some wartime events, like the July 20 plot against Adolf Hitler, had clearly involved the Nazi intelligence apparatus on one or both sides of the action. It strained credulity that German intelligence could have been important while Allied intelligence had not, especially given that the Axis services had been as ineffective as they were. The Nuremburg and Far Eastern war crimes trials elicited extensive testimony and new records, where intelligence figured even where it was not primary. In addition, in order to validate the new arm of airpower, Great Britain and the United States both undertook major reviews of the former enemies. In the American case, at least, the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (1946) included treatments of the intelligence capabilities of the adversaries, with sections like Report No. 97, *Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence*. Behind the reports lay detailed investigations by naval technical missions to Germany and to Japan, interrogations of former enemy officers, and in the German case, monographs written for US intelligence by former Nazi officers. The emerging data helped vitiate any possibility of keeping the lid on the German intelligence story.

Following World War I, the impact of intelligence had remained a deep secret long after the guns fell silent, not to become well integrated into conventional histories until quite recently. By contrast, in the second global war, the early memoirs and investigations illuminated its importance from the start. Figures like Churchill and Eisenhower acknowledged the intelligence factor without revealing its true scope, but even their limited comments opened the door to more extensive discussion. And, as described, some evidence from spy memoirs and documents had already entered the record. Arguably this made a difference to the evolution of the general World War II literature, which routinely devoted some space to intelligence. Histories of Pearl Harbor and Midway are prominent examples, but the standard of analysis quickly extended to other battles and campaigns. This proved both a blessing and a curse – the former in that demand for this kind of information provided an impetus for raconteurs, revelations, and research; the latter because over time a tendency developed for war historians to rely upon the initial versions of the story rather than develop new information.

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the emergence of what might be termed the “basic story” of the war. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union all published official histories. Participants produced memoirs while historians compiled battle and campaign accounts. But for intelligence the stream of official documentation dried up, except for information that appeared in the official histories, typically references to evidence that remained classified. (With one exception that is outside the focus here, a British account of operations with the resistance in France (Foot 1966), official histories were on military operations, not intelligence work.) Instead, this middle period was dominated by the filling out of the memoir material plus the beginnings of a secondary literature attempting to consolidate the record.

The German experience is a case in point. A number of key works on German spy activity appeared during this period. A study of the *Abwehr*, Germany’s military intelligence service, was published by Paul Leverkuehn in 1954. Several years later came a work on both sides of a battle that did not happen, the projected German invasion of Britain, which included intelligence (Fleming 1957). Probably the most famous German spy of the war took the codename “Cicero,” and was a manservant

to the British ambassador in Turkey. His memoir, *I Was Cicero*, appeared in 1962 (Bazna 1962). Other German agents, including Herman Giskes (1953), and Erich Gimpel (1957) also told of their work. One of the best-known but most hapless German spy operations, the attempt to infiltrate spies into the United States, was profiled by John Dasch in *Eight Spies against America* (1959) and then reprised by Eugene Rachlis in *They Came to Kill* (1961). Considerable attention also went to the July 20 plot, primarily because it represented German opposition to Nazism, but which also opened windows onto German spies, since not only *Abwehr* chief Admiral Canaris, but a number of others, were associated with schemes against Hitler. For a work typical of the period see Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *The Men Who Tried to Kill Hitler* (1964).

As the middle period ended, to finish the German side, these and other materials, including work in the archival material then available, were used by Ladaslas Farago to write what reigned for a few years as the best history of German wartime espionage, *The Game of Foxes* (1971). The new wave of work was characterized by greater use of documentary sources, interviews, and private papers and came to embody unprecedented detail. Beyond these came what remains the standard text on German military intelligence, David Kahn's *Hitler's Spies* (Kahn 1978), plus authoritative biographies of Canaris and of Gehlen. In recent years there has been much more research but much of the book-length literature has focused on the politics of German resistance and repression, including Hitler's war against the Jews.

One of the nicknames for the Office of Strategic Services in the United States, playing upon its initials, was "Oh So Secret." During the middle period, the American literature reflected this, with OSS treatments falling to a low level. As with the Germans some prominent intelligence officers detailed their service. One was Allen Dulles (1966), who had headed the OSS station in Berne, Switzerland, and played a key role in the German surrender in northern Italy. Other books focused on OSS activities in specific theaters, rank and file accounts, technological intelligence, including the search for evidence of a German atomic program, and so on.

As befit a global war, there were other intelligence organizations. MacArthur and Nimitz prevented the OSS from operating much in the Pacific (except in China-Burma-India), and here work was the responsibility of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, profiled by an official in 1958. Another of MacArthur's mainstays was the unit of interpreters, primarily Japanese Americans, called the Allied Translation and Interpretation Service. Its activity was revealed during this period. MacArthur's intelligence chief also published memoirs and his counterintelligence chief followed suit in 1969. A picture of psychological warfare operations, general prewar intelligence issues, and the Washington effort by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) appeared in Admiral Ellis Zacharias's *Secret Missions* as early as 1946.

Work on the Pearl Harbor controversy benefited from early postwar injection of documentary sources and advanced to integrative studies much sooner than in other areas of intelligence history. By the time Gordon Prange – a postwar intelligence interrogator in Japan – began converting his massive files into books (late 1970s), the Pearl Harbor story had already been explored extensively. Some OSS veterans ascended to intelligence theory, famously so for Sherman Kent, formerly a senior OSS analytical officer, whose *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Kent 1949) distilled the OSS method into a primer that continues in use today. Among early

synthetic histories were ones on intelligence preparations for D-day, an account of the North African secret diplomacy surrounding the 1942 Allied invasion, and stories of Allied efforts to combat Germany's secret weapons, heavily dependent on intelligence. Toward the end of the period Lyman D. Kirkpatrick – like Kent and Dulles a figure of the postwar CIA – began examining the impact of intelligence more systematically in his set of case studies *Captains Without Eyes* (Kirkpatrick 1969).

Treatments of Japanese intelligence are an exception. This literature has remained underdeveloped. Almost the only exemplar of the middle period was Ronald Seth's *Secret Servants* (Seth 1957). The sources, all anecdotal, are preoccupied with early espionage, Japanese atrocities, or the Kempeitai secret police and their repression or political machinations in the occupied islands. Only very recently have any overview histories appeared. These remain limited.

Writing on Soviet intelligence is also undeveloped, despite plentiful literature on specific spy networks and sources. After more than five decades, the best overview history of Soviet intelligence in the war continues to be David J. Dallin's *Soviet Espionage* (1955). There is extensive source material on the *Rote Kapelle* (Perrault 1969; Trepper 1977; Tarrant 1995), Sorge (Deakin and Storry 1966; Prange 1984; Johnson 1990), and Lucy networks (Foote 1949; Accoce and Quet 1967; Read and Fisher 1981); good studies of the "Barbarossa" surprise (Whaley 1972; Murphy 2005), an excellent biography of Lavrenti Beria (Knight 1993), a study of information exchanges with the Russians (Smith 1996), and a memoir of the notorious SMERSH unit (Seth 1970). But overall, inquiries have been overshadowed by the cold war – postwar Soviet espionage against Great Britain and the US rather than its role in wartime operations. This preoccupation has had benefits – extensive research on the Cambridge spies, the British "Ring of Five" has shed light on British wartime intelligence, but has done little to illuminate the Soviet-German war.

In view of the importance of naval intelligence and the American advances in this field of historiography, not to say the considerable attention devoted to naval subjects by other historians during this period, it is perplexing that British historians lagged so far. Max Horton, one important participant, was profiled in a 1954 biography by W. S. Chalmers, but only fourteen years later did a more articulate history appear – and that still avoided the subject of code breaking (McLachlan 1968). It was, however, one of the first new-generation histories.

British accounts appeared of other significant activities. One was the effort to organize ways for downed airmen to escape and return to England – the unit chief who designed equipment to aid escapes published his reflections in 1961 (Crowley 1958). Deception operations prior to the invasion of Sicily were revealed in 1954. A key source on aerial photography appeared in 1957. One crucial British operation, a liaison office in the US that helped bring America into the war, began coming to light with the 1962 publication of H. Montgomery Hyde's *The Quiet Canadian*. Among memoirs of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), John Whitwell's *British Agent* (1966) was notable. Toward the end of the period Sir Kenneth Strong, the general who had been Eisenhower's chief intelligence officer, weighed in with his own account, *Intelligence at the Top* (Strong 1968), from the intelligence perspective.

By the end of the 1960s, the facets of intelligence work had become known. Key questions were posed. More than two decades had passed since the war. Yet intelligence history still suffered from a paucity of authoritative sources plus the serendipitous

nature of anecdotal literature. All that was about to change: veterans were anxious to tell their stories, war secrets no longer seemed so sacred, and the cold war had moved official concern to a very different place. In the cold war context, World War II intelligence could be reframed as a heroic age and a beacon of light – but not without an authentic record. Historians had already begun to move toward more comprehensive accounts, were mining archives, and only awaited official source materials. This section will briefly discuss the new evidence and then survey different kinds of intelligence work, focusing on the United States and United Kingdom.

There were many reasons why the dam burst. Some were political – in America the administration of President Richard M. Nixon received a recommendation to open remaining war records, and the president wanted CIA secret records to gather ammunition against political opponents. Those motives led Nixon to order declassification and put teeth into the Freedom of Information Act for the first time. He used the opening of some documents as a cloak for other goals. On daily notes for June 23, 1971, recording his assignments from the president, Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman noted, “re declassification,” that Nixon was “determined to do everything to our advantage on assumption we have only a year to do it,” and that the subjects on which to move were “WWII – Korea – Cuba Missile – Bay of Pigs – Murder of Trujillo.” A new presidential executive order regarding secrecy and declassification appeared early in 1972. Top-secret records started becoming available. Meanwhile, new memoir material appeared and, with subjects placed within bounds, extended to more areas with more explicit coverage.

These revelations revolutionized OSS historiography. The timing can be established with some precision, for the first new-generation OSS histories, based largely upon interview material, appeared soon into the 1970s (Ford 1970; Hymoff 1972; Smith 1972). Meanwhile, the US began declassifying real information, starting with analytical studies, notably one on Adolf Hitler’s character (Langer 1972), and war reports of the OSS (Cave-Brown 1975, 1976; Roosevelt 1976). Fresh material led to a new sophistication. The basic war records supplied context. Anthony Cave-Brown took advantage to write eye-opening studies of D-day intelligence and then a biography of OSS chieftain Donovan (Cave-Brown 1982). More Donovan biographies followed, along with the first records-based OSS history. A host of specialized OSS studies, and smaller-scale histories appeared. Even memoirs and later biographies benefited from records access.

Not ignored were such other US entities as the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Army’s Counterintelligence Corps, or technical intelligence collection means and organizations. Quickly illuminated was the work of Japanese-American translators, many of them Nisei, important to the code-breaking effort but who worked in many intelligence capacities. The air spies, purveyors of what we now call overhead imagery, also became better known. Focused studies of aerial photography rolled off the presses.

In the United Kingdom, the process was different and remains obscure. The British had held the line against revelations. Their practice had ensured that lessons were learned by means of extensive internal histories which were kept under lock and key. Due to the Official Secrets Act, Whitehall had a mechanism to impose prior restraint on disclosures, which sent former officers to American publishers. The new British evidence transformed intelligence studies – the US may have made a decision but it continued to lag in implementation. British action had to have involved some

government consideration. The net result permitted new-generation histories on both sides of the Atlantic, and finally, publication of the British official account of intelligence in World War II.

The dam burst first on counterintelligence. John C. Masterman became the agent of change. Masterman had figured in an operation in which German spies were apprehended, offered freedom in return for cooperation, and used to send phony reports. Eventually virtually every key German spy network in the West worked to London, not Berlin, and were coordinated by an entity known as the London Committee, the XX Committee (twenty by Roman numeral, but “double cross” in common usage), or simply the Double Cross committee. Masterman wrote an account of the entire XX operation, *The Doublecross System*, published by Yale in 1972.

The Double Cross revelation put the nexus between counterspies and positive intelligence squarely to the public, a picture filled in by a plethora of subsequent writing. An important principal agent whose greatest contribution was to assist the D-day deception appeared in print. So did the memoir of his American equivalent. All this inspired historians to consider many aspects of wartime espionage.

More jolting revelations on the espionage front were the depth and breadth of British covert activities within the United States, with the door again kicked in by a participant, Sir William Stephenson (1983). More works documented training activities, political manipulations, relations with OSS counterparts, and so on. In the case of British Security Coordination, as Stephenson’s unit was known, the official history only appeared after it had become well known. In some respects, this was a throwback (Stafford; 1987; Troy 1996; Mahl 1998; Macdonald 1998; Hodgson 1999; Stephenson 1999).

The source material on the SIS (MI6) as a whole attained a certain sophistication. Starting with an illuminating history of the service by West (1983) and an exhaustive biography of the wartime “C,” or SIS director – Sir Stewart Menzies – by Cave-Brown (1987), additional attention has been devoted to British operations. It is nevertheless true that British analysts have devoted more attention to cold war issues than to MI6 during the 1939–1945 conflict (Haswell 1977; Johns 1979; Dekel 1980; McCall 1981; Wark 1985; Andrew 1991; Stafford 1997). This contrasts with counterespionage (MI5) in the form of the XX System, or inquiries devoted to SOE, is discussed elsewhere in this *Companion*.

Perhaps the most sensitive of British revelations concerned the British and American penetration of German codes, used to guide combat operations (works on efforts against Japanese codes followed later though the basic story was already known). A Royal Air Force group captain, F. W. Winterbotham, revealed this in his 1975 book, *The ULTRA Secret*. The name “Ultra,” from the codename for the security compartment used to protect German intercept information, became the generic term for all World War II combat code breaking, and inspired what is probably the widest stream of recent historical work. Peter Calvocoressi’s *Top Secret Ultra* (1980) and Ronald Lewin’s *Ultra Goes to War* (1978) quickly followed Winterbotham’s revelation and began to show how large a role radio interception had played.

Since Winterbotham’s disclosure, memoirs and biographies, even oral histories, have described the German codes in detail and extended the inside stories to Italian, Russian, and Japanese codes. Even a sparse account could go on for many pages. The coverage has featured activity at Bletchley Park, headquarters of the top British

communications intelligence organization, the Government Communications Headquarters; the techniques used to work on enemy codes, radio interception activities, recollections of some top code breakers, the peculiarities of cipher systems, relationships between British and American contingents, those between code breakers and military commanders, and so on.

Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, the National Security Agency (NSA) began releasing certain material, starting with actual texts of the Japanese diplomatic cables before Pearl Harbor, followed by internal history papers which contained a limited number of actual intercepts. From the early 1980s and especially from mid-decade, the NSA included the bulk of intercepted wartime messages, and in the century's final decade, a multivolume capstone official history. Frederick D. Parker's volumes concerned Pearl Harbor's unsolved messages (1994), and the Coral Sea and Midway battles (1993). In the 1990s, the US successively released the actual wartime aerial intelligence photographs and, finally, the complete records of the OSS. Though some documents continue to be withheld for security reasons, researchers now benefit from a massive record.

The United Kingdom began with histories. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office informed Parliament in January 1978 that intelligence records and directorates would be moved to the Public Record Office (PRO) and eventually become available for research, but operational mission details and methods remained subject to the Official Secrets Act. Almost simultaneously, one of the most significant new doors opened when R. V. Jones, a scientific adviser to Prime Minister Churchill, published *Most Secret War* (1989), a memoir illuminating the role of technical intelligence. Within the British strictures, between 1979 and 1990 the British proceeded to publish five volumes (one divided into a pair of massive books) under the generic title *History of the Second World War: British Intelligence in the Second World War* (Hinsley et al. 1979–1990). The first three volumes covered the influence of intelligence on strategy and operations, the fourth counterintelligence and security, and the last one strategic deception. Even at this length, the British history made no effort to cover the war in the Far East, but its treatment of the European and Mediterranean theaters was comprehensive. Meanwhile, monograph literature indicates researchers have indeed unearthed important additional material at the PRO.

Historians – and some participants – have used this evidence to apply the intelligence story to various facets of World War II. Impacts on the naval war were among the first, starting in 1977 with Patrick Beesly's account of British naval intelligence (1978) and Ludovic Kennedy's reframing of the *Bismarck* episode (1974), but continuing through the present. The impact of intelligence on the air effort, in particular the strategic bombing of Germany, has been another focus of inquiry (Rostow 1981; Powell 1987; Puttney 1987; Graham 2009). Ralph Bennett, one of the Bletchley code breakers, is among the most devoted analysts of the specific impact of Ultra (Bennett 1979, 1989, 1994). Alexander McKee's *El Alamein* (1991) examines intelligence in the North African campaign. Works by Sebag-Montefiore (2000) and Ratliff (2008) attempt to meld different campaigns with the code-breaking story, and versions that link military operations with intelligence more broadly.

Long fixated on the interval from Pearl Harbor to Midway, the story of intelligence in the Pacific also broke free of old constraints. Perhaps the point of departure was the appearance of memoirs from Pacific Fleet intelligence officers Holmes (1979) and

Layton (1985). Some might argue the breakthrough came with Clay Blair's remarkable *Silent Victory* (1975), though that focused on operations, with important intelligence contributions. Others might say that the moment the code-breaking dimension entered history came in 1977 with publication of Ronald Clark's *The Man Who Broke Purple*, which centered on penetrating Japanese diplomatic codes. But the actual leader of that effort was Friedman's assistant Frank B. Rowlett. His memoir appeared as *The Story of Magic* (1998). Specifics began emerging with Edward van der Rhoer's *Deadly Magic* (1978). This was the moment when NSA began releasing files more rapidly. At that point, the most recent treatment had been Ronald Lewin's *The American Magic* (1982), which, given the limited NSA evidence to that time, remained relatively superficial. By the end of the twentieth century treatments attained a new level. My *Combined Fleet Decoded* (1995) represented an attempt to bring to bear many aspects of intelligence and relate them to specific operations, and it would be joined by several more, including Edward Drea's *MacArthur's ULTRA* (1992), John Winton's *Ultra in the Pacific* (1993), and Jeffrey Moore's *Spies for Nimitz* (2006). Some battles were reinterpreted in the light of new records and, in the case of the projected Allied invasion of Japan, a campaign never fought, the intelligence itself became a key component of the historical narrative.

On the British side, in spite of the reluctance of official historians to address the Pacific, a companion literature has developed, including recollections of British and Australian code breakers and oral histories. These include Alan Stripp's *Codebreaker in the Far East* (1989), James Rusbridger and Eric Nave's *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor* (1991), Jack Bleakley's *The Eavesdroppers* (1992), and Geoffrey Ballard's *On Ultra Active Service* (1991). While the article literature has been excluded here, one piece needs mention, for historian John Ferris has brought to light the diary of Malcolm D. Kennedy, a key British figure on Far East intelligence. Elphick (1997), Aldrich (2000), and Smith (2000) provide accounts of the Far East effort, and Marder (1981–1990) and Winton (1988) devote attention to the operational use of intelligence.

For the past quarter century writing on secret codes has contributed the most to the literature, but another stream has begun and is broadening – studies of deception activity. With a couple of books early on, a vein that would be mined is the use of camouflage and decoy operations (Maskelyne 1949; Barkas 1951; Mure 1980; Fisher 1983; Dobinson 2000; Gawne 2002). Serious interest turned to deception writ large in the late 1970s. The D-day deceptions were somewhat known – and fleshed out in Cave-Brown's *Bodyguard* study. Cruikshank (1979), Wheatley (1980), Browne (1986), Huber (1988), Rankin (2008), and Glantz (1989) have turned to deception throughout the war. In due course, the British released an official history volume and later declassified the end of mission report on the "Bodyguard deception" (Hesketh 2000). A near-definitive history now exists in the form of Thaddeus Holt's *The Deceivers* (Holt 2004).

Despite the existence of this enormous literature, there remain poorly understood aspects of intelligence in World War II. A few have been highlighted here. There is a remarkable contrast between the explosion of our knowledge regarding Anglo-American activities and those of some other belligerents. Coverage of German intelligence is good on Admiral Canaris and his *Abwehr*, somewhat developed on Nazi organizations, but spotty in many places, including any comprehensive overview of agent activities, some operational history of combat intelligence, the detailed record of Foreign Armies East and West, thorough treatments of German aerial reconnaissance

and communications intelligence, and much else. German naval intelligence remains an ocean largely uncharted. There is material on many of these issues in the journals, particularly *Intelligence and National Security*, and in bits and pieces in certain combat histories, but despite the efforts of David Kahn, Ladislav Farago, and a few others, so far there has yet to be a satisfactory overview history.

What is true for Germany is true in spades for the Soviet Union. There are accounts of a few individual networks – some quite good – and a nice treatment from Western sources of data exchange with Moscow, but little to fit the puzzle together. Soviet communications intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, naval intelligence, even combat intelligence, have yet to be addressed in any serious way. Archival access is poor, however, and there is little reason to expect improvement. Japanese intelligence studies are in an even more primitive state, further complicated by the destruction of many Japanese records at the end of the war. Scholars are beginning to make use of the interrogations conducted in the war's aftermath, and records compiled for the occupation forces and the International Military Tribunal, but these inquiries have far to go to create an intelligible history. One subject that has gone entirely unmentioned is that of Italian intelligence. Investigations there – at least in English – are stuck somewhere in the Stone Age.

While the status of knowledge on Anglo-American intelligence is light years ahead of these others, important gaps remain. One is the need for a comprehensive wartime history of MI6. There are others. On the US side, there is a need for study of the “Washington command post” of intelligence – poorly understood, but with stories that include the coordination of American efforts, infighting between intelligence units, the differences among Washington agencies and field commands, and so on.

Other lacunae result from the way writing has progressed over time. Attention has leaped to topics in succession. At one point, Pearl Harbor was a main focus, at another special operations, at a third Ultra. This results partly from the appearance of materials and interests of participants and researchers, but it means that our knowledge is more evolved in some areas than others. For example, after some interest in the 1970s, focus on photo reconnaissance gave way to overwhelming preoccupation with Ultra. Today, despite the availability of command and unit records, and the aerial photographs, there is only one authentically detailed study of the impact of air reconnaissance, Robert Ehlers's *Targeting the Third Reich* (2009). Instead, there is an impression, possibly unwarranted, that radio intercepts are the sole material of value.

A major task ahead is suggested by this point. It is the need to integrate developing knowledge of different streams of intelligence. Overhead imagery, intercepts, and reports from the resistance and from spies all contributed to views propounded by analysts (intelligence staffs) to commanders. Showing how the types of data influenced analysis, documenting the debates, and explaining how commanders were thus guided, may be the next great task for World War II intelligence studies.

Obstacles need to be kept in mind. One is the need to disentangle threads of study. The aims of World War II studies and those directed at the cold war diverge. In the one case, the task is to use intelligence to explicate an actual evolution of events. In the other, the problem is to show how behind-the-scenes events during the war influenced those of another era, including ones that never happened, a virtual history if you like. The cold war materials can be mined for data useful to World War II studies but the evidence must be used with caution.

Beyond that lie projects to occupy historians for many years. One is to create accounts of the various intelligence services that give full weight to different disciplines, as well as equal attention to World War II and cold war developments. The greatest task, however, will be to reframe the diplomatic and combat history of World War II as a richer, more nuanced narrative that both gives intelligence its proper role. This is not to say that some of this has not been done – and well. Rather, the point is that our knowledge of World War II cannot be considered complete until the battles and campaigns, diplomatic initiatives and conferences, and basic strategies are all accorded this comprehensive treatment. A huge task indeed, but one capable of accomplishment, and a worthy goal for students of intelligence and of war.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

French African Soldiers in World War II

RAFFAEL SCHECK

The substantial presence of soldiers from African territories in the French army of 1939–1940, the armistice army of Vichy France, and the Free French forces opens up a global dimension of World War II. The contacts of hundreds of thousands of Africans with Europeans (French, German, Italian, British, even sometimes Swiss citizens) as well as Americans had important consequences for the mindset of the Africans and, in a less obvious fashion, for Europeans, too. Veterans returned with a new mindset, and their experiences particularly with France, the colonial power, influenced political attitudes in their homelands. Although the road from the war experience to national independence was twisted and sometimes muddled, it is noteworthy that several African leaders of the early independence period were former French soldiers. Ahmed Ben Bella, for example, one of the key figures of the Algerian independence movement and later president of Algeria (1963–1965), fought with great distinction in the Free French forces in Italy, France, and Germany in 1943–1945. Léopold Sédar Senghor, first president of independent Senegal (1960–1980) and highly accomplished poet and philosopher, belonged to the French army in 1939–1940 and was a German prisoner of war. Frantz Fanon, the influential philosopher of decolonization and member of the Algerian independence movement, also served in the Free French forces and was wounded in combat. With hundreds of thousands of other soldiers from the French Empire, these three men connected military service for France with aspirations for better rights and ultimately for full equality and national independence. The military service of Africans for France still serves as a backdrop and legitimization in debates about African migration and civil rights of people of African descent in contemporary France.

The involvement of Africans in the French armies of World War II has received increasing attention in the past two and a half decades. Among the works focusing specifically on World War II are Nancy Lawler's *Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II* (1992), Raffael Scheck's *Hitler's African Victims: The*

German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers (2006), and Armelle Mabon's study *Prisonniers de guerre "indigènes": Visages oubliés de la France occupée* (2010). Lawler's work is an oral history based on interviews with veterans from Ivory Coast. Scheck has uncovered a series of massacres of black prisoners by the German army and analyzed the German propaganda and the specific battle situations that helped to trigger them, and Mabon has studied the everyday life of "indigenous" prisoners of war from the French Empire held in German-occupied France 1940–1944. The field has not yet generated sharp controversies, and publications have tended to build upon each other collegially despite different emphases and subtle differences of opinion. Several fundamental issues have been explored, but many aspects still leave room for further research and discussion. First, the recruitment practices and the consequences of recruitment for African societies are a crucial question. A very strong work on this aspect is the longitudinal study of Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (1991). As Echenberg shows, the intensified drafting of young men in World War I and the interwar period had deplorable repercussions on the local economy and triggered resistance or even rebellion in many regions, although it appears that the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 produced a short-lived wave of solidarity with France in the French Empire. Second, the circumstances of recruitment and the aspirations of African soldiers deserve a close look. Echenberg and Lawler dwell on this aspect, and Belkacem Recham, in his book *Les Musulmans algériens dans l'armée française 1914–1945* (1996), provides a detailed analysis for Muslim soldiers from Algeria and to a lesser extent Morocco and Tunisia. Although there were genuine volunteers who identified with French civilization and democracy – not least as a stepping-stone for a hoped-for improvement of their own legal status – most soldiers in French Africa were drafted, and even many so-called volunteers signed up under pressure from pro-French local leaders. Almost invariably, however, military service awakened aspirations for citizenship and equality and led to a questioning of the colonial order with its practices of discrimination, forced labor, and segregation. Third, the experience of Africans in wartime Europe has become an important perspective of research. African soldiers often found French civilians less condescending and more welcoming than the white people in Africa, and subsequent French administrations considered these contacts as potentially subversive. Fourth, one big and intensely transnational subfield is the experience of prisoners of war (POWs). Over 90,000 French African soldiers became German prisoners and experienced changing German policies and French efforts to maintain their loyalty. Fifth, the reaction of Europeans to the presence of African soldiers in Europe is important, particularly with respect to black soldiers, although this aspect also includes contacts with African Americans. Finally, the consequences of the war experience for ex-soldiers, especially their relationship to the independence movements, represent an important field of study. France had a long tradition of recruiting soldiers in Africa. After landing on the Algerian coast in 1830, the French army began drafting various local troops for use in the conquest and pacification of Algeria and later for deployments in Europe, as during the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Italian war of independence (1859), and the Franco-German War (1870–1871). The Algerian units were complemented by Tunisian and Moroccan forces after France established protectorates in these two countries (1881 and 1912 respectively). These troops were called the *Armée d'Afrique* (African Army) and included European

settlers as well as Muslim Africans, who constituted the majority. Large contingents of the African Army fought in all major theaters of World War I with French participation.

Similarly, the French colonial administration in Senegal drafted local troops for expansion across West Africa in the early nineteenth century. In 1857, these troops were formally constituted as the *tirailleurs sénégalais* (Senegalese riflemen; the name was maintained even though soldiers from other West African regions far outnumbered the Senegalese by 1914). Given France's demographic weakness, the French army overrode misgivings about the use of black troops in a war with white men and began to envision the deployment of *tirailleurs sénégalais* in Europe. West Africans, therefore, fought on the Western Front, the Gallipoli peninsula, and in the Macedonian campaign during World War I. Units recruited in the French colonies in East Africa, Central Africa, Madagascar, and Indochina joined the *tirailleurs sénégalais* under the administration of the *troupes coloniales* (Colonial Troops) and also participated in the European campaigns of World War I. Since France's North African territories were not called colonies (Algeria was considered integral territory of France, and Tunisia as well as Morocco were protectorates), the African Army was administered separately from the Colonial Troops.

In Algeria and West Africa, the French administration developed an ambitious but inconsistent conscription system, which was often based on quota systems. Volunteers usually supplemented the conscripted troops, although in many cases enlistment happened under considerable pressure, as was also the case in areas like Morocco that did not have conscription. Troops from France's North and West African territories were deployed in the occupation of the German Rhineland after World War I, where the presence of black soldiers triggered a German hate campaign with strong international repercussions (the so-called Black Horror on the Rhine), and African units were also active in the repression of anticolonial uprisings in Morocco and Syria in the 1920s. At the outbreak of World War II, France again relied for its defense on forces from Africa, with the African Army yielding the largest contingent and the Colonial Troops with the *tirailleurs sénégalais* the second largest (twenty divisions total, although with a significant white settler component in the twelve African Army divisions).

After a long and demoralizing wait during the so-called Phony War (September 3, 1939 to May 9, 1940), several North African divisions saw fierce combat with the German army during its initial breakthrough in the Ardennes region. In Southern Belgium and along the French border with Luxembourg, North African troops, including some Spahi cavalry, fought courageously but to no avail. The remainders of some of these units were evacuated from Dunkirk and later sent back to France for deployment in the final battles in Central France. Units of *tirailleurs sénégalais* also participated in some of the initial battles in May, but most of them experienced their hardest test during the second phase of the German offensive (Operation Red) starting with the attack on French positions along the Somme River on 5 June. In many cases, *tirailleurs sénégalais* put up desperate resistance in hopeless situations until the end of the fighting two and a half weeks later. German officers ordered executions of 1,500 to 3,000 captured black soldiers, and an unknown number of black soldiers were killed in battles in which the German forces had decided not to take any black prisoners or en route to prisoner of war camps. North Africans were generally spared, although in some cases German units considered them black soldiers and also massacred them.

For the approximately 90,000 POWs from French Africa, a harsh period of captivity began. Nearly half of these prisoners (about 40,000) were sent to POW camps in Germany. Black prisoners, in particular, experienced much abuse from guards during this transfer and were met with an exotic curiosity, often mixed with insults, from German civilians after arriving in Germany. In August 1940, however, a German directive initiated by Hitler stipulated that all non-European prisoners be sent back to France. The declared purpose of this decision was to prevent the spread of tropical diseases. Hitler, however, had a different “contagion” in mind, namely the possibility of amorous liaisons between African soldiers and German women. In any case, the decision to transfer all non-European prisoners back to France caused considerable confusion because it was based on Nazi categories of “race” or skin color, which did not exactly correspond to French recruitment categories (white prisoners from Algeria, for example, also required transfer to France – to no avail). By the end of 1940, almost all African prisoners were back in France with the exception of several hundred North Africans selected for German propaganda camps and an unknown number of Africans who were overlooked.

In France, most prisoners from Africa were assigned to work commandos of variable size (from one to one thousand prisoners) predominantly in agriculture and forestry. Their treatment and living situation improved in 1940 and 1941, but diseases took a heavy toll, particularly among the West Africans. The Germans initially released affected prisoners too late but soon adopted a permissive practice that allowed a number of prisoners to obtain a medical discharge rather easily. Pressed by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Vichy French agencies responsible for POWs, the Germans transferred some African prisoners to the milder Southwest of France, but this transfer was never completed because the camps in that region were quickly overcrowded and because the German army needed the prisoners’ labor in other regions, too. Although French aid organizations and in many cases individual farmers helped supply the African prisoners, most prisoners suffered from temporary shortages of food, deteriorating clothing and shoes, and inadequate living quarters, especially in the winter months. In the numerous work commandos assigned to farms and public work projects, prisoners had close contact with French civilians who were generally supportive and friendly except in areas with large unemployment.

The French collaborationist government in Vichy and the German authorities sought to use the African prisoners for their own purposes. The German army undertook various propaganda initiatives targeting foremost North Africans. German propaganda mixed pro-Islamic and anti-Jewish messages with a denunciation of French and British colonialism. Groups of North African prisoners were sent to a camp near Berlin where they received privileged treatment and “lessons” in world politics. These prisoners later came back to the POW camps in France where they were expected to spread the message. In December 1941, the German army released ten thousand North African prisoners as a propaganda measure. Moreover, the German military administration granted North African independence activists access to some POW camps in France. Vichy, in turn, had an interest in preserving the loyalty of African soldiers to France and tried to counteract German propaganda. The Vichy authorities responsible for the prisoners of war soon concluded that ensuring good supplies – assured by French governmental and nongovernmental aid organizations – constituted the best French counter-propaganda. Moreover, Vichy diplomats worked

hard to secure the release of all prisoners from French overseas territories, but to no avail. The intelligence service of Vichy, nervously interviewing dismissed POWs and seeking to reaffirm their loyalty to France, finally concluded that Nazi propaganda had made few converts.

Although the efforts of the French governmental and nongovernmental aid agencies did improve the conditions in the camps, the Vichy authorities received no credit in the eyes of the prisoners not least because Vichy, in order to receive any concessions, played by the rules of Nazi Germany and therefore seemed to accept its discriminatory categories. This was resented bitterly, for example, when Vichy agreed to the German decision to dismiss almost all remaining white prisoners from the German camps in France on 3 July 1941. Prisoners with mixed ancestry, even if they had French citizenship and lived in France, were excluded from this dismissal action. Concern for German propaganda also played a role in Vichy's rapid acceptance of a German request to place African and other French colonial prisoners under French guards in January 1943. Although no more than 6,000 prisoners were ever guarded by French officers and soldiers, the fact that France deployed former comrades-in-arms as their guards created bitterness among some African prisoners – although some others appreciated the French guards.

In the last two years of the war, prisoners from Africa experienced further hardship. After the Allied landings in France, the German army transferred 10,000–15,000 prisoners – a little less than half of the remaining prisoners from the French Empire – to Germany, where they experienced the severe conditions of the German collapse. The increasingly intense Allied bombings also killed hundreds of African prisoners on work assignments in France and Germany or in trains during their transfer to Germany. Sometimes this was due to the German practice – tacitly accepted by some Vichy politicians – to deploy French prisoners of war illegally in war-related work, both in German-occupied France and in Germany itself. Several thousand African POWs escaped from the camps, often with the help of French civilians, and went to the southern zone of France (unoccupied until November 1942), where they were either repatriated or assigned to labor battalions in French service. A few escaped POWs joined the French resistance. If caught by the Germans, they were executed or deported to a concentration camp.

A little appreciated fact of World War II history is that the Free French forces, under the command of General Charles de Gaulle, for a long time consisted predominantly of African soldiers. De Gaulle's first territorial base was Chad in French Central Africa, which rallied to him officially in August 1940; henceforth, African soldiers from Central Africa complemented the nucleus of French forces that had fled to Britain in the wake of the defeat of 1940. Migrants from French West Africa, who crossed the border to the British colony Gold Coast (today Ghana), strengthened the Free French regiments in 1941–1942. When the British and Free French invaded the French Levant in June 1941, Africans under Vichy command fought against Africans under Gaullist command. After the success of the invasion, some of the former agreed to join the Free French forces, while others demanded to be sent back to France or French North Africa. The Allied landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) in November 1942 opened up new sources of recruitment. North African troops and *tirailleurs sénégalais* under Free French officers participated in the last battles with Axis troops in Tunisia and later in the Allied campaigns in Italy (including the battle

of Monte Cassino), Southern France, and Germany. Even the Free French forces landing in Normandy several weeks after D-day included some African troops.

In early 1943, the French forces fighting on the side of the Allies still had a majority of Africans. They included approximately 100,000 *tirailleurs sénégalais* and 405,000 men in the North African units, of which 230,000 were “indigenous” North Africans (Clayton 1988, p. 143). Once parts of France were liberated, more and more white French men, many of whom had belonged to the resistance, streamed into the French forces hamstrung by severe shortages of equipment ranging from uniforms to weapons and tanks. The shortage of American-supplied materiel imposed a cap on French troops and thus precluded a large-scale integration of white French recruits without the dismissal of other troops. In fall 1944, de Gaulle therefore decided to withdraw the Black African and some North African troops from the frontlines and to replace them with white French men. This decision, called *blanchiment* (whitening), was perceived by many Africans as a deliberate snub, as if they were not worthy of completing the imminent victory by advancing into Germany. The motives for the *blanchiment* were certainly complex. A careful case study of this question is Gilles Aubagnac, “Le retrait des troupes noires de la 1ère Armée” (1993), which argues that the official reason (the cold climate) was not the only motive and that political and psychological considerations also played a role. Whereas Aubagnac at least gives credit to the official reason, Echenberg and Mabon see it as a cynical pretext, and Lawler takes a slightly different position by showing that some West Africans did appreciate being allowed to leave the front in harsh climatic conditions. To be sure, it had been customary in both world wars to withdraw the troops from tropical Africa to the South of France during the winter months because they were believed to be more vulnerable to the diseases prevalent in the cold and wet conditions in northeastern France; this had happened for the last time in 1939–1940, and the new French army could argue that it was continuing this practice. Yet there were other motives as well. De Gaulle was worried about the strong communist orientation of many armed resistance groups and wanted to tie them into his military hierarchy to better control them. He may also have wanted to demonstrate to the other Allies that France could make a powerful contribution to the war through its own manpower, not through units recruited in Africa. It is also likely that fears of provoking hostility in the southwest German territories, which France wanted to control after the war, played a role: a new “black horror” campaign might arise in reaction to an invasion by black troops.

The mindset of many French politicians and military leaders at the time of the *blanchiment* suggests that all of these reasons played a role; French officers were greatly worried about the claims and aspirations of African soldiers who had tasted victory in Europe and who sometimes bolstered their claims by arguing that they had fought harder and longer than most white French troops. The French colonial administration, shaken by the economic and administrative consequences of the French defeat in 1940 and the rift between Vichy and de Gaulle, wanted to readapt African soldiers quickly to the colonial routine. Downplaying the contribution of Africans in the liberation of France was a central concern – and not only of the French authorities, as Olivier Wieviorka has shown in *Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris* (2008), where he mentions an Anglo-American intervention, supported by the Free French, to exclude black French troops from the liberation of Paris.

The French efforts to restore the colonial order without too many concessions clashed with the frustrations of African veterans. Short of funds and shipping, the provisional French government kept most former POWs – as well as African troops released through the *blanchiment* – in large repatriation camps. Some former POWs found themselves in the same camps as they had been under the Germans, but often under worse conditions. Frustrated by years of captivity, a long wait for repatriation, and withheld pay, former POWs met embittered soldiers affected by the *blanchiment*. The mood of the veterans was explosive, and explode it did on many occasions. The most fatal case was a mutiny by *tirailleurs sénégalais*, all former POWs, in the camp of Thiaroye near Dakar on December 1, 1944. Tired of broken promises regarding their pay, the veterans refused orders to board trains and demanded to be paid in the camp. French army and police units (many of them also consisting of *tirailleurs sénégalais*) gathered to repress the mutiny, opened fire, and killed 35 veterans. Not much later, North and West African veterans in Versailles, demanding the release of arrested comrades, stormed the local police station and took policemen as hostages. After a firefight between the veterans and the police, the French authorities fulfilled the demands of the veterans and sent them to Africa on the next ship. More riots followed, as African soldiers returned from German captivity in the spring and summer of 1945. In Saint Raphaël on the Mediterranean coast, veterans disgruntled about the poor conditions in the camps took to the streets and confronted the police in August 1945; four people were killed and many more were wounded. French authorities habitually blamed these disturbances on German propaganda and the influence of American anticolonialism.

The returning African veterans often found their homelands profoundly transformed. In Algeria, unrest had been smoldering in several cities during the last years of the war, and it erupted in Sétif in an extremely violent confrontation on May 8, 1945. In Morocco and Tunisia, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa, movements for political emancipation and independence had grown despite repression by the Vichy governors and their successors. Veterans brought their own frustrations with the French administration (both Vichy and Free French) to the mix. Nazi Germany, with its racism and discrimination, had been defeated and discredited, and French African soldiers often looked up to the ideals of democracy and equality upheld by the United States, hoping that they would reform or overturn the colonial system. Nevertheless, not all veterans immediately supported independence. Not without some success, the French government adapted colonial legislation and built up a support system and social network for veterans, casting them as representatives of France and as mediators between the colonial administration and the local people. Members of the independence movements sometimes treated veterans with suspicion because they had fought for the “wrong” side. In the long run, however, French reforms and promises could not keep up with the grown aspirations of the locals, including the veterans. Veterans, hoping for privileged access to jobs and services, saw their pensions frozen by the French state at the time of national independence, and the struggle to “de-crystallize” pensions has succeeded only in the period 2006–2010.

An indispensable guide on the French deployment of African soldiers is Anthony Clayton’s book *France, Soldiers and Africa* (1988), which details the recruitment, organization, and battles of African troops in French armies from the acquisition and expansion of empire in the 1830s to the last wars of decolonization in Algeria and

Vietnam. Clayton summarizes the deployment of French African units in World War II in a chapter called "Decline," referring to a colonial order in crisis already before 1939 but further shaken by the French defeat in 1940 and the following schism. Still, Clayton points out that the declaration of war against Nazi Germany triggered a wave of solidarity in the empire that became muffled only with the catastrophic outcome of the 1940 campaign in France and the following insecurities. Clayton also offers a detailed treatment of the different units recruited in Africa across time. His book is an essential resource for anybody interested in military organization and operations.

The standard work on the *tirailleurs sénégalais* is Myron Echenberg's *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (1991). After tracing the origins of France's West African recruitment and the role of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* in the conquest of West Africa and in World War I, Echenberg analyzes the recruitment patterns in French West Africa as well as the resistance to conscription, which led to significant migration and intriguing schemes to "buy" substitutes. In comparison to World War I, Echenberg stresses the more intense ideological preparation of the *tirailleurs* arriving in France in 1939–1940 as well as the greater mixture of white and "indigenous" units. Echenberg aptly summarizes the combat and captivity experiences of French West African soldiers, mentioning various massacres of black prisoners by the Germans. Regarding the *blanchiment*, he takes a critical stance, stressing that de Gaulle primarily wanted to give young Frenchmen "a taste of victory, a share in the Allied success in ridding France of its shame and humiliation," and to integrate communist partisan groups into the army in order to control them and to separate them from their political leaders (p. 99). Echenberg provides a differentiated interpretation of Thiaroye; he stresses the strong shockwaves it sent through French West Africa but also points out that many conservative Africans condoned the repression of the mutiny because they feared chaos and anarchy spreading to the colony. Thiaroye was fueled by resentment against the unequal and inferior treatment of black soldiers. What contemporary French analysts usually failed to see, moreover, was that the ex-POWs had "acquired a heightened consciousness of themselves as Africans united by their shared experience in suffering" (p. 103). A survey of veterans' interest groups and their political involvement concludes the book. Echenberg shows that veterans, going through phases of militancy and accommodation, primarily demanded higher pensions, privileged access to jobs, and services rather than independence. Finally, one fascinating aspect of Echenberg's discussion is his claim that the veterans often chose what they perceived as a "European" and "modern" lifestyle and adopted consumption patterns influenced by their experience in the military.

While Echenberg's *Colonial Conscripts* is a diachronic analysis of a special military force, Nancy Lawler's *Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II* (1992) focuses directly on West African soldiers in World War II. Lawler draws from interviews with veterans in the north of Ivory Coast while using French and African archival sources to provide a broader framework for the veterans' recollections. She points out, like Echenberg, that West African soldiers felt a strong devotion to France in 1939, but she also highlights fatalism and resentment against military service, as expressed, for example, in a large number of recruit suicides. As many statements of interviewed soldiers suggest, West Africans' professions of solidarity with France often implied hopes for equality between French and African soldiers. After arriving in France, many Africans felt that the French population was welcoming and relatively

free of racism and prejudice; yet, discrimination was tangible in the army itself, as in the lower quality of food for the Africans and their lower pay.

The recollections of veterans from the battle of France in 1940 shed light on the confusion of many African soldiers, their trauma in a mechanized battle with dive-bombers and tanks, and their often heroic resistance. Lawler's interviews reflect the widespread impression among *tirailleurs sénégalais* that they fought harder than the white French troops. This heroism to some soldiers explained the German massacres of black prisoners and the frequent abuses in the early period of captivity. In turn, the perception of having fought hard for France implied a sense of entitlement. Lawler follows the route of *tirailleurs sénégalais* back into a more repressive and economically unsettled French West Africa as well as the battles in the Levant, which pitted Africans against Africans, and in North Africa. Lawler provides a conflicted assessment of the *blanchiment*: although some *tirailleurs sénégalais* were frustrated, she also found many veterans who admitted that they were happy to be withdrawn from fighting in very cold winter conditions in the hills of northeastern France. Many veterans returned to Africa proud of having helped to liberate France and impressed by European ways of life. They had heard about the promises of improved rights as incorporated into the Atlantic Charter and de Gaulle's declaration in Brazzaville in January 1944. They had observed American black soldiers and believed that they had far superior rights than black people in the French colonies. Back home in Ivory Coast, however, many of Lawler's interview partners felt embittered by the failure of the authorities to reward them for their military efforts and by witnessing the effects of harsh requisitions by the Free French authorities in the colony. This disillusionment provided a fertile ground for the recruiters of pro-independence parties, especially under the leadership of the charismatic politician Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Not least given the extensive use of interviews with veterans, Lawler's book will remain a crucial resource as very few veterans are still alive.

The richly illustrated volume *Héros méconnus 1914–1918, 1939–1945* by Rives and Dietrich (1990) offers a detailed survey of the deployments of Colonial Troops in both world wars. Its purpose is above all to point out the heroic contributions of these forces to the defense of France. The tone of the book, therefore, is celebratory rather than scholarly (Rives and Dietrich, for example, take no notice of the previously presented books). Still, the merit of the authors is to have traced and brought to the limelight all the combat engagements of the Colonial Troops. The book *La Force noire* by Deroo and Champeaux (2006), also richly illustrated, puts more emphasis on scholarly aspects and on the cultural and social context of France's black troops from the foundation of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* to their deployment on the French side in the Algerian war of independence.

On North African troops in World War II, Belkacem Recham's book *Musulmans algériens dans l'armée française 1914–1945* (1996) presents a good analysis based on archival sources in France and Algeria. Recham discusses recruitment practices in the interwar period and traces the competing propaganda for Algerian soldiers from communists, Algerian nationalists, and the Germans. Similar to Lawler, he stresses the initial enthusiasm of Muslim Algerians to defend France against Nazism – an enthusiasm that masked deeper aspirations for equality. As is true for the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, however, the defeat of France, the economic shortages, and the repressive policies of the colonial administration created a dangerous potential among Algerian soldiers

that first exploded in the mutiny of an Algerian regiment slanted for deployment in the Levant in January 1941. Recham devotes a special chapter to the POW experience, providing much useful information on the basis of the French military archives in Vincennes but ignoring the much larger holdings of the French National Archives. A detailed study of Algerians in the Free French forces deployed in Italy, France, and Germany in 1943–1945 concludes the book.

Less research exists on Moroccan and Tunisian soldiers, but Driss Maghraoui's articles on the image and memory of Moroccan soldiers open up an important axis of analysis. In "Moroccan Colonial Soldiers: Between Selective Memory and Collective Memory," Maghraoui (1998) examines French discourses on the Moroccan soldier as a ferocious fighter who could be "civilized" through training in a French military unit. French propaganda also suggested that Moroccan troops were volunteers and completely loyal to France. Yet, Maghraoui contrasts these notions with the more complex and conflicted memories of Moroccan soldiers. Many signed up for the army under economic pressure, induced by the coercive labor arrangements imposed on the Moroccan peasantry by the French administration. In "Den Marokkanern den Krieg verkaufen". Französische Anti-Nazi-Propaganda während des Zweiten Weltkrieges," Maghraoui (2004) shows how French propaganda in World War II sought to cast the Moroccan soldier as a heroic and loyal fighter for France. He points out that in an effort to encourage Moroccan support, the Moroccan and French comrade-in-arms appeared almost as equal members of an army committed to universal human rights, thus contradicting the racist colonial mindset.

The massacres of black soldiers by the German army in 1940, although mentioned by Echenberg and Lawler, received the first detailed analysis based on French as well as German documents in my book *Hitler's African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940* (2006). Surprised that these massacres were never mentioned in the heated discussion in Germany about the crimes of the *Wehrmacht* (German armed forces) in 1939–1945, I gathered archival evidence documenting the killing of 1500–3000 black soldiers, mostly *tirailleurs sénégalais*, during the German campaign in France. The book traces the German prejudices against black men in arms to the colonial wars 1904–1907, the discourses about crimes of black troops in World War I and in the occupation of the Rhineland, and it then shows how Nazi propaganda, launched at the behest of Hitler and Goebbels in late May 1940, revived many older stereotypes – particularly the notion of mutilating "savages" – to incite more hatred against France. The propaganda stereotypes appeared almost verbatim in German war diaries and letters, and they gave officers a "felt" authorization to order the murder of black prisoners in spite of official orders to respect the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (1929). The book suggests that some particularly Nazified units were most eager to kill black prisoners, but it also shows that some commanders spared black prisoners, occasionally despite documented evidence of their own antiblack racism, while some German soldiers, in cooperation with French officers, occasionally intervened to avert a massacre. The book was translated into French (2007) and German (2009) and triggered an examination by the German office for the investigation of Nazi crimes in Ludwigsburg, which is still ongoing at present (2011).

The fate of African prisoners of war has recently attracted much scholarly attention. Armelle Mabon's book *Prisonniers de guerre "indigènes": Visages oubliés de la France*

occupée (2010) offers a detailed overview of life in captivity, the reaction of French civilians, propaganda, and the problems associated with the repatriation and reintegration of the veterans. The book carefully assesses the living situation of the prisoners, concluding that supplies were in general sufficient, and it is particularly strong on the work of French aid organizations as well as the support of French civilians. Mabon shows that numerous prisoners, loosely guarded, began amorous liaisons with French women, and she provides much evidence of networks for escapes, some of them leading former POWs to the resistance. Mabon takes a critical stance toward the Vichy and Free French authorities, arguing that the guarding of the prisoners by French personnel as well as the *blanchiment* constituted a betrayal. The book continues with a critical analysis of the repatriation and demobilization of the soldiers from the French Empire, showing that the financial claims of the ex-prisoners were entirely justified but consistently frustrated. Mabon concludes by denouncing the tendency of the French public to forget the contribution of North African and colonial soldiers, starting with ostracism against mixed couples after the war and ending with the many roadblocks on the way to overturning the freezing of veterans' pensions as stipulated by a law of 1959. Mabon's book is greatly enriched by the use of oral testimonies from French civilians and some former prisoners, but it does not consider German documents (both the large collections that came into French archives after 1945 as well as the holdings in Germany itself) and draws only marginally on works published in English and German. The discussion of German decisions regarding the prisoners (work assignments, economic considerations, guidelines for the guards, for example) therefore remains incomplete, as does the important diplomatic context.

A very rich article by Martin Thomas, "The Vichy Government and French Colonial Prisoners of War, 1940–1944" (2002), takes a critical stance against the Vichy government on the basis of French archival documents. Intending to remake France and its empire along the lines of a more racist and xenophobic philosophy, Vichy officials, according to Thomas, copied and condoned Nazi racial categories with respect to the colonial prisoners. He harshly criticizes the decision to deploy French officers and soldiers as guards of the prisoners from the colonies. Thomas further provides much detail on the supply of the prisoners, diseases, and dismissals. He concludes that the fate of colonial POWs was significantly harder than the fate of white French POWs held in Germany.

In contrast, I have argued in the article "French Colonial Soldiers in German Prisoner-of-War Camps, 1940–1945" (2010) that representatives of the Vichy government, despite their occasional paternalism and Vichy's racist vision of the colonies, worked hard to improve the fate of colonial POWs. In order to obtain concessions for the colonial prisoners, they had little choice but to play by the racist rules of Nazi Germany, but the diplomatic negotiations and internal documents show that they did not condone these rules. Drawing from German and French archival documents, I have shown that the German guards habitually violated strict orders to keep a distance from the prisoners and to separate the prisoners from civilians – orders that were often unenforceable given the deployment of prisoners in thousands of mostly small work commandos with only one or two guards. I have also argued that evidence on the French guards is more mixed, with some prisoners appreciating them and the freedom they granted. Altogether, I found that being held in France in proximity to aid organizations and surrounded by a generally supportive civilian

population was an advantage for colonial POWs that neutralized the drawbacks associated with being very far from home.

Gregory Mann, in *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (2006), explores veterans in Mali after 1945, using a set of interviews as an important primary source. Considering the question whether veterans were for independence or for France, Mann formulates a nuanced answer. He shows that large-scale efforts by the French state to integrate the veterans into a support network loyal to France, after an initial phase of disillusionment associated with Thiaroye, did have some success. In turn, the privileges and offices many veterans received from France also made them a coveted object of attention for African independence activists. In the end, the veterans defended their own interests by employing a language of mutual obligation and blood debt owed by France and also by their new nation. By serving France, they argued, they had also made independence possible.

The events of Thiaroye have drawn much research, although a comprehensive work on the problems of reintegration, apart from Mann's superb local study, is still lacking. Articles by Godechot (2002) and Fargettas (2006) stress the intense frustration of African soldiers awaiting repatriation and demobilization toward the end of the war and show that Thiaroye, far from being an isolated incident, belongs into a dense context of riots and violent confrontations between African soldiers on the one side and French authorities and sometimes civilians on the other side. In "'Souviens-toi de Thiaroye!' La mutinerie des tirailleurs sénégalais du 1er décembre 1944," Akpo-Vaché (1996) stresses how being in France had changed many *tirailleurs sénégalais* who experienced French civilians as welcoming and who observed that French farmers and workers did similar things as they did themselves. The contact with metropolitan France thus changed the soldiers' perception of the colonial regime at home and led to a heightened critique of colonialism, which the events of Thiaroye powerfully confirmed. In his article based on the holdings of the national archives of Senegal "Le 1er décembre 1944 à Thiaroye, ou le massacre des tirailleurs sénégalais anciens prisonniers de guerre," Gueye (1995) places Thiaroye into the context of a weakened French state desiring to restore authority in the colonial empire by making a deterring example. Stressing the suffering of the Tirailleurs in German captivity, which he sees as uniformly horrible, Gueye portrays the stigmatization of the rebels as Nazi traitors as a perfidious ploy of the colonial regime. In her article "African Colonial Soldiers Between Memory and Forgetfulness: The Case of Post-Colonial Senegal," Ginio (2006) focuses on the memory of African colonial soldiers in Senegal and argues that the "rather quiet" process of decolonization in Senegal as well as the interest of the Senegalese government in good relations with France prevented "a real re-assessment of the colonial past in both countries" (p. 142). Although the events of Thiaroye now receive more attention from the Senegalese government, the predominant image of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* still stresses their role as the saviors, not the victims, of France. If their victimhood is addressed, it is usually victimization by the Germans, thus reinforcing the notion of shared French and African suffering from a common enemy.

Several German-language publications have also contributed new insights on France's African soldiers and their perception in Germany and elsewhere. The groundbreaking work here is Riesz and Schultz (1989), *"Tirailleurs sénégalais": zur bildlichen und literarischen Darstellung afrikanischer Soldaten im Dienste Frankreichs*, which

offers a truly transnational and interdisciplinary perspective on perceptions of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* in the literature and media of various countries. This perspective is all the more important as the *tirailleur sénégalais* has become an almost iconic figure in the more recent literature of Francophone Africa, representing the torn identity of postcolonial nations between French and African influences and between democracy and authoritarianism. Christian Koller's book *"Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt": Die Diskussion um die Verwendung von Kolonialtruppen in Europa zwischen Rassismus, Kolonial- und Militärpolitik (1914–1930)* (2001) provides an excellent analysis of public discourse in European countries about the deployment of nonwhite soldiers in Europe. Although centered on World War I and its aftermath, Koller's book has important implications for World War II. A book conceived as an exhibition guide on black people in Nazi Germany is Martin and Alonzo's *Zwischen Charleston und Stechschritt: Schwarze im Nationalsozialismus* (2004). Several of its articles offer much insight on German encounters with black French soldiers, and they all meet high scholarly standards.

More specifically on World War II issues is the book edited by Morgenrath and Rössel (2005) *"Unsere Opfer zählen nicht": Die Dritte Welt im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. This is a very rich documentation on the basis of oral history sources that a team of German journalists gathered in their free time while on missions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. By focusing on the participation of often overlooked peoples in World War II, the book gives a fascinating look into the global dimension of the war and offers much material specifically on French African soldiers. Oral history sources are also central to Brigitte Reinwald's case study of veterans from Burkina Faso in *Reisen durch den Krieg: Erfahrungen und Lebensstrategien westafrikanischer Weltkriegsveteranen der französischen Kolonialarmee* (2005). Using interviews with veterans, she stresses that the experience of Europe during the war tended to make the African soldiers more conscious and more critical of racism and colonialism. The return to a colonial routine after the war was therefore difficult, as veterans found themselves torn between a paternalist, sometimes brutal, but also supportive colonial state and a new, insecure national and postcolonial identity. Many veterans, as Echenberg had already noted, strove for a lifestyle similar to a European urban bourgeoisie after 1945. They became, perhaps against their will, a symbol of the tenuous transition from colony to modern independent state.

In these publications, as well as other works not mentioned here, a consensus is emerging that the experience of World War II had profound transformative effects on French African soldiers, even though the road from the war to decolonization was not a straight one. The confrontation with Nazism, both in combat and captivity, together with the encounters with the French administration and French civilians, generally led to a questioning of the colonial system at home. Without pushing too far toward a highly questionable equation of Nazism and French colonialism, it is fair to say that fighting a racist, undemocratic regime awakened aspirations for a more democratic and less racist society in the French Empire in many African soldiers. The perception of the United States as a democratic ally and the promise of the Atlantic Charter, although hard to track down specifically in the mindset of French African soldiers, bolstered this aspiration in spite of the persistence of racist attitudes in the Allied military leadership.

Several questions in the field remain open, however. The encounter of French colonial soldiers (especially West Africans) with African Americans requires more

exploration. Although, or because, these soldiers communicated little given that they had no shared language, their perceptions of each other were powerful; each group seems to have seen the other as less disadvantaged than itself, perhaps by projecting their own aspirations onto the other group. In this context, the notion that the United States would take over the French colonies, which was widespread in French West Africa and usually welcomed enthusiastically by Africans, cannot be ignored. The United States had much prestige in French Africa toward the end of the war. French African soldiers in 1943–1945 fought largely with American equipment, and they were mindful of the American military presence in North Africa and, to a smaller extent, even in West Africa.

It would be desirable to have more research on North African soldiers, despite the good work by Recham and Maghraoui. To some extent, the *tirailleurs sénégalais* have occupied the limelight in research. Perhaps the fact that Nazi Germany, with its anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist propaganda, wooed the North Africans and posed as an ally of national independence has made research on North Africans appear thornier than it is. Certainly, Nazi Germany's propaganda was hypocritical given its own colonial appetites and its considerations for its ally Italy and for Vichy, and the North African soldiers seem not to have responded strongly to it, although the propaganda might have helped to undermine the credibility of France as a colonial power in North Africa. Given the many similar themes that appear in works on North and West African veterans, a comprehensive history of veterans and decolonization in the French Empire should be written. Such a comprehensive history would, however, encounter a problem that already affects research in this field: linguistic abilities and research funds quickly become overstretched because many projects require research in France, Germany, North Africa, West Africa, and the United States.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

Scientists and Nuclear Weapons in World War II: The Background, the Experience, and the Sometimes Contested Meanings and Analyses

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

Without the discovery of uranium fission – it occurred in 1938–1939 – there would not have been nuclear weapons. Thus, the interest by historians and others, when focusing on weapons, scientists, and World War II, would have instead examined other scientific-technological achievements. That would probably have involved discussing research in radar, in improving airplanes, and probably breakthroughs in biomedicine. This chapter will examine the science, and scientists, behind the advent of the nuclear age, with an eye on both the story and the historiography of this epic moment of World War II that changed history.

In World War II, in the United States, and in other major nations, many of the organized scientific efforts, under the nation-state, to develop and improve science-technology for war have often been eclipsed in memory, and generally starting at the Asian war's end, by the atomic bomb. Its use was dramatic, its power awesome, its killing massive, and what it portended seemed in 1945 and afterward uncertain.

Some analysts including some A-bomb scientists believed that the atomic bomb's existence might bar future war. But others, including some scientists, feared that the bomb might be used in wars with catastrophic results. In various nations, atomic-energy scientists and others, like rank-and-file citizens, divided on what the future might bring because of the atomic bomb. And many scientists, including A-bomb scientists, like rank-and-file laypeople, were actually ambivalent, if not somewhat oscillating in estimates for the future, variously feeling torn between hope and fear.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945 killed at least about 110,000 people that year, and perhaps many more, and might have injured about 100,000 or more. The two bombs – the gun-type uranium weapon

used on Hiroshima on August 6, and the implosion plutonium bomb on Nagasaki on August 9 – were the two most powerful weapons up to that time, and since, ever used in war against an enemy.

The Hiroshima bomb, publicly reported in 1945 as being equivalent to about 20,000 tons of TNT, was probably equivalent to somewhat less – about 16,000 tons of TNT. The Nagasaki bomb, though killing only about half as many as the Hiroshima weapon, was probably equivalent to about 22,000 tons of TNT. Whatever the precise estimates of the two weapons in TNT equivalency, and those estimates have ranged up and down in the past 67 years, the two bombs had in fact killed by blast, by heat, and by radiation, and by starting fires in the targeted cities. Most people in the two Japanese cities who died or were injured were noncombatants, felled by a major scientific-technological/industrial achievement.

The two atomic-bombed cities were on a final target list of four Japanese cities, with the understanding that the precise aiming point within the cities would be determined in the field by specialists. They included a few B-29 crew members (the pilot, bombardier, and navigator) judging what could be hit with reasonable accuracy from a bomber flying thousands of feet above the Japanese cities.

But the selection of the particular Japanese cities themselves, and the criteria for selecting the general targeted areas within the cities, was largely made in April–May 1945, in a set of three meetings, involving military officials and scientists. So far as the now-declassified but unpublished minutes (located in the archives) of those meetings indicate, there was no substantial difference in sensibility, and no raising at those sessions of any ethical concerns, in defining the target areas in Japan for dropping atomic weapons. All members at the special meetings apparently agreed that the atomic bomb should be used to produce profound psychological effects (on those not killed), that the A-bomb should not be used on fringe areas in the cities (there was fear of missing the area, and thus “wasting” the bomb), and that the immediate purpose was to produce massive destruction, with the understanding that it would include many dead and injured.

As the archives and historical accounts have made clear, after those three secret April–May meetings, the target list of Japanese cities was somewhat changed, when Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson ordered, for political and moral reasons, the removal of Kyoto (the ancient capital city) from the targeted cities. The ultimate list, by mid-July 1945, was Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki, and Niigata, with the final approval of that small list being made by Secretary Stimson and by President Harry S. Truman.

What the two men knowingly approved was the use on the enemy of the most powerful weapons ever developed, which employed a recondite science – nuclear physics – that neither man understood. Stimson, educated at Yale and Harvard in the nineteenth century, undoubtedly had some general but rather vague knowledge of the recent history in the 1930s and into the 1940s of the development of the relevant science, but it is highly unlikely that Truman, with only a high school education, understood anything involving the science of fission and of nuclear weapons.

The fact that fission was central to the conception and functioning of the new weapons is fundamentally important in understanding A-bomb history, and in some ways also the roles and activities of the scientists. But very probably the conception of the underlying science was unimportant in understanding Stimson’s and Truman’s

own decisions in 1945 on targeting, without any prior warning, Japanese cities with the new weapons – atomic-fission bombs.

The road in the 1930s to scientists discovering nuclear fission had been jagged, and the accomplishments of discovering fission could plausibly have occurred about a half-decade earlier, or very easily some months or even perhaps a year or two later than it did. In 1934, the brilliant physicist Enrico Fermi and his small team in Italy actually split the uranium atom's nucleus and produced fission, but they misread the chemical results of their experiment and thus believed that they had created what were called transuranic elements – elements higher in the periodic table than uranium at 92. A German chemist, Ida Noddack, in reading of the Fermi team's results, suggested that the Italian physicists had actually split the uranium atom, but no one took her suggestion seriously, and she herself did not choose to do the necessary experiments to test her interpretation (Segrè 1989).

The effort was also transnational in scope; scientists hailed from North America and Europe. And the transnational refugee movement of scientists who fled from fascism should also be noted, at the very least for its contribution to the atomic bomb when many of these victims of European dictators eventually congregated in the United States. Even the year before the 1934 work by Fermi and his team, the wonderfully ingenious, Hungarian Jewish émigré physicist Leo Szilard, then living in London, had conceived of fission and a chain reaction. He soon sought, in 1934, to secure funding and other support for testing various elements to determine whether the atom could be split and neutrons released to produce a chain reaction, but financial resources were not available and he had no interest in doing the work himself. He, however, did take out a secret patent with the British Admiralty on the idea of a chain reaction.

In doing so, Szilard had wanted to certify his imaginative intellectual accomplishment – though, to his knowledge, untested by any known experiment – but he also feared letting the idea become publicly known and thus getting into the wrong hands. Szilard, remarkably prescient, feared the prospect of nuclear weapons, and was as an émigré Jew, having only recently fled Hitler's Germany, most worried about the likelihood of Nazi Germany developing such a deadly weapon.

In Germany, in the mid-1930s, the internationally respected radiochemist Otto Hahn, a native-born German, and his longtime collaborator, Lise Meitner, an Austrian-born theoretical physicist, became interested, as were some scientists elsewhere, in the uranium atom. After about four years of such work with uranium, Meitner, because she was born a Jew (though she had actually converted to Protestantism), had to flee Nazi Germany in mid-1938 for safety reasons. Later that year, Hahn, working with his young assistant in chemistry, Fritz Strassmann, produced what they regarded as very strange results in bombarding the uranium atom with neutrons – barium. Puzzled by that unexpected result, but reasonably sure of the accuracy of his chemical analysis, Hahn, a very careful chemist, communicated those seemingly peculiar results by letter to Meitner, who was soon vacationing in Sweden at Christmas time with her nephew, the experimental physicist Otto Frisch, also an Austrian-born émigré who had fled Hitler's Germany.

Seeking to make sense of the reported but unexpected results, Meitner, realizing that Hahn had not misinterpreted the chemical evidence and working somewhat with Frisch's aid, concluded that Hahn and Strassmann had done something that was not

foreseen. They had actually split the uranium atom's nucleus. In producing barium, Hahn (with Strassmann) had produced an element about halfway down the periodic table from uranium. It was Otto Frisch who soon gave the process of splitting the atom the name "fission," based upon the biological term for cell division.

Uranium-238 had 92 protons and 146 neutrons, adding up to 238. Barium, in contrast, had 56 protons and 81 neutrons, thus totaling 137. That result suggested that the other major element produced in the process was undoubtedly an isotope of krypton. In addition, using Einstein's formula of $E = mc^2$ (with "E" for energy, "m" for mass, and "c" the velocity of light, squared), there should also have been some conversion of mass into energy, Meitner and Frisch accurately concluded.

Frisch, soon returning to Copenhagen in early January 1939, speedily informed the great Danish Nobel laureate, physicist Niels Bohr, of the Hahn-Strassmann results and of the Meitner (or Meitner-Frisch) interpretation. Bohr reportedly said something like, "Oh what idiots we have all been. But this is wonderful? This is just as it must be" (Moore 1966, p. 226).

The question of who "discovered" atomic fission would later become important, and the Nobel Prize selection committee in 1944–1945 would unfairly choose only Hahn, and entirely exclude Lise Meitner. Yet, it was the important insight by the theorist Meitner, with the experimentalist Frisch, that took the initially puzzling Hahn-Strassmann chemical results and explained them in terms of splitting the uranium atom. Without such an interpretation, what became known as "fission" would not have been "discovered" then (Friedman 2001, pp. 240–252).

By the late 1930s, there were enough first-rate physicists interested in problems of the atom, and with some of them very curious about uranium and doing experiments with it, that at least one, if not more, would at some point in 1939 have come to the conclusion that Meitner, aided by Frisch, had reached about the Hahn-Strassmann results. To offer such a judgment about how history would otherwise have very probably turned out is not to minimize Meitner's important intellectual accomplishment in late 1938, but it is to place her 1938–1939 work, partly because of her earlier research with Hahn in Germany on uranium, in an appropriate interpretive context in the history of science in the 1930s.

It was Niels Bohr, soon visiting the United States, who told American-based physicists at first in brief conversations and then more notably at a conference in Washington in late January 1939 that the uranium atom had been split. Within a few weeks, Bohr, working at Princeton that winter, concluded that it was actually the rather rare isotope, uranium-235 (present at about 0.007, or 0.7% in mined uranium), and not the far more common uranium-238 (present at about 99.3%), that when bombarded by slow neutrons produced fission. Put otherwise, the ratio of U-238 to U-235 was about 140 to 1, and U-235 was, indeed, quite rare. A ton of uranium, if one could separate out *all* the U-235, would yield only about 14 pounds of that rare isotope.

To some physicists, like Bohr, the fact that it was the relatively rare U-235 that fissioned with slow neutrons meant that development of a nuclear weapon seemed highly unlikely in the next handful of years or even longer, because the difficult task of separating the needed amount of the rare U-235 from the comparatively common U-238 would be formidably expensive and time-consuming. Such difficult processing to isolate the rare uranium isotope might well take the entire resources of a nation the

size of the United States for a few years to produce the amount of needed U-235 that a weapon would likely require, Bohr concluded.

Bohr's conclusion that it was U-235 and not U-238 that had fissioned was based initially, in large measure, upon scientific theory involving the stability of isotopes. The scientific theory was that, in the nucleus, neutrons coupled with neutrons and protons with protons, and thus an isotope with an uneven number of neutrons (U-235 only had 143) was less likely to be stable than an isotope with an even number – U-238 with 146 neutrons.

Bohr's scientific analysis in turn led to his conception that a very large amount – implicitly something like tons – of the rare U-235 would be necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. His optimistic analysis – no possibility of a bomb in the likely future – would be undercut if it turned out, as other physicists soon concluded, that only some pounds, maybe only a few pounds or even a few dozen pounds, of U-235, would be required for an atomic bomb.

Despite Bohr's optimism that a nuclear weapon was not realistically possible in the war, other physicists and most notably Leo Szilard feared otherwise – the possibility of an atomic bomb in World War II. Szilard labored, sometimes with his Hungarian émigré physicist friends (Eugene Wigner and Edward Teller) and with Enrico Fermi, in 1939 to seek American government funding for some uranium research. Szilard also energetically sought various ways to alert the American government to the possibility of nuclear weapons. The full federal funding that year for uranium-related research was to be relatively meager – under about US\$7,500.

The results of Szilard's efforts, beyond helping to gain very minor funding, were an August 1939 letter signed by Albert Einstein to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and then the appointment, also urged by others, of various government-sponsored scientific committees to study the prospects of using atomic energy for war purposes. But there was little progress in the United States, in its scientific committees, on such matters. In 1939, in 1940, and into early 1941, those various committees accomplished remarkably little. Many matters in the relevant science and technology seemed uncertain, as historians who wrote about the making of the A-bomb noted several decades ago, and deliberations involving the appointed scientists were normally slow and cautious, and often rather desultory (Hewlett and Anderson 1962).

Because émigré scientists like Szilard and Fermi were not American citizens, and thus somewhat marginal, and because even a recently naturalized citizen like Wigner was viewed with some suspicion, they could not participate as members of those top-level scientific advisory committees. Had the hard-driving and often willfully impolite Szilard been a committee member, the important decisions – to seek to build a government-funded A-bomb – might have been made somewhat earlier by the Roosevelt government.

But, fortunately, for the development of the American program, the British were interested in the possibility of an A-bomb and generally ahead, in 1940–1941, of the American scientific estimates on the possibility, and probability, of producing an atomic bomb. The British, facing bombing of their homeland and the problem of scarce resources, concluded they could not build a bomb in the UK during the war. But they were willing, and at times eager, to share their scientific analysis with the United States.

Crucial scientific work in 1940 in Great Britain, initially conducted by Otto Frisch and his fellow émigré (Jewish) physicist Rudolph Peierls, had indicated that only a

small amount (possibly a few pounds) of U-235 would be necessary for a small atomic bomb, and about 12 pounds of U-235 would produce a much more powerful atomic bomb, one “equivalent to several thousand tons” of TNT. That significant scientific analysis, with some recalculation and more information, led to the conclusion by a top-level scientific committee in the UK in 1941 that about 55 pounds of the rare U-235 could produce a powerful atomic bomb equivalent to about 1800 tons of TNT, and that the rare isotope could actually be produced, through a separation process, in an adequate amount in about two years (Gowing 1964).

That ultra-secret British report (called the MAUD report), communicated to top scientist-administrators Vannevar Bush and James Conant in the United States, spurred them to recommend to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in October 1941 a substantial government commitment to seek to determine the possibility of building an A-bomb, in what was deemed a likely desperate race with Germany. Thinking in terms of weapons equivalent to about 1800 tons of TNT, or to several thousand tons of TNT, meant creating weapons of a different order of magnitude from conventional bombs, when bombs equivalent to a *few* tons of TNT were already considered both large and formidable.

There was no guarantee, in late 1941, that an atomic bomb could actually be constructed. Successful construction would depend upon various matters: Were the British estimates, of the amount of U-235, roughly correct? Could a chain reaction be established within a reasonable time? Could enough of the necessary U-235 or plutonium (which was discovered to be fissionable), or both elements, be produced for a bomb? Could the material be shaped into a design for a deliverable weapon that would actually work and be small enough, if it was wished, to be actually used in war on an enemy?

Solving those problems, if they could be solved – and they were solved on the American project – would require massive expenditures, hard scientific, technological, and industrial work, and a huge labor force. The substantial enterprise – equivalent during the course of about 46 wartime months to about 2 percent of the nation’s 1939 GDP – would mean, ultimately, the US army’s direction of the large project, the enlistment of major industrial firms in massive construction, and the significant energy and talent of scientists and engineers.

The British estimates of the amount of needed U-235 would prove to be too optimistic, but not greatly so. The preparation of substantial amounts of plutonium would prove easier, or at least more efficient, than producing enough U-235 for multiple atomic bombs during the war. And a chain reaction, an essential part of the process of moving toward a bomb, would be achieved, secretly, in early December 1942, at the University of Chicago, beneath the football stadium, by a Fermi-led team, including Szilard and Wigner.

Plutonium would prove ultimately to be a better route to an atomic bomb than uranium-235, but that was not clear in 1941. Plutonium had not been discovered – really created – until 1940. It was not a natural element, but human-created. It was produced by bombarding U-238 with neutrons, which produced U-239 (one more neutron than U-238), a highly unstable isotope. That U-239 decayed within about 23 minutes into a new transuranic element – neptunium, as it was soon named. It, in turn, decayed in about 2.3 days into another new transuranic element, soon called plutonium. Neptunium was element 93 in the periodic table, and plutonium was 94. Plutonium, it was discovered, would fission.

Because fission had been discovered and reported in a 1938 German-based experiment, and because Germany, despite the purges of its Jewish scientists, still had in 1941 a first-rate physics and chemistry facility, the fear in the democratic west of the development of a German atomic bomb was eminently reasonable. That fear was not correct, but that could neither be known nor foreseen in 1941, nor in 1942, nor even in 1943. What seemed eminently plausible (a German atomic bomb) thus seemed highly likely, and what seemed highly likely spurred organized Anglo-American action.

Such thinking, rooted in what was later called “worst likely scenario analysis,” was obviously based upon inference and likelihood. It was not, in view of 1940–1941 knowledge, outlandish or highly implausible.

The actual decision making, and the personnel making key decisions, was very different in the major nations – the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan – that made some effort in World War II to move toward an atomic bomb. The bold decision in the United States of a very substantial commitment that President Roosevelt made in October 1941, and the added far more expensive commitments he made in 1942 and subsequently, were not made during the war by any of the other major nation-state leaders.

The United States was unique in important ways. It was the only major nation at war where there was virtually no likelihood of its main territory (the continental area) being subject to enemy bombing, land warfare, or other massive destruction from war. Of the major nations, the United States, by a very considerable amount, had the largest GDP and also the greatest capacity to expand its productive resources, and to recruit a very substantial labor force, to support a large A-bomb project.

Yet, had President Roosevelt, who could not understand the recondite science of nuclear physics, possessed less confidence in his own top scientist-administrators, and had they had less confidence in the British-based and the American-based scientists, it seems quite likely that nuclear weapons would not have been developed in World War II, and thus such weapons could not have been used in that war. Had the issue of such a commitment to considering the quest for the A-bomb been put openly before the American people and the Congress before Pearl Harbor, it is highly unlikely that such a commitment – involving large expenditures and significant resources in personnel and material – would have been approved.

In the United States, the secret government decision-making by an expanded executive branch was conducted far from public view. In the case of the highly secret A-bomb project, with the knowledge in the next few years by only a handful of congressional leaders, and the necessary appropriations hidden in revenue-approved bills for the War Department, a rather small group of appointed administrators – the secretary of war, various scientists, and some military men – directed the top-secret A-bomb project. The national-security state in World War II, even in a democratic polity like the United States, operated substantially by the tactic of behind-the-scenes decision making. Public knowledge was systematically barred, public dialogue was easily blocked, and the executive branch of the government – operating in the terrifying exigency of war – secretly defined the national policy on armaments and on many other major matters in military and foreign policy.

In the United States, top-level scientist-administrators, and apparently many working scientists, generally endorsed such arrangements of expanded executive power and secret decision making. To all of those scientist-administrators, and for

most working scientists, whatever their attitudes to the earlier New Deal and its expansion of the state's executive power, the war was a decidedly unique, and terribly threatening, situation. It required unique arrangements in the American government, and in the reorganization of the American state.

Often, in practice, in the wartime United States, the crucial governmental commitments about developing and making choices on secret weaponry involved decisions by military leaders, or in the case of the A-bomb-related project, also important decisions by scientists (and engineers), with sometimes very few people being informed. For example, in a notable but still little-known case, very few if any political officials in the American government, and apparently no scientists outside a small group in the American government's secret research system knew in 1943 that there was a serious discussion – between physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer and Enrico Fermi – about developing radiological warfare (byproducts of the fission process) for use in the war on the enemy. Oppenheimer suggested that the crucial standard for going ahead on such a top-secret project should be a capacity to kill a half-million of the enemy. Perhaps because of that criterion, the notion of developing such a weapon was generally cast aside during about the last 27 months of the war (Bernstein 1985).

Neither did anyone outside the American government, and probably not many even on the top-secret A-bomb project itself, know in 1945 that a special, secret health-and-safety program was initiated that involved intentionally injecting plutonium (a very dangerous substance) into some unknowing American patients. Those American patients, in effect, were commandeered by American medical men, with the likely approval of some A-bomb physicists and chemists, in order to be the unknowing human subjects in scientific tests that could help set safety standards for A-bomb-project workers handling plutonium. The injected patients, many years later, were labeled by a congressional report outraged by that experimentation, as “America's guinea pigs” (Committee on Energy and Commerce 1986).

Not surprisingly, much of the scholarly and near-scholarly, historically oriented writing on scientists and World War II nuclear weapons has been heavily biographical. Biography is an attractive genre for journalists and scholars, encouraging the study of the relationship between personality, social context, and events, and thus the lives of many of the scientists, especially the notable ones, can be gripping and impressive.

Emphasis on that genre has meant often concentrating, especially in the history of the US-based development, on such key physicists as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Leo Szilard, and on such top-level scientist-administrators as Vannevar Bush, an electrical engineer and president of the Carnegie Institution, and James B. Conant, a chemist and the president of Harvard. Such a biographical focus has sometimes meant also providing a study of General Leslie Groves, an engineer and director of the wartime A-bomb project (beginning in 1942), looking at his relationship to the A-bomb scientists and especially to Oppenheimer, whom he liked, and to Szilard, whom Groves contemned and mistrusted.

Oppenheimer, especially with the centenary in 2004 of his birth, has been the subject of a near-flurry of biographical studies in the early twenty-first century. There has been deep consideration by biographers and others of Oppenheimer's puzzling personality, of the question of whether his formal education influenced his later thinking about ethical considerations, and of his work abroad in physics in Cambridge

and Gottingen as he moved from unhappiness in experimental physics to delight into theoretical physics, with impressive accomplishments. Such biographical studies often examine his creation in the United States of a major "school" of theoretical physics (on the west coast), and his preparation, or his seeming lack of it, before World War II, for leading a major laboratory (Los Alamos) in wartime to build the atomic bomb. How, some biographers asked, could the ethereal and sensitive Oppenheimer endorse the use of the bomb on Japan in 1945 without even a warning to Japan? Had he been ambivalent then, and regretful or at least ambivalent afterward?

Such interest in Oppenheimer, as well as the understandably very strong concern for the reasons about the American decision to use atomic weapons on Japan, has led sometimes to emphasis on the special, four-member Scientific Advisory Panel (with Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Fermi, and Arthur H. Compton). That prestigious group, in mid-June 1945, formally rejected the idea of a noncombat demonstration of the atomic bomb as a warning to Japan prior to actual combat use of the weapon on Japanese cities. To a number of historians and other analysts, in the aftermath of the two August 1945 atomic bombings, the possibility of a noncombat demonstration of the bomb came to seem attractive and as possibly likely to have produced an acceptable surrender without the actual military use of the bomb on Japan.

When the Oppenheimer-led Scientific Advisory Panel submitted its formal June 16 report to Washington, their then-secret statement dealt with some important themes. One was the contention that some scientists (not specified in the report) believed that actual use in the war of the bomb on Japan, in addition to possibly "saving American lives," could also have a beneficial effect on future international relations. The report's unstated implication, despite some ambiguity, was that the vast destructive power and the likely resulting horror of the atomic bomb might force nations to seek in the future to avoid war, because atomic war would seem too frightening and too destructive (Sherwin 1975).

A second set of themes, also in that secret June 16 report, dealt with the obligations and roles of scientists. "[W]e, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights" in regard to atomic-energy issues, the four men said bluntly in their report. In effect, though they were among the leading creators of the atomic bomb, they asserted that they had no special rights involving bomb policy. Nor, stated the four men, did they have any claim to "special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."

The advisory panel's June 16 report did not in any way address the actual explosive power of the bomb, or how it would kill, injure, and destroy. Perhaps significantly, the issue of foreseen radiation killing and radiation injuring in the A-bombed cities went unmentioned in the report. That subject had arisen, very briefly, about two weeks earlier, on May 31, when the four men had met with the Interim Committee, a blue-ribbon group which had been appointed by Secretary of War Stimson to give advice on the bomb.

At that May 31 session, Oppenheimer, in speaking about the power of the bomb, had mentioned, according to the minutes' summarizing words, that the "neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile." The "neutron effect" meant radiation, though it is unclear whether most of the members of the Interim Committee, because they were not scientists, understood Oppenheimer's words (Sherwin 1975).

There is no evidence that anyone on the eight-member Interim Committee (including its three scientist members) or among the four scientists on the special panel dwelled on the nature of radiation, and whether it, perhaps like poison gas, crossed some troubling moral threshold beyond the normal way – by blast and heat – of bombs killing people with a weapon. Nor was there any expressed thought at the May 31 sessions about the nature of radiation injury – those not actually killed by the bomb, but impaired by it, yet living as handicapped people well into the aftermath of the bombing.

The question about a possible noncombat demonstration of the A-bomb had initially surfaced for the advisory panel, in late May 1945, perhaps in the morning briefly on the 31st and then also apparently rather briefly during lunch, perhaps somewhat informally, when the four panel members had met with the Interim Committee, on A-bomb matters. By various recollections, a noncombat demonstration did not seem very feasible.

There were multiple, and often somewhat connected, reasons in the thinking, as some of the participants later recalled. They thought that the bomb might not be that powerful, and that there would be only a few atomic bombs, and therefore that it was risky to use one in such an effort. In addition, an advance warning, it was feared, might lead to interception by the Japanese of the bomb-carrying plane, or possibly placing Allied POWs in the target area of a demonstration. In short, as Arthur Compton, a participant, and others noted in the 1950s, there were multiple risks, and no incentive – no important reasons – to take such risks (Compton 1956).

The issue of a possible noncombat demonstration came up significantly, once more, in mid-June 1945, after a small group of scientists in Chicago, headed by the Nobel laureate James Franck and known as the Franck committee, had proposed a noncombat demonstration. The Franck group had stated that use of the bomb, without a prior warning, might also unleash a postwar nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. That Franck committee statement, dated June 11, had been submitted to Washington for Secretary of War Stimson, and it was that statement that had triggered one of Stimson's top assistants (George Harrison) to ask the Scientific Advisory Panel for its advice in mid-June on that matter.

The Franck committee, in its petition, had also urged informing the Soviet Union of the A-bomb before the weapon was used. That idea of prior notification to the Soviet Union was endorsed by the four-member Scientific Advisory Panel in mid-June, when it was consulted by higher-ups about such matters. But that recommendation by the Franck committee and by the advisory panel carried little weight, and top American policy makers chose, before the bombing of Hiroshima, not to make any clear communication to the Soviets on this matter.

At the Potsdam meeting in Germany, President Truman did inform Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in late July that the United States, had a powerful weapon that the US intended to use on Japan. But Truman's words were apparently designed to be very vague. He intentionally did not say atomic bomb, and thus the first clear Soviet understanding of the full meaning of Truman's brief statement may not have occurred until August 6, 1945, the day when the atomic bomb was actually used – with great destruction and massive death at Hiroshima.

Because the atomic bomb seemed, by many intelligent post-Hiroshima analyses, to have transformed issues in national security and thus in postwar international

relations, historians and others have closely examined the pre-Hiroshima thinking of major scientists about the political and international significance of the weapon. Most often, such studies have focused on the American-based project, and then on the wartime scientists' ideas, doubts, fears, and hopes on these matters of military use of the weapon and of wartime and postwar policy.

The mixture, in World War II nuclear weapons history, of the studying of the scientists and the studying of policy by nation-states has, understandably, spawned a good-sized literature. It has ranged widely, and it is a combination of journalism and of scholarship, and of later recollections by participants in memoirs, reminiscences, and interviews.

Though the story of the A-bomb and the A-bomb scientists is in a sense an international story, it is also one that necessarily, with World War II, tended to become generally specific to the particular nation-state, or sometimes (as with the Anglo-American entente) to the alliance between friendly nation-states. The fact of international hostilities, in a brutal war, meant that scientists in particular nation-states felt usually obligated, by formal law and by personal loyalty, to their own nation-state or to that state and to its allies. The earlier broad internationalism of scientists, especially in the rather small prewar physics community, in which nation-state loyalties had played a small role, was eroded and then largely destroyed during the brutal war.

The strong anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, and its vicious 1930s mistreatment of Jews in general and of Jewish scientists, added to the breakdown of such internationalism in science. The painful departure of many scientists from Germany, and the hatred of Nazism, meant that for scientists elsewhere the German state was often defined as a radical evil, or nearly so. That raised serious problems for scientists in the West, beyond Germany, about how to regard the scientists who stayed in Germany and whether their staying under Hitler's government meant that they were not morally trustworthy.

Probably partly because of the magnitude of the destruction and death produced in Japan by the two atomic bombs, historians and others have sought to examine the pre-Hiroshima period to ask which of the scientists had ethical objections, or even phrased doubts, to the use of the weapons on Japan? The inquiries have yielded, in terms of the American-based project, a number of scientists, disproportionately physicists. Those pre-Hiroshima dissenters or doubters included the émigré physicists Joseph Rotblat, Leo Szilard, James Franck, and Eugene Wigner, the émigré chemist (and later biophysicist) Eugene Rabinowitch, the American chemist Glenn Seaborg, the American physicists Robert R. Wilson, Donald Hughes, and Joyce Stearns, and, at one juncture, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ernest O. Lawrence.

A small group in the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory (often called the "Met Lab") had signed the Rabinowitch-Szilard-framed Franck report in early June 1945, and a much larger number of scientists – placed variously at about 67 to 70 – had signed a Szilard-framed report of mid-July 1945 raising ethical objections to the use of the bomb on Japan. Those signatories (actually a minority of all A-bomb scientists) had been at the Chicago laboratory or at Oak Ridge, and Szilard's efforts to circulate a similar petition at the Los Alamos laboratory had reportedly, in effect, been blocked by Oppenheimer, the director.

Understandably, latter-day analysts would sometimes focus on Oppenheimer's negative decision – not to have Szilard's petition circulated at Los Alamos. And historically

oriented analysts would sometimes ask why, comparatively, there was so much anti-use ferment at the Chicago laboratory before Hiroshima, and so little at Los Alamos.

The likely explanations are complex, and possibly incomplete: Arthur H. Compton, the director at Chicago, allowed such anti-use protest, whereas Oppenheimer, by his very charismatic presence and by his explicit decisions, variously blocked by indirect means such dissidence or actually suppressed it by direct action. In addition, by late spring 1945, the Chicago scientists had basically finished their pressing work, and therefore they had time for such political activity, while the Los Alamos scientists, in contrast, were working feverishly to produce workable atomic bombs for use on the enemy. Also, and very significant, Szilard and the Nobel Prize-winning Franck in Chicago constituted what, metaphorically speaking, might be termed a “critical [political-ethical] mass” to produce moral and political objections to using the bomb, but those two men did not have political counterparts, with the same energy and commitments, in early or mid-1945 Los Alamos.

The most likely vigorous dissenter at Los Alamos, physicist Joseph Rotblat, having departed in 1944, was therefore not in Los Alamos in 1945 to raise questions or to suggest organized ethical action. Rotblat had left the laboratory and its atomic-bomb work in late 1944, largely because he believed that the A-bomb was not necessary and that the bomb should not even be built. The experimental physicist Robert R. Wilson recalled, after the war, a political meeting in 1945 at Los Alamos on the subject of the “gadget,” as the bomb was sometimes termed, but Oppenheimer had been opposed to such sessions, Wilson reported. That political meeting did not lead to any political action, and there was apparently no organized dissent at Los Alamos (unlike in Chicago) before the Hiroshima bombing, about using the weapon on Japan (Rotblat 1985; Lewis and Wilson 1970).

In contrast to Los Alamos, a poll of about 150 scientists in early July 1945, conducted at the Chicago laboratory about a week before the Alamogordo test, indicated substantial uneasiness about using the bomb on Japan without some prior warning. At least a third, and perhaps as many as two-thirds, of the 150 scientists preferred some kind of prior warning to Japan before any use of the bomb on that country (Smith 1965).

After the war, physicist Edward Teller, who had been at Los Alamos in 1945, would on varying occasions claim that he had had his own pre-Hiroshima objections and doubts about the use of the bomb on Japan. But his postwar claims changed over time, partly because a contrary July 1945 letter by him surfaced in the archives. In it, he had stated to his longtime physicist friend, Leo Szilard, in early July 1945, that “actual combat-use” on Japan might even be best.

None of the major Anglo-American project scientists, in the aftermath of the war, ever suggested that they would have had severe ethical doubts about using the weapon on Germany had the atomic bomb been available in 1943 or 1944. Because the A-bomb was not developed until mid-1945, and not used until August 1945, three months after Germany’s May surrender, the scientists never really had to face, in stark terms, the actual prospect of using the bomb on Germany in the war.

After the atomic bombings of August 1945, some A-bomb scientists, among the notables, developed a sense of regret about the use of the bomb on Japan and the mass deaths and injuries it had produced in Japan. Often, those scientists, like others, carefully distinguished between their attitudes toward *developing* the A-bomb and

using it, and sometimes they came also to distinguish between the use of the first A-bomb (on Hiroshima) and the second on (Nagasaki). Many came to view the Nagasaki bomb as unnecessary, and they came to wish that it had not been used and sometimes to wonder, and ask, why there had not been more than a three-day gap between the two atomic bombings of Japan.

The fact that Japan, as the scientists later learned, had been engaging in “peace feelers” even before the Hiroshima bombing, variously propelled or simply added for some A-bomb scientists to their sense of regret, and sometimes to guilt, about the August 1945 atomic bombing. The fact that Japan on August 10, the day after the Nagasaki bombing, offered a conditional surrender (with the single provision of retention of an imperial system), led a number of scientists to believe that the same offer might well have been made without the second atomic bombing.

The postwar information about pre-Hiroshima “peace feelers” was actually more complicated than many postwar analysts understood, and the topic has preoccupied several historians. Those “peace feelers” also revealed that the Japanese government, before Hiroshima, was deeply split on policy and on what terms might be put together in an effort to end the war. At no point, did the Japanese government, before Hiroshima, agree on any *reasonable* terms that it might propose to end the war (Bernstein 1995; Frank 1999; cf. Alperovitz 1985).

What is striking is that with the exception of only one scientist, no others in the United States initially refused to participate in the wartime A-bomb project for ethical reasons. And that one dissenter (Volney Wilson) soon changed his mind, and joined what started as a quest to build the bomb in what was deemed, incorrectly as it turned out, a desperate race against Germany.

To the American-based scientists, whether émigrés or native-born, and to their UK scientist allies, whether native-born or émigrés, joining the A-bomb project was often defined as an ethical and patriotic act – even as a moral necessity, or near-necessity. The prospect of a Nazi Germany with the atomic bomb was frightening, and a Hitler-led state with nuclear weapons seemed, in prospect, to menace the Western democracies and to risk the destruction of the best in humane, Western values. For many of the scientists who joined the Anglo-American A-bomb project, not to join – to refuse – would have been unethical. It would have meant taking the gravely perilous risk of leaving the Anglo-American entente without a possibly necessary weapon.

Looking at the A-bomb projects abroad (beyond the US), there is no evidence that the early project in the United Kingdom led to any invited scientist in that polity declining for moral reasons to work on the bomb. Quite possibly a few scientists, like the German-Jewish émigré Max Born, a future Nobel Prize winner and one of the creators of quantum mechanics, would have declined, if invited. But few British-based scientists, worrying about Germany and a German A-bomb, were inclined to let even pacifist feelings shape their decisions and actions, and such feelings were often cast aside in what many viewed as the dangerous crucible of war against a radical evil (Nazi Germany), in which a scientific/technological breakthrough – the atomic bomb – could shape future history and the nature of much of civilization.

In other nations, including Nazi Germany, there were no reported explicit refusals to participate for moral reasons in the nation-state’s atomic-energy work, even among those who disliked, if not hated, the Nazi regime, though physicist Max von

Laue, a 1914 Nobel Prize winner, apparently was on principle unwilling to join any Nazi weaponry project. So far as the evidence reveals, there were no refusals by scientists, acting for such moral reasons, in the USSR or in Japan. Admittedly, in all three nations, clear refusals by desired scientists could have been personally risky, and thus the absence of explicit refusals must be understood in that analytical context, where there was a lack of comfortable freedom of choice.

In every nation in World War II that embarked on a possible nuclear weapons-related project, it is important to emphasize a marked commonality: that it was initially some scientists or engineers (with good training in science), and not primarily political policymakers, who energetically suggested, if not proposed, such a scientific-technological venture to try to develop nuclear weapons by that state. In that sense, all the wartime A-bomb-related projects, while state-directed, and often in day-to-day activity functionally operating under scientists, were apparently also initiated at least in part because of the recommendations, and sometimes the urgings, by scientists or engineers (with significant scientific training).

Without such urgings or recommendations, the breakthrough in 1938–1939 of the discovery of uranium fission, and the further advances in uranium research and then in the discovery of plutonium, would have remained simply interesting scientific activities – nothing more. Those scientific developments would have been of deep interest to scientists and some engineers as significant achievements in science, but they would not have seemed relevant to nation-state leaders without the efforts by scientists or engineers to emphasize to nation-state leaders the importance of those scientific breakthroughs. Put bluntly, the scientists made those discoveries, and scientists or engineers (with good scientific backgrounds) stressed the possibilities of building weaponry based on such work, and thereby scientists and such engineers made such weaponry a matter of interest to nation-state leaders.

The Soviet case is somewhat complicated, because Soviet espionage in the UK provided the substance of a high-level British scientific report indicating that an A-bomb was possible, and that secret report helped spur the initial Soviet project. Independently, however, a Soviet scientist had for a few months been energetically urging, even before the arrival in Moscow of that stolen report on UK activities, that the Soviet Union seeks to develop an A-bomb project.

In looking at the various A-bomb projects in an international context, and at the role of scientists and related engineers in those projects during the World War II period, there seems to be some marked consistency, *independent* of the particular nation-state, of the dominant ideology and particular national culture, of whether the state was democratic or otherwise, or of the particular prewar relationship of science and scientists, and engineers and engineering, to the particular nation-state. But, beyond those important themes, the later decisions in defining the nature and magnitude of the nation-state's commitment to an A-bomb project would vary greatly.

That variation would depend upon different factors: the size of the state's resources (both manpower and finances); the availability of uranium; assessments about U-235 and plutonium for atomic weapons; the explicit promises and hopes of influential scientists, engineers, and scientist- or engineer-administrators; the confidence of particular nation-state leaders or military chieftains in their scientists, engineers, and scientific advisers; and significantly on important organizational arrangements. The decisions would also depend on the sense that such nation-state leaders or military

chieftains had about the likely course of the war, and its length and likely victor; the fact of whether the nation-state's homeland was vulnerable to bombing and other ravages of war; the likelihood of actually developing new weaponry during the war; and the possibility of employing such new weaponry in that war. All that would be linked, in various ways, to the estimate – and sometimes to the fear – that an enemy nation in the war might first develop an atomic bomb.

Such causal, or contextual, differences in the major nation-states help to explain why and how the United States, with British and Canadian help, developed both the uranium and the plutonium bomb. Such causal or contextual differences between the nation-states also help to explain why, unlike the US, Germany did not advance very far, in what was a uranium project, and why Germany apparently did not make a real commitment to seeking to build an atomic bomb. The Soviet and Japanese A-bomb-related activities during the war can be substantially explained in similar terms, though the details varied in significant ways.

After the war, partly because they were celebrities or near-celebrities of the American A-bomb, scientists became advisers in Washington and sat on various committees on defense and military-related matters. Their success on the wartime bomb project, and the dramatic achievements of that project, not only led to massive postwar federal funding for the physical sciences and engineering in the United States, but the wartime success greatly accelerated the move in the United States, far more than elsewhere, to what was soon termed “Big Science” – large projects, large teams, long-run efforts, and handsome support.

The result was an important transition especially in the United States, if not transformation, in physics, and in parts of engineering and chemistry. Building on the World War II experience, the American federal government became the primary source of funding in those fields. Defense-related research would be conducted in those fields on campuses during the cold war, government-required secrecy would frequently exist in those projects, and the universities and their scientists and engineers would normally endorse such institutional alliances. That important linkage of science and defense undoubtedly helped define how various fields in physics and in related sciences and in engineering developed, what intellectual questions were pursued or not, and how reputations were advanced and prestige gained.

The impact of World War II science and its organization, and the wartime federal-scientist alliances, and questions about the shaping and reshaping of scientific fields because of defense funding, or the lack of it, have been important subjects in the history of science for well over a generation. The importance of the World War II experience, for funding and prestige, was understood by some scientists at the time, even well before the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Usually the published scholarship on larger developments in nuclear history, reaching beyond individual biography, tends to focus on the A-bomb-related history in one country, or occasionally in two, and seldom in a few. To go beyond a single nation, or perhaps two nations, is normally daunting for a serious scholar, one committed usually to in-depth study and the intensive use of archival sources. Journalists, in contrast, tend to be less troubled by such difficulties in research and more cavalier about evidence, and thus more willing to engage in multinational studies in A-bomb history and to build, sometimes without adequate acknowledgment, on the published work

by scholars and other journalists. Such journalistic ventures, more often than in the scholarship, also tend to create dialogue that probably was never uttered. Scholars are not immune from such temptations, but they probably succumb less frequently.

A broad analytical task studying A-bomb work and policy in a multination project can, for a scholar, involve troubling language barriers, and trying to use very substantial archival materials in multiple countries, as well as requiring deep-rooted knowledge of multiple national cultures. As a result, there are no solid, volume-length, scholarly studies looking in considerable depth – either in a full volume or even in a very long article – at three or more wartime nations and their scientists in World War II nuclear history.

For various reasons, heavily rooted in language problems and sometimes because of limited access to archival materials, the scholarly literature, in English, on the Soviet and Japanese wartime A-bomb work is rather skimpy. The scholarly and related serious journalistic literature on the British (with Canadian involvement) and German projects is more substantial.

Partly because only the United States (albeit with UK and some Canadian help) actually developed the A-bomb in World War II, and also because of the size of the US history profession concentrating on American developments, the literature on the American “story” is, by far, the most extensive. Sometimes, that writing on the American “story,” as with the “story” elsewhere, dips back to earlier scientific work in Europe and to the brief British effort in the war period to build an atomic bomb. Normally, the American-focused studies stress, among other themes, the important role in the American project of European émigrés – especially physicists Leo Szilard, Enrico Fermi, and Hans Bethe, and sometimes John von Neumann, Edward Teller, Eugene Wigner, Victor Weisskopf, James Franck, Emilio Segrè, and Niels Bohr among others.

That literature also benefits substantially from the various memoirs and oral histories from the émigrés and from native-born scientists. That includes books by Luis Alvarez, Otto Frisch, Rudolph Peierls, Edward Teller, Arthur H. Compton, and Robert Serber, oral histories by Norman Ramsey, Robert Bacher, and Oppenheimer, as well as a number of others, and shorter interviews by Philip Morrison, among others. Such writings are richly supplemented by biographical volumes on Niels Bohr, on Richard Feynman, and on Albert Einstein, even though he did not work on the A-bomb project, and on Isidor I. Rabi, who was only a consultant on the project.

The biographies of Bohr, like some of the broader volumes on the Anglo-American A-bomb project, often emphasize his valiant but unsuccessful efforts in 1944 to persuade Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt to end the full-scale secrecy on the A-bomb project in dealing with the wartime Soviet Union. Bohr’s concern was not about the *use* of the bomb on the enemy, but rather that the wartime secrecy toward the USSR would sour postwar relations, spur a postwar nuclear arms race, and ruin the peace. Thus, Bohr chose to campaign, behind the scenes, to alter the international politics of atomic energy during World War II, and thereby, in his hopeful estimate, to save the postwar peace.

The various writings dealing with Bohr and his efforts to head off an arms race are reasonably consistent on him. Where the studies differ, when they do differ, is in interpreting Roosevelt’s actual responses and whether he was deceiving Bohr, as seems most likely, or whether FDR later changed his mind after consultation with Churchill – an interpretation that seems highly unlikely.

Memoirs and oral histories, along with reminiscences, can be both useful and perilous as sources. Put together usually well after the central events that are being recalled, those recollections can be self-serving and flawed, but not easily ignored by enterprising scholars. Sometimes the recollections have a coauthor, who rewrites parts, to improve phrasing and perhaps intentionally to re-craft the past.

The problem of using such sources in doing A-bomb history may be more severe than in other areas of history because the A-bomb issues are sometimes more emotional, and more controversial. What one did or did not do, and possibly why, can take on significant meaning, because such actions and motives relate to A-bomb history.

In the general scholarly and journalistic writing on the A-bomb project, the heavy focus on the scientists has meant, probably disproportionately emphasizing physicists. Chemists and biologists, and engineers, usually receive far less attention than is merited. The American A-bomb project is usually conceived greatly, and almost entirely, as a physicists' enterprise, and most of the other scientists and all the engineers are treated, perhaps too simply, as minor adjuncts. Yet, without the vast engineer-designed production plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington, which were built by major industrial firms, there would have been no uranium or plutonium, and thus no A-bomb. Without biologists, and physicians, much of the bomb-producing enterprise would have seemed so greatly dangerous that illness and death might have speedily impeded research on the A-bomb project, and possibly blocked the creation of any atomic weapons for use in World War II.

No realm of World War II A-bomb history, other than interpretations about why America used the bomb on Japan, is more contested than the study of Germany's World War II atomic-energy efforts, the roles of its A-bomb-related scientists, and especially of Werner Heisenberg. Within the scholarship and journalism on these linked subjects, there is no agreement on most matters, and often sharply expressed – even near-feverish – disagreement.

At the risk of simplifying the issues, the interpretive field often seems defined in part by the 1956–1958 analysis by the journalist Robert Jungk and by the later work, in 1993, of the American journalist Thomas Powers, in *Heisenberg's War* (1993). With varying emphases, those two writers contended that Heisenberg in particular, and many of the German A-bomb scientists in addition, did not want to build an A-bomb for Germany for moral reasons, and therefore Germany did not develop the weapon. By that argument, put in blunt terms, scientific conscience triumphed, Heisenberg was a hero, and thus Germany “failed” to build the bomb.

The claims by Powers led substantially to the formulation by playwright Michael Frayn of his arresting, prize-winning play *Copenhagen* (Frayn 1998), and the implications in it of an ethically minded, agonizing Heisenberg fearful of the atomic bomb and hoping that such an effort might be headed off. In the Frayn presentation, Heisenberg, uneasily, tried to explain such matters to Niels Bohr in September 1941, when Heisenberg journeyed to Nazi-occupied Denmark and met with Bohr for part of a day.

Because there are no contemporaneous documents, from 1941, on the exact content of that September meeting – what Heisenberg said, and what Bohr understood – there is, understandably some ambiguity about what was intended, stated, and understood, and full uncertainty even about whether Heisenberg spoke to Bohr in Danish or in

German. In 1957, Heisenberg offered (to Jungk) what might be termed, not unfairly, a pro-Heisenberg interpretation of his 1941 presentation to Bohr. When Bohr read it in Jungk's Danish version of *Brighter than a Thousand Suns* (1958), the great Danish physicist bristled, and crafted various rejoinders – but they were not sent by him.

To many historians who have examined Heisenberg's activities, and the German World War II scientific effort in atomic energy, the “story” involving Heisenberg is very different from the pro-Heisenberg version. In the harsh version, Heisenberg sought, with his scientist colleagues, to develop the German bomb, but failed because of scientific mistakes. That was the version initially promoted by the émigré physicist Samuel Goudsmit (1947) in his book, *Alsos*, and picked up by some analysts, who have used the “Farm Hall” transcripts to find what they deem corroborating evidence. To Goudsmit and to some of those who followed his interpretive path, Heisenberg was not morally uneasy about seeking to develop a bomb for Hitler's Nazi Germany. In an extreme version, building indirectly on the Goudsmit approach, the historian Paul Lawrence Rose went beyond and also contended that Heisenberg was, basically, a Nazi himself.

A considerably more moderate and more convincing interpretive path, cast by the historian Mark Walker, is that Heisenberg and his colleagues did not have moral scruples about developing an atomic bomb, nor did they “fail” because of scientific errors. Rather, they usually had serious doubts about whether an atomic bomb could be developed in time for use during the war, and they retreated to define less bold aims – producing a nuclear reactor (Walker 2005, 2009).

Because the German authorities did not believe that an atomic bomb was likely to be developed in time, and because they had other military-industrial priorities, and because the German military-science-industrial system was decentralized, the German atomic-energy project did not receive plentiful resources (unlike the American project), and only employed about 50 to 100 people. In view of such comparatively skimpy support, when contrasted to the lavishly financed, huge American project, the limited achievements of the German project should not be surprising.

Significantly, the top German scientists involved with the atomic-energy project did believe, until learning in August 1945 of the use of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, that the German atomic-energy project was ahead, not behind, the project in the United States. In that pre-Hiroshima belief, there was considerable hubris.

Large studies of the German atomic-energy project focus on many of the top scientists, besides Heisenberg, and have to struggle to make reasonable interpretive sense of the often ambiguous “Farm Hall” materials. Such interpretive ventures have to look critically at what those German scientists, well after the Hiroshima bombing and the making of the Farm Hall materials, had to say about the wartime German project. Those postwar claims often seemed to involve substantial rewriting of the wartime history. The noted physicist Carl F. von Weizsacker, the slightly younger colleague of Heisenberg, and the brother of the later head of the German postwar state (Richard von Weizsacker), seemed to be skillful in offering pro-Heisenberg and pro-von Weizsacker interpretations of why the wartime scientists did not produce an atomic bomb.

There is good reason to conclude that if the German state had chosen in World War II to allocate its resources (money, material, and scientists) differently, and to have given top priority to the atomic-energy project and very little to the large rocket

project and to the expensive improvements in submarines, Germany could have come, by early 1945, rather close to the American achievements that year – atomic bombs. Such counterfactual analysis is obviously risky, and subject to reasonable criticism and counterargument, but that counterfactual contention seems, at minimum, eminently plausible.

Such an argument is a useful reminder of how A-bomb history might otherwise have turned out in World War II, and that the “failure” to develop a German bomb, while explicable, involved a number of unforeseen, and probably unforeseeable, contingencies in the decisions of 1940–1945.

Some admittedly fragmentary and truly very “soft” support for such a speculative interpretation emerges from the claims by Karlsch and Walker (2005) that a German scientific group, under physicist Kurt Diebner and not under Heisenberg, had put together a nuclear device and actually tested it probably in late 1944 and (Karlsch and Walker seem certain) in early 1945. Karlsch’s evidence (endorsed by Walker) is very skimpy, and their argument – which may be an uneasy compromise statement – is strained by questionable inferences, but it seems possible that some kind of nuclear device – not an actual weapon – did blow up in early 1945.

If so, however, it is strange that Diebner, one of the ten Farm Hall physicists, and also Walter Gerlach, another of the ten physicists, and according to Karlsch and Walker, an informed supporter of Diebner’s work with the device, did not mention it during the extended forced time that the ten men spent at Farm Hall. In that period, Diebner and Gerlach, long in rivalry with the brilliant Heisenberg and easily regarded as decidedly less able than the great Heisenberg, could have claimed – and even gloated about – greater success than Heisenberg in the German wartime atomic-energy project.

To doubt the Karlsch-Walker contentions – about a German nuclear device (one like a tactical nuclear weapon) having been actually developed and tested – seems warranted and reasonable. But to dismiss the Karlsch-Walker contentions entirely may be a mistake. There is still need for more work by careful historians to assess fully and critically the Karlsch-Walker contentions. In doing such work, they must recognize that much of the scholarship on the story of Germany’s wartime involvement with atomic-energy research has focused unduly on Heisenberg and his close associates.

In Japan, the notion of investigating and possibly pursuing development of the atomic bomb arose from military men, in the army and navy, who had some scientific background because of their work in engineering. The Japanese army and navy, rivalrous in multiple ways, initially pursued separate atomic-energy ventures. Neither effort was well funded, and in neither were the top Japanese scientists involved in the project optimistic about the possibility of developing an atomic bomb in time for use in the war.

The Japanese scientists did not plead for far more substantial funding for atomic-energy work, and some key men – including, notably physicist Yoshio Nishina – seemed to prefer engaging in other scientific-technological ventures instead. Because Nishina served at various times and sometimes concurrently as a main adviser to the army and to the navy atomic-energy projects, but apparently did not want to risk crossing bureaucratic boundaries and combining the projects, he seems to have acceded generally to the balkanization of effort and to the very limited funding.

Among the prominent Japanese scientists who were involved in giving advice on Japan's atomic-energy project, besides Nishina, were: Hantaro Nagaoka from the prestigious Riken institute; Seiji Nishikawa, Ryokichi Sagane, Juichi Hino, and Sanichiro Mizushima from Tokyo Imperial University; Tsunesaburo Asada and Seishi Kikuchi from Osaka Imperial University; Satoshi Watanabe and Tamotsu Nishina from Tohoku Imperial University; and Masamihi Tanaka from the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company. All were members of a special "Physics Committee," which had about ten meetings running into 1943.

There is no solid evidence that any of the Japanese scientists or others advising on the atomic-energy projects had any moral reservations during the war about developing or using an atomic bomb on the enemy. To those scientists and others, the limitations were not matters of ethics but the technological-scientific difficulties and the concern with time constraints. Those men did not believe that an atomic bomb could be developed in the war by their state, or by the American state.

Severe shortages of uranium, the very limited allocation of scientific talent to the Japanese A-bomb projects, and the extremely skimpy government funding had the effect of guaranteeing that Japan would not, and could not, develop an atomic weapon in World War II. The evidence is overwhelming that Japan did not even come close to producing such a weapon. Had the Asian war continued for another year or so, and not ended in August 1945, there still would not have been a Japanese atomic bomb.

Unfortunately, an ill-conceived January 13, 1978 article in *Science*, by reporter Deborah Shapley, contended that a near-conspiracy of silence ("curtain of silence" was her phrase) in Japan had long hidden information in the postwar years about Japan's wartime A-bomb project. In fact, by the late 1960s, and going back to the early 1950s, and sometimes even somewhat earlier, there had been published reports in Japan on that nation's World War II A-bomb project. Strangely, some A-bomb scholars in the West had not known of the Japanese wartime project, and certainly no Western-based author, whether writing on the A-bomb or on other political/scientific matters, had dwelled upon the Japanese wartime program, but the general information was accessible in the West.

In 1968, notably, a group of Japanese historically oriented scholars, the Pacific War Research Society, after three years of work, issued in Japan a volume, *The Day Man Lost: Hiroshima, 6 August 1945*, which devoted quite a few pages to the wartime Japanese atomic-energy project. That book was not explicitly sourced, and it was not error-free, but it was a good summary statement on the wartime project. That volume was translated into English for a 1972 hardback publication, with more than 25 pages on the Japanese project, but the book received almost no attention at that time in Western-based publications. It later became rather easily available, in 1981, in a low-priced paperback, and the issuance of that paperback may have been spurred, in part, by Shapley's article, the front-page coverage her article received in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, and elsewhere, and the spirited rejoinders by some American-based historians.

Starting in the late 1970s and continuing occasionally into the early 1990s, Shapley's unwarranted contentions of a near-conspiracy were intelligently, and systematically, rebutted by well-informed analysts, including the important American scholar of Japanese history, John Dower. But in between the publication of some of Dower's essays, an enterprising American writer, Robert Wilcox, issued his 1985 book, *Japan's Secret War* (Wilcox 1985), based on very dubious evidence and very

strained inference, to argue that Japan had actually tested an A-bomb in Korea in 1945. It is a markedly unreliable book, with a strangely admiring introduction by a distinguished American historian of science (Derek de Solla Price). There is an argument that has been dismissed, justifiably, by a few careful historians, including Dower (Dower 1993).

What Shapley, De Solla Price, and others usefully emphasized was that Japanese government and other military officials, and Japanese scientists connected with their nation's wartime atomic-energy project, had no ethical compunctions about developing the weapon or using it in war. Put bluntly, and significantly, there were other reasons why the Japanese atomic bomb was not built, and why Japan did not come close to developing the bomb, and thus one can conclude that Japan did not use the A-bomb in war *only* because it did not have such a weapon.

The American-based historian Walter Grunden, in a valuable chapter in his 2005 book, *Secret Weapons and World War II*, estimates that total Japanese government expenditures for atomic weapons development in World War II were under about US\$12 million (if converted into wartime American money), and quite possibly considerably lower. Even allowing for the destruction of some (and possibly many) wartime Japanese records, some disagreement on exactly what exchange rate to employ to convert Japanese money into American dollars, and the danger of postwar self-serving claims by Japanese scientists and government officials, that total of \$12 million is well under 1 percent (or 0.01) of the cost of the nearly \$2 billion American A-bomb project in the World War II period. Put in other comparative terms, the estimated Japanese expenditures, even if tripled to the very unlikely total of \$36 million, were probably about \$1.95 billion less than the US funding for its wartime A-bomb work.

Soviet physics had significantly advanced in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, and a number of the major Soviet physicists had good relations with their counterparts in the West, and some had studied in the West – in Germany or the United Kingdom. The 1938–1939 discovery of fission, when reported in the Western scientific journals, had excited Soviet physicists, but primarily because that discovery constituted a breakthrough in the field and opened fascinating areas of scientific research.

Physicists in the Soviet Union from early 1939 to about June 1941 did some important work on fission, closely read the available relevant Western literature, and recognized, as the Western literature underscored, that both plutonium and uranium-235 might well produce chain reactions. But such interest in the science of these materials, and even the possibility of a nuclear bomb, faded in mid-1941 with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The mobilization for a deadly war, the need to expend resources to defend the USSR from the *Wehrmacht*, and the patriotic commitment of Soviet scientists on more pressing problems shifted interests and efforts.

In 1942, one young Soviet scientist, G. V. Flerov energetically pushed for the development of an atomic-energy project and an effort to pursue the building of an A-bomb. Ignored by many more powerful scientists in the Soviet system, Flerov in early 1942 pleaded his case directly in a letter to Stalin.

Independently, and more important, the Soviet espionage system received rather full reports on the 1941 British conclusions that an atomic bomb was feasible. Added

to such reports was the capture of a German book that indicated that Hitler's Germany was probably investigating the possibility of developing an atomic bomb. Such information about developments in the UK and in Germany propelled top Soviet leaders, including Lavrentii Beria and V. M. Molotov, to decide to create a Soviet atomic-energy project in 1943.

When two older and more distinguished Soviet physicists, Pytor Kapitsa and A. F. Ioffe, declined (not on ethical grounds) the opportunity to head such a project, Molotov turned to Igor Kurchatov, who at the time was not even a member of the prestigious Soviet Academy. To advance Kurchatov's standing in the scientific community, he was soon named to the academy, despite the protests of some distinguished senior members, who did not understand that atomic-energy politics dictated the appointment. Kurchatov himself, in seeking a strong subordinate, appointed physicist Iulii (Yuli) Khariton, who had earlier worked under James Chadwick at the Cavendish Laboratory (Cambridge University), to direct the A-bomb segment of the Soviet project.

The strong evidence indicates, according to historian David Holloway who has written the major scholarly study on the Soviet project, that there was no expectation of developing an actual Soviet atomic bomb in World War II. Rather, the concern apparently was to make sure that Soviet scientists, and thus the Soviet state, learned enough about atomic energy during the war to be able to develop an atomic bomb, as was likely to be desired, at some point after the war.

The wartime Soviet project did benefit significantly from espionage from abroad – the UK (including the émigré physicist Klaus Fuchs and probably a UK government official, John Caincross), the United States (notably physicists Fuchs and Theodore Hall, and less significantly machinist David Greenglass and his brother-in-law Julius Rosenberg), and Canada (UK physicist Alan Nunn May). But the espionage reports did not propel the Soviet state during the war to make the atomic-energy work in the USSR a top priority nor to bestow substantial economic and scientific resources on that atomic-energy work. The Soviet project, if compared to the American Manhattan project, was relatively *very* small-scale.

In late September 1944, Kurchatov complained to Beria that “the state of affairs [the support for the project] remains completely unsatisfactory.” There were serious problems, Kurchatov explained, in securing the needed uranium, in establishing cooperation with other Soviet enterprises, and in creating better leadership. Knowing from espionage a good deal about the great size, the lavish resources, and the American government's ardent support for its top-secret Manhattan Project, Kurchatov felt deeply aggrieved by the stark comparison with his own project's situation (Holloway 1994, pp. 102–103).

In May 1945, at the time of Germany's surrender, as one of Kurchatov's aides (M. G. Pervukhin) later recalled, the two scientists wrote to Stalin to plead for more support for the Soviet project. Whatever the likely reasons, there was no apparent change in actual policy. Most likely, as Holloway suggests, Stalin, Molotov, and Beria did not “understand the role the bomb would soon play in international relations” (Holloway 1994, pp. 114–115).

The significant, and dramatic, shift in Soviet policy – to a high-priority push for the atomic bomb – *followed* the American use of the atomic bomb on Japan. The great destructive power of the weapon on Japan indicated to Stalin that the atomic bomb was definitely possible, that it could presumably be devised by the Soviets in a short

period of a few years, and that the weapon could change, if not shape, the nature of international relations, and especially Soviet-American relations.

To Stalin, an international situation of the United States with an A-bomb monopoly was apparently intolerable. What Stalin may only dimly have understood at Potsdam in July, when Truman mentioned having a new powerful weapon for use against Japan, was made crystal clear within less than two weeks – by the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima – and reaffirmed, if such was necessary, by the bombing of Nagasaki.

The *push* for a Soviet bomb, as David Holloway has found, was a *post*-Hiroshima, not a pre-Hiroshima, decision by Stalin. In the postwar period, the Soviets were behind, as they had been in the war period, and the Soviet state's interest in developing a postwar bomb, like the Soviet state's wartime interest in atomic-energy research, was significantly a response to what major Western states were doing or had done. The Soviet A-bomb, tested in August 1949, was reportedly a close replica of the American plutonium bomb used at Nagasaki. It seems likely, according to the shrewd estimate by historian David Holloway, that the Soviet development of its atomic bomb was speeded by a year or possibly two by espionage from the West.

That espionage undoubtedly smoothed the Soviet path to the bomb, and helped the Soviet scientists avoid various costly mistakes. By focusing on a plutonium weapon, and by not replicating the wartime American program that had emphasized both uranium and plutonium bombs, the Soviets moved rather efficiently and directly to the bomb.

The espionage did make a useful difference, and undoubtedly the Smyth report (a public American report of August 1945) also helped, but it would be a fundamental error to conclude that Soviet scientists, without such help from abroad, would not and could not otherwise have devised and built a deliverable nuclear weapon within about a handful of years. That achievement required what the Soviets had in the postwar period – very firm support from the top (Stalin) of the Soviet state, substantial resources (including uranium) and a first-rate physics section, and the necessary support in chemistry, mathematics, and engineering. Scientists, engineers, and others, loyal to the Soviet state, worked in the postwar secret project, realizing that there were substantial rewards for success, and likely harsh penalties for failure.

By August 29, 1949, the Soviet scientists, with some aid from German scientists who freely or under coercion had gone to the USSR, achieved their desired scientific-technological success – the first test of a Soviet atomic bomb. The American nuclear monopoly, aided by important communist espionage, was ended. On September 23, 1949, President Truman, in a guarded public announcement, indicated that the American monopoly was over.

Any interpretive survey of nuclear weapons and the related scientists in World War II, in focusing heavily on the Anglo-American project, and very briefly on the activities in France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, must acknowledge how much has been written on many of these subjects, how much is known, and how much remains unexplored or under-explored.

A generally neglected issue in the literature on all the projects is whether the A-bomb scientists, in their work, gave much thought to the relationship of their projects to the environment, in particular to uranium mining, and to the hazards of uranium

mining for the miners and others. In generally underestimating the dangers of troubling contamination, and of injury from radiation, the scientists, building loosely on knowledge by radiologists, failed to appreciate adequately the risks of dealing with uranium and plutonium and the dangerous waste products from fission and from reactors. The science at the time was not really adequate, and the health-safety standards, if measured against later knowledge, undoubtedly meant the imperiling of many workers – whether brilliant scientists, or rank-and-file scientists, engineers, technicians, or others.

Looking beyond the UK at the other three major nation-state projects (Germany, Japan, and the USSR) that did *not* develop a World War II nuclear weapon, and despite the continuing problems with archival sources, it is important to recognize how comparatively small each of those wartime projects was. The total personnel on those three projects (not including uranium mining) was probably close to the mid-1945 size – 1300 scientists and technicians, and a total of about 6,600 employees – at the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, in the huge American A-bomb project.

The legacy of the various major World War II projects is markedly different from one another. The American nuclear weapons system, despite the return of many scientists to their university activity after World War II, was to produce, literally, many thousands of nuclear weapons in the postwar years, and by about the mid-1950s those weapons would often be thermonuclear, and not exclusively fission, weapons.

In Germany and Japan, for multiple reasons, neither of those two nation-states, nor their remaining scientists, would choose in the postwar decades to seek to develop nuclear weapons for those countries. In both of those former Axis nation-states, there were strong objections by scientists to nuclear weapons development in the postwar years. Significantly, in Germany, in April 1957, Heisenberg, Von Weizsacker, Von Laue, Born, Strassmann, Gerlach, and 12 other notable scientists publicly opposed, in what became the famous “Gottingen Manifesto,” any effort, by West Germany, to develop or deploy nuclear weapons. The 18 signatories pledged not to contribute any scientific assistance to such a nuclear quest.

In the UK, in marked contrast, an earlier postwar secret decision was made, by the Labour government shortly after the war, to develop, despite the substantial cost, a British A-bomb. That nuclear weapons effort received substantial support from a number of the wartime UK scientists associated with the Anglo-American A-bomb project. The UK for reasons of prestige and security was unwilling to rely upon the American nuclear weapons system, and thus wanted its own nuclear weapons. In October 1952, shortly before the first American test of a thermonuclear device, the British exploded their first atomic bomb, becoming the third nation-state with atomic weapons.

And, most notably, in the emerging cold war, inside the USSR, Joseph Stalin’s forceful demand on his scientists for a Soviet atomic bomb was soon followed by that nation-state’s scientific-technological effort, ultimately successful in fall 1955, to develop a deliverable H-bomb (a thermonuclear weapon). That Soviet H-bomb in November 1955 was achieved roughly 20 months after the American H-bomb, which was tested in the Pacific in March 1954. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the American state remained substantially ahead of the Soviet state in nuclear weapons science and technology, and in the number of produced, and available, nuclear weapons.

In the American case of the postwar development of the H-bomb, a number of notable scientists and scientist-administrators who had pushed in World War II for

the atomic bomb preferred by 1949–1950, at least partly for moral reasons, not to work on developing or endorsing the H-bomb. In the Soviet Union, however, such expressed doubt or opposition was not the case in that period. A number of the USSR's successful A-bomb scientists moved on to help produce the Soviet H-bomb. Only much later, and most notably in the case of physicist Andrei Sakharov, the so-called "father" of the Soviet H-bomb, would some open dissension occur in the USSR on nuclear weapons. Because of his expressed antinuclear sensibilities, Sakharov would become by the late 1960s a hero in much of the democratic West, and in 1975 the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, but generally he was not treated as a hero in public in his own country during the extended cold war, and for a lengthy time he was punished and persecuted by the Soviet state for his publicly expressed dissidence.

Significantly, in 1968, in an epigraph, Sakharov had decided to preface his publicly dissenting essay/book, *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (Sakharov 1968), with these words carefully chosen from Goethe:

He alone is worthy of life and freedom
Who each day does battle for them anew!

Those two likely inspiring lines, whose meaning may be less than fully clear, were selected about a year after Oppenheimer's 1967 death. Perhaps those quoted words, when contrasted with Oppenheimer's own 1951 expressed thinking, usefully indicate the complexity and frequently the ambiguity of the moral and political life of the nuclear physicists, involved variously with the A-bomb or H-bomb, or with both weapons, in defining their own sense of responsibility and what they should and did expect of their fellow scientists.

In 1951, Oppenheimer, the so-called "father" of the A-bomb, privately answered a letter from the Yale physicist Gregory Breit, who had been involved in the early American A-bomb project. Breit asked Oppenheimer whether Werner Heisenberg, in view of that German physicist's World War II activity in Germany, should be given a permanent position on the Yale physics faculty. Oppenheimer, seeming to cast aside the still-recent past, replied: "I doubt whether any attempt to assess and punish the political behavior of one of our colleagues can be constructive."

Historians, and others, in interpreting and assessing the role of scientists in producing nuclear weapons in World War II, or in enlisting in nation-state atomic-energy projects then or later, may often wrestle with the differing kinds of standards proposed by the lives, and by the words, of Sakharov and Oppenheimer. Such problems do not fully shape the meaning of the scientists' activities in connection with nuclear weapons, but such problems do often influence the interpretive judgments – sometimes explicitly, and probably more often implicitly.

Such judgments, by necessity, however, should also take into account the thinking of someone like the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarez. He always endorsed the 1945 atomic bombing of Japan, and sometimes proudly pointed out that he had flown on an accompanying plane on that Hiroshima mission in August 1945. He helped, with his senior Berkeley colleague Ernest Lawrence, to promote the American successful effort to develop thermonuclear weapons in what Alvarez and Lawrence, and their crusading ally Edward Teller, as well as Von Neumann and Wigner, among others, believed was a desperate race with the Soviet Union.

It is significant that the ranks of the American pro-use-of-the-bomb scientists of World War II, who had been deeply involved with the wartime A-bomb project, fractured sharply in the postwar years on the H-bomb. In late 1949, Oppenheimer, Conant, Rabi, and Fermi were among the leaders, at least briefly, in the anti-H-bomb ranks in the United States. They were defeated in the 1950 decision by President Truman, the elected nation-state leader, for the energetic American quest for a thermonuclear weapon.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

Civilians in the Combat Zone: Anglo-American Strategic Bombing

SEAN L. MALLOY

The western Allies did not pioneer aerial warfare against civilians in World War II. Depending on where one chooses to locate the start of the conflict, that distinction belongs to either Japan (during the invasion of China in 1937) or Germany (first during the Spanish Civil War and later in the assault on Poland in 1939). It was the Allies, however, and particularly the United States and Great Britain that engaged most heavily in strategic bombing. The Anglo-American bombing campaigns represented a significant fraction of those countries' respective war efforts and exacted a heavy toll in civilian casualties. In Europe the Allied bombing killed somewhere between 300,000 and 583,000 people, the vast majority of whom were civilians. In *The Fire*, Friedrich (2006) wrote evocatively of a "gangrenous waft of annihilation" rising from the smoldering remains of German cities ravaged by bombing (p. 141). The bombing of Japan was probably even more destructive, with fatality estimates ranging from 330,000 to 900,000. Anticipating and perhaps even outstripping the nuclear devastation unleashed on Hiroshima, as many as 100,000 people died in a single American firebombing raid against Tokyo on the night of March 9–10, 1945.

In recent years, scholars have produced a rich and vibrant literature on strategic bombing that goes far beyond counting the number of rivets on the B-29, measuring tons of bombs dropped, or revisiting a handful of well-known raids on cities such as Berlin, Dresden, and Tokyo. Historians and political scientists employing a variety of approaches and methodologies have raised important questions about strategic bombing with implications for the broader study of diplomacy, war, and morality, as well as for our understanding of World War II. This chapter will examine four major areas of debate within the recent literature on Anglo-American strategic bombing. First, it will consider the interwar origins of the western Allies' commitment to bombing. Why did two liberal democracies lead the way in developing and employing a type of warfare that disproportionately targeted civilians? The second and third sections will examine the scholarly debate over the conduct of the Allied bombing

offensives in Europe and the Pacific respectively, with a particular focus on the issue of targeting civilians. The fourth and final section will address the controversial questions of efficacy and morality. What contribution did strategic bombing make to Allied victory World War II? And what role, if any, should ethics and morality play in evaluating these campaigns?

In answering these questions, I will draw on the literature on Allied strategic bombing published since 1980. Prior to that point, writings on this subject were dominated by the various official histories and postwar bombing surveys produced by the governments and armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. The publication of Richard Overy's *The Air War* (1980) and a controversial article by Schaffer (1980) marked the start of a productive period of scholarly inquiry and it makes a convenient starting point for any historiography of strategic bombing. This survey is also skewed toward studies focusing on the United States. It is neither possible nor desirable to discuss the American approach to strategic bombing in a vacuum. Historians in recent years have shown that American ideas about bombing were shaped at a variety of levels by European influences. The American side of the story, however, has attracted far more attention and controversy. In large part this is due to the fact that, unlike the British, US Army Air Forces (AAF) leaders loudly and repeatedly insisted that their bombing did not deliberately target cities and civilians. Much of the literature on this subject has focused on the contrast between the self-professed American commitment to "precision bombing" and the reality of indiscriminate area attacks with the attendant mass killing of noncombatants.

One of the more intriguing questions surrounding strategic bombing in World War II is why it was that the United States and Great Britain chose to invest so heavily in an unproven and ethically troubling form of warfare. A number of historians have looked to the interwar years in explaining this development. For while, the Anglo-American bombing campaigns that reached their grisly climax in 1944–1945 evolved significantly during the course of the war, they also owed much to doctrinal developments, technological innovations, and production decisions dating back to the 1930s if not earlier.

In *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare*, a comparative study of strategic bombing in Great Britain and the United States, Biddle (2003) identified both the experience of World War I and interwar social and economic trends as crucial in pushing both nations toward an embrace of strategic bombing. In Britain, "the anxieties felt by Edwardian-era politicians and military planners who looked with increasing trepidation on the forces transforming their societies" led them to believe that bombing might quickly decide future wars (p. 8). Projecting anxieties about their own working class masses, many British leaders concluded that the restive urban populations whose labor was necessary to sustain modern industrialized warfare would collapse into anarchy or even revolt under the weight of bombing. Although there were important differences among British military planners on the subject, a significant strain of thought embraced this logic in advocating so-called "moral bombing" that directly targeted civilian populations. A variety of factors, including fear of German reprisals, kept the British from employing these tactics at the outset of World War II. But Bomber Command's eventual shift to urban area attacks had deep roots in earlier thinking about civilian vulnerability and the fragility of the modern industrial state.

American proponents of bombing, Biddle suggested, shared “assumptions about the complexities and vulnerability of modern industrial societies” with their counterparts across the Atlantic. However, whereas the British tended to emphasize the morale of the working classes, US air theorists focused on the underlying industrial machinery, targeting “what they believed to be the inherent weaknesses of interdependent, interlocking national economic systems” (Biddle 2003, p. 128). In *The Rise of American Air Power*, Sherry (1987) offered a nuanced analysis of the social, cultural, economic, and political forces that drove US military and political leaders to embrace bombing between the wars. Like Biddle, he concluded that its appeal rested in large part on an “unquestioned belief in the fragility of modern societies.” Focusing primarily on infrastructure rather than people, the architects of interwar American bombing strategy obsessively sought “key nodes” in the “industrial web” the destruction of which might unravel entire economies, societies, and states. Sherry acknowledged that a number of factors, including lean budgets, the desire of US airmen for an independent force, and the traditional American antipathy for large standing armies, helped to fuel the interwar obsession with the strategic bomber as a war-winning weapon. Ultimately, however, he argued that “practical developments were usually secondary to imagination in shaping strategic air war.” During the interwar period, American airmen developed an unquestioned belief in their ability to identify, reach, and destroy the underpinnings of an enemy’s war economy without the need for the costly and protracted land warfare that had marked World War I (Sherry 1987, pp. xi, 26).

The specific doctrine that emerged from American discussions of strategic air warfare during the interwar period is usually referred to as “precision bombing.” The alluring promise of this doctrine, as outlined by McFarland (1995) in *America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing*, was that by targeting “machines, not people,” the selective use of strategic air power would bring a quick and relatively bloodless end to future conflicts (p. 82). Its architects, many of whom were instructors at the interwar Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), based their planning on optimistic assumptions about their ability to locate the relevant “key nodes” in the enemy’s war economy. They also put what turned out to be undue faith in the ability of American airmen to overcome weather, enemy resistance, and human error in order to accurately bomb those targets.

In light of the actual conduct of the American air offensive in World War II, culminating in the massive firebombing of Japanese cities and the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one of the more interesting historiographical debates is whether precision bombing was ever a truly meaningful concept in the first place. In *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians*, Crane (1993), while acknowledging the practical difficulties that American airmen faced once the war began, insisted that “[c]ontrary to many American doctrines in our military history, this one was uniformly known, understood, and believed by most of the soldiers who were supposed to follow it” (p. 9). Werrell (1996), Clodfelter (1994), and Futrell (1989) also argued that while practice did not always match doctrine, American airmen entered the war genuinely believing that precision bombing of carefully selected industrial targets would bring victory without the need for the mass killing of civilians.

Other scholars have suggested that a close examination of interwar American doctrine reveals that the underneath the rhetoric of precision bombing lay a strategy

that accepted, or even embraced, inflicting pain on the civilian population. Several prominent interwar prophets of bombing, including Giulio Douhet (who had helped oversee Italian air effort in World War I), British military theorist Basil Liddle Hart, and maverick American aviator William "Billy" Mitchell, predicted that the next war would be won by a devastating aerial blitz against cities and civilians. On the surface, the AAF doctrine of selective, precision bombing of military-industrial targets appeared to be the antithesis of this approach. However, in *Wings of Judgment*, Schaffer (1985) argued that while precision bombing "modified the Douhetian principle of all-out attacks on cities, it did so on the pragmatic ground of efficiency, not a promising basis for insulating civilians against air attacks" (p. 33). Downes (2008), in *Targeting Civilians in Warfare*, agreed that "American airmen largely viewed bombing the population as inefficient rather than immoral" (p. 124). Sherry (1987) went further in suggesting that while

the new doctrine appeared more refined and humane in its focus on select economic targets rather than on the lives and homes of civilians and their leaders ... it did not clearly substitute economy for morale as an objective but rather saw economic targets as a more effective point of attack on the enemy's nerves. (p. 57)

In other words, American airmen were simply employing more precise means to achieve Douhet's apocalyptic ends. Pape (1996), in *Bombing to Win*, agreed that despite its selective approaching to targeting, precision bombing was primarily a "punitive" strategy that hinged on unraveling an opponent's entire society (p. 63).

The interwar period remains ripe for further exploration and it would be particularly helpful to have more fine-grained studies of the individuals and institutions responsible for crafting bombing doctrine in both the United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless, despite some differences of opinion with respect to precision bombing, the existing literature is useful in explaining why both nations were so committed to strategic air warfare at the start of the war. There is also general agreement that whatever the intentions of its various proponents, interwar theories of precision bombing were not well suited to the messy operational realities of World War II. Indeed, strategic bombing in general remained heavily rooted in fantasy and wishful thinking at the start of the war. Hard questions about the ability of unescorted bombers to reach and hit their targets remained largely unaddressed by the apostles of bombing on the United States and Great Britain. Overy (1996) characterized interwar (and even early war) strategic bombing doctrine as "technically unfeasible and operationally amateur" (p. 106). Murray (1992) agreed that "[n]ot only did peacetime doctrine (one could almost say, dogmas) mislead wartime commanders at the start of the conflict, but it added to the costs and losses in the air offensive" (p. 236).

Although there is considerable scholarly debate about its operational and ethical merits, the origins and evolution of Britain's wartime bombing campaign are relatively uncontroversial. Bomber Command began the war by conducting daytime operations against specific German military and industrial targets. Following a disastrous start marked by heavy losses with little in the way of results to show for them, Bomber Command shifted to nighttime attacks in early 1940. Any hopes of accurately hitting individual targets vanished with this shift. "So inaccurate was British bombing," Overy (1996) noted, "that German intelligence had considerable difficulty in grasping

exactly what strategy the British were pursuing" (p. 108). In *The Strategic Bombing of Germany*, Levine (1992) similarly observed that while Bomber Command "remained subject to delusions of accuracy until the summer of 1941," existing technology effectively limited the utility of night bombing to area attacks on large urban areas. German attacks on British cities during the "Blitz" of 1940–1941, combined with compelling evidence of the failure of nighttime "precision" raids to find their mark, helped overcome any remaining scruples about deliberately targeting civilians. By September 1941, British leaders had "frankly accepted area bombing," and a February 1942 directive formalized this policy (pp. 25, 31).

It fell to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, who took charge of Bomber Command shortly after the formal embrace of area bombing in February 1942, to put the new policy into operation. Although it is agreed that Harris was not the author of this shift, throughout the war he remained the most enthusiastic Allied proponent of city bombing. Harris "pursued the strategy of area bombing with an almost religious fervor," declared Garrett (1993) in *Ethics and Airpower in World War II*, "and with a contemptuous disregard for even marginal quibbles about the pragmatic or moral correctness of such a strategy" (p. 38). While the initial shift to targeting cities had been driven in large part by expediency – they were the only targets that Bomber Command could reliably hit in 1940–1942 – Harris made a virtue of necessity. He relentlessly championed area bombing, from the first "thousand plane raid" on Cologne in May 1942 through the infamous firebombings of Hamburg in July 1943 and Dresden in February 1945, even as advances in radar and navigation technology greatly increased Bomber Command's accuracy and opened up the possibility of precision nighttime attacks. This resulted in a dispute with his nominal superior, Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal, who advocated concentrating British bombing efforts on the German oil industry. Harris, however, persisted in launching Bomber Command on area attacks against cities until the end of the war.

Harris's outspoken support for area attacks, and his success in employing Bomber Command to that effect in spite of the objections of Portal, leaves little room for historiographical debate on the nature of the British strategic bombing campaign in World War II. The conduct of American bombing in Europe, in contrast, has produced a lively scholarly dialogue. It is widely agreed that the United States entered the war with a commitment to daylight precision bombing of specific military-industrial targets. It is also uncontroversial to note that this strategy met serious setbacks in 1942–1943 as a combination of bad weather and stiff German defenses made it difficult, if not impossible, for American bombers to locate and hit effectively their assigned targets without prohibitive losses. The major historiographical debate revolves around the adaptations that followed these initial setbacks. Did the US abandon precision bombing in favor of a strategy that was similar to British area bombing in all but name? Or did American airmen genuinely persist in attempting to make good on the promises of selective targeting even if the results sometimes inadvertently resembled the more indiscriminate British attacks on cities?

In a controversial article in the *Journal of American History*, Schaffer (1980) insisted that "[p]rewar American air plans and doctrine and the development of operations during the war reveal that official policy against indiscriminate bombing was so broadly interpreted and so frequently breached as to become almost meaningless." While American airmen "did prefer precision bombing to area attacks," this

commitment had no deep ethical roots. Thus, when poor weather made it difficult to conduct precision attacks on a regular basis, the AAF commanders readily embraced radar navigation aids to conduct “a series of bombings through cloud cover that were tantamount to urban area attacks.” While image-conscious AAF leaders publicly sought to distance themselves from indiscriminate attacks on cities conducted by Britain’s Bomber Command, they were fully aware that in practice the two campaigns were essentially identical. In the final year of the war in Europe, they cast aside any remaining pretense of concern over civilian casualties in conducting Operation Thunderclap (a February 1945 aerial assault on Berlin aimed at breaking German morale) and Operation Clarion (a massive series of attacks on small German towns and cities three weeks later). The AAF also strongly considered converting older, “war-weary” bombers into primitive unmanned cruise missiles. “It was obvious to [US] air force commanders that the employment of robot bombers was really indiscriminate air warfare,” Schaffer argued, “and it is equally evident that the generals had no moral objections to using them” (1980, pp. 319, 322, 326, 333).

Parks (1995), focusing primarily on the AAF’s heavy reliance on radar to locate and hit targets in bad weather, echoed Schaffer in concluding that American leaders “knew blind bombing was an inaccurate method” but persisted in employing it because “it was better than no bombing at all.” Examining wartime and postwar assessments of the two campaigns, Parks concluded that “[g]iven American blind bombing accuracy, it is difficult to distinguish between Bomber Command’s general area offensive and USAAF’s blind (area) bombing of selective targets” (pp. 154, 162). McFarland (1995) agreed that “[b]ombing through overcast made targets out of urban areas, despite official and unofficial policies against terror bombing” (p. 183). More specifically, Biddle (2003) noted that by nominally targeting rail yards, which were generally located in the center of German cities, American air leaders could conduct de facto area bombing while still claiming to be striking specific, enumerated targets. “Though they were designated and recorded as area attacks on transportation targets,” Biddle concluded, “they were, in essence, area raids on German cities” (p. 244).

Summing up the literature, Downes (2008) declared that the “scholarly consensus on [AAF] radar bombing is that it was the functional equivalent of British night area bombing” (p. 139). There is significant disagreement, however, on the issue of knowledge and intent. Schaffer and others asserted that AAF leaders were aware of the fact that they were practically engaged in indiscriminate area bombing and that they were untroubled by this fact. The rhetoric of precision bombing was intended only for public consumption in order to distinguish the AAF from the British, distance it from any moral concerns over the mass killing of civilians, and build support for an independent air force after the war. “What the Americans did well,” Buckley (1999) summarized in *Air Power in the Age of Total War*, was not hitting precision targets, but rather working “to distance themselves from the policy of area bombing in a way that Harris [and Bomber Command] never even attempted” (p. 164).

Other scholars have offered a slightly more nuanced and sympathetic view of the American bombing campaign in Europe. Sherry (1987) agreed that “American bombers relied on radar or ‘blind bombing’ techniques so often ... that terror became their inevitable consequence even when defined targets were the avowed objectives.” However, Sherry was somewhat more willing than Schaffer to attribute the continued rhetorical emphasis on precision bombing among AAF leaders to genuine (if mistaken)

conviction rather than cynical opportunism. Because the heavy civilian casualties inflicted by American bombs “seemed inadvertent, and because it came about through a slow erosion of the distinction between precision and area bombing, any confrontation with moral scruples was forestalled for American commanders” (p. 261). Or as Eden (2004) succinctly put it in *Whole World on Fire*, “the [AAF] strategy remained one of precision bombing, in aspiration if not in fact” (p. 80). Levine (1992) agreed that while the AAF became “more callous about casualties among enemy civilians,” by the end of the war in Europe they “were little close to a policy of deliberate bombing of civilians than before” (p. 180).

One of the more detailed attempts to wrestle with the question of what AAF leaders knew and believed about the effects of their bombing was provided by Davis (1993) in *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe*. Based on an analysis of AAF operational records and the papers of Spaatz, who helped led the American bombing efforts against Germany as head of 8th Air Force and later as commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), Davis convincingly demonstrated that “despite denials, [the AAF] did engage in the deliberate bombing of German population centers.” He also found evidence that at least some in the AAF engaged in a campaign to cover up these attacks by changing the stated target descriptions from “city areas” to the more precise-sounding “marshalling yards” in postwar summaries of American bombing. However, Davis also asserted that at the highest levels of American air war in Europe, Spaatz and his key deputies genuinely believed that they were not targeting civilians. Although they were aware that the effects of their attacks might be similar to British area bombing, they clung to the fact “they had not aimed these raids at civilians, but rather at military targets.” Rail yards were, indeed, the targets of American bombs, even though everybody knew that these yards were located in the heart of German cities and that stray bombs would inevitably end up killing many civilians. AAF leaders however, “judged themselves by their motives rather than by their results.” Since they had not intended to target civilians, they were not being deceitful in insisting that the AAF remained committed to precision bombing of military-industrial target (pp. 570, 435).

Conrad Crane’s *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians* (1993) offered a robust scholarly defense of AAF leaders and their commitment to precision bombing in Europe. While he conceded that “the ideal of pinpoint air attacks that could send bombs down industrial smokestacks was never achieved in World War II,” Crane argued that “the claim that adherence to precision-bombing doctrine was a myth ignores the operational record.” Unlike the British, who were deliberately targeting the center of German residential areas for destruction, even nonvisual American bombing “usually targeted docks or marshaling yards that operators could detect on their radar scopes.” Thus, while “theory did exceed technology,” American airmen in Europe “did the best they could to win the war with consistent application of a doctrine that favored military and industrial targeting over terror bombing.” The Thunderclap raid on Berlin aimed at breaking civilian morale was the exception, rather than the rule, and was strongly opposed by Spaatz and other high-level AAF commanders. Even Operation Clarion, with its sweeping assault on small Germany towns and cities, was technically aimed at destroying transportation facilities and thus “was not a departure from precision-bombing doctrine” (pp. 159, 160, 76, 113). Hansen (2009) similarly concluded in *Fire and Fury* that “intention matters: unlike their British Allies, American airmen

were, with some important exceptions, committed to the precision bombing of noncivilian targets until the end of the war" (p. x).

Crane and Randall's focus on the motives and intent of American airmen offered a needed layer of nuance to the debate over strategic bombing in the European theater. However, Crane's claim that "[o]bjective observers can still perceive a definite difference between AAF strategic bombing in Europe and the British area raids on cities or the German Blitz on London" rested perhaps a bit too heavily on the often tortured and self-serving logic of his subjects (Crane 1993, p. 160). While they may well have convinced themselves that they were not deliberately conducting area or terror attacks, even the most optimistic AAF leaders considered to some extent the entirely predictable results of blindly attacking targets in the center of German cities with bombs dropped from high altitude. Clodfelter (1994), in an article that was generally supportive of the AAF's commitment to precision bombing, conceded that to "the German civilian, the rationale behind such raids mattered little, for in terms of results they mirrored the Royal Air Force's area attacks" (p. 98). Certainly, as Friedrich (2006) remarked, "[t]hese distinctions made no real difference to those attacked" (p. 144).

While there remains scholarly debate over the intent, if not the reality, of American bombing in the European theater, the campaign against Japan left considerably less room for ambiguity. Like Britain's Bomber Command in Europe, the AAF in the Pacific embraced a deliberate strategy of city annihilation. By the end of the war, American B-29s had firebombed some 66 Japanese cities as part of a systematic series of area attacks. This massive and indiscriminate conventional assault helped pave the way for the nuclear attacks that followed in August 1945. Overy (1996) summarized the conventional scholarly wisdom on this subject in noting that "the difference between the atomic bomb and a conventional B-29 attack was largely academic in the case of Japan where the cities were ideally suited to area firebombing, which produced largely the same effects" (p. 125). But while the most significant disputes related to American conventional (and nuclear) attacks on Japanese cities are related to issues of efficacy and morality, there are a handful of important historiographical questions about the operational conduct of the bombing of Japan.

As was the case in Europe, the AAF began its large-scale bombing campaign against Japan in 1944 with an emphasis on daylight, visual attacks against specific military-industrial targets. These proved ineffective for a variety of reasons, including clouds and high winds that made it difficult to hit precision targets even without enemy opposition. In January 1945, Haywood Hansell was relieved of his duties as head of XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas and replaced by Curtis E. LeMay. Although LeMay was not the first to employ incendiary weapons, he perfected the art of urban fire-raising in the Pacific theater. On the night of March 9–10, 1945, he sent a massive force of B-29s on a low-level incendiary attack against the center of Tokyo. The spectacular destruction unleashed by LeMay's force that night – killing some 80,000 to 100,000 people in the course of burning 16 square miles of residential Tokyo – encouraged him to follow up with additional area attacks. In *Bombing to Win*, Pape (1996) suggested that the Tokyo fire raid marked an irrevocable shift in AAF strategy. "Precision bombing [in the Pacific] began in June 1944," he declared, "and ended in March 1945." With the firebombing of Tokyo, LeMay and the AAF embraced "a Douhetian strategy meant to inflict maximum damage on population centers" (pp. 101, 103).

In *The Journal of Military History*, Searle (2002) agreed that the attack on Tokyo, as well as subsequent fire raids against Japanese urban areas, were part of a strategy that explicitly targeted civilians. "Japanese civilian casualties," Searle asserted, "were not accidental or incidental, but an explicit goal of the incendiary raids on Japanese cities." However, Searle strongly disagreed with Pape and other scholars who pinpointed the March 1945 attack on Tokyo as a watershed moment. First, Searle suggested that since the AAF had already been conducting de facto area bombing in Europe, it made little sense to describe the firebombing of Japanese cities as a dramatic shift in doctrine or practice. Moreover, while the incendiary raids have received the most attention from historians, LeMay continued to conduct daylight precision attacks until the end of the war in the Pacific. "Thus neither LeMay nor the USAAF abandoned precision bombing in favor of area bombing," Searle argued. Rather, "they supplemented an unspectacular precision bombing campaign with a stunningly successful urban incendiary campaign" (pp. 105, 128).

The dispute over change and continuity with respect to the American bombing of Japan has spilled over into a debate over LeMay's role in the process. Most general accounts of the air war in the Pacific portray LeMay as the architect and chief proponent of the American incendiary campaign. Some specialists, including, Crane (1993), Buckley (1999), and Gentile (2001), have essentially endorsed this position, albeit with a number of qualifiers. Other scholars, however, have questioned the significance of LeMay in initiating the firebombing campaign. Searle (2002), for example, argued that an examination of planning documents from the AAF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) revealed that the firebombing of Japan had been an important part of American war plans since 1943. "Urban incendiary bombing was not LeMay's idea or even his primary goal," Searle argued, "he just made it work spectacularly well" (p. 128). In *Blankets of Fire*, Werrell (1996) agreed that "[a]lthough it is widely believed that LeMay was the force behind the firebombing, the pressure to firebomb Japan was present before he arrived on the scene" (pp. 150–151). Downes (2008) was even more emphatic in asserting that the desire of leaders in Washington to defeat Japan without the need for a costly invasion of the home islands ensured that the massive incendiary campaign unleashed against Japanese cities would have taken place with or without LeMay. As suggested by both Sherry (1987) and Frank (1999) in *Downfall*, however, LeMay is probably best understood neither as the sole initiator of incendiary bombing nor as a passive agent of larger structural forces. Like Arthur Harris in his role as head of RAF's Bomber Command, LeMay's contribution was forthrightly to embrace urban area attacks with an enthusiasm that transcended the bureaucratic and operational pressures that were already pointing in that direction.

Another lingering question about the AAF's incendiary campaign is the role that race and racism played in driving (or least easing) the shift toward area attacks in the Pacific. Even if we accept Searle's (2002) argument that the United States had already been engaged in similar tactics in Europe, there was at the very least a substantial difference in the way AAF leaders presented their operations in the two theaters. While the AAF remained at least rhetorically committed to precision bombing in Europe, there was little attempt to disguise the nature of the devastating fire raids against Tokyo and other Japanese cities. Echoing John Dower's pioneering study *War Without Mercy* (1986), a number of scholars have suggested that American racism helped facilitate both the conduct and rhetoric of city annihilation in the Pacific

theater. Sherry (1987) noted that even in the interwar period, “[t]he ease and openness with which bombing Japan was mentioned and ethical considerations were disregarded had no equivalent in speculation about war against Germany or other Western nations.” This “long tradition of casual racism” toward the Japanese was only exacerbated by the fighting in the Pacific, which had racial dimensions that were not present in the European theater. Strategic bombing against Japan thus proceeded without any of the checks, including “concern over the fate of friendly civilians and religious institutions” that at least sometimes acted to constrain AAF leaders in Europe (pp. 60, 114, 170). Schaffer expressed similar sentiments in *Wings of Judgment*, noting that “[a]nti-Japanese sentiment was quite different from the predominant American opinion about Germans, which acted as a brake against bombing civilians rather than as an impetus to attack them” (Schaffer 1985, p. 155). Biddle agreed that “If race alone did not determine the nature of the air war in the Far East, it certainly intensified a campaign already characterized by strong emotions and forces ... [a]nd race did account entirely for the rhetoric associated with the Far Eastern air campaign” (Biddle 2003, p. 270).

Not all scholars agree that race played a significant role in the bombing of Japan. In *Targeting Civilians in War*, Downes argued that “racism did not cause the shift to firebombing in the Far East or the use of the atom bombs” and that “[a] more convincing answer is provided by the varying susceptibility of Japanese and German construction to fire” (Downes 2008, p. 140). Crane (1993), Werrell (1996), Frank (1999), and Hastings (2008) all downplayed the role of racism in dictating the shift to area bombing in the Pacific. Instead, they stressed a variety of practical factors, including not only the particular vulnerability of Japanese cities to fire, but also the gradual erosion of moral constraints against the killing of civilians that had begun in the European theater, the pressure on AAF leaders to show dramatic results from the tremendous investment in strategic bombing, and the fact that many Japanese industries were scattered in small shops located in the midst of dense urban areas. “The most direct reason for the switch,” argued McFarland, “was the simplest and most pragmatic: from high altitudes, 20th Air Force bombardiers could not hit the nail on the head or the broad side of a barn. They aimed at what they could hit – cities” (McFarland 1995, p. 205).

While scholarly debates over the timing and rationale behind the AAF’s shift to area bombing in the Pacific remain, ultimately it seems likely that both the conventional and nuclear attacks on Japanese cities and civilians were essentially over-determined. By 1945, a variety of forces, ranging from the racial ideology of white supremacy to the operational limits of American bombsights, were all pointing toward a strategy of city annihilation in the Pacific. None of the factors that had acted to restrain at least partially the conduct of AAF bombing in Europe – including the desire to distinguish itself from the British and concerns over damage to building and monuments with a deep historical resonance in western culture – were relevant in the case of Japan. The result was an unchecked and largely unquestioned use of airpower against cities and civilians that culminated with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The most enduringly controversial questions arising out of the Anglo-American bombing campaigns are those related to efficacy and morality. Did the substantial investment in men and material devoted to strategic bombing by the United States and Great Britain contribute significantly to the eventual Allied victory? Or could

those resources have been somehow put to better use, either in pursuit of a different bombing strategy or perhaps invested in something else altogether? More philosophically, what role, if any, should ethical, moral, and legal concerns over the mass killing of noncombatants play in our assessment of the Allied bombing campaigns?

Political scientist Robert A. Pape has offered the most far-reaching criticism of the efficacy of strategic bombing in World War II. In *Bombing to Win*, Pape (1996) flatly denied that bombing made any significant contribution to Allied victory. In the European theater, he insisted that it “made virtually no difference” and that “[e]ven if there had been no strategic bombing campaign at all, the war would have ended in the same way and at just about the same time.” The most important factor in the defeat of Germany was the advance of Allied ground troops. The one major contribution of strategic bombers, drawing out the *Luftwaffe* to be destroyed in the air, could have been accomplished equally well at a far lower cost by employing tactical airpower against strictly military targets. In the Pacific, Pape argued that “Japan’s military position was so poor that its leaders would likely have surrendered before invasion and at roughly the same time in August, even if the United States had not employed strategic bombing or the atomic bomb.” Aerial attacks on Japanese cities were a wasted effort, as that nation’s leaders did not care about civilian casualties and the war industries contained within those cities had already been rendered useless by a crippling naval blockade that cut off the raw materials necessary to keep them running (Pape 1996, pp. 281, 89).

Few if any historians have embraced Pape’s sweeping dismissal of the role of bombing in the defeat of Germany and Japan. A number of scholars, however, have offered more measured critiques of strategic bombing’s contribution to the war effort. Biddle (2003) concluded that bombing helped prepare the way for the successful Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe in June 1944, not only by crippling the *Luftwaffe* but also by destroying crucial transportation targets that prevented the Germans from reinforcing the area around the Normandy beachhead. However, Biddle also cited official postwar bombing surveys conducted by both the United States and Great Britain which indicated that area bombing was largely ineffective in either breaking German morale or reducing war production. Sherry also cast grave doubts on the efficacy of the Allied air effort. Although bombing may have contributed in some measure to Allied victory, a combination of technological fanaticism and a lack of agreement over how best to pursue the air offensive led Anglo-American air planners to fall into the trap of “overkill: redundant and pointless destruction” (Sherry 1987, p. 152).

The sharpest criticism of the Allied air effort – even from historians generally supportive of strategic bombing’s contribution to victory – has been reserved for Harris and his dogmatic insistence on employing Bomber Command as a blunt instrument for the destruction of German cities. Levine decried the insistence of Harris (with the support of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill) on continuing to attack indiscriminately German cities through the end of the war. “The effort expended against cities,” he argued, “would have contributed more to victory – and have simplified postwar reconstruction – if it had instead been aimed at oil and transportation targets” (Levine 1992, pp. 193, 174). Biddle agreed that “[h]ad Harris been persuaded to put the full weight of the resources at his command on German military targets, victory in Europe conceivably might have come sooner than it did”

(Biddle 1995, p. 124). Hansen similarly concluded that Harris's dogged insistence on area bombing "not only failed to win the war, it probably prolonged it" (Hansen 2009, p. 281). Garrett joined in condemning Harris's monomaniacal focus on area attacks as both militarily and ethically questionable, though he also noted that "the ultimate moral culpability for the inhumanity of the area offensive must lie at the feet of those who had the power, not just in theory but in actuality, to force a change of policy" (Garrett 1993, p. 61).

On the American side, Richard G. Davis critiqued the AAF's target selection even as he argued that strategic bombing in Europe "vindicated the treasure expended on it" by inflicting "severe, if not fatal, damage to the German military and German war economy" (Davis 1993). In particular, Davis lamented that "area bombing failed on both military and humanitarian grounds; it did not shorten the war and it took lives unnecessarily." Building on the findings of the postwar United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), he concluded that the Allied bombs expended on indiscriminate area attacks would have been much more efficiently targeted against specific military-industrial targets, and particularly against the German oil industry. Although he was sympathetic to the pressures faced by Spaatz and other AAF air leaders, he ultimately concluded that "the Allies might have won the war earlier" if they had remained more disciplined in their approach to bombing German industry (pp. 589–590, 592, 418). Smith (1990) similarly lauded the overall contribution of strategic bombing to victory while lamenting that

at the end of the war the larger part of the heavy bomber forces, about 65 per cent of the total available bomb load, remained adamantly targeted on general area bombing while the Western Allies' land forces were struggling through Europe, their advance indubitably aided by the selective and specific bombing of the other 35 per cent.

Smith also noted that the priority given to strategic bombing diverted long-range aircraft from the Allied effort to stamp out the U-boat menace in the Atlantic, and thus "may actually have prolonged the defensive stance that the Allies had to adopt in the sea war and thus, in effect, have delayed the American build-up in Europe for D-Day" (pp. 80–81).

Other scholars, while acknowledging failings of the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe, have placed greater emphasis on what they deem to be its significant contribution to victory. In *The Air War*, Overy (1980) argued that when evaluated in terms of its actual accomplishments, rather than against the inflated rhetorical claims of some of its more enthusiastic proponents, "bombing achieved all that was expected of it." While bombing alone did not win the war in Europe, this was never a realistic goal nor had Allied leaders expected such a result. When employed as a complement to naval and ground warfare, however, it was tremendously effective: "The Luftwaffe was fatally weakened; German transportation was successfully interdicted; the submarine and V-weapons successfully combated from the air; the German economy increasingly eroded in the year-long conquest of mainland Europe." Overy acknowledged that German arms production continued to increase for much of the war in spite of increasingly powerful Allied aerial attacks. However, bombing "prevented the increase from being very considerably greater than it was [and] placed a ceiling on German war production." Without bombing, he argued, the Allies would

have faced "a longer and far more costly battle for the final defeat of fascism" that "might have made necessary the use of atomic weapons in Europe as well" (Overy 1980, pp. 118, 123, 125).

Overy offered a renewed argument for the efficacy of strategic bombing in *Why the Allies Won* (Overy 1996). Drawing on research into the Anglo-American and Axis war economies, he concluded that "the air offensive was one of the decisive elements in Allied victory." For the United States and Great Britain, strategic bombing played to their comparative advantages by allowing them "to bring their considerable economic and scientific power to bear on the contest." The resulting "harvest of destruction and disruption reaped by bomb attack, random and poorly planned as it often was, was sufficient to blunt German economic ambitions." Perhaps even more important than the damage done to war industries was the drain that bombing inflicted on thinly stretched German military resources, forcing them to divert valuable men and equipment away from the frontlines in order to defend against the Allied aerial assault. The result was "not a single, spectacular victory, but a slow and lethal erosion of fighting capability" that nevertheless was crucial to assuring victory in Europe with far fewer Anglo-American casualties than would have been required had it not been for bombing (Overy 1996, pp. 133, 129, 130).

Buckley (1999) offered a similarly robust defense of strategic bombing's role in Allied victory in Europe. Although he conceded that it was not always used in the most efficient manner possible, Buckley insisted that in "strategic terms, the necessity and value of the combined bombing offensive to Allied victory is irrefutable." Like Overy, he stressed "the direct impact on the German economy caused by the physical damage of bombing" as well as "the massive redeployment of resources to counter the bombing raids ... [and] the imposed attrition of the *Luftwaffe* caused by the bomber offensive, especially from the spring of 1944 onwards" (Buckley 1999, pp. 164, 168). Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet reached nearly identical conclusions in *A War to Be Won*, declaring that "the Combined Bomber Offensive was essential to the defeat of Nazi Germany ... It was not elegant, it was not humane, but it was effective" (Murray and Millet 2000, p. 335).

Stephen L. McFarland not only defended the overall contribution of Anglo-American bombing to victory Europe, but also suggested that curtailing indiscriminate area attacks in favor of more directed precision strikes might have been counterproductive. "More precise bombing would still have destroyed the resources Germany required to wage war," he suggested, "but by its very preciseness would have failed to convince the German people they were beaten" (McFarland 1995, p. 189). Richard Frank also placed emphasis on this particular motivation for area bombing, noting that Allied leaders purposely "did not intervene to halt the movement to less discriminate [bombing] attacks ... because of a shared perspective that ultimate Allied security rested not simply on driving the aggressors back behind their borders but on reordering their societies" (Frank 1999, p. 47).

In the Pacific theater, critical analysis of the impact of American strategic bombing on the outcome of the war has largely been overshadowed by the vast scholarship on the use of the atomic bomb. While Pape (1996) offered the most dramatic dismissal of bombing's impact, arguing that it made no difference whatsoever in the timing of Japanese surrender, other scholars have made similar arguments. Sherry (1987) conceded that the firebombing campaign did effectively target the

“feeder system” of small industries scattered throughout Japanese cities and that its “destruction did serious damage to Japan’s war economy and thereby was implicitly justified.” However, drawing on evidence from the postwar USSBS reports, he also argued that these industries were already starved of raw materials thanks to the strangling submarine blockade of the home islands. “In short,” Sherry suggested, “much of LeMay’s bombing simply made the rubble of Japan’s war economy bounce.” And though the wholesale destruction of Japanese cities by fire surely had some impact on civilian morale, it “still did not add up to an immediate threat to the government or constitute the lever Americans could work to effect surrender” (Sherry 1987, pp. 285–286, 314).

In *Blankets of Fire*, Kenneth P. Werrell agreed that bombing had “no significant effect on the Japanese economy, since the factories it destroyed were already in decline or idle because of a lack of materials.” He also conceded that lowered civilian morale as a result of the firebombings “could not directly end the war in an authoritarian society.” However, he insisted that bombing did play an important role in compelling surrender due to its “emotional impact on the thinking of the decisionmakers.” While the Japanese military cared little for civilian casualties, “both the emperor and civilian leaders did care and were moved” (Werrell 1996, pp. 241, 235). Crane (1993), Frank (1999), and Hastings (2008) offered similar arguments with respect to the psychological impact of the American firebombing campaign on the Japanese leadership and its eventual decision to surrender.

Ultimately, the scholarly debate on the role of conventional bombing in ending the war in the Pacific has foundered on many of the same issues of evidence and methodology that have hamstrung the debate over the atomic bomb. The postwar USSBS reports were relatively conclusive with respect to the effects of the blockade versus those of bombing, and even scholarly defenders of the US conventional bombing campaign have conceded that it had little net impact on Japanese military production that was already stalled due to lack of supplies. However, neither the USSBS reports nor other sources have been able to provide a conclusive body of evidence with respect to the decision-making of Japanese leaders surrounding the end of the war. Postwar interviews of surviving Japanese leaders offered sometimes conflicting accounts, all of which must be viewed skeptically given that they were conducted by representatives of an occupying power after the end of the fighting. Nor do currently available Japanese wartime records provide definitive answers to the many questions surrounding the relative role of conventional bombing, the blockade, the atomic bomb, Soviet entry, and general war weariness in prompting surrender. Barring fresh revelations from the Japanese archives, any evaluation of bombing’s contribution to Allied victory in the Pacific will remain a matter of interpretation and debate.

Traditionally rooted in military history, most pre-1980 scholarly treatments of Allied strategic bombing largely ignored its moral, ethical, and legal ramifications in evaluating its contribution to the war effort. Schaffer’s article on “American Military Ethics in World War II” sought among other things to complicate that picture. While he did not outright condemn the bombing of civilians, he did suggest that the AAF’s de facto embrace of area raids against German cities made it “somewhat harder to distinguish the ethical conduct of the United States in World War II from its conduct in Vietnam and in other wars from the morality of other nations that practiced terror

bombing” (Schaffer 1980, p. 334). In *Wings of Judgment*, Schaffer (1985) devoted substantial space to considering how the culture of the military and civilian organizations that planned and executed the American bombing campaigns combined with the pressure of the war to produce a kind of “groupthink” that overcame any moral or ethical concerns about the mass killing of civilians. Sherry offered a similar but somewhat broader set of arguments, arguing that “[t]he leaders and technicians of the American air force were driven by technological fanaticism – a pursuit of destructive ends expressed, sanctioned, and disguised by the organization and application of technological means” (Sherry 1987, pp. 251–252). By focusing intently on process and technology, AAF leaders, airmen, and their civilian overseers were able to avoid grappling with the moral and ethical issues raised by the increasingly destructive American bombing campaign.

Responding to arguments by Sherry and Schaffer, some military historians flatly rejected the notion that ethical concerns about the targeting of civilians should play any role in historical evaluations of the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive. In “American Military Ethics in World War II: An Exchange,” Mierzejewski and Werrell took Schaffer to task for even raising the issue. Mierzejewski argued that Schaffer had “done us a disservice” by implying that “our military leaders should permit moral judgments to govern their strategic decisions.” AAF leaders had been motivated by pragmatic concerns over efficacy, which “was and still is the best view that military leaders should have.” Werrell argued that “[w]ar itself is immoral, so only degrees of morality, or immorality, can be discussed.” Applying this relative standard, Werrell concluded that the conduct of the American bombing of Germany was “clearly superior on moral grounds to that of the British and German bombing, as well as American bombing in other theaters and other wars” (Mierzejewski, Werrell, and Schaffer 1981, pp. 86, 87, 89).

Buckley (1999) offered a similarly robust defense of Anglo-American bombing. The targeting of civilians was nothing new, he suggested, and bombing differed little in its effects from more traditional sieges or naval blockades that killed by starving the population. He also questioned whether special immunity ought to be bestowed on civilians who were “organizing and supporting the war effort in Germany.” Ultimately, Buckley concluded, the only relevant criteria in evaluating strategic bombing was that of efficacy: “If it contributed significantly to the defeat of the Axis powers, then it becomes more acceptable; if it did not, then area bombing in particular becomes indefensible” (Buckley 1999, p. 6). Davis offered a slightly more nuanced version of this argument, suggesting that the civilian casualties caused by Allied area bombing should be weighed against “the extent to which the action contributed to ending the war as quickly as possible with minimum loss of life” (Davis 1993, p. 592). Overy, meanwhile, sought to “lay aside the moral issue” entirely on the grounds that “[strategic bombing’s] strategic merits or limitations are distinct from its ethical implications, however closely entwined they have become in the contemporary debate” (Overy 1996, p. 128).

Other scholars have sought to broaden the context in which Anglo-American bombing is evaluated, moving beyond military history to consider its wider ethical implications. In “Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the Fate of Urban Places,” geographer Kenneth Hewitt condemned Allied conventional bombing effort as not only unnecessary (in that it came at a time when Germany and Japan were already well on their way

to defeat), but also comparable to genocide. "Any policy of war that indiscriminately makes places its targets, whether settlements, political groupings, or whole nations," he suggested, "takes a large step toward the ultimate politico-biological crime of genocide, for the certain fulfillment of such a policy is possible only through the annihilation of places and people" (Hewitt 1983, pp. 259–260). Eric Markusen and David Kopf took this argument even further in *The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing*. Not only was Allied strategic bombing genocidal in its "calculated slaughter of masses of defenseless innocent human beings on the basis of their membership in a group rather than because of what they as individuals did or did not do," it also had important similarities to the Nazi's campaign of extermination aimed at European Jews. While they acknowledged that there were "important differences between the Holocaust and the strategic-bombing campaigns," Markusen and Kopf ultimately concluded that "the two killing projects were in fact facilitated by some of the same psychological, organizational, and scientific-technological processes" (Markusen and Kopf 1995, pp. 257, 237).

Although relatively few scholars of Allied strategic bombing have been willing to embrace the accusations of genocide levied by Hewitt, Markusen, and Kopf, several have delivered harsh verdicts that fall somewhat short of that charge. In *Choices Under Fire*, Michael Bess characterized "the practices of large-scale area bombing and firebombing of cities" as "atrocities, pure and simple." He based this judgment on the fact that by 1944, "the Anglo-Americans increasingly possessed both the technology and the know-how to conduct a very different kind of aerial warfare: far more precise, measured, and controlled." The fact that the US and Great Britain escalated their indiscriminate bombing of cities and civilians after 1944 when they could have won the war (and perhaps more quickly) through the selective use of airpower against military-industrial targets constituted "the single greatest moral failure of the Anglo-American war effort" (Bess 2006, p. 110). Focusing more narrowly on a reading of the legal issue, Manfred Messerschmidt argued that "[s]trategic bombing of the civilian population was for years a blatant violation of international law, carried out with the consent of both the political and military leadership, and on the authority of Churchill, Roosevelt and Truman" (Messerschmidt 1992, p. 307).

Since 2001, some scholars have directly linked the legacy of strategic bombing in World War II to 9/11 and the issue of terrorism. In the introduction to an edited collection on *Bombing Civilians*, Yuki Tanaka argued that the September 11 attacks "can be seen as a variation of indiscriminate bombing using civilian instead of military planes." Explicitly invoking the American conventional and nuclear attacks on Japanese cities, Tanaka asserted that "killing civilians is a crime against humanity regardless of the asserted military justification, a crime that should be punished on the basis of the Nuremberg and Geneva principles" (Tanaka and Young 2009, pp. 6–7). In *Among the Dead Cities*, philosopher A. C. Grayling invoked similar logic in suggesting that there was

very little difference in principle between the RAF's Operation Gomorrah [the 1943 firebombing of Hamburg], or the USAAF's atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York by terrorists on 11 September 2001 ... All these terrorist attacks are atrocities, consisting in deliberate mass murder of civilians to hurt and coerce the society they belong to. (Grayling 2005, p. 278)

There remain a number of underexplored areas in the literature on Anglo-American strategic bombing. As Davis (1993) and Crane (1993) have demonstrated, historians would benefit from greater efforts to integrate a detailed study of the operational records of the AAF and Bomber Command with the more sweeping high-level analysis of war aims, ethics, and efficacy that characterizes much of the literature on this subject. The scholarly focus on strategic bombing has also sometimes obscured the extensive Anglo-American use of tactical airpower, particularly in Europe. For civilians on the ground, it mattered little if the bombs dropped on them came from high-altitude formations of B-17s or a lone fighter-bomber flying at housetop level. As Anglo-American armies advanced through Western Europe, the devastation unleashed on small German towns and cities by tactical airpower was often indistinguishable from that inflicted by strategic bombers.

As with the ongoing controversy over the use of atomic bombs against Japan, the scholarly literature on Anglo-American strategic bombing in World War II is unlikely ever to reach a tidy resolution. While a more fine-grained analysis of the many factors that went into the use of airpower by the western Allies would be welcome, it is unlikely to offer definitive answers to the divisive questions of efficacy, ethics, and morality that continue to hang over the field. Perhaps the most intriguing possibility for the future development of this scholarship lays in integrating the robust specialist literature on bombing with more general studies of law, ethics, and the fate of noncombatants. Marc Selden has observed that

[t]he most important way in which World War II shaped the moral and technological tenor of mass destruction was the erosion of the stigma associated with the systematic slaughter of civilians from the air, and elimination of the constraints that for some years had restrained certain air powers from area bombing. (Selden 2009, p. 87)

Hopefully, the future will see scholars expanding their efforts to join the study of strategic bombing in World War II with related issues involving the targeting of civilians, particularly with respect to the ensuing cold war nuclear arms.

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PART IV

**Multinational and Transnational
Zones of Combat: Society**

CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

European Societies in Wartime

ISABELLE DAVION

Even if it is rather common to highlight the fact that two-thirds of the 55 million people killed worldwide between 1939 and 1945 were civilians, it is rare to come across a study on how the average citizen lived, if such a person ever existed. The multilayered complexities of a nation at war can only be understood through the study of these societies as they confronted this particular moment of their history, which first demands that we attempt to tackle the blurry notion of everyday life.

Since the 1990s, the notion of “war culture” put forth by World War I specialists has permitted us to inquire into the degree of “consent” or “coercion” in European societies (when studies of World War II have focused on the social mood before September 1939) that led to the war. But more and more research regards the years of war from below, with a growing interest on home fronts. Thus, Bartov et al. (2003) initiate an analysis of “the collective mechanisms at work in belligerent societies” (p. 9). While studying how the two world wars were received by entire societies, this work compares the organization and the behavior of the civilians in the two conflicts, particularly in the chapter written by John Horne. To consider the societal consequences of the war, all elements – human, material and moral – must be taken into account – first of all the political, professional, and family contexts, and then the various social or generational groups – in order to put in perspective a frame of reference regarding all behaviors of daily life, such as the meals, the modes of cultural consumption, or the violence both endured and inflicted. Hence, the necessary integration of other disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, of course, but also psychoanalysis and philosophy, which are among the greatest stakes of future research, is necessary. Was war the same for everyone? Obviously not, especially if we remember that Jean-Paul Sartre alleged in an article published by *Les Lettres Françaises* in September 1944 that “We have never been freer than we were during the Occupation” (Sartre 1949). Even if he spoke about the freedom to transcend any situation by subjective effort rather than by the excitement to defy curfews during Parisian parties,

he illustrates the variety of experiences brought by total war. And in order to stick to social and cultural problematics regarding home fronts, I choose here not to include works dealing with the situation of the Jewish people or everyday life inside the ghettos, questions that are analyzed with the emphasis they deserve in other chapters.

On the other hand, it may be suggested that war provides a common experience to multiple European societies, which can legitimate a comparative approach to the question. As asserted earlier, the historiographical renewal surrounding World War II is mainly due to the studies comparing it with the Great War, and first and foremost on the *violence of war* theme, like in Audoin-Rouzeau et al. (2002), *La violence de guerre 1914–1945*. But the comparative approach between the various European civilian experiences is still a brand new project, since each nation has long striven to emphasize the uniqueness of the course of its historical development. Many comprehensive works, though, have dealt with comparisons of the western belligerent states. Christophe Charle (2001) uses social history for a comparative perspective, highlighting each country's differences through their own social dynamic. The approach is different to the book edited by Mark Harrison (1998) in which authors introduce elements of comparison, particularly for Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, while dealing with each one in separate chapters. In comparative history, the parallel of personal experiences of the war between western and east-central European societies remains on the agenda for future work on World War II. A wide diversity of tools are available to address this huge enterprise in which the knowledge of languages is not the least of obstacles. Collections of documents of the Third Reich have been compiled by each occupied country – for example, *Europe unterm Hakenkreuz: die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus, 1938–1945* (1988–1996) and, also a huge collective work, *Nationalsozialistische Besatzungspolitik in Europa 1939–1945* (1996–2001) undertaken by the European Science Foundation – in order to write a global history of the German occupation in Europe. Both of the above collections enable researchers to build the framework of a comparative approach to directly or indirectly occupied countries, with all their characteristic nuances. For an overview, Mark Mazower (2008) shows how the Nazis improvised on an ad hoc basis after each conquest. In the third tome of his trilogy on Nazi Germany, *The Third Reich at War*, Richard J. Evans (2008), draws up an extremely complete panorama of the various considerations prevailing in the administrative structures developed in each territory under Nazi control.

Historians have traditionally focused on east-central Europe's dramatic political history and conceived of the area where war began as the place of mass murdering and Holocaust (Snyder 2010). But since the beginning of the 1990s, with the German reunification and the changing political landscape of this region, an interest in the cultural history of World War II arose in the wake of occidental confrontation with the legacies of the war in eastern countries, the reemergence of European states at war in former Yugoslavia, the prospect of the European integration of east-central European countries, and the growing attention to the questions of nation and national identity all through the continent. At the same time, one cannot but notice the persistence of political studies of World War II in east-central Europe; the ideological and institutional lens still takes precedence over the societal approach which is still in its birth pangs. To explain this, Pieter Lagrou (2000) observes that the clean political break which appeared between the prewar period and the postwar period in east-central

Europe justifies renewed studies on the matter; in the west, where the break is not as radical (the author highlights the various resemblances between the French Fourth Republic and the Third), new criteria have to be found to evaluate the impact of the war, such as the changes within social relations or cultural behaviors (p. 2). Czechoslovak philosopher Jan Patočka (1975) has claimed, on the contrary, that it took a long time for World War II to trigger global analyses because its beginnings and course seemed clear. At the same time, as peace failed to give war a meaning – remember that the peace treaties date back to 1990 – it has not been studied as such, but rather through the prism of state structures and national destiny, which is a vision dominated by Marxist ideology.

Whatever the approach, the research on societies at war – except for a few innovative works such as Gordon Wright (1997) – truly took off from the 1990s onward. But, researchers of the historiographical renewal in the east and in the west can hardly agree on interpretative patterns of the societies at war. At the time, Western historians took interest in collective consciousness, the individual or collective handling of suffering, or the adaptation to extreme violence. George L. Mosse (1991) brilliantly undertook such research. The concepts of *brutalization* of the societies and the *trivialization* of violence that he elaborated for World War I are now largely questioned. For example, in Warsaw posters threatening the death penalty covered walls from October 1939 along with the establishment of terror. In the *Dictionnaire critique*, Jerzy W. Borejsza (1995) explains in his chapter on Warsaw that the Poles in the general government were subjected to the death penalty for even the most innocent behavior – for the baking of white bread or for a high consumption of electricity, or even preventatively – which turned out to be nonsensical and therefore less impressive on the Poles? Polish society was entirely under “the law of death,” as Tomasz Szarota (1973/1988) sums it up in his pioneering work. In east-central Europe the political vision still dominates the interpretation of World War II which remains widely considered due to Nazi and fascist violence, and also to the fact that societies at the time embodied various levels of the totalitarian ideal type.

From the historiography of the 1990s, quality studies emerged, which, regardless that there was too much investment in the political field, nonetheless reflects many insights into the topic of wartime societies. One such an example is Detlef Brandes (1999). Moreover, as the Nazi occupation was a favored topic in the 1970s, notably among such Polish historians as Edward Serwański (1970), it does not generate as much interest as before. Thus, it was unwittingly excluded by scholars when the first historiographic renewal occurred. As far as the Czech society is concerned, one can refer to the historiographical synthesis of a specialist of the period, Jan Gebhart (2001). A synthesis about Slovak historiography also exists: Ivan Kamenec (2008, pp. 157–216) reviews the history of the Slovak home front and evaluates the lack of everyday life studies. In his article on “central Europe” in the dictionary by Azéma and Bédarida, Karel Bartošek notices how, from 1989 onward, the understanding of the war years was used until then by those in power to legitimize its existence (Bartošek 1995). This use of the war has obviously evolved, without any huge upheaval, and sometimes some virulent anticommunism substitutes were used for a new basic pattern.

Yet, objectivity remains by focusing on the question of democracy and its relations with nationalism. The East European theater of war is known to have been, in many

ways, quite distinct from the other theaters of war. Most East European countries experienced not one, but two occupying forces during the war, being either occupied by national socialist Germany or the Soviet Union, or being occupied by Germany and then “liberated” by the Soviet Union. While numerous studies have explored the effects of the occupying regimes on the respective societies of East Europe, new research tries to grasp the East European perspective on World War II. This is, for example, the direction taken by the Deutsches Historisches Institut in Warsaw in order to bring together scholars from both Eastern and Western Europe and the United States.

Much work is still to be done and distinctive temporalities linked to Eastern and Western societies have to be highlighted before comparing territories; the study of everyday life enables an empirical approach that should provide interpretative patterns wherever it is possible. The research performed in a national framework has emphasized differences in behaviors from one region to another. It should be recalled that in France, apart from being an occupied zone and a so-called free zone, 4 million southeastern French people lived under the rule of 200,000 Italian soldiers as well as Blackshirts and OVRA policemen until capitulation in September 1943. Their presence was not as benign as was asserted later on, which is underlined by Jean-Louis Panicacci (2010), and in the regions of Savoie, of Nice and of Corsica, repression descended upon the irredentists. These regional nuances appear also within east-central European countries – obviously the distinction between city and country is necessary – and should enable transnational cross-checking because there already are numerous local monographs such as those from Callum MacDonald and Jan Kaplan (1995), Zbyněk Válka (2004), Stanisławska Lewandowska (2003) and Dušan Kováč (2006). These studies generally focus on social changes with rare incursions into social moods.

But so far in Western historiography of the home fronts in World War II, east-central Europe has remained partly *terra incognita*. In his article “East-Central Europe in Historiographic Concepts of German Historical Studies,” Eduard Mühle (2009) explains that this is still an open question. This recent book includes, typical for the neglect by the genre, no study about the social or cultural history of World War II. It focuses instead on political problematics. For that matter, debates about totalitarian experiences seem as much about the many calls for studies on everyday life, though with methodological cautions necessary. For example, the case of Bohemia-Moravia Protectorate apart, Czechs suffered a less harsh treatment due to the Nazi need to maximize industrial exploitation of both of these territories. In another book written by specialists (Aleksiun et al. 2004), societies in wartime are observed through the prism of resistance: the Armia Krajowa [home army] in Poland or the Ústřední vedení odboje domácího [central leadership of home resistance] in Bohemia-Moravia. Yet ordinary civilians are still the ones who fall as martyrs and as heroes.

These works are highly useful, because before comparing wartime societies, their political and administrative frames have to be specified and put in perspective. General studies may deal with this topic, as does Weinberg (1994), but not in a comparative way. The starting point of a comparative approach should be a typology of the new political situations which societies were plunged into. Slovaks, for example, formed their own state for the first time in their history, and this fact had repercussions on the

seemingly more or less normal life of individuals or families – as long as they were neither Jew or Czech – at least until the national uprising on August 29, 1944 (Kalina 2003). The political works on east-central Europe open a window on the general problematic related to this area, and on the evolving debates on World War II. Thus, Peter Sokolovič (2010) explains the main issues of the “young Slovak history” of offering a less contrasting vision of Tiso’s state. In the aftermath of the Marxists and exile historians, the openness to the everyday life is a contribution of this school, but it brings the issue of a certain rehabilitation of this idea of the state, in spite of the acknowledgement of its crime.

Studies about institutional surroundings of wartime societies also provide information on two important themes for studying everyday life. The first one concerns the relations between the occupier and occupied people. Philippe Burrin (1996) shows that most French citizens chose the expedient path of passive accommodation. The fact that they were all defeated societies is a fundamental feature common to all European countries (Azéma and Bédarida 1995), even if the roughness of the occupation varied according to a people’s position in the racial Nazi scale. The occupier and the occupied belonged to separate worlds. For example, Wiewiorka pictures the endless lines in front of the shops while the Germans enjoyed the best supplies; in Paris, a *Soldatenkino*, Le Rex on the Grands Boulevards, was specifically reserved for the Germans (Bertin-Maghit 1989). Therefore, contacts were only the obligatory ones, and reflected all the range of human reactions between “supreme contempt” and “self-interested complicity”; and women also followed various behaviors, even if they were often described either as Mother Courage or as whores. The Czech case raises the specific issue of life with the German inhabitants of Bohemia-Moravia (Gebhart and Šedivý 2003), as well as in the annexed Sudeten (Zimmermann 1999), and also describes the lot of the Czech culture, but also the social mood marked by dissatisfaction among the Germans confronted with shortages.

Everywhere throughout the continent compromises were made, for most of the civilian people resigned themselves to a *fait accompli*. Wiewiorka recalls that the total war proclaimed by Germany, and thus the toughening of occupation, shook the *modus vivendi* in France. That is, some occupied people joined an open or even armed dissidence, and we know how the STO (Service du Travail Obligatoire) filled the French Maquis. But on a European scale, we observe that when there was state collaboration, and so dissidence was limited (Rings 1982). Monographs enable an understanding of the day-to-day connivance and resistance which characterized the societies where there was no longer a state (Wójcik 1998).

The second theme concerns the professional cultures and the sociological study of behaviors and practices within professions. The civil servants had priority; the work of Marc O. Baruch (1997) underscores what historians might name the “Bridge on the River Kwai syndrome.” In other words, among *préfets* more particularly, historians must study closely the life of the ministries of home affairs, national education, or finances. Other practices have been attentively observed. In *Une exception ordinaire*, Alain Bancaud (2002) explores the life of French lawyers through judges’ careers and the evolution of verdicts. In the French historiographical field, the sociological studies of professions grew in number, and elsewhere in Europe other scholars have followed, as represented by Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz (1999), or Lucjan Dobroszycki (1994) who focuses more on intellectual than material conditions.

Such work provides information about the social and economical conditions and the various rhythms of the everyday life. Steven Zdatny (1990) concentrates particularly on the social history of the archetypical *petit bourgeois* of France. In *The Politics of Survival*, the fifth part is devoted to "Vichy, the Broken Promise," where the author underscores the optimism of men and women hoping that Pétain's social conservatism, rooted in the values of the peasant and the artisan, was going to protect them: "The Artisan," said Pétain in his May Day speech of 1942, "is one of the vital forces of our nation, and I attach special importance to its development, its conservation, and its perfection" (p. 128). Zdatny (1999) also explores hairdressers' daily life. French workers have also been closely studied by Peschanski and Robert (1992), where the contributors question the uniqueness of the workers' war experience and of their behaviors, such as a "wait-and-see attitude," withdrawal on familial or individual spheres, fear, mistrust of the power, or others that seem to be the predominant feelings until 1942. This apathy vanishes very slowly with a certain delay in comparison to the middle classes as analyzed through Guillon's article in Peschanski and Robert. Coal miners' everyday life in North-Pas-de-Calais is exposed; the extreme harshness of the terror regime, established right from the first resistance acts in 1940, is obvious, as well as resentment toward the Polish community and its so-called dubious resourcefulness is shown in Petit's article. A repressive occupant, a hard economic mobilization: the Northern miners' strikes in May–June 1941 and October 1943, which mixed material and political claims, constituted a brave response that cost them freedom and life through shooting or deportation.

Indeed, wartime life did not rid France of social antagonisms. In spite of an interlude of labor peace with no strikes and an acceptance of tough work conditions during the first months of mobilization, as analyzed by Stéphane Sirot (2002), working-class demands remained in their traditional forms or adapted to the context. Going on strike was still a possibility for these workers chained to the war effort, and wartime was a turbulent period for social relations. All through Europe strikes were forbidden, and in France the practice of stoppage spread in order to minimize the risk of being arrested. An example is where railway workers suspended their activity for 15 minutes (Chevandier 2002). Sirot has also studied the rallying cries to oppose German or collaborationist measures when working conditions were still burning issues, including in occupied countries. This was the case, for example, in Belgium as revealed by the publication of two spontaneous surveys made during occupation about the social mood among the elite and the working class (Struye and Jacquemins 2002), or in Slovakia where huge strikes and acts of sabotage erupted in the textile factories of Žilina in summer 1943 (Průcha 2004). Some stoppages had patriotic motivations: a report from the Parisian police mentions how some workers observed a minute's silence on November 11, 1943; or insurrectionary strikes that broke out in the aftermath of the landings in Italy in 1943, and in Paris and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1944. Regarding the Slovak case, we also have reports written by the district officials and published in 2005 that mention social movements in the big factories of the Revúca district during Spring 1944 (Lacko 2005).

The situation is different, of course, in other nations. In Great Britain, in a tripartite cooperation government and trade unions, employers managed to handle exceptionally numerous strikes (2,194 in 1944, according to Mitchell 1992).

Considering the German case, historians have highlighted the Third Reich's obsession with social peace, the support of the working class being vital to national consensus (Mason 1993).

To approach the crucial topics of resistance and collaboration on a European scale, Jacques Sémelin (1993) explains the essential concepts, following the pioneering study by Jorgen Haestrup (1981). Concerning east-central Europe's anti-Nazi uprisings, their distinctive processes are brought into perspective both in their territorial and social context by Jan Křen (2005). Various monographs enable us to study closely the sequences of events. Joanna K. M. Hanson (1982) analyzes the social structures as well as the life conditions in insurgent Warsaw. In an introduction to a comparative approach, Bob Moore (2000) notices how difficult it is to put different societies in perspective – structures of German rules varying from one territory to another. This is also underscored by two joint publications in the 1990s: Frank and Gotovitch's (1994, 1996), which analyze the phenomenon from below in a comparative way between France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, to study the class composition of the resistance group. Also, Guillon and Mencherini (1999) study rural and urban movements through the prism of society and culture in southern France, Italy, Greece, and Croatia.

In the same period, researchers have begun to take interest in the material conditions of the resistance, as did historian and former resister himself, Henri Noguères (1984). For a comparative study, it is possible to choose a delimited area in the field of "the social history of the resistance," which is also the name of the collection of works gathered by Antoine Prost (1997). In this book that questions the influence of the resistance and society, and vice versa, he asks: does the recruitment mirror the social body? Thus, the mechanics of spontaneous engagement appears to reflect the individual's unequal availability, that is, that their jobs and regular income allowed them periodic freedom to resist, which could explain the relative underrepresentation of the working class in this matter. A social history approach also leads Kedward (1994) to examine how the circumstances of occupation and resistance affected the ways of life of rural communities. In East Europe, resistance was also studied through social and economic prisms by Salmonowicz et al. (1999).

After the sociological approach, anthropological research has combined macro-histories with micro-histories. The various national analyses have begun to write the history of women in the European resistance, opening the window to comparative studies such as Hart (1996), Weitz (1998), and Wickert (1995). Authors in the Wickert study explore the motives for women's activism, their daily experiences as partisans, including the risks taken. Jane Slaughter (1997) uses extensive interviews to build an intelligible context that helps describe how people worked to overthrow the fascist regime.

Such studies enable historians to evaluate the successes and the limits of the totalitarian attempts at transforming civil societies; this is clearly the goal of Bosworth's (2005) study. He examines the life of ordinary Italians, from all classes, who for the most part "continued to draw their identities from, and craft their behavior around, other strands of their lives, woven from their multilayered comprehension of culture, class, family, gender, region, age, religion and a host of other factors, whether stable or shifting" (p. 562). Mazower (1993) writes a detailed chronicle of daily life in Greek society, including from the German point of view, and of the rise of the resistance

movement. And one of the most innovative research paths in this field takes place in east-central Europe. Feinberg (2006) remarks that “historians taking interest in questions of collaboration and resistance tend to neglect places like kitchens,” had the idea to open the cookbooks of Czech housewives, and discovered “how living in an occupied territory changed the character of everyday tasks, bringing the moral choices of the war into the lives of ordinary citizens” (p. 95). Women were thus taught to make meals seem as normal as possible, and “as [they] filled their family stomachs, [they] lifted their spirits and lightened their hearts, preserving the essence of home, and providing an illusion of normality in uncertain times” (p. 106).

Bearing the political frame in mind, researchers could focus on the degree of control, and so the degree of violence and coercion, within home fronts. As we saw earlier, Polish society provides the extreme example studied by Bartoszewski (2008). In his work about everyday life in the German capital, Roger Moorhouse (2010) notes that by 1942, the Gestapo arrested around fifty Berliners each day. Based on various sources, including unpublished memoirs and interviews, Moorhouse also studied the topic of criminality – hard to define in a society where the very state is criminal – since under the cover of blackouts, pillaging, rapes, and murders were routine. Rising crime rates – analyzed for the British scene by Donnelly (1999) – questions the trivialization of violence in wartime societies. This does not mean that brutality and death were less traumatic, but that they seemed to be part of normality, as war produced a permanent “background noise” to dull compassion (Bartov et al. 2003, p. 151). And Lagrou (2000) has shown that mass death did not trivialize individual loss, and that even in a total war situation, a minimal ritual is respected, such as burials under the bombings in Warsaw on September 1939 or tombs dug on the road of French exodus in May–June 1940.

Yet, with strategic bombing the civilian people faced a new process of war violence in addition to traditional frames such as invasions, sieges, and retreats. The objective of strategic bombing is to obtain the moral breakdown of the civilians and therefore the surrender of their government, but no society rose up. There was no revolution in Hamburg in July 1943, and among French people, in spite of the collaborationist campaigns, exhibited a certain resignation in popular expression: “que voulez-vous, c’est la guerre!” [what do you expect, war is war!] (Université de Sophia-Antipolis 1991). In Great Britain, numerous posters encouraging safety in the blackout (“*Wait! Count 15 slowly before moving in the blackout*,” G. R. Morris in Aulich 2007) give evidence of popular adaptations to the situation. Research has been undertaken on the social history of strategic bombing, like Mosse (1980), or more recently, Martens and Vaisse (2000).

But confronted by the problems arising from the comparative approach (to build homogeneous statistics when only partial data are available), studies remain generally in a national framework and follow political, psychological (Berthomé 2002), or architectural issues (Picon 1996). Thus it was observed that mass death had evolved into death rituals; in Dresden, in February 1945, 500 corpses were incinerated to avoid epidemics (Müller 1995). In France, the mention “Dead for France” granted to the bombing victims modified the commemorations, making the distinction civilian/soldier even more blurry (Capdevila and Voldman 2002, p. 171). The public funeral constituted very particular moments, analyzed by Lagrou (2000), which jeopardized society’s sensitivities. For that matter, funerals took place in Poland from September

1939 onward and in France, collaborationist speeches were prohibited on such occasions. The Germans were expected to be discreet. The authorities also tolerated the tombs of Allied aviators to be covered with flowers. More generally regarding civil societies' relation to death, Capdevila and Voldman (2002) analyzes the forms of the social expression in public and private bereavements, such as during the funeral rites improvised at Oradour-sur-Glane, which enables comparisons with the Lidice case.

But in order to compare the frameworks that produced violence against the civilians, it is necessary to take into consideration the invader's representation of the victims. The German invasions tinged with racial and ideological motivations like in Poland – the word *Polenwirtschaft* [Polish mess] designated at the time everything that was chaotic and inefficient (Evans 2008, p. 27) – fundamentally differed from politico-strategic invasions in Western Europe, which did not exclude massacres (such as in Vinkt, Belgium in 1940). In periods of retreat, the same distinction works, even if the justification of “reprisals” against “acts of resistance” often covers it up (Schreiber 1996; Capdevila 1999).

On the wider topic of France at the time of the liberation, an insightful social and cultural history is *The Liberation of France* (1995) by Kedward and Wood. In such chapters as “The Police in the Liberation of Paris,” Simon Kitson shows that Gaullist sympathies turned into an active engagement. Also, “Propaganda fiction for children,” by Judith Proud, and Karen Adler's “Women and the expectation of Liberation,” do the same. Any comparison of the home fronts when facing war violence should therefore take into consideration the political conditioning of the dominant power.

Concerning the periods of invasions and liberations, women's history often arouses nightmarish narratives. Dombrowski (1999) deals with the French exodus told by women and the topic of rapes – here of German women by the Red Army. In the latter case, revenge seems to be the main motive, explains Atina Grossmann (1995). Concerning the rape of an estimated 14,000 civilian women in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany between 1942 and 1945, Lilly (2007) studies military records and trial transcripts. The author pays attention to the differing social contexts prevailing in each country, providing a possible first approach for an analysis of East European narratives. In the matter of nonjudicial *epuration*, Fabrice Virgili (2002) has explored the theme of sexist retribution. France “will be virile or dead,” and it is payback time. Head shavings thus punish the effective or imaginary “horizontal collaboration”; being a collaborator's wife or working with German men were enough. Paczkowski (2003) recalls that the Poles

also regarded prostitutes whose clients were Germans to be engaged in a form of collaboration, and indeed this was true for all contacts with the Germans, even those that did not go beyond cooperation at the black market and other forms of speculation, behavior that may have been reprehensible, but did not endanger the rest of the population. (p. 60)

Head shaving, born in Belgium and France in 1918, had started in June 1943 in France as a so-called act of resistance. Then the practice spread through Western Europe until 1945, and so widely that Allied soldiers and war correspondents were sickened.

The comparative approach to these acts of retribution, where all the frustrations of wartime crystallized, is complicated by their irrationality. Their intensity did not correspond to the length of the occupation since there were few shorn women in Norway, which was occupied since 1940, but many in Italy, which had been only partially occupied by the Germans from September 1943. In France, there were more summary executions in the former free zone than in the north. The conditions of occupation, resistance radicalism, and the modalities of liberations appear thus to be more effective criteria (Boyer 2004), to compare the forms of violence of German retreat with those of Soviet "liberation."

The modification of legal markers also informs us about moral codes in wartime societies. This phenomenon has been illustrated first by the demographic statistics. The baby boom started during the war in belligerent countries (Great Britain, Germany, the United States) as well as occupied territories (France, the Netherlands). This seemed to be a consequence of both a "vitalist" reflex – in France, the rate of suicides is divided in two – and a less codified sexuality that appeared through the rates of illegitimate births and syphilis cases, and an increase in prostitution. Posters encouraging hygiene give evidence of these two last phenomena in the British society: "*VD hello boyfriend coming MY way?*" Death calls out wearing a nice pink hat (Reginald Mount in Aulich 2007, p. 199). The presence of foreign workers and war prisoners among civil societies also shattered day-to-day life in its intimacy. Evans (2008) estimates there were about 20,000 illegitimate births in Nazi Germany as consequences of the contacts with foreign workers and prisoners. Lagrou (2000) describes the huge misery, and the so-called "immoral environment" (p. 152), of foreign women who experienced life as workers in Germany. These questions of morals are exposed on a European scale by Noakes (1992), though not in a comparative fashion.

In the late seventies, Gross (1979) had already dealt with the upheaval of moral values. He mentioned "alcoholism" – explored in Slovakia by Pekník (2009) – as well as "the gradual loss of a sense of private and public property, corruption" (p. 160). He noted that there was also "the emphasis on money ... In conditions of scarcity and inflation, the major preoccupation of people is to find ways to earn more money" (p. 174), and the "breakdown of the family" (p. 167). Concerning this last topic, Fishman (2002), examines "the experience of World War II for children and teenagers (p. 45)." She shows that crushed families and the lack of fathers are some of the multiple ways the war reshaped children's lives – traumatic events like the exodus is another examples – and juvenile delinquency was one of the various reactions according to age, sex, and social class.

Social changes were very evident in World War II, and scholars have studied the transformations. In his *France, the Dark Years* (2001), Julian Jackson questions "the destruction of local democracy" (p. 266). But it survived in every European country through the network woven between town and country to improve the food supply. Jackson studies this topic of the black market through the social changes it caused in France. The countryside often took revenge over the cities because rural inhabitants had the economic leverage, and traditional social marks (such as employment, family status, or educational level) were replaced by the type of ration coupons individuals possessed (Veillon 1995). Social changes are consequences of an evolving economic geography in occupied territories, a fact illustrated in Slovakia by the huge

expansion of modern arms factories and the large “grey market” of a parallel economy tolerated by authorities that enabled peasants from the mountains to sell their production. Kolko (1994) analyzes the social and political effects of the traumatizing experience of rationing, shortage and pillaging. He provides a Marxist interpretation that escapes from national compartmentalization and focuses on Western societies by studying Poland. For this country, we can also refer to the work of Łuczak (1993a, 1993b). A specialist in social and economic history, he takes an interest in home fronts in his regional studies (Łuczak 1989, 1993a, 1993b) as well. The material aspects of the shortage have been deeply studied through such topics as the increase of self-consumption thanks to kitchen gardens and occasional farming at home; the “salvaged economy” of Hyde Park iron gates or hair from Parisian salons; the food parcels sent to urban family, and the parallel networks organized in coal or fuel rings in Belgium. And this wartime activity, significantly, led to the consumerist thirst of the 1950s.

The “people’s war” has become the signifying concept of World War II, asserts Rose (2003). Calder (1969) already used this 1940s expression to illustrate the fact that no section of society remained untouched by the total war. This condition required an understanding of the day-to-day life of ordinary civilians. In 2001, Bourke used diary entries, oral histories, poetry, and letters to achieve the same goal. The term “people’s war” is now considered from an intellectual distance. Calder (1990) returns to, and re-emphasizes, the narration of a patriotic and civic Great Britain, united in the pursuit of a common goal. The real sacrifice cultivated the myth of unified patriotism, and thus hushed the inevitable flare up of defeatism or racism that thrived on paranoia about the fifth column. This was famously illustrated by “the treacherous-lady poster” (“*Careless talk costs lives. Keep mum. She’s not so dumb!*”) attributed to Harold Foster in 1942. Rose seeks more knowledge about all the aspects of wartime society, too, by favoring three problematics: gender, class, and race. Thus, when the author remarks on the rough ride given to the “good time girls” who went with African American GIs instead of British soldiers or, at least, with white Yankees, it is clear that the people’s war was widespread.

Other nations come under scrutiny for their “people’s war” as well. American people are studied within the Parisian home front environment by Glass (2009). They were expatriates before being liberators, and few of the 2,000 people were as famous as Josephine Baker or Gertrude Stein. In east-central Europe, two historians – Kuklík and Gebhart (1996, 2006–2007) – focused on wartime Czech society from below and studied the social and cultural life under the protectorate. In Slovakia, Kamenec (2008) offered pioneering studies in the 1990s that resulted in a general but insightful synthesis.

The relationship between people and esoteric concepts like spirituality and mood are also fertile grounds for exploration. Religion, for instance, has been explored in east-central history narrative studies by Dreisziger (1998). The churches, considered from the prism of their social role and religious practice, come under scrutiny by Azéma (1985). As for France, Jackson (2001) notes the revival of pilgrimages and saint worship. This is a way to approach the social mood in which national cultures are crucial, but raises some volatile issues. Jan Gross (1979) has studied multiple rumors in the Polish society; living in a world that lacked the routine of everyday affairs, people need to interpret their situation, and living in a world of terror, rumors had a

cathartic function. Thus, in August 1943, a story spread of how a German general shot Hitler during an argument at Sulejówek, Piłsudski's private residence. Jokes also provide information about social mood, and Jackson (2001) quotes some of the French ones ("Did you know Marshal Pétain was dead? – No. when did he die? – Three months ago, but his entourage has hidden it from him"; p. 283).

These aspects of the wartime experience can be called "mental baggage," filled with mindsets and cultures, as Crémieux-Brilhac (1990) defined it. The social mood in 1939 has been studied in detail for France – the "dreary resignation" detected by Wright (1997 pp. 7–12) – and in Germany. In the latter case, the debate has focused on the opposition or agreement of the society, particularly the working class, as war broke out (Bartov 2003). Studies have fluctuated between both attitudes of "consent" and "coercion," as in Gellately (2001). Johnson asserted that the "cruel effectiveness of the Gestapo" (Johnson 1999) had been underestimated, as well as the resistance of many Germans, but the oral accounts he recorded, with German sociologist Karl-Heinz Reuband (Johnson 2006), adheres to a consensus within the *Volksgemeinschaft* [national community].

Thus, numerous works are published in search of the everyday climate of life in Western societies. Since 1990, Clarendon Press has translated the 10-volume *History of World War Two* produced by the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office. Volume IX, *German Wartime Society 1939–1945* (Blank et al. 2008) has taken a "history from below" approach in order to gauge the minds and behaviors of individuals in wartime German society. This topic is also investigated by the odd or banal experiences recounted through interviews that Engelmann analyzes (1986).

As in Germany and Great Britain, France also benefits from a clear advance in the field of everyday life history. Voluminous sources have been exploited by Alary, Vergez-Chaignon, and Gauvin (2006) to follow the French from mobilization to the end of rationing. *Les Français au quotidien* explores streets, farms, parishes, family celebrations. Jackson (2001) also scrutinizes micro-histories, with all their contradictions and complexities, as he searches for ordinary people's experiences, explores local conditions, and analyzes leisure activities such as fishing. Gildea (2003) also looks into the legacy of wartime experiences in French society. Other studies of day-to-day France highlight a specific aspect of the society. Vinen exposes fates crushed by the daily horrors of war (2007) and Fogg (2008) focuses on the material distress of outsiders. This body of knowledge should be linked as well to works on socioeconomic conditions in Eastern European societies.

Young people also attract attention from scholars interested in everyday life. Werner (2000) has written a general history of the European children based on their own words in letters and diaries. Most of the studies are cast in a national framework, such as Kleindienst (1988) regarding German children. On the British home front, Mike Brown has published two short, abundantly illustrated studies about children. *Wartime Childhood* (Brown 2009a) pictures Britain's young people not only as victims, but as people who fight back in their own way – "digging for victory" (p. 5), collecting salvage, acting as runners for the Air Raid Precautions and the Fire Brigade, and just as kids who making hilarious faces finding their school ravaged by the Blitz. *Evacuees of the Second World War* (Brown 2009b) shows children's lives in the countryside (teaching facilities, Welsh lessons, rural crafts, sports days). Ragache (1997) also pictures day-to-day childhood in wartime France and follows children from the

playground to the movies, from their quiet readings to their bootleg activities. Numerous diaries have been published, which could be the starting point of a comparative history of European teenagers. French Benoîte and Françoise Groult (1965) and Pole Alexandre Wolowski (1967) provide accounts from young people caught up by the war.

As Zahra (2008) notes, “The histories of eastern Europe have, until recently, remained surprisingly ‘ungendered.’ Studies focus on women as victims of sexual violence or as ‘perpetrators.’” Harvey (2003) follows the female activists who were sent to Poland to segregate and persecute non-German people, and therefore reconsiders the traditional opposition of masculine-warrior/feminine-pacifist. This is also of interest to Wingfield and Bucur (2006), who identify the masculine figure at the very heart of civilian societies. The famous double helix model – with its two strands always equidistant (Higonnet et al. 1987) – does not match the experiences of men and women in the occupied territories where they fight the same battle in everyday life. Some studies even describe situations where the roles are reversed: weakness for traumatized men defeated in battle, but strength for women who assume responsibilities as heads of the family, as employees, or enlist in service (Capdevila et al. 2010).

In a second category, gender studies of wartime east-central Europe focused on dynamics, such as intimacy, the impact of the war within the domestic sphere or, as we have seen, day-to-day compromises or acts of resistance. In Western historiography, women’s history was born circa 1970, and the debate has focused on whether feminine work has emancipated women (Marwick 1974) or has not changed at all because it was an immediate solution to an exceptional situation (Summerfield 1989). In these texts, women who take on “masculine roles” on the home front regain their “feminine” position after the war is over. The debate over potential social change has declined in favor of new topics focusing on particular aspects such as middle-aged women or women voluntary services (Hinton 2002). But the potential emancipation of prisoners’ wives still raises its own issues: can we talk of wider independence, considering the increase in tasks assigned to women, the tougher life conditions, and the interminable waiting for the return of men? Fishman (1991) and Diamond (1999) have studied this topic.

Concerning totalitarian or authoritarian states, the terms of the debate are quite specific. Germany or Vichy regime did not mobilize women to a great extent, or even failed to do so, as Thalmann explains (1997). The patriarchal ideology of the state was an obstacle, an aspect developed by Stibbe (2003) who explores the Nazi impact on women’s lives. And De Grazia (1992) is careful to distinguish between fascist rhetoric and practices in chapters on “working,” “going out,” or “growing up.” The title of Pollard’s *Reign of Virtue: Mobilizing Gender in Vichy France* (1998) summarizes the ambivalence of Pétain’s National Revolution that was eager both to mobilize and contain women. The day-to-day tasks weigh on them: saving, mending, and queuing (Thébaud 1992). To help them, a program broadcast by Free France on the BBC tried to teach them how to be smarter, and as a result, it “highlighted” the blurry political situation by repeating “the enemies are the Germans” (Eck 1992, p. 311). The comparative approach is very promising if it follows defined frameworks (social class, privacy, work, mindset) at the risk of creating a theoretical woman who exists nowhere. It could thus be useful to consult the methodological chapter that Capdevila et al. (2010) placed at the beginning of their book. Rouquet, Virgili, and Voldman

(2007) have also compiled reflections that cross gender studies and war history, organized around six main themes: mobilization, separation, controlled sexuality, love, sexual violence, and the end of war. A synthesis of Virgili's categories of "Gender and World War Two," in English, can be found in Diamond and Kitson (2005).

Posters constitute both the everyday environment of urban societies and reflect their mental landscape. To communicate, the poster campaigns use common values in order to teach new ones. That is, if images of atrocities were rare, posters materialize the violence that impregnated wartime societies. This violence expressed itself through insulting slogans and garish colors accompanying, for example, calls for anti-Semitism. All forms of communication – posters, figures, exercise books – benefit from a scientific, detailed inventory that allows scholars to write across design and mindset histories, as in Peschanski (1990). This new approach, more technical and at the same time more anthropological, studies coherent series of classified items. It tries to escape the dichotomy of propaganda/counterpropaganda, and to take into account material elements. Life within societies is revealed, but it is difficult to distinguish the German posters from the collaborationist ones, since they share the same illustrators and the same financing, which is complicated by politics. For instance, in Vichy, the dominance of grayish and drab colors gives information both about the shortage and the somber social mood that reflected the French defeat. Therefore, research in art has made it possible to open the fields of design to academic audiences, and a lot of exhibitions contributed to the cataloguing and publication of posters that constituted the landscape of the home fronts, as in Aulich (2007). The idea is here to study popular culture "as instruments for promoting and disseminating war aims, social cohesion, ideological purpose ... these posters document the social, political, ethnic, and cultural aspirations of belligerent nations" (p. 7).

Although this is not the place to focus on the designs, posters, and portfolios from World War II, it should be noted that a comparative approach to national characteristics of portraying the enemy or the effects of war to the average person is a fruitful way to distinguish how regimes marketed their totalitarian message to citizens. As psychological weapons deployed at home, posters tried, as Aulich (2007) and Heller (2008) demonstrate, to reach hearts and minds. But if it is interesting to study the posters from the *commanditaire's* point of view, it is also very difficult to apprehend the target's reception. Laborie (2001) thus demonstrates, through his study of social mood and imaginary that the average French people's loyalty to Maréchal Pétain was hardly due to propaganda but was due to the memory of the Great War. Anyway, we know that posters can provide topics of conversation and introduce difficult subjects. In Great Britain, campaigns expressing admiration for the USSR also had psychological motives, including the bad conscience in the face of Russian sacrifice (Henrion 1942 in Aulich 2007). Scholars believe that these posters contributed to the development of a popular democratic socialism. More generally, one of the British posters' goals was to highlight dominant values and help bolster the social mood by "presenting an illusion of coherent reality. [Their rhetoric addresses] real anxieties and feeling of dislocation" (Aulich, 2007, p. 162). That is why when considering social mood, consensual values, and relationships between the government and the public, popular culture is an issue in posters that inform viewers both about the visual and mental landscapes of the home fronts. What does the lack of impact of American-inspired slogans such as "*Back them up!*" or "*Help them finish the job!*" tell us, when unrealistic

pastoral images of Britain, as developed in travel poster campaigns before the war, were more successful in catching people's imagination?

Cultural and artistic activities undoubtedly belong to a history of everyday life in wartime. But here again, methodological caution is important for fear of giving the false impression that the whole of urban societies spent most of their time at the theater or that any song was but a scathing attack on the enemy. We have to understand the cultural behaviors and customs in wartime societies, and to verify the possible connections, similarities, and gaps between them. For a shrewd approach, see Rioux (1990). The author deals with cultural practices by discriminating, among the effervescence of the war years, the "haven-culture" from the "resistance-culture" (p. 10). Most topics are studied: from public reading to sport (for example, the quarrels between sports and catholic associations), including radio and theater.

Regarding these latter two subjects, Eck (1985) offers a panorama of radio stations – in Paris, Vichy, London, Switzerland, Belgium, and Québec – that depict this popular medium of everyday life. The most popular broadcasts were dramatized, and the use of actors made successes out of such programs as "The Enigmas of History" on Radio National, the rival of Radio Paris. In Great Britain, radio serials were also hugely popular, as Cooksley (2007) writes. "Garrison Theatre," for example, featured the popular Jack Warner, who had served in the Royal Flying Corps. Theater is also analyzed by Added (1992), who links it to French society. As cinema and museums, it attained some prosperity in wartime; the "theatrical euphoria in occupied Paris" touched an audience of 800,000 people a month during winter 1943–1944 (Rioux 1990, p. 315). Those who could afford it experimented with candlelit performances.

These studies thus provide a day-to-day analysis of cultural practices in their social context, and some of them appear also in Eastern European societies, political conditions permitting. Obviously, Poland constitutes a special case, since the occupying powers, in Soviet territory and within the government-general, made the Polish intelligentsia "*public enemy number one*" (Paczkowski 2003, p. 52). While elementary schools continued functioning, all institutions of higher education closed down, and clandestine teaching provided 100,000 Polish pupils instruction in history and languages, as well as technical courses to prepare the future staff of the reconstruction. Even though the Germans closed Prague University, upper-class students undertook individual studies in philosophy, literature, and even folklore (Bělina et al. 1995). In Czech society, religious phenomena seemed to be a reaction against war experience, and they took various forms, from Christianity to spiritualism or even the occult. On September 1, 1944, it was the turn of the Prague Theater to be closed down. Concerning the Bratislava theater, researchers can use its archives published in 2005 by Ladislav Lajcha, *SND* [Slovak National Theater], *Dokumenty 1939–1945*, as well as an analysis of the press year by year for information about programs, audiences, and cinema (Hradská 2006). Sport was also an entertainment form sought by Czech people, and the spectators were more numerous than before the war.

Numerous studies of French society confirm the acceptance of shows and music by urban middle classes. Gordon (1998) provides a very useful research tool to address French cultural history, since many entries deal with art, style, and literature – fields that were specific to the context and as potential vehicles of cultural life. Other books (Chimènes 2001) deepen our understanding of these art forms through case studies. Through Spotts's (2008) biographical sketches, readers

can find information about performers and their audiences within the social and cultural climate of the occupation.

Whatever the observed topic may be, we should keep in mind that cultural practices did not necessarily follow the orders or suggestions of the authorities. We should therefore remain cautious about propaganda: they were clandestine dancing in the free zone where Vichy had imposed a ban. As for cinema, Hake (2001) analyzes this field through social and cultural practices: "The so-called *Interhaltungsfilme* (literally, entertainment films) ... more than anything, confirm the pervasive influence of popular culture" (p. vii); cinemagoers were not necessarily manipulated or escaping reality. She points out how important the modern-looking woman in German films was, which was far from the stereotype of the traditional Bavarian dirndl dress, a conclusion that leads us to the theme of fashion.

Fashion deals with the history of the body and culture, and also with mindsets and politics. In *Nazi Chic?* (2004), Irene Guenther explores those topics from above – the attempt to construct a female image that fit with gender policies and national pride – and below, she asks how women dealt with the severe clothing restrictions brought about by both the state and the war. This study thus illustrates the "split consciousness" (Schäfer 1984) of National Socialism which was forced to tolerate modern consumer goods like the Volkswagen automobile and fashionable women to attract that part of German society concerned with modernity and consumerism. During World War II, Paris still represented, as the jacket cover of Veillon's book states, "the very pinnacle of style, and French women the epitome of chic" (Veillon 2002). But there, as in Berlin, haute couture elegance was a concern for only a few of the couturiers' wealthy clients. For the majority, glamor was restricted to the drawing of a false stocking seam along the calves, or was simply not an issue at all. Veillon also deals with creative innovations to circumvent deprivations, such as hats made from newspapers and blouses made out of parachute silk. Everyday life under the occupation became a source of inspiration. Culottes were made so that people could ride the omnipresent bicycle; a haute couture collection was named after metro stations. These ripostes to the context of war definitely tell a history of the social mood.

World War II led to the splitting up of societies in various ways. On a European scale, scholars juxtapose these diversities of civilian experiences with the complexities of territorial frameworks. Therefore, much caution is required in the comparative approach. Once researchers proceed with care, it will be possible to write the necessary history of plural European societies and their common, everyday experiences in wartime.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

Life in Plato's Cave: Neutral Europe in World War II

NEVILLE WYLIE

Writing some three decades after the end of the war, the historian F. S. L. Lyons (1973, pp. 557–558) summed up the experience of neutral Ireland during the war in the following terms: neutrality, he suggested, “condemned [the Irish] to live in Plato’s cave, with their backs to the fire of life and deriving their only knowledge of what went on ... from the flickering shadows thrown on the wall before their eyes from the men and women who passed to and fro behind them.” The end of the war saw the Irish emerge, dazzled by the light of the day, into a “new and vastly different world,” one which they neither understood, nor fully comprehended. A more contemporaneous observer of the wartime events, Clifford Norton, British minister in Berne (1942–1946), would probably have concurred with Lyons’s judgment on the impact of neutrality on a nation’s psyche. Holed up behind their Alpine ramparts, the Swiss had little grasp of the forces shaping the new European environment. “For all their admirable bourgeois-peasant qualities,” he remarked in early 1945, “they show at present little sign of appreciating the great change in political, social and economic structures that two major wars have accelerated in other European countries” (C. J. Norton to Foreign Office, No. 727, 13 Feb. 1945. UK National Archive, London. FO371/49714 Z2778).

It is this image of the neutrals – as disengaged, passive observers, insulated from the effects of the war – that has been challenged by recent historical research. Prior to the mid-1990s, historians showed little interest in the neutrals. A single attempt in the mid-1950s to paint the neutrals into the history of the war failed to stimulate curiosity, far less debate, amongst the wider scholarly community (Toynbee and Toynbee 1956). Such writing as there was tended to remain the preserve of academics of the former wartime neutrals themselves; much of this was colored by individual national concerns or locked into languages that were impenetrable to the broader international audience. It was only in the 1990s, with the end of the cold war and the

opening of previously closed archives beyond the iron curtain, that historical writing on the neutrals “emerged,” so to say, from Plato’s cave.

The principal stimulus came from the efforts of the World Jewish Congress to return “dormant accounts” to their rightful owners (the heirs of those who had perished in the Holocaust). But other, broader concerns over where Europe’s “cold war” neutrals would fit into a landscape dominated by the supranational European Union, helped stimulate interest in the roots and founding national myths of modern neutrality and the connection between neutrality and national identity. The World Jewish Congress’ campaign not only raised the veil of secrecy on the wartime (and in many instances postwar) activities of neutral banks and insurance houses – charged with holding on to “dormant” assets for half a century – but also provoked discussion into the ethical dimensions of neutrality, the neutrals’ attitude toward the Holocaust and their responsibility in sustaining a Nazi war effort that wrought such unparalleled destruction and misery on Europe’s population.

Professional historians, no less the “neutral” governments themselves, were slow in reacting to these claims, and for several years the debate was driven by popular historians. But by the mid-2000s, a host of academic studies had appeared that explored different national experiences or examined themes that had hitherto escaped the historical spotlight. As the Cambridge historian David Reynolds noted in 2003, the new research not only modified our understanding of neutrality, but also “prompt[ed] us to rethink the Second World War itself” (Reynolds 2003). Though the pace of publication has slackened in recent years, interest in the neutrals has not disappeared, and any serious student of the war, its course, outcome, and origins can scarcely ignore the “neutrals” perspective on their studies.

The image of neutrality that emerged at the end of World War II was as much a *product* of that conflict as a reflection of what actually occurred during these years. After 1945, former wartime neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland (who sought to stand aloof from the East–West confrontation) or Spain and Portugal (whose authoritarianism placed them outside the postwar political order) deliberately constructed a “history” of the war that magnified the distinctive and unique in their own experiences in order to justify their subsequent abstention from world politics and forge a domestic consensus behind the concept of cold war neutrality (Johansson 1997). It was only in retrospect that neutrality became synonymous with the foreign policy ambitions of neutral states, rather than what it invariably was – a tactical means of achieving a desired political end. Before 1939, neutrality was a foreign policy instrument, not a doctrine. Belgium’s celebrated “return” to neutrality in 1936, by abandoning its 1920 military accord with France, was, in reality, a return to “independence.” It coincided with an increase, rather than a decrease in military defense expenditure. Likewise, in the 1938 referendum debate over Switzerland’s continued adherence to the League of Nations, neutrality, though clearly an important factor, was only one of a number of issues affecting voter preferences (Moos 2000; Wylie and Wyss 2011). Neutrality became the defining principle of Swiss foreign policy in the light of later events; encouraged, in no small measure, by an officially sponsored history of Switzerland’s experience in the war, in which the author, the Basle historian Edgar Bonjour (1967–1970), deliberately situated his discussion of the war years within a broader survey of four centuries of Swiss neutrality. Prewar attitudes were perhaps best summed up by the Swedish social democrat – and future wartime

premier – Per Albin Hansson, in May 1938 when he insisted that Sweden had to “look further than neutrality,” and resist the temptation of “absolute neutrality.” “Even as a neutral, we must have our thinking directed to where our natural position is” (Gilmour 2010, p. 14).

If neutrality before 1945 was, then, a less dogmatic and unconditional concept than it has subsequently appeared, it was also a more prominent form of international behavior than generally acknowledged. Before the *Wehrmacht's* drive into Southeast Europe brought an end to the independence of Balkan states in the spring of 1941, European diplomacy largely revolved around the interests and intentions of the neutral “lobby.” Pride of place in the belligerents’ political calculations was the two non-European neutrals, the Soviet Union and United States. But for much of the first 18 months of the conflict, the European neutrals played a major role in shaping the deliberations of the belligerent powers.

Three areas in particular drew the neutrals into the center of international politics. The first involved the Scandinavian neutrals, and hinged around the fate of Swedish iron ore shipments to the German Reich. In retrospect, British planners probably exaggerated the importance of Scandinavian ore exports to the health of the German war economy, but their fixation on Scandinavian ore traffic during the Phony War, rested in part on the weight given to this issue in British prewar planning, and in part on the growing political need to breathe life into Britain’s lackluster war effort, still overshadowed by Hitler’s bold *coup de main* against Poland at the start of the war, and blunted by the West’s ineffectual support for Finland in its “winter war” with the Soviet in 1939/1940. Unable to limit the ore traffic through diplomatic means, the British cabinet finally agreed to force Norway’s hand and land troops on Norwegian soil – with or without Norwegian agreement – in mid-March 1940. Even before this, however, Allied criticism of neutral conduct had become increasingly strident: Winston Churchill’s radio address, as first lord of the British Admiralty, on 20 January – urging the neutrals to throw in their lot with the Western Allies before it was too late – particularly irked neutral audiences. But in sum, Allied public and private criticism of the neutrals only went to underline the impotency of their political position in neutral Europe, and fan German concerns over Allied intentions. As Patrick Salmon (2002) has observed, the unfocused and contradictory Allied policies over the spring of 1940 ultimately left the field open for Hitler to seize the initiative and unleash his forces against Denmark and Norway; it was the British premier, not the Führer, who “missed the bus.”

Two features stand out in Scandinavian reaction to the disintegration of their neutrality over the first months of the war. First, confidence in their ability to replay the events of the Great War and remain out of the fray blinded neutral state leaders to the fact that over the intervening years, Scandinavian economies had become intertwined with those of the major European powers. The region was, in short, no longer the backwater it had been a mere two decades before. Embroilment in the war was not inescapable; but once iron ore took center-stage in the Anglo-German economic struggle, the odds were heavily stacked against it. Second, the chance of any meaningful neutral Scandinavian cooperation evaporated within hours of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940. Admittedly, the prospects had never been good. As Van Roon (1989) has shown, prewar attempts at fostering economic and political cooperation through the so-called Oslo Pact floundered, and the one issue

capable of generating a sense of common purpose – aiding Finland resist Soviet invasion in November 1939 – ultimately exposed the limits, rather than the extent of Scandinavian solidarity. Despite virulent Russophobia and strong kindred ties with the Finns, concern over the conflict's wider ramifications dissuaded the Swedish government, upon whom any genuine Scandinavian cooperation essentially depended, from sponsoring a broader front (Gilmour 2010).

If the Allies were tempted by the rich pickings available by tackling German power at the periphery of Europe during the Phony War, the same could equally be said for rewards open to Germany in the western Mediterranean after the French collapse. The significance of these opportunities are best captured by the historian Denis Smyth (1986) who argues that in trying to hold Spain to its policy of non-belligerency in the winter of 1940/1941, Britain was involved in nothing less than a strategy for its own survival. Had Hitler's meetings with General Franco and Marshall Pétain in late October resulted in the Führer backing the Caudillo and trading France's North African empire in return for Spanish belligerency, Britain would, in all likelihood, have lost Gibraltar and its access to the western Mediterranean, and faced a German fleet operating against its convoys from ports in West Africa and probably Spain's own Atlantic islands. The seriousness of the situation was sufficiently grave for the British chiefs of staff to assemble a 24,000 strong expeditionary force in preparation for the seizure of the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic islands should Spain throw in its hand with the Axis (Stone 1994; Stone 2005). The Hendaye-Montoire meetings with Franco and Pétain might have convinced Hitler to favor the French over the Spanish, but German planning for an attack on Gibraltar – with or without Spanish assistance – continued until May 1941.

Franco's efforts to court German patronage and secure a suitable price for Spanish entry into the war continued for at least another eighteen months. Indeed David Wingate Pike (2008) has recently suggested that the Spaniard held to this goal until the last months of the war. This helps account for Franco's willingness to offer resupply services for German U-boats in Spanish ports, and his dispatch of the 18,500 strong Blue Division to fight on the Russian front (Smyth 1994, pp. 537–553; Preston 1995). For Britain at least, the maintenance of Spanish non-belligerency, through a judicious mixture of blockade concessions and pecuniary "gifts" to "sympathetic" Spanish generals, remained a key element in British grand strategy until the winter of 1941 (Dunthorn 2000, pp. 11–27). It was not until February 1942 that the forces earmarked for operations against the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic possessions were finally disbanded (Smyth 1986, pp. 230–238).

The final instance where neutral conduct came to impinge directly on the interests of the great powers was in the Balkans. As with the Scandinavian imbroglio, the Balkans fell prey to the attention of the belligerent powers. Long viewed as a "natural" area for Italian imperial expansion, Mussolini tended to view any foreign encroachment in the region – whether German, British, or French – with distaste. In late 1939, he even toyed with the idea of sponsoring the creation of a neutral Balkan bloc to resist German penetration. His own ambitions ultimately led him down the path to war with Greece in October 1940; a campaign that not only resulted in the humiliation of Italian arms, but triggered precisely the foreign involvement – a British landing at Salonika in aid of the Greek government and a German occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece in March 1941 – that he had long sought to forestall.

To depict German overawing of Southeast Europe and the subsequent collapse of Balkan neutrality as merely a prelude to Hitler's titanic struggle with the Soviet Union runs the risk of ignoring the extent to which the disintegration of political stability in the region was triggered by events that had little to do with Germany's wider political or strategic agenda. Berlin certainly harbored its own economic ambitions in the region, especially over Romania's oil fields, and was clearly anxious about the presence of British forces in a region that was soon to become the southern flank of its attack on Soviet Russia. But the Balkan governments were far from powerless, or guiltless, in the diplomacy that led to their extinction. Indeed, recent studies have suggested that the Axis' challenge to the European status quo over the 1930s merely provided the opportunity for the Balkan states to settle old scores and reverse the "injustices" of the 1919 settlement (Watt 1989, pp. 271–312; Frank 2002; Pearton 2002; Dimitrov 2002; Zivojinovic 2002). It was the playing out of these largely regional dynamics – the dismantling of the Treaty of Trianon, dismembering of Romania and reconfiguration of national politics in Yugoslavia – that destabilized Balkan politics and prompted – arguably compelled – external forces to enter the fray. Throughout, Balkan politicians either rejected the scripts handed down to them by the belligerent powers, or manipulated them for their own national ends. The Turks proved equally unwilling to tow the belligerents' line. Contrary to widespread foreign assumptions about Turkey's desire to be the "leading Balkan nation," Ankara refused to take an active political, far less military, stand over the winter of 1940/1941 and effectively left Britain alone to assist in Greece's defense, and stem the tide of Axis influence in the region (Tamkin 2009, pp. 19–51).

The key point to note is that in all three instances given above, German and British interests collided head on. Discussion over the fate of Norway, Spain, or the Balkan neutrals was central to how the top policymakers in London and Berlin viewed the war. Indeed, the fulcrum of European diplomacy during the first two years of the war essentially hinged on questions of neutrality; the neutrals place in the war, and the extent to which they could be persuaded, bullied, or cajoled into meeting the belligerents' economic, political, and strategic demands. The demise of Balkan neutrality in the spring of 1941 extinguished the last remaining neutral "hub" in Europe. While individual neutrals – Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal – survived, they lacked the numerical strength, resources, and cohesion to press themselves upon the belligerents' diplomatic agenda. Henceforth, as Leitz (2000), Gabriel (2002), Wylie (2003), Stone (2005), and Tamkin (2009) have shown, belligerent governments tended to deal with each neutral on its own terms. Intense diplomatic activity did not end: London expended considerable effort to coax Ankara into severing its ties with Berlin before August 1944, but such efforts as there were toward developing a coherent policy for the neutral camp as a whole – the most celebrated being the Allied campaign to end neutral commercial relations with Germany over the winter of 1944/45 – were ad hoc and largely confined to the economic realm (Watt 1985; Salmon 1993; Eisenstat 1998).

It has been the neutrals' economic contribution to the belligerent war efforts that has dominated scholarship on the neutrals over the last forty years. The early appearance of W. N. Medlicott's detailed "official history" (1952–1959) of the British blockade provided scholars with a solid foundation upon which to develop their own, more specialized, individual case- and country-studies. Contemporary

observers were likewise impressed by the importance of this issue and the lengths to which both sides were prepared to go to gain access to neutral sources. As a consequence, in most cases, the essential questions driving current historical debates differ little from those that prompted the first generation of historians to explore the issue four decades ago: what was the nature of neutral-belligerent commercial relations; how important were these to the neutral economies and the war efforts of the belligerent powers?

The basic outline of the neutrals' economic relations with the two camps is also well known. The Allied attempt to hold neutral trading patterns to prewar – *courant normal* – levels soon floundered and left neutral authorities and their trading companies to steer a course between the competing demands and counter-demands of the two warring factions. While German political hegemony over the continent after June 1940 could scarcely be overlooked, neutral state leaders had powerful domestic reasons for wishing to accommodate German wishes. Germany was, for the most part, the neutrals' principal market for finished manufactured goods and their primary supplier of coal and other raw materials. As a result, despite mounting Allied economic pressure, neutral trade flow, particularly in the key strategic commodities – Turkish chrome, Swedish iron ore and ball bearings, Spanish and Portuguese wolfram, and Swiss precision manufactures and machine tools – was heavily weighted in Berlin's favor (Leitz 2000). This may have been a blatant form of appeasement, but it was also, at one level, a supreme case of political pragmatism. The most recent studies, as a result, have tended to be complementary in their evaluation of neutral economic policy (Golson 2011).

The apparent clarity of the trade statistics, however, should not lead us to conclude that contemporary scholars agree on how to interpret these figures or on their significance for the wider economic relations between the neutral and belligerent powers. On most of the key issues, current historical opinion remains sharply divided. We still lack a clear picture of the significance of the neutrals' contribution to the Axis – or Allied – war economies. German imports from Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Finland amounted to 18 percent of the total by 1943: a sizeable, though nevertheless comparatively small, proportion when set aside the contribution made by the western European economies and the occupied territories (Boelke 1994, p. 159).

At the same time recent research has tended to emphasize the importance of individual commodities to the German economy; German officials often used the term *kriegsentscheidend* [war decisive] to describe Swedish iron ore imports or deliveries of Iberian wolfram and Turkish chrome (Leitz 1996, p. 196; Leitz 2000, p. 179). More research is required on the nature of the German war economy before an accurate assessment can be made. Methodological issues also need to be resolved. Should we, for instance, evaluate the impact of Swedish ball-bearing imports on the basis of their monetary value – 47 million kronor by 1943 (up from 8.3 million in 1939) – their relative value to Germany's total needs – estimated at about 7.5 percent by early 1944 – or on the place occupied by ball bearings in Allied strategy (whether this was warranted or not)? US air raids to stifle Germany's ball-bearing manufacturing plants at Steyr and Schweinfurt were amongst the most costly for the entire war (Medlicott 1952–1959, vol. 2, pp. 483–484; Fritz 1975). We need also to be conscious of the qualitative differences. Swedish ball bearings were reputed to have

been of higher quality than their German counterparts; Swiss jewel bearings enjoyed a similar status, as did Swiss watch and fuse mechanisms.

Historians are likewise undecided over how to interpret the economic rationale behind neutral export policies. Those inclined to be generous to neutral governments, such as the former Swiss federal councilor George-André Chevallaz (2001), insist that it was only to be expected that, bereft of external support, neutral statesmen reacted to the threat of German attack in mid-1940 by trying to buy off German pressure through granting financial, economic, and trade concessions. But it is clearly difficult to sustain such arguments when explaining the existence of high export levels after 1943, at a time when the fortunes of war had swung decisively in the Allies favor, the danger of invasion or armed German retaliation against the neutrals had receded and Berlin had begun renegeing on its own economic obligations to the neutrals.

One of the most acute observers of wartime neutrality, Christian Leitz (2000), shares the conclusions of the official US study into the issue (Eisenstat 1998), in arguing that "profit considerations" ultimately overrode, or at least numbed, any moral qualms that neutral statesmen or businessmen might have had about doing business with the Nazi regime in the final years of the war. Yet if it was only the Spanish who genuinely welcomed a German victory, it remains the case that official reactions to Hitler's demise in neutral Europe were heavily shaped by domestic political considerations that were scarcely appreciated by those observing events in London or Washington, and remain, even today, difficult to fully comprehend. Although felt in different measure, all neutrals were affected by a profound sense of Russophobia and hatred of communism that not only colored judgments over the shape of the postwar world, but also, critically, shaped official attitudes toward the rising prominence of the left in both their own countries and elsewhere across Europe (Cailliet 2009). Determined to control and contain the rise of organized labor, neutral governments ultimately preferred a fully employed workforce to a well-fed one, and consequently erred on the side of caution when faced with Allied demands to curtail their trade with Germany in the final years of the war.

Evaluation of the economic ledger is complicated still further when considering those "invisible" elements in the neutrals' external economic relations. Beginning in the 1920s, German companies went out of their way to foster close relations with partner firms in neutral countries in the hope of evading some of the financial and economic restrictions imposed on Germany by the 1919 settlement. Many of these relationships originated in the Great War, but continued into the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (Uhlig et al. 2001). A significant number of Swiss firms, including the food manufacturer Maggi, had filial businesses located in southern Germany, whose "output" did not show up in Swiss-German trade figures. Likewise, assessing the scale of German imports – particularly from Spain and Portugal – is problematic given the quantity of material known to have been smuggled across the Pyrenees, frequently with official connivance, and often with the support of sympathetic local officials and customs officials. A measure of the impact that smuggling could have on the official trade statistics can be gauged from a recent study of British covert operations out of Switzerland. Elicit exports, which circumvented official Swiss customs controls, are reckoned to account for as much as a quarter of British imports from Switzerland between mid-1940 and late 1944 (Wylie 2005).

A similar set of questions arise when evaluating the neutrals' involvement in the financial activities of the two camps. It is in this area where recent research has had perhaps its most profound impact, and overturned earlier interpretations of wartime neutrality. Three issues in particular have come under the historical spotlight;

- 1 the emotive, though in monetary terms relatively minor, question of neutral connivance in the dispersal of the personal effects of those who perished in Hitler's death camps;
- 2 the role of neutral banks in assisting German overseas financial operations; and
- 3 the part played, principally by neutral central banks, in exchanging German gold stocks – much of it acquired from the bank holdings in the occupied territories – into foreign exchange.

To this list we might also add a fourth; the various official credit arrangements advanced to Axis firms to cover purchasing operations in neutral markets. While earlier historians were not unaware of these activities, the scale of neutral involvement revealed by recent research is altogether new.

Credit advances played a vital role in lubricating neutral economic relations with the Axis by subsidizing German and Italian commercial activities in neutral markets. The Swiss were the most addicted to credit advances, providing German importers with SF450 million in August 1941 and an additional SF850 million in July 1941, but probably the most significant advance was the RM100 million credit given by Madrid in November 1943 – ostensibly to settle Spain's outstanding debt for German support in the Civil War – which effectively neutralized Allied preemptive purchasing operations and allowed Germany to remain in the Spanish wolfram market for a further six months (Leitz 1996, p. 183).

Neutral commercial banks were also active in support of their Axis clients. Again, it was the Swiss banks – in particular the three international banks of Credit Suisse, the Union Bank of Switzerland, and the Swiss Bank Corporation – that led the way, though Sweden's Enskilda bank was also deeply implicated. While the exact scope and nature of their activities remains unclear, Allied economic warfare authorities assembled evidence which pointed to the neutrals' connivance in German evasion of Allied currency control regulations, the repatriation of overseas funds and foreign currency payments (Aalders and Wiebes 1996; Wylie 2003). The fact that these banks rarely featured in the Allied "statutory" and "black" lists of neutral firms found "trading with the enemy," probably accounts for why they managed to keep beneath the historians' radar for so long. Their success can partly be explained by the services they rendered to the Allied financial authorities during the war, and to the powerful political position they enjoyed at home. It was concern for the fragile state of Anglo-Swiss relations that persuaded London to resist "black listing" Credit Suisse in the winter of 1940/1941, notwithstanding the accumulation of evidence demonstrating the scale of the bank's activities on behalf of its German clients (Wylie 2000).

By far the most important financial facility provided by the neutrals was the exchange of foreign currency against German gold. Large-scale gold sales began in the fall of 1941, and reached a peak over 1942 and 1943 when some SF850 million worth of gold was received by the Swiss National Bank in exchange for foreign currency. Berne was the destination of choice for the *Reichsbank*, though smaller

amounts were directed toward some of the other neutral central banks, and the Bank for International Settlements. The majority of gold reaching Berne was deposited into the accounts of other neutral national banks – principally Portugal (SF450 million), Spain (SF150 million) and Romania (SF100 million). The importance of this trade was twofold. First, it provided the *Reichsbank* with a reliable source of foreign currency, without having to divert German resources toward the production of export goods. Second, it enabled Germany to mount extensive clandestine operations outside its immediate orbit (Perrenoud 2011).

Research is still required on the use made of these funds, but a sizeable proportion appears to have been used to cover commercial, intelligence, and propaganda activities. By late 1943, for example, the foreign exchange requirements for running intelligence operations in Turkey and subsidizing the activities of friendly newspapers amounted to some RM4 million a month (Leitz 2000, p. 29). Earlier that year, according to Allied sources, German purchasing authorities in Spain were able to use Swiss franc advances, provided by one of the major Swiss private banks, to “obtain pesetas and [thereby] stave off the interruption in wolfram buying which” that would otherwise have resulted (Ministry of Economic Warfare, London, to British delegation, Berne, No. 1688, 10 April 1943. UK National Archives, FO371/34840C4189/447/41).

As with the neutrals' commercial activities, the new light thrown on neutral financial operations during the war has tended to raise more questions than it answers. Switzerland's place as a hub for foreign exchange and financial transactions was sufficiently well recognized in Berlin to convince senior officials that Germany could not survive without it (ICE 1998, pp. 129–130). The global reach of some of the key neutral banks was clearly indispensable to German activities abroad, and the Swiss National Bank's willingness to part with cash in return for gold was more than a matter of mere convenience. Some questions remain – if gold sales were so vital to the German war economy, why was so much gold retained in Germany and allowed to fall into Allied hands at the end of the war? But the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that it was in the area of war financing that the neutrals played their most significant part in the war.

Questions of legality, however, also shroud the discussion. To what extent did neutral bankers care about the provenance of the gold they received from the *Reichsbank*? Did they consider it legitimate for Berlin to extract occupation costs from its occupied territories, and if so, did this extend to ransacking state gold reserves and sequestering private assets held in gold? The fact that questions over Germany's legal title to the gold in its possession were belatedly posed in 1943 suggests that Swiss bankers were at least alive to the potential ramifications of Berlin's unprecedented despoliation of the occupied territories. But in the last resort the issue was never pressed, nor was it used to justify delaying or suspending exchange operations; facts that at least imply a lack of conviction and a basic reluctance to upset the lucrative gold trade (Fior 1997). There is little doubt that over the climactic summer of 1940, when faced with the collapse of Allied fortunes, Switzerland's political leadership, no less its central bankers, looked to finance as the principal way of buying off German demands. Indeed, some members of the Swiss National Bank felt it Switzerland's duty to collaborate with the new regime: “our country” wrote one board member, “will have to consciously seek its place in this new world, and endeavor to play an active role in it. In no case should we limit ourselves to passive adaptation alone” (ICE 1998, p. 72 n.64).

Whether the issue of national survival played a part in the bank's subsequent willingness to accept German gold nevertheless remains an open question. The official report into Swiss financial activities during the war found no convincing evidence to support the view that Switzerland's purchase of gold was directed by the need to deter a German invasion (ICE 1998). Internal memoranda show that far from being moved by external considerations, Swiss bankers became increasingly resentful of any outside interference – whether practical or moral – over a matter they considered their own. But historians such as Jean Christian Lambelet (1999) and Philippe Marguerat (2006) insist, by contrast, that neutral bankers operated entirely within their rights and should not be criticized for trying to defend their country's financial interests and wellbeing.

Debate over the neutrals' economic activities has focused on their involvement with the Axis authorities, but it is worth noting that the Allies were never entirely excluded from the neutral markets. In many instances, Allied economic penetration of the neutrals during the opening months of the war was every bit as impressive as that of the Axis powers. It was the British and French who worked hardest to overturn neutral export restrictions and open up their manufacturing, raw material, and services markets to foreign buyers. While the collapse of Allied military fortunes over 1940 and 1941 inevitably restricted Allied commercial activity on the continent, it did not erase them completely. The need to gear up the British economy for total war quickly uncovered bottlenecks and resource scarcities, many of which that could only be resolved by drawing on neutral markets and resources. Such trade did not compensate for the volume of neutral exports heading to the Reich, but it did give the Allies, particularly Britain, a stake in neutral economies that inevitably complicated efforts to reduce neutral collaboration with the Axis. A similar situation was confronted in their financial relations. The Allied financial authorities and central banks sold over two times as much gold to the Swiss National Bank over the course of the war as their counterparts in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo.

In almost every case, from Ireland to Turkey, Spain to Sweden, the neutrals played their economic cards relatively well, navigating between the competing belligerent interests and defending – and in many instances augmenting – their economic and financial resources. The Portuguese and Spanish authorities reaped huge profits from the “wolfram rush,” which saw the price of Spanish wolfram rise by from about 8 pesetas per kilogram in 1938 to 180 pesetas per kilogram by July 1944: though questions remain over how these profits translated into real improvements in their respective societies and economies (Leitz 1996, pp. 181–195). A similar story could be told of Turkish chrome exports. Irish workers who flooded into British factories and shipyards over the course of the war repatriated between GB£100,000 and £150,000 a week by the middle of 1942, sums which, according to Irish officials, were vital in relieving economic hardship in Eire (Kavagh 2000, p. 86; Connolly 2000, p. 122). Clearly not all the economic indicators went in the neutrals' favor, but in general, neutral authorities must be credited for rising to the economic challenges of the war (Golson 2011). By September 1944, there were only 3,000 registered unemployed in Switzerland; retail prices rose by as much as 161 percent between 1939 and mid-1943 but this was considerably less than the 240 percent rise in the comparable period during the Great War. None of the “long haul” neutrals who saw out the conflict with their independence in tact experienced the same level of external

interference in their domestic affairs as they had in the Great War, or faced the kind of social and political disruption that had marked the return of peace in 1918/1919 (Schmitt 1988; Hertog and Kruizingen 2011).

The grudging respect one might feel for the neutrals' single-minded defense of their "national" interests after 1939 is inevitably tempered when placed within the broader context of the war. Did, in short, neutral pragmatism ultimately extend the duration of the war, or its severity? As evidence of the scale of neutral support for the Axis reached public attention during the late 1990s, heated – though ultimately rather pointless – debates broke out over how many weeks, months, or years neutral collaboration had extended the life of the Nazi regime. Of more interest, however, were the discussions that revolved around the kind of moral compromises struck by the neutral authorities over the course of the war. To what extent were the neutrals, as the last representatives of the independent international community, responsible for maintaining and promoting what one authority has termed "humanity in warfare"? Did the pursuit of strict neutrality at an international level entail a neutrality of thought and deed at the domestic level? Were, in short, the humanitarian principles espoused by so many of the citizens of neutral Europe, compromised by the policies pursued by their governments, businessmen, and financiers?

These questions did not carry the same weight in every country (for instance, few expected Franco to bestir himself for the defense of humanity). But for Switzerland and Sweden, who by any measure were mature bourgeois liberal-democracies by 1939, blemishes on their wartime record cut deep into the national consciousness. In many respects, the research of the 1990s and early 2000s merely confirmed what subject-specialists had known for some time (Jost 1983). Officials in neutral capitals had struggled – as their counterparts in London, Paris, and Washington had struggled – to comprehend fully the depths to which the Nazi regime had plummeted in its determination to make Europe *Judenfrei*. They had claimed, as one Swiss federal councilor had in early 1942, that the "boot was full," when the number of refugees in the country could comfortably fit into a football stadium. They had also connived in Nazi exclusion policies; "Aryanising" their business boards to curry favor with their German clients and, in Switzerland's case, allowing German racial legislation to penetrate administrative law by agreeing to mark all passports of ethnic Jews with a "J" to help with immigrant selection at the frontier. The Swiss Police Division even obliged by sending samples of stamped passports to Germany for tests to ensure that the "J" could not be easily erased (ICE 1999, p. 82).

Where the new research findings did add to the debate was in the depth of latent anti-Semitism it unearthed in neutral societies and the way in which official reactions to the humanitarian tragedy unfolding on their doorsteps were shaped by narrow reading of the national interest (Picard 1994). It is Switzerland's record that has been most severely dented by these findings. The official commission tasked with examining Switzerland's wartime activities concluded that "although Switzerland's international role gave them several trump cards, they rarely chose to play them for the defense of basic human values" (ICE 1999, p. 263). The impact of such views on Swiss humanitarianism during the war is thrown into relief by the activities of the handful of Swiss officials and diplomats who tried to buck the trend and harness Switzerland's neutral status for the benefit of those most in need of assistance (Tschuy 2000). More significant is the example offered by the Swedish authorities who, from

the fall of 1942, allowed their representatives to extend a modicum of support and protection for many thousands of Jews across occupied Europe. The fact that this policy was, as Paul Levine (1998) has shown, largely the initiative of one individual – Gösta Engzell, the head of the foreign ministry's legal department – raises the intriguing question as to whether the difference in Swiss and Swedish policies might ultimately have hinged on the attitudes of a handful of pivotal officials.

Although Sweden's record stands up better than Switzerland's, it is nevertheless the case that both countries devoted their resources toward specific categories of war victim, whose selection might have had as much to do to with the ease with which assistance could be granted, as their "value" to the foreign policy interests of the neutral states themselves. Sweden's humanitarian activities were *principally* (though not exclusively) directed toward saving the lives of its fellow Scandinavians. As early as the summer of 1940, the Swiss federal council deliberately harnessed its humanitarian efforts to the benefit of Swiss diplomacy. Medical missions – arranged by the Swiss national Red Cross society, but acting with official approval – were sent to tend German soldiers, though not Russian, wounded on the Eastern Front. The country opened its doors to French and Belgian children offering "rest and recuperation" visits lasting several months at a time. Berne devoted its principal energies toward fulfilling its functions as a protecting power – a duty it performed for the British, US, and German governments – and from early 1942 consciously sought to tailor the work of international relief organizations stationed on Swiss soil to the country's foreign policy interests (Wylie 2010). Perhaps the clearest example of how the federal council channeled Swiss humanitarianism along officially approved lines was its intervention in October 1942 to dissuade the International Committee of the Red Cross from going public in its denunciation of the Holocaust (Favez 1999; Crossland 2011).

More than the question of Nazi loot, it was the tragic stories of individual refugees and their families denied sanctuary and turned back at neutral frontiers that sharpened public discussions over the neutrals' wartime record in the mid-1990s. For neutral publics such stories jarred, not merely because of the doubt it cast over the sense of national self-worth and international standing, but because they threw into question the value of the "sacrifices" made by the war generation in defending the nation's autonomy and independence. Instead of embodying the national will and offering their lives for the defense of the homeland, the allegations appeared to transform the "Front generation" into an unwitting cipher of the myopic, self-serving elite interest groups who occupied the country's boardrooms and cabinet chambers.

They also, however, epitomized the extent to which in the era of total war, neutral frontiers had taken on multiple meanings and significance. Neutral borders defined who would live "at peace" and who "at war," who enjoyed sanctuary, and who did not. But such distinctions were never absolute. Blackouts, air raid sirens, rationing, and so forth, were part of the daily lives of those who lived in neutral Europe and were not restricted to citizens of the belligerent states. Sanctuary was a matter of choice: neutral authorities could choose who or what to offer sanctuary to: civilians, children, refugees, deserters, prisoners of war; "hot money," art work, "loot" funds, state- or private gold. The very issue of what neutrality meant between 1939 and 1945 was contingent on the changing circumstances and the shifting mindsets of those responsible for charting national policy.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

Resistance in Eastern Europe

STEPHAN LEHNSTAEDT

The resistance against National Socialism in Eastern Europe has been considered in the last 65 years mainly from two perspectives: that of the German resistance and the fight against the national resistance movements. For a long time, this characterization also resembled a geographical dividing line, as people behind the Iron Curtain touted their own success, whereas the West focused mostly on the actions of the Germans. This was not least a source problem, because the materials in the archives of the “others” were often not accessible to researchers (Chiari and Kochanowski 1995).

In recent years, many limitations could be overcome, and apart from certain practical difficulties in accessing Russian and Belarusian archives, today only language still is a barrier. Nevertheless, research interests continue to be nationally dominated in many areas. The reason for this can be seen in two key points regarding any resistance research: first, the success of resistance is hard to measure in an absolute way; and second, its assessment is often subject to moral categories. Such – in any case highly problematic – statements seem to be easier for the historian’s own nation than in relation to other countries.

Groundbreaking new studies are characterized by the fact that they avoid national restrictions and reach down to the local level, a deep penetration of German and Eastern European sources (see, for example, the Belarusian/eastern Polish territory of Baranowicze; Musial 2004; Brakel 2009), and also include a comparative view of other resistance movements. There was not only “the” resistance in Eastern Europe or even in individual countries, but numerous, sometimes regional, sometimes border-crossing movements with very different organizational structures and procedures. Their common ground was solely opposition to the Nazi occupiers – but even this did not always prevent fighting between guerrilla groups.

Poland’s conservative Catholic national movement *Armia Krajowa* (AK) [home army], with its close ties to the exiled government in London, had little intersection with the Soviet partisans or even the Polish, but Moscow had the devoted *Armia*

Ludowa (AL) [people's army], and in the areas of today's Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, armed conflicts were not uncommon. Victims of internal quarreling were often Jews who formed their own guerrilla units and who, due to nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe, were always under scrutiny. This proved to be a tragedy especially for the resistance fighters in the ghettos, as they had to make it almost completely without support from outside. Mounted differently and acting independently from the aforementioned movements was the short-lived Czech resistance, which was widely celebrated only because of its successful assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (1904–1942) in Prague. In contrast, the 1944 Slovak National Uprising is largely unknown in the West.

All of these phenomena are part of "resistance in Eastern Europe." Their commonality is, first, a more or less structured association in German-occupied territories and second, active struggle against the Nazis and their collaborating institutions, usually in combination with violence, with the aim to eliminate their rule. As a consequence, this chapter does not deal with individual action or the denial of everyday obedience. Also, one must avoid a definition of resistance from the perspective of the occupying forces; for example in the Soviet Union, only a minority of people suspected and killed as partisans were actually a member of such a grouping.

Resistance was not found in all parts of the German-occupied Soviet territories. In some places, such as the Baltic states, there were no significant underground movements (Bubnys 2003; Gaunt 2004; Swain 2009), and because the Germans were initially seen as liberators from communism, quite the contrary happened: much cooperation and collaboration. In the southern regions of Ukraine, resistance was also rare (Kosyk and Rudnytzky 1993). In the west of this country, which had belonged to Poland until 1939, mainly Polish units operated. On the other hand, in Belarus, northern Ukraine and western parts of Russia, developed what is commonly referred to as the "Soviet partisans."

The local marshy and wooded, sparsely populated terrain favored the partisans topographically. The first groups formed at the end of 1941 from Red Army soldiers who escaped capture, hiding behind the German lines (Brakel 2009, pp. 284–287). These early units were hardly a threat to the occupying forces and acted with little success. Most of them did not survive the first winter. Nevertheless, the German order to shoot indiscriminately all soldiers found in the hinterland as "insurgents" promoted the emergence of an actual partisan movement, simply because the men saw no other way than gathering in groups. A significant raise of partisan numbers only started in February 1942, when an increasing number of local residents found living and surviving under German rule more and more impossible.

The Soviet leadership started supporting these first groups, because Stalin was less interested in an unguided "popular resistance" than in a guided struggle under Moscow's leadership. The motivation of the fighters arise out of feelings of patriotism, honor, revenge, and the love of freedom, but such feelings seemed dubious to Stalin because they constituted no attributes a *homo sovjeticus* should have (Slepyan 2006, pp. 91–95). The Kremlin wanted the resistance movement to be targeted at the Germans – not least to prevent the occasional clashes among the units, and therefore offered human and material support to secure its influence (Armstrong 1964; Hrenkevič 1999). From the eastern parts of the occupied territories, where resistance was the most successful, individuals gradually leaked to the west and they then

provided assistance and helped implement Moscow's strategies. Additionally, in May 1942 the "central headquarters of the Soviet partisan movement" had been created under the Belarusian communist Panteleimon Ponomarenko (1902–1984), who kept in touch with the various guerrilla units and coordinated them (Slepyan 2000).

But this did not always succeed (Musial 2009), so that well into 1943 local warlords often determined the fate of many groups. For those leaders, taking care of their men usually had a higher priority than fighting the Nazis. For example, to ensure food supplies, they did not attack German stocks, but drew on the local farmers – not infrequently with violence. Thus, it soon became apparent that the rural population was exposed to a double risk: partisans and Nazis, who both looted food more or less brutally. This two-sided threat put people at a high risk of being subject to reprisals by either party, because one suspected collaboration with the other. For the population this permanent threat was aggravated by the continuing deportations to forced labor in the Reich. To a large extent, this dilemma pushed farmers into the arms of the resistance, because there they were at least safe from coercive measures. This happened despite the fact that resistance outside of the organized communist partisans became less and less possible (Pohl 2008, p. 283).

Due to the continuous inflow of new members, the guerrilla movement in the Soviet Union in summer 1943 gained serious military strength. The total number of men organized in different regional groups will probably never be determined precisely simply because of the absence of reliable statistical information on the Russian side, but estimates amount to 250,000 people in the occupied Soviet territories (Hill 2005). In any case, the figures in the German reports are misleading. In the various *Bandenkampfunternehmen* [partisan fighting action – the German "*Bande*" literally meaning "gang," thus delegitimizing partisans], the units of *Wehrmacht* and SS reported mostly high four-digit death tolls, referring to people as partisans when they were not. Adding up the Nazi figures, one can count at least 160,000 dead for the areas under army command, and added to probably more than 200,000 in the occupied territories under civil administration deaths, the overall amount increases to 345,000. Contrasted to this were the few numbers of fallen partisans counted officially by Soviet authorities. Thus, we must assume that only about 25 percent of the victims were members of partisan units. This fact demonstrates once more the terror with which the Germans covered the occupied areas – the rural population was subjected to a mass murder, which from the perpetrators' perspective is already comprehensively explored (Wilenchik 1984; Gerlach 2000; Shepherd 2004).

The figures clearly show how little military success the occupiers had fighting the partisans. During the mid-1942 "Bamberg" campaign in Belarus, for example, units of *Wehrmacht*, police, and auxiliary Slovak troops seized only 47 guns, while they reported thousands of victims and countless burned villages. The German losses accorded to the enemy's "arms" totaled only seven men; there simply was no fight because the partisans rapidly withdrew and redeployed (Gerlach 2000, pp. 884–890).

Wehrmacht leaders before 1939 had reflected on guerrilla war, a concept known to them from the Napoleonic wars in 1813/1814 and also from successes in encounters after World War I, especially in 1919 in the east (Blood 2006, pp. 4–8). However, this does not mean that resistance movements were regarded as legitimate. On the contrary they were seen as illegitimate in occupied territories, so reprisals were considered to be reasonable. The Polish campaign, in 1939, had shown that the

Wehrmacht was engaging actual or alleged insurgents with fullest brutality (Rossino 2003; Böhler 2006).

Fighting against resistance groups in Europe proved to be highly arbitrary and full of excessive violence. Nevertheless, the magnitude differed not only by time and place, but also by the respective military units. A central commonality was the fact that the local civilian population, particularly Russians and Belarusians, was extradited to the *Bandenkampf* without protection and rights. The racial categories projected onto the locals exacerbated the situation even more (Pohl 2008, pp. 303–304). The arbitrary classification as a *Bandenverdächtiger* [partisan suspect], who was to be executed, did not depend on actual evidence of belonging to the resistance; in practice, the Germans massacred entire villages just because partisans were suspected nearby. Hitler had decreed that women and children were not excluded therefrom, and also exempted the units conducting murders from prosecution (Hesse 1993; Pohl 2008, p. 288).

So far in the literature, the antiguerrilla fight of the front-line troops is much lesser explored than that of the backup units operating further away (Gerlach 2000; Munoz and Romanko 2003). Behind the front, however, a threat evolved until summer 1942 that was perceived as a military task, and not just a minor matter. So it was only logical that in June 1943, the SS *Obergruppenführer* and general of the police, Erich von dem Bach, became “leader of the *Bandenkampf* units” for all forces. He had already distinguished himself since 1941 as higher SS and police leader Russia Center by brutal terror against the natives. Since October 24, 1942 he was also the “authorized representative of the Reich Leader SS for *Bandenkampf*,” and now coordinated fighting the resistance in the occupied Soviet Union. Paradoxically, it was in the second half of the war, when the guerrilla movement’s penetration had increased and a certain fear spread, when the Germans were ready to make small concessions to the indigenous population, but they always did so in combination with a sweeping use of force (Pohl 2008, pp. 303–304).

It is difficult to develop objective criteria for assessing the effectiveness of resistance, however, although its operations are well described (Hill 2005). The destroyed infrastructure played a role in making *Wehrmacht* supply more difficult, but as the main German supply route could be successfully backed up to the Eastern Front, the attacks can hardly be estimated as severely weakening the military effort against the Soviet Union. More important was that relevant lines had to be guarded by significant troops deployed in the country. Yet, a rate of 3.8 percent security forces in October 1943 cannot be seen as decisive for warfare (Hartmann 2004). The partisan logic moreover neglects the civilian victims who had at least an indirect connection with the resistance action. The research on all these factors offers various theories but a conclusive assessment is still not available.

It is noteworthy, though, that the contemporary reception in Moscow and Berlin turned out to be completely different. While Stalin generally criticized the ineffectiveness and passivity of the partisans (Hill 2005), Hitler overestimated their relevance and made larger allotments to *Bandenkampf*—with little success, although notably, at least during the second half of the war, large parts of Belarus were neither under German nor partisan rule. And although the Nazis observed a constant growth of resistance, this did very little to their policy of ruthless violence (Brakel 2009, pp. 300–301, 337). The Germans’ fear was identified as a central effect of resistance, so their importance can hardly be overestimated. Precisely this fear was a major motivation for the occupiers’ limitless violence, preventing reflection on the causes

and consequences of resistance, as well as on a population-related policy (Berkowitz 2006). Not only by way of direct action did the partisans inhibit a more efficient exploitation and enslavement of the occupied territories. Indeed, they were also successful, above all, because in reciprocity, the German operations drove further people in their arms, which only made them a mass movement. This may well have met Moscow's intentions, although the degree of guidance and support of the resistance by Stalin is controversial (Musial 2009). The price paid amounted to hundreds of thousands of victims and countless destroyed villages – which was not too high for the Soviet rulers.

In this sense, the interdependency between partisans, occupation policies, and *Wehrmacht* warfare can hardly be overestimated, but it also represents a field with numerous research gaps. Recent studies were inspired mainly from the fertile debate in Germany about the exhibition “War of Annihilation: Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*” from 1995 (Heer 1995). The exhibit showed, at the very least, that the German Army – but also the Air Force (Blood 2010) – acted often more brutally than SS and police units. Yet the show did not provide concrete answers to the question of an initiative either by SS or *Wehrmacht* (Richter 1998; Shepherd 2003; Arnold 2005; Brakel 2009, p. 294; Hasenclever 2010). The interactions of politics, economics, resistance, and terror are, as of yet, known only for small regions.

Nevertheless, the Soviet partisans are not a “myth” (confirming an alleged myth: Musial 2009), as in recent years much important research has been conducted. By all means the West retains an image of heroic resistance fighters, who love their country, just as the former territories of the Soviet Union maintain the story today. Historical literature of the past 20 years did not overestimate the achievements of the partisans, but on the contrary, pointed at many less praiseworthy aspects of resistance. First and foremost, one has to mention the handling of the Jewish men, women, and partisans (Tec 1993; Walke 2007). Due to the extreme persecution Jews were exposed to during the Nazi regime, many of them fled into forests where they organized own or joined communist groups. And although the Soviet partisans rescued tens of thousands of Jews, and even helped them in many cases to flee the ghettos, the Jews were isolated within these groups and often seen with suspicion because they were regarded as foreigners. Thus, equality with other Russian partisans usually existed only on paper. Since Jews were regarded as part of their own nationality, they were hardly trustworthy, according to partisans (Slepyan 2006).

This perception also influenced rescue operations in 1942 and early 1943, when the Holocaust was in full swing. There was but scant help for the Jews, although occasional exceptions are emphasized in the research literature (Epstein 2008). Considered pragmatically, the partisans did not know what to do with the Jews. Especially those who had fled from the ghettos were not able to make a contribution to the struggle of the groups due to malnutrition and disease. They had to be fed, and therefore were regarded as ballast endangering the own survival. Moscow saw this very similarly, and did not send any rescue instructions until September 1942 – when the Nazis had already murdered millions of Jews.

For this reason, the dictum of a care too little and too late (Slepyan 2000) is not very controversial. But despite the adversity that the Jews met in the Soviet underground, one cannot really speak of a state anti-Semitism, as especially in Belarus the Jews comprised one-third of the partisan population. Since any nationalism was

suspicious to the Kremlin, Stalin tried to create as ethnically diverse groups as possible, distributing Jews among the various resistance units. From fall 1942 onwards, the only nuance of this policy was to call partisans a "people's movement." The Soviet orientation was not abandoned; rather, only the groups would explicitly offer the opportunity to participate to other nationalities and – at least officially – differ from the purely communist organization. Even then solely Jewish formations did not emerge in the second half of the war (Smilovitsky 2006).

Better known than the story of Jewish partisans is the resistance in the ghettos, where the uprising in Warsaw in spring 1943 stands out as a particularly striking example. However, the idea of an armed struggle against the occupiers was not developed there, but in early 1942 by the Zionist youth movement in the Vilna Ghetto (Arad 1981). There had been discussions whether, in the face of Nazi extermination policy, it was better to fight in the ghetto or to flee to the partisans. The basic dilemma was already clear then: partisans did not offer any real help, insurgency seemed to court mass suicide because no weapons were available, and no outside help was expected. An uprising was, therefore, reasonable, when the end – the dissolution of the ghetto and the deportation to death camps – was imminent.

Jewish reactions in the face of the Holocaust confront the historian with many moral dilemmas. Resistance in the ghettos and camps had the foremost aim of ensuring one's own survival, and the main goal was not always the direct fight against the Nazi regime but to create conditions in which survival was possible. Assessments are being driven forward by strong research on these issues in Israel, and there especially from survivors (an overview of the Israeli research can be found in Bauer 1989), where the Zionists strongly propagated the idea of a Jewish state as a shelter for Jews. As Israel stands for the idea that never more will a Jew be exposed defenselessly to his enemies, the resistance in the ghettos stood as shining example of a defiant people. This very patriotic view contrasts sharply with the self-perception of the ghetto resistance fighters, who, in contrast to all other resistance movements, did see themselves as representatives of their people but as a small, motivated group of Zionists (Ainsztein 1974).

This is also consistent with the fact that there never was "the" Jewish resistance, but various forms developing from ghetto to ghetto in different shapes. In smaller ghettos resistance was often not present, and thus the question has been asked: "Jewish Resistance – Myth or Reality" (Bauer 2001, p. 119)? This is related also to views shared by the *Judenräte* [Jewish councils] and many inmates that resistance was as pointless as it was dangerous because it would lead to certain destruction. Instead, one had to become indispensable for the Nazis by means of cheap labor. Only in hindsight is it easy to condemn this idea as unrealistic because, in fact, this strategy seemed to work out for the Jewish survivors, at least at first (Trunk 1996).

Speculative, but interesting in this context, is the question of whether the evaluation of Chaim Rumkowski (1877–1944), the opportunistic head of the Litzmannstadt [Łódź] *Judenrat*, would be different if his strategy of cooperating with the Nazis had succeeded in survival of the ghetto until liberation was possible, in 1944 (Bauer 2001, pp. 130–134). This shows that ultimately there was no trade-off between resistance and Jewish councils, for both intended the survival of as many Jews as possible. Only by the means in which this should be achieved did they differ diametrically. Furthermore, herein lay a key difference to other national resistance movements, but also collaboration regimes, that were not faced with certain destruction.

The decision for armed struggle, therefore, was practically motivated and not ideological driven. In many smaller and larger ghettos in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, escaping into the surrounding woods and swamps was – unlike Warsaw – relatively easy. Minsk is the model and also the exception, for there the underground was communist and not Zionist (Epstein 2008). With the explicit intention of supporting the Soviet partisans, it helped organize the flight of some 10,000 Jews, which resulted in about 10 percent of survivors. However, it should not be forgotten that in Warsaw, some 70,000 Jews in hiding survived, which was a ratio of almost 15 percent (Paulsson 2002) in proportion to those captured and killed. Thus, Warsaw enjoyed a higher survival rate than Minsk, a result that questions central interpretations of previous research.

Future studies, therefore, must detach themselves from focusing on only one place, and should, with all empathy for the victims, also strive for objectifying standards. In addition, everyday life within the ghettos in particular remains a desideratum. In this context, future research should explore smuggling of food into the ghettos, education, and culture, which was organized collectively and reached far beyond passive resistance, even though it did not attempt to eliminate German rule because it was intended mainly to allow for physical and spiritual survival (Bauer 2001).

Warsaw, where in the ghetto from April 19 to May 16, 1943 some 750 resistance fighters of the Jewish Military Organization (ZZW, see Arens 2005) under the leadership of Mordechai Anielewicz (1919–1943), fought fierce battles with SS units, is the antithesis of the model of flight and passive resistance (Ainsztein 1979; Gutman 1982; Edelman 1990; Altman 2011). The uprising was brutally put down by some 2,000 Germans, led by SS-*Gruppenführer* Jürgen Stroop (1895–1952), and ended with the complete destruction of the ghetto and the murder or deportation of its inmates to the Treblinka extermination camp. The importance of the uprising not only lies in its enormous symbolic power, but also in its military significance. That is, the ill-equipped resistance fighters, thanks to the element of surprise and their local knowledge, managed to prosecute a lasting battle and inflict heavy losses upon the occupiers of 300 to 500 casualties. This can be contrasted to the 600 or so dead Jewish fighters, as well as the 12,000 civilians killed during the battle. It has to be added that, despite the opposite German victory message, fighting did not completely cease in May 1943. Smaller groups still hidden in the ruins of the ghetto harassed the occupiers in occasional skirmishes for more than a year (Engelking and Libionka 2009).

Other Jewish resistance often is overshadowed by Warsaw. But, for example, in Vilna (Arad 1981; Levin 1985) or in Białystok, led by Mordechai Tennenbaum (1916–1943) (Bender 2008), strong underground movements were active, yet in much less spectacular ways than in Warsaw, because their fighting mainly aimed at enabling escape from the ghetto. Furthermore, one should not forget that even in the extermination camps of Treblinka (Steiner 1997) and Sobibor (Schelvis 2007) in August and October 1943, revolts broke out, again with the intention of the prisoners to flee the camp. They were quickly and brutally suppressed, and only a few inmates managed to escape. Yet such insurrections somewhat succeeded because both camps were abandoned by the SS immediately afterwards. Still, in Auschwitz, the uprising of the Jewish operators of the gas chambers and crematoria on October 7, 1944 had no effect, because these were quickly murdered and replaced (Shelley 1996).

The example of Jewish resistance in Warsaw was not the only outstanding uprising in the city, because the Polish underground movement also rebelled in late summer 1944 against the Germans. Under the command of Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, units of the Polish underground *Armia Krajowa* launched a two-month battle between August 1 and October 2. Different SS and *Wehrmacht* units were supported by collaborating Russian volunteers, initially led by SS-*Gruppenführer* Heinz Reinefarth, who soon was replaced by Erich von dem Bach. On the Polish side, roughly 45,000 mostly ill-equipped fighters took part, faced by some 39,000 Germans with technically superior weapons, as the extensive literature on the event reveals (Borodziej and Ziemer 2001; Davies 2004).

In the end, the Nazis quelled the uprising. A high four-digit number of dead Germans stood against not only around 15,000 Polish resistance fighters, who died, but also murdered some 200,000 civilians and nearly totally destroyed Warsaw. Hitler and Himmler were quite satisfied with these results because they seemed to have broken the backbone of the Polish national movement and erased a capital that stood as a symbol of the Polish state – and in the way of Nazi Germanization concepts and policies. The many dead, the unprecedented excesses of violence, and the heroic courage of the insurgents in Warsaw 1944 made this the culmination of Polish resistance. It bundled the critical issues of all people struggling against Nazi occupiers: how to organize against them? How to engage them? And how to deal with the Soviet Union, an ally and enemy at the same time?

From 1939 to 1941, the “underground” had resisted communist suppression in the Soviet-occupied areas of Poland, but it had done much better in the west against the Germans than the well prepared NKVD in the east (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, i.e. the secret police). This antagonism continued after 1941, although the Soviet Union now was officially an Allied state and no longer occupied Polish territory. Initially there was no more fighting, but since February 1943 in parts of Poland, which had been conquered in 1939 by the Red Army, fierce battles between Soviet partisans and units of the AK broke out again. In some cases there even was collaboration between *Wehrmacht* and the home army against the Communists (Litvin 1995).

Those fights were piqued by Stalin’s unequivocal statement to the Polish government in exile in London and his allies that he did not intend to give up eastern Poland. Relations between Moscow and the government in exile had further deteriorated after the discovery of the Katyn mass graves where several thousand Polish officers and intellectuals had been murdered by the Soviet Union. That issue even led to a breakdown in diplomatic contact on April 25, 1945.

Fighting between Poland and Soviet Russia is, for the most part, a desideratum of research because many facts still need to be reconstructed. This is even truer for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which originated mainly from former policemen who collaborated with the Germans. Since April 1943, it had about 10,000–20,000 members seeking their own advantage and plundering the western parts of modern-day Ukraine, while at the same time fighting for an independent, non-Soviet, non-Polish or non-German land. For this reason, the UIA attacked not only settlements with ethnic Germans, but in numerous massacres killed some 50,000 Poles. Like the Russian partisans, there were frequent clashes with units of the home army (Pavlenko 2002; Motyka 2002, 2006; Snyder 2003; Bruder 2007).

Before 1990, from a communist perspective, the AK was seen as a fascist national movement. Nowadays, Ukrainians and Belarusians see the Polish enthusiasm for their wartime resistance as support for claims for lost territory (Poles label their eastern territories as “Kresy”), as the AK during the war logically fought only in Poland (Juchniewicz 1985; Romanowski 1993). The Belarusian historiography especially is of little help, because the issues are very politically charged and, under a dictatorship, also determined centrally and subjected to control. Therefore, the historiography is usually limited to local studies of purely military description (Chiari and Kochanowski 1995). For the record, it has to be clearly stated that the cooperation of *Wehrmacht* and Poles was strictly locally limited, and never took place on a larger scale or even in an official form because it was not sanctioned by the government in exile in London. Further research, as in the case of Soviet partisans, should investigate relations of local and central power. Such work, however, is very difficult because it disturbs the traditional Polish historical picture of the country as a victim of the war. “Poles as collaborators” is still regarded as taboo, as well as “Poles as perpetrators.”

For the Germans, local cooperation did not mean sparing the Polish resistance in any way. On the contrary, the Nazis observed in great detail (Borodziej and Ziemer 1999) what happened in the east. The Poles were regarded as nationally conscious people with a great tradition of revolt (Hahn 1988), which is why, in 1939, the local elite was purposefully murdered (Wardzyńska 2009). The first months of the occupation seemed to confirm German fears, as in the Kielce region a Polish partisan unit of several hundred men under Major Henryk Dobrzański, called “Hubal,” fought fiercely against the occupiers. This group was wiped out in March 1940, whereupon several hundred civilians were killed (Jacobmeyer 1972).

After three relatively calm years in Poland, the first signs of a flaring up of resistance were seen in summer 1942 in the eastern parts of the general government. The uprising emerged from escaped Soviet POWs and 50,000 Jews, thus mainly from survivors of Nazi persecution (Krakowski, Blaustein, and Bauer 1984). Later, it was in Poland also that forced labor recruitment led many men into the underground movement, and once more primarily the countryside was affected. In the summer of 1943, Heinrich Himmler declared the general government a *Bandenkampfgebiet* [partisan fighting area] – although in 1942 over 15,000 people had been killed as partisans – for which in turn Erich von dem Bach was made responsible. Transfer of knowledge, that is, learning from the failures in the Soviet Union, did not take place. Instead, the Nazis still relied on ruthless terror against the population (Madajczyk 1965; Fajkowski and Religa 1981). Like the fighting further east, these methods only achieved the opposite of the intended purpose: a further increase in resistance.

Nevertheless it has to be stated that well into the year 1942 the Polish resistance did rarely seek military action against the occupants. This was because the government in exile was not willing to risk civilian casualties (McGilvray 2010), but instead tried to build a system to provide a functioning state during the occupation and immediately after the German defeat. Indirectly, London also hoped to prevent a denationalization of the country (Gross 1979). Therefore the resistance was provided with detailed instructions and almost had its own constitution.

The underground army *Związek Walki Zbrojnej* (ZWZ) [union for armed struggle] existed since January 1941, and in February 1942 changed its name into the

much better-known Home Army, of which a comprehensive history can be found in Chiari and Kochanowski (2003). The Home Army was built up into an organization led by the government in exile and in 1944 numbered 350,000 members – including many women who also held military ranks (Ney-Krwawicz 2007). It gathered information on the occupation and disseminated that knowledge throughout the war in the journal *Biuletyn Informacyjny*. The Home Army also provided the country with its own system of social security, offered educational opportunities, and featured even a judicial apparatus pronouncing judgments against occupiers and collaborators (Karski 1944; Korboński 1978; Salmonowicz et al. 1999; Grabowski 2003; Eberhardt 2003).

The AK also listed Nazis accused of crimes against Poland, who, in secret court proceedings, were sentenced in absentia and later on shot. As the Germans punished Poles for their attacks on them by brutal reprisals, the AK executed their sentences on perpetrators, in some cases even inside of the Reich. However, the most spectacular incident took place in Warsaw on February 1, 1944 in a real battle in broad daylight, the SS- and *Polizeiführer* Franz Kutschera was assassinated. The resistance movement had, despite Kutschera's heavy guard, displayed a clear sign against the persecution of fighters for Poland's freedom. The assassination was surpassed in worldwide attention probably only by the killing of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague (Stachniewicz 1982). In retaliation, the Nazis shot 300 Poles.

The Polish underground state, which certainly represented the most remarkable phenomenon of this kind in occupied Europe, was a national movement which only the communists did not join. Their underground was organized in the *Armia Ludowa*, which, with some 30,000 members, numbered much less men (Gontarczyk 2003). Parts of the opposing rural population, which had initially been organized in *Bataliony Chłopskie* [peasant battalions], joined the AK in May 1943, as the most current Polish research has revealed (Markiewicz 1982; Przybysz 1985; Gmitruk 2001). This movement, numbering roughly 150,000 combatants, was never in real opposition to the government in exile, but paid close attention to maintaining a certain degree of independence.

But despite great inner unity, numerical strength, and success in the cohesion of the nation, the Home Army, in early 1944, was in a desperate situation. The Red Army had crossed the prewar Polish border. Not willing to give up his conquests of 1939, Stalin began to bring the country under control. The Poles fought the Germans at the same time, but without Soviet aid, they saw only limited success. Facing two enemies, neither the government in exile in London nor the local leaders in Warsaw saw a way for an independent Polish state to be possible. While the image of Poland to the Western Allies was very good – much discussed allegations of lack of help for Jews did not cause damage (Prekerowa 1996; Krakowski, Blaustein, and Bauer 1996; Zimmerman 2003; Friedrich 2006) – neither London nor Washington were willing to stop Moscow's western expansion.

The only way to preserve a Polish state seemed to lie in liberation on its own, before the Red Army took Warsaw. For a long time there existed plans to fight an open struggle against the occupiers in the capital and expel them from there. But more concrete considerations between March and July 1944 led to the conclusion that this would cost too many civilian lives, despite the relative strength of the AK. Once more, on July 14, 1944 Bor-Komorowski reported to London that an uprising would have no chance of military success.

A few days later, the situation seemed to have changed. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, and the defeat of the German *Heeresgruppe Mitte*, it looked as if Germany was through (Wiaderny 2002). The decision to an uprising made on July 22 was also connected with the fact that a day earlier, in Lublin, the Committee for the Polish Provisional Government was established by Stalin and thus denied the legitimacy of the London exile and the leadership of the AK. These developments dictated by the Soviet Union should, in turn, be countered by other facts (Borodziej and Ziemer 2001). Although the equipment of the Home Army in Warsaw was as bad as the prospects for military success, the exiles in London wanted to strengthen its legitimacy, demonstrate their own strength to the Allies and also provide arguments against Soviet expansion (Krajewski and Łabuszewski 2006).

Bor-Komorowski in Warsaw was open to these arguments partly because he overestimated his own strength and partly since he underestimated German power. He pursued the goal of liberating the city before the Red Army, which had already reached the other bank of the Vistula, but at the same time he hoped – despite the fundamental hostility – on sympathy from the Soviet Union. Predominantly within the contemporary Polish historiography, a fierce debate exists about whether the Red Army did not want to, or simply could not, help. At the moment, both views hold water. Even if Stalin had been able, he would have hardly supported the national-conservative Home Army. Possible, but rather improbable, Soviet aid was in doubt even before the outbreak of the uprising. It should be noted that the underground was willing, in a pinch, to sacrifice tens of thousands of civilians for its political objectives (Hanson 1982; Martin and Lewandowska 1999; Davies 2004).

During the Communist regime, and up until its last years in Poland, the failed uprising has been strongly criticized and the legitimacy of the AK discussed, while the role of the *Armia Ludowa* was far overvalued until 1989 (Duraczyński 1997; Borejsza 2000; Dmitrów and Kułak 2003). After the war, members of the AK were forced into exile, persecuted, and imprisoned as fascists and nationalists. The most absurd case was probably that of Kazimierz Moczarski (1907–1975) who served during the war as chief of the Office of Information and Propaganda of the Home Army, and then spent from 1945–1956 in prison, including nearly a year sharing a cell with the German mass murderer Jürgen Stroop (Moczarski, Fitzpatrick, and Stroop 1981).

In recent years, a turnaround in interpretation has started, pushed forward by the late Polish President Lech Kaczyński. The members of the AK nowadays enjoy in Poland a status as folk heroes (Kasznica 2005), and the uprising is included in the canon of a tradition of national resistance as a heroic deed. This, despite the many victims and the issue of for whom the resistance acted; that is, whether it was necessary to force a battle upon the inhabitants of Warsaw. The Polish-language literature now fills libraries; not a quarter, not a street in Warsaw can do without “its” history during the uprising, and since 2004 there has also existed a national museum which has a double function as documentation and memorial site (Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego, ul. Grzybowska 79, Warsaw).

The history of resistance in Czechoslovakia is divided into two separate stories, which correspond to the different fate of its two parts since 1992, when they once again became separate states. While the western part of the country as “Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” since March 1939 was completely under German control, the Nazis created a formally independent puppet state with the

Slovak Republic. Until the summer of 1944, there were no serious acts of resistance, as all opposition was suppressed by Jozef Tiso's regime, which was loyal to Hitler, unlike the Czech nations, where an underground movement was controlled from the London exile by former Czechoslovak President Edward Benes.

But the protectorate was not a place of great resistance. After the Nazis had ended mass demonstrations and strikes by force on October 28, 1939 (the Czechoslovak day of independence), the noncommunist underground movements was founded in early 1940. This Ústřední vedení odboje domácího (UVOD) [consolidation of resistance groups], was similarly oriented to the Polish Home Army, and since September 1941 even had partial cooperation with the communist underground. However, this did not mean that significant achievements in fighting the German occupiers were possible (Gebhart and Simovcek 1989). This was due to the fact that the exile government under Beneš failed to overcome the great differences between London and the homeland, and because the national and the communist underground were at odds (Pecka 1999). The objectives were different, and many Czechs just wanted to survive the war. As in Poland, because there were not "the" Czechs in wartime, a consistent history of the country or its resistance can hardly be written (Brandes 1975; Kosta 2008).

The relative powerlessness that characterized the underground in the protectorate, provoked even more by the brutal persecution by the Deputy Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich, emerged from fall 1941 as more and more of a major problem for Beneš in London. It weakened his legitimacy and his position vis-à-vis the Allies, thus reducing their tendency to support Czechia. Again and again the government in exile sent resistance fighters home to perform acts of sabotage which would then, in turn, be interpreted as a sign of success and of the Czech government's strength. By the end of 1941, Beneš was looking for an action that was spectacular enough to attract worldwide attention – and soon found an assassination attempt on the hated Heydrich as appropriate.

At the end of December 1941, allied planes dropped the assassins by parachute in Czechia, but it took them until May 17, 1942 to finally conduct their assault. They managed to wound Heydrich severely, so that he died on June 4 of a wound infection (Ivanov 2000; Haasis 2002; MacDonald 2007). The Nazi retaliation was brutal. On June 9, 1942, SS troops surrounded the village of Lidice, shot and killed all 172 male inhabitants, deported the women to the Ravensbrück concentration camp, and set fire to the village. It is less known that on June 24 in the hamlet of Ležáky, 47 inhabitants were massacred. In the course of reprisal measures, the Germans killed a total of 1,357 Czechs. But the plan of the government in exile bore fruit; not only had Heydrich been eliminated, but a well-publicized stand against the Nazi occupation regime had occurred which was associated indelibly with the massacre of Lidice and became infamous, from that point onward, for the terror against civilian population second only to the destruction of the French village of Oradour.

On the other hand, the German reprisals also attained its purpose because Czechia fell into lethargy for the rest of the war (Bryant 2007), especially as Hitler had threatened the collaborationist President of the Protectorate, Emil Hácha, with mass deportations if another terrorist act happened. Opposition activities in the country were limited to jokes (Bryant 2006) or slightly subversive acts (Černý 1984) which offer a rich field for cultural and historical studies but hardly threatened Nazi rule.

With Slovakia, Hitler had created a vassal state, which was indeed quite docile, and in the war against the Soviet Union, also provided troops. But Slovakia also sought to

preserve its formal independence, and did not always blindly carry out all instructions from Berlin (Tönsmeier 2003). Therefore, and because of the suppression of all opposition, greater opposition to the collaboration regime only started in the wake of German defeat. Parts of the military sought contact with the resistance movement, which included, in this case, even the Communists. Here we can see the unusual case of a cooperation of former fascist troops with a former, legally elected president and partisan units in a non-German-occupied country, with the ultimate goal of eliminating Nazi influences – and at the same time preparing the way for the Red Army. To this end, the Slovak National Council was founded, which not only recognized Beneš's authority, but also intended the restoration of Czechoslovakia (Plevza 1985).

Specific plans were complicated by the fact that in late August 1944, a German military mission was wiped out near Sveti Martin. To forestall the Nazi punitive expedition that had already started, the resistance's military leadership under Ján Golian initiated an uprising on August 29, 1944, which was earlier than originally intended. Some 47,000 Slovak fighters faced 40,000 well-equipped SS men under the command of SS-*Gruppenführer* Gottlob Berger who was replaced in mid-September by higher SS and police leader Hermann Höfle (Schönherr 2001). But since the Red Army had lost its offensive power after hard battles in the summer, a merger with the rebels was not realized. Thus, the aid promised by Stalin failed to arrive (Havlin and Hudec 1964; Venohr 1969; Husák 1972). Furthermore, quarrels within the resistance leadership were not overcome by Golian.

Thus the rebellion was doomed to fail, and indeed, it collapsed in late October, even if last units fought until the end of December against the Germans and collaborating troops from the Hlinka Guard. The number of Slovaks killed is estimated at around 20,000 – of which at least 5,304 were civilians buried in 211 mass graves. Only on April 4, 1945 did the Red Army conquer Bratislava and liberate the capital of Slovakia. The uprising, which had happened far away from worldview and produced no spectacular headlines, is still mostly neglected even by historians (Kropilák 1980).

Resistance in Eastern Europe was reflected in numerous small movements. These rarely possessed a national character; instead, they held their own particular political orientation or their own social group with predominated decision-making. Indeed, there was not a model of resistance, but only individual, isolated cases of resistance in the region. Even communist underground fighters acted, despite a more or less strong orientation towards Moscow, often quite independently. The historical context therefore requires a discerning eye because the names and territorial reach of these organizations often have little in common with today's national borders.

Differences extend also to the relationship between collaboration and resistance. Just like the actions of Soviet partisans against the indigenous population, a pro-German Belarus movement could also be complex (Chiari and Kochanowski 1998). Moreover, a scholar in Poland recently published a book that caused a sensation because it described the story of a man in the Home Army who handed out death sentences against compatriots (Dąbbski 2010). Not only in this context is it proper to ask about gender relations, since the study addresses the coexistence of female and male partisans and resistance fighters, and the related role expectations, but one should also explore the handling of sexual collaboration, which is now often a taboo subject.

Furthermore, little is known about the social dynamics of the resistance movement, not just on the relationship between management and insurgents, but also within a group of partisans (Musial 2009). It is necessary to explore the perception of everyday life in the underground and that of the Germans. Modern approaches to cultural and social history have so far been applied only occasionally, simply because even the most basic facts were unknown. Many studies in recent years, however, have provided important new insights, so that the foundations have been laid for further research. Given the fact that such written sources from Soviet and Jewish partisans only sporadically appear, and that they are mainly interviews and oral history projects, there is a certain urgency in recording and recovering these stories, because the surviving resistance fighters are getting older and dying off.

Just as the individual motivation to go into hiding and to risk one's life is often passed over through generalized statements, the same goes for the goals of individual groups. By no means was the expulsion of the Germans the only aim of the resistance movements. Political beliefs, pragmatism, and even economic considerations played no small role to fight against political rivals. The intentions of the underground were not always clearly and unambiguously addressed as a noble future for all. Future studies should, therefore, deal with why large populations, even entire countries, such as the collaborationist Hungarians, were not interested only in a rebellion against the Nazis. Indirectly connected to this agenda is the question of support and legitimacy of resistance. The Warsaw Uprising in 1944, for instance, showed how quickly innocent civilians can be victims of a liberation struggle (Hanson 1982).

The fact that these victims were, of course, ultimately attributed to German violence is indisputable. The policy of the Nazis was especially brutal because they are a topic far better researched than the underground movements. Nevertheless, questions arise toward adapting German action in the course of war (for instance, in connection with propaganda) to woo locals. In Poland in 1942, the occupier asked for a common struggle against the Soviet Union and wanted to underscore certain similarities between the two nations (Jockheck 2006). Thus, the Germans identified as the root cause of all resistance as "Judeo-Bolshevism," an enemy image of which much of Europe certainly approved. In sum, there are many nuances, allegiances, and shared beliefs among resistance groups and occupiers that require the close attention of scholars.

It cannot be overlooked that even the "gang fight" against the Soviet partisans was not successful. On the contrary, oftentimes, resistance strengthened the aggressor's brutality. But the failure of the guerrilla war, like the colonial struggles of the early twentieth century, could have allowed groups to learn from their own approach and that of others. There was a certain perception, but no real success in learning from predecessors. The Germans had more success the more the underground resisted – for example, during uprisings. However, against individual forms of resistance, rather than battles or riots, the *Wehrmacht* and SS had less success.

Another perspective that must be investigated is the postwar perception and apotheosis of resistance. Myths and historical images, which were transformed after the demise of the Soviet Union, have largely been deconstructed (for example, for the Polish Communist handling of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto, see Kobylarz 2009; for the uprising in 1944, see Sawicki 2005). Glorification and condemnation of certain groups exists in the Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego [Museum of the Warsaw Uprising] and an effort is underway to derive new identities and create a national

lieux de mémoire in postcommunist societies. Thus, not only the communists were demonized, but also groups were glorified, which rarely were bearers of democratic and pluralistic tendencies. Apart from the fact that a base of resistance can be organized for purely practical reasons, and may hardly be democratic, the Holocaust clearly shows that on many occasions, the concern of resistance movements for the fate of other ethnic groups under the Nazis was not present.

What occupied Eastern Europe achieved in the fight against the Germans will probably be measured in the future as both a success and a failure. No country was set free, and instead, there was a high death toll to pay for revolt against the Nazi occupiers. The after-effect of the resistance, and the largely positive reception it drew, but also its continued and constant presence in the present, shows very clearly that it was essential for pride, self-esteem and self-preservation of the Eastern European (and Israeli) people (Szarota 2000). It is with no small measure of irony to conclude that resistance is futile. But it is nevertheless essential.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN

Boomerang Resistance: German Émigrés in the US Army during World War II

PATRICIA KOLLANDER

Since the end of World War II, the history of resistance against Hitler has undergone several reinterpretations. In the years immediately after the war's end, scholars in Western Europe and the United States generally concluded that the strength and pervasiveness of the Nazi terror machine made resistance well-nigh impossible. Those who did resist paid dearly for defying Nazism. As Peter Hoffmann has pointed out, "Between 1933 and 1945, Special Courts killed 12,000 Germans, courts martial killed 25,000 German soldiers, and 'regular' justice killed 40,000 Germans" (Hoffmann 1996). Given the risks inherent in opposing Hitler, only those closest to him, such as the officers who engineered the abortive July 1944 plot to assassinate him, were deemed capable of anything approaching effective resistance. Efforts of the communist resistance were dismissed, as the communists allegedly had the goal of substituting the existent Nazi totalitarian regime with its communist counterpart.

These conclusions were first challenged by communist scholars in the German Democratic Republic, who lionized the contributions of communist resisters and downplayed the efforts of the July Plot members, charging that they were elitist right-wingers who only opposed Hitler after he began losing the war. Beginning in the 1970s, a new generation of scholars posed another challenge to the older school by turning their attention to the social history of Nazism. Contrary to earlier accounts, they cited evidence of both greater cooperation with and resistance against the Nazi regime than previously thought. On the one hand, works by Robert Gellately (2001) and Christopher Browning (1992) showed how "ordinary Germans" – who were not members of the SS or other leading Nazi organizations – routinely and willingly denounced fellow Germans to the Gestapo or participated in the murder of Holocaust victims. On the other hand, works by resistance scholars of the early 1990s not only reassessed the impact of the

communist resistance but also brought to light the existence of numerous other forms of resistance against Nazism. In his essay, "Working Class Resistance: Problems and Options" (1991), Detlev Peukert developed a pyramid model that in effect measured the quality of resistance, ranging from minimal resistance (i.e. nonconformity with Nazi ideology and practices), to the strongest form of resistance – total rejection of the Nazi regime demonstrated via acts of violence specifically aimed at its destruction.

While these important studies have broadened our understanding of the resistance movement, none make any mention of another group qualified for membership in the latter category of its ranks: the German émigrés who fought in the US Army, who numbered in the thousands. Several émigrés published their memoirs, none of them attempted to place their experiences in the wider context of the resistance movement (Von Elbe 1988; Schmitt 1989; Frazier 2001; Von Rosenstiel 2002). Works covering the history of German-Americans say nothing about the recent German émigrés who fought in the US Army (Rippley 1976; Holian 1998; Tolzmann 2000). And while other studies have examined the efforts of German exiles to undermine the Nazi movement from abroad (Anderson 2000; Lehmann and Sheehan 2002; Stokes 2006), only two specifically discuss the experiences of those who donned the American uniform and fought their former countrymen on the field of battle: the author's biography of one of these men (Kollander 2005), and filmmaker Christian Bauer's documentary focusing on several émigrés, along with his book based on it, both bearing the title *Die Ritchie Boys: Deutsche Emigranten beim US Geheimdienst* (Bauer 2005) [The Ritchie Boys: German émigrés in the US Intelligence Service]. This essay makes a case for the importance of these men to the struggle against Nazism in general and examines the resistance movement in light of their contributions.

According to the US Military History Institute, over 33,000 men who served in the army were born in Germany. Of that group, over 14,000 were not yet citizens. Many left Germany after Hitler came to power, and therefore had some direct experience with Nazism. A majority of these men were Jews threatened by the Nazi regime, or were Christians who had Jewish grandparents, as Nazi anti-Semitic legislation affected them as well. After the passage of laws against employment of Jews in the civil service in 1933, Joachim von Elbe, member of the district government in Potsdam, lost his civil service because his grandmother was Jewish. This experience compelled him to leave Germany for the United States in 1934. As he put it, "a compromise with Nazi ideology was out of the question" (Von Elbe 1988, p. 202).

Like Von Elbe, Kurt Franz Korf was also penalized by the 1933 law; he was denied admission to the bar because he had one Jewish grandparent. At first, Korf tried to work around the restrictions, but the passage of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 made this impossible. The laws not only removed so-called "full-blooded" Jews from official life in Germany, but also penalized millions of other Germans who had Jewish grandparents, who were henceforth labeled as non-Aryan "mixed breeds" or *Mischlinge*. Those with two Jewish grandparents were labeled "first degree mixed breeds"; those with one were called "second degree mixed breeds." Holocaust expert Raul Hilberg (1961) notes that as of 1939 the Third Reich housed a population of over 100,000 *Mischlinge*. Thanks to the absurd rationale of the Nuremberg Laws, the *Mischlinge* found themselves not only vulnerable to persecution as "non-Aryans" but also still eligible to serve the German Army, the *Wehrmacht* (Rigg 2002; 2009). Korf, who did not wish to fight for an army of a

country that persecuted so-called non-Aryans, left Germany for the United States in early 1937 (Kollander 2005, p. 10).

It is important to note that the numbers of German émigrés in the US Army also included men who did not fall under the jurisdiction of any of the anti-Semitic legislation but left because of their moral or political opposition to the Hitler regime. *Wehrmacht* draftee and part-time law clerk Werner von Rosenstiel left Germany in 1939 because he refused to withdraw his favorable judgment on a property case involving a Jewish couple (Von Rosenstiel 2002, p. xv). Friedrich Karl Bruhns, son of a Lutheran pastor, was arrested at age 17 for distributing anti-Nazi leaflets in Berlin. After serving a three year sentence, he escaped from Germany, made his way to France and somehow he managed to obtain a visa to enter the US in 1941 (Fred Bruhns oral history, part of the American Folklife Center's Veterans Oral History Project at the Library of Congress AFC/2001/001/34014).

That such men were in a minority attests to the broad appeal of Nazism, which was based on its ability to provide for Germans an alternative to unemployment, economic depression, and humiliation associated the disposition of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Historians generally agree that while Nazism found its strongest base of support among the members of the middle classes, it also became a party capable of offering something to virtually everyone except the Jews (Childers 1984; Peukert 1987; Fischer 1995).

Although their backgrounds and extent of vulnerability to Nazi persecution varied, what most German émigrés had in common was a desire to join the US Army to defeat Nazism. Some were potentially exempt from serving, but had no interest in avoiding the call to arms. In 1941, Joachim von Elbe was forty years old and could have easily waived his right to serve on the basis of advanced age. But he had no reservations about doing so. "To fight Hitler," he concluded, "was a matter of self-defense ... it was either him or me" (Von Elbe 1988, p. 202). Korf was in his thirties and had a hammertoe; both of these factors could have kept him out of the army. But he was more than eager to serve. As he put it,

I felt very strongly that I should go into combat, because these boys, they came from Pennsylvania and South Dakota, they didn't even know what a Nazi was. They had no idea what they were fighting for, and they were going to get killed for it, too. I felt I had a much higher obligation.

Ulrich Heinicke wrote in a similar vein: "I had more reason than most to know the danger imposed on the world by Hitler, and to recognize the values we had in America and how important it was to save them." (Frazier 2001, p. 120).

Younger émigrés had the option of staying out by not applying for US citizenship, which was the first step towards draft eligibility. Yet within days of his arrival in New York, Friedrich Bruhns applied for US citizenship so that he could register for the draft. He noted, "I experienced Hitler being in power ... before the Gestapo arrested me, and there was absolutely no question about me being repelled by Nazism and ... [felt] the duty to do something against it" (Fred Bruhns, oral history Library of Congress). Richard Bach observed, "I was proud that I could do my part. It would have been easy to sit it out ... but that isn't me" (Bach oral history, part of the American Folklife Center's Veterans Oral History Project at the Library of Congress, AFC/2001/001/16287).

The US Army, however, did not share their enthusiasm. Because the United States was at war with Germany as of late 1941, the loyalty of all non-naturalized Germans residing in the US was called into question, regardless of their attitude towards the Nazi regime. Because the émigrés were not naturalized, they were now classified as “enemy aliens.” As enemy aliens, they were put into a separate category from naturalized citizens. They were ineligible to be licensed to practice medicine and law, could not travel more than five miles away from their homes during the day, or beyond a mile of their homes after dark (Krammer 1997, p. 3; Tolzmann 2000, p. 334; Bauer 2005, p. 32). The Selective Service Act stipulated that enemy aliens could not be inducted unless they were deemed acceptable to the armed forces by applying for citizenship and going through a screening process. Even after they were cleared to serve, they could not serve in the navy, air force, receive heavy artillery training, or go overseas – until they became naturalized. They were also subject to FBI probes to determine whether they represented a threat to the United States; those who fell into this category were sent to internment camps located in the south and southwestern sections of the country (Tolzmann 1995).

The classification “enemy alien” was irksome to the émigrés who had fled Hitler, because no distinction was made between refugees from Hitler and other Germans who had failed for one reason or another to acquire US citizenship. To be viewed as potential enemies of America after they had fled Nazism for America was a bitter pill to swallow. As Hans Spier put it, “all of a sudden I was a hostile foreigner. No one cared that I was Jewish and that I had fled the Nazis [for that reason]. In their short-sightedness they labeled me a potential enemy.” To make matters worse, some of the Jewish émigrés who experienced anti-Semitism in Germany were disheartened to find that prejudices against Jews were alive and well in America. After Si Lewen arrived in New York, he was arrested and harassed by a policeman on the flimsiest possible pretext. Soon it became clear that he had been detained because the policeman didn’t like his “Jewish” appearance (Bauer 2005, pp. 29–30). Ulrich Heinicke’s Jewish stepfather, who had studied with the best thoracic surgeons in Germany, was denied permission to operate in Portland hospitals.

Korf tolerated his enemy alien status until he came home one evening to discover that FBI agents had searched his apartment in his absence. The intrusion was especially galling since he had been a volunteer informant for the FBI two years earlier, and obtained documents incriminating the leader of the pro-Nazi German-American Bund, Fritz Kuhn (Kollander 2005, pp. 39–40). He wrote his sister, also a recent émigré,

The [FBI] agent apologized profusely but said that he had to follow this procedure with all foreigners like us. But I still made my case, and added that you live in Los Angeles, that your husband was of Jewish heritage, and that you helped him escape Germany. Our conversation got much friendlier ... By the way, [they] went through your letters; naturally they found nothing of interest in them. (Kollander 2005, p. 49)

Though he was perturbed by the incident, he remained determined to join the army. Shortly after the unwelcome intrusion from the FBI, he received a “Notice of Alien’s Acceptability” form, clearing him to serve. After the war began, 19-year-old Hans Schmitt was also very anxious to serve. He wrote, “The time of passive suffering was

over. Now I could do something" (Schmitt 1989, pp. 185–186). But Schmitt also had to be cleared by the FBI before he could take a job in a war factory, much less join the war effort.

Korf's hatred of Nazism overshadowed the idea that he might have to kill some of the people with whom he grew up. He confronted this issue in a letter he wrote to his mother shortly before he left home:

"Would you shoot your own countrymen?" I've been asked. I have answered, "Yes." This question cannot be evaded, and no compromises can be made about it. It doesn't matter where one stands when one is in a war, because one must kill – indirectly or directly – those with whom one grew up. Am I right to shoot those who went to school with me, [the same] boys who were close to me and married the girls I used to date? Yes.

He did not approach the task without being depressed about it; had there been no Hitler, Korf would not have been in this position. He bitterly reproached his former compatriots for allowing Nazism to triumph:

Why did they tolerate what has happened? Why did they shrug their shoulders and say, "Let the chips fall where they may." Why did people betray everything that they were taught to value? Why did teachers who taught me humanity and liberalism also show the new masters how to tighten their hold on power? These men and boys were raised just as I was. We thought the same thoughts. But they went astray, all the while knowing that they were doing the wrong thing. (Kollander 2005, pp. 51–52)

Because he was once a member of the *Wehrmacht*, Werner von Rosenstiel had an understandably harder time convincing the powers that be that he was suited to fight in the US armed forces. He was repeatedly interviewed by the FBI, who suspected that he was a spy. In December 1942, he came before an enemy alien hearing board to determine whether he should be locked up for the duration of the war or released. Several witnesses testified that he "was no follower of Hitler's; indeed, quite the opposite" (Von Rosenstiel 2002, p. xxi). Shortly thereafter, he received word that he was not only in the clear, but also that he had been drafted into the US Army. On the opposite extreme of such scrutiny was Bruhns, who was never interviewed by the FBI and had no trouble getting into the army. The ease of this process probably had to do with the fact that unlike the others mentioned thus far, he had been arrested by the Nazis and had volunteered to join the French Army to fight against Germany.

Research on this subject indicates that, generally speaking, those who had more to fear from Hitler and Nazism – such as Jewish refugees or political prisoners under the Nazis – were scrutinized less by the FBI than the other way around. The army also queried former émigrés about their willingness to kill fellow Germans, and used the answer to this question to determine where they could serve best. Some German émigrés who expressed reservations about killing fellow Germans made it into the army, but were sent to the Pacific instead of the European theater of operations. Werner Ahrens was a seaman employed by Standard Oil when he defected to the US in 1939. After being interned for less than two months, he was inducted into the army and served in the Pacific theater (Ahrens, unpublished observations).

Some scholars agree with those émigrés who complained about misguided FBI scrutiny and further charge that it led to the unfair interrogation, arrest, and internment of around eleven thousand German and Italian Americans (Krammer 1997; Holian 1998; Fox 2000). In 2001, the Wartime Treatment of European Americans bill (HR 1425) was introduced by Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin. This, in turn, led to the formation of commission to review the treatment of these groups (testimony pertaining to the 2009 hearings is available at <http://judiciary.house.gov>). Recent work by Friedman (2005), however, has pointed out that many internees were openly sympathetic to the Nazi movement and that the actual number of internees was much lower than ten thousand. In addition, while the émigrés featured in works by Kollander and Bauer were critical of FBI interrogations, very few of them called complained about or otherwise called attention to the internment of thousands of German born in camps.

After émigrés were finally inducted into the army, the US government made it easier for alien soldiers to become naturalized. In 1942, on the recommendation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Congress provided for the expeditious naturalization of noncitizens serving honorably in the armed forces while in the United States or abroad. During the war, over hundred thousand members of the US armed forces were naturalized (Miller 1948, p. 274).

The men who had passed all scrutiny thought their linguistic abilities and their anti-Nazi fervor made them ideally and logically suited to fight against Hitler's forces in Germany. But the road back to Germany was not an easy one. Some struggled to fit in to the army. This struggle may have had a lot to do with the fact that American officers had the tendency to view the American character as superior to all others. A veteran of the US Army in World War I wrote that "brutality is a European military characteristic ... we have a really superior humanity than any European can understand" (Bendersky 2000, p. 8).

As a result of this attitude, foreign-born soldiers often found themselves at a disadvantage. K. Frank Korf and Hans Schmitt were criticized by army officials being too "German" in speech and mannerisms, and both struggled to secure commissions. Korf's superiors in transportation officer candidate school criticized his lack of a "proper command voice" and for not knowing anything about baseball. Hans Schmitt also felt out of place at engineering officer candidate school. He recalled: "My foreign background and limited experience in traditional American ways soon proved a severe handicap. I was 'different,' and that could prove fatal to one aspiring to attain a commission in the United States Army" (Schmitt 1989, p. 187). Others felt that they were simply misplaced by the army. Frustrated by his assignment to train to become a medic, Hans Spier commented: "nothing against medics ... but if I had to go to war, I wanted a weapon. I wanted to kill Nazis, but not with a syringe!" (Bauer 2005, p. 33). Bruhns served in Italy in as a radio operator with the 15th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. After Werner von Rosenstiel was drafted, he learned that because of his German army stint, he was exempt from service in the infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, signal corps, air force, airborne troops, ordinance, and intelligence. That left the army band and the Quartermaster Corps as areas where he could safely be used. He noted with some bitterness, "Knowing that I was incapable of producing any acceptable music, I knew that I was headed for a heroic career as a cook" (Von Rosenstiel 2002, p. 4).

Howard Triest hoped to be a translator, but instead found himself tending officers' campfires on Omaha Beach (Stephenson 2005, p. 25).

The men persevered; many changed their names to sound more American in an attempt to fit in better, and most found their true niche at the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie in Maryland. Camp Ritchie trained some nineteen thousand battle specialists, photo interpreters, and interrogators of prisoners of war (Finnegan 1998, p. 65; Bauer 2005, pp. 44–45). The camp essentially prepared them to get information from their former countrymen in order to defeat them in their own territory. After training at Ritchie, Joachim von Elbe evaluated German military documents within the G-2 division (military intelligence) of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Kurt F. Korf changed his name to K. Frank Korf and graduated from Ritchie as a second lieutenant. He was assigned to Headquarters of the European Theater of Operations of the United States of America (HQ ETOUSA) as an interpreter for military intelligence. He eventually led a small interrogation team attached to Patton's Third Army, which pushed into Germany in 1945. Ulrich Heinicke, who volunteered for the same duty, became Tom Frazier, taking the surname of the Unitarian church founder in his newly adopted home of Portland, Oregon (Frazier 2001, p. 132). The gratification that Ritchie graduates felt in getting to where they felt they belonged was perhaps best expressed by Stefan Heym, who literally wept when he received his weapon and noted, "I was no longer defenseless. For the first time, I could defend myself" (Bauer 2005, p. 80).

Others had a more difficult time getting into military intelligence. In 1944, Friedrich Bruhns – now better known as Fred Bruhns – requested a transfer from the 15th Field Artillery Observation Battalion to military intelligence. As he put it "I could be much more useful [with] my German language." But his captain turned him down, insisting that the army needed its radio operators. So Bruhns smuggled a letter to head of the battalion, who was an acquaintance, and told him he could do a better job in intelligence. Three weeks later, he was sent to a military intelligence unit in Italy and given a crash course in POW interrogation methods (Bruhns oral history, Library of Congress). Triest was eventually placed in a military intelligence unit attached to the army's Fifth Corps. Hans Schmitt was serving as a battalion adjutant when he was ordered to provide a list of men that could speak German. The first name his placed on the list was his. Shortly thereafter, he was ordered to report to Camp Ritchie, and became head of an interrogation of prisoner of war team.

Armed with specialized training, the men found themselves heading back to Germany – this time as members of an army bent on the destruction of the Nazi regime. Needless to say, the experience of arriving back in Germany was unsettling for the men. As Rudi Michaels remembered,

As we crossed the border, I sat in my jeep. My sergeant sat behind me with a machine gun, and I was in my uniform ... with a pistol in my belt along with two hand grenades. I thought to myself, it's been exactly six years since I left; I bet you Germans never imagined that I'd be back so soon, much less that I'd be returning this way!

Hans Spear recalled: "Can you imagine how I felt? I was moved and very sad to have to return to fight against the country where my ancestors were born ... but I had to do my duty" (Bauer 2005, p. 164). Korf found the experience of encountering

Germany in ruins disorienting to say the least. As he wrote his wife, “Nothing seemed familiar. I had been in that countryside before, but now I had no idea where I was” (Kollander 2005, p. 95).

Although the men were well trained, they were literally and figuratively unprepared to face the fate of Jews in Hitler’s Germany. They had heard rumors about widespread executions, but what they found exceeded the worst of all possible rumors. Bert Anger, who left Germany in 1936 at the age of 16, was incredulous when he saw his first concentration camp near Leipzig. He wrote,

I thought that it was all propaganda, like in the First World War, when German soldiers were rumored to have murdered and eaten Belgian children. But now I knew it was all true. [The camp] was a sight that I will never forget. Never! I took a lot of pictures on that day and took them back to a druggist shop in Leipzig and told the druggist to develop the film. I added that if anything happened to it, I would personally shoot him, and I meant it. But the man gave me the pictures the next day, with tears in his eyes, and told me that he couldn’t believe that something like this could have happened. (Bauer 2005, pp. 169–170)

When Werner Angress learned that his father had been sent to Auschwitz, he recalled, “I had never heard the name Auschwitz before. It was the beginning of the end and the end of the beginning” (Angress 2005). Before he returned to Germany, Guy (formerly Guenther) Stern learned that his parents and siblings were in the Warsaw Ghetto and was also in the dark about the fate of the Jews in the east. He recalled:

I had hoped that I could still see [my family] again. But this hope gradually faded. We did not know exactly what had happened. That was revealed to us gradually. Although we were working for [military] intelligence and had access to top-secret information, I only learned exactly what had happened in the months after the war. (Bauer 2005, p. 175)

Howard Triest’s unit was one of the first to enter Buchenwald, where he found “trenches lined with corpses, its crematorium still warm” (Stephenson 2005, p. 23).

While the Allied soldiers were understandably shocked by what they saw in the concentration and extermination camps, the experience was far more intense and personal and unique for the German émigrés in the US Army for two reasons. First, what they saw before them a fate that they themselves had only narrowly escaped, and a fate that had likely befallen friends and family members (Bauer 2005, p. 170). Second, their confrontation with horrors of the Holocaust was also unique because, unlike their American born counterparts, they had so recently been a part of the society that produced it. Korf noted: “I mean I knew there were decent Germans, but that a whole country could participate in the dirtiest, filthiest, shameless acts the world has ever seen! It’s still beyond my comprehension. And it wounded me deeply. Aside from anything else, it was a deep hurt” (Kollander 2005, p. 114).

As he approached Buchenwald shortly after it was liberated, Si Lewen wondered if he would recognize any of the inmates. But after seeing their condition, he observed, “even if I knew them before, I would not recognize them now. Most of them did not resemble human beings anymore.” Given the fact that most of the former émigrés were members of military intelligence, it appears odd that they were not informed

about or better prepared for the horrors that they witnessed. But they may have been deliberately left in the dark for reasons related to preservation of morale; their ability to do their duty may have been compromised had they known in advance that their families, who they had aspired to liberate or save, had already been lost.

Coming to grips with this reality was obviously difficult. After seeing the Dachau concentration camp, Tom Frazier wrote: "my anger towards the Germans reached a climax ... the only truth I knew was that I was an angry and upset soldier, but I kept these feelings to myself. When I returned to my room ... I shut the door and cried bitterly for a long time" (Frazier 2001, pp. 338–339). Werner von Rosenstiel's anger was evident when he wrote, "Men who had engaged in such deliberate murder must account for what they had done and hang" (Von Rosenstiel 2002, p. 176). For some, it was too much. Si Lewen suffered a nervous breakdown and was shipped home. For a long time, he would not shake the hand of anyone he knew was a German. He said,

I always had one question on my mind: where were you during the war? I almost wished that I had killed all of them. Only later I realized that I had also saved the lives of Germans during the war. I saved lives, and I learned to be happy about that. (Bauer 2005, pp. 171–172)

At war's end, the former émigrés found that their skills were more in demand than ever as they were now needed to assist with the capture and prosecution of war criminals. Because they had narrowly escaped Hitler's wrath and had friends and relatives who had not, they were particularly dedicated to dismantling Nazi power after the war. After his tour of Dachau, Tom Frazier was determined to hunt down SS records before the Germans could destroy them. Thanks to a tip from a former Dachau inmate, he located a huge cache of SS personnel records in a hotel basement just as a young SS officer was poised to burn them (Frazier 2001, p. 345). Korf was one of the officers in charge of the prisoner of war screening team at the prisoner of war enclosure near Third Army Headquarters in Bad Aibling, near Munich. He came up with a system to snuff out possible war criminals, and provided testimony to the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal regarding the organizational structure of the SS. He also made a point of making the SS men in his prison see the error of their ways: "I had the photos from Flossenbuerg enlarged and posted them on a board outside the main SS barracks. [The caption] above them read: 'See what you have done.'" Korf recalled, "It made an impression" (Kollander 2005, p. 114).

Howard Triest was also called upon to assist with the Nuremberg trials after he became a civilian employee with the war department. As preparations to try top Nazi war criminals were underway, Triest was assigned to work as a translator for army Major Leon Goldensohn, one of the psychiatrists hired to tend to jailed Nuremberg defendants. Triest visited prisoners daily, and translated what they said to Goldensohn, who recorded their thoughts. The prisoners, who did not know that Triest was Jewish, were cordial. Ironically, one of the most cordial was Julius Streicher, publisher of the notoriously anti-Semitic journal *Der Stuermer*. Streicher even gave Triest some of his personal papers for safekeeping. He told Triest that what he feared most was that the papers might fall into Jewish hands. He added, "I can smell a Jew from a mile away. I can see it in their faces, their eyes, from the way they walk, even the way they sit." But Streicher regarded blond haired blue-eyed Triest as someone who most certainly

came from a "fine Nordic family." Triest happily observed that he went to the gallows not knowing that he had entrusted a Jew with his personal papers. Maintaining a calm and professional demeanor was far more difficult when Triest had to deal with Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hoess, as Triest knew that his own parents had perished under his command. When Triest was asked how he kept his emotions in check during his encounters with Hoess, Triest replied, "it was a tremendous satisfaction to know that we had captured him and that he was going to hang; that was a comfort." Triest recalled that Hoess often complained of cold feet. Triest quipped, "He eventually got over it. After they hung him, he was a lot colder" (Stephenson 2005, p. 25).

While the men were dedicated to this duty, it is also important to point out that their treatment of their former countrymen was, generally speaking, above-board and humane (Kennett 1997; Kollander 2005, pp. 130–131). This stood in sharp contrast to the brutal Soviet treatment of German POWs, of which the Germans were well aware. Their fears were justified; only a fraction of those captured by the Soviet forces survived captivity. The émigrés were well aware of this fear and used it to their advantage: if German POWs or suspected war criminals were uncooperative, the former émigrés would threaten them with transfer to Soviet authorities in order to get them to cooperate. The ruse usually worked (Bauer 2005, pp. 139–141).

They also did what they could to make sure that the horrors of Nazism and the Holocaust would not be forgotten. Werner von Rosenstiel took pictures of burial services for the victims of the Woebbeline concentration camp in north-central Germany. He noted,

I am glad I took these pictures on May 9, 1945 ... to remind me that I must never forget. Once or twice when I have the opportunity to talk about what I saw during the war, people have challenged me and I have been glad that on a hunch I brought my photos so that I could show them the pictures I took ... as evidence of how it really was. (Von Rosenstiel 2002, p. 179)

Others chose career paths that facilitated perpetuation of Holocaust awareness. Werner Angress received his PhD from Columbia University, taught German history at Berkeley and SUNY Stony Brook, and published three books, including his autobiography. Guy Stern, professor emeritus of German and Slavic studies at Wayne State University, recently served as interim director of the Holocaust Memorial Center near Detroit (Lessenberry 2009). Si Lewen used his abilities as an artist to demonstrate the evils of what Nazi Germany had perpetrated. At first, he avoided the subject of war in his art, but over time, he was compelled to do the opposite. He wrote:

Bit by bit, the war kept stalking back until there seemed no choice but to confront and attempt to transform those memories into art ... Returning from war I would have agreed with the writer Adorno: "after Auschwitz, writing poetry is barbaric." However, when I did begin to paint again, I realized that we do need art, always, especially after a disaster ... Eventually, through art perhaps, we may succeed in transforming ourselves into the image of our dreams. Even when "dead serious," the creative process, ultimately, should prove to be a redeeming, even jubilant event, perhaps not only for the artist. (Lewen 2010)

All of these men made important contributions to the war effort. As recent immigrants from Germany, they were more intimately connected with the German way of life than their American counterparts. This in turn enabled them to do their various

jobs – interpreting German documents, interrogating prisoners of war – more efficiently and rapidly than their American counterparts. Their stint in the army enabled them to contribute to the defeat of Nazism, and it also allowed them to transition from being victims of Nazism to being victors over Nazism.

In the end, the émigrés' mission to fight Nazism not only set them apart from their fellow soldiers, but also made them members of the resistance movement against Hitler. Simply put, they resisted by leaving Germany, and they resisted by insisting on joining the US armed forces to defeat Nazism. In the 1930s, the founding father of the resistance movement, Carl von Ossietzky, wrote: "to be really effective in combating the contamination of a country's spirit, one must share its destiny" (Mommensen 2003, pp. 9–10). As we have seen, the émigrés fought the disease that was contaminating Germany before, during, and after the war. Also, though Ossietzky remained in Germany, his resistance was stifled by his imprisonment in 1933 and subsequent death of tuberculosis five years later. By leaving Germany, the émigrés were able to continue their resistance as a member of the US armed forces.

The wartime experience made them surer of themselves in their new American identities, despite the fact that they were not always treated equitably in the armed forces because of their German or German-Jewish backgrounds. As Joseph Bendersky puts it, the Jewish soldiers believed in American ideals and found them "reaffirmed by living and fighting closely with non-Jews" whom they found "equally devoted to the same ideals" (Bendersky 2000, p. 298).

In the end, the contributions of these men to the resistance movement should not be necessarily obscured by the fact that they wore American uniforms and had the weight of the American army behind them. As victims of the Nazi movement, they shared the goals of their former German brethren in the resistance movement. And even though they were less defenseless than their counterparts within Germany, they undertook many of the same risks as those who openly confronted the regime, and certainly put themselves at far greater risk than those who passively opposed it.

Their resistance against Nazism extended into the postwar years as well, as they played a significant role in the de-Nazification process as well as the apprehension of war criminals. Though Allied authorities have been criticized – and justifiably so – for not having punished war criminals enough, or for letting the job of their capture and persecution falter to the allegedly higher priority of fighting the Soviet threat in the wake of World War II, perhaps it is in no small part thanks to the sincere efforts of the anti-Hitler German émigrés that many war criminals were brought to justice, and that stories of their crimes were not permitted to be denied or to fade into obscurity. Melissa Wilard Foster (2009) notes that the American de-Nazification program is seen as the most thorough of the occupying powers; its success is probably in no small measure due to the work of the former German émigrés. If this is indeed the case, the correlation between the numbers of recent German émigrés involved in the relatively less successful de-Nazification processes in the other three occupation zones of Germany needs to be explored.

Christian Bauer's book and film on this subject, *Die Ritchie Boys*, is interesting not only for the light it sheds on the subject, but also because of its origins. Bauer (1947–2009) was a German filmmaker whose parents were part of a generation that generally regarded the Ritchie boys and others of their ilk as traitors. But when the younger Bauer met Guy Stern at a lecture in Germany in the late 1980s, he was so intrigued

by Stern's story that he launched a 15-year-long project to bring it to the screen. The younger Bauer's intense interest in and admiration for the experiences of these men shows that the younger generation does not necessarily regard them as traitors, but as members of a coalition that rescued Germany from Nazism. The evolution of Germany's process from denial to acceptance of the evils of Nazism in general, and the reasons for the younger generation's attraction to the stories the émigrés in particular – are both worthy of further investigation.

At first glance, the stories of these men do not appear to be at home in either the history of the American war effort or the German resistance. But the courage and steadfast opposition to Nazism that they demonstrated before, during and after the war all show that they occupy a special place in both chronicles of the war, and that more of their stories need to be recorded for posterity. Bauer's homage to the Ritchie boys also shows how the postwar generation appears to have come to terms with Germany's problematic past. In sum, there is still a great deal to be learned about resistance against Nazism, its impact on postwar Germany, and the means by which the younger generation has come to grips with it.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT

Beyond Impact: Toward a New Historiography of Africa and World War II

JUDITH A. BYFIELD

The 81st, the Empire's first Division to meet the Japs ... went in anonymously, marched out anonymously, and it seems they have left anonymous dead behind them. To all intents and purposes they have remained anonymous, if not absolutely unacknowledged, in all the written records of the Far East war.
Winston Churchill quoted in Hamilton 2001

Hamilton reported that forty years later little had changed, in fact "the more recent the narrative the less is said of the Africans" (Hamilton 2001, preface). The erasure of Africans from the narrative of the eastern campaigns during World War II is not unique. Similar claims can be made of the overarching narrative of the war, for Africa is primarily referenced in relation to the North African campaigns (1941–1943). In this narrative African spaces become little more than place names on a landscape of imperial battles.

This chapter is part of a larger effort to transform the narrative about Africa in World War II as well as the narrative of World War II in Africa. A small group of scholars have been participating in a collaborative project to bring to light new concerns and evidence that will allow for a much richer representation of World War II as a global event. Furthermore, the project offers new insights into the ways that the war years shaped African communities and/or influenced socioeconomic and political developments. This collaborative volume, coedited by Judith Byfield, Carolyn Brown, Timothy Parsons and Ahmad Sikainga, seeks to move beyond the temptation to simply reclaim Africa's contribution to the war or the war's impact on Africa. We take advantage of the temporal distance from the war to employ a wider lens, to ask different questions of the period and to confront some of the representations and memorializations of the war. Specifically, we examine the social and economic outcomes of Africa's participation in the war. We consider, for example, how efforts

by colonial officials to mobilize manpower and materials reshaped gender and generational relations. We also examine state actions during these critical years that transformed rural and urban spaces as well as the myriad ways in which race informed Africans' experience of the war. Finally, we highlight the contradictions that helped restructure the imperial order in the postwar period. In recentering Africa in the narratives of World War II the participants in this collaborative project hope to deepen the discussion of race, gender and imperialism in our analysis of World War II, as this chapter makes clear.

Since World War II was not the first war of the twentieth century involving the main imperial powers that dominated the globe, it is important to look back briefly at World War I for in many ways World War I established a framework for the role of African colonial subjects in imperial wars. World War I as Rathbone argues "marked the period in which 'pacification' of both African and metropolitan critics of colonialism ends and colonial rule proper" began (Rathbone 1978, p. 4). Thus, more firmly in control of their African colonies imperial powers considered the multiple ways in which Africa's human and material resources would be utilized strategically in their conflict. Across the continent Africans experienced – in varying degrees of intensity – changes in the style of colonialism as colonial states consolidated their rule and control, cash crops and mineral production drives, the introduction and encouragement of new modes of production, as well as military recruitment.

Imperial powers had to define their military goals for Africa as well as where and how to use the military personnel they recruited. Under the mantle of "strategic necessity" Britain and France took the war to Africa. These claims of strategic necessity did not mask the fact that wars provided opportunities for victors to lay claim to lands once held by the defeated and this reasoning was very much in play during World War I. France and Britain hoped to extend their control of West and East Africa by ultimately seizing Germany's colonies, while Italy hoped to trade their support of France and Britain for complete control of Ethiopia and an expansion of Libya (Hess 1963, p. 108; Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1978, pp. 12–14; Osuntokun 1979, pp. 172–176).

Where and how to use African soldiers was discussed in Britain well before World War I. Many people advocated using African manpower in the service of the empire but the colonial office strongly "resisted the idea of using black troops outside Africa, particularly in Europe or against European troops" (Killingray 1979, p. 425). Nonetheless, the demands of the war forced a change in thinking and by 1917 the Colonial Office conceded that African troops could be employed beyond Africa. Britain would come to use its African recruits on the continent in its campaigns against German forces in Togo, Cameroon, and Tanganyika. The Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) consisting largely of soldiers from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast fought initially in campaigns in West Africa while forces from the King's African Rifles from Rhodesia, British East Africa (Kenya), and Uganda fought in East Africa. However the high mortality rate of European troops, 80 percent, prompted the imperial government to send troops from Nigeria and the Gold Coast to East Africa in April 1916 as well (Osuntokun 1979, pp. 239–240). A few "marines" from Nigeria and Sierra Leone also served in the Middle East, specifically Mesopotamia (Osuntokun 1979, p. 258). In addition to recruiting troops, the imperial government needed thousands of military laborers. In East Africa the army could not use pack

animals especially in tsetse fly areas and there were few roads on which to use motorized vehicles. A local newspaper characterized the conflict in East Africa as a "carriers' war ... for the main difficulty was not in defeating, but in reaching the enemy" (Savage and Munro 1966, p. 314).

France, on the other hand, decided to use African troops in Europe as well as West Africa. The decision to employ African soldiers in Europe was a response to the high casualty rate of French soldiers during the first fifteen months of the conflict. Lunn notes that "over 50 percent of all French casualties suffered during the war occurred during this period" (Lunn 1999, p. 34). To offset these losses, France brought in soldiers from all its sub-Saharan African colonies and Indochina. Among the African soldiers the largest contingent came from French West Africa and North Africa (Lunn 1999, p. 106). Approximately one hundred and forty thousand West Africans served as combatants in Europe (Lunn 1999, p. 120). Some West African troops replaced French troops initially assigned to garrisons in North Africa, some were sent to the Dardanelles and Thessalonika, and some to the Western Front in Europe.

By the end of the war, French colonial policy crystallized around the principle of using African troops on the front line (Lunn 1999, p. 121). While some objected to the use of African troops on the frontlines due to their "limited intellectual faculties," others championed their service on the front lines because of the warrior qualities and "natural" combativeness of Africans (Lunn 1999, p. 123). Despite the divergent opinions of the skills and aptitude of West African soldiers, Lunn clearly documents that many French officials believed in sacrificing African soldiers in order to spare French soldiers. French Premier Georges Clemenceau defended the resumption of African recruitment in 1918 by arguing that "although I have infinite respect for these brave blacks, I would much prefer to have ten blacks killed than a single Frenchman because I think enough Frenchmen have been killed" (Lunn 1999, p. 140).

In order to ensure that they had sufficient African men to meet their demands, French officials relied on conscription and would continue to do so even in peacetime. Italian officials also relied primarily on conscription. The British used both voluntary recruitment and conscription, for Savage and Munro argue that the war "necessitated a mobilization of manpower on a scale almost unknown in Africa until that time, the exception being recruitment of the South African miners" (Savage and Munro 1966, p. 313). As a result of the scale of mobilization the line between voluntary and forced recruitment often blurred. Coercive recruitment was just one of multiple precedents established during World War I. It established that African soldiers could be used in Europe and other parts of the empire, and that they could be compelled to sacrifice their lives to save those of Europeans.

Martin Gilbert identifies the first victim of World War II as the prisoner dressed in a Polish uniform and killed in the German frontier town, Gleiwitz, on August 31, 1939 by the Gestapo (Gilbert 1989, p. 1). His murder, characterized as a "Polish attack," provided the cover Hitler used to justify Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. This date is accepted by most scholars as the beginning of the conflict. For scholars of Africa, however, this date is problematic because it disconnects World War II from Italy's invasion of Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. Weinberg argues that this division is warranted because the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia "was the last of a series of European wars for the control of portion of the African continent" (Weinberg 1994, p. 2). World War II, on the other hand, was not

a struggle “for control of territory and resources, but about who would live and control the resources of the globe and which peoples would vanish entirely because they were believed inferior or undesirable by the victors” (Weinberg 1994, p. 2). The distinctions Weinberg makes between the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and World War II require further refinement. While genocide was not the stated policy of Mussolini’s invasion in Ethiopia, Zewde argues that there were genocidal events such as the effort to eradicate the country’s educated elite after the assassination attempt on the life of Marshal Graziani (Zewde 1993, pp. 282–283). More importantly, both conflicts are linked by the common desire of Mussolini and Hitler to control vast resources.

In disconnecting Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia from World War II, scholars discount the reality that while Europe sustained six years of war the horn of Africa experienced a decade of war from 1935–1945 (Ayele 1985, p. 77). It erases the experiences of Ethiopians and Somalis in Italian concentration camps where the death rate approached 50 percent (Walston 1997, p. 174). More importantly, it masks the international mobilization in defense of Ethiopia and the relationship between this mobilization, support of the antifascist struggle after 1939, and the anticolonialism of the postwar era. While Britain, France, the United States, and the League of Nations stood on the sidelines and effectively sanctioned Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia (Asante 1974; Baer 1976), a global resistance movement took shape. Across Africa and the African diaspora men and women organized petitions in defense of Ethiopia’s sovereignty, raised funds for the Ethiopian Red Cross as well as guns and munitions and some joined the resistance in Ethiopia (Weisbord 1970; Olusanya 1973; Shack 1974; Scott 1993; Harris 1994; Gebrekidan 1995).

Unintentional outcomes also proceed from the effort to separate the Italo-Ethiopian war from World War II. Since the 1990s a wave of revisionist histories have attempted to sanitize the legacy of Benito Mussolini. In a review of the historiography on Mussolini, Anthony Cardoza illustrates how these authors and the media cast him as an essentially harmless leader “who never had to resort to mass murder to hold on to power” and “whose only real mistakes were his decisions to form an alliance with Nazi Germany and to enter WW II.” Most ignore his actions in Ethiopia and those that acknowledge the invasion characterize it as a “civilizing mission” (Cardoza 2005, pp. 727–729). Separating the invasion from World War II indirectly supports this revisionist effort. The most sustained critics of the rehabilitation strategy argue that it is only by examining his domestic and foreign policies from the 1930s that we can appreciate the similarities between Hitler and Mussolini. Mussolini’s interlinking foreign and domestic policies reflected his “embrace of violence and war as instruments to forge a new national community at home and to elevate his country’s power and prestige in the world” (Knox 1995; Cardoza 2005, p. 730). The invasion was much more than an effort to avenge Italy’s loss to Ethiopia in 1896; it was a window into the evolution of fascism. De Grand argues that Africa was a laboratory for fascism without constraints and compromises, and policies and practices developed in the colonies would be exported to Italy (De Grand 2004, p. 138).

The military campaign in Ethiopia was extremely brutal. The Italian Army had much better equipment and outnumbered the Ethiopian forces for the army also included soldiers conscripted from Italy’s other African colonies. It is estimated that approximately forty thousand Somalis, Eritreans, and Libyans served in the Italian Army that brought Ethiopia’s sovereignty to an end (Parsons, forthcoming). Italy’s

success also reflected the type of campaign Mussolini demanded of his generals. He pressed for unrestrained warfare and his generals unleashed air force attacks using incendiary bombs and poison gas on cities, roads, hospitals, and peasants working in the fields (De Grand 2004, p. 140). Mass arrests and executions were commonplace following rebel attacks as well as more arbitrary mundane acts of brutality on the civilian population. Still acts of resistance continued throughout the occupation especially in the central and northern parts of the country and the Italians never had much control outside of the cities (Zewde 1993; Sbacchi 1997; De Grand 2004, p. 142). Much of the scholarship on the resistance focused on the men, but a number of women also joined the resistance. Hailu Habtu suggests that women composed as many as one-third of the resistance fighters (Habtu, forthcoming, p. 3). Some joined at the time their husbands joined, while some joined after witnessing the atrocities carried out by the Italian Army. Some women performed customary women's work – cooking and caring for the sick, some were part of the underground resistance collecting and passing on information, while others were “honorary men” fighting on the front lines and commanding all male troops (Habtu forthcoming, pp. 7–10). Conditions of war created opportunities for numerous women to step outside of expected roles.

The invasion and occupation of Ethiopia belonged to the ideological landscape out of which World War II emerged. As Jackson argues, the war has to be recognized as *both* a global struggle and an imperial war. Imperial histories shaped the battlefields, and only an imperial perspective allows us to connect the battles in different regions of the world to the European war, and to understand the worldwide ramifications of specific events in the struggle in Europe (Jackson 2006, p. 1). For example, Germany's conquest of France in 1940 as well as Italy's decision to join the Axis forces in the same year had implications well beyond Europe's physical borders. The implications extended to the colonized spaces controlled by all these imperial centers.

At the start of war in Europe in 1939, Britain, for example, assumed that its African colonies would only be affected tangentially, but within less than a year British colonial officials had to create structures to marshal the resources required to conduct a war on multiple fronts. The West Africa command and the East Africa command supplied over half a million soldiers who participated in campaigns in North and East Africa, the Middle East, and Burma (Jackson 2006, p. 180). The continent's strategic importance cannot be overstated. Six million troops passed in transit through South Africa's ports; the Eastern Fleet which was responsible for guarding the sea-lanes of the Indian ocean was based in Kenya; the Royal Navy's South Atlantic Command was based in Freetown (Sierra Leone) and this port became the region's main convoy assembly port (Jackson 2006, pp. 175–176). Critical supply routes traversed the continent. One of the most important routes extended from the Gold Coast to the Middle East. According to Jackson, the supply route “delivered over 7000 fighting aircraft to the Western Desert Air Force” (Jackson 2006, p. 175). The relative security of air travel over Africa allowed British and Americans planners to meet in order to plan the D-day assault on Normandy. Equally significant, Africa was the base of the Free French forces led by de Gaulle for his capital was in Brazzaville (Jennings forthcoming).

Numerous consequences flowed from Africa's centrality to the prosecution of the war. African men found themselves fighting other Africans as opponents in different imperial armies. In Ethiopia soldiers from West, East, and Southern Africa fought

against the Somali, Eritrean, and Libyan soldiers in the Italian Army. Francophone soldiers had probably the most confusing situation, for some belonged to the Free French forces that battled with soldiers from French colonies still loyal to the Vichy government (Parsons, forthcoming). Regardless of the imperial army in which they served, African soldiers could not escape the racism of their colonial masters. They had to contend with racial slurs (Lovering 2010, p. 116). In many instances, official racism translated into less pay, poor conditions, and segregation. Soldiers from the High Commission Territories, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, worked together with British troops when in battle, but otherwise were kept in rigidly segregated living and eating quarters. Officials maintained segregated spaces for they feared that the Africans would imagine themselves equal to British soldiers and demand equal pay for the similar tasks they performed (Jackson 1999, pp. 656–657).

Following the defeat of the Axis armies in Africa, military officials expressed much consternation about sending these troops to Europe for they feared that “sexual opportunities and the sight of impoverished whites threatened white prestige, and had implications for the return of Africans to their colonies” (Jackson 1999, p. 654). Racial fears also followed soldiers to the grave. British officials chose to respect the racial sensibilities of the South African forces that participated in the war by disintering the bodies of white soldiers who were buried along with members of the Native Military Labor Corps (Parsons, forthcoming, p. 8). In a similar vein, concerns about white prestige and the acquiescence to racism shaped celebratory ceremonies after the war. Although troops from North, West, and Equatorial Africa played a significant role in the fighting in Italy and France, de Gaulle ordered the “whitening” of the Free French divisions before the liberation in Paris (Parsons, forthcoming, p. 9). In one of the most contradictory cases the British Military Authority which controlled Eritrea after Italy signed the armistice with the Allies in 1943 maintained Fascist race laws in part because they drew a distinction between race laws that applied to Jews and those that applied to Africans (Barrera, forthcoming, p. 3).

Race was only one axis along which differential acknowledgement and benefits existed. Within imperial armies there were soldiers who were armed and those who were not armed, essentially comprising labor units. In the Allied armies, these uniformed military laborers provided logistical support. The African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps composed of East Africans and some West Africans served in North Africa and Middle East. They had some combat, but were not expected to actually fight because they primarily worked behind the front line (Parsons, forthcoming, p. 7). In French West Africa, military laborers composed the *deuxième portion*. As Ash notes, men conscripted into the *deuxième portion* considered it a form of forced labor (Ash, forthcoming, p. 1). They were sent to worksites around the region, many posted to the Dakar–Niger railroad. Recruitment into the *deuxième portion* began in 1926 and increased substantially during the war. Before 1940 recruitment into the force averaged 1,900 men per year, but between 1941 and 1943 it rose to 6,000 men per year and actually reached 8,000 men in 1943. These positions were considered less dignified than being a soldier, the pay was one-third less than that of soldiers and the camps often experienced epidemics of dysentery and other diseases as well as high death rates (Ash, forthcoming, pp. 8–10). In South Africa, black people who joined the army would only be given noncombat functions. They would have the duty of guarding military property, subject to gunfire and air attacks, but only provided with assegaïs

and knobkierries (an assegai is a spear similar to a javelin, and a knobkerrie is a club with a large knob at one end). Furthermore, their pay was less than half the amount white soldiers received. White soldiers received 5 shillings per day, while black soldiers with dependents received 2 shillings and 3 pence, and those without dependents received 1 shilling and 6 pence. (Grundlingh, forthcoming, p. 10). Race played a central role in determining the units and the conditions under which African servicemen served.

While imperial powers needed African subjects to prosecute the war on battlefields in Africa, Europe, and Asia, officials feared the potentially radicalizing impact of the experience. British colonial officials from the High Commission Territories (HCT) formed an additional tier of army authority. They served as liaisons keeping families, chiefs, and administrations in touch with servicemen and offered their opinions of military policies. Although they claimed that their primary role was to ensure the welfare of the HCT soldiers, their intervention reflected a greater concern with the post-war period when these battle hardened soldiers would be demobilized and returned to their respective colonies. Jackson argues that officials wanted to ensure that the “the men returned home without any ‘dangerous’ ideas, attitudes, or habits” and still respectful of chiefly authority (Jackson 1999, p. 648). This fear of exposure to dangerous ideas that could undermine colonial authority after the war informed discussions about Africans seeing Europeans kill each other, fighting alongside Europeans, witnessing impoverished Europeans, and establishing sexual relationships with European women.

The large number of African troops who served in France often came into contact with the civilian population. This generated great concern among French officials who feared that interaction with French women opened the door for sexual relationships. African soldiers met French women in a variety of settings, for women performed a range of activities associated with the war. Some women worked as nurses in the hospitals and therefore encountered wounded soldiers. French women drove the Red Cross trucks that delivered foods to the camps housing African soldiers in the occupied region of France. A number of women also participated in a service, *marraines de guerre*, arranged by local organizations in which these young women “accompanied African soldiers, sent them letters, and invited them to their homes during their leaves” (Ginio, forthcoming, p. 8). Some of these relationships led to children and/or marriage. The military authorities had to approve all marriages of African soldiers and even though they approved some interracial unions the military did not allow African soldiers married to French women to remain in France (Ginio, forthcoming, p. 8). While many French objected to any form of interracial sexual relations, sexual relations between African men and French women were more disturbing than sexual relations between French men and African women. Therefore, when French women sought unification with their African partners who had returned to West Africa, the colonial government more willing sent these men back to France. However, they loathed the idea of unifying an African man and a French woman in the colonies. Ginio suggests that colonial governments could not encourage these relations for they reflected “the ultimate blurring of colonial boundaries” (Jean-Baptiste 2010; Ginio, forthcoming, p. 10). In spaces where soldiers amassed, commercial sex relations also flourished. Carina Ray showed that the deployment of British and American military and air force personnel to the Gold Coast contributed to an escalation of prostitution

(Ray, forthcoming, p. 1). These soldiers worked at or were transitioning through the Royal Air Force base at Takoradi, a coastal town, or the US Army Air Force base in Accra, the capital, where planes destined for the campaigns in North Africa and the Middle East were assembled or overhauled and refueled (Lawler 2001, pp. 54–55; Ray, forthcoming, p. 8). The British and American men, as well as the close to one hundred thousand men from across the Gold Coast who belonged to the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) and military laborers, ensured a steady client base for sex workers (Killingray 2010; Ray forthcoming, p. 9). Women and girls from other West African countries, especially Nigeria, ventured to the Gold Coast to take advantage of the distorted sex ratio that existed as well as the colony's lax antiprostitution laws (Naanen 1991).

The dramatic increase in prostitution had multiple consequences. The increased opportunities for sex work affected social life in Accra as dance halls and even social functions to support wartime charities became popular spaces for meeting clients. It also sparked an equally dramatic increase in the cases of venereal diseases. Despite these consequences Gold Coast officials moved slowly to try to curb prostitution, not enacting legislation that allowed police to arrest sex workers and brothel owners until 1943. As Ray notes, the driving force behind the legislation was the escalating rate of venereal disease among European military personnel, otherwise officials would have remained reticent to act because of their assumptions about African sexuality.

Like the Gold Coast, prostitution expanded significantly in Kenya which was home to three Royal Air Force bases, twenty thousand Italian POWs, four training camps for the King's African Rifles, and nine thousand troops of the Gold Coast Regiment of the RWAFF (White 1990, p. 148). This concentration of men did more than increase the incidence of prostitution, it also altered its practice. Before the war women engaged in sex work in Nairobi practiced two main forms of prostitution – *watembezi*, streetwalking, and *malaya*, indoor, in which women provided sex and domestic services such as meals or laundry. Furthermore, they tended to specialize in one form or the other. White found that during the war, the number of women engaged in *watembezi* prostitution increased while the age at which women first practiced the *watembezi* form decreased (White 1990, p. 158). In addition, some women began to combine both forms. As in the Gold Coast, military officials became preoccupied with the elevated rates of venereal disease. Rather than try to remove sex workers from locations near the camps, medical staff provided prophylactics and medication to soldiers (White 1990, pp. 177–178).

Assumptions about African sexuality and concern about venereal diseases led some military authorities to provide sexual services for soldiers. When three Korean women, who had been abducted and forced to work in Japanese military brothels during World War II, filed a class-action lawsuit in December 1991, they focused attention on a practice that had been suppressed in the annals of World War II (Tanaka 2002, foreword). This was not unique to the Japanese, for the US military also created brothels for African American soldiers serving in Liberia. Fearful of attacks by Germany or its allies, the US sent Task Force 5889, composed of seventy-six white officers and two thousand black infantry men to protect the Firestone plantations (Abraham 2000, p. 7). The sex workers in these officially sanctioned brothels received regular medical screening and treatment in order to reduce the incidence of venereal diseases. It is clear that prostitution was considered a routine

dimension of the business of war and in the same way that authorities provided food for these soldiers, they also provided sex workers.

In the communities from which these men departed, women's responsibilities and work changed as a result of their absence. In South Africa, white women moved into auxiliary positions such as clerical workers, transport drivers, cooks, nurses, and mechanics (Chetty 2010, p. 461). White and colored women also moved into industry. Clark argues that the introduction of women into industrial positions formerly held by white men facilitated radical restructuring of industry (Clark 2001, p. 1186). In order to meet the volume of goods that the South African government committed to the war effort – 40,000 tons of iron ore and £1 million worth of ammunition each month for the duration of the war – industry had to move away from craft production to mass production techniques. The standardization of mass production did not require the same type of skill levels therefore mass production led to a de-skilling of formerly skilled positions. By introducing these changes while women held the positions, labor unrest remained at a minimum (Clark 2001, p. 1188). The de-skilling of these jobs now held by women further justified the lower wages that they received. While the war created new opportunities for some women, structural inequities were already embedded in them.

As officials in Uganda debated the issue of taxes one official posted, "Everybody is overtaxed of course, but if the UK taxpayer is to go on accepting heavy sacrifices ... it would be only reasonable that the African should accept taxation" (Summers, forthcoming, p. 13). These officials clearly imagined that African men and women were not sacrificing sufficiently during the war. Sacrifice and its attendant sense of reciprocity inspired demands made of Africans during the war as well as the demands by Africans in the post war period. The most obvious sacrifice was the thousands of men who served in battlefields around the globe. It can be argued as well that those not on the battlefields also sacrificed to produce the quantities of materials needed to support the war effort.

Rubber was a vital resource for the mechanized armies that contested the war. Clarence-Smith notes that at the beginning of the war Africa produced one percent of the global output of natural rubber, but by 1944–1945, 30 percent of global output came from Africa (Lawler 1990; Clarence-Smith, forthcoming). Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia restricted access to palm oil and copra, from which coconut oil was produced as well as palm oil. African producers thus had to increase production of both items. Demand for forest products, particularly timber, reached unprecedented levels during the war. Timber was needed to upgrade or construct military bases in West and East Africa, in railway construction in Middle East, and to process coal. In 1941 and 1942, Tanganyika alone supplied over 300,000 railway ties each year (Howard, forthcoming; Sunseri, forthcoming). As a result of the demand, British officials intervened massively in the forests in the African colonies (Cline-Cole 1993, p. 56). During the war Africa was the main source for a number of minerals as well. Dummett estimated that Africa supplied 50 percent of the world's gold, 90 percent of the cobalt, 100 percent of the uranium, and 98 percent of the world's industrial diamonds (Dumett 1985, pp. 382–383).

With the limitations on shipping African producers also had to increase the volume of food production in order to feed local populations, urban centers swollen with military personnel and Europeans in Europe. In many instances, officials resorted to

forced labor to increase food production. In Ivory Coast officials implemented a quota system for rice production (Lawler 1990, p. 96). In Kenya and Southern Rhodesia African laborers were conscripted to work on European farms (Spencer 1980, pp. 503–504; Johnson 1992, p. 119). Maize and beans from Angola helped the Portuguese avoid food shortages, while fish, tomatoes, and potatoes from Spanish colonies supplemented Spain's food stores (Clarence-Smith 1985, p. 315; Newitt, forthcoming, p. 9). Demand for African foodstuffs and other commodities sometimes incurred detrimental consequences for the producers. Famine and food shortages accompanied many commodity production drives across the continent (Spencer 1980, p. 504; Johnson 1992, p. 123). Therefore, the sense of sacrifice within some African communities was quite literal.

In addition to providing labor and materials, African communities also made financial sacrifices. British colonial officials provided interest-free loans from their surplus balances to the metropolitan government. Ugandan cotton growers loaned the British government £4 million, while other communities raised funds through "Win the War" and "War Relief" campaigns (Chuku 2010, pp. 220–221; Summers forthcoming, pp. 2–3). They made these funds available to support the war effort in spite of the hyperinflation that dominated African economies during the war and the wage and price freezes imposed by colonial officials. Even for those not on the battlefronts, the war affected their daily experiences in very tangible ways that constituted varying degrees of sacrifice and informed the politics of the postwar period.

As the war wound down, many expected that the sacrifices they endured willingly or unwillingly would be reciprocated. Veterans expected they would receive what was owed to them and to secure an elevated status given their service to the war. However, upon demobilizing many were disappointed by the callous treatment they received early on. Fears that French colonial officials would not pay their benefits, resulted in a mutiny and bloody clash in camp Thiaroye just outside Dakar (Mann 2006, p. 116). Nonetheless, veterans did receive some benefits. Some returned to positions they held before the war and the government established a policy providing preferential access to reserved jobs in both the public and private sectors in French West Africa (Echenberg 1991, p. 134). But soldiers who fought for the British did not receive any extra benefits upon their return to colonial society in part because the British did not want them to coalesce as a social or political group. Just as the war did not elevate the status of those who fought on its battlefields, it did not elevate the status of those who sacrificed at home. Ugandans who loaned money to the metropolitan government mistakenly assumed that they would be considered equal partners in determining their future (Summers, forthcoming).

The failure of imperial governments to reciprocate the sacrifices African men and women experienced individually and collectively during the war informed the nationalist movements that emerged in the postwar period. A variety of factors created the social and political base from which these movements emerged. As Frederick Cooper argues, the war helped to change the political frameworks through which colonizer and colonized understood colonialism. Labor unrest both during and after the war reflected the crystallization of an emerging awareness among workers of their critical economic role as well as an emerging critique of colonialism and the repression they experienced. Colonial administrators also had to see Africans through a new paradigm, as urban dwellers and industrial workers (Cooper 1996, pp. 172–173). Workers

were not the only segment of colonial societies adopting new political frames. Wartime policies created conditions that brought peasant farmers, students, and petty traders to their own critique of colonialism thus helping to create the social base of anticolonialism and nationalism.

Schmidt shows that opposition to the colonial state began in Guinea during the war. The colony had experienced military conscription, forced labor and crop requisition, heavy taxation as well as food shortages and inflation. Since chiefs carried out these policies on the local level, the war created great antipathy towards the colonial state and towards chiefs. Anticolonial activities did not begin after the war, instead they began during the war. Opposition took multiple forms – massive desertion from plantations, widespread exodus of rural populations, and refusal to pay tax. Rural resistance continued after the war and leaders of the main nationalist organization, Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), focused on groups that were already mobilized (Schmidt forthcoming). In part due to the high degree of mobilization of these constituencies, they were able to push nationalist leaders to vote for independence in 1958 rather than staying in a French-led political community (Schmidt 2005).

New technologies helped facilitate the political mobilization that occurred both during and after the war. In Sudan the establishment of Omduram Radio in April 1941 increased people's involvement in the war. As they listened to reports about the war's progress and their contribution, they came to "own" the struggle and the sacrifice. Those who did not have their own radio could listen to them in coffee shops and public places. The British recruited Sudanese singers to perform patriotic songs to further bolster support for the war. The performers created a new genre of songs and the radio ensured that these songs connected urban and rural Sudan (Sikainga, forthcoming). In Tunis, radio helped to crystallize Tunisian national identity as listeners debated the distinctive features of Tunisian cultural forms. Tunisian radio also broadcast to France so that it became an important resource for the Free French government to relay information to occupied France (Corriou 2010, pp. 373, 377). The role of the radio during the war was critical for it "revealed the existence of an audience beyond the European listeners" at the same time that it helped that audience to develop its identity (Corriou 2010, p. 397). Thus, the war also contributed to important cultural developments.

This chapter has highlighted just a portion of the important scholarship on Africa and World War II, but there is still much work to be done. While we need to construct a narrative for some countries, Helal argues that the narrative of Egypt's engagement in the war needs to be rewritten because it does not accurately reflect the country's contribution to the Allied effort (Helal 2010, p. 222). We still have much to learn about the relationship between military service and nationalism. Many scholars have examined the involvement of military veterans in nationalist politics, but Lovering suggests that we need to ask slightly different questions by looking at the political character of their experience and how it shaped territorial or national identities (Lovering 2010, p. 109). We also have many more questions to ask about changes in gender relations, work, and economic and environmental transformations. We are just beginning to scratch the surface on the relationship between the war and cultural forms and innovations. As this work proceeds it is critical that it happen in dialogue with scholarship on other regions that were a part of this global war.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE

Race, Genocide, and Holocaust

JOCHEN BÖHLER

War equals violence, and modern technology enables mass destruction. That is why at the beginning of the twentieth century, two international conferences were held in the Netherlands to restrict future wars to encounters between enemy soldiers and to protect the civil population from atrocities. In 1907, the Hague Convention was passed, and in 1910 it came into effect. Four years later, World War I reduced it to an absurdity. World War II was in many ways a sequel to the first, and again, atrocities against the civil population were committed on either side of the frontlines. But it is a defining feature of World War II that this time, atrocities were not everywhere a mere side effect of warfare, but sometimes became a war aim in themselves.

In the period under consideration, war crimes of this kind were mainly perpetrated by the Axis powers. Japan and Germany led not only a conventional war of conquest, but a war that was also influenced by racial classifications. Both countries were highly militarized, ruled by authoritarian leaderships, and already in peacetime extended their sphere of influence through terror against political opponents and people regarded as ethnic enemies. For them, World War II created opportunities to pursue this program in heretofore unimaginable dimensions.

It was the Germans who started a distinctive program of persecuting and killing “enemies of the state” even before the fighting began. In summer 1939, when relations between the Third Reich and Poland deteriorated, the Berlin police headquarters prepared lists of members of the Polish educated classes and veteran organizations that were considered as a threat to the future German administration in conquered territories. Special police forces – the so-called Operational Groups of the Security Police and the Security Service (*Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes*) – were deployed to execute mass arrests and killings. The *Wehrmacht* – the German armed forces that were to conquer the country – was left in the dark about the killing orders that were only passed verbally to the

Einsatzgruppen commanders shortly before the German attack (Mallmann, Böhler, and Matthäus 2008).

But the German massacres on conquered Polish territory at the beginning of World War II were committed by both army and police units and their motives were diverse. Battlefield frenzy led *Wehrmacht* soldiers to kill thousands of innocent Polish civilians – among them women, children, and elderly – and captured soldiers as alleged partisans immediately after the fighting. When the area came under German control, the *Einsatzgruppen* men gathered members of the native intelligentsia and either put them into prisons or kill them at the outskirts of towns and villages (Bojarska 1972; Rossino 2003a; Böhler 2006). The so-called *Selbstschutz* [self defense] – a paramilitary formation recruited by the SS amongst the German minority during the first days of the invasion – supported the *Einsatzgruppen*, often providing execution squads and finger-pointing Polish and Jewish neighbors (Jansen and Weckbecker 1992).

The Polish Jews were targeted by German soldiers and policemen alike, and here, the obvious motive was a deep-seated anti-Semitism among the ranks and files. From the first day of the invasion and all over Poland, Jews were humiliated, mistreated, raped, plundered, and murdered. Although these actions looked very much like uncontrolled excesses on the spot, some of the atrocities followed a clear pattern, suggesting that orders had been given from a higher level. Especially in the areas close to Soviet occupied territories, *Einsatzgruppen* conducted mass executions of Jews, thus causing thousands of survivors to flee across the demarcation line, whereas *Wehrmacht* and *Einsatzgruppen* pursued a common policy of active expulsion (Rossino 2001). In the city of Przemyśl alone, on September 18–19, *Einsatzgruppen* and *Wehrmacht* killed more than 500 Jews (Böhler 2009).

With the invasion of Poland, Germany crossed the Rubicon of violence. Massacres and systematic mass executions cost the life of more than 50,000 Polish citizens until the end of 1939. In a letter from October 1939, backdated to September 1, Hitler empowered physicians of his choice to kill “incurable” patients, thus unmistakably linking the *Euthanasia* killing program T4 that was already taking place in hospitals throughout the *Reich* to the war (Aly 1987). During the next months, the annexed Polish territories experienced a wave of mass killings of inmates in mental hospitals (Rieß 1995), whereas the persecution of members of the educated classes continued within the scope of the Extraordinary Operation of Pacification (*Ausserordentliche Befriedungsaktion* or *AB-Aktion*) (Madajczyk 1987) and Polish Jews were successively forced into designated areas called ghettos where they were to remain until further notice (Browning 1992a; Klein 2009).

At the beginning of World War II in Poland, the Germans persecuted – by mass murder, mass arrests, and mass expulsions – so-called enemies of the German State (*Reichsfeinde*). Those were any Polish citizens – including Jews – who in the eyes of the occupying forces constituted a threat to the German ethnic community (*Volkgemeinschaft*), either as potential resistance fighters or as bearers of allegedly “racial inferior” genetic material – such as Poles, Jews and the mentally ill. With the annexation of Poland’s western territories into the *Reich* and the establishment of the General Government for the Occupied Polish Territories (*Generalgouvernement für die besetzten Polnischen Gebiete*) between the *Reich* and the Soviet Union in October 1939, the German authorities cleared the way for further large-scale population exchanges. German minorities from now Soviet-controlled areas like the Baltic States

or Western Ukraine were brought to and settled in the annexed territories, whereas Poles and Jews were deported from there to the General Government. Adolf Hitler institutionalized this policy by appointing *Reichsführer SS* Heinrich Himmler Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Ethnic Nationhood (*Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums*). Within the border of the German *Reich* that had been relocated several hundred kilometers eastward, there was to be a place only for people considered as ethnic Germans by the authorities. Due to lack of capacity, though, the figures were never met (Rutherford 2007; Epstein 2010).

Nevertheless, the Germans applied a “new order” (Polish Ministry of Information 1940) in Poland that was marked not only by ruthless repression, but by ethnic cleansing, which was a special distinguishing mark to the policy applied in the meantime by the Soviets in the occupied eastern parts of the country. The murder of about 22,000 officers of the Polish army and other members of the educated classes at Katyn, Kalinin, Kharkiv, Kurapaty, and Bykivnia by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Soviet secret police, in Spring 1940 bore analogy to the *AB-Aktion*. Between 1939 and 1941, the NKVD deported over 300,000 “political enemies” (including close family members) and proved more efficient than the Gestapo (Hryciuk 2007) – but unlike the Germans, the Soviets did not follow a program of ethnic “purification” in occupied Poland.

Until recently, the “Polish Campaign” in 1939 was considered rather an example of conventional warfare than the beginning of the German war of annihilation (*Vernichtungskrieg*) in the occupied east (Hamburg Institute of Social Research 1999). Indeed, although the fighting of partisans in France and especially Italy was conducted by both sides with utmost brutality, during the whole duration of World War II, the war theaters of Western Europe saw nothing like the ethnic cleansing and depopulation of whole landscapes under the guise of breaking armed resistance in Eastern Europe from 1941 onwards (Lieb 2007). But it was the “Polish Campaign” that foreshadowed and triggered these developments. Despite the fact that some generals protested against the program of ethnic cleansing conducted by the police and SS forces in the aftermath of the campaign, *Wehrmacht* units had committed horrendous crimes as well and, more often than not, cooperated with the *Einsatzgruppen* during the invasion. In Spring 1940, *Reichsführer SS* Himmler was invited to explain the racial policy in occupied Poland to the generals (Müller 1970), and general Georg von Küchler, who had criticized the SS for the slaughter of about 50 Jews in the Northern Polish town of Krasnosielec in September 1939, less than one year later, stressed

the necessity of ensuring that every soldier of the army, particularly every officer, refrains from criticizing the ethnic struggle being carried out in the General Government, for instance the treatment of the Polish minorities, of the Jews, and of church matters. The final ethnic solution of the ethnic struggle, which has been raging on the eastern border for centuries, calls for unique harsh measures. Certain units of the Party and the State have been charged with the carrying out of this ethnic struggle in the East ...

Especially soldiers recently transferred from France and not yet familiar with the implications of the racial warfare in the East were to be accordingly instructed on “the purpose of that struggle” (NOKW 1531, Letter From Commander in Chief of 18th Army, 22 July 1940, Containing Directives Concerning Ethnic Struggle in the East, cited after Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1951, p. 1208).

Although the military administration in occupied Poland had been replaced by a civil administration at the end of October 1939, this struggle was carried out by SS and police forces with the knowledge and under the auspices of the *Wehrmacht* in the years to come (Mallmann and Musial 2004).

With the pending attack on the Soviet Union, the Third Reich's occupation practice for Eastern Europe in spring 1941 expanded to genocidal dimensions. Already during World War I, Germany had regarded Russia as a potential "living space" and compensation for lost opportunities during the time of Europe's colonial adventures. Hitler had stressed this war aim in front of the generals already four days after his coming to power in 1933 because he could be sure that he shared this vision with the German military elite (Vogelsang 1954). When Poland in spring 1939 had refused to play the role as a junior partner in the Third Reich's future expansion plans to the east, it paid a price by becoming itself Hitler's first eastern conquest. With the decision to turn against his short-term ally, the Soviet Union, Hitler opened the gate to old German dreams of infinite vastness for German settlers (Ueberschär 1992; Furber 2003).

Furthermore, the communist state with millions of Jews living within its borders in the eyes of the National Socialist regime in Berlin represented a double lethal thread. Hitler merged the Third Reich leadership's image of its political and racial major enemies when on March 3, 1941 he openly invoked the specter of a Russian "Jewish-Bolshevist intelligentsia." At that time, with the Polish experience of 1939 in mind, nobody of the inner planning circle could have any illusions about the character of the future campaign: mass executions of communists and Jews were scheduled. In the Berlin headquarters, military and police officials agreed upon a division of labor: The *Einsatzgruppen* death squads this time would operate independently in the combat zone, logistically supported by the *Wehrmacht* (Bartov 1991; Browning and Matthäus 2004). The army itself did not limit its mission to mere military conquests but to helping with ethnic cleansing (for the draft of Barbarossa *Gerichtsbareitserserlass* of May 6, 1941, see Browning and Matthäus 2004, p. 219). Courts-martial were not obliged to examine war crimes committed by German soldiers; the political officers of the Red Army – the commissars – were to be shot on the spot (Streit 1978; Römer 2008, 2012). These arrangements did not contradict the military planning and preparation of the invasion. On the contrary, unconditional military conquest and mass murder of prisoners of war and civilians were two sides of the same coin (Megargee 2006).

During the first days of the invasion, vast waves of anti-Jewish violence erupted immediately behind the frontline in German-controlled areas. Whereas the *Einsatzgruppen* were to persecute first and foremost Soviet officials of Jewish origin, the other ethnic groups – Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Poles – who had been living in these borderlands under Soviet rule from September 1939 until June 1941 blamed the Jewish minority for alleged collaboration. In reality, Jews had not been more active in the communist administration than any other ethnic group. In the vacuum that was left after the retreat of the Red Army, local bands took power and, in an act of so-called "self-purification," hunted Jews. Fuel was added to the fire by the discovery of thousands of political inmates murdered in their prisons by the NKVD before the retreat (Browning and Matthäus 2004).

The result was a series of anti-Jewish pogroms from the Baltics to the Black sea that were often initiated and supported by the new German occupation forces. Reinhard Heydrich, the chief of the *Einsatzgruppen*, instructed his men not to interfere with acts of “self-purification” committed by indigenous anticommunist or anti-Jewish forces (Klein and Angrick 1997, p. 319). On the outskirts of Latvian towns like Kaunas and Vilnius, Lithuanian units killed Jews under German supervision and order. Until December 1941, *Einsatzkommando 2* reported the “Jewish problem in Lithuania resolved,” with 114,856 Jews murdered. At the same time, 69,750 of Latvia’s 80,000 prewar Jewish population were killed. In the eastern parts of Poland inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians, during the first days of the German attack on the Soviet Union 19,655 Jews lost their lives in the course of similar pogroms (Snyder 2010), as in Tarnopol or Lviv. In the Polish town of Jedwabne and surrounding parishes, it was the Poles that killed hundreds of their Jewish neighbors in early July 1941 (Gross 2001; Machcewicz and Persak 2002; Rossino 2003b).

The first executions of the four *Einsatzgruppen* – consisting of about approximately 3,000 men only – without participation of foreign helpers on Soviet territory were directed against male Jews and Soviet officials. Other police and *Wehrmacht* units, like police battalions, SS cavalry brigades, or security divisions of the army, participated in these murders. Only a month after the beginning of the invasion, *Reichsführer* SS Heinrich Himmler ordered German personnel to include women and children, who had been already targeted during the pogroms, in the systematic shootings, using their alleged support of partisans as a pretext (Cüppers 2005; Snyder 2010). During the massacre of Kamianets-Podilskyi between August 26–29, 1941 police battalion 320 killed 26,500 Jewish men, women, and children. One month later, the massacre of Babi Yar caused the death of 33,761 Kievan Jews. The number of Jews murdered by SS, police, and *Wehrmacht* until March 1942 mounted to 600,000 (Pohl 2003).

Romania, Germany’s ally during Operation Barbarossa, partly shared its racial and political goals and, with German support, added to the death toll by murdering 13,000 Jews in Iasi on June 29 and 25,000 Jews in Odessa from October 23 to 25, 1941. While the Romanian Jews living in the center were left untouched for the most part, the Bessarabian Jews in the eastern parts of the country were persecuted and killed. A main scene of crimes was Transnistria, the newly annexed territory east of the prewar Romanian borders. Here, in imitation of German anti-Jewish measures, ghettos and camps were built. Between Christmas 1941 and March 1942, Romanian army and police forces, members of the German minority – organized along the lines of the *Selbstschutz* in Poland 1939 – and Ukrainian auxiliaries murdered about 250,000 Jews (Ioanid 2000; Benz and Mihok 2009; Pohl 2010; Steinhart 2010).

Although Stalin at the end of July 1941 had called all Soviet citizens to active resistance, no effective partisan movement to speak of existed in the conquered territories during the first two months of Operation Barbarossa (Musial 2008). This did not prevent Hitler from interpreting the appeal as a welcome opportunity for “eradicating whatever puts itself against us” (cited after Browning and Matthäus 2004, p. 265, emphasis in the original). By associating Soviet Jews of every age and gender to Bolshevism and marking them as potential partisans, German authorities built a framework in which the change from systematic persecution to systematic destruction of the European Jews took place.

Furthermore, with the perpetuation of the war and the Soviet partisan movement gaining power, the German genocidal conduct of warfare – especially in the former Soviet Republics of White Russia and Western Ukraine – affected more and more of the other ethnic groups living in the areas controlled by the *Wehrmacht* (Chiari 1998; Gerlach 1999; Heer and Naumann 2000; Pohl 2008). Large-scale anti-partisan operations from 1942 onwards often went hand in hand with the complete destruction of settlements and the extermination of the civilian population. From 1943 onwards, German army and police forces declared so-called death zones and killed everybody they would meet within afterwards (Heer 1999). Historians estimate that between 300,000 and 350,000 civilians fell victim to the anti-partisan military operations in the Soviet Union (Pohl 2003). Sometimes the civilian population would be placed between hammer and anvil, facing reprisals from Soviet partisans as well in case of support of or collaboration with enemy units, though certainly with casualty figures that came not anywhere near the figures answered for by the Germans. It is hardly known that Polish civilians from 1941 onwards also suffered enormously under German counterinsurgency measures, culminating in the bloody abatement of the Warsaw uprising in the fall of 1944 that cost the life of perhaps 150,000 noncombatants (Snyder 2010).

But inhabitants in the former Soviet territory died not only in the course of mass executions and arson. Besides fitting into Hitler's strategy to traverse any British plans for a future alliance with Russia against Germany, Operation Barbarossa had opened the prospects of gigantic war booty and breadbaskets for the German population that was facing supply shortfalls caused by the British sea blockade. In reality, German economists knew well that the legendary Ukraine wheat fields in 1941 were merely producing surpluses. Their blueprints for the exploitation of Soviet Russia, therefore, foresaw the death of tens of millions of inhabitants (Browning and Matthäus 2004; Tooze 2006; Kay 2006, 2012; Snyder 2010; Benz 2011). All in all, approximately 4.2 million Soviet citizens starved under German occupation until 1944 (Snyder 2010), amongst them up to 1 million victims of the siege of Leningrad (Ganzenmüller 2005) and a large number of the roughly 3 million Red Army soldiers who died in German captivity. Lacking shelter, medical help, and food, their widespread death, too, soon reached genocidal proportions. Even if they would have wanted to, the German military authorities often were not able to improve the disastrous conditions because the maintenance of the millions of prisoners expected before the attack had deliberately not been taken into consideration (Streit 1978; Streim 1981). Jewish soldiers and commissars of the Red Army after their surrender were selected and summarily shot. After the war, German veterans would deny that the notorious "commissar order" was extensively put into practice (for proof of the ruthless application of the commissar order in all *Wehrmacht* units, see Römer 2008).

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in summer 1941 was flanked from the southeast by the attack on Serbia and Greece. Similar to the Soviet Union, in Serbia, the German army in cooperation with the *Einsatzgruppen* used a dawning partisan war in the rear as a fig leaf for the persecution of the Serbian civil population, especially the Jews. The German troops depopulated whole areas, burning down settlements and jamming tens of thousands of residents into concentration camps. Army "reprisals" always followed the same pattern: after a partisan attack on German facilities or units, so-called "hostages" – usually Serbian Jews and communists – were

chosen from those concentration camps and summarily shot. At the end of the year, Germany had lost 160 soldiers, while 278 were wounded. On the other side, between 25,000 and 30,000 civilians had been shot, among them all 6,000 male Serbian Jews (Manoschek 1993).

In Greece, people first died from starvation rather than from bullets. When they arrived in April 1941, German soldiers were not equipped with sufficient supplies and thus started to “live from the country.” The result was a famine in Greece that lasted from summer 1941 to spring 1943 and cost the life of between 250,000 and 300,000 civilians (Mazower 1995). In 1943, two political factors radicalized the conduct of German troops towards the non-Jewish population. First, Italy quit the Axis and second, it sought an armistice with the Western powers, making an allied invasion in southeastern Europe ever more likely. From then on, the Germans introduced practices of warfare to Greece and Northern Italy that they had applied already for two years in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union and Serbia. Civilians, including women, children, and old people, were shot en masse – over 10,000 in Italy, over 20,000 in Greece – in the course of so-called reprisals for partisan attacks, villages were burned to the ground, leaving millions without homes and shelter (Lamb 1993; Mazower 1995; Gentile 2011, 2012). Some 5,200 Italian soldiers who surrendered to the Germans on the island of Kefalonia were shot on September 21–22, 1943 (Schreiber 1990; Meyer 2008).

Greek Jews experienced humiliation and stigmatization from the first day of the invasion, but large-scale lethal action was taken by the Germans only in late 1942, when it became clear that the troops of their Italian allies could not be convinced to initiate anti-Jewish programs in the parts of the country they controlled. Since by that time the death camps the Germans had built in occupied Poland were already in operation, the approximately 50,000 Greek Jews whose majority was herded together in the Northern city of Salonika were not – as in the years before in the other occupied territories – murdered on the spot, but deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau by the SS. According to the records, 37,386 of them were gassed immediately. Less than 2,000 Jews survived the war in Salonika (Mazower 1995).

In Croatia, the fascist Ustaša regime that came into power with the German appearance in the Balkans followed its own politics of ethnic purity. The Serbian minority was the main target. Thousands were slaughtered in the Serbian-dominated areas Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first months of the existence of the Ustaša Independent State. In the concentration camp of Jasenovac between 1941 and 1945, 80,000 civilians perished, more than half of them Serbs and a quarter of them Jews. Furthermore, the Ustaša introduced and executed the anti-Jewish laws that were already brought into effect in German-occupied Europe, killing all in all about 24,000 (including the Jasenovac body count) of the 39,000 Jews that lived in Croatia in 1941 and assisted the SS to deport additional 7,000 Jews to Auschwitz-Birkenau (Sojčić 2008; Korb 2012).

As the last of the German allies, Hungary joined the process of extermination in 1944. Before, the Horthy regime had deprived the Hungarian Jews of their civil rights, but refused to send them to the German camps of extermination. After a Hungarian attempt to reach a separate peace with the Western Allies, the *Wehrmacht* entered the country, followed by an *Einsatzkommando* of 200 men. A puppet regime was installed, and with the support of the Hungarian administration and police,

between May and July 1944, more than 400,000 Jews were deported to the German death camps (Gerlach and Aly 2002).

The economic exploitation in all of the conquered territories was not limited to material goods. Millions of civilians were hunted down and transported to the Reich, joined by prisoners of war where they were coerced to work for German war industry. Widespread death took place in plain view of the German population. While slave laborers from Western Europe had a better chance to survive, over 150,000 “Eastern Workers” (*Ostarbeiter*) from Poland and the Soviet Union perished under the inhuman conditions (Allen 2002; Pohl 2003; Knigge, Lüttgenau, and Wagner 2011).

Axis allies had shared the war booty and had partly committed to the national socialist crimes in the occupied east and Southeast (Klinkhammer, Guerrazzi, and Schlemmer 2011), with Italian soldiers fighting up to 1943 side by side with the *Wehrmacht* at the Russian front (Schlemmer 2010) and controlling large areas in southeastern Europe (Rodogno 2003). Meanwhile, Romanian and Croatian troops exerted their own version of the Holocaust. Volunteers from occupied countries joined the *Wehrmacht* in the war against Bolshevism. With Operation Barbarossa unexpectedly lasting not months, but years, and the resistance growing constantly with the magnitude of the occupied territory, the German occupation forces depended more and more on assistance from indigenous forces. For this goal, they applied a policy of *divide et impera* by instrumentalizing local ethnic tensions for their purposes. The blueprint for this policy was the formation of members of the German minorities into so-called *Selbstschutz* units in Poland and Romania and the assignment of ultra-nationalist elements in the Baltics, Western White Russia and Western Ukraine in the course of the anti-Semitic pogroms in summer 1941. Fanatical anticommunists who were fighting for an independent state, captured Soviet soldiers who wanted to avoid death by starvation or maltreatment, uprooted civilians who did not see another possibility to provide for a living in war times, and ordinary criminals and maniacs who saw a chance to live out their basest instincts – they all filled the ranks of the Foreign Armies East (*Fremde Heere Ost*) and of auxiliary police battalions, which often witnessed or took part in the ethnic cleansing that was directed against other (often as much detested as contested) groups of the prewar society. At the heights of Operation Barbarossa, every third uniformed man on the German side was of foreign origin (Müller 2007). Thus, the war of annihilation in eastern and southeastern Europe was a German project, planned and put into action by Germans, sometimes with assistance from the outside (Dieckmann, Quinquert, and Tönsmeier 2003; Browning and Matthäus 2004; Lower 2012).

In the millions of pages left behind by the bureaucratic German military and civil administration, there exists no explicit order from Hitler to exterminate all European Jews. Although Hitler openly prophesized their destruction in case of the outbreak of a new world war in the German *Reichstag* on January 30, 1939, no plans for complete physical elimination were elaborated. At this stage, German authorities were concerned with the arrest and deprivation of the German Jews, by the confiscation of their property (Dean 2008), deliberately causing a climate that coerced Jews to leave the country as soon as possible, providing they had the financial means to do so and would find a country that was willing to accept them. The “Night of Broken Glass” in 1938 further tightened the violent atmosphere in the Reich, making open

humiliation, physical harm, and arbitrary arrests a pending sword of Damocles hanging above the head of every Jew living in Germany.

With the attack on Poland in 1939, the German planners faced more space, challenges, and opportunities concerning the “Solution of the Jewish Question.” Suddenly, millions of Polish Jews became subject to German rule. Stalin, who in early 1940 was addressed by Reich authorities with a desultory request to absorb them into the Soviet Union, declined, though with thanks (Polian 2008). In the wake of the war, methods could be applied that had not been put into practice within the borders of the German Reich so far. The registration of the Jews prefaced their concentration in ghettos. Nevertheless, although murder – by physical impact or famine – was always an integral part of the German “Jewish policy” in occupied Poland, during the first two years it was not systematically and summarily applied, and mass deportation further to the occupied east or to Madagascar were the options that were discussed in Berlin offices by that time (Brechtken 1997). Nevertheless, the fate of the Jews once deported would have been sealed as well, since their survival in exile was never part of those plans.

With the attack on the Soviet Union, the parameters changed. Whereas at first glance, the expected vast conquests would supply enough space for a kind of “Jewish Reserve,” in Winter 1941/1942 it became clear that the German attack got stuck. In the meantime, German police and military forces had started to kill tens of thousands of Jews in the former Soviet territories, thus triggering a development that changed the perspective from expulsion to destruction. These actions at the periphery of the German sphere of influence correlated with the radicalization of ideas in Berlin headquarters. Although it is difficult to say when exactly the decision to kill all the Jews in the occupied areas was made, most scholars agree that Hitler in September or at the beginning of October 1941 authorized the elimination of the Jews in the occupied areas (Browning and Matthäus 2004). The German attack on the Soviet Union led to an increase of resistance in occupied western and southeastern Europe. Whereas the Serbian Jews were killed on site, hundreds of thousands of Belgian, Dutch, and French Jews in retaliation were deported to the occupied east and pressed into the already existing ghettos. During the second half of 1941, it became obvious that firing squads were not able to perform mass murders of these tremendous dimensions.

In reaction to the challenge of killing millions of Jews, extermination camps were built on Polish territories. The use of poison gas had already been tested during the *Euthanasia* killing program T4 between 1939 and 1941. While local authorities – as for example in Minsk or Serbia (where in the first half of 1942 the remaining female Jewish population joined the fate of their already murdered husbands, fathers, and sons) – experimented with mobile gas vans (Beer 1987), the T4 experts were transferred to occupied Poland and assisted the edification and operation of new stationary killing facilities (Heberer 2011). Such killing sites were established in Belzec (Bełżec), Majdanek, Treblinka, Sobibor, Kulmhof (Chełmno nad Nerem), and Auschwitz (Oświęcim). Whereas Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka were placed in remote areas, Auschwitz (outside Katowice (Kattowitz)) and Kulmhof were located in territories annexed in 1939, and thus within the borders of the Reich, in the midst of German neighborhoods. The Holocaust was no secret to German society or the people living in the occupied countries. From Majdanek, it was a stone’s throw to the old town of Lublin. Dachau, the site of one of Nazi Germany’s most notorious concentration

camp, was a suburb of Munich. On the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942, the state secretaries were informed about the program of killing all European Jews.

Whereas the extermination camps in comparison with the death squads signified a kind of “professionalization,” the mass-killing process was far from being industrialized in a sense of being automatically converted by lifeless machinery. When the deportation trains arrived in the camps, guards pulled out the survivors and segregated the masses according to their ability to work. Whoever failed the examination was driven to the gas chambers. All properties were confiscated, the doomed to death had to undress, women’s hair was shaved. After the gassing, the dead bodies were dragged out of the chambers and either buried in mass graves or cremated. As auxiliaries, Germans recruited Soviet soldiers from the camps, thus offering them a chance to avoid one genocide by taking part in another, most of them being trained in the Trawniki camp near Lublin (Black 2011). Furthermore, some Jews were given a chance to survive for some more weeks or months in the extermination camp by becoming themselves a cog in the wheel of extermination (Rajchman 2011). Almost half of the total number of at least 5.6 million Jews who died during the Holocaust were killed in the extermination camps (Kulmhof: at least 152,000; Belzec: about 435,000; Sobibor: 160,000–200,000; Treblinka: about 850,000; Auschwitz: about 800,000; Majdanek: 170,000; total: 2,567,000 to 2,607,000, see Pohl 2003). When at the end of the war the camps were hastily evacuated, surviving inmates were sent – often by foot – on death marches in which few of them survived (Blatman 2011). Others filled the ranks of Jewish special commands that were built to erase the traces of mass extermination by unearthing the mass graves and burning the corpses, before they themselves were killed – as Jews and inconvenient witnesses (Hoffmann 2008).

Racial warfare was not limited to the European theater of war. Japan’s military elite since the late 1920s had constantly weakened the Japanese parliament and through open pressure, conspiracy, and assassination of democratic opponents gained more and more influence in politics. In September 1931, forewarning of Germany’s annexations of Austria and the Sudetenland seven years later, Japan started its expansion with the invasion of northeastern China and the establishment of a puppet state in Manchuria (*Manchukuo*). Japanese reign was harsh from the very start. According to the British consul in Mukden, Manchuria was “under the control of a military despotism whose methods can only be described as savage. The Kwangtung Army rely upon terrorism as an instrument of policy, convinced apparently that Chinese antagonism can be cowed by the unrestricted use of machine guns and torture” (P. D. Butler to Foreign Office, 29 June 1936, cited in MacDonald 1999, p. 238).

The door to mass murder was pushed open wide when the second Sino-Japanese war started in July 1937. The Japanese themselves regarded the campaign rather a “punitive expedition” against insubordinate Chinese “bandits,” pursued in order to “punish the people of China for their refusal to acknowledge the superiority and leadership of the Japanese race and to co-operate with them” (cited after Russell of Liverpool 2008, p. 39). Consequently, the conduct of the Japanese troops towards the Chinese people – soldiers and civilians alike – was marked by a fatal mixture of a sense of superiority and contempt. Looting, rape, and mass murder were the orders of the day. In winter 1937, the atrocities of the Japanese army culminated in the massacre of Nanjing. In the course of over six weeks, in the capital of the Jiangsu province, Japanese soldiers killed between 100,000 (Japanese figures) and 300,000 (Chinese

figures) Chinese civilians and prisoners of war and raped uncounted Chinese women. Whereas the “Rape of Nanking” has recently been dealt with extensively (Chang 1997; Yamamoto 2000), it is widely unknown in the western hemisphere that horrors of war were not contained by the Nanjing city borders, but affected the surrounding area alike. Some days before the entry into the capital, a Japanese medical officer noted in his private diary:

At 10:00 on 29 November 1937 we left to clean out the enemy in Chang Chou [Changzhou] and at noon we entered the town. An order was received to kill the residents and eighty (80) of them, men and women of all ages, were shot to death [at dusk]. I hope this will be the last time I'll ever witness such a scene. The people were all gathered in one place. They were all praying, crying, and begging for help. I just couldn't bear watching such a pitiful spectacle. Soon the heavy machine guns opened fire and the sight of those people screaming and falling to the ground is one I could not face even if I had had the heart of a monster. War is truly terrible.

A 22-year-old private nearby commented on 29 November 1937:

Depart from the village at 9:00 a.m. Various units compete to enter the town. The tank unit also starts. In contrast with yesterday, there are no traces of the enemy at all. Enter the town magnificently, passing an impressive temple (even though there are many temples in China). ... Because Wu Jing is an anti-Japanese stronghold, we carry out “mopping up” [sōtō] operations in the entire town, killing all men and women without distinction. The enemy is nowhere to be seen, either because they have lost the will to fight after their defense line at Wu Xi was breached or they are holding strong positions further ahead. So far I haven't seen a town so impressive as this one. (both entries cited after Drea et al. 2006, pp. 7–8)

Japanese war crimes after 1945 soon fell into oblivion and the evidence, compared to the records on Nazi war crimes, is scarce due to an almost complete destruction of Japanese sources at the end of the war. Nevertheless, postwar trials and scholarship proved beyond all doubt that Japanese soldiers during the years to follow in the occupied countries of southeastern Asia applied a policy of scorched earth that became known as the “Three Alls Policy” (*Sankō Sakusen*, “kill all, loot all, burn all”) and was not limited to the Chinese mainland, but transferred to other war theaters such as Malaya (Kheng 2002). At times, it appallingly reminds one of the behavior of German soldiers in the occupied Soviet Union (MacDonald 1999). The key difference was that the atrocities of the Japanese forces, cruel as they were, did obviously not intend to “clean” completely the occupied area from all “non-Japanese elements,” but rather to constrain complete obedience and submission.

In the eyes of the Japanese, the Chinese people – although obviously lacking a sensibility for the “pan-Asian mission of the Yamato race” – were of the same kind, while the Slavic people of Eastern Europe, in Nazi eyes, represented an “Asian threat” to the German race. Japanese felt racial superiority towards the Chinese and other Asian people, and Germans demonstrated racial exclusivity towards Russians, other Slavs and – first and foremost – Jews. Nevertheless: Although figures are hard to establish, it has been estimated that Japanese anticomunist “pacifications” in rural China reduced the indigenous population from 44 million to 25 million through

flight and death (Dower 1986). Japanese requisitions of food in Vietnam in 1945 led to a famine that cost the life of two million people (Kratoska 1998).

But the awful experience of Japanese atrocities was not limited to Asian victims alone. The “bushido” spirit, or way of the warrior, that reigned inside the Japan military required that a soldier should rather die than give himself up to captivity. The Japanese ratio of captured to killed soldiers was 1:40; in the West, it was 4:1. Thus, captured soldiers of enemy armies were regarded as cowards and often mistreated or killed (Zeiler 2011). The beheading of Chinese prisoners of war with a sword became a common practice and kind of initiation ritual amongst Japanese officers (MacDonald 1999). While detained British soldiers in Europe had an almost hundred percent chance of survival, nearly one-third of them (35,756 of 132,134) died in the hands of the Japanese (Dower 1986). Some of them fell victims to cruel vivisections and bacterial experiments carried out by the notorious Unit 731 (Williams and Wallace, 1989), a practice fatally reminiscent of the Nazi experiments in concentration and extermination camps (Wolters 2011). Like the Germans, the Japanese also extensively used civilians and prisoners for slave labor. As everywhere in the Pacific theater of war, figures are hard to get. Approximately 15,000 out of 60,000–70,000 British, 60,000 out of 670,000 Korean, and 70,000 out of 300,000 Javanese, Tamil, Malayan, Burmese, and Chinese forced workers did not survive the inhuman conditions in the camps and at the working sites (Dower 1986). Between 139,000 and 200,000 women were kept as sex slaves by the Japanese military, euphemistically called “comfort women” (Turner 2011).

Although a plethora of titles have been published on World War II as a period of racial killing, mass murder, and genocide, many questions are still to be answered or even to be raised. First and foremost, it is still common practice amongst historians today to write the story from only one perspective – either through the eyes of the occupying powers or of the occupied people – and to reduce the range of sources and literature referred to, usually to texts in either Western or Asian/Slavic languages. Thus, the wartime and cold war partition of the world lives on in the books, and most of the available information and state of research from the one side is still unavailable to the other. Exceptions from this rule point in the right direction (Chiari 1998; Berkhoff 2004; Pohl 2008). For decades after the war, the Japanese war crimes have been largely neglected and the identification and declassification of sources is still an ongoing process (Drea et al. 2006). Many aspects are still in the dark or just to be published and without a doubt for many years will be a challenge for future scholars. Regardless of the affiliation or nation of perpetrators, postwar proceedings and the inclusion of former war criminals or participants in the societies of the successor states have found repercussion in literature (Weinke 2002; Earl 2009; Mallmann and Angrick 2009; Tanaka et al. 2011).

Scholarship to a greater degree concentrated on how policemen, soldiers, and paramilitaries were able to fulfill the bloody task of shooting millions of civilians, including women, children, and the elderly at near range. It was a common belief immediately after the war that only sadists and maniacs were capable of such hideous crimes. More recently, it has been argued that ordinary Germans killed millions of Jews because they were fervent anti-Semites (Goldhagen 1996). But this does not take into account that in the course of World War II not only Germans killed Jews, and large other groups of the indigenous population of Eastern Europe were killed as well.

Recently, scholars, without discharging the perpetrators from their personal guilt, have pointed out a bundle of motivational and situational factors – anti-Semitism, shifted moral standards by indoctrination, barbarization, deprivation, group pressure, combat situation, fear, career orientation, coercion, or regarding killing as a kind of monotonous job and thus a sort of abstraction – that could turn ordinary men into killers (Bartov 1985, 1991; Browning 1992b; Welzer 2005; Burleigh 2010). Moreover, historians have examined how belonging to specific generational cohorts have influenced perpetrators' behavior (Wildt 2002; Hürter 2006). Recently discovered secret recordings of dialogues of German generals and rank and file soldiers in British and US captivity have provided new insights into the mindset of perpetrators (Neitzel 2005; Neitzel and Welzer 2011). Such detailed research on mass killing of noncombatants under terms of war and occupation helps to understand the disturbing level of compliancy amongst occupied people or confederate states. New source editions that keep this aspect under account point the way for future studies (Aly et al. 2008–).

While extreme violence was always in the focus, everyday life under occupation has not been challenged for a long time. This is surprising since, without trivializing the horrors of World War II, it has to be established that more people lived than died under occupation. How did they survive, and how did everyday violence affect their lives? How did the members of the occupying forces – often with their families – lodge themselves in the occupied countries (Lehnstaedt 2010, 2012; Böhler and Lehnstaedt 2012)? Other questions still open to discussion are how the course of war and occupation influenced the escalation of violence on the spot (Rutherford 2012; Stahel 2012) or how the experience of violence was transferred from one theater of war to the other (Laub 2012).

From today's perspective, World War II might resemble a war of good against evil: modern democracies (as Great Britain and the United States of America) that were led by the will of the people and respected human rights on the one side, and anachronistic fascist or authoritarian regimes (as Germany, Italy, Romania, and Japan) on the other. But it would be simplistic to use this dichotomy to explain the war of annihilation and genocide between 1939 and 1945. In France, the cradle of European democracy, after its defeat in 1940, a fascist puppet regime collaborated from Vichy with the Third Reich. Italy, although side by side with the Germans until 1943 and ruled by a fascist elite, unlike Romania, refused to become a partner in crime in south-eastern Europe. Soviet Russia first willingly made common cause with the Nazis and changed sides only in 1941 – of course without changing its totalitarian type of rule. Russians gang raped German women on their way to Berlin (Beevor 2002) and an estimated number of between 55,000 and 113,000 Japanese soldiers died in Soviet detention camps in Siberia after 1945 (Dower 2002). Poland and the Czechoslovakia expelled millions of ethnic Germans at the end of the war, with hundreds of thousands left behind dying in the snow or drowning in the icy water of the Baltic Sea. And the United States air raids – including the dropping of two atomic bombs over Japanese cities – killed hundreds of thousands of people.

But the key for racial warfare was the perpetrators' conviction of belonging to a chosen people who were superior to the people living in their actual or claimed territories – people who either had to serve them obediently or vanish by emigration, expulsion, or extermination. It was only the Third Reich and Japan that had radically internalized such ideologies and put it into practice in the course of World War II.

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CHAPTER FORTY

Holocaust and Genocide Today

YEHUDA BAUER

There is text and there is context. The text is the core of the Holocaust; the core is the period between 1933 and 1950. That end date of 1950 reflects the fact that by then, the survivors of the genocide of the Jews who were concentrated in the DP (Displaced Persons) camps in the Western occupation zones of Germany and Austria, had left for their new homes, some of them to the US, Western Europe, South America and Australia, and most of them to Israel. The core includes Nazi anti-Semitism, persecution of Jews in Germany in the 1930s, development of the so-called Final Solution, the history of World War II and the war's impact on the genocide of the Jews, ghettos, camps, Jewish leadership, Jewish unarmed and armed reactions, Jewish–non-Jewish relations with the surrounding populations, attempted rescues and rescuers, attitudes and policies of the Allies and of Neutrals, the Jewish communities outside Europe and their reactions, the death marches at the end of the war, liberation, DP camps in Europe, emigration to new homes, and the rise of Israel. Without the text, the context is meaningless, and without starting from the text, there can be no comparison with other genocides, and there can be no discussion about the universal impact that the Holocaust might possibly have.

Yet on the other hand, the Holocaust cannot of course be approached as a series of events without context, or contexts. There are a number of such contexts, and they are essentially of a global character. The need for a kind of globalization in regard to a scholarly approach to the genocide toward the Jews in World War II is apparent; in a sense, the contexts can be seen as vertical and horizontal. Vertical contexts include the historical depth – Jewish history; history of the relations between Jews and non-Jews throughout history, including anti-Semitism; European history; German history, and so on. By horizontal contexts, the meaning relates to the fact that there is an impact of the Holocaust almost everywhere – in Latin America, in North America, in China and Japan, in South Africa, and so on. There are contexts that are both historical and global, as, for instance, the context of human rights, or that of genocide.

Regarding the latter, it is obvious that the Holocaust was a form of genocide, and therefore has to be related to other – many – events of that kind.

In December 1948, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Since then, a number of genocides have taken place, including recent ones such as in Darfur. In *Democide* (1995), the American sociologist and political scientist Rudolph J. Rummel argues that some 169 million civilians and unarmed POWs were murdered by governments or other political groups between 1900 and 1987 (the dates were chosen arbitrarily). By comparison, 34 million soldiers were killed during that period, which included the two world wars. Of the 169 million civilians killed, 38 million died in genocides, as defined by the Convention, and close to 6 million of these were Jews who lost their lives in the Holocaust. These figures, moreover, do not include Rwanda, Bosnia, Congo, or Darfur, all of which happened after 1987. Thus, the issue of genocide and the legacy of the Holocaust are major issues for all of humanity.

First, the problem of definitions has to be tackled. Views about what exactly constitutes genocide are varied and contradictory. When the term “genocide” was coined by a refugee Polish-Jewish lawyer named Raphael Lemkin in his *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944), it was based on the realization that Jews and Poles were then being murdered by National Socialist Germany (Although *Axis Rule* was published in 1944, the assumption is that he coined the term in the preceding year). The annihilation of the Poles was partial, as the Germans wanted to use them as slave labor. But the murder of the Jews was to be total – every person they defined as being Jewish and whom the Germans could find, anywhere, was to be killed. It is this policy of annihilation which is probably reflected in the Convention because the document refers to the intention to annihilate an ethnic, national, racial, or religious group, as such, in whole or in part. Most academics will agree that the wording of the Convention is problematic. It mentions racial groups, and in the context of 1948, such wording made sense. But today, it is common knowledge that there are no races. DNA analyses reveal that humans are descended from a group of *Homo sapiens* that dwelt in East Africa some 150,000 years ago or so. Whether Australian aborigines, African pygmies, Harvard students, Einstein, Hitler, Stalin, Obama, Hu Jintao the reader, or this author, human beings all come from the same place. Differences in color or body shape are secondary or tertiary mutations, and very minor. There are many more differences between different kinds of cats or dogs than there are between humans. Despite the inherent racial commonality, there is racism, of course, and it is based on a social construct that reflects social, economic, and political attitudes or ideologies as well as power struggles. The inclusion of the term “racial groups” in a UN document unfortunately, and perniciously, may be interpreted as somehow legitimizing an artificial division of humanity into separate so-called races, implying a difference in worth or value.

Definitions also matter when considering scale. It is important to note that a vast difference exists between the annihilation of a group as such in part or totally. If the intent is to annihilate a group in part, then there is a hope that the group will revive and recoup its losses. If the annihilation is total, there is no such hope. The inclusion of both situations in the Convention is, again, a problem.

The Convention lists five types of action that define genocide: killing members of the group, causing physical and/or mental harm to the group, creating conditions of life that make the survival of the group impossible, preventing births, and kidnapping

children. But if the process of annihilation is aimed at all people defined as belonging to the victim group, as with the Jews during the Holocaust, and the Germans intended to kill all the women, then the phrase "prevention of births" seems misleading. If all the children are killed, it is hardly possible to kidnap them. And it is doubtful whether shoving people into gas chambers creates "conditions of life" that make survival impossible. Furthermore, if genocide basically involves mass killing, where does kidnapping of children and preventing births enter the analysis of genocide, as these acts are horrible enough in themselves but do not necessarily involve murder?

The phrasing of the Convention was the result of horse-trading between the West, the Soviet Union, and some Latin American states in 1948, and it leaves much to be desired. The most crucial fault of the Convention lies in the fact that it does not really indicate what should be done if an act is recognized as being genocide. The document refers such actions to the UN, and specifically, the Security Council, for consideration, but not a single case in the post-World War II era has been dealt with on the basis of the Convention. The reason is fairly clear: whenever one of the five Security Council powers (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US) with veto authority, or an influential group of states (ASEAN, Arab League, etc.) wishes not to react because of real or perceived economic or political interests, the UN remains inactive. Only when no major interests are at stake will the UN intervene and prevent a genocide or a conflict that may develop into a genocide, whichever way one interprets the term "genocide." In Kenya, for example, where a violent inter-ethnic conflict in 2008 threatened to turn into mass murder and might have deteriorated into a genocidal situation, there were no major economic or political interests of any big powers involved (see Kofi Annan Foundation 2009; Landau and Misago 2009). Therefore, Kofi Anan could be sent there to mediate, with success, and end the conflict. In 1992, in Macedonia, where a dangerous simmering conflict between Albanians and Macedonians threatened to turn into mass murder, UN intervention succeeded because none of the Security Council members was interested. On the other hand, no effective UN intervention in Darfur is possible unless China, which has major oil concessions in the Sudan, agrees, or unless the rebels become strong enough to force the government into serious negotiations.

Today, most academics will argue that one has to add to the Convention what the historian and sociologist Barbara Harff has termed "politicide," that is, the annihilation of political or social groups whether they exist in reality or are virtual groups (Harff 2003). One example was the kulaks, the so-called rich peasants, approximately 3.3 million of whom were killed or starved to death under Stalin, mostly in the Ukraine (1930–1933). But no realistic possibility exists to change or amend the Convention. With 192 member states, it is impossible to arrive at a consensus to transform the document into a sharp tool to end genocide. Is the Convention, then, useless?

The answer has to be "not at all." It hangs over possible or actual perpetrators like a sword of Damocles, threatening them with action on behalf of the UN. Although such a remedy has not happened until now, it might happen in the future. There is also another, very positive, element in the Convention. Article III states that incitement to genocide is part of the punishable crime of genocide. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinajad threatened Israel with extinction, and this, as some Western diplomats argued, amounts to incitement to genocide, whether or not the threat is actualized (e.g., in a speech reported by Iranian radio (IRIB) on October 26, 2005,

or in a speech in Malaysia, reported by the *Washington Post* on August 3, 2006 – and elsewhere). While the UN has not acted, there is the possibility of a charge on the grounds of incitement under Article III of the Convention, and many analysts believe that is an important weapon in the fight against genocide.

Definitions also are critical to understanding ways of terror that arose from World War II. For instance, it is important to differentiate between conflict and genocide. Conflict is a confrontation between two or more sides, none of which has sufficient power to conquer and/or annihilate the other or others, or use the power it has for one reason or another. By contrast, a genocidal situation, whether it fulfills the requirements of the Convention or not, arises when one party is overwhelmingly powerful, and the targeted victim is nearly or totally powerless. Thus, the Kashmir problem is a conflict, not a genocidal event. In Sri Lanka, there is no real danger of a genocide despite the defeat of the Tamil rebels, even though political oppression and persecutions are distinct possibilities. The same applies to the Middle East, where the Palestinians cannot overcome Israel with terrorism or rockets, nor can Israel annihilate the Palestinian population. That struggle remains a bloody and difficult conflict, but not a genocidal event. Conflicts can be solved either by compromise, as a result of negotiations or arbitration, by the intervention of an outside force, by the exhaustion of the contending parties, leading to a settlement, or by a victory of one side that will not escalate into mass murder (the latter is the case for Sri Lanka).

But a conflict can degenerate into a genocide or a genocidal situation (i.e., a situation of mass murder that threatens to become a full-fledged genocide), if it remains unsolved and one of the sides acquires enough power and motivation to annihilate a target population. Conversely, a genocide can de-escalate into a conflict. Thus, in Darfur, if the rebels should attain sufficient clout to pose an insurmountable obstacle to the intention of the Sudanese government and their Janjaweed allies to destroy the black farming tribes (whether by actual murder or by attrition in DP camps, and specifically the Fur, Masa'alit, Zaghawa, and Tanjur), then there is a real possibility that negotiations may lead to a compromise. Equally, if the Sudanese government should find itself in a difficult international situation, for a number of political and economic reasons, the genocidal situation could de-escalate into a conflict that may be settled by a negotiated arrangement. However, should the Sudanese government succeed in practically eliminating the black rebel groups, then the Sudanese perpetrators will have attained their aim of genocide.

Genocidal situations proliferate the world over. In "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?" (2003), Barbara Harff highlights a detailed risk assessment produced in the United States that indicates forty-six places around the globe where mass murder or genocidal situations could develop. Some are more plausible than others, but it is natural to ask, when approaching modern-day genocidal threats, why start with the Holocaust, and not with Darfur, the Congo, or Rwanda? In other words, why start with the text – the Holocaust – and not the current context of genocide? Was the genocide of the Jews, which we call the Holocaust, in some ways different from the other tragedies? Was it not parallel? Actually, it was both. To call it "unique" appears to be inappropriate, but more properly, it should be thought of as unprecedented in some crucial aspects.

Why is the term "uniqueness" inappropriate? There are two main reasons. One, that "uniqueness" might imply that the Holocaust is a one-time event that cannot be

repeated. If that were so, however, there is hardly any point dealing with it, as there is no danger of its recurrence. In reality, the genocide of the Jews was engineered and executed by humans for human reasons, and anything done by humans can be repeated – never in exactly the same way, to be sure, but in very similar ways. Second, claiming the uniqueness of the Holocaust implies that it was decreed by God, Satan, or by some transcendental force, in which case Hitler and the perpetrators generally would have been the executors of a Divine or Satanic will. As a result, they could not be held responsible, as they were not free actors. That, indeed, is the position of some Jewish ultra-orthodox thinkers, such as the late Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn, the Chabad (a Hassidic sect) leader, and some Christian evangelical preachers (*Mada ve’Emunah*, sayings of the Lubavicher Rabbi, Kfar Chabad; see Schneersohn 1980). To view Hitler as the emissary of a transcendental power is very problematic, yet these thinkers generally do not accept the idea of lack of responsibility of the perpetrators. Rather, they argue – illogically – that humans possess free will and can thus choose between good and evil. By perpetrating the Holocaust, the Nazis chose evil. They do not explain whether Jewish children killed by the Nazis had the free will to choose between being killed or not. On the other hand, adherents to the view of transcendental power say that nothing can happen without the Almighty’s will, which leads to the conclusion that, indeed, the guilt lies with the Almighty, not with the perpetrators. If one rejects that view, and concludes that the Holocaust, and therefore all other genocides as well, was the work of humans, not of transcendental factors, then it was not unique.

Obviously, the Holocaust was a genocide, and it therefore not only can, but must, be compared with other genocidal events of a similar nature or quality. The main parallel between it and other genocides lies in results: mass murder. Another central parallel addresses the suffering of the victims, which is always similar. There are no gradations of suffering, and there are no better murders or better tortures or better rapes, and so forth, than others. The suffering of the victims is always the same, and from that point of view, there is no difference between Jews, Poles, Roma (“Gypsies”), Germans, Russians, Darfurians, Tutsi, or anyone else.

Another parallel could well be that perpetrators of genocides or mass atrocities will always use the best means at their disposal to realize their project. For instance, in the genocide of the Armenians in World War I – which is still being denied by official Turkey – the Ottoman Turks used railways, machine-guns, specially recruited murder units, a fairly efficient bureaucracy which had been developed with the help of French, German, and Austrian advisers, and a mass army. The Germans, in World War II, used railways, special units, modern weaponry, an excellent bureaucracy, brilliant propaganda, and a very powerful army. They used gas, because they had it; the Ottomans did not use it, because they did not have it. As far as the Holocaust is concerned, though, one has to add that there is one element in the genocide of the Jews that is unprecedented even in the methods adopted. For the first time in human history, an industry was established that produced something that had never been produced before: namely corpses. In Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec, and Chelmno, live Jews went in at one end, and corpses came out at the other end. There is therefore a caveat regarding the means employed in genocide, as well as comparative histories of genocides: the Holocaust stands out as something entirely new in this regard.

One may argue that there is no element in genocides other than the Holocaust that are not repeated in yet other genocides, but there are elements in the genocide of the Jews that are without a precedent in human history, as far as we now know. If the Holocaust was unprecedented, then it is clear that it was a precedent, and that these elements can be repeated, although never exactly in the same way. What are these elements?

The first element is the totality. No precedent exists, it would seem, to a state-organized mass murder of members of a targeted group, in which every single person identified as a member of that group (i.e., identified as a Jew) by the perpetrator – not self-defined – was sought out, registered, marked, dispossessed, humiliated, terrorized, concentrated, transported, and killed. This applied to every single person defined as a Jew who was caught, without a single exception. Those who survived because they were used as forced laborers did so only because the Germans decided that they should live, temporarily, so their labor could be utilized for the victory of a regime that was totally committed to killing them when their labor was no longer needed, or when they had been brought to a state where they could no longer work. In the German Reich, outside of the conquered areas of Europe, so-called half-Jews were in most, not all, cases left alive because there was a disagreement among the bureaucrats whether the fact that they were half-Germans should save them from death. In addition to the estimated 566,000 “full Jews” in 1933, there were about 70,000 “half-Jews.” A total of 20,000 Jews survived camps or hiding, but among them there were thousands – no one knows how many exactly – of “half-Jews” who had been arrested and put into camps. The other “half-Jews” suffered discrimination, and many were put to forced labor, but not into labor or concentration camps. Most bureaucrats involved thought that such half-Jews should be sterilized, so their half-Jewish blood would not enter the German blood stream. Because the perpetrators could not arrive at an agreement among themselves, most German half-Jews survived. In occupied Europe, in most cases, so-called half-Jews were killed. In Germany, most persons with one Jewish grandparent were considered Germans. Outside of the German Reich area, the decision what to do with them was mostly left to the local German authorities. The annihilation was intended to be as total as possible.

The second element is that of universality. It is suggested that there is no precedent to a universally conceived genocide. Technically, this was in any case impossible before modern times. But, even in the twentieth century, the Ottomans did not bother about the Armenians in Jerusalem because that was not Turkish ethnic territory. Hutu Power wanted to “cleanse” Rwanda of Tutsis, but there were apparently no plans to kill all Tutsis everywhere (although after the Rwandan genocide there were Hutu attempts to kill Tutsi-related groups in Eastern Congo). On the other hand, the National Socialist regime in Germany intended to deal with the Jews everywhere “the way we deal with them here in Germany,” as Hitler told the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini, on November 28, 1941, to quote just one of a number of clear statements. This genocidal universalism developed in stages, of course, and had, as stated above, no known precedent.

The third element that rendered the Holocaust without precedent was an ideology that was based not on any pragmatic, economic, political, military, or other consideration, but on what Marxists would call pure ideological superstructure. By comparison, the Armenian genocide was the answer to Turkish military and political defeats in the

Balkans, resulting in a dream of a new Turkic empire stretching from the Dardanelles to Kazakhstan and replacing the old, collapsing one. Added to this geopolitical concern was another strategic one, the justified fear of a Russian invasion supported by Armenians that would destroy the Turkish state altogether. Politically, there was also the intent to replace a successful urban Armenian middle class with ethnic Turks. These were political, military, and economic, in other words pragmatic, considerations, which were then dressed up in an ideology that justified the mass murder.

Take any other genocide and you will find similar pragmatic bases, on which of course ideologies were then built as rationalizations. The basic reasons for the genocidal situation in Darfur, for example, are economic and political. The ideology is clearly a racist superstructure designed to justify a policy whose real motives are economic, social, and political. There were no such pragmatic elements when considering the Nazis.

In the case of the Holocaust, the motivations were ideological. German Jews did not control German economy – pace various Marxist writers. Only one major industrial establishment, the AEG, the major German electrical company, was owned by a Jewish family, the Rathenaus, and there was one Jew among some one hundred members of the boards of the five major German banks. Jews were mostly middle class, lower middle class, members of free professions, and craftsmen; there was an upper-middle class, mostly of merchants, and some rich people owned a number of major consumer stores and were engaged in the transport industry. But Jews were not an organized group in any meaningful sense. Their first country-wide organization ever, the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden [the Reich Representation of German Jews], was founded in September 1933. This date was eight months after the Nazi accession to power, as a result of a Jewish, not a Nazi, initiative.

There had in fact never been an organized German Jewry before the Nazis. They had no territory, and had no political, never mind military, power, or presence. There was one Jewish politician, Walther Rathenau, the head of the family that owned the AEG, who was the only Jewish minister in any German government before the Nazis came to power. He was murdered by right-wing German nationalists.

The reasons, then, for the persecution of the Jews bore no relation to reality; they were of the nature of nightmares. That is, the Nazis imagined an international Jewish conspiracy to control the world (a mirror-image of the Nazi desire to do so), the supposed corruption of German blood and society and culture by the Jews (when in fact the Jews, who were loyal German citizens, contributed, as individuals, very considerably to German culture), the blood libel (the accusation that Jews killed non-Jewish children to bake their *matzot* [Passover bread]). Generally, National Socialist ideology conceived of the Jews as a satanic force. It is hard to discern any other case in history where mass murder was committed for basically non-pragmatic reasons. Of course, pragmatic considerations did play a role, as long as they did not stand in contradiction to the ideology. Some historians think that the Jews were murdered in order to get their property, but that is demonstrably wrong. In many cases, they were murdered after they had been deprived of their property, and the fit among them could have been used for slave labor. The looting was done in the process that led to the murder or after the Jews had been murdered, and was not the reason for the murder.

The non-pragmatic nature of the genocide can be shown in, literally, hundreds of cases. Thus, for instance, Lodz, the second largest city in prewar Poland, had the last

ghetto on Polish territory in the spring of 1944 because its workshops, run basically as slave labor places, produced some of the *Wehrmacht's* requirements for clothing and accessories. In early 1944, the local Nazi bureaucrats were opposed to the liquidation of the ghetto, partly because of the usefulness of the ghetto for the German Army, and also because they themselves had enriched themselves at the expense of the Jews. If the ghetto was annihilated they might have to serve in the army – not a very inviting prospect. But the ghetto was annihilated at Himmler's orders after he explicitly argued against any economic pragmatism. This was hardly capitalistic, cost-effective, or rational. There is no known precedent for a genocide committed because of ideology, due to nightmarish fantasies.

The fourth way in which the Holocaust was unprecedented was that the racist Nazi ideology was something utterly revolutionary. Communism, originally (before it became the rationalization for Russian imperialism), sought to replace one social class by another (consistent with past revolutions, such as in France). Nations have replaced nations, empires have replaced empires, religions have superseded other religions. But "races"? Never before. And, of course, there are no races, as stated already. The National Socialist revolution may have been the only really revolutionary attempt in the twentieth century, bar none, to change the world radically, and it was of course without any precedent. A new hierarchy was to rule the world, a hierarchy at the head of which would be the Nordic peoples of the Aryan race. The Nordic peoples were, apart from the Germans, the Scandinavians, the English, the Dutch, and the Flemish, none of whom proved to be enthusiastic about their being part of the master race. Nordic rule over the world would be shared with, for instance, Japanese allies (who are not exactly Nordic Aryans, which created some ideological problems), and everyone else would fall underneath them. No Jews would be there, because they would all have been killed by then. Blacks, who were considered somewhere between apes and humans, would be treated nicely, as animals, because Nazis were always kind to animals as long as they did not pretend to be human. In a distorted way, National Socialist racism was a quasi-religious view: there was a God-Messiah, namely the Führer, and a holy people or holy race, and there was a Satan. The Satanic Jew was taken from a de-Christianized Christian anti-Semitism. And, naturally, Satan had to be fought, defeated, and killed. There do not seem to have been any precedents for such thinking and policies in human history.

Fifth and finally, the Jews themselves provided an unprecedented opportunity for oppression. Their culture provides one of the background elements to the emergence of what is wrongly termed "western civilization." The Nazis rebelled against the Enlightenment, as well as against Christianity, because it was a development from Judaism and shared the basically universalistic, humane teachings of the Jewish prophets. They wanted to do away with customary morality, because that was a Jewish invention, too, which had been inserted into the heads of people by Christianity. They wanted to do away with liberalism, conservative and liberal democracy, social democracy, and parliamentarianism – all of which they understood to be the legacy of, or transmitted by, the French Revolution. But the legacy of the French Revolution rested on Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem (aesthetics, literature, law, and order of the Greeks and the Romans, and the ethics of the Jewish prophets).

Romans and Athenians today speak derivatives of the original languages, but not the ancient languages themselves, pray to other gods, and write literature that has no

direct connection to the sources. But the Jews were, and are, still here, and they spoke and speak the same language. There is the argument, of course, that their language had been dormant for millennia, but that is a specious position because while Hebrew was not used to buy bread or conduct daily discourse, it was the common written language of Jews. Each and every literate male Jew knew it. Correspondence was conducted almost exclusively in Hebrew, for over two thousand years. Literary works, both prose and poetry, were written in that language, and read because every literate Jew knew it.

In addition, Jewish traditions, though developed and changed over time, whether they were or are religious (a minority), or not (a majority), are direct descendants of the original ones. The Jews' contemporary culture, and their literature, is indecipherable without relating it to their ancient texts. A violent, brutal, exterminatory attack on the legacy of the French Revolution involved, almost necessarily and certainly logically, an attack on the only surviving remnant of the original sources from which western civilization developed. The ethics of the Jewish prophets stood in stark contradiction to the Social Darwinist ideas behind the Nazi revolution – basically, an ideology that said that the stronger “races,” or peoples, had not only the right but the duty to rule the world and do away with the weaker ones, even to annihilate them.

The Holocaust, then, was unprecedented, a fact of tremendous importance to anyone who wants to fight the self-destructive tendencies in human society. It also means that it was a precedent, and indeed, in Rwanda the first point, totality of annihilation, was repeated. All Rwandan Tutsis were to be killed. It may be possible that the most important Hutu Power ideologue, Ferdinand Nahimana, heard something about the Nazi annihilation of the Jews when he studied philosophy and history in Europe.

The Jewish specificity and the universal implications of the Holocaust are two sides of the same coin. Every genocide is specific, so that specificity, paradoxically, becomes a universal trait. This universal characteristic has to be set into a context: we are the only territorial, predatory, mammals that kill each other in large numbers, in mass atrocities some of which we now label genocides, because they are the most extreme form of this, unfortunately, very human behavior. And arguably, the most extreme form of genocide, to date, was the genocide of the Jews, not because of the suffering of the victims, not because of the numbers of people that perished, and not because of the percentage of the dead in relation to the total number of Jews in the world. It is the extreme case because of the unprecedented character of the Holocaust that has made that event, in the eyes of an increasing number of humans and their societies (e.g., the UN), the paradigmatic genocide because it is the most extreme form of an illness that afflicts all of humanity. In November 2005, the UN passed a unanimous resolution to memorialize the Holocaust yearly, on January 27, the date in 1945 when Auschwitz was liberated by the Soviet Army. The resolution also provided for a mandate to the UN to educate people about the Holocaust, as the paradigmatic genocide, all over the globe. Some efforts have been made in this direction, due to some heroic efforts of a few dedicated people. The main thing is that the principle has been made clear.

The conclusion appears to be that the Holocaust is at the center of any study or consideration of genocide and it is also the starting point of any serious attempt at preventing such mass atrocities. When one starts from the extreme case – again, not because the suffering is any different, but because of the other factors involved – one

must become committed to an effort to stop or prevent ongoing and future genocides, because they are manifestations of the same human illness which caused the Holocaust. Future research on the Holocaust must search for factors that facilitate genocide, as a means of preventing it. One has to clarify: mass murder committed by humans against humans is not inhuman but, unfortunately, very human indeed. The slogan "man's inhumanity to man" is an unfortunate cliché. Mass murder is an aspect of humanity that we have to fight inside nations and regions, and not problems that are external to us. One has to deal with Darfur, Zimbabwe, Eastern Congo, Southern Sudan, Burma, and a number of other places in an increasingly crowded, small, world. The main lesson one can draw from the Holocaust is that one has to fight genocide.

If this analysis is correct, then a major question arises: can genocides be prevented? On the face of it, the prospects are far from rosy. When we look at human behavior from its beginnings, we can see that genocides or genocide-like behavior characterizes the human race from its inception and, arguably, before it. Humans are predatory mammals, like tigers or bears. They hunt and kill in order to live. But as humans are weak predators, and do not have the teeth of tigers or the claws of bears, they have to hunt in herds, in groups, in order to live. This is a basic instinct of humans. It is of course unlikely that people today will go out into the streets and hunt antelopes; instead, they will go into a supermarket and buy meat or fish (with the exception of some vegetarians). The methods have changed, but not the basic instincts. We hunt in groups, and thus we are herd animals. Here and there, an individual can try and exist on his or her own, but generally this does not work, so that an idealistic universalism that says "I do not belong to any national, ethnic, or social group, I am just a human being" is delusionary. If we do not belong to one group, we belong to another, whether we like it or not. But we are also territorial predators, because we need a territory within which we can find our means of sustenance. Our ancestors used the territory to hunt, and today, we use it to establish major industries which then try to penetrate other territories as best they can. Basically, it is the same process.

When another human group then tries to enter into our territory, whether that territory is real or whether it exists only in our mind, we have, it seems, four options: we can absorb them so they strengthen us; we may enslave them because we don't want to do certain jobs or because we can use their labor for our benefit; we can tell them to get out, which they sometimes do and sometimes do not; or we can kill them. Sometimes, we combine more than one of these elements in our behavior. When we kill large numbers of fellow-humans, it is called genocide. Humans have been doing that for many thousands of years, as anyone familiar with ancient history knows well. The destruction of Carthage by the Romans, or of the island of Melos by the Athenians, or the annihilation of the Midianites according to chapter 31 in the fourth book of Moses, or the annihilation of enemies in the Indian Vedas, are but a tiny sample of these human capabilities.

But if this is true, then genocide is the result of general human inclination or instinct. How then can we fight it? Taking the Holocaust as the starting point, researchers should explore this question through a variety of disciplines.

Fortunately, the killing instinct, called *Thanatos* by some important psychologists, is balanced by another instinct, called *Libido* by Sigmund Freud, who interpreted it in much too sexual terms. It derives from the same source as the killing instinct. We are,

after all, not only hunters, but also collectors. We eat fruit of the earth – vegetables – and fruit of the trees. We also eat grass. Grain comes from certain types of grass. They grow buds that we grind into flour, and eat. We therefore are grass and fruit eaters, and we need collective efforts to do so. It is that collective effort that makes us create societies that develop social structures that, in their turn, make our survival possible. Societies cannot exist if they only serve as a platform for a struggle of everyone against everyone else.

We humans have, therefore, developed attitudes and emotions of sympathy, love, collaboration, mutual care, family, clan, and tribal cohesion, and even readiness to sacrifice ourselves, not only for the good of the society's survival, but also for the rescue of individuals who may be total strangers. Unconsciously, we know that the person we rescued will be beholden to us and may help us just as we helped him or her. We develop what we call morality in order to justify what we do, and create laws and regulations to support this social structure. We also use the laws that we create in order to try and domesticate our destructive instincts. We are inclined, by our nature, to kill, so, in order to fight our inclinations, we develop laws against murder. If we were not inclined to murder, we would not have laws against it. However, killing is permitted if it is useful for society. Murder is forbidden killing. Killing is permitted murder. When societies fight over territory and power, killing becomes a virtue, as every soldier knows. Equally, if we were not inclined to take things that belong to others, in other words to steal, we would not need laws against theft.

We have two conflicting sets of instinctual behavior that develop into cultural attitudes: the destructive, killing instinct, and the life-affirming, altruistic one. We therefore *can* fight the murderous instinct within us by emphasizing and consciously furthering the life-affirming one. It is possible to fight genocide and mass murder generally, but it is extremely difficult as contemporary politics demonstrates in the fight for genocide prevention. Well-meaning preachers – from Desmond Tutu, through Elie Wiesel, the Pope, some rabbis and some Moslem clerics, writers, and musicians – campaign to create public awareness and recruit masses to support moves against genocide, for instance in Darfur. These are important and worthwhile efforts, and they may create a major constituency for political moves in the right direction. But sermonizing does not make that much of a difference, and much of what these good people preach has become or is turning into so many clichés.

The Holocaust teaches us that what we need more than anything else is a series of actions that are mainly political. Academics and scholarly research can make a difference because governments today, especially in democratic or semi-democratic regimes, turn to think tanks to help them master the increasingly complicated reality with which they have to grapple. There has to be a combination of pressure and advice in relation to governments and the political world. The number of politicians on the one hand, and governmental bureaucrats on the other hand, that are aware of the existential need to face the dangers of conflicts and genocidal dangers, is growing. That goodwill has to be addressed and utilized, and academics should work in tandem with anyone in the world of politics, the media, and the bureaucracy who understands and is willing to act.

We still do not understand enough about the developments that lead to genocides. We need more statistical research about present situations, and content research of present and past instances of genocides and genocidal threats. That is something

academics are trained to do. In fact, there are already formal and informal groups, whether organized in NGOs or not, that fulfill these needs at least partly, and they have to be supported. Risk assessments of genocidal dangers have been and are being made, some governments have been approached and are being approached. It is a slow process, and it will take time – and there might not be enough time, in any case, to fight these dangers. Political analyses have been and are being made as well, and economic issues are central. More experts on economic problems are needed to deal with the impact of the economy on threats of conflict, mass murder, and genocide, and vice versa. Ideally, all these efforts should be collected and united, or at least coordinated. The institutional rivalry between NGOs that deal with the same issues from similar perspectives are a major problem because a united front of NGOs would make a great difference.

In the end, the major issue that has derived from the Holocaust has to be faced: the real world is one of conflicting interests of major powers, medium powers, and groups of states that combine for various reasons. Impasses on the Security Council of the United Nations make real progress difficult. Pressure from the member states has to be organized to at least attempt to effect change. In addition, there is a parallel world of ideology that influences the world of jostling power interests, and occasionally it is the ideology that determines the economy and politics, and not the other way round. For instance, the recent surge of radical Islam that engages in denial of facts, past and present, is part of a historic reality of radical ideological movements, religious or quasi-religious, which developed over the past hundred years or so.

Bolshevism, National Socialism, and radical Islam are of course different from each other in many respects, but there are also important parallels. All three are exclusivist ideologies, religious or quasi-religious, which aim at controlling the whole world, explicitly. All three aver that the only way to achieve this aim is by the use of indiscriminate force, annihilating real or perceived enemies. All three are, essentially, anti-nationalistic, and thus oppose the trend that developed in modernity of establishing independent or at least autonomous units based on ethnicity or nationality. National Socialism moved from extreme German nationalism to the concept of a Germanic unity of the Nordic peoples of the Aryan race – the Nordic peoples consisting of Germans, Scandinavians, English, Dutch, and Flemish. All the other nationalities would be subject peoples in one way or another. The Soviets acted on the principle of “socialist in content, national in form,” which in practice meant the supremacy of Russian imperialism, and the subject character of everyone else. Radical Islam, especially in its Sunni version, is explicitly opposed to nationalism, especially Arab nationalism. Thus, Hamas aspires not to a Palestinian national state, but to an Islamic State of Palestine, as part of a world federation of Islamic countries, in which national units are convenient subdivisions of a worldwide Islamic entity. National Socialism and radical Islam are antifeminist. And all three, in different degrees, are or were anti-Jewish. Nazism wanted to annihilate the Jews, and so does radical Islam. Soviet Bolshevism became grossly anti-Semitic, especially during the last years of Stalin’s life. And, finally, all three emerged more or less in the same decade of the twentieth century: Hitler’s first political statement was made in September 1919; the Bolshevik revolution occurred in 1917, and Hassan el-Bana founded the Moslem Brotherhood in 1928.

In a way, one can see the reemergence of radical religion, whether theistic or not, in a much broader context. Soviet Bolshevism was an atheistic faith which had all the

characteristics of radical religion. The same can be said of the Social Darwinistic beliefs of the Nazi elite in a religion of nature. And, of course, radical Islam is a genocidal religious ideology. But one can also see the emergence in the past century of radical evangelical creeds in the US and other places, and one can see a similar development in Hinduism, and even in Buddhism – in Sri Lanka, for instance, where armed Buddhist monks favor violent policies towards the Tamil minority. Among Jews, a similar development exists. For instance, some of the trends in the radical religious settlers' movement in Israel have pointed toward mass violence. All these, and many other similar phenomena, are obstacles to possible international moves against mass murder and genocide, not to mention conflict situations.

Where does the Holocaust fit into the framework of attempts to fight genocidal situations? It is impossible to deal with all genocides, and one has to choose where to start and with which paradigm. The Holocaust is an essential starting point for all such attempts because it was the most extreme form of a general malady. It was extreme, one has to emphasize again, not because its victims suffered more than others – they did not – but because, as I have argued, of the unprecedented character of some of its central elements. Any contemporary proposals for social and political action immediately refer to the Holocaust, whether such comparisons or analogies are justified or not – usually they are not. But the Holocaust has become the paradigmatic genocide in the consciousness of friend and foe alike, and therefore any discussion regarding genocide and any action taken will start from there.

This does not mean that one should concentrate on the Holocaust only. Quite the contrary: comparisons are essential, and anyone dealing with the Holocaust must gain some knowledge about other genocides, and refer to them as best one can. This is true especially in the field of education. Studying the Holocaust is a major way, perhaps *the* major way, to enter into that darkness, to use the term of Gitta Sereny (1974). There is a kind of dialectical tension between the unprecedentedness of the Holocaust which makes it into the paradigm for genocide generally, and the essential need for comparison with all other genocides, which in its turn is the prerequisite for any action to, perhaps, reduce its recurrence or even put a stop to it. Whether we are capable of approaching that goal is up to us.

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CHAPTER FORTY-ONE

Environmental Dimensions of World War II

JACOB DARWIN HAMBLIN

World War II was wide ranging in its human, animal, and material destruction, it halted certain political ideologies in their tracks and strengthened others, and entailed the mobilization of natural resources on an unprecedented scale. And yet scholars have been slow to assess the war's environmental dimensions. Scholars of the war itself seldom look at it through an environmental lens, and environmental historians are often preoccupied with peacetime changes to the natural environment. There remains ample room for research and interpretation, and questions abound. What were the short- or long-term impacts of the war on the natural landscape, whether from bombing, construction, or the large-scale manipulations of terrain for tactical or strategic advantage? What were the opportunities and constraints of topography, natural resources, climate, and disease, in the actual prosecution of the war? How did the competing political ideologies in the war adopt differing views on wildlife and resource conservation, from Hitler's vegetarianism to the Americans' technological fixes? Can we find in World War II the roots of contemporary environmental science and social thought, even though the environmental movement typically is associated with the 1960s?

The present chapter attempts no comprehensive answer to these questions, but instead introduces some of the themes, questions, and controversies around which scholars have situated their work. These often overlap, but broadly stated they are: the global struggle for natural resources, the natural transformations due to war mobilization, the environmental impacts of combat, the rise in environmental sciences, and the role of the natural world within political ideology.

Was World War II a fundamental episode in the rise of environmental consciousness? There is some debate about the origins of the environmental movement, and many

historians focus on postwar affluence, suburbanization, the critique of pesticide use, or the continuation of prewar debates about conservation and wilderness protection (Hays 1987). Others look to the atomic bomb or the worldwide contamination from nuclear tests in the 1950s (Worster 1994). But World War II is also rich territory for understanding environmental consciousness because of the purported causes of the war, and the anxieties about resources by great powers on all sides.

One clue to understanding this perspective is to highlight what contemporary observers took to be the war's proximate causes. The first UN Specialized Agencies were all designed to address a perceived cause. Combating disease, starvation, and ignorance propelled the spirit of the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Yet among scholars, other factors – the rise of Nazism and Japanese militarism, to name just two – routinely trump these naturalistic explanations. This was not so during the war itself. It may be that the tendency of the Axis powers to justify actions as the natural result of population pressure made these explanations less attractive after the war. Population pressure was a critical part of Hitler's embrace of *Lebensraum*, the notion that Germans needed more living space. Columbia University geographer George T. Renner (1944) argued that the war ultimately was about ownership of the materials in the natural environment that could be used industrially or commercially by man. "This Second World War," he wrote, "has been variously pictured as a war of ideologies, a race war, a religious war, a war of mad leaders, and a class revolution" (p. 430). It was all of those only superficially, he argued. At a deeper level, the war was the result of a major challenge to Anglo-American dominant control of the world's natural resources. He lamented the lack of attention to the links between geopolitics and human ecology.

Imagining access to natural resources as the principal cause of the war would be an example of environmental determinism, that is, that the conditions of the natural environment have determined the course of human events more than other causal factors such as culture, religion, or ethnic conflict. Environmental historians are chary of making such claims, and even authors comfortable with a large dose of naturalistic explanation of major world events, such as Jared Diamond (1997), acknowledge that the war might not have happened if, say, Adolph Hitler had died in childbirth. Nevertheless, environmental warnings since World War II have drawn implicitly from the belief that natural resources, climate, and population pressures can lead to such wars again. The awakening of consciousness about global resources is evident in numerous works from the immediate postwar period. Fairfield Osborn (the son of a well-known American paleontologist Henry Fairfield Osborn) published *Our Plundered Planet* in 1948, arguing for wise land use and warning about a future of dwindling global resources. Robertson (2008) reveals Osborn to be intensely critical of humanity's apparent war against nature – Osborn went so far as to complain that wartime caricatures of the Japanese as gorillas were unfair to the gorillas, because animals did not have the warlike tendencies or destructive impulses of man. William Vogt, in a 1948 review of Osborn's book, called humankind "the only animal that deliberately destroys the environment on which its survival depends." In the same year Vogt wrote *The Road to Survival*, which revived Malthusian fears of population outstripping the food supply and called for curbs on growth. Vogt complained that Americans used machines to extract far more than their fair share, and only delayed

their ecological judgment day. The war itself had created its own kind of judgment day around the world. Commenting on the United States' Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe with massive capital investment after the war, ecologist Charles Elton pointed out that the Americans were trying to delay the natural consequences of the war.

As Linnr (2003) demonstrates, the Malthusian frame of mind never disappeared after these early commentators, and the issue would boil to the surface in the early 1970s in discussions about Paul Ehrlich's 1968 *The Population Bomb* and other works that pointed to the consequences of population pressures. Given the sensitivity of environmental historians to the arguments from that later era, it is difficult to underestimate the impact of these works. And examples from World War II have slipped into more contemporary debates. For example, concerns about global warming and other worldwide pressures such as population growth and access to water have heightened interest in the environmental dimensions of international security. Scholars writing about food and water security, such as Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991), see the importance of these pressures as axiomatic, and have attempted to formulate theoretical approaches to relate environmental degradation to acute conflict. Homer-Dixon also made the intriguing suggestion (1994) that there are fewer resource-based armed conflicts over renewable resources than nonrenewables. The classic case has been Japan's southward invasions in search of oil resources during World War II (Westing 1986; Homer-Dixon 1994).

Because of the disruption of markets and the reorientation of supply networks, the war itself offers historians a unique opportunity to evaluate the global reconfiguration of humans, animals, insects, and natural products. Strategic commodities crucial for military and economic strength, such as petroleum, copper, aluminum, and rubber, all depended on access to specific geographic regions. In his analysis of aluminum, recently Matthew Evenden (2011) noted that the war "drove an unprecedented search for resources at a global scale," resulting in intensified use of, and sometimes entirely new, commodity chains. His approach is ecological, seeing the interdependence of bauxite mines in British Guiana, cryolite mines in Greenland, smelting facilities in Quebec, and numerous other critical junctures in the production and shipping of aluminum for the war effort. Evenden (2009) argued that the war overrode preexisting political constraints on large-scale development schemes as well, such as massive dams for the use of hydroelectric power. It also displaced previous regimes of control. Prior to the war, provincial governments regulated hydroelectric power. During the war, all control shifted to the federal government. Drawing on the power of political propaganda, complete with images of fists coming out of rivers, the Canadian government mobilized the economy by rationalizing it – leading to an extraordinary level of centralized planning.

Because of mobilization and various "crash" programs to develop weapons, build harbors, and produce food, services, and armaments, World War II is a case study to see the transformation of the natural environment under sudden, relatively uncontested, seizure by state power. Scholars draw, explicitly or implicitly, from the post-modern critique of modernization and development (much of which is not about World War II, but rather about development schemes during the cold war). What was once perceived as rational and scientific has been described as disruptive, unnatural, and the result of widespread hubris among experts. The ranks of environmental historians are filled with those who trace the unintended consequences of such

“high modernist” schemes, as political scientist James Scott describes them. Scott’s *Seeing Like a State* (1998) argued that states have attempted to make their subjects and lands “legible,” transforming them through rationalization schemes of many stripes. These include land and water use, dictating the shapes of parcels of land, and micromanaging development schemes according to scientists’ or economists’ advice.

To focus on the consequences of extracting and trading a particular wartime commodity is to follow a time-honored pattern among environmental historians. As a conceptual tool, “commodified nature” is an echo of Karl Marx’s “commodified labor,” as discussed in *Capital*, and it has exercised a powerful influence upon the field of environmental history. Influential texts such as Donald Worster’s *Nature’s Economy* (1994) and Ted Steinberg’s *Down to Earth* (2002) both of which are widely used as textbooks in university courses, include critiques of capitalistic values that are in keeping with Marx but also sympathize with Henry David Thoreau’s nineteenth century assertion that Americans look at a tree and see a chair. On the global scale, Richard Tucker’s work on the degradation of the tropical world due to market demands and American corporations (backed by American military forces), provides detailed accounts of the transformation of landscapes to emphasize the most profitable crops for global markets (monocropping, or monoculture). This oft-repeated pattern – sugar in Cuba, bananas in Central America, for example – was well established by World War II. The results were typical: dependence of locals upon foreign corporations for basic services, dependence upon foreign markets for basic food needs, and completely obeisance by local politicians to foreign dictates (Tucker 2000).

In most narratives, the war heightened these trends and compounded them with comparatively weak attention to long-term conservation practices. Tucker (2004) shows how much better equipped nations were to commandeer forest resources even between the two world wars. World War II wrought enormous damage on a truly global scale to boreal, temperate, and tropical forests. In combat operations, forests lands were reclaimed for use in air bases and training camps, while the fighting itself destroyed much more. But most of the damage to forests came in the form of clear-cutting, away from combat zones. As German forces marched into France, Tucker points out, they were careful to preserve the French sawmills. Given the lack of reliable imports, European forest cutting increased dramatically. Yet there is some evidence that suggests that German forest managers were sophisticated in their approach to sustainable forest management, and it drew the admiration of American occupiers. Tucker argues that the Germans had learned a lesson from World War I, during which a naval blockade had starved Germany of wood. Nevertheless, though Germany managed its own forests efficiently, it was much more aggressive in cutting down trees in the east, particularly in occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the Baltic States. And when the war ended, coal shortages compelled more wanton cutting of trees even in Germany. Tucker argues that elsewhere emergency war measures undermined forest management, paving the way for “unrestrained capitalist exploitation of forest resources” after the war (Tucker 2004, p. 124).

Those with greater access to global trade made ample use of it. When Germany’s conquest of Norway cut off Britain’s access to Scandinavian boreal forests, Britain turned to its own forests, ignoring laws that had protected them for centuries. In addition, it drew heavily upon imports from the United States and Canada. These demands, compounded by American entry into the war against both Japan and

Germany in late 1941, turned World War II into a “lumberman’s carnival,” in the words of American forester William Greeley (p. 126). In Tucker’s view, this was a mixed blessing for American forests, particularly in the Pacific Northwest. On the one hand, extraordinary numbers of trees were cut down. On the other, the high value of lumber led Americans to abandon seeing it as an endless resource, and to invest heavily in replanting projects. Meanwhile, the Japanese occupation of former British Malaya, French Indochina, and Dutch Indonesia apparently dismantled years of forest management for the greater needs of the Japanese military and naval forces. The Dutch destroyed their logging facilities when they retreated from teak plantations in Java, but the Japanese imposed a forced labor system to have the Javanese cut down trees at a furious pace over more than three years of occupation. Tucker’s thesis is that the war opened a door toward unsustainable practices, most of which occurred during peacetime after the war ended. In Latin America, for example, the war gave American firms a foothold for timber exploitation from Mexico all the way to Argentina.

Investigating such pressure upon natural resources presents historians with the opportunity to highlight political and social tensions. For example, resource demands during the war put extraordinary strains on colonial holdings and planted seeds of discord that lasted into the postwar years. In the case of Rhodesia, Samasuwo (2003) argues, Allied demand for beef allowed local authorities to requisition cattle forcibly in ways that fed African nationalism after the war. Intensive land use and the changing ownership of cattle deepened the impact of colonialism and fostered high levels of resentment. Other scholars use these pressures to resolve questions of culpability for national catastrophes. For example, in the latter half of the Japanese occupation of Vietnam, between one and two million people starved to death. Naturalistic explanations of the famine include bad weather, flooding, and the inability to respond efficiently in the frantic situation of wartime Southeast Asia. The French after the war widened the blame to include Allied bombing, particularly its role in impairing rail and road systems. Bùi Minh Dũng (1995) disagrees, pointing out that most explanations fail to account for the resiliency of the population in previous crises. Instead Dũng claims that Japan gradually converted land use from rice to strategic commodities such as textiles (mainly cotton) and plant oils (such as peanut and castor oil) on a huge scale, and even converted some of its rubber plantations to cotton cultivation. Some rice was grown, only to be exported to Japan, stored for later use, sold elsewhere, or simply destroyed. Peasants were forced to convert their crops to commodities in the service of the Japanese Empire, leading in 1944 and 1945 to widespread starvation, desperate migrations, and even cannibalism.

Two commodities have earned considerable attention from scholars: rubber and uranium. When Japan took control of Southeast Asia, it robbed European empires of the world’s main source of rubber. The United States, which previously relied on British Malaya for some ninety percent of its rubber, scrambled to find other sources. In doing so, it subsidized a massive reorientation of Brazil’s Amazonian rubber trees, a process that included the movement of some 52,000 Brazilians (workers and their families) into the area. By the end of the war, 23,000 of them were dead or missing. Scholars such as Dean (1987) have tended to emphasize the victimization of these workers, who had suffered from the impacts of drought and were desperate enough to go into a region rife with malaria and inadequate sustenance. Some even have compared the migration to forced-work concentration camps in Nazi Europe. But

Garfield (2010) argues that pointing fingers at the Americans or opportunistic local oligarchs oversimplifies the problem, and it is misleading to portray the migrants as “dragooned.” State-sponsored migrations could also be perceived as humanitarian and patriotic. During the drought of 1942–1943, Brazilian authorities promoted migration out of the at-risk towns, and the American subsidy appeared as an opportunity to facilitate that.

The American efforts to develop a synthetic form of rubber during the war have sparked considerable interest from environmental historians and historians of science and technology. One perspective would see the story as a “technological fix” for a resource shortfall, with World War II creating a mutually beneficial partnership between the chemical industry and the US government. Mark Finlay’s (2009) analysis runs deeper than that, seeing political forces within the American agricultural sector ultimately favoring petroleum interests over grain interests. The key chemical product in synthesizing rubber was butadiene, derived from either grain-based alcohol or petroleum. Both were produced on a large scale in the United States, and both had powerful lobbies in Washington. Petroleum-based rubber was cheaper, but grain-based rubber would have addressed grain over-production while decreasing the dependence of the United States on foreign oil.

Perhaps the most notorious commodity has been uranium. Albert Einstein’s famous 1939 letter to President Roosevelt, about Germany’s discovery of fission and its implications for atomic bombs, included the advice to secure a source of uranium from the Belgian Congo. The United States benefited from having a cache of uranium from the Congo to make its first bombs, but both the United States and Canada developed mining operations. For those who choose to pay any attention to it, the history of uranium mining is grim material. Norman Naimark’s (1997) discussion of the uranium mines in Germany and Czechoslovakia, taken over by the Soviets at the end of the war, leave little doubt that the harm to miners from radiation exposure was callously set aside for the superior aim of attaining fuel for an atomic bomb. His discussion of workers wading in radioactive sludge raises serious questions about how radiation safety was handled elsewhere, particularly by the Americans, who progressed much farther in bomb work during the war.

Scholarship on uranium mining in the United States is closely tied to literature on environmental justice, because most of the mining occurred on Native American land, and the mining work fell predominantly upon Navajo people in the southwest United States. For years, advocacy groups have claimed that many health problems among the Navajo can be attributed to mining operations. Histories of nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and even of radiation health safety, typically ignore the issue or tread lightly upon it, following the industry’s cue by not considering mining as part of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, this is changing and more scholarship is needed to bring the perspectives of environmental justice and environmental history together with history of science and nuclear history. One reason for the change has been the 1990 passage of Radiation Exposure Compensation Act by the United States Congress, which implicitly acknowledges that such human damage may have occurred. Although that legislation was designed to help miners and the “down-winders” from postwar nuclear tests, many Navajo had difficulty seeking redress. Brugge, Benally, and Yazzie-Lewis (2006) have attempted to bring these voices to a broader audience through oral histories and commentary, but the process is slow and involves contentious litigation.

To what can historians attribute cases of clear environmental harm? Were these practices in keeping with the norms of the time, based on contemporary scientific knowledge? Or were these problems simply swept aside for wartime expediency? And if they were swept aside, were the problems addressed at war's end, or simply continued in the postwar years? Jenks (2007) tells the story of a particular site in New York, first requisitioned for TNT production and eventually used as a chemical and radioactive waste dumping ground. He argues that the feverish pace of the Manhattan Project left ample justification to raise exposure levels at production facilities and, at war's end, little sense of responsibility for ensuring that contaminated sites were cleaned up or contained. Those practices set a standard that would continue long into the post-war era. Such sites, often maintained privately and only connected to the government by contract, routinely escape notice by anyone, including historians.

At more well known nuclear sites, the legacy of the war remains controversial. At Hanford, in eastern Washington State, the United States built the first major plutonium production facility, using the ample supplies of hydroelectricity and cooling water from the Columbia River. Hanford created the fuel for one of the atomic bombs used against Japan (the one that destroyed Nagasaki). The fuel for the other bomb, uranium-235, had been produced at the Oak Ridge site, powered by the enormous New Deal project, the Tennessee Valley Authority. At Hanford, plutonium production also created a toxic site, because Hanford workers dumped contaminated water into the Columbia River and released radioactive isotopes such as iodine-131 into the atmosphere. Scientists' wartime assumptions about the fate of these radioactive pollutants – that they would bond with the soil or dissipate – proved incorrect (Gerber 1997). The secrecy surrounding the site continued after the war. The details of the contamination were not widely known until 1986, when the US Department of Energy began to point out the need for a major cleanup effort. As Bauman (2007) notes, the "Hanford site is often either celebrated as a place of heroic, scientific pioneers or denigrated as a disgraceful atomic wasteland." He argues that public history, targeting undergraduate education and the wider public, is one of the ways to break the heroic mindset and to see the site as the nexus of several environmental, demographic, and racial struggles.

To see such links requires historians to move outside the confines of the war itself, and to gauge the ways that war mobilization and fighting changed human interactions with the natural world in the long term. For example, the evacuation of families from cities to the countryside in Britain during the Blitz temporarily reversed the pattern of industrialization and opened up numerous questions of social policy. Aside from the public health concerns attendant to such migrations, Richard Titmuss (1950) argued that the experience drew attention to problems of poverty and malnourishment, and led to clamoring for equal apportionment of the country's resources in food, milk, and other commodities. Historians of social policy in Britain continue to argue about whether the evacuation changed or reinforced views about class differences, but rationing in the war and the interactions among so many different walks of life in unfamiliar surroundings may have created a mood for social reform. Welshman (1999) argues that the evacuation of schoolchildren in particular opened a longstanding dialogue about the importance of environmental factors in health, crime, and poverty.

Gerald Nash has set the tone of discussion about the transformation of the American West during the war. In two books, *The American West Transformed* (1985) and

World War II and the West (1990), he explicitly identified the mobilization of the war effort as a decisive moment in altering the history of the western states. Prior to 1941, he contends, the West was a sparsely populated backwater, a colony, America's "Third World." Like European colonies, the West essentially provided natural resources for manufacturing centers located in the eastern states, with no massive urban centers to claim as its own. But because of the Pacific war, cities like Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco mushroomed in size and importance, building the shipyards to strengthen America's Pacific fleet. The aircraft industry similarly boosted Seattle and the Los Angeles area. Workers migrated in huge numbers, with some seven million moving to the West in just four years of war. The story of this migration also is fundamental to American social history, with numerous studies of race relations using as a jumping off point the settlement and labor patterns established during the war years. African Americans moved out of the Southeast and came to California in the search for defense-related work, creating tensions not only with white people but also with Latinos, some of whom also were immigrants crossing the border from Mexico looking for work. Nash's upbeat attitude about the positive aspects of these demographic changes has come under fire from some scholars who would stress the resultant racial tensions, exemplified by the Zoot Suit riots of 1943. In addition, the positive spin downplays the fact that displacement of Native Americans from their lands only intensified during the war, and Japanese-Americans were interned in camps. James Gregory (1991) argues that Nash oversimplified the situation by calling the prewar West a backwater, ignoring the importance of California to Pacific trade and the preexisting economic expansion that the war may simply have accelerated rather than triggered. Richard Lowitt's (1984) interpretation, published prior to Nash's books, credits President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal policies of the 1930s for changing the West from a plundered region – for its oil, water, forests, wildlife, and mines – into a highly managed region based on principles of resource conservation. This interpretation is in keeping with environmental historians who see federal intervention, particularly the drive toward more efficient land use, as a response to the disastrous Dust Bowl of the early 1930s.

It does seem clear from recent historical work that the major combatants tried to bring scientific knowledge to bear on their ability to exploit the natural environment and to operate within it. Knowledge of natural resources and the peoples of the earth proved deficient enough during the war that combatants attempted to remedy their knowledge in a variety of ways. Farish (2005) notes that the war stimulated a mutually beneficial collaboration between geographers and the military. Academics gathered a vast amount of data for the war effort. He argues that for Americans, the war radically reshaped this relationship, leading to strong regional intelligence services designed to blend national aims with local knowledge. Farish notes that this also led to the proliferation of "area studies" during the cold war. Such work involved not only intelligence-gathering about people and natural resources, but also finding ways to survive in unfamiliar environments from the tropical Pacific islands, deserts of North Africa, to the snowy Aleutians. The US government routinely sent scientists along with armed forces, particularly in the Pacific, with its many problems of climate, disease, and organisms yet unknown to science.

Although the role of World War II in stimulating technological developments such as the atomic bomb and penicillin is well known, the war's impacts on the environmental

sciences are less understood. The postwar growth of oceanography and marine geology as disciplines in the United States, often in partnership with the US Navy, resulted directly from relationships developed during World War II. Pacific campaigns were voyages of discovery as well. While serving in the US Navy, for example, Princeton geologist Harry Hess discovered undersea peaks (he called them guyots). Other work was directed at combat operations. For example, military commanders realized that the 1943 amphibious landing disaster at Tarawa was the result of inadequate knowledge of oceans and tidal conditions. The marines had tried to land on the beach at low tide, which meant they had to wade through shallow water over a long distance, while subject to machine gun fire from the Japanese. Thousands of marines died because of inadequate scientific knowledge. Similarly, oceanographers and meteorologists set up ocean and weather monitoring stations in Britain to help prosecute the war in Europe. General Eisenhower used these scientists to plan the timing for the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. The desire for operational knowledge of the natural environment cemented the relationship between the armed services and scientists, and the US military would continue after the war to be the dominant patron of scientific research in the ocean and atmospheric sciences (Weir 2001; Hamblin 2005).

The war also stimulated work in ecology. One example is a matter of timing: the American Raymond Lindeman's influential work on the passage of energy within an ecosystem was published during the war. But there were very practical questions about agricultural defense that enrolled ecologists. For example, Oxford's Charles Elton oriented his colleagues toward rodent control during the war, initiating a flurry of work on rats, mice, and rabbits (Crowcroft 1991). Others investigated mosquitoes and locusts, and the various chemical measures to control them. This wartime work, much of it done collaboratively between the UK and the United States, also led to the large-scale production of herbicides and plant hormones to control weeds and clear underbrush. Pringle (1975) argued that without the war, there would not have been such a proliferation of the variety of herbicides in the postwar years. In the Pacific region, the movement of tens of thousands of American marines in and out of one island or another posed enormous risks of infectious disease and ecosystem disruption. Bennett (2004) reveals the intersection of existing colonial expertise by British and French scientists and the American island-hoppers. American horses had brought ticks to New Caledonia, leading to the death by tick-borne disease to local cattle. The Americans violated quarantine rules established by the French, and some British scientists were convinced that the Americans would spread malaria in the islands like wildfire, carried by mosquitoes feasting on their blood. Although a malaria epidemic never materialized, the tick problem would plague the Pacific islands after the war.

These studies speak to a question at the intersection of environmental history and the history of science: to what extent are ecological outlooks informed by political ideology? Peder Anker (2001) writes that ecological arguments were used repeatedly to prop up not only nationalism, but also to justify the apartheid regime in South Africa (all things having their proper place or niche). During the war and its aftermath, British ecologists affirmed global interdependence in a way that deemphasized human agency and helped to justify the need for management and control, such as the creation of far-reaching international bodies.

Russell (1996) raises a disturbing link between insect control and the language of total war. Just as ecologists tried to understand the behavior and life cycles of rats and mice to control them, Russell suggests that chemical research focused less on control and more on extermination. Fumigation for insect control at prison camps allegedly inspired the first use of an insecticide, Zyklon B, on humans at Auschwitz – first on Soviet prisoners of war, then on Jews and others on a large scale. In the Pacific theater of war, American propaganda described the Japanese as vermin to be annihilated. According to Russell, this was more prevalent in anti-Japanese propaganda than in anti-German propaganda. The imagery of Japanese as vermin, insects, spiders, scorpions, and other pests, Russell notes, must have made it “natural” to talk of extermination. American Admiral William F. Halsey referred to the Japanese as gophers, and other American leaders used the word extermination routinely. After the war, the metaphor reversed course, allowing chemical companies to focus not on insect control but on total annihilation of insect species.

Although historians conventionally identify casualties by the cause of death – that is, in combat, of disease, or of starvation – these presume an easily discerned separation. To what extent did combatants manipulate natural causes to their advantage? Most of the major combatants experimented with biological and chemical weapons during the war. Some of this involved human experimentation, most notoriously on the effects of chemical burns, conducted in Nazi concentration camps, and on a variety of disease pathogens on Chinese and Korean prisoners in Japan’s research facilities in Manchuria. Harris (1994) gives excruciating details of the Japanese Unit 731, set up in Manchuria and led by biologist Shiro Ishii. The Japanese attempted not only to experiment on humans with chemical weapons, but also to attempt to infect humans with diseases by using natural insect vectors. Harris also demonstrates that American occupiers understood that this had been done and, in exchange for the data, did not prosecute the Japanese scientists for war crimes. In Britain, one noted case of biological weapons research was Gruinard Island (off Scotland), where in 1942 and 1943 scientists had experimented with bombs containing anthrax spores to kill sheep. The entire island had to be abandoned because the scientists were unsure where all the contaminated soil was. Balmer (2001) notes that these experiments were a response to rumors of a planned chemical or biological attack by Germany on the London Underground rail system, and were designed to test Britain’s retaliatory ability. Lockwood (2008) reveals the enrolment of entomologists into such work, not only in the case of Japan, but at the American research facility at Camp Detrick, Maryland.

On the subject of bugs, more widely known is the role during World War II of insect control measures. One controversial aspect of combat zone technologies has been the legacy of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, or DDT. At war’s end, it had a reputation as a crucial element of the Allies’ arsenal, having saved many lives that otherwise might have perished from tropical mosquito-borne diseases. Paul Müller won the Nobel Prize (for Physiology or Medicine) in 1948 for his role in developing it. And yet it earned a negative reputation in subsequent decades due to indiscriminate spraying and DDT’s links to cancer – mentioned most prominently in Rachel Carson’s 1962 bestseller *Silent Spring*. The turn against DDT features prominently in orthodox narratives about the rise of the environmental movement after World War II. Hays (1987) argued that regulators during the war era were most concerned with whether chemicals were as effective in killing insects as developers claimed, with little

attention to health or environmental consequences. That would change by the 1960s, and Dunlap (1981) notes the importance of activism and public consternation, exerting political pressure from outside traditional government advisory structures. Shulman's (1992) work on toxic military installations in the years since the war plays up the notion that DDT's military origins may not have been conducive to rigorous health or environmental standards. And yet Edmund Russell (1999) has documented wartime measures by the US Army and the Public Health Service that prohibited indiscriminate spraying and warned against the possible links to cancer. He argues that even during World War II, government scientists recognized the dangers, issued cautions, and restricted DDT's use. Instead of looking at a rise in consciousness or new methods of emphasizing policy, Russell sees structural similarities in federal control between 1945 and 1972 (when DDT was banned in the United States under new federal regulations). During World War II, mobilization and centralized planning went hand in hand, but the country transitioned to decentralized and local politics after the war. Ironically, the federal government essentially created a new industry of mass-produced DDT, but it was unable to control that industry once the war ended.

Such work suggests that political culture has a great deal to do with the uses or abuses of the natural world. Examining environmental ideas during the war has allowed scholars to explore what Douglas Weiner (1992) calls the "hidden history" of environmentalism, embedded in the political ideologies that vied for influence in the 1930s and ultimately clashed in World War II: fascism, communism, and liberalism. Environmental historians routinely criticize the rapacious practices of free markets and capitalism, and there has been a spate of recent work on Nazism. Less work has been accomplished on communism. Much work on the Soviet side has focused on environmental degradation beginning in the Stalin years and continuing relatively unabated until the fall of the Soviet Union. Weiner (1999) suggests that ecologists came under fire for suggesting that there might be limits to humans' ability to transform the natural world. Soviet ideology emphasized the use of science and technology to modernize the economy and to centralize planning, so such skepticism was not welcome. And yet Weiner also points out that conservationists were able to find key political allies and to earn "a little corner of freedom," from which they protected animals (such as the European bison) from over-hunting during the war.

The appeal of reexamining environmental attitudes in these regimes, aside from their intrinsic value as scholarship, may be the irony of seeing unexpectedly progressive views emerge from the Axis powers. While Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin all were smokers, for example, Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco apparently were not. But the differences ran more deeply. In *The Nazi War on Cancer* (1999), Robert Proctor showed the extent to which the Nazi regime attempted to limit the public health effects of second-hand smoke (or "passive smoking"). He also revealed how American tobacco companies used this to their advantage, calling their opponents crypto-fascists and complaining about efforts to put smokers in "ghettos." The Nazi "war" was ideologically linked to its attempts to purify Germany from all forms of cancer, including human ones. This lent nature protection in Germany a decidedly racist, authoritarian flavor. Other similarities to later environmentalists – Hitler's vegetarianism, an emphasis on whole grains and organic produce, nature protection laws, and a surprising respect for integrating high modernist architecture with the existing natural landscape, gave later Green politics a troubled legacy. The Greens seemed "brown" on the inside.

Others see the links less in “purity” and more in Nazi ideology’s rejection of the mechanical, scientific vision of human relations with the natural world. The notion of “blood and soil,” identifying the German *Volks* with their land, was popularized by Minister of Agriculture Richard Walther Darré. In Anna Bramwell’s (1985) telling, Darré’s true sympathy was with the peasantry, the countryside, and their plights, but his ideas were co-opted and made ugly by the Nazis. Other authors criticize Bramwell’s account for glossing over Darré’s own anti-Semitism, and ignoring his role in the Holocaust. Gesine Gerhard (2005) argued that Bramwell’s attempt to lionize landscape planner Darré as an early Green underplayed the links between his racism and land use policies. She and others in the edited volume *How Green Were the Nazis?* explicitly linked these ideas with racial purity (Brüggemeier, Cioc, and Zeller 2005).

Most scholars of Nazi conservation distance themselves from Bramwell’s conclusions. Dominick (1992) sees the roots of modern environmentalism much earlier (such as Napoleonic-era natural philosopher Alexander von Humboldt), giving little credence to the Nazi period’s formative influence. Uekötter (2006) denies that political ideology created a distinctive brand of conservation, citing the multitude of approaches in Germany during the 1930s. He sees little evidence of Nazi attempts to dictate the ethos of conservationists, though the Reich’s zeal to protect national heritage strengthened the movement considerably. In his analysis, the institutional links were the most important drivers of change, rather than ideological ones.

The central concept in many of these studies is *Heimatschutz*, which might be translated as “homeland protection.” Thomas Lekan writes about how both regional identity and national identity remained intact in Germany after its unification in 1871, and that rivers such as the Rhine often mediated between them. He argues (1999) that Nazi nature protection laws did not significantly improve upon preexisting regional and local agencies and private clubs oriented toward nature protection. Nazi laws may have given the preexisting rules and regulations a firm legal standing, but the regime’s penchant for massive public works projects created discord with those groups. The respect of *Heimat*, and the notion that certain people belonged to particular regions, meant a considerable sense of care in development issues, but it seems that the national government’s view of *Heimat* was not always consistent with regional views. Thomas Zeller’s (2007) study of the Autobahn shows the heated negotiations between construction engineers and landscape planners, both of whom argued that their designs would return the German land to their natural state. Zeller puts more stock in rhetoric and individual influences than an organized “Nazi” approach to nature protection during the Autobahn’s construction. As Coen (2008) notes, several contemporary authors disagree about whether the strong nature protection movement before and during the war was primarily a Nazi innovation or a product of disillusionment with the Weimar regime, or even a result of militaristic regionalism from World War I.

How did the war itself change how people interacted with the natural environment? The forced migrations and mass murders of people in Eastern Europe during the war had devastating consequences well known to historians of war and genocide. Less well studied are the changing uses of the land under different political cultures. After Hitler’s invasion of Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union exerted enormous influence over previously independent states from the Baltic to the Black Seas. Many of these countries suffered tremendous destruction and multiple occupations at the frontier between the Wehrmacht and Red Army.

In her study of Lithuania, Diana Mincyte shows how the Soviet land reforms – initially nationalization, and later forced food requisitions and high taxation – were intended to extract commodities on a large scale. She argues that this was resisted through “everyday environmentalism,” namely small-scale agricultural diversification. Farmers identified more with the land itself, considering themselves “bugs of the earth,” rather than the nature-conquering peasant-citizen in Stalinist discourse (p. 43).

Combatants drew upon images of the natural environment to shore up political support. The peasant-citizen was a powerful image in the process of collectivization throughout the Soviet sphere of influence. The Nazis attempted to blend notions of German-ness with the landscape. But also the natural landscape lent authenticity in a time of immense political uncertainty and flux. The “Forest Brothers” in the Baltic States were a catchall term describing anti-Soviet resistance fighters among Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians. The forests concealed them, provided them a source of nourishment, but also served a symbol that they were not the outsiders.

Looking to the west, Pearson (2006) argues that forests also became a crucial part of the Vichy government’s attempt to survive, on both material and symbolic levels. The forests were an important natural resource in southeastern France, and the Pétain government attempted to increase production of fuel, animal litter, bark, and charcoal. But more intriguingly, Pétain and others tried to blend forest imagery with their reactionary political views. Getting back to the land was deemed healthy for the body and soul, and leading Vichy politician Jacques Chevalier suggested that eternal France resided in the forest. It was the site of traditional values: work, family, country. Conversely, resistance fighters also tried to draw upon the forests’ power of authenticity, making it a site of revolt and subversion. Pétain famously named a particularly strong and tall oak tree after himself, and it later was dubbed the Oak of the Resistance.

Nature served as a symbol of resistance elsewhere, too. The forced removal and internment of Japanese-Americans in the United States has garnered some attention of scholars of environmental issues. Like the Lithuanian peasants in Mincyte’s telling, Japanese-Americans resisted on a small scale. Scholars such as Tamura (2004) have noted that the detainees improved their grim surroundings as strategies of survival and resistance, building what Helphand (2006) described as “defiant gardens.” Chiang (2010) takes a different approach, not focusing on the gardens as emblems of resistance, but instead investigating how the natural environment challenged or reinforced race-based imprisonment. The US government located the camps in places that were isolated, intending to exploit detainee labor, she argues, but soon found them to be powerful symbols of the American war effort. Chiang argues that the extent of Japanese-Americans’ transformations of the landscape helped them to frame their activities as patriotic – like the “victory gardens” throughout the country – a characterization encouraged by camp administrators.

In Japan itself, it is clear that the war entailed fundamental changes to the natural environment. Brett Walker’s *Toxic Archipelago* (2010) maps out the multiple causes of suffering and disease by Japan’s people during the twentieth century. Though not limited to World War II, Walker reveals that the pursuit of national power through the Japanese imperial period led to extraordinary levels of complicity in hurting people by poisoning the natural environment with industrial toxins. Walker’s outlook differs from the orthodox view of many environmental historians who blame capitalist

structures for environmental degradation. Instead, he puts the onus of responsibility on the modern state, with its pursuit of national power.

William Tsutsui (2003) has pointed out that the pressure of “total war” reshaped the management of natural resources and Japanese perceptions of nature. Although the dropping of atomic bombs would leave a lasting cultural impression within Japan, the wartime exigencies of supply also made dramatic physical changes to the landscape. He identifies four distinct causes of environmental change: direct damage from bombing, indirect damage from economic and military mobilization, the repercussions of wartime scarcities, and the ramifications of Japan’s disengagement from the global economy.

As destructive as they were, Tsutsui argues, the bombing of cities took a relatively insignificant toll on the natural environment, compared to the huge areas “tainted” by military bases, mines, and industry, and the vast tracts of land deforested for war purposes by the Japanese themselves. By 1945, the Japanese were cutting down some fifty square miles of forests per week. The pollution of air and water from the industrial and mining sites, along with the degradation of forestlands, were far and away more lasting than the effects of bombs. Tsutsui cites a 1947 survey of Hiroshima fauna as evidence that animal and insect populations had fully recovered even from the atomic bombings. And other developments have passed without much notice as well, such as the halt to global trade in Japan’s pyrethrum – the standard insecticide, derived from dried flowers. Lacking it, Americans took the lead in developing powerful chemical insecticides such as DDT.

Tsutsui takes issue with the notion that war is inherently destructive upon the environment. Like many environmental writers, he sees peacetime activities by people as enormously exploitive and insensitive about the natural world. War, by curbing these activities, can be helpful to nature. Also, wartime scarcities could lead to practices – such as composting rather than using chemical fertilizers – that returned nutrients to the earth. Probably the most far-reaching example of human inactivity was in the area of fishing. Japan’s dominance in Pacific deep-sea fishing ended during the war, as its fishermen stayed closer to safe home waters. At war’s end, fishermen found abundant fish, even in areas thought to have been depleted long before the war.

Even in the countries that saw intense fighting and widespread environmental destruction, there is evidence that most of the environmental effects of the war were indirect, away from the fighting. In Finland, Laakkonen (2004) points out, the fierce standoff between Finns and Russians in the Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940 decimated vast areas of pine trees, and yet most of the war’s impact there can be attributed to changing patterns of production and consumption. Air and water pollution from cities and the expansion of paper and pulp industries changed the natural environment of Finland more than combat itself. Granted, military forces cut down trees for their operations – and for wood-fired saunas – in great numbers, leaving a lasting imprint on the slow-growth taiga of the north. But fortunately, he says, much of the fighting took place below the Arctic Circle, where growth and recovery occurred more rapidly. The forest, he argues, saved the trees. Ironically, so did the fighting: after the conflict, uncleared mines and bullet-ridden trees made forests in the former war zone (now ceded to the Soviet Union) unappealing to loggers. On the Finnish side, however, more trees were cut after the war to rebuild a new eastern Finland. Laakkonen also suggests that wartime austerity may have made Finland more sustainable, by limiting

the consumption that led to environmental degradation in peacetime. Here Laakkonen makes the case that in Finland the ecological “bootprint” of war was much less than that of peace. This view is partly enforced by Lahtinen and Vuorisalo (2004) who point out the rise in recycling and urban agriculture. City dwellers grew their own crops, particularly potatoes, during tough times, and even kept chickens and other animals in their apartments. But overall Lahtinen and Vuorisalo conclude that the war led people to set aside their environmental sensibilities about pollution control, sanitation, and nature conservation. Keeping farm animals in one’s apartment spoke volumes for what people were willing to put up with while they attempted to survive.

In deep-sea fishing, there appears to be consensus that the war allowed fish stocks to recover. It did not last very long, though, and the war itself helped to mask trends in overfishing that would continue after 1945. European marine science bodies, such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), prioritized studies of maximum sustainable yields. They found that the stocks of fish in the North Atlantic had recovered during the war years, only to be overfished again at war’s end (Rozwadowski 2002). These trends would become clear to fishermen and policymakers alike after the war. The California state legislature in 1947 established a special committee to address the apparent collapse of the state’s lucrative sardine fisheries immediately after the war (McEvoy and Scheiber 1984).

The argument that the war allowed nature to recover tends to fail when applied to the land – after all, war mobilization typically increased land use and resource exploitation for the war effort, even if some kinds of civilian consumption decreased. The argument holds best when applied to areas that disallowed human economic activity – war zones and deep waters far from home. Kurk Dorsey (2004) has shown that the war gave whales a reprieve from the Germans, Scandinavians, and Japanese who dominated the industry. The United States had little stake in whaling prior to the war, and British vessels had been requisitioned for the war. But Dorsey cautions against the idea that the war was a holiday for whales. In fact the United States actively promoted whaling during the war, and the government encouraged consumers to try whale meat – which was not rationed. He also suggests that surface vessels killed many whales by exploding depth charges, mistaking them for submarines or using them for target practice. Whales became a strategic commodity, and after the war the United States seized the leadership role in regulating whaling, based on American-style resource management strategies from the progressive era. But the postwar food crisis, as well as powerful belief that the war had replenished the world’s supply of whales, made conservation practices extraordinarily difficult to establish or enforce.

The notion that war has been “good for nature” has a certain amount of morbid appeal, but it also is in keeping with a consistent theme among environmental historians – namely, that peacetime practices by humans often have been unsustainable, and the worst practices have been encouraged by easy access to markets. It would be foolish to impose consensus upon environmental accounts of World War II, but it may be worth ending the present chapter on this particular point, because it pervades the historical literature and begs for more research. To put it simply, the war should not be seen as an aberration from practices that began before and continued long afterward. If true, scholars should not forget that most of the deep-seated ideas about the natural world have been set into practice during peacetime, even if the war may have accelerated them, made them glaringly obvious, or in some cases mitigated them.

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CHAPTER FORTY-TWO

The Women of World War II

D'ANN CAMPBELL

World War II was the last total war. To win a total war required the help of every man and woman. The Allies were quick to understand the nature of total war and to place their women in a variety of roles; the Axis lagged behind. This chapter will focus on the multiple roles played by women, such as working outside the home, serving in uniform, and caring for their families. It will consider women as victims of famine and atrocities, and look at the homecoming as the war ended. A special concern is how the war affected masculine and feminine gender roles in different cultures. There are no global histories of women and very few comparative studies for the social history of the war, so this chapter uses the history and historiography of women in numerous nations to make some preliminary comparisons.

In most of the world, the spirit of industrial efficiency, the absence of men in the military, and the very rapid growth in munitions work required the use of women. Complex skilled industrial jobs were broken down and simplified into operations that could be taught to women in a few days. Historians agree that under the best of circumstances – in the US and Canada – conditions were difficult for women workers, especially if they had children. The poverty and unemployment era was over, and families achieved a new level of prosperity. All the regular household duties remained and more were added. Transportation was always overcrowded, day care was seldom adequate, and shopping hours never matched the women's free minutes. Low paid service workers were the most likely to move into factory jobs, which better-educated white-collar workers scorned. Conditions were much more difficult in Europe. Nations like Germany that had a high wage for soldiers and high benefits for their families found fewer volunteers.

Historians in the US and Britain have paid far more attention to women workers than other nations, but with sharply different perspectives. The Americans look at the war years as a golden opportunity for women achieving more equality since their services were urgently needed and the economy was rich enough for equal pay for

equal work. The first generation of home front historians in the 1960s, writing in the sunshine of the civil rights movement, wrote glowing accounts and hailed the wartime experience as a harbinger of the feminist movement that was just emerging, emphasizing the high pay scales and the breakthrough of women into jobs previously closed to them (Chafe 1972). The thesis was soon shot down by historians who emphasized continuity rather than discontinuity (Hartmann 1984). The way history happened, they believed, was through grass roots organization and activism, of the sort that had won suffrage for women in 1920, a major role for labor unions in the 1930s, and legal equality for blacks in the 1960s. Obviously there were no signs of any such movement in the 1940s, so liberation could not have happened. Yes wages were high but high pay was not equal pay (the men in factories were paid much more). Services women urgently needed such as child care were scarcely provided. Unions took women's dues but did not seek out their opinions. The wartime propaganda called on women to fill in during the emergency, then dutifully return home once the need was over. The historians typically emphasized the overpowering role of public opinion – as expressed by the national media (which were in part controlled by the government) (Rupp 1978; Honey 1984). They were following a liberal interpretation of capitalism popularized by John Kenneth Galbraith to the effect that consumers' wants are shaped by advertising, and the elites that control the media control the people. Thus women meekly went home after the war to traditional roles as housewives, and there was no long-term memory that decades later sparked the revival of feminism.

In the democracies, there was a spirit of universal enthusiasm for the war effort, emphasizing patriotism much more than women's emancipation from traditional roles, but traditional barriers permanently vanished in the white-collar world. The war opened jobs for married women, not just in factories but in offices and schools outside the war sector where the custom had been to quit on marriage, so that the wife would not be taking away a scarce job from some needy breadwinner. Women typically kept their places after the war. A few found opportunities in middle management or in new roles like bank teller or store clerk that had been reserved for men. A few college graduates more easily entered professional schools. Harvard Medical School admitted its first woman in 1945; Harvard Law School postponed the day until 1950. Millions worked as "Rosie the Riveter" in munitions production ranging from assembling radios sets to installing rivets in the aluminum sheets that made up the airplane body. These were temporary jobs that ended when the war factories closed in 1945 or reverted to civilian products using men after the war.

Most black women in America had been farm laborers or domestics before the war. Despite discrimination and segregated facilities throughout the South, they escaped the cotton patch and took blue-collar jobs in the cities (Honey 1999). Working with the federal Fair Employment Practices Committee, the NAACP, and CIO unions, these black women fought a "Double V" campaign – against the Axis abroad and against restrictive hiring practices at home. Their efforts redefined citizenship, equating their patriotism with war work, and seeking equal employment opportunities, government entitlements, and better working conditions as conditions appropriate for full citizens (Shockley 2003). In the South, black women worked in segregated jobs; in the West and most of the North they were integrated, but wildcat strikes erupted in Detroit, Baltimore, and Evansville where white migrants from the South refused to work alongside black women (Campbell 1984; Kryder 2000).

The proportion of married women at work jumped from 18 percent to 25 percent, a trend that continued after the war. While the husbands of the youngest cohort of women were often at war, the great majority of husbands were older and remained civilians during the war, usually earning much more money thanks to overtime and high pay rates. It was uncommon for them to move alone to war centers; most brought their families despite the extreme shortage of housing. Volunteer work energized middle-class women as they signed up to help the Red Cross and the USO (United Service Organization), providing a sense of contribution to the war effort and an expression of patriotism. With more cash in their purses than ever before, women learned to work around rationing and shortages, trading with their neighbors while noting how clothing and shoes declined in quality. Most families saved their extra income, spending it after the war (Campbell 1984).

The shortfalls with the feminist historiography included fixation on the sort of gender equality the feminists were seeking for themselves in the 1970s, especially equal access to jobs and equal pay, and the assumption of the media shaping the values and desires of the people. An alternative approach, along the British model of the People's War, appeared in the American historiography in the 1980s: asking women themselves what were their goals and whether they achieved them. This approach relied on public opinion polls which were often reanalyzed using the original IBM cards, letters, and oral histories. Gluck (1987) interviewed 45 war workers in depth to find major change had come about quietly. Campbell (1990) analyzed questionnaires returned by 600 women veterans. Tuttle (1995) used 2500 letters where adults recalled their childhood experiences during the war. Litoff and Smith (1994) examined over 30,000 letters from 500 women of diverse backgrounds and discovered evidence of profound and lasting changes as women became more self-sufficient in decision making and financial management. Their work life became more all encompassing, and their self-confidence grew as a result of doing things for themselves. Campbell (1984) emphasizes that women demanded more equalitarian, companionate marriages, centered on the suburban life style that was built around the needs of housewives and their baby boom children.

The history of wartime female labor in Britain paralleled the US, but historians there took a very different approach. They had never placed much emphasis on advertising or the media as shaping consumer society. Their suffrage movement was an elite movement, while the labor unions failed in the 1920s when they tried to be militant and there was no civil rights movement. Instead the British historians celebrated the success of the home front in creating an era of equality and planning as shown in the welfare state, which involved the Beveridge Report, the reform of education, the National Health Service, the nationalization of industry and the success of the Labour Party. British scholars largely ignored the media (which was too political and controlled by too few men to truly reflect public opinion). Instead they had a unique resource, Mass Observation, in which hundreds of observers monitored the daily life of British men and women, producing a mass of fresh documentation (Sheridan 2006; Hubble 2009). British historians already bought into the concept of a "People's War"; now they had the archives they needed to document it. Women were given a major, albeit not equal role in upholding and transforming the nation (Calder 1969). Calder's thesis struck home at the right moment – a time of student unrest and young scholars turning to "history from below," exemplified by the History Workshop

movement and the new interest in social history that was comprehensive in including all the people. Calder was the innovator who used Mass Observation, as he demonstrated how to privilege the nonelite while working around traditional historical narratives that centered on the Establishment.

Britain had the most successful record of mobilizing the home front, in terms of maximizing output, assigning the right skills to the right task, rationing food and necessities, and maintaining the morale and spirit of the people. Much of this success was due to the systematic planned mobilization of women, as workers, soldiers, and housewives (Hancock and Gowing 1949). The women supported the war effort, and made the rationing of consumer goods of success. In some ways, the government over-planned, evacuating too many children in the first days of the war, closing cinemas as frivolous then reopening them when the need for cheap entertainment was clear, sacrificing cats and dogs to save a little space on shipping pet food, only to discover an urgent need to keep the rats and mice under control (Marwick 1968). In the balance between compulsion and voluntarism, the British relied successfully on voluntarism. The success of the government in providing new services, such as hospitals and school lunches, as well as the equalitarian spirit of the People's War, contributed to widespread support for an enlarged welfare state. Munitions production rose dramatically, and the quality was high. Food production was emphasized, in large part to open up shipping for munitions. Farmers expanded from 12,000,000 to 18,000,000 the acres under cultivation, and the farm labor force was expanded by a fifth, thanks especially to the Women's Land Army. The rationing system, which had been originally based on a specific basket of goods for each consumer, was much improved by switching to a point system which allowed housewives to make choices based on their own priorities. Food rationing also permitted the upgrading of the quality of the foods available, and housewives approved – except for the absence of white bread and the government's imposition of an unpalatable wheat meal nicknamed the “national loaf.” People were especially pleased that rationing brought equality and a guarantee of a decent meal at an affordable cost (Calder 1969; Mackay 2002).

Britain fought a People's War, and with surprisingly little debate, the government undertook the close supervision of womanpower, while downplaying the coercive element and preserving the volunteer spirit (Calder 1969). In general, married women and mothers of children under fourteen were not coerced, but were given many opportunities for paid employment. In practice, women 19 to 24 were called up, given a choice between the auxiliary military services and specified forms of civilian employment. The success was most apparent in manufacturing, where the number of employed women quadrupled to 2,000,000. The system allowed the government ordinance factories to expand from 7,000 women to 260,000, and for the Civil Service to expand from 95,000 to 325,000 women. The largest increase came in the private factories making war equipment, especially airplanes. By 1944 the 770,000 women comprised 34 percent of the munitions workforce. The production of civilian consumer goods was curtailed, allowing 400,000 women workers to shift out of textiles and clothing. Domestic service fell by two-thirds, freeing up 100,000 women. Mothers had much less time for supervision of their children, and the fear of juvenile delinquency was upon the land, especially as older teenagers took jobs and emulated their older siblings in the service (Marwick 1968).

Soviet historians portrayed the people as putting Stalin's plans and ideas into practice, but they avoided any social history of the war and gave little attention to women. Although women comprised about half the membership of the Komsomol (the youth wing of the party), a scan of over 90 scholarly articles dealing with the history of the organization reveals negligible attention to women. The historians could not get around the official line that communism and the Party had resolved the gender issues that bedeviled capitalist societies. In two decades since the fall of communism the Russian historians have yet to turn their attention to the role of women in the war effort. However, some Western scholars have gained enough access to sources to begin some work. Krylova (2010) looks at the tension between the traditional babushka, who dominated the villages, and the new urban woman – idealized as the Communist comrade, well-educated and committed to rejection of old bourgeois values. They eagerly volunteered for the war, often serving as political officers in the military, even front line infantry regiments. The Soviets successfully moved many of their factories to the east, out of reach of the Germans. Women went from 38 percent to 57 percent of the Soviet workforce as every available man was conscripted. The workforce of the collective farms was 80 percent female, and since the horses and tractors had also been conscripted, they worked by hand (Harrison 1998).

Although historians have not yet made comparative studies of women at work, it appears that in general, the Allied nations (except perhaps for China) tolerated and encouraged much more modern and equalitarian roles for women, and strongly encouraged them to go to work in the munitions factories and auxiliary military units.

Historians have explored how fascism rules women (De Grazia 1992) and examined in some depth how the economies worked and what role women played, especially in the labor force. The fascist model of gender roles predominated in Italy, Germany, Japan, and most of their satellite nations (with the exception of Finland). The emphasis, especially for older women was on women in the home, bedroom, and kitchen, under the dominion of the male head of household. The role of mother was made sacred, and often marriage and childbearing was subsidized. However, for younger women, there was recognition of the need for them to work in the factories, and even in auxiliary roles in the armed services. The fascist social model emphasized the male virility and violence, especially muscularity and fighting strength rather than brainpower (Koonz 1988; Heineman 2003).

Nowhere have social historians examined the conditions for women more thoroughly than in France. The Vichy Regime in France glorified traditional sex roles, made divorce difficult, and promoted motherhood and natalist policies through the Alliance nationale contre la dépopulation, while strictly enforcing anti-abortion laws in order to reverse the tendencies toward liberal gender roles. By 1945, the birth rate in France was the highest in a century (Diamond 1999).

Of all the major nations Germany was (after Japan) the most backward when it came to mobilizing its women (Evans 2009). Aryan motherhood was a high ideal for the Nazis, and they were pampered (Koonz 1988). After years of debate, the conscription of women for factory jobs finally began in 1943, far too late, and too few women were involved. The Nazis had two large, ineffective women's organizations, their membership was largely inactive, devoting merely one hour a week to party sponsored volunteer work. Women outside the organizations were hard-to-reach. Germany had probably the lowest rate of middle-class volunteer work anywhere.

Working class and rural women did not volunteer either. One result was pretending that rationing and shortages did not exist, and depriving the women of tips and skills they needed to cope. The women's units did produce millions of leaflets with information on recipes, washing techniques, repairing clothes, promoting better diets, collecting old clothes for recycling, and giving books for the army. The programs were poorly organized and much less effective than in most countries. German businesses much preferred to use foreign workers or POWs instead of German women, because they could get by with lower wages, far worse working conditions, and far fewer government protections and regulations (Herbert 1997).

In 1945, the "women of the rubble" ("*Truemmerfrau*"), standing alone, cleared away the rubble and forged a founding myth of West Germany's phoenix-like rise from the ashes. Women outnumbered men by at least seven million, because of war casualties and delayed return of POWs. Women's desperate search for food, fuel, and housing were central to the recovery years. In West Germany they eagerly went back to very traditional gender roles. Marxist feminists in West Germany such as Kuhn (1989) argue this was because of duress from the old male leadership. Heineman (2003) provides a much more complex interpretation from the viewpoint of the women themselves. The postwar government in West Germany valorized the women's endurance and suffering, and these women cashed in through legislation that privileged the status of the housewife, as against the single career women. They obtained the laws they wanted regarding marriage, divorce, widowhood, illegitimacy, welfare, pensions, and labor force participation. Meanwhile in East Germany the Communist regime imposed a form of equality by moving wives into the labor force, for equal pay, downgrading middle-class status, and stripping away the traditional privileges of the housewife even as she kept all her home duties and lost her servants.

Japanese historians have ignored their own women, but Americans have partly filled the gap. The US Strategic Bombing Survey in 1946 generated primary sources conceptualized according to American and British economic models that have provided a mine of data (Daniels 1981). Japan was late in realizing the dangers to the civilians on the home front, and thus in mobilizing the women for war industries. Only a small net increase of 1.4 million women joined the labor force during the war, as most married women stayed home in accordance with the government's commitment to a family policy. The 600,000 women who remained domestic servants during the war exemplified the failure of manpower policy. Belatedly, the government began making evacuation plans in late 1943, as American bombing campaigns expanded, and in 1944 it removed 450,000 city children and their teachers to rural areas. After the bombings began in late 1944 ten million people fled in unorganized fashion to the safety of the countryside, including two-thirds of the residents of the largest cities. About two-thirds of the adult refugees were women; many of them had relatives in the countryside (Havens 1975, 1986).

In every major country, historians who explored the long-term impact of hiring women during the war have concluded that it did not lead to women's liberation or long-term economic equality. The feminist historians argue that after 1945 the important gains made by female workers were lost because the male-dominated society demanded they return to domestic subordination (May 1993). The People's War model suggests that women did achieve what they wanted in terms of homes and families because the money they earned went not for independence and new careers,

but into a family pool that was used to fund the nuclear family in the late 1940s and 1950s (Campbell 1984).

The impact of World War I on citizenship has been examined in great depth, but only a little has been done for World War II, so generalizations are difficult (Rose 2003). The rejection of fascism did expand the political rights of women in many countries, such as the right to vote in France in 1944, in Japan in 1945, and Belgium in 1948. Switzerland was so protective of its neutrality that it glorified the male-soldier-defending-the-homeland; the women were not mobilized into support units or factories. Feminists suspended their campaign for suffrage during the war to show patriotic solidarity. The nonparticipation of Swiss women in the war delayed their full equality in the political system until 1971 (Dejung 2010). Peace movements have been studied by many historians for the World War I era. The main movements such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) went into decline after 1938 (Rupp 1994).

Making women soldiers was a most dramatic break with traditional sex roles of the twentieth century. The major powers realized they needed the women, and the general staffs, with their engineering mentality, charged ahead in disregard of social norms. The engineering orientation of the generals was required for maximum utilization of manpower, for technology, and for industrial capacity to engage in total warfare. The amount of paperwork needed was enormous, ranging from personnel files, orders, repair manuals, vouchers, payroll slips, requisitions, medical records, and any number of other documents that had to be dictated, typed, copied, delivered, responded to, and filed away – jobs that were increasingly handled by women in advanced industrial societies. The United States was the world leader in the use and the employment of women in clerical jobs on the home front. It was also a leader in military paperwork, with 35 percent of the soldiers in the United States Army assigned to clerical work in 1944 (Campbell 1984).

Only recently have scholars begun comparative studies of military women; we now have one analytic study (Campbell 1993), two encyclopedias covering all of world history (Pennington 2003; Cook 2006), a survey of World War II pilots (Merry 2010) and one overview (Goldman 1982). The reason for the paucity is that historians of women emerged in the 1970s with heavy political baggage. The personal was political – the personal was also historical. They emphatically did not want to be soldiers, nurses, or housewives, so they left those roles out of women's history. They wanted liberation from tight sexual norms, so they welcomed studies of lesbians and prostitutes (Rose 2003).

The historiography of women in military uniform remained outside the mainstream of women's history and military history. The young academic women were not seeking militaristic role models, for they came of age as part of the peace movement. The senior male historians had long since severed ties with military history, while the military historians wanted to valorize masculinity, not diminish it by showing women could fill the male role. Occasionally, but not often, a feminist would engage the field, with Pierson (1986) showing Canada would not relax its strict gender norms for its women in uniform, Meyer (1996) stressing how the Women's Army Corps (WAC) suppressed sexual freedom, and Krylova (2010) showing that young Russian women could use communist ideals of the new Soviet to break away from bourgeois gender roles.

Utilization of women was an obvious solution to shortages of manpower, but it was the British Army which had done the planning and were first to use them. The British model for the use of women in uniform was copied by Canada and the Commonwealth nations, as well as by the United States. Women were volunteers in military service, as was the case in all countries except Russia. Only one nation, Finland, successfully integrated its women in uniform into the broader civilian woman's movement. That was possible because the Latta movement in Finland was a well-organized interwar effort to move women into socially necessary volunteer jobs, to which noncombat military roles were added. No nation used women in the field artillery, but when the need became apparent, most nations used women in anti-aircraft artillery mixed-gender units. The Germans shifted upwards of a fourth of their economy into anti-aircraft protection, using hundreds of thousands of women in Luftwaffe uniform to shoot down Allied bombers (Seidler 1979). The United States stood out for its refusal to use women in these combat roles (Campbell 1993).

Women released men to fight. This was a priority not so much for the generals as for the politicians, who thought it would be a winning propaganda technique to encourage women to volunteer. The strategy backfired, for young women did not want their husbands, sons, brothers, and boyfriends taken off desk jobs and sent into combat units. Much more effective was the propaganda argument that women could bring their men home sooner if they themselves were in uniform. Above all, there was patriotism, or as Ovetta Culp Hobby told the first WAACs, they had a date with destiny and were repaying a debt to democracy.

While the British had good planning, as well as an upper class and royal patronage, the Americans played catch-up. There was no support network in high society, politics, or the women's organizations that provided a recruiting network, a support system, or even people willing to speak up among their friends and neighbors about the value of women in the military. While numerous male movie stars, top athletes, and head coaches joined the armed forces with a flash of publicity, there were no high visibility celebrities in any of the women's services. New York's fashion industry was not consulted when it came to uniform design, except in the case of the navy, which therefore had the sharpest outfits, with the WAC consigned to drab masculine-like uniforms with mediocre cut, tailoring, and material quality. The directors were young society women or college presidents with no knowledge of the military and few connections in Washington. Nevertheless, the military found the right women leaders and they all turned in a credible performance (Godson 2002).

Washington planned a much smaller operation than the British were running, expecting 12,000 women in the army in 1942 in a peak of 25,000 in 1944. Officers were trained at an old cavalry fort in Des Moines, Iowa. A surprising surge of applications rolled in, producing its exaggerated estimates of the supply, and the generals demanded more and more (as they always do), suggesting an unlimited demand. There was talk of 1.5 million women in the army but aggressive recruiting campaigns brought in few volunteers. The media, it turned out, could not manipulate women to do what they did not want to do.

The main problem was that the men in uniform did not want women in uniform, but the solution was to lower standards for women, which degraded the quality and morale of the WAC. While the military was harsh on gay men, it largely ignored lesbians. Most women never had heard the term; a WAC investigation of eleven bases

turned up four active couples (Berube 1990; Weatherford 2009). However, the WAC – and many civilians – focused on the dangers of masculinized women. The American policy was to strongly discourage any sexual activity during service – there was no hint of sexual liberation in the WAC (Meyer 1996). The ugly rumors that circulated about WACs focused on heterosexual promiscuity and pregnancy, not lesbianism. These were false charges circulated by men who resented the idea of losing their noncombat jobs when women arrived. The rumors were widely repeated by male soldiers who warned their sisters and girlfriends away from the services. Recruiting fell off and never recovered (Treadwell 1954). In all the American services, a total of 340,000 women served in addition to the nurses (Campbell 1984).

In 1938, the British took the lead worldwide in establishing uniformed services for women, in addition to the small nurses units that had long been in operation. In late 1941, Britain began conscripting women, sending most into factory work and some into the military, especially the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS), attached to the army. It began as a woman's auxiliary to the military in 1938, and in 1941 was granted military status (with two-thirds pay compared to men). Women had a well-publicized role in handling anti-aircraft guns against German planes and V-1 missiles. Mary Churchill, the daughter of the prime minister, was there; he gushed that any general who saved him 40,000 fighting men had gained the equivalent of a victory. By August 1941, women were operating the fire-control instruments; they were never allowed to pull the trigger, as killing the enemy was too masculine (DeGroot 1997). By 1943, 56,000 women were in AA Command, most in units close to London where there was a risk of getting killed, but no risk of getting captured by the enemy. The first "kill" came in April 1942, when the commanding general noted, "Beyond a little natural excitement and a tendency to chatter when there was a lull, they behaved like a veteran party, and shot an enemy plane into the sea." (Campbell 1993; Schwarzkopf 2009). General Dwight Eisenhower suggested the Americans use women in anti-aircraft units, so Chief of Staff George Marshall authorized a secret experiment that compared all-male units with 50–50 mixed units. The women had higher performance scores, for women "are superior to men" in handling the instrumentation and doing repetitious jobs. The anti-aircraft generals called for 2400 women (Treadwell 1954). Marshall refused – American public opinion was not ready for women in combat so he shut down the experiment and clamped a lid of secrecy on it. America had drawn the gender line (Campbell 1993).

Public opinion mattered little in Berlin, and as the Allied bombs started falling, the Germans put more and more of their resources into anti-aircraft units. Crews were up to half female and they shot down thousands of Allied airmen. By 1945, 450,000 German women had volunteered for the auxiliaries, in addition to the nurses. By 1945, German women were holding 85 percent of the billets as clericals, accountants, interpreters, laboratory workers, and administrative workers, together with half of the clerical and junior administrative posts in high-level field headquarters (Campbell 1993; Williamson 2003).

In Australia, the government – committed to the ideal of male mateship and male military roles – was hostile to women in uniform, but civilian women organized themselves, and at their own expense, trained in signals. The Air Force, by far the most socially aware unit, grew rapidly and had an urgent need for telegraph operators. Hundreds of women were available but the Cabinet insisted it look for men. Few could

be found. Reluctantly, the Cabinet allowed a few hundred women on a limited-time experiment until men were available. Then the navy wanted women telegraphers. After the prime minister witnessed the success of the ATS in Britain, the Cabinet finally went along (Hasluck 1952). In the event, 65,000 Australian women volunteered for service in the war, 27,000 in the Women's Auxiliary Australian Air Forces (WAAAF), 24,000 in the Australian Women's Army Service (AWAS), and 3,000 in the Women's Royal Australian Naval Service (WRANS). They performed a variety of back-office services, but they also operated searchlight units. Late in the war, some volunteered to serve in New Guinea and Borneo. The units were closed at the end of the war but revived in 1950 (Pennington 2003).

Over 800,000 Soviet women saw active service, with 120,000 in combat units. They dominated the medical and nursing units, and were combat pilots, navigators, snipers, anti-aircraft, as well as laborers in field bath/laundry units, and cooks. They were radio operators, truck drivers, and political commissars who enforced party discipline (Cottam 1980; Erickson 1990; Krylova 2010). They played a major role in the partisan movement (Furst 2000). Even larger numbers were mobilized as factory and farm workers (Cottam 1982). After three years of very high casualties among its men, Moscow turned more and more to women. All-female elite units were formed using volunteers from the 300,000 women in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), including 50,000 in nursing units, and many in anti-aircraft units. Komsomol women formed three bomber regiments, and the Central Female Sniper School trained over a thousand snipers and over four hundred sniper instructors for men's units. Komsomol women dreamed of becoming the new Soviet woman who had overthrown bourgeois conceits about women's pacifistic nature and reached a new stage of equality with men that could be proven in combat. In practice, women had few command position (Krylova 2010). Soviet historians ignored their achievements, while state propaganda focused on the heroic dimension of personal relationships, home, and the mother and motherland, in an expression of humanistic values, to inspire self-sacrifice. The masculine ideal became the soldier risking his life to defend his family, while the ideal woman was either a war worker or a "rodina-mat" ("motherland-mother") who sent her children to the front and awaited their letters (Kirschenbaum 2000).

In India, the Women's Auxiliary Corps operated 1939 to 1947, with peak strength of 850 officers and 7,200 auxiliaries in the Indian Army, and including a small naval section formed for the Royal Indian Navy (Harfield 2005). The Rani of Jhansi Regiment was the Women's Regiment of the Indian National Army; active 1943–1945, it fought against the British as part of the pro-Japanese Indian National Army of Subhas Chandra Bose. He mobilized models of women as mothers and sisters rooted in Indian mythology and tradition, and portrayed the direct involvement of women as necessary for the pursuit of nationalist goals. Drawing on rich, malleable Indian lore, he articulates a modern definition of female heroism considerably in advance of the more passive concepts of Mahatma Gandhi. His was a losing cause that left no impact on India (Hills and Silverman 1993; Lebra 2008).

The PLSK was formed in Britain by the Polish government in exile in 1942, and served with the Polish Air Force in service and support roles at bases in Britain. About 1500 women worked in 45 specialties, such as communications, clerical, radio, medical, and intelligence (Pennington 2003). The Soviets organized the "Emilia Plater"

Independent Women's Battalion in 1943, made up of voluntary Polish women. Its maximum strength was about 700 with 48 officers. It handled sentry and military police duties. Other units of Polish women numbered from 9,000 to 14,000 in total (Cook 2006).

Other belligerents had a mixed record regarding women in combat. The Free French Women's Auxiliary Army operated in North Africa from 1943 to 1944 with 3,100 women who worked mainly as wireless and telephone operatives, drivers, secretaries, interpreters, nurses, and social assistants (Gaujac 2000). Mussolini had refused to allow women in his army. However, in 1944, the rump Mussolini regime formed the Servizio Ausiliario Femminile. Fascist women, although not carrying arms, were mobilized alongside men in the civil war (De Grazia 1992). In Finland the Lotta organization had build a nationwide woman's network between the wars to promote volunteer social service work. Lotta included 242,000 women, out of a national population of fewer than four million. The Lottas worked in hospitals, at air raid warning posts, and other auxiliary tasks in conjunction with the armed forces, and they were officially unarmed. The only exception was a voluntary anti-aircraft searchlight battery in Helsinki in the summer of 1944, composed of Lotta Svärd members (Cook 2006).

By far the most celebrated women of World War II were the 2,000 pilots who flew warplanes for Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States (Merry 2010). In the US, 1,100 women ferried airplanes from factories to embarkation points. The Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASP), under the leadership of high society pilot Jacqueline Cochran, merged with the Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS) in 1943. The original justification was a shortage of male pilots. When that shortage was gone in 1944, the WASP was disbanded. Cochran's goal was to glamorize women who could handle a high visibility, high performance male role. However, postwar America had few aviation roles for them apart from airline stewardess (Merryman 1997). The Soviets made the most extensive use of women aviators after Marina Raskova convinced Stalin to let Komsomol form three all-female regiments. In all, the "Night Witches" flew 30,000 combat sorties; two pilots became fighter aces and 30 were named Heroes of the Soviet Union (Pennington 2007).

The story of women in uniform had a policy dimension, but the gap between the history profession and the Pentagon planners was too wide to bridge. The presidential commission on women in combat called on theologians and pollsters, but not historians (United States Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women 1993). Feminism paid a heavy price – the Equal Rights Amendment was lost chiefly because traditionalists emphasized it meant drafting women, and the feminists did not want that to happen because of their hostility to all military roles.

Of central importance in raising the status of women in Europe was their role in resistance movements (Strobl 2007). Resistance leaders generally assigned women traditional support roles, and gave them duties in hiding, supplying, and communicating with underground units. Rarely were women admitted to the underground combat units. In France, thousands of women participated in the resistance, knowing full well that Nazi reprisals against themselves, their villages, or hostages would be savage. They helped rescue 5,000 downed Allied airmen, provided intelligence on German installations and troop movements, printed and distributed clandestine journals, and performed acts of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. They were especially

prominent in escape networks and intelligence (Rossiter 1986). After the war, the new governments valorized the masculine combat roles of the resistance, but the women were left out. For example, Charles de Gaulle gave 1,053 "Compagnon de la Libération" awards to men, and only six to women (Schwartz 1989).

In Italy, 35,000 women joined with 170,000 men in the resistance but the "staffetta," were stereotypically viewed as support personnel and therefore kept out of the higher ranks, and the standard histories. They were valuable as guides, messengers, and couriers, but many were assigned to cooking and laundry duty. Most were attached to small attack groups of five or six men engaged in sabotage. Some all-female units engaged in civilian and political action. The risks were high, as 5,000 were imprisoned, 3,000 were deported to Germany, and 650 died in combat or by execution. On a much larger scale, the Catholic Centro Italiano Femminile (CIF) and the leftist Unione Donne Italiane (UDI) were new, broad-based women's organizations that gave women a political voice, and guaranteed the postwar government would give women the right to vote for the first time (D'Amelio 2001). Mussolini's Salò Republic in 1944–1945 gave their women roles as "birthing machines" and as noncombatants in paramilitary units and police formations (Servizio Ausiliario Femminile) (Terhoeven 2004).

In Eastern Europe, the resistance was also strong. The Soviet resistance movement included about 20,000 women, who comprised 10 percent of the partisan force by 1944. Many worked as radio operators, nurses, and messengers, as well as cooks and washerwoman. The Russian historiography ignores them but some American scholars have reported their exploits (Cottam 1982).

The richest historiography on women in resistance movements comes from Yugoslavia, where the communist resistance formed the postwar government and made heroes of the women, while returning them to traditional domestic roles (Jancar-Webster 1990). Josef Tito formed the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement with 6,000,000 civilian supporters (30% women) and the Yugoslav National Liberation Army (NOV) with 700,000 men and 100,000 women by 1945. Half the women served in medical units; 40 percent were unspecialized; and a few became radio operators, artillery spotters, intelligence agents, and political commissars. About 62 percent were officers; 9 percent were noncommissioned officers (such as corporals and sergeants). One in four did not survive the war. Resistance propaganda denied that women's roles violated traditional gender boundaries, either by redefining women partisans as men or by incorporating violence into the traditional roles women were allowed to play. Wiesinger (2008) finds ethnic variations, with the Serbians more likely to assign women to combat and Croats less so outside the army, two million women volunteers formed the Antifascist Front of Women (AFŽ), in which the revolutionary coexisted with the traditional. The AFŽ managed schools, hospitals and even local governments, and supported the army by handling traditional chores such as cooking and washing for soldiers. Tito and his top leaders stressed their dedication to women's rights and gender equality and used the imagery of traditional folklore heroines to attract and legitimize the *partizanka* (Batinic 2009). After the war women were relegated to traditional gender roles, but Yugoslavia is unique as its historians paid extensive attention to women's roles in the resistance. The postwar national army was all male, but the heroines of the resistance were memorialized, and were included in the historiography (Jancar-Webster 1990; Drapac 2009). With the breakup of

Yugoslavia came the disintegration of the official historiography. In Croatia, traditional gender roles are again dominant and the erstwhile wartime heroines have become villains while the women who are now honored are the helpless victims and mourning mothers protecting the dignity of a patriotic war (Kirin 1999).

Conditions in neighboring Greece were quite the opposite from Yugoslavia. The women in the communist-led Greek resistance began in the margins and reached fully integrated combat status by 1944, comprising a fourth of the strength. However, the left lost the civil war of 1946–1949 and instead of memorials Greek historiography anathematized the women as traitors, gangsters, or hyenas. By the 1970s a second-wave feminism emerged on the left in Greece that idealized the freedom, justice, and equality of the wartime resistance (Anagnostopoulou 2001).

Nursing represented a major role for women worldwide, and since the days of Florence Nightingale had been an accepted role for women in wartime. In the United States the military wanted well-trained efficient specialists. All the services used enlisted men to handle the routine care of sick patients and wounded patients, and used their nurses as officers who were trained specialists. In military units, male doctors supervised female nurses, and both were officers, while the women in practice supervised large numbers of enlisted men. Army and navy nursing was highly attractive and a larger proportion of nurses volunteered for service than any other occupation in American society. The nation responded by a dramatic increase in the numbers and functions of nurses, and a moderate modest increase in their pay scales, with the expansion powered by the training of 200,000 nurses' aides by the Red Cross, and the creation of a temporary new government agency, the Cadet Nurse Corps, which enrolled 170,000 young women in speeded up training programs in the nation's 1,200 nursing schools. About five percent of the Cadet nurses, and army nurses were black, but the navy refused to accept black nurses until it was forced by the White House to admit a handful near the end of the war. The black army nurses were used in all-black units, handle and to handle medical services for prisoners of war (Campbell 1984). American nurses were kept out of harm's way, with the great majority stationed on the home front. However 77 were stationed in the jungles of the Pacific, where their uniform consisted of "khaki slacks, mud, shirts, mud, field shoes, mud, and fatigues" (Campbell 1984; Norman 1999). The 20,000 nurses in Europe were safely behind the lines as they worked in evacuation hospitals, primarily in the role of supervising the male enlisted medics. The closer to the front, the more flexible and autonomous was the nurse's role. The women wanted to be much closer to the front, but they had too weak a voice to counter the Pentagon's highly protective attitude (Campbell 1984). The new leaders emerging from the war had learned command skills, maneuvering in complex bureaucracies, the taste of equal pay and officer status, and autonomy within military medical system. New technical skills validated their demands for an autonomy as they learned and employed in crisis situations the latest trauma and medical techniques and technologies. When the nurses returned home they used the previously powerless American Nurses Association to take control of the nursing profession (Campbell 1984; Sarnecky 1999).

Nursing was not a major military focus for the other Allies. For example, in Britain, 10,500 nurses enrolled in Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service (QAIMNS) and the Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Nursing Service. These services dated to 1902 and 1918, and enjoyed royal sponsorship. There also were

VAD nurses who had been enrolled by the Red Cross, (McBryde 1985). However Toman (2007) has provided a deep understanding of the multiple roles of Canadian nurses as they negotiated their way through military, professional, and gender roles.

Unlike Britain, Germany had a very large and well-organized nursing service, with four main organizations, one for Catholics, one for Protestants, the secular DRK (Red Cross), and the "Brown Nurses," for committed Nazi women. Military nursing was primarily handled by the DRK, which came under partial Nazi control. Frontline medical services were provided by male medics and doctors. Red Cross nurses served widely within the military medical services, staffing the hospitals that performed were close to the front lines and at risk of bombing attacks. Two dozen were awarded the Iron Cross for heroism under fire. They are among the 470,000 German women who served with the military (Williamson 2003). The brief historiography focuses on the dilemmas of Brown Nurses forced to look the other way while their patients were murdered (McFarland-Icke 1999).

Brazil operated a small program with a strong ideological goal. Brazil sent 73 nurses to Italy as part of the Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB) and the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). The Vargas regime heavily publicized the nurses in terms of its "*Estado Novo*" ("new state"), and affirmed nursing as a suitable profession for middle-class women. Furthermore they exemplified a devotion to the motherland as they delivered maternal care to the soldiers in combat, helping make the war a collective experience that would bring together all Brazilians. Nationalism thus helped transcend gender and class restrictions (Cytrynowicz 2000).

In Europe and Asia the war proved a hard time for housewives. Many worried about death and physical disaster for their men folk, their children, and themselves. They all encountered shortages – most faced malnutrition and starvation – and profound uncertainty. In the best cases, they were overworked, with additional duties in paid employment, and volunteering, on top of the additional difficulties of being a housewife.

The United States saw a surge of marriages, as young couples made up for lost time when jobs reappeared. From 1940 to 1943, there were 1,000,000 more marriages than expected, with 5,000,000 women married to servicemen by 1943. Mobility was the theme, as many wives moved repeatedly to be near their husbands (most husbands were still in the United States before late 1944). Jobs were hard to find near the army camps, but the women banded together to help each other out, joined the Red Cross, did volunteer work with the USO to entertain the troops, helped at blood centers, and took courses as a nurse's aides. When their husbands were shipped overseas, they often moved in with their family, and took a full-time job (Winchell 2008). There emerged a widespread but unexpected development of the ideal family: the companionate family with husband-and-wife mutually supportive and inwardly directed (and not compartmentalized in separate spheres). The dream was for suburban housing designed for the modern housewife and her children. The search for the ideal produced the American baby boom in the decade after the war. Conditions were much more favorable in America. The narratives of the soldiers' wives focused on loneliness and separation, and with money coming in from war work, they built a nest egg that undergirded the optimism for the future. In Europe only France had a similar baby boom, though much smaller than in the United States and based less on companionate marriage and more on the pronatalist policies which the prewar government had inaugurated, and which the Vichy and the postwar regimes continued.

When France surrendered in 1940, 2,000,000 soldiers were shipped off to Germany as prisoners of war; they were hostages to keep France in line behind German policies. There were 800,000 soldiers' wives who endured alone for five years. The Vichy government refused to provide significant financial help to the wives, but there were modest cash allowances and free bread for children. One in ten French wives resorted to prostitution to feed their families. Vichy did manage to protect Jewish POWs from Nazi death camps. Germany agreed to send one POW home for every three skilled French workers who volunteered to work in factories in Germany. After the summer of 1944, communications between POW husbands and wives were severed; conditions in German camps deteriorated drastically. When the POWs finally returned in late 1945, one in six suffered severe physical or mental health problems. Many had aged prematurely and could not function sexually (Fishman 1991).

While the men's morale and skills deteriorated in captivity, the women had been head of household and developed a whole repertoire of coping skills, and knowledge of how the hostile world worked. Many had taken jobs outside the home, some had become activists, and all were accustomed to more independence and assertiveness. Some wives were happy to return to the prewar norm of male dominance, others found a veritable stranger at their doorstep after a five-year absence. The divorce rate rose briefly, but in long-term perspective, there was no increase in divorce. Only ten percent of the POWs got divorced, compared to eight percent among other men (Fishman 1991).

The war had a varied impact on women's status. Germany continued its natalist policies through relatively large family allowances to the wives of soldiers. Soldier's wives became increasingly independent and autonomous. The high allowances meant they did not have to take jobs to survive, and in any case wages for women were low. Wives who were running family shops and farms were often given a low-cost foreign female helper. The Nazis were relaxed about sexuality, and tolerated or encouraged promiscuity among soldiers and their wives – with other Aryans only, of course – as a pronatalist policy. Sexual relations with non-Aryans were severely punished (Herbert 1997). Across occupied Europe, some women provided sexual favors to German soldiers in exchange for food, knowing they would be ostracized as “kraut whores” and “horizontal collaborators.” There were about 140,000 such collaborators in the Netherlands. In all countries, they were systematically humiliated at liberation, usually by having their heads shaved. Their children became outcasts (Nicholas 2005).

Besides documenting the devastation of battle, historians in recent years have turned their attention to the civilian victims of the war, most of them women and children. Housewives had charge of food and clothing, which was rationed almost everywhere. Clothing issues were minor but food was an urgent matter for women in all countries, and a desperate one in all the occupied countries. The malignant Nazi government also used famine and starvation as a deliberate tool to punish their enemies. Jews suffered quicker deaths; 90 percent of Europe's Jewish children died in the war and a majority of the Jewish women (Ofer 1999). Such treatment also prompted a black market, and families coped by trading with the resistance or planting vegetable gardens on vacant city blocks (Collingham 2011).

Fearful of German bombing, the British planned an evacuation program involving four million people from the major cities as soon as the war began. However, many families were reluctant to split up, so in the end half the students left, along with a

third of the mothers, and most of the teachers. The discovery of the poor health and hygiene of evacuees was a shock to Britons, and helped prepare the way for an egalitarian welfare state.

In Asia, the plight of women was especially severe. When the American bombing of large cities began in Japan in 1944–1945, ten million city dwellers, two-thirds of them women and children, evacuated to the countryside, where many had relatives and food was available, if not housing. Civil defense units were transformed into combat units, especially the Peoples Volunteer Combat Corps, enlisting civilian men to age 60 and women to age 40 (Havens 1975).

China was the scene of many horrors and atrocities. The most dramatic was the rape of Nanking in late 1937, when Japanese soldiers systematically brutalized, raped, and murdered large numbers of civilian men and especially the women. The atrocities were repeated on a smaller scale in other Chinese cities as late as 1945. The Chinese government has sponsored studies of the Nanking horror to pressure the Japanese government into apologies, and Western historians have explored the atrocities as well (Fogel 2000; Lary 2010).

The Korean government has sponsored a study of the several hundred thousand “comfort women” who were forced to become prostitutes to service overseas Japanese soldiers. Few Japanese women were used; most were Korean or Chinese. Some were originally volunteers, but they discovered they could never quit. As the failure of the Japanese Army’s logistics system grew worse, they were the first to have their rations cut, and thousands died of malnutrition or disease. One in four survived the war, and the mistreatment was the centerpiece of anger at the Japanese for over a half century after the war (Hicks 1997).

The worst atrocities were perpetrated by the Nazis in Eastern Europe, most noxiously the Holocaust of the Jews. While the historiography is vast, there is little scholarship that examines the gendered dimension of the Holocaust (Ofer 1999). Recently historians have started exploring the Nazi plans for replacing the Slavic populations in Poland with Germans – an ethnic cleansing that would use starvation as the main tool of national policy. Again, the historiography has not yet turned in depth to gender roles (Hitchcock 2008; Snyder 2010; Collingham 2011). In the German popular mind they suffered as much as any victims for they were not just the target of Allied bombings, but were brutalized and expelled from Eastern Europe, while Soviet troops raped their way through Germany in 1945 (Nolan 2005; Niven 2006; Prince 2009). Although most of the civilian victims were women, the gender issues have not yet been explored. Japan likewise has a self-image as a victim (Giamo 2003), but in this case its neighbors demand apologies and protest the Japanese textbooks (Schneider 2008). Conservatives and nationalists stress Japanese sufferings and ignore the reality of Japan’s war record, but there are moderate scholars and museum curators who portray Japan as a victimizer as much as a victim. Again, the gender dimension is lacking (Jeans 2005).

The surrender of Germany and Japan brought cheers around the world: the men are coming home! The anxiety about death in combat ended, but not the loneliness, as the return process dragged on for months and years – up to ten years in the case of German prisoners held in work camps by the Soviets as a form of reparations. The interlude reinforced the demands of women that now was their time for a reward. In Britain it was the welfare state, and likewise the French emulated the British welfare

state. Yet that was not enough. Women wanted to be housewives and mothers, and strongly believed in the family wage doctrine whereby it was the man's job to be the breadwinner. Dual careers were not an ideal, and were not common.

"No sex please, we're English," was a dominant outlook that disparaged pleasure-seeking, fun-loving, and sexually active young women who seemingly did not appreciate the seriousness of the moment (Rose 2003; Costello 1985). The absent menfolk were perhaps frightened less by the German grenades than the specter of American soldiers who were highly available, and were "overpaid, oversexed, and over here" (Potts and Potts 1985; Gardiner 1992). When they finally went home, they took a million war brides with them (and some war grooms as well). Over 100,000 war brides were British; they averaged 23 years of age, came from working- or lower-middle-class families, and had left school at age fourteen (Virden 1996). Disillusionment with German menfolk led to a popular celebration of the war brides who went to America. They were seen as representative of the new German woman who was stylish, modern, and devoted to democracy and would be living the "American Dream" while enhancing German-American relations (Esser 2003).

Returning men in every nation were surprised and sometimes shocked at rediscovering the wife and children they hardly knew. Divorces that had been postponed during the war took place, so there was a brief postwar surge but no long-term increase in the divorce rate (Campbell 1984; Allport 2010). When the women veterans came home they were ignored, but they discovered it was easy to hide their wartime service and blend into the society (Gambone 2005).

Historians have explored what happened to the war workers – they became housewives – but split along political lines whether it was a matter of personal choice or social coercion – or perhaps (say the post-structuralist historians), the question cannot be answered (Summerfield 1998). Women who took on additional paid employment during the war did not feel liberated. Rather, they felt overworked, and looked forward to the day when they could reestablish their nuclear family in some comfort. As one British woman explained, "My plans are simple and ordinary: my aim is to return to normality in an England at peace. I want to marry, I want children, and I aspire to being a good cook and housewife, one who makes a house a home." (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000). In British factories in 1944 a large majority of women said they wanted to be homemakers after the war. The minority who wished to keep working comprised three groups. Some were single, widowed, or divorced and were quite comfortable with their lives. Others were wives who enjoyed part-time work as an opportunity to meet people and obtain spending money. Some were careerists, usually professionals who wanted to leave the factory and return to their careers. For the younger women in the factories as well as the services, marriage and domestic life were the almost universal postwar dream. The double burden of factory worker and housewife was coming to an end, and women across Europe and North America agreed that priority for jobs should go to the male breadwinner who should earn the "family wage" without the wife having to take paid employment (Cantril 1951). Even more important, the self-confidence that women had gained, the companionship they had lost, plus the equalitarian ethic typified by equal exposure to the draft, and equal treatment in rationing allocations, combined to accelerate the trend towards more equalitarian, companionate marriage in major countries (Donnelly 1999). The postwar saw most American and Canadian wives eagerly give

up the extra duties of wartime to return to domesticity, with more companionate marriages, higher incomes, better housing, and the baby boom (Campbell 1984; Fahrni and Rutherford 2007).

The women of World War II filled many new and unexpected roles in every nation (Duchen and Bandhauer-Schöffmann 2000). There was always an effort to redefine "femininity" to include the new roles, but when it came to women in the military, the male soldiers felt their own masculinity was threatened, and reacted negatively. Only in the Soviet Union, and there only among elite young communist enthusiasts, were women allowed to kill men. In a total war, the reserves of woman-power had to be used, despite the shortages and burdens. In nations under the gun, there was no choice. In prosperous and safe nations the new affluence of husbands and fathers meant that women were not forced to work. However, women volunteered out of patriotism and to answer to the most successful of all propaganda themes: that their service would bring the men home sooner. The horrors of death and dying enhanced the male sense of patriotism, sacrifice for nation and family, and masculinity. Death and valor became the central themes of the memory of the war. The suffering of women in manmade famines, in urban bombings, in systematic mass rapes and killings of refugees and racial targets, in making do with inadequate food and shelter, and in waiting for their men to return did not enhance any feminine self-images or virtues. Those themes were never memorialized, and seldom remembered.

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CHAPTER FORTY-THREE

Transnational Civil Rights during World War II

TRAVIS J. HARDY

The relationship between the individual and the state came under great pressures because of the exigencies of World War II, particularly in the area of civil rights under those governments. This has traditionally been one aspect of the war experience that has been pushed to the back by the idea of the “good war.” Historians over the past few decades, however, have begun to remedy this by analyzing exactly how the war affected the application of civil rights during that time of crisis. This chapter will provide an introduction to scholarship that addresses the question of civil rights during World War II in an international manner and comparative focus. In particular, the experiences of four major democratic powers that fought in the war, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and France, will be considered in this chapter. Like any historiographical piece, this chapter is unable to give coverage to every available work but instead is designed to provide a basic overview of some of the existing literature and to suggest possible avenues of inquiry that still need to be explored by historians.

The experience of the United States in World War II was a complex and diverse one, as diverse as the nation itself. This complexity, though, was often lost in the rather simplistic explanation that became the “good war” myth. The majority of histories written after the end of the war focused on the high level political, diplomatic, and military decision-making that shaped World War II. This trend continued until the 1970s, when social and cultural historians began to offer new ways of looking at the war in an effort to create a more complete vision of the American experience in World War II. Works such as Richard Polenberg’s *America at War: The Home Front, 1941–1945* (1968) and John Morton Blum’s *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (1976) helped to bring previously neglected aspects of the American war experience back into focus. Polenberg concluded that World War II placed fewer strains upon American civil liberties than had been expected but that this “balance between restraint and intolerance was tenuous”

(Polenberg 1968, p. 90). Blum offered a less comforting picture of how American society reacted to the pressures placed upon it by the war. In particular, his two chapters focusing on the experiences of what Blum (1976) termed outsiders revealed that World War II was not always the good war for every American.

The experiences of Italian Americans, Japanese Americans, Jews in the United States, and African Americans revealed a pattern of endemic racism by the wider American society and frustrated expectations for these outsider groups. Blum does not specifically focus on the issue of civil rights as a primary issue, rather he is more interested in the interaction that took place between culture and political life. His work, though, does provide an excellent starting point for a discussion of the issue of civil rights in relation to Japanese Americans and African Americans. Blum highlights what has become the primary focus of the historical discussion of these two group's World War II experience. For Japanese Americans this meant the issue of internment as a violation of their civil rights. For African Americans, Blum demonstrates how World War II provided a springboard to the highly organized civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, the issue of voting rights and equal opportunity to employment are focuses of Blum's study. One of the main criticisms leveled against *V was for Victory* is that two other groups who have become central to any discussion of civil rights in the United States, Mexican Americans and Native Americans, are excluded from his work.

Kenneth Rose's *Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social History of Americans in World War II* (2008) seeks to show that the nation that fought in World War II was first and foremost a country of human beings, capable of despicable acts as well as great ones. Rose focuses on the experiences of American soldiers and on the home front as well. It is this second part, entitled "Americans at Home," that is of particular interest to a discussion of civil rights in the United States during the war. Particularly useful in this part of his work is chapter six, entitled "Life at the Margins," in which the author examines the experiences of African Americans, Japanese Americans, Jews, and homosexuals. Rose's discussion of the African American fight for civil rights in World War II mirrors Blum's to some extent in that he does not specifically focus on the topic of civil rights. He provides a broad overview of the African American experience and how the constant reminder of their subordinate status in American society, both in civilian employment, American political life, and military service, helped to motivate what became known as the Double V campaign undertaken by African Americans to fight fascism abroad and racism on the American home front.

As both Blum and Rose point out, leaders in the African American community and common individuals held that military service warranted equal civil rights, in particular voting rights. The war also represented an opportunity to make gains for fair employment standards as evidenced by the pressure placed on President Franklin Roosevelt by A. Philip Randolph and other African American leaders that led to the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). Like Blum also, Rose's discussion of Japanese Americans focuses solely on the issue of internment. Rose's work, while highly useful as a starting point, offers only scant attention to the two other groups represented in the chapter, Jews and homosexuals. And like Blum there is no mention of two of the other most prominent groups in the growing historiography of American civil rights during World War II, Mexican Americans and

Native Americans. These shortcomings should not undercut the usefulness of the work as a basic starting point for researchers.

Both Blum and Rose are also representative of the broader approach that has been adopted by historians in discussing the issue of minority rights and civil rights in the United States during World War II. Or put another way, the focus of historians has been, and continues to be, compartmentalized. That is, the experiences of African Americans have been considered separate from that of Japanese Americans, which have been considered separate from the experiences of Mexican Americans, and so on. This sort of bloc approach is easily seen when considering the literature of the American experience in World War II. It represents both one of the great shortcomings of the historiography but also an exciting new avenue of inquiry. More work should be done which attempts to look at the struggle for civil rights by minority groups as a cohesive movement. How did each group draw upon the tactics of other groups? What did they learn from those group's failures? How did the various civil rights movements of these groups complement each other? Historians of nineteenth century American reform movements have done excellent work in showing the strong linkages that existed between the abolition and women's rights movement and a similar approach needs to be adopted in considering if there was a particular American approach in handling how World War II affected the issue of civil rights. This one shortcoming in the historiography does not mean that the existing literature fails to deliver an understanding of how civil rights were contested and fought over in the United States during the war years. A strong body of work exists that considers how groups, such as African Americans, Japanese Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans, all considered their relationship to the state during World War II.

Arguably the single largest body of work that deals with civil rights in the United States during World War II focuses on African Americans. Primarily works on African Americans and the war fall into two categories: broad overviews of the African American experience as it relates to the fight for political and economic rights or a specific focus on the role of military service in attempting to secure greater civil rights. Neil Wynn's *The Afro-American and the Second World War* (1976) and the condensed *The African American Experience during World War II* (2010) are excellent examples of works that provide broad overviews of the relationship African Americans had with the war. A central point raised by many of these works was the central role World War II played in improving the condition of African Americans, particularly by laying the groundwork for the civil rights movement of the 1950s. In *The Afro-American Experience and the Second World War*, Wynn argued that black protest and the demands of the war "brought greater advances than any preceding conflict" (Wynn 1976, p. 20). However, as historians have looked more at World War I as the springboard for African American's struggle for equal civil rights, there has been some moderation of the point Wynn raised in 1976. In *The African American Experience during World War II*, Wynn ends the work on a slightly less certain note. He states, "If the war did not bring total, overwhelming, and complete change, it brought enough to establish the preconditions for another generation to demand that the United States indeed practice the very principles it espoused at home and continued to defend abroad" (Wynn 2010, p. 98).

Wynn's moderating of this one point represents really the only significant difference between the two studies. Both examine in depth the issue of civil rights in the

economic arena, particularly the issue of fair hiring practices during the war. In both texts, Wynn examines the role A. Philip Randolph played in forcing Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 in June 1941 which sought to end discrimination in hiring in defense industries receiving contracts from the federal government. The order established the FEPC which Wynn judges as having enjoyed mixed success in its efforts to end discrimination in hiring. One consistent point that Wynn raises is that the advances African Americans enjoyed in the labor market owed more to acute labor shortages than to any specific program or protest from within the African American community.

Both texts also address the issue of African American service in the military. There has long been a tradition, dating back to the colonial period, of linking military service to rights as citizens, a point forcefully stated by Bernard Nalty in *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (1986). World War II continued that tradition and, as Wynn points out, this became one of the most important issues in the struggle for equal civil rights. White people, Wynn argued, were so adamant in their defense of a segregated military because "if they [African Americans] could fight as equals, then blacks could expect to be rewarded as citizens" (Wynn 1976, p. 21). Because of this, African Americans proved willing to put up with often degrading treatment from both white military officials and white civilians. Wynn does a solid job of concisely laying out the main arguments put forward by both African Americans and their opponents and in *The African American Experience during World War II*, he also includes a welcome, albeit brief, section on the issue of African American women in the military, something his earlier text had omitted. Both of Wynn's texts provide a fairly thorough and broad-based view of the experience of this one group but suffer from the aforementioned problem of compartmentalization since there is no effort to link the African American struggle for civil rights to other minority groups.

The second major concentration of historians' treatment of African Americans focuses on the issue of military service. An excellent example of this approach is Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke's *A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany* (2010). Höhn and Klimke focus on the experiences of African American GIs who took part in the postwar occupation of Germany and how their interactions with a society free of Jim Crow style segregation led many to demand equal civil rights both during their military service as well as upon their return to the United States as private citizens. One of the most significant contributions of *A Breath of Freedom* is the transnational approach that is utilized by the authors. Recent work on the American civil rights movement has placed a growing emphasis on the international context of what has traditionally been seen as a distinctly domestic event. Höhn and Klimke fit squarely into the growing literature on this topic along with works such as Brenda Gayle Plummer's *Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (1996), Carol Anderson's *Eyes Off the Prize: the United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (2003), Marc Gallicchio's *The African American Encounter with Japan and China* (2000), and Thomas Borstelmann's *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (2001). Although the majority of Höhn and Klimke's work focuses on the postwar experiences of African American soldiers, their introductory chapter provides an accessible overview of the African American experience in World War II. This work, like others in the literature, suffers from a compartmentalized view.

A possible avenue of inquiry that would help to enrich the study further would have been a comparison with the experiences of Japanese American veterans returning from war. The experiences of both groups under military service bear striking resemblance, including the often-degrading treatment they received upon returning home from the war.

There can be no mistaking that civil rights are indelibly linked to the African American experience during the war as the literature makes clear. That being said, though, certain areas within the literature need further exploration, especially in regards to placing the African American experience in a broader or more comparative context with other minority groups' struggles during the war. There also remains a tendency in the literature to rely on the voices of the African American press and elite to discuss the civil rights issue, especially in relation to economic issues. This is something that is perhaps unavoidable but greater effort could be made to include a wider array of voices.

If the historical literature on the African American experience and civil rights has generally been focused on presenting a broad overview, then the body of writing on the Japanese American experience stands at the opposite end of the spectrum. The issue of internment has dominated the study of the relationship between Japanese Americans as citizens and the greater state. Within this one topic though there has proven to be a variety of approaches in dealing with the issue of internment. Four works that do just this are Roger Daniels's *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (1972) and *Prisoners without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (1993), Eric Muller's *American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World War II* (2007), and Greg Robinson's *A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America* (2009).

Both of Roger Daniels's monographs provide strong analysis of what factors led to the decision to intern Japanese Americans beginning in February 1942. In *Concentration Camps USA*, he argues that the decision to circumvent native Japanese Americans' civil rights was made decidedly easier by a long tradition of legislation aimed at excluding this group from American society. In his more recent work, though, Daniels provides a more broad-based assessment of what led to the decision to intern Japanese Americans. As he points out in *Prisoners without Trial*, "American government agencies responsible for internal security had made contingency arrangements to intern enemy aliens if war broke out, arrangements primarily directed at the presumed threat from Nazis and Nazi sympathizers" (Daniels 1993, p. 24). So in this way, Daniels sees Japanese American internment as part of a larger program undertaken by the American government that would result in the curtailment of numerous individual Americans' civil rights rather than simply being a continuation of traditional American racism directed at Japanese Americans. Daniels also provides in depth coverage of the actual evacuation and transportation of the internees to the relocation camps scattered throughout the western United States. Both texts examine the experiences of Japanese Americans once they arrived in the camps, although *Prisoners without Trial* provides a more focused and ultimately more useful discussion of this topic. A central question ties both of these works together: do the emergencies engendered by war ever excuse the purposeful destruction of a citizen's rights? For Daniels, the answer is a resounding "No" in examining the case of Japanese American internment. Taken together, both works provide as complete an overview of the topic as a

reader could ask for as *Prisoners without Trial* builds on the strong base Daniels provided in *Concentration Camps USA*.

These two works certainly do not represent the whole of historical writing on the topic of internment. Eric Muller's *American Inquisition* examines the issue from a far different perspective than Daniels did. While Daniels focused on the experiences of the Japanese Americans themselves, Muller is more interested in exploring the legal rationale for interning Japanese Americans. Muller's text focuses on the creation of a standard way to judge loyalty among Japanese Americans during the war. As Muller points out in his introduction, the majority of writing on Japanese American internment has focused on the demoralizing effect loyalty questionnaires had on internees. He is interested, however, how government bureaucrats utilized answers to these questionnaires to pass judgment on the loyalty or disloyalty of an individual. This proves to be the most important contribution of the text in regards to the issue of civil rights. Muller demonstrates that once put into action, government policy develops its own momentum that often blinds it to the niceties of civil rights for citizens. Muller also separates his work from the existing body of literature by arguing, "the loyalty bureaucracy for Japanese Americans in World War II was new" (Muller 2007, p. 137). The apparatus created by the state was a departure from previous American experience where a simple loyalty oath was considered enough to judge a citizen by. This point also makes Muller's study a timely one as questions on judging the loyalty of Muslim Americans have been raised by some in government and concerns over violations of basic civil liberties have reappeared. Like the other works discussed thus far, Muller's study could benefit from an expanded inquiry into how other minority groups' loyalty was judged during the war. As Daniels did, Muller points out that race played an important part in shaping the American approach to dealing with Japanese Americans. This means then that other groups who were considered outsiders, such as Italian Americans, Jews, and even African Americans, also faced having their loyalty called into question by a government driven by paranoia of internal attack by what were considered alien groups.

Greg Robinson's *A Tragedy of Democracy* mirrors the approach utilized by Roger Daniels in his two works. Robinson highlights the long-term effort to deny Japanese Americans basic civil rights. He details the standard story of how the government reached the decision of internment and how that process was carried out and the experiences of the men and woman who suffered the indignity of being locked away during the war. Where Robinson's work differentiates itself is in his expanded focus on the long-term battle over redress and in its discussion of the role the US played in interning not just US citizens of Japanese descent, but citizens of other Latin American nations such as Peru, as well as Canada's own internment story. This aspect goes a long way towards combating the idea that internment of Japanese Americans was simply a symptom of wartime hysteria and instead helps to give evidence to the truly transnational nature of the issue of internment and how it represented a fundamental violation of civil rights. This issue represents one of the possible avenues of future inquiry for historians examining the issue of civil rights in World War II. Internment was not simply an American phenomenon. What shape did it take in other nations? Was race as central a factor in the interning of citizens in other countries as it was in the United States? Further study is needed to address these issues.

World War II also affected two other minority groups in the US traditionally neglected by historians, Mexican Americans and Native Americans. Two recent works to consult that explore the issue of the Mexican American experience and civil rights during World War II are Richard Griswold Del Castillo's *World War II and Mexican American Civil Rights* (2008) and Emilio Zamora's *Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas: Mexican Workers and Job Politics during World War II* (2009). Del Castillo's study provides a broad overview of the Mexican American struggle to achieve equal rights during the war. In many ways it mirrors the broad approach utilized by Neil Wynn in his work on the African American experience during the war. And like African Americans, Del Castillo argues that Mexican Americans sought to utilize their service during the war as a way to lay equal claim to the rights of citizenship that had been denied to them. The story of the denial of civil rights to Mexican Americans is a familiar one: blocked from equal access to schooling and economic opportunity, often denied the right to participate in the electoral process, and discriminated against in housing and public services.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the Mexican American experience mirrored that of African Americans exactly. As Del Castillo points out, many were not natural born Americans but rather immigrants who had come to the United States to find a better life. Also, unlike African Americans who had begun to exert great political power as a voting bloc in the 1930s, Mexican Americans proved "among the least likely immigrants to take the steps necessary to secure American citizenship and hence the right to vote" (Del Castillo 2008, p. 16). The war, in Del Castillo's estimation, served to focus what was a generally uncoordinated effort by Mexican American leaders to secure civil rights in the US. One point that is raised in *World War II and Mexican American Civil Rights* is how the government of Mexico sought to intervene on behalf of Mexican Americans in their struggle for equal civil rights during the war years. However, Del Castillo does not pursue this point in great detail but it is greatly expanded upon by Emilio Zamora in his study of job politics in Texas during World War II.

In his work, Zamora offers a focused study of the experiences of Mexican workers in Texas. This is a welcome addition to the literature since it allows readers to see how themes raised in broader studies, such as Del Castillo's, play out on the local level. What emerges is a story that challenges the traditional gradualist approach that is often utilized by historians when discussing minority groups' push for equal civil rights. The main focus of the text is the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) the leading Mexican American civil rights organization in the United States in the 1940s. LULAC, according to Zamora, actively courted the Mexican government's support in trying to improve working conditions for Mexican workers in Texas during the war. They were able to engage in this activity because of the Roosevelt administration's efforts to improve US relations with Latin America, the so-called Good Neighbor policy. This point is an important one because it demonstrates that civil rights during World War II were a transnational concern and not simply isolated to any one particular country. Zamora himself admits that in the end whites and African Americans benefitted more from the economic boom of the war than did Mexican workers. This is attributed to a lessening support of LULAC from the Mexican government as the war wound down and a growing emphasis among

nations on the broader issue of human rights rather than on more narrowly defined civil rights within individual countries.

The issue of Native Americans and civil rights in the United States during the war has received only minor consideration, something that is in need of correction. The majority of the historiography focuses more broadly on the experience of Native Americans. This, however, does not mean that these works do not have anything to add to the discussion on civil rights. Two works indicative of this are Kenneth William Townsend's *World War II and the American Indian* (2000) and Jere' Bishop Franco's *Crossing the Pond: The Native American Effort in World War II* (Franco 1999). Both works provide a nicely detailed analysis of the whole of the Native American experience during the war on both the home front and the battlefield. A consistent theme in both texts is a familiar one as Native Americans hoped to use their service in the war as a way to secure greater protection of their civil rights from the government.

In dealing with the question of civil rights, both texts raise an interesting point in discussing Native Americans. Like African Americans and other minority groups, Native Americans faced a deeply ingrained prejudice that ran throughout the majority of white American society in the 1940s. This meant fewer opportunities to advance economically, discrimination in voting, and prejudice in social and commercial services. It would appear easy then to simply write the Native American experience off as another byproduct of American racial attitudes in the 1940s. To do so, however, would ignore the historical relationship that Native Americans had shared with the federal government in American history.

Both Townsend and Franco are quick to point out one key feature that distinguished the Native American experience from that of other minority groups: the question of citizenship for Native Americans. The numerous treaties the American government had struck with various tribes over the decades had served to create a sense of separation from American society among Native Americans. This included the sense that Native Americans, since they were not seen as citizens, did not have to fulfill the obligations of citizenship. Congress attempted to clarify this with the passage of the Citizenship Act of 1924 that stated that all Native Americans born within the territorial boundaries of the US were natural citizens. This legal precedent was renewed in the Nationality Act of 1940. As both authors demonstrate, though, this issue became one of the prime points of contention between the state and native tribes. Many Native Americans legally challenged their draft status in 1940 and 1941 based on this point. Importantly for a discussion of civil rights, it raises the question of how does a state define citizenship? And conversely, are individuals required to meet the obligations of citizenship if there is no clear definition of the term itself? These are both questions that Townsend and Franco raise but never fully answer. Future research into this topic, including a comparison with Japanese Americans who experienced a similar situation, is needed to help give a fuller picture of the Native American struggle to secure civil rights during World War II. These questions also need to be addressed in the broader context of discussing civil rights in democracies during times of war, not just in the context of World War II since they represent a fundamental conflict that democracies engaged in war experience.

In attempting to summarize the American experience in dealing with civil rights during the war it becomes clear that several major themes cut across the compartmentalization of minority groups experiences that took place. First, service in times of war

has, and remains, a central way in which outside groups attempt to lay claim to the mantle of citizenship. Second, defining who is and is not a citizen, and judging their loyalty, is a process that needs to happen in a transparent manner and not in the halls of government bureaucracies. Third, the need for labor and economic manpower often proved to be the most important factor in helping to ameliorate minority groups' demands for greater civil rights during the war. All of these issues and questions raised by the various histories discussed here seemingly demand that a greater synthesis of the American civil rights issue during World War II be done. This is, and remains, the single most glaring gap in the current historiography.

Other nations also had to deal with the interplay between the necessities of executing the war and maintaining standards in civil rights for which they claimed to be fighting. More often than not, the reality did not live up to the lofty pronouncements of the Allied powers. Such was the case with Canada. Canadians dealt with many of the same issues as the US during World War II and often responded in the same manner. This was especially true when the issue of interning groups considered security risks arose. Two excellent texts that discuss this issue are Patricia Roy's *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941–67* (2007) and Franca Iacovetta, Roberto Perin, and Angelo Principe's edited volume *Enemies Within: Italian and Other Internees in Canada and Abroad* (2000).

Roy highlights the longstanding racial animosity towards Canadian Japanese that existed among white Canadians, especially on Canada's west coast, mirroring the experiences of Japanese Americans. Much of the rationale for placing Japanese Canadians into camps was similar to rationale used by American policymakers in reaching the decision to intern Japanese Americans. Roy correctly also points out that economic factors played as important a role in the internment policy of Canada than did security concerns. Concerns from white fishermen about competition from the Japanese Canadian community were voiced to leaders in Ottawa from western representatives. Economics also played a key role in where to relocate Japanese Canadians. Many locales refused to house Japanese internees for fear they would stay in place after the war causing greater competition with white businesses. The one exception to this rule was the sugar beet industry of southern Alberta which was starved for laborers, a similar situation to what emerged in some western states in the US in regards to using Japanese American internees as farm laborers. One way that Roy does separate her work from the standard histories of internment is by including how the war affected the position of Chinese Canadians as citizens. While Japanese Canadians saw their civil rights trampled during the war, for Chinese Canadians the opposite proved to be true. While many of the legal barriers preventing Chinese Canadians from enjoying the fruits of citizenship were kept in place during the war, there was strong evidence of a changing Canadian mindset that would lead to the postwar relaxation of immigration restrictions on Chinese immigrants and most importantly the granting of the franchise to Chinese Canadians. It would be beneficial for historians of Japanese American internment to examine if similar changes in attitudes occurred towards the Chinese in the US and if this resulted in an expansion of civil rights for that group in the postwar period.

At the heart of *Enemies Within* is one central question on the issue of civil rights in times of war, "how to achieve balance between the civil liberties of minorities and the needs of majorities" (Iacovetta, Perin, and Principe 2000, p. 3). Of the 2,500

Canadian citizens interned during the war, roughly 600 were of Italian origin. The editors admit that they are not seeking to equate the experiences of Italian Canadians with Japanese Canadians or Japanese Americans but intend to add to literature that explains how wartime internment was not always the result of the racist and xenophobic attitudes of the governments that carried out such actions. Several of the essays in the volume offer arguments that seek to show the actions undertaken by the Canadian government were understandable in the context of the times. There was in fact a small, but active, fascist element at work within Canada's Italian community and the internment policy targeted this segment of the population. *Enemies Within* also offers an excellent blueprint in examining the issue of internment in a truly comparative perspective by examining the internment of ethnic Italians in the US, Great Britain, and Australia. Several contributing authors all discuss the failure of these democracies to address the central question that lies at the heart of the volume. They point out that judicial systems in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and Canada upheld the military's prerogatives to override civil liberties during the war but that later action undertaken by the civilian governments to offer redress to various minority groups ran counter to those decisions. This inability to effectively address this question invites further study that should look solely at the issue of redress within each of these countries. Were lawmakers aware of the implications of their actions? Is redress an admission on the part of a government that civil liberties, even in times of national emergency, are sacrosanct?

Christopher MacLennan's *Towards the Charter: Canadians and the Demand for a National Bill of Rights, 1929–1960* (2003) highlights the important role World War II had in the development of guaranteeing civil rights in Canada in the postwar years. He argues that the open infringements on Canadian citizens' civil rights by the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King led to the realization that Canada needed something on par with the US Bill of Rights (MacLennan 2003, p. 3). *Towards the Charter* is an excellent supplement to works like Roy's and Iacovetta and colleagues' because he offers an expanded view of how the war provided the Canadian government with an opportunity to actively suppress the rights of political threats, especially communists and other groups considered to be fronts for communists. Here MacLennan echoes one of the major points raised in *Enemies Within*, that the process of dismantling civil liberties in wartime Canada was not something arrived at blindly but rather was the result of calculation on the part of Canadian government officials. MacLennan's work also makes an important contribution to the literature on civil rights during World War II by clearly drawing the connections between the war and the growing international focus on human rights in the postwar period. This is an area that historians should continue to explore in greater detail, in particular the connection between international support for the United Nations and the wartime trampling of civil rights.

Historians have amply demonstrated how civil rights in both the United States and Canada suffered during World War II which is all the more remarkable since neither nation ever came under large-scale direct attack from enemy forces. What then was the result in countries that were more directly affected by the horrors of the war? Historians of both Great Britain and France have provided a large number of studies that examined the war's impact on the home front of each nation. But what have historians had to say about civil rights in those nations during World War II? An

examination of the existing literature reveals that this is a topic that has received some treatment in the historiography but that important gaps still exist that need to be filled by historians.

Two excellent works to begin with when considering the British case are Neil Stammers's *Civil Liberties in Britain during the Second World War* (1983) and K. D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty's *The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain 1914–1945* (2000). Stammers's work presents a thorough, but dry, political account of how the governments of both Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill dealt with the issue of civil rights. Stammers chronicles how the British government seemed at ease with the imposition of clearly antidemocratic tactics such as the internment of enemy aliens (many of which were refugees from Nazi controlled portions of Europe), the censorship of media and news, the suppression of political dissent, and the effective use of government power to coerce labor into meeting the needs of the war economy. Stammers's other contribution is to reveal how in Great Britain, the Labour government that emerged after the war was loath to relinquish these wartime powers, especially in controlling labor. This raises an interesting avenue of inquiry for future study. Did other national governments also maintain antidemocratic practices that had been implemented in the name of executing the war into the postwar period? If so, what rationales were provided?

Ewing and Gearty examine the issue of civil rights from a more theoretical and legal perspective than Stammers does. Their work challenges the idea of the Rule of Law in Great Britain, which argued that common law protected civil liberties. A. V. Dicey first published his ideas on the Rule of Law in Great Britain in 1885 in his work *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*. His interpretation was deeply influential in Great Britain and remained a standard work well into the second half of the twentieth century. The study presents a picture of the consistent overturning of civil liberties by those institutions, such as Parliament and the police, that were supposed to protect them. In regards to World War II, Ewing and Gearty focus on the purposeful suppression of political rights undertaken by the wartime British government. Unlike Stammers, who offers a view focused primarily on communists, the authors discuss primarily the case of the British Union of Fascists (BUF) led by Oswald Mosley. Ewing and Gearty see the treatment of the BUF by government officials and the police, who they argue actively worked to defend the rights of the BUF to assemble and voice their opinions against protesters. This stands in stark contrast to the persecution of the small communist party inside of Great Britain in the 1930s. Their discussion raises the interesting question of whether or not groups or individuals who present a potential threat to a war effort should enjoy the protection of their civil rights. Both men also see a long established policy of suppression of civil rights in Northern Ireland dating back to 1916–1917 and continuing through World War II, especially after the outbreak of a renewed Irish Republican Army (IRA) offensive in 1939. This point is one that historians of civil rights in World War II could expand on by asking to what degree were the choices made during the war continuations of pre-war policy. This should be separate from the issue of prewar racism that has been well documented in histories dealing with the internment of ethnic minorities. Both works echo the major findings of Geoffrey Stone's *Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime* (2004) which argues that the American government has only punished opposition to government policies during times of war. This opens up the avenue for greater

comparative work to address the question of whether war automatically means the circumscribing of civil liberties in a democracy?

Many of the basic histories of the British home front during the war touch on the issue of civil rights, primarily focusing on the internment issue. Examples here include Mark Donnelly's *Britain in the Second World War* (1999) and Robert Mackay's *The Test of War: Inside Britain 1939–45* (1999). Both of these works provide accessible discussions of the issue but also bring the added dimension of framing the issue in regards to the question of citizenship. Donnelly argues that an agreement existed between the British wartime government and the broader population, one that "in return for the civilian population's tolerance of compulsory measures in pursuit of victory, the government committed itself to the fight against material and social deprivation beyond the end of the conflict" (Donnelly 1999, p. 49). This is an intriguing point that historians should examine further. Is it only applicable in the British context or did a similar understood compact emerge in other nations during the war? Mackay sees the suppression of civil rights by the British government during the war as an extension of the growing role that the state took in everyday life through the first half of the twentieth century. As the state increased its presence in the lives of ordinary British citizens it becomes more feasible for an understanding like the one Donnelly discusses to take shape. Mackay also presents a more positive view of internment than other historians. He argues that given the peril that the nation faced in the spring of 1940, a hysterical reaction like internment is understandable. Rather than judging the issue on this point, he argues, it would be more beneficial to examine how the government handled internment after the initial wave of hysteria had begun to recede. What emerges for Mackay is a process that "began as a dangerous and near-hysterical lurch towards the police state ended in a re-assertion of tolerance and calmness" (MacKay 1999, p. 100). Here Mackay and the editors of *Enemies Within* are in agreement that the decisions made by these governments to circumvent their citizens' civil rights need to be better understood in the context of the threat the war posed.

The French experience in World War II was far different from the other nations examined in this chapter. Unlike the US and Canada, who never experienced large-scale attacks on their soil, or the British, who experienced the bombing campaign of the Blitz but was never occupied, the French experience was wholly different. They dealt with not just military defeat and occupation but also with what was, for all intents and purposes, a civil war between the Free French forces of Charles de Gaulle and the Vichy regime of Philippe Petain and Pierre Laval. The issue of civil rights in France during the war has not been a major focus of the historiography but there are available works that provide a good starting point for interested readers. Thomas Christofferson and Michael Christofferson's *France during World War II: from Defeat to Liberation* (2006) is a short and accessible overview of the French experience during the war. Any discussion of civil rights in France during the war has primarily focused on the period of Vichy rule (1940–1944) and the implementation of what was known as the National Revolution. The Christofferson's offer a succinct explanation of what ideological factors drove the National Revolution and how this ideology translated into the purposeful stripping away of minority groups' civil rights in Vichy controlled area, such as Jews, Freemasons, and communists. An excellent complement to *France during World War II* that explores the nature of the Vichy program

of exclusion is Richard Vinen's *The Unfree French: Life under the Occupation* (2006). This is a rich social history of the period of occupation and Vichy rule. Vinen singles out the Jewish experience in Vichy France as most representative of the dismantling of civil rights that occurred during the war. It was under Vichy rule that being Jewish was codified in an October 1940 law that defined a person as Jewish if they had three Jewish grandparents or were married to a Jew with Jewish grandparents.

Arguably the most comprehensive work on the Jewish experience is Renée Poznanski's *Jews in France during World War II* (2001), which presents a well-researched look at the totality of the Jewish experience in France during the war. Unlike the Christofferson's and Vinen, who only discuss the Jewish population under Vichy, Poznanski establishes French views on Jews prior to the occupation. What she sees is a differentiation between Israelites (French Jews) and Jews (often immigrants from Eastern Europe). As Poznanski highlights in her study, Israelites became a primary target of the dissolution of civil rights under Vichy rule. For the first time French Jews found themselves being counted and codified. Their access to employment was circumvented as they were forced out of the professions and their status as citizens of France, which dated back to 1791, was stripped away. It would be simple to assume that Vichy policy was simply a reflection of Nazi anti-Semitism. Poznanski, however, does a highly effective job of demonstrating that much of the anti-Jewish policies of Vichy were motivated by organic demands rather than foreign ones.

Another interesting aspect of discussing civil rights was the process by which Vichy exported their exclusionary practices to French colonies overseas. This issue is examined partially in works such as Eric Jennings's *Vichy in the Tropics: Petain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–1944* (2001) and Jonathan Gosnell's *The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930–1954* (2002). Both authors chronicle the process undertaken by the Vichy colonial administration to define who was and was not a citizen in the colonies and the political process by which the exclusionary practices of the metropole were implemented in the colonies. Again, Jews became the primary target of the new laws that stripped away traditional civil rights but other groups were targeted as well, in particular Freemasons. Jennings is quick to point out though that in the colonies the numbers of Jews and other perceived enemies of Vichy were miniscule and led to the creation of what Jennings terms a "colonial straw man" (Jennings 2001, p. 23). Another point both authors focus on is the question of citizenship. This proved to be a fluid one in the Vichy colonies and that by opening up the issue, the Vichy regime perhaps contributed to the growing disillusionment French colonial subjects had with their status within the empire and led to the growing anticolonial movement in places such as Indochina in the postwar period. The question of citizenship and the rights of citizens in colonies during the war is one that should be explored further by historians.

The vast literature on World War II and its global implications has grown steadily over the years as historians have begun to move away from more narrowly focused national studies. This is arguably the single greatest area in discussing the issue of civil rights during the war that needs to be expanded on. Works that compare the policies and rationales of how different nations approached the problem of balancing civil rights with prosecuting the war would be welcome additions to the historiography. More thematic works would also help to expand our knowledge of how the war affected civil rights. For example, a global examination on internment programs carried out by

governments during the war would help to explore to what degree were these programs knee jerk reactions by policymakers and to what degree were they well thought out policies? Historians should also move to a more expansive view of elements of society that suffered from the stripping away of civil rights during the war, such as religious minorities. Works of this nature would shed more light on the nature of the issue of citizenship and the relationship that exists between the state and the citizen.

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CHAPTER FORTY-FOUR

Global Culture and World War II

M. TODD BENNETT

If television brought Vietnam into American living rooms, then film mediated World War II. Still crude and in their infancy during the Great War, movies matured over the next two decades, as talkies replaced silent pictures, technique improved, and Hollywood perfected a formula that took the world by storm. To be sure, the epicenter of movie culture resided in the United States, where 85 million people (about 65 percent of the entire US population) flocked to theaters each week. Yet, cinema stood at the heart of global culture, to the extent that one existed. Cinematic art developed internationally. Movie going became a universal habit, at least in the industrialized world. Even Hollywood became cosmopolitan by virtue of its pool of talent drawn from abroad: producer Erich Pommer (Germany), director Alfred Hitchcock (Britain), and actress Greta Garbo (Sweden), to name but a handful of figures.

Awareness of cinema's ability to influence theatergoers was widespread, as well. Today's experts are less certain that human behavior is culturally determined, whether by graphic movies or violent video games, for they understand that audiences are free agents who can interpret what they see or hear. But research on mass communications and their effects was only just beginning in the years leading to World War II. Whatever social scientific and anecdotal evidence existed indicated that motion pictures had the capacity not only to amuse patrons but also to arouse their emotions, shape their thoughts, and condition their behavior. Movies beguiled because they were bigger and better than life. They immersed spectators in the deepest multimedia experience of the pretelevision age, when only film combined sight and sound: breathtaking settings, stirring musical scores, and authentic sound effects, all that and more artfully combined into a seamless whole. Projected onto the big screens of darkened theaters before what were thought to be spellbound audiences, Hollywood pictures, in particular, featured glamorous stars doing things, wearing fashions, and living in styles that set influential standards of prewar cool. To wit, sales of men's undershirts plunged after actor Clark Gable appeared bare-chested in director Frank Capra's *It Happened*

One Night, leading garment manufacturers and unions to lobby, albeit unsuccessfully, Columbia studio to excise the scene from 1934's best picture. Film trafficked harmful ideas, as well, or so found the Payne Fund studies which included, for example, works from Charters (1933), Blumer (1933), and Holaday and Stoddard (1933). Published by a team of psychologists, sociologists, and educators from 1933 to 1935, the studies blamed the poor behavior modeled onscreen for causing juvenile delinquency. Such thinking helps explain why governments from London to Berlin to Tokyo erected trade barriers to protect the national character from harmful American imports.

The misuse of cinematic power by so-called totalitarian regimes most concerned observers in the Western democracies. Taking at face value films like Leni Riefenstahl's documentary of the 1934 Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, *Triumph of the Will* (1935), critics saw a troubling pattern: totalitarians, be they German Nazis, Italian Fascists, or Russian Bolsheviks, all brought the potent medium under central control and mobilized it to indoctrinate the public in official ideology. The apparent mass brainwashing that followed helped explain what seemed inexplicable otherwise: how these new kinds of dictatorial states acquired power, held rational people in thrall, and expanded. Some traced France's sudden fall to Germany in 1940 to a failure of will weakened by Nazi Fifth Column propaganda.

All the major combatants – Axis or Ally, dictatorship or democracy – thus armed themselves with moving pictures to win World War II. It took scholars more than a generation to appreciate that fact. In the United States, culture became a legitimate subject of academic inquiry only in the late 1960s, when the entire profession underwent a seismic upheaval. Historians, media students, and political scientists have since produced a formidable body of literature, “revisionist” in the sense that it interjects culture into the scholastic conversation in such a way as to revise understanding of the past. More to the point, such scholarship has established film as indispensable to the history of World War II. To grossly oversimplify, it has explained why individual belligerents came to regard film as a weapon of war, how great powers mobilized cinematic propaganda to raise morale at home, and what effect movies had on the civilian experience of war.

Scholars owe a tremendous debt to that pioneering work, and this chapter selectively surveys book-length English-language literature with an eye toward charting a course for the future. To be sure, gaps remain in our knowledge of wartime film propaganda within specific countries, Japan and China especially. Now that a more or less solid national foundation has been built, however, it is time to adopt a transnational perspective so as to connect those separate histories that exist largely in isolation. No longer should our frame of reference stop at the water's edge. Rather, we would be wise to heed the words of Thomas Bender, whose *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (2002) recommends situating national history within a wider context. Such a broadened framework can alter our understanding of the past, Bender insists, by revealing previously overlooked connections, patterns, or disjunctures. Scholarship ought to build on the momentum already moving in that direction when it comes to World War II, an event that has remained mostly impervious to history's cultural turn. Closer inspection reveals, however, that while patterns shifted communication did not stop during the war, which witnessed a vibrant cultural exchange. Allies conversed, sharing information in order to foster unity, vie for internal advantage, or both. Enemies argued, employing communications strategies that demonized opponents,

waged psychological warfare, and justified differing war aims before the world court of public opinion. Meanwhile, moviemakers exchanged knowledge even as they competed for hearts, minds, and pocketbooks. By treating World War II as a global cultural event, scholars can trace how film, a subject well suited to transnational study, contributed to that dialogue as it crossed borders, transmitted consciousness, and traded blows.

Nazi Germany entered the fray with decided institutional and conceptual advantages. A March 1933 decree established the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* or RMVP) not long after Adolf Hitler's seizure of power, and the RMVP, headed by Joseph Goebbels, stood atop a proven censorship system by the outbreak of war. Unlike the Western democracies, moreover, the Nazis were not sheepish about using propaganda. In fact, the Third Reich was history's most willing propagandist, for propaganda was prized as an aid in the ultimate quest to revitalize Germany and give it dominion over others.

A vast historiography on Nazi film exists. The latest word comes from David Welch, whose *Propaganda and the German Cinema* (2001) details how Goebbels, confident that the medium had "power" over people, brought moviemaking under National Socialist Party control (2001, p. 265). A *Filmkreditbank* underwrote favored productions. The Reich Cinema Law of 1934 legally required filmmakers to submit their work to censors, whose word was final. And the 1942 consolidation of the German motion picture industry into one giant, nationalized firm, UFI, streamlined oversight. Such mechanisms enabled the RMVP to supervise some of the most notorious movies ever made, including the aforementioned *Triumph of the Will* and *Jud Süß* (1940), whose virulent anti-Semitism was meant "to prepare the German public" for the Final Solution, according to Welch (2001, p. 239).

The Third Reich rather easily converted its enormous propaganda machine to a war footing after the 1939 invasion of Poland. Goebbels issued "Guidelines for the Execution of NSDAP Propaganda" assigning duties to film and other media. Newsreels were tasked with treating home front audiences to the stream of good news that arrived from the battlefield, where blitzkrieg scored victory upon victory in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France. Civilian morale spiked. But features struggled to maintain spirits when the Red Army stymied the *Wehrmacht* and the good news stopped. As one might expect, Goebbels continued to rely on *Tendenzfilme*, overtly propagandistic pictures containing strong Nazi ideology: the anticommunist *GPU* (1942) alerted viewers to the terrible fate that would befall them if the bloodthirsty, vengeful Bolsheviks were to step foot on German soil; the desperate *Kolberg* (1945) encouraged audiences to fight to the death to save the fatherland.

What is surprising is that *Tendenzfilme*, however much they may confirm our preconceptions of Nazi propaganda, composed only a small minority (one-sixth) of the 1,097 feature-length pictures made in the Third Reich. The rest were *Unterhaltungsfilme*, entertaining, commercially viable movies. Goebbels considered *Unterhaltungsfilme* to be integral to good opinion management, the warp to *Tendenzfilme*'s woof so to speak, in that escapism could counterbalance and sugarcoat propaganda, making it more palatable to moviegoers. Little wonder, then, that amusement flooded screens in the wake of Stalingrad – a prime example being *Münchhausen*, a 1943 fantasy whose style was inspired by the 1939 Hollywood blockbuster *The Wizard of Oz* – to distract spectators from the depressing reality that lurked just outside theaters. Despite (or, because of) such extensive

efforts, however, Welch argues that the Nazis ultimately lost the propaganda battle in that German morale swiftly collapsed as Allied forces approached, hastening the Third Reich's defeat.

Several scholars – from Jay Leyda (1960) to Richard Stites (1992, 1995) – have examined Soviet film. The latest to do so, Peter Kenez and Denise Youngblood, have the advantage of access to Soviet archives since the USSR's fall. Deep wartime engagement made Soviet films “unique,” according to Kenez's *Cinema and Soviet Society* (2001, p. 167). Nowhere did the fighting bear more directly upon filmmaking. A major Kiev studio was lost not long after Germany's June 1941 invasion. Production capacity diminished further in September when facilities in Moscow and Leningrad were among those factories dismantled and relocated eastward, to points in central Asia, ahead of encroaching enemy forces. Severe supply shortages hampered filmmakers. That the industry somehow survived and released 70 full-length movies ranks as a noteworthy accomplishment under the circumstances.

Moreover, the Soviet screen displayed a “single-minded concentration on the war,” Youngblood writes in *Russian War Films* (2007, pp. 56–57). Whereas German *Unterhaltungsfilme* (almost 85 percent of all Nazi productions) provided escape from reality, only about 30 percent of Soviet pictures avoided the war. That as many as 28 million citizens perished in a brutal life-or-death struggle fought in their own backyards explains that fixation. So, too, does the fact that Soviet film was already mobilized for war, in a sense, having been a key cog in the Communist Party's propaganda apparatus since the Bolshevik Revolution, Kenez points out. In any event, the first wartime newsreel arrived in theaters only three days after the outbreak of hostilities. “Fighting Film Collections” (*boevye kinosborniki*), the anthologies of agitprop shorts were a Soviet innovation, premiered not long thereafter. Full-length combat documentaries became another Soviet staple, the most important being *The Defeat of the German Armies near Moscow* (1942), whose onscreen recapitulation of the capital's successful defense cheered audiences.

Soviet features dramatized the eastern front's grim realities as well. Take the canonical trilogy *She Defends the Motherland* (1943), *Rainbow* (1944), and *Zoia* (1944), a biopic of the martyred partisan girl, Zoia Kosmodemianskaia. Each followed roughly the same plotline: an ordinary Soviet woman's victimization, radicalization, and ascension to resistance leadership following the German invasion. *She Defends the Motherland's* heroine, Pasha, witnessed her child's murder and husband's execution before she herself was raped by German troops. Traumatized at first, Pasha recovered and metamorphosed into Comrade P., a revered partisan leader determined to take revenge on, and defend the homeland from, the brutal invaders. And does she ever ... with an ax no less, exhorting her fellow partisans to “Kill the beasts!” likewise. To be sure, male battlefield heroes reemerged once the Red Army turned the tide and began its drive toward Berlin. Yet, heroines like Comrade P., *The Rainbow's* Olena, and Zoia nonetheless distinguished Soviet cinema by virtue of their sheer quantity and visceral agency. Youngblood, for one, finds it understandably difficult to imagine Mrs. Miniver, the eponymous protagonist of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's 1942 best picture winner, butchering the Nazi aviator who invaded her home.

It is also noteworthy that Soviet filmmakers and artists, generally speaking, enjoyed a “small oasis of freedom” during World War II, writes Kenez (2001 p. 182). So grave was the crisis that Communist Party ideologues temporarily loosened Stalinist strictures

out of a belief that the people would be more motivated to defend mother Russia than socialism from the Nazis. Ideological instruction therefore took a backseat to displays of Russian nationalism and Orthodox iconography, according to John Barber and Mark Harrison (1991) and Steven Merritt Miner (2003). The war became known as the Great *Patriotic* War, and faith inspired onscreen icons like Comrade P. to risk their lives for the motherland. All told, Soviet cinema achieved a higher degree of authenticity than before 1941 or after 1945, according to Kenez, who concludes that

the war, in spite of the dreadful destruction and suffering it caused, was a liberating experience. Films once again expressed genuine feeling and real pathos: the hatred for the enemy, the call for sacrifice and heroism, and the sorrow for the abused Soviet people were real and heartfelt. The directors believed in what they were saying. (Kenez 2001, p. 182)

The Western democracies also employed cinematic propaganda. Whereas scholarship on Nazi film dates from 1947, scholars ignored British and American efforts until 1974's publication of *Films and the Second World War* by Roger Manvell. What accounts for this lengthy amnesia? We already touched upon the fact that cultural studies started to gain an academic foothold only in the 1960s. Plus, key documentation remained unavailable until the late 1970s, when empiricists flocked to the Public Record Office (as the British National Archives was then known) or US National Archives and Records Administration to mine the newly opened files of the British Ministry of Information (MOI) or US Office of War Information (OWI). A cynic might add that the long silence spoke to discomfort with the historical fact that the United Kingdom and the United States had manipulated citizens. (Welch notes in his introduction to *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia* (2003) that both countries avoided the very word "propaganda," instead resorting to euphemism in naming the MOI and OWI.) Only dictators did propaganda; democrats did not. Acknowledging that that presumption had not, in fact, held true during World War II risked calling into question certain cherished national myths. "Propaganda has never been an activity with which the British have felt comfortable; it is believed to be the sort of thing which foreigners go in for and ... inextricably associated with the work of Joseph Goebbels," writes Philip M. Taylor, who notes in *Britain and Cinema in the Second World War* that this cognitive disconnect sustains the "myth that the government did little or nothing to promote" popular morale (Taylor 1988, p. 3), a central component of the "people's war" thesis (one hastens to add here that acknowledging US propaganda implicitly critiques the "good war" myth, as well).

To take Britain first, Ian McLaine's *Ministry of Morale*, a standard since 1979, exhaustively chronicled MOI activities with the exception of film, dispensed with in a single postscript. Several historians – led by Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards (1986), Philip Taylor (1988, 1999), and James Chapman (1998) – corrected that omission over the next two decades. A common, triumphal narrative emerged in which British film recovered from initial setbacks to facilitate victory. The rags-to-riches story begins with cinemas being closed for security reasons after the outbreak of hostilities and not reopened until November 1939. Studio space was requisitioned by the government for defense purposes, as well. That, plus celluloid nitrate's classification as an essential war material, caused production to drop sharply (not that fans went without, it should be noted, as Hollywood already supplied 80 percent of the UK

market). Neither the MOI nor its Films Division did much to improve things, at first. Three directors headed the Division during its first nine months of operation. Inert, it stood idly by as producer Alexander Korda initiated *The Lion Has Wings* (1939), Britain's first propaganda feature. Derided as the "Ministry of Muddle," the MOI likewise went through four ministers and four directors general in less than two years and was widely faulted for losing the propaganda war to Goebbels's RMVP during much of that span.

Good appointments – Jack Beddington's as films director in 1940; Brendan Bracken's as information minister in 1941 – sound policy, and pragmatic administration improved things considerably. A "Programme for Film Propaganda" specified, in 1940, roles for newsreels, documentaries, and features in projecting Britain's fight. That year's *London Can Take It*, a short MOI documentary about the capital's stoic endurance of the German Blitz, portrayed the "people's war" as a popular, and just, social leveler, for example. Meanwhile, a cooperative working relationship with the motion picture industry developed to the point where the MOI could manage content without resorting to the RMVP's coercion. Aside from a documentary unit and financing one commercial picture, *49th Parallel* (1941) starring Laurence Olivier and Leslie Howard, the Ministry steered clear of direct intervention. Instead, officers made recommendations, consulted British Film Producers' Association members, and organized an "Ideas Committee" of industry leaders. That is not to say that the system was entirely consensual: the MOI exerted precensorship by denying assistance to projects it disliked, and producer Michael Balcon of Ealing Studios protested official meddling by suspending his cooperation for a while. Yet, it enabled the Ministry to maintain the appearance of practicing what it preached: the "strategy of truth." His Majesty's Government did not always provide citizens with complete and accurate information, as claimed, but its decision not to suppress *The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp*, Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's biopic of an incompetent, if imaginary, British Army officer, suggested otherwise. That picture's 1943 release over Prime Minister Winston Churchill's objections came to symbolize wartime Britain's relative freedom of expression.

Across the Atlantic, World War II coincided with Hollywood's golden era, and the American motion picture industry lent enthusiastic support to the US war effort. Take the stars' good works on behalf of the so-called "good war." Carole Lombard died in a 1942 plane crash while returning from a war bond rally, for example, and Frank Capra directed *Why We Fight*, a seven-part orientation film series sponsored by the US War Department. Or, take some of the good war's greatest hits. *Casablanca* (1942), whose protagonist, Humphrey Bogart's Rick Blaine, turned out to be a Nazi-hating internationalist under his skeptical, lone wolf exterior. *Bataan* (1943), whose collective heroes, diverse members of an American combat unit, forged a common, democratic spirit as they battled Japanese in the Pacific. Or, the equally prototypical *Since You Went Away* (1944), whose star, Claudette Colbert, took a defense job and kept the home fires burning while awaiting her soldier-husband's safe return from overseas.

Surveys of wartime politics and culture – including Richard Polenberg's *War and Society* (1972) and John Morton Blum's *V Was for Victory* (1976) – set the stage for serious study of Hollywood's contributions. Blum, in particular, demonstrated that the movies people watched, not to mention the games they played and the radio programs they listened to, all involved issues of the highest importance: how those in power sold the war to the public, how consumers understood the world around them,

and how interests competed to define the above. In fact, Blum contended that the American wartime experience could not be fully understood without reference to popular culture. With Europe occupied, the Soviet Union and China invaded, and Britain bombed, only the continental United States remained unscathed by a war that occurred, quite literally, over there. The vast majority of Americans thus fought “on imagination alone,” and the mass media mediated the global conflagration for those fortunate civilians safely removed from its travails (Blum 1976, p. 16).

That paved the way for Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, coauthors of *Hollywood Goes to War* (1987). Still a go-to book on the subject, *Hollywood Goes to War* identified another reason for all those treacly pro-war movies. Newly released records enabled Koppes and Black to document how the US government, via the OWI, operated behind the scenes to manipulate American moviegoers in the name of victory. Washington, “convinced that movies had extraordinary power to mobilize public opinion for war, carried out an intensive, unprecedented effort to mold the content of Hollywood feature films,” they concluded (p. vii). Aware that Hollywood gave the United States an unmatched advantage, the OWI strove to sugarcoat the otherwise bitter propaganda pill by embedding messages within entertainment. Officials issued guidelines, reviewed scripts and prints, and pressured filmmakers to heed their advice. Studio executives cooperated even though they were not obligated to do so, especially once US authorities began to deny export licenses – tickets to overseas receipts – to OWI-disapproved pictures.

Scholars have since offered refinements. Thomas Doherty’s *Projections of War* (1999) argues that the studios’ strong support for the US war effort revised the unwritten “contract between Hollywood and American culture,” elevating the industry’s “social prestige and cultural cachet” (pp. 4, 13). *The Censored War* (1993), an incisive and distinctive contribution by George H. Roeder, Jr., draws attention to the extent to which US censors sanitized the American visual experience. Roeder demonstrates, in part through impressive visual essays, how authorities hid the war’s ugly human toll – physical injuries, psychological trauma, and death – from view. As a result, movies, photographs, and graphic design portrayed war as costless and celebrated the apparent ease with which Americans could exert their will in the world, an unfortunate lesson that contributed to subsequent US misadventures in Vietnam, Roeder concludes. In a similar vein, Michael C. C. Adams’s provocative *The Best War Ever* (1994) critiques Hollywood for misrepresenting reality. Such pictures as *Bataan*, Adams contends, bathed the American cause in sweetness and light, obscured battle’s actual hellishness, and mythologized the “good war,” contributing to a militaristic culture whose hubris eventually wasted the lives of Americans and Vietnamese alike a generation later. Susan A. Brewer has the latest word in *Why America Fights* (2009), a survey of US propaganda that discusses how World War II was sold to Americans as a fight against Axis slavery and for a freer, better future.

There are a growing number of exceptions to the rule of national studies. Comparative approaches date from the publication of Richard Taylor’s *Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany*, first published in 1979 (Taylor 1998), which found more similarities than not between history’s “most deliberate and consistent [manipulators] of public opinion through film” (p. 6). Michael Balfour’s *Propaganda in War* (1979) compared British and German propaganda but made scant reference to film. Fast-forward to 2007 and Jo Fox’s *Film Propaganda in Britain and Nazi Germany*, which illuminates some surprising similarities. The RMVP and MOI both navigated among

domestic moviemakers and moviegoers, leading each agency to satisfy those constituencies with commercial, escapist entertainment. Moreover, both ministries faced certain “generic problems” (p. 308), including justifying war aims, demonizing enemies, and persuading audiences not only at home but in neutral and allied countries, as well. All told, her findings blur “the distinction between democratic and authoritarian propaganda,” a line often too sharply and easily drawn (p. 12).

We need more such studies because they can respond to questions that haunt cultural history: So what? Does culture matter? Is culture ever causative? How does one answer such questions definitively? Or, to put a finer point on it: Did propaganda (a form of managed culture) help determine who won or lost World War II? Renowned British historian Richard Overly thinks it did. However inevitable the outcome may appear in hindsight, he writes in *Why the Allies Won* (1995), it was not a foregone conclusion at the time. Rather, fortunes turned on the superior ability of the Allies to translate both “economic strength into effective fighting power” and “the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win.” Specifically, and here is where film enters the equation, the Allies won the propaganda war insofar as they staked “the moral high ground” and defined theirs as a “just war against aggression.” Assured that God was on their side, in other words, the great Allied powers overcame deep “doctrinal and political differences,” found common cause, and achieved a degree of consensus that, although fragile, departed sharply from the “growing demoralization” and disunity among the Axis powers. “It is this contrast that helps to explain the eventual outcome of the war,” Overly concludes (pp. 15, 22–23, 286, 325).

Maybe Overly is correct; maybe he is not. In any case, we need to put his argument to the test by conducting more comparative analyses of the Allies, the Axis, and individual powers within each confederation. In retrospect, it now appears that the Allies’ – a forty-plus nation polyglot spread across the globe, disunited by language, and headed by an odd assortment of liberal or authoritarian, and white or nonwhite powers – improbable development of a common, albeit imperfect, identity was a major, but overlooked, turning point. A similar spirit clearly never developed among the Axis powers. Why? Did the Allies better share information and consciousness – on screen, over the airwaves, in print, and so on – in a way that bridged the divides among them? If so, how? Speaking more narrowly, did Hollywood make a bigger contribution to the cause relative to its Nazified German counterpart? Whereas German morale collapsed, Japanese spirits stayed high during the war’s final, desperate days. Not to overcomplicate things, but if that is true then does it not: (a) suggest that Japan’s media well performed their assigned duties; and (b) undercut Overly’s Eurocentric argument? Maybe not, but only comparative analyses can say for sure.

Let us return for a moment to Jo Fox, who observes that film propaganda was “reactive” in the sense that public diplomats the world over saw and “responded to one another’s work.” She writes:

Film propaganda did not solely operate in a national context. If the military war was global, so too was the battle for hearts and minds. We need to analyze how British film propaganda reacted to or drew upon German film propaganda and vice versa, and demonstrate the propagandistic interconnectivity of the two nations ... [W]hilst home propaganda operated within a specific internal context, it was also observed and noted by enemy and ally alike. (Fox 2007, p. 9)

Wartime persuasion, in other words, entailed a transnational exchange of images, perceptions, and technique. Propaganda was not made in a vacuum; developments beyond the nation's border shaped it, as well. That process merits closer and more sustained attention than it has received. To be sure, we have episodic accounts of opinion makers conversing. Goebbels's sophisticated film propaganda made a strong, if negative, impression on Anglo-American experts, who recoiled but applied some valuable lessons from it. Philip Taylor's survey *British Propaganda in the 20th Century*, for instance, recalls how *Film as a Weapon*, a British-made compilation of captured Nazi footage, made the rounds in London in 1941 and helped convince UK officials to take necessary countermeasures. Doherty's *Projections of War* devotes a chapter to Riefenstahl's contribution to the US war effort. Portions of her documentary masterpieces, *Triumph of the Will* and *Olympia* (1938), were "spliced into newsreels, War Department orientation films, and Hollywood features," thereby giving Americans images of an enemy they could hate (p. 18). Perhaps Capra, whose *Why We Fight* series made liberal use of repurposed German imagery, best explained the thinking behind this technique: "Let our boys hear the Nazis and the Japs shout their own claims of master-race crud," and thus demonstrate the "justness" of our cause by their very own words (Capra 1971, pp. 330–332).

While a good deal is known about domestic film propaganda, we are only just learning about overseas information campaigns, including that which occurred in the United States after 1939. Prior to that time, Hollywood productions kept mum regarding foreign crises. Economics determined Hollywood's neutrality. The studios earned about forty percent of their gross income abroad, and they remained silent so as not to offend paying customers anywhere. It did not go unnoticed, then, that the industry released a number of movies with anti-Nazi, pro-British, and interventionist themes in the two-plus years *prior* to the US declaration of war in December 1941. Isolationist Senator Gerald P. Nye declared, in 1941, that films had "ceased to be instruments of entertainment" and instead "become the most gigantic engines of propaganda in existence to rouse the war fever in America." Congressional anti-interventionists thus launched a sensational investigation that fall into allegations that Hollywood executives, White House officials, and British propagandists were all in league to push "our country on the way to war." Such accusations gained traction before ugly anti-Semitic remarks made by Nye and aviator Charles Lindbergh – both saw an international Jewish conspiracy behind Hollywood's politicking – delegitimized the inquiry, which quietly folded (Nye 1941; US Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce 1941).

Scholars have offered several possible explanations for Hollywood's tilt. Some point to personal politics. Refugees from Nazism (Pommer, Billy Wilder, and Marlene Dietrich, to name but several) and British expatriates flooded Hollywood during the thirties. Social scientists Harold Lavine and James Wechsler cited their influence in a 1940 book, *War Propaganda and the United States*, and a vast popular literature continues to speculate whether figures like Olivier, Howard, or Hitchcock somehow worked, officially, on London's behalf.

While one cannot deny that such talents shaped how particular films communicated, they generally had neither money nor power enough to determine what did (or did not) appear on screen. Only executives who owned the movie factories, wrote the checks, and controlled production in Hollywood's studio system possessed the

ability to set the industry's editorial line. (Charlie Chaplin provides a good example. His anti-Hitler spoof, *The Great Dictator*, made it to screen in 1940 not because Chaplin was a great actor but because he owned a share of United Artists, the distribution firm.) Michael E. Birdwell's *Celluloid Soldiers: The Warner Bros. Campaign against Nazism* (1999) recalled how and why Albert, Harry, and Jack Warner enjoined the fight. Jewish, like most movie moguls, the Warner brothers were justifiably opposed to Hitler's violent anti-Semitism. They joined the growing Hollywood Anti-Nazi League, a popular front-era political action organization, and their studio released *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (1939), the industry's first picture to take a clear position. The Warners' opposition to Hitler also manifested in support for Britain and US intervention: they joined Fight for Freedom, an interventionist pressure group, and produced *The Sea Hawk* (1940). The Warner brothers were not the only political activists willing to use the screen to make their views known. Other Fight for Freedom members included independent producer Walter Wanger and Daryl F. Zanuck, Twentieth Century-Fox's powerful production head, who respectively produced the interventionist features *Foreign Correspondent* (1940) and *Yank in the RAF* (1941).

"If you want to send a message, use Western Union." Producer Samuel Goldwyn's warning against onscreen lecturing serves as a reminder that studio executives were in the movie business not to educate but to make a buck. As fortune would have it, public service became profitable by the end of the 1930s. H. Mark Glancy, author of *When Hollywood Loved Britain* (1999), notes that shifts in the same European market that once kept Hollywood quiet gave voice to antifascism. At one time, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy were all important overseas markets for Hollywood. That began to change in 1933 when the National Socialist Party restricted American imports. Then, in 1940, Berlin banned Hollywood productions from all German-controlled areas, which by then included most of Europe. Rome mimicked Berlin's autarky, leaving Britain as Hollywood's single biggest foreign revenue source by a wide margin. The bottom line, not personal politics, most influenced the industry's editorial policy, writes Glancy, who concludes that "Hollywood's love for Britain," expressed in over 150 movies produced over more than a decade, "stemmed primarily from box-office considerations" (p. 6).

Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration gave industrialists another incentive to endorse the President's internationalist foreign policy, according to Richard Steele's *Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933-1941* (1985). In 1939, the US Department of Justice sued the major studios for violating antitrust law due to their control of the production, distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures (that case would go on to deal the majors a serious financial blow when the Supreme Court, in 1948, issued a decision requiring their divestiture of theater chains). Executives sought to quash the suit, and Harry and Jack Warner, so closely affiliated with the President that their firm was known as the "Roosevelt studio," asked Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest adviser, to intervene. Evidence suggests that Hopkins did so, brokering a July 1940 compromise that enabled the studios to hang onto their theaters in exchange for a pledge to support Roosevelt's foreign policy. This development encouraged Hollywood to take off its gloves, Steele argues. For evidence, he cites a subsequent memorandum written by Lowell Mellett, the White House's chief movie expert, who reported,

the motion picture industry is pretty well living up to its offers of cooperation. Practically everything being shown on the screen, from newsreel to fiction, that touches on our national purpose is of the right sort. And there is a lot of it, perhaps almost as much as the picture patrons can take. (Mellett 1941)

Nicholas Cull's *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American "Neutrality" in World War II* (1995) made an important discovery. Cull's research in US and UK archives – his binational research proved indispensable, as key British records conveniently went missing – revealed that Britain, indeed, conducted a transatlantic propaganda campaign from 1939 to 1941 to counteract US isolationism. Movies played an integral role in the multimedia effort. The MOI-financed *49th Parallel* was designed, in director Michael Powell's words, to "scare the pants off the Americans and bring them into the war sooner," cites Cull. Cooperative Hollywood studios provided "cover," as well, laundering otherwise objectionable British manipulation that, to the unwitting theatergoer, appeared to be mere homegrown news or entertainment as a result. Warner Bros. distributed *London Can Take It*, enabling 60 million Americans to witness the MOI documentary about the Blitz. And United Artists released Korda's feature *That Hamilton Woman*, a 1941 historical analog starring Vivien Leigh and Laurence Olivier. In any event, Cull concludes that the campaign "won the battle" for American public opinion, helping to make formal US intervention a matter of time (pp. 84, 199).

Cull's work was bookended, in 1997, by Brewer's *To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II*. Through impressive multinational research, Brewer documents British publicity targeting a friendly foreign country, the United States, and seeking not just to win the war but also to jockey for position in the postwar world. Anticipating Britain's peacetime eclipse by the United States, British officials touted the value of Anglo-American partnership and its extension beyond 1945. The MOI shaped *Mrs. Miniver* behind the scenes, for instance, a picture that stood out among many expressions of transatlantic solidarity. In the end, a new tradition was invented. Although an artificial construct in many respects, the "special relationship," Brewer argues, helped guide the transfer of geopolitical power from London to Washington in a way that served the latter's interest.

Let Cull's and Brewer's pathbreaking works be only the beginning of additional exploration of international propaganda. There is no comprehensive study of the OWI's Overseas Operations Branch, despite the fact that it maintained extensive foreign outposts and employed motion pictures and other media not only to inform Allied audiences about the United States but also to insinuate American culture abroad. Although the literature on cold war cultural warfare is extensive, far less is known about the USSR's or China's wartime efforts. J. D. Parks's *Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence: American-Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917–1958* (1983) and T. Christopher Jespersen's *American Images of China, 1931–1949* (1996) have sketched out the information programs conducted by each wartime ally in the United States. Both fine books are told from the recipient's perspective, however, and neither incorporates Soviet or Chinese archival sources. It is past time to fill in that gap.

Recently, cultural and film historians have revisited the Allied occupations of defeated Germany and Japan. Although beyond the chronological scope of this chapter, those postwar occupations are worth mentioning briefly if for no other reason

than that they shed light on a major disequilibrium in the literature on the war. Goldstein (2009), Fay (2008), and Fehrenbach (1995) have added to the growing body of work on the remarkable cultural turnaround performed by West Germany under the watch of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). OMGUS seized control of cinematic expression after Berlin's 1945 surrender. And its selected films landed a one-two punch – official documentaries confronted Germans with unforgettable visual evidence of the Third Reich's crimes against humanity; lighthearted Hollywood movies softened the mood – that helped reeducate and, then, reintegrate Germany into the Western orbit when cold war tensions arose.

Geopolitics demanded that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the US-dominated occupation authority headed by General Douglas MacArthur, change its foremost goal from reforming to rehabilitating Japan, as well. Hiroshi Kitamura's *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan* (2010) and Kyoko Hirano's *Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945–1952* (1992) detail SCAP's management of film, from its censorship of Japanese productions to the reintroduction of select Hollywood features, to achieve that fluctuating objective. Both works are among the rare exceptions to what Kitamura sees as the “transatlantic ... bias” of the extant English-language literature (p. xi). Anglophone scholars should redress that imbalance. Not only would it be revealing “to compare the Japanese experience with that of other national cinemas under foreign military and political control,” as Hirano speculates (p. 266). But the lack of transpacific studies also prevents us, Kitamura laments, “from fully comprehending the widespread impact of US cinema in much of the non-Western world” (p. xi).

English-speakers remain poorly informed about wartime cinema in the Pacific. That needs to be corrected. Only fragmentary details about the Chinese situation can be pieced together from the few existing sources. Chang-tai Hung's otherwise outstanding survey *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937–1945* (1994) hardly mentions film, except to say that the second Sino-Japanese War severely disrupted China's film industry (other than the USSR's, no nation's cinematic infrastructure was harder hit). Shanghai's vibrant trade came to a halt in 1937, and an acute shortage of materials and equipment slowed feature film production to a trickle until 1945. Like the USSR, the Republic of China did relocate what capacity survived to Chongqing, where newsreels continued to be made to stoke the resistance. US State Department and OWI records, meanwhile, reveal that theaters remained open in unoccupied areas, showing newsreels and prewar Chinese pictures, the odd pirated Hollywood feature, and documentaries supplied by US public diplomats.

More, but still not enough, is known about wartime Japanese cinema thanks to Barack Kushner's *The Thought War* (2006) and Peter B. High's *The Imperial Screen* (2003) among others. The Cabinet Board of Information's Ministry of Propaganda, a central body modeled after Goebbels's RMVP, nominally directed Tokyo's “thought war,” as elites called Japan's fight for ideological supremacy. In reality, Japanese propaganda emanated from several semi-autonomous sources, including the largest movie studios Toho, Shochiku, and Daiei. Governmental intervention nonetheless increased after the second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937. Protectionist measures reduced Hollywood imports, banned entirely after Pearl Harbor. The Film Law of 1939 established both censorship and propaganda requirements in order to improve

the “culture of the national population.” With such guidelines in place, movies lent unwavering support to Japan’s imperial wars against China, Southeast Asia, and the United States with the main thesis that all represented benevolent attempts to spread the blessings of Japan’s superior spirit. While High debates the extent to which filmmakers willingly collaborated with the militarist regime, Kushner credits films for keeping Japanese morale high long after the tide had turned against Tokyo. Japan’s war “lasted fifteen years and stretched to include virtually half the globe. A war of this magnitude ... demanded active participation from a population that believed in the cause,” writes Kushner, who adds that such “enthusiasm lasted well beyond the time when winning appeared as a salvageable option” (Kushner 2006, pp. 12, 18).

A critic could fault the existing literature for its tendency to employ a top-down methodology that places undue emphasis on film propaganda and institutions. It is important also to treat movies as commercial goods and cultural objects that moved, and were consumed, across international boundaries, often in ways only loosely connected or even contradictory to high policy. The international film market provides a case in point. To be sure, warzones, alliance systems, and overloaded transportation networks retarded the movement of motion pictures, which were far less mobile than radio. Yet, the movie traffic and its attendant international disputes continued. Hollywood had dominated the worldwide movie trade since the Great War, leading foreign critics to oppose and interwar governments to take protectionist steps against American imports. Ian C. Jarvie’s *Hollywood’s Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920–1950* (1992) and John Trumpbour’s *Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950* (2002) discuss the United Kingdom, whose economic and cultural struggle against Hollywood carried over into World War II despite its overriding diplomatic and military alliance with the United States. The Anglo-American film battle involved the highest officials in both Washington and London, and it was reignited by the belief among some Britons that monies expended on foreign pictures wasted the nation’s dwindling resources and currency reserves. In 1944, for instance, a Member of Parliament questioned the wisdom of expending precious specie on “second rate American films” when food was being rationed. “I have a great admiration for Mr. Humphrey Bogart,” he said. “But if I were compelled to choose between Bogart and bacon, I am bound to say I would choose bacon at the present time” (*London Daily Herald* 1945).

Commerce and policy collided in Nazi Germany, as well, according to Victoria de Grazia’s *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe* (2005). Despite Berlin’s systematic elimination of American imports from areas under its control, which grew to encompass most of continental Europe, Hollywood still exerted considerable influence within the Third Reich. Goebbels’s favored *Unterhaltungsfilme*, to take but one example, mimicked Hollywood’s famous style (recall the *Münchhausen* episode), proving that “[n]ot even the most self-isolating system was impervious” to the movie capital’s charms (p. 327).

For decades battling armies and conferring diplomats preoccupied historians who did not stop to consider, in Philip Taylor’s words, the “remarkably fluid” way in which “information flow[ed] amongst the combatants” (Taylor 1999, 177). Over the last twenty years or so, however, a historical vanguard has charted the war’s transnational cultural exchange that saw people, news, and ideas flow across borders more commonly

than one might expect. David Reynolds recalls the not altogether pleasant encounter between the 3 million US GIs stationed in Britain prior to D-day and their hosts in *Rich Relations* (1995). Fighting side-by-side broke down barriers and led to increased “contact” among Allied peoples, according to Frank Costigliola (1998). Meanwhile, Akira Iriye’s *Power and Culture* (1981) and John Dower’s *War Without Mercy* (1986) detail the culture clash that intensified Japanese-American conflict.

Adopting a transnational framework allows historians to trace where and how far film and filmmakers traveled, as well. As they become apparent, those patterns of movement unmoor cinema from a single, national context. And once that happens, movies seem less like mere playthings of domestic propagandists than dynamic cultural forces whose cosmopolitan production, international trade, and transnational consumption transmitted consciousness around the world. Two anthologies – Nicholas Pronay and D. W. Spring’s *Propaganda, Politics, and Film, 1918–45* (1982) and K. R. M. Short’s *Film & Radio Propaganda in World War II* (1983) – set scholars in motion three decades ago. Although neither explicitly drew transnational connections, both adopted a wide perspective by considering film propaganda across the globe, from Asia to Europe to North America. Another anthology, 1994’s *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939–1945* coedited by David Reynolds, Warren Kimball, and A. O. Chubarian, took advantage of the Soviet Union’s collapse to include Russian scholars and thereby further internationalize the history of World War II. *Allies at War* featured an essay by Mikhail Narinsky and Lydia V. Pozdeeva, mapping the inter-allied exchange of imagery and ideas, an interaction that operated semi-independently of high policy and helped frame popular experience in each country (Narinsky and Pozdeeva 1994).

M. Todd Bennett, *One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, the Allies, and World War II* (2012) examines how movies circulated among, and helped knit together, America, Britain, China, and the USSR. To be sure, that process involved domestic propaganda. The OWI, for instance, asked Hollywood to make Americans fonder of their British, Chinese, and Soviet comrades with *Thunder Birds* (1942), *Dragon Seed* (1944), and *The North Star* (1943), among dozens of pictures. But it also involved multilateral communication. Newsreels and documentaries – including an English-language version of the Soviet-made *The Defeat of the German Armies near Moscow* – circulated among the Allies, conveying information about distant theaters of battle. Anglo-American authorities jointly set propaganda policy and coproduced combat documentaries like *The True Glory* (1945), a record of the Normandy landings. And the USSR lifted a ban on foreign films, opening itself to Hollywood pictures for the first time since the 1920s. By 1945, all this and much more had amplified the experience of fighting successfully alongside one another, contributing to a sense of allied brotherhood in a world interconnected as never before.

Miscommunication increased when films crossed international boundaries, however, and foreign audiences often arrived at interpretations unexpected or unwanted by producing elites. Some Soviet audiences saw Warner Brothers’ *Mission to Moscow* (1943), a movie so pro-Soviet that the House Un-American Activities Committee later investigated the studio, as an advertisement for free market capitalism when it played in the USSR as part of Roosevelt’s charm offensive. Szechwan farmers came away from a cinematic agricultural demonstration organized by US public diplomats less admiring of Iowan knowhow than skeptical of American honesty

because, as cultural attaché (and spouse of Harvard's noted China expert, John K. Fairbank) Wilma Fairbank observed, the onscreen livestock seemed too huge to be true (Fairbank 1976, p. 148).

All of which leads to the final matter of reception. For too long, historians of film have written top-down stories that privilege cinematic texts and the institutions and figures that produce them. Versed in the latest histories of consumption – including those by Jacobs (2005), Cohen (2003), and Kroes, Rydell, and Bosscher (1993) – future scholars should turn film history on its head by exploring reception across space, first and foremost. Gauging reception is difficult because box-office customers leave behind few records attesting to their movie-going experiences. But students should read sensitively what materials are available – fanzines and reviews, attendance statistics and social scientific studies, and real-time reports made by the RMVP, the OWI, or Mass Observation, for starters – that give voice to hundreds of millions of past fans. For only by doing so can scholars get inside people's heads, to the extent that such a thing is possible, and thus determine the what, how, and why: What sense did consumers make of what appeared onscreen? How did people negotiate with cinematic texts? Why did they accept, reject, or adapt elites' creations? And it is only by better answering such questions that scholars can respond to skeptics, prone to ask of cultural history: So what? What effect did movies have? Did they create or merely reflect the zeitgeist? Did films affect the way viewers thought and behaved?

It appears that wartime audiences, be they Muscovites watching *Mission to Moscow* or Szechwan seeing US documentaries, were not as spellbound by the big screen as elites assumed. It is there, geographically and cognitively speaking, where the new frontiers yawn. The next big things regarding research on World War II (and beyond) in film will be discovered by those whose international scope, multinational research, cultural method, and bottom-up narrative explore the moveable space between onscreen texts and spectators' imaginations.

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PART V

Homelands

CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE

The Balkans in the Origins of World War II

MARIETTA STANKOVA

Discussing the Balkans in World War II is no less infused by theoretical and methodological difficulties than the analysis of the history of the region in any other period of the twentieth century, and modern times indeed. An initial significant issue is that of definition and delineation, as tangible tensions persist between notions emanating from geography, history, and politics. Not only are there varying local and external views as to which territories and nations should be considered “of the Balkans” but it is often impossible to disentangle developments on the peninsula from those in the larger Eastern Europe, itself a complicated and volatile term. Even more importantly, a conscious effort is required to overcome the pervasive stereotype of an isolated and peculiar corner of Europe governed by primordial ethnic disputes and rapacious territorial aggression. Such a concept could easily be turned into a complete and only explanation of the involvement of the Balkan states and people in World War II, repeating the reasons for earlier – and later – armed conflicts. Indeed, the postcommunist violence in what has recently been termed “the Western Balkans” has fueled abundant scholarly and general attention and led to frequent presentation of the World War II period as part of historic trends that originated earlier and lasted longer. Conversely, as World War II is an enduring topic of interest and debates rage around some of its fundamental events and features, the Balkans are treated in two distinctive ways – either in case studies exploring a particular problem often through the prism of an individual country, or as one region evolving in the course of a longer historic period. However, in the last two decades no integrated work has emerged reflecting on the experience of the peninsula in World War II as a whole.

More often than not, the role of the Balkan region in World War II evokes the problem of continuity with the previous three-quarters of a century, most notably with the outcome of World War I. The majority of authors are compelled to revisit the consequences of the Versailles Treaty, which failed to bring peace and stability to the region but instead accentuated the traumas of the earlier Balkan wars. Indeed,

overviews and specialized works alike construct an almost direct link between the two world wars. This is the approach demonstrated in volumes covering to a different extent "the age of extremes," (Hobsbawm 1994) notable among which are Gallagher's *Outcast Europe* (2001), Crampton's *The Balkans since the Second World War* (2002), and Pavlowitch's *A History of the Balkans* (1999; see also Pavlowitch 2008). As Crampton dwells briefly on aspects of World War II as prelude to the cold war period, he has also chosen to exclude from coverage Turkey whose center of gravity he finds outside Europe. In Prazmowska's *Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War* (2000), the Balkans appear as one part of a wider area where only Romania is considered on its own but Greece and Turkey are mentioned in passing. In contrast, Gallagher's scope is much wider and fluctuates through the different parts of the book, often illustrating the inextricable links of Balkan politics and especially foreign policy with what is often termed Eastern and Central Europe. A similar longer-term stance is often adopted in monographs dealing with the domestic developments and foreign policies of specific states, as for instance Lampe's *Yugoslavia as History* (1996) and Fischer's *Albania at War* (1999).

The involvement of the Balkan states in World War II is an unlikely episode through which to probe their image of notoriety. Although hostilities did not originate there, the Balkan neighbors were divided and suspicious of one another throughout the interwar period; once war broke out, they seemed to contribute relatively little to the strategic military efforts of their great-power allies but instead focused on fulfilling their unrelenting nationalist aspirations. Most were also soon engrossed in a civil war of varying length and brutality which hindered resistance to the Axis. Indeed, the ethnic clashes that were unleashed under occupation and the mistreatment of minorities are the aspect that such a renowned scholar of the region as Mazower (2000) has chosen to highlight in his brief dealing with World War II in his short history of the Balkans. Recognizing the reasons for the label of endemic nationalism, Gallagher interprets Balkan unrest and conquest as engendered by a combination of indigenous and external forces, so that outside interference exacerbated local disputes "giving them a value they might not otherwise have had" (Gallagher 2001, p. ix). He builds the case by showing that in the interwar period the Western democracies held stereotypical attitudes to the Balkans and claims that it was Western miscalculation and cynicism that made it impossible for the Balkans to stay outside the conflict (Gallagher 2001). For Prazmowska (2000), the policies of the major European powers were also unsurprisingly self-centered. She clarifies that France, the engineer and beneficiary of the establishment in 1920–1921 of the Little Entente, in which Romania and Yugoslavia joined with Czechoslovakia, was nevertheless adamant that the alliance should not be strengthened to the detriment of relations with Italy, which should at all times be discouraged from associating with Germany. At the same time, France's Balkan protégés are portrayed as remaining committed to their regional territorial disputes rather than the building of an anti-German bloc. One powerful reason for this, in the light of the Locarno treaty of October 1925, was the concern, if not certainty, that France would be willing to entertain the possibility of revision of borders to the east of Germany. Attempting to enhance its security, France concluded accords for consultation in the event of aggression with Romania in 1926 and Yugoslavia in 1927, followed by modest arms deliveries, all the while aware that these gestures allayed few fears. Prazmowska's analysis of Britain's interest in the area during

the early period exposes it as sporadic, often precipitated by France's actions – which she notes did not mean that the two were able to synchronize their policies.

The picture that emerges, therefore, is one of Western aloofness rather than active interference, of a Balkan policy determined by the priorities of relations to the west of the Trieste–Gdansk line (Lampe 1996; Prazmowska 2000; Gallagher 2001). However, some authors find it also worthwhile to question the assumption – not infrequently promoted by the small nations themselves – that they were merely the object of the European power politics. Prazmowska's work is permeated by doubts over the inability of small powers to determine their own fate, and her efforts are directed at showing that even as the Balkans were ultimately caught – with the rest of Eastern Europe – in international crises beyond their control, they were “active if not always willing” contributors to tensions (Prazmowska 2000, p. ix).

It is undeniable that there were moments of cooperation in the Balkans, albeit few and far between. One example underlined by Gallagher is the Bulgarian Agrarian Prime Minister Alexander Stamboliyski's search for conciliation with Yugoslavia in 1921–1923 in order to break out of regional isolation and as a way of dealing with domestic challenges from nationalists and communists. But acknowledging this somehow underplays the fact that the next episode of warming Bulgarian–Yugoslav relations did not take place until the mid-1930s. He reminds that in the early 1930s, no fewer than five conferences of all Balkan states mapped out measures for economic and cultural cooperation, even though some of the fundamental issues such as Macedonia were too sensitive to be addressed at such forums. In the meantime, Greek–Turkish rapprochement was codified in agreements in 1930 and 1933. Crampton is one of the few historians who mention that – against another stereotype, the Balkans were also the scene of a rare success of the League of Nations, which resolved a dispute between Bulgaria and Greece in 1925. The Montreux Convention of 1936, which allowed Turkey to fortify the Mediterranean Straits and remilitarize its European borders, was only possible because both the major European powers, including Russia and all Turkey's neighbors, approved it. In Gallagher's line of argument, the convention was a major development because it constituted a multilateral voluntary revision of the post-World War I order (Gallagher 2001).

Speculations are legitimate as to whether such advances were significant or temporary, most scholars implicitly inclining towards the latter given that nationalist objectives did not disappear. In the complex web of Balkan relations, improvement on a bilateral basis did not necessarily have positive consequences for the whole region: such a view is primarily expressed when detailing events from the vantage point of a particular nation. Petrov (2001) does so with regards to the issue of the Turkish demilitarized zone and its effects on Bulgaria. Unlike more comprehensive works such as Seydi's (2003), Petrov follows exclusively the evolution of Bulgaria's relations to the south. The Greek–Turkish agreement of September 1933 fixed the frontier between the two but simultaneously it curtailed Bulgaria's hope for economic access to the Aegean as provided by the peace treaty. Bulgaria's suspicions were raised despite – or because of – the fact that it was scheduled to renew its neutrality treaty with Turkey only a week later. After all, in 1934, the so-called Balkan Entente was founded with the undisguised aim of containing Bulgarian revisionism. Therefore, Bulgaria's adherence to Montreux is judged by Petrov to be making virtue out of necessity, fully conscious that it had few other useful options. This is a different assessment to the consensus expounded by Gallagher and Seydi but it

also accepts that the act marked the beginning of further efforts towards reconciliation (Gallagher 2001; Seydi 2003). Bulgaria first signed a friendship treaty with Yugoslavia in January 1937, followed in July 1938 by the Salonika agreement with the Balkan Entente which abandoned the military clauses of the Neuilly and Lausanne treaties. These undertakings were indicative of the repositioning in the Balkans, more clearly of Turkey rather than Bulgaria. They were also welcome by Britain, whose interest was in a stable and united region that would be a barrier against adversarial penetration. Driven by exigencies of diplomacy and security, they were never meant to address the controversial status quo which was at the heart of the nationalist dilemma across the region.

Improved relations with the neighbors almost invariably meant forsaking coveted lands or oppressed national minorities – policies unacceptable to highly vocal and active radical nationalist organizations such as the Bulgarian IMRO or the Croat Ustaša, who were extremely subversive. This aspect is most authoritatively developed by Lampe (1996) on the example of Yugoslavia and an overview can be found in Crampton's earlier work on Eastern Europe (1994). Influenced by their domestic radicals the Balkan states sought to seize any moment of weakness of their neighbors, simultaneously providing opportunity for the European powers for manipulating local ambitions. Prazmowska (2000) detects such functional attitudes in Romania's policy: its links with France were most developed but it was equally open to cooperation with Italy, Germany, and occasionally the Soviet Union in its quest for preserving its expanded borders. Further, Prazmowska and Crampton endorse the long-existing consensus that Bulgaria, which portrayed the loss of territory as a national catastrophe, was driven almost exclusively by the desire for revision of the punishing peace treaty: in the later 1920s, it maintained good relations with Italy which seemed to offer support, itself guided by ambitions over Yugoslavia and Albania. When Bulgaria later reoriented towards Germany, it was equally led by economic necessities and renewed hope of border adjustment. The corollary, however, emphasized by Prazmowska was that Bulgaria was not deemed of sufficient importance to justify British or French investment in either economic or diplomatic terms (Crampton 1994; Prazmowska 2000). Nuances of this view are elaborated to an extent by Livanios (2008) who strives to disentangle the infamous Macedonian question and the attention it attracted from British policy-makers on the eve of war. What has transpired then from recent scholarship is that great-power interference is a recurring and potent, but not exclusive, explanation of the Balkans' entry in World War II. Because the region was still ridden with a range of territorial, ethnic, and economic problems, it did not simply provide a field for maneuver but also actively pursued European engagement.

As the Nazis rose to power in Germany and began implementing a domestic and foreign policy agenda driven by nationalism, rearmament, and treaty-revision, they almost immediately began exploring the opportunities afforded by the intricate Balkan economic and political situation. But the advent of steady German interest in the area was preceded by the activity of Fascist Italy. The robust literature that traces Mussolini's imperial ambitions sheds significant light on how these complicated the Balkan internal and international landscape. Fischer and Gooch concur that Italy had identified Albania and parts of Yugoslavia as an area for economic and strategic expansion already in the early 1920s, noticing considerable continuity of Mussolini's approach with previous liberal policy. The Corfu affair in August 1923 and the annexation of Fiume from Yugoslavia in March 1924 are among the first examples of an accelerating drive to make

the Mediterranean an Italian sea (Fischer 1999; Gooch 2002). Gooch and Knox agree that looking eastward Mussolini was also guided by a military aggressiveness which he saw as critical to the fascist doctrine (Knox 2000; Gooch 2002). In the late 1920s, diplomatic overtures in the Balkans were combined with a quest for ideological influence and political partnership with rightist nationalists. The topic has been sporadically researched only by local scholars, for instance Migeu (1996) who outlines the authoritarian and fascist trends in interwar Bulgaria and Velichkova (2002) who is mostly interested in the propaganda of fascism. Thus there is insufficient understanding of the extent to which such domestic factors affected the foreign policy choices of the Balkan states.

An assessment of the importance of links with the extreme right in the region as opposed to dealing with the Balkan governments is mostly lacking. However, Gooch and Knox show that, aiming for the encirclement of Yugoslavia, Italy concentrated on forging closer official links with Bulgaria and Romania; good relations with Turkey were sought in view of Italian ambitions regarding Greece. As early as the winter 1932/1933, Mussolini believed that a sudden attack on Yugoslavia was possible (Knox 2000; Gooch 2002). By then, Italy had obtained almost total monopoly of Albanian economy, as evidenced, for instance, by the controlling share of the Albanian national bank. According to Fischer's persuasive account Albania's ruler Ahmet Zog was largely able to maintain his power by patronage that was financially underpinned by Italy; this is accentuated also in other works on Albania in the interwar period (Vickers 2001; Tomes 2003). But in this marshaling of power, an element can be detected of a small state seeking to make the most of a difficult predicament and choosing the better financial deal as the minute Albania only attracted the attention of its neighboring states (Lampe 1996; Fischer 1999).

In his study on the Mediterranean in the origins of World War II, Salerno approaches the question differently. He highlights the seamless link between the Balkan Peninsula and the eastern Mediterranean, perceiving the latter as intrinsic to Italian national identity, essential in French foreign policy but only instrumental in British imperial and defense strategy. As Britain considered no contingency for war in the Mediterranean until 1935, Italian schemes were unhindered. On the other hand, believing in the similarity of his and Hitler's ideologies, Mussolini was emboldened by the prospect that Italian consolidation in southeastern Europe was compatible with German domination of central-eastern Europe (Salerno 2002). Yet even though Salerno views Hitler as showing loyalty to his ally, he also echoes some of Prazmowska's assertions that gradually Italy's moves in the Adriatic and the Balkans brought it in friction with the spreading German influence. Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, in particular, was anxious to prevent Yugoslavia from associating exclusively with Germany, and so in March 1937, an agreement was signed leading to the restraint of Italian efforts for the destabilization of Yugoslavia through the activities of Croatian nationalists. However, France felt increasingly undermined in its eastern alliances, and responded by overtures to draw Greece and Turkey nearer – an apt illustration of Salerno's supplementary thesis of the knock-on effect of most diplomatic acts in the Balkans (Prazmowska 2000; Salerno 2002).

Moreover, Salerno shows that every subsequent German achievement in 1938–1939 precipitated advances by Mussolini: the *Anschluss* triggered intensified Italian approaches to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria; the Munich agreement activated Italian plans for the invasion of Albania in full awareness that these would antagonize

Yugoslavia. Consequently, while looking to rebalance the German–Italian partnership, and even hoping that Germany would abstain from increasing its stake in these countries to the benefit of Italy, Mussolini consciously escalated tensions in the Balkans and the adjoining regions. Italy had been supplying materiel to Turkey which was also able to obtain armaments credit from Britain in May 1938 as well as a friendship agreement plus a secret military accord with France the following July (Salerno 2002).

There is consensus in the literature that Mussolini's hopes for an ideological and strategic partnership with Hitler hardly influenced the manner and timing of Germany's moves to the southeast until the war had started. Indeed, Germany's renewed interest in the Balkans, especially in terms of trade, preceded Hitler's advent to power; and already in 1932 France had advocated forestalling it through a Danubian union based on a common customs system. In the second half of the 1930s, Germany's growing foreign economic activism took a more concerted form. The initiative for responding to it passed to the British, who were instantly alert to its political and international consequences.

Boyce has highlighted the importance of economics for the origins of World War II but there has been little new research on this aspect in relation to the Balkans (Kaiser 1980; Boyce 2002). Although the results of Germany's economic penetration in the Balkans may have been more perceived than real – at least until 1938 – it was significant for being equally an element in Germany's plans for economic recovery and a new eastern diplomatic orientation. Direct German trade and financial negotiations with the Little Entente were meant and seen by the Western powers as weakening the existing order in Eastern Europe, which could not fail to have wider implications. Validating Barker's earlier research, Prazmowska demonstrates conclusively that even as they were guided by desire to preclude the Balkans from falling under the exclusive influence of hostile powers, the Western democracies found it extremely hard to formulate appropriate and feasible reactions. The Foreign Office, for one, discussed endlessly the merit of economic actions for political reasons and continued to vacillate between possible options until in late 1938, and then the Treasury precluded it from taking a stance by categorically refusing loans to the Balkan governments for political purposes. One argument was that some of these governments, for instance, Romania, were considered in default of previous financial obligations (Barker 1976; Prazmowska 2000). That Germany's economic schemes took roots across the Balkans is highlighted without exception by authors mapping out the broad trends leading to World War II; Gallagher is among the few who note the concurrent "energetic attempts to promote German culture" – which were doubly significant as they met with precious little counteraction from Britain and France (Gallagher 2001, p. 106).

Case studies of individual Balkan states' relations with Germany on the eve of World War II are not common and consequently extremely interesting. Haynes (2000) analyzes Romanian policy towards Germany, offering the rarer perspective of the evolution of the small power in relation to the big; this is all the more significant as uniquely, Romania had reserves of oil, a strategic commodity. The picture that appears is not entirely unexpected but it is nuanced: it clearly shows that throughout the 1930s, Romania was conducting a multisided pragmatic foreign policy underpinned by diverse objectives. While the paramount interest of securing Romanian borders, especially to the east, was addressed by Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu's persistent

efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, economic needs were tackled through a treaty with Germany in March 1935. Conciliating the Soviets had the side effect of marring relations with erstwhile friendlier neighbors, including Yugoslavia, but mostly reflected concerns over France's commitment to the status quo. Continuous with Prazmowska's assertions, Haynes exposes the inability of France, Romania's nominal patron, to offer a reliable economic partnership, for instance, by absorbing Romanian agricultural surplus among the motives for moving closer to the resurgent Germany (Haynes 2000). With regards to Greece, a similar argument is unfolded by Pelt whose approach is distinctly based on the intersection between economic and diplomatic history. Through fascinating original analysis of the link between tobacco trade and arms industry, forceful evidence is given of German economic penetration preceding preparations for war. This is accompanied by the novel assertion that it also determined the political evolution of the country, in particular the Metaxas regime. Simultaneously, although British financial and strategic interest in Greece was the strongest in the region, the Foreign Office struggled to find suitable countermeasures. However, Pelt makes the vital distinction that unlike the majority of the region Greece was not singularly dependent on Germany (Pelt 1998).

Aware that traditionally, party politics in the Balkans often revolved around the foreign orientation of personalities, another of Haynes's contributions is to bring into the picture the seemingly opposite trends favored by different groups of the Romanian ruling elite. She traces the process through which – despite the conscious effort for balanced relations – throughout 1936–1937, the pro-German inclination gradually began to dominate Romanian politics. It was initially defined largely by a new economic accord in December 1937, which envisaged the increase of trade volume by a third. However, German armaments deliveries which Romania also agreed to were hardly just a commercial proposition, especially since Romania had already objected in the spring to a proposed pact between France and the Little Entente. Yugoslavia also did so for similar reasons. In this context, of the greatest international implication was the fact that in talks with the Western Allies, Romania firmly refused to contemplate giving Soviet troops transit rights. It rendered – in conjunction with the similar Polish stand – diplomatic and military negotiations between the Soviets and the West for collective security impracticable, if not meaningless. By the time of the Sudeten crisis Romania was “desperately” attempting to avoid its obligations towards Czechoslovakia (Haynes 2000).

Haynes makes it clear that the origins of Romania's mounting economic dependence on Germany cannot be convincingly explained solely as the result of pressure by the latter. By the time Germany's rising power became a primary European force, the pattern of its trade and credit links was well established: this is widely confirmed in surveys of its links also with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Turkey (Deringil 1989; Crampton 1994; Lampe 1996). In the case of Romania each of Germany's subsequent diplomatic feats, namely the agreements for oil export in December 1938 and for agricultural and industrial supplies in March 1939 also held distinct military undertones because Romanian products would be offset by armaments deliveries including aircraft. Haynes underscores that all of these arrangements were energetically prepared and judged as beneficial by the Romanian government. In fact, the newly appointed Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu aimed at using the growing economic cooperation as a step towards a closer political relationship after the disappointment with the Western democracies in the wake of the Munich conference (Haynes 2000).

The assertion that British interests in the Balkans in general were governed by reaction to developments rather than active strategy is confirmed by a number of authors. Prazmowska and Pelt, looking at Romania and Greece respectively, are in agreement that in 1938, as part of a larger evaluation, Britain began reconsidering its economic relationships with the region. In the former case, although increased imports of wheat and petroleum became possible and desirable, the two sides' objectives are seen to be completely at odds: Britain's moves were governed by the necessity to prevent Germany from capitalizing on its progress whereas Romania was looking for further economic benefits without political strings, and became especially wary of mutual assistance pacts (Prazmowska 2000). In the latter case, Greece is presented as balancing between the great powers and preserving a significant degree of independence long after the outbreak of war. Moreover, Pelt uniquely claims that Germany tolerated this state of affairs as it planned to use Greece for opening up the Middle East (Pelt 1998).

Relations with the Soviet Union are logically among the most persistent themes for analysis of developments in the Balkans on the eve of World War II. Haynes and Prazmowska are in accord that Romania's priority was to preserve its post-World War I territorial set-up and it was most disturbed by the Soviet Union's obvious reluctance to confirm the status quo in Bessarabia. It is ironic that, since none of the neighbors at whose expense Romania had enlarged were prepared to relinquish their claims, the nation tried to look for support from the arch-revisionist, Germany. Haynes illustrates the centrality of the issue with Romania's acceptance of concessions regarding the situation of its German minority but she also proves that the process was not one-sided. In late 1938, Hitler was more concerned with the next oil-for-arms agreement rather than the fate of his ideological followers and such a pragmatic attitude allowed the Romanian King Carol to eliminate the pro-Nazi Iron Guard from the political scene (Prazmowska 2000; Haynes 2000). Picking up the story where Haynes ends, Deletant asserts that after September 1940 General Ion Antonescu was equally driven by hardheaded considerations of German support for his priority of regaining what had been lost to the Soviet Union (Deletant 2006). Thus, the scrutiny of the motives and mechanisms for increased German influence reveals that on numerous occasions the Balkans were active and ready participants in the process; this is not to deny that their choices were much narrowed as war approached.

The historiography of the origins of World War II has always noted the importance of the reinvigoration of Soviet foreign policy in response to the dramatic changes in Germany and Western Europe in 1933–1935. A corollary of this is the undisputed notion that the new Soviet activism was quick to affect the pace and substance of the situation developing in the Balkans. It was only then that some governments established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (Bulgaria in 1934, for instance). However, this was equally the result of domestic political restructuring as of external influences and could not be construed as a conscious search for alternatives, except perhaps for new economic contacts. In turn, the Soviet search for collective security against the escalating German danger, of which Haslam's account remains the most thorough and thoughtful, was primarily and naturally focused on relations with the French and British (Haslam 1984). Still, the Balkans were the zone of immediate and historically enduring concern due to their geographic continuity with Soviet territories but also because they were the hinterland of the Mediterranean Straits. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Soviet Union's efforts in the mid-1930s were directed to the countries

it bordered, namely Romania and Turkey and to a lesser degree Bulgaria which was also relatively near, across the Black Sea.

Roberts is the most eloquent proponent of the argument that Soviet diplomatic dealings with these states were meant not only to stabilize the region but also to include it in the larger European framework (Roberts 1995). The flip side as revealed by Prazmowska was that the Western democracies, too, encouraged their eastern partners towards a parallel rapprochement with the Soviets. Exclusively on the basis of Soviet–Romanian relations, Prazmowska corroborates Robert’s view that in the Balkan context, as elsewhere, the USSR practiced *realpolitik* – although small and big powers alike were guided by fear of Soviet aggression and aversion to communism. Carley and Roberts demonstrate forcefully that the misperception of Soviet motives was entrenched in the outlook of British and French policy-makers; the same can be said of the leading Balkan politicians who remain on the margins of these articulate enquiries (Roberts 1989; Carley 1999).

Historiographical attention returns to the Balkans with the advance of historic events. The Munich conference served as a vivid illustration – if such was further necessary – of the perils of overreliance on the big powers. Carley highlights evidence that Romania’s refusal of passage to the Soviet Army and Air Force on their way to fulfill obligations to Czechoslovakia was mellowing, yet this was not appreciated by the French or followed up by the Soviets since both were highly suspicious of the other (Carley 1999). Apart from this tension, and fleeting insinuations that the Bulgarian King Boris might have influenced Hitler to accept a peaceful solution to the Sudeten question, the role of the Balkan states at the time of Munich is largely assumed to be passive. Although Boris was a known procrastinator, in the circumstances it was not irrational to try to delay the necessity of committing to a side in a looming but not yet crystallized conflict.

Of more interest to Balkan scholars is the effect of Hitler’s attack on the rump Czechoslovakia in mid-March 1939. This brought forcefully to the attention of the Western powers and the Soviet Union the urgency of clarifying their strategy for southeastern Europe. The situation was exacerbated when the first military theater in the Balkans opened by Italian aggression against Albania on April 7, 1939. Fischer questioned why Mussolini needed to invade a country, which was “totally subjugated anyway,” finding the answer in the fascist regime’s craving for an unequivocal foreign victory as well as a demonstration that it could match Germany’s expansionist drive (Fischer 1999, pp. 20–21). The fact that Albania’s case simply attracted no support from any other big power should not be overlooked either. In Salerno’s analysis, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain saw Italy’s aggression as a sign of division with Germany, which is perhaps the reason why Britain only expressed concern with the general peace. In the same vein Fischer and Prazmowska stress that no member of the Balkan Entente responded to King Zog’s plea for help (Fischer 1999; Prazmowska 2000). Concerned with Italy’s longer-term outlook, Gooch ascertains that in reality, the Italian plans envisaged also the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and attacks on Greece and Romania, even though the latter was gravitating towards Germany. Salerno confirms this and shows that Mussolini was soon encouraged by the Pact of Steel in May 1939, which to him signaled German readiness to fight. So, he was determined in his resolve to take a further share in Greece and Yugoslavia (Gooch 2002; Salerno 2002).

The negotiations between the Western democracies and Soviets culminated in the latter's offer on April 17 for a comprehensive mutual assistance pact to cover the Baltics, the Balkans, and Poland. While this is one of the most controversial episodes in the approach of World War II, of interest here is that Britain and France, for once, were apparently inclined to explore opportunities for Balkan collective action. Following through ideas from Barker and Deringil, Catherwood views the whole idea as practically a nonstarter, with Britain's decision not to press Rumania or Greece to make concessions to Bulgaria as indicative that preserving the goodwill of the Balkan Entente countries' was ultimately more important than securing Bulgaria. In asserting that Bulgaria, which was left as a target for both Germany and Russia, naturally preferred Germany, he misses some significant detail, namely that the Soviets also supported Bulgarian territorial claims while the Bulgarian government emphasized historic links with Russia when it suited them but equally dreaded world communism (Catherwood 2003).

Scholars of Romanian policy agree that it had even less scope for maneuver as it feared the USSR and mistrusted the continuing Western-Soviet talks. For Prazmowska, Romania attempted to continue to balance, when on March 23, 1939, it extended its economic agreement with Germany while on April 13 – together with Greece – it was covered by unilateral guarantee from Britain and France. Crucially in this view, the guarantee would not operate against Romania's most immediate threat, the Soviet Union, and might even have been regarded by King Carol as an instrument to obtain a more comprehensive German guarantee (Prazmowska 2000). For Catherwood, this episode reveals, in particular, Britain's weakness, as London made unsubstantiated gestures to countries it could not help but completely failed to secure Turkey (Catherwood 2003). For Salerno, the April guarantees were undertaken by France more as a measure of deterrence rather than a demonstration of decisiveness regarding the Balkans. He also highlights the interesting detail that, while the British were still examining the idea for a Balkan neutrality pact, they contemplated associating Italy with it. This option was abandoned, mainly because of Turkish suspicions, but it illuminates the British approach to the Balkan dilemma. Salerno uniquely perceives an element of appeasement to Italy which endured much longer than toward Germany, with the goal of sowing discord among the Axis powers (Salerno 2002).

Scholars agree on the supreme importance of Turkey's participation for the success of any multilateral regional scheme. As the Balkan bloc failed to materialize, the West anticipated a second-best option whereby Turkey would join in the guarantees of Poland and Romania. Seydi (2003) and Catherwood (2003) both consider that this was undermined by a parallel Soviet initiative to Ankara, and was whittled down to a British-Turkish interim agreement on May 12 for cooperation in case of threats to the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, Turkey was under pressure from Germany to stay neutral unless military supplies and economic aid halted. On the other hand, Deringil's work (1989) discerns in this episode above all Turkish resolve to stand independent of commitments to either of its Balkan neighbors or the West. Roberts's insight into Soviet thinking leads him to conclude that the erosion of the concept of collective inclined Moscow first towards a neutral Balkan pact to resist both Germany and the West, in which a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would be pivotal. In the absence of that development, the idea of Turkish neutrality was raised, including closure of the Straits (Roberts 1995). If a collective view can be derived from these slightly varying approaches, it must be that of a combination of Balkan states' own

intransigence and attempts to balance between the big powers while Western and Soviet tactics in the area mirrored one another.

Britain, France, and the USSR reached a stalemate in the discussions for a political and military pact of mutual assistance in mid-August 1939. There is general acceptance that the talks had evidenced distrust on all sides, although the jury is still out on whether the responsibility for the eventual failure resides in Western anticommunism and appeasement or Stalin's imperial aspirations and desire to see the capitalist powers clash with one another. What is undeniably clear is that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that ensued on August 23, 1939 marked a sudden change of dramatic magnitude for the Balkans, as it did for the rest of Europe. Although authors such as Prazmowska suggest that Stalin was predominantly driven by anxiety about Germany's pressure to the east, most Balkan governments harbored genuine alarm of a possible Soviet drive to the west and southwest, reminiscent of perennial Great Russian strategic aspirations (Prazmowska 2000). Indeed, Haslam shows that the Balkans did feature in the discussions between the Soviet Union and Germany as part of a prospective settlement for a much larger area between the Baltic and the Black seas (Haslam 1984). Roberts, too, shows that Stalin's goal of securing a mutual assistance pact with Turkey was variously shaped by the changing position with regards to the European powers. Accordingly, the Soviet-Nazi alliance led Moscow to exert pressure on Turkey to accept clauses debarring Soviet involvement in war with Germany, as well as to abstain from a pact with the West (Roberts 1989).

From their different vantage points, Deringil, Seydi, Roberts, and Gorodetsky all agree that the Turks worried simultaneously about a threat from Germany and the evident Soviet attempt to gain more influence over the regime of passage of the Straits, to the detriment of non-regional belligerents. This is why it ended up breaking the talks with the Soviets and concluding an agreement with Britain and France on October 19, 1939. However, conspicuous in this accord was the absence of provisions against the USSR (Deringil 1989; Roberts 1995; Gorodetsky 1999; Seydi 2003). In hindsight, Catherwood argues that only consistent neutrality as practiced by Turkey could ensure that the Balkan states were not dragged into war against their will. Yet he is fully aware that Turkey's strategic position was unmatched by any of its northern neighbors, with the possible exception of Greece, which allowed it to keep its distance from all contenders for influence (Catherwood 2003). It should be remembered, too, that unlike others in the region, Turkey posed no territorial issues.

As war broke out, the Balkan states hoped to be able to remain formally neutral. Yet the pressure to take sides hardly subsided. For a time, the Soviets focused on Bulgaria, offering their preferred mutual assistance pact in return for acknowledging its claims against Romania. Because the offer was carefully declined on several occasions, the Soviets persisted with assurances of their willingness to "help in trouble" (Roberts 1995, pp. 121–122). Taking place less than a month after the Russo-German Pact and before the Turkish dilemma was resolved, these assurances, as Roberts deciphers them, resulted in an attempt to fulfill Russian interests while Russia and Germany were still in equilibrium. However, the approach can also be interpreted as marking the somewhat blurred beginning of the next stage of developments in the Balkans, that of Russo-German rivalry. Common views prevail that at the same time, in the fall of 1939, Romania's situation became extremely sensitive, as its patron was now in agreement with its principal enemy. Valuable as it was for Germany, there was little certainty that Romania could

compete with the Soviet Union for the role of preferred economic and political partner. In February 1940, Stalin offered a nonaggression pact to Romania, accompanied with a demand for Soviet control of the mouth of Danube and territorial compensation in Soviet Moldavia. Gorodetsky (1999) explains that as the package was not accepted, Romania's single viable option was to draw even closer to Germany although it was becoming increasingly hard to reason that the original justification – of economic development and independence – was still valid.

Gorodetsky (1999) and Roberts (1995) maintain that from the spring in 1940, Russia's interests in the Balkans came dangerously close to Germany's. As their respective spheres of control were being delineated in northeastern Europe, Stalin presumed that the Balkans would look to him for protection from Germany. But Gorodetsky does not engage with the question whether this opinion is perhaps more significant in clarifying Soviet intentions, as neither the outlook of Balkan governments nor any realistic account of recent developments would actually favor the Soviet card. He does point out that the Soviets detected an opportunity at the moment of Hitler's spectacular defeat of France which emboldened him in many ways, including in his expectation for domination over the Balkans. In fact, German pretensions had more solid foundations based on developments since at least the mid-1930s, whereas the Soviets could hardly boast of any political achievements. Yet Lampe and Gorodetsky draw attention to the Soviets' efforts of forging new connections such as a belated recognition by Yugoslavia and soundings for a nonaggression pact with Italy. Additionally Roberts and Gorodetsky concur in the Soviets' heightened interest in the Balkans as exemplified in talks with both the German and Italian ambassadors to Moscow. Molotov outlined a possible division whereby Romania (and Hungary) would be included in a German sphere, and Bulgaria and Turkey in the Soviet one. Additionally, they find it significant in terms of Soviet attitudes to the Berlin–Rome alliance that the Soviets sought reciprocity between the Soviet positions in the Black Sea region and Italian domination in the Mediterranean. In the meantime, Germany signed another oil-for-arms treaty with Romania.

On June 26, 1940, the Soviets issued an ultimatum for the return of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Keen to secure its oil supplies, Germany advised Romanian acceptance, and demonstrated an element of caution not to challenge the USSR on behalf of a relatively small nation. Prazmowska maintains that even on this occasion Romania should not be perceived exclusively as victim. Haynes too views Romania as having hitherto actively readjusted and taken advantage of the changing European situation (Prazmowska 2000; Haynes 2000). Haynes complements the studies of the Turkish position by showing how Romania sought common resistance against the Soviets with Turkey but the latter remained noncommittal and aware that the Soviets continued to support Bulgaria in the dispute over Dobrudja. Even more important for her thesis of the Romanian predicament is Hitler's choice to support the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria. She believes without expanding much – that one factor for this was the wish to prevent a possible Hungarian–Soviet agreement.

The Romanian professor Dinu Giurescu, whose monograph is among few native studies translated into English, attributes responsibility for Romania's huge losses through the so-called Vienna awards arbitrated by Hitler to domestic factors. He criticizes the King for trusting that Germany would shield his country from the Soviets, lacking resolve in the face of the Soviet threats, but above all, for leaving the army and people without any opportunity for resistance (Giurescu 2000). Haynes's assessment is more

moderate; she presents Romania's debacle as part of the shifting strategic environment whereby she proves that Romania had founded its policy on three related factors, namely economic links which could pave the way for stronger political relations, combat of Hungarian revisionism perceived to be underpinned by German support for its territorial integrity, and fear of the Soviets in both ideological and military terms (Haynes 2000).

Such analysis, especially the first and last elements, can be applied to other states in the region, with some modification. Bulgaria lodged her claim for Dobrudja via Berlin, although Soviet benevolence on the matter had been known for at least a year. In his informative account Gorodetsky reveals that Bulgaria even ignored a Soviet offer for the whole of Dobrudja, turning instead to its most prominent historic claim, that of Macedonia (Gorodetsky 1999). The author does not attempt the difficult task of disentangling, in this instance, opportunism from persistence with long-enduring aspirations, and ideological preferences from caution when faced with the imminent proximity of the USSR. As for Soviet Russia, it is possible to interpret its motives for the reacquisition of Bessarabia as mainly defensive. Gorodetsky and Roberts likewise do not spot any desire for aggrandizement, and even less so any ideological elements in its behavior. However, such positions become less categorical even as the authors' own exhaustive narratives outline the Soviet approaches to Bulgaria to bring a common border on the Danube, and the consultations with the Italians.

It is difficult to ascertain at what point in time and territory the actions meant to enhance the security of one power begin to look threatening from another's perspective. Gorodetsky recognizes that the Soviet move in Bessarabia presented an implicit threat to the Romanian hinterland in general and oil-producing capacities in particular. He only validates such an impression further through expounding one of the relatively unknown points revealed by his painstaking research, namely that soon afterwards the Soviets began actively asserting themselves in the work of the Danubian Commission tasked with coordinating interests on the river (Gorodetsky 1999). On the other hand, Roberts stresses that the Vienna arbitration was seen by Moscow as hostile because it had not been preceded by the type of joint consultation prescribed by the Nonaggression Pact. Thus, having been initially willing to acknowledge a greater German interest in Romania, the Soviets were appalled at the manner in which Romania was made totally dependent on Berlin. As this was swiftly followed by the arrival of German military in Romania, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940 and the Italian attack on Greece, Stalin felt that the situation in the Balkans had evolved to an unacceptable level (Roberts 1995).

Focusing on the evolution of Italian policy as emerging from private exchanges and public acts, Salerno deduces that at the time of the German attack on Belgium and France, Mussolini was not entirely open about Italian plans for moving in the direction of the Balkans (Salerno 2002). Lampe completes the picture by reporting on Italy's moves towards an agreement with the Croat Peasant Party for Croatian independence, in exchange for Italian expansion in the Adriatic and southern Balkans. This was the context for the Yugoslav attempt to discuss a possible Salonika front with the Western powers (an idea that became obsolete after the fall of France) and the diplomatic approach to the Soviets in June 1940, which in turn precipitated Hitler's own warning against Italian invasion of Yugoslavia. Despite this, on October 28, 1940 Mussolini, driven by jealousy of Hitler and eagerness to prove Italy's military worth, presented an ultimatum to Greece, which was promptly rejected. In Knox's analysis, using the

regime's rhetoric but more importantly internal party, government and army documents, the Duce's imperial ambitions and obsession with his warrior image were never those of the Italian military chiefs. Ironically, the latter saw the opening of new military theaters as a means of accounting for themselves. However, despite the great expense of men and equipment and the emerging priority over previous commitments, such as Africa, the campaign was poorly prepared and coordinated. It was for Knox ultimately doomed but in the short term could only be rescued by Germany's invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece (Knox 2000).

Some evidence from Soviet archives, scrutinized by Pleshakov, suggests that between the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and the invasion of Greece, in October 1940, the Soviet General Staff rewrote an earlier offensive strategy directed against Germany. It planned for Germany to be cut off from the economic resources of the Balkans and discussed the possibility that Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia would lose their independence to Soviet control. Acknowledging that this was one scenario – and not a formally approved one at that, Pleshakov nevertheless deduces that Stalin coveted the Balkans and was considering a preemptive strike there as part of a southern strategy (Pleshakov 2006). Gorodetsky, however, examines Soviet military plans and exercises over a longer period of time and points out that at almost any given time various alternatives were played out, covering the whole expanse of the Soviet Union's western border. In late fall 1940, the concentration on the possible southwest theater of operations strengthened in response to Germany's increased presence in Romania, the adherence of that country to the Axis, and rising pressure on Bulgaria to follow suit. However, Gorodetsky reiterates his general conclusion that, at its core, Soviet strategy – political as well as military – was consistently defensive (Gorodetsky 1999).

The building tension in German-Soviet relations culminated on November 12, 1940 when Molotov visited Berlin. The Soviet–German Pact had been followed by the agreed division of northeast Europe, but for contemporary observers as for historians it evidently left the lands to the south of Poland exposed. German influence in Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and even Yugoslavia was visibly growing. For Stalin, the situation of Bulgaria was most sensitive because control over that nation could enhance the security of the Black Sea and provide strategic routes to the Turkish Straits. Bulgaria's commitment to Hitler could forestall a British attack on the Romanian oilfields while also creating a continuous Axis zone in the Balkans up to the Italian theater of war. The two alternatives were seen as mutually exclusive, and the neutrality that had been proclaimed in September 1939 was targeted by both. Pleshakov's assessment of Stalin is that he had “megalomaniac” ambitions that claimed uninterrupted predominance from Romania to Turkey and obviously looked beyond the Balkans to the Middle East. Simultaneously, Stalin's tactics showed inexperience in foreign affairs and only succeeded in outraging Hitler (Pleshakov 2006). For other scholars, notably Roberts and Gorodetsky, the Soviets were acting rationally according to their strategic needs and expectations of further hostility from Germany. The Soviets had already approached Bulgaria with the renewed offer for mutual assistance pact to be supported by a provision for Soviet military bases on the Black Sea coast: this was part of wider regional overtures including Yugoslavia and Turkey. In the meantime, the Soviets had seized those islands in the delta of the Danube, which controlled the shipping route into the Black Sea, and from such position of strength demanded a Danubian conference to sanction the existing situation (Gorodetsky 1999).

There is general consensus that the Berlin talks were instrumental in bringing war to the Balkans as different from war with Russia. Gorodetsky's is the most detailed account, following the subversion of what he presents as Russian intention for reconciliation by German insensitivity and intransigence. Molotov was dissatisfied with the vagueness of Ribbentrop's ideas for alteration of the regime of the Straits and was unwilling to consider Russian expansion in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Molotov's own proposals – that Germany revoke its guarantees to Romania but the Soviets instead guarantee Bulgaria including an outlet on the Aegean – were in turn not acceptable for the Germans. Gorodetsky also appreciates the nuances of the next Soviets steps in the Balkans as at the end of November 1940, the Russians directed the Bulgarian communists to carry out street demonstrations in favor of the Soviet proposals. The result was that the Bulgarian King who tried to emulate Turkey's balancing act between the great powers, was intimidated while also factoring in Germany's presence in Romania and pressure on Yugoslavia. As a last echo of the Berlin talks, the Soviets modified their offer to allow both for Bulgaria's membership in the Axis and a treaty with the USSR (Gorodetsky 1999).

This did not succeed either, and in mid-January 1941, the USSR declared publicly that its security interests were violated by the presence of German forces. These had been admitted in preparation for assisting the Italian campaign in Greece. Rather than the Berlin talks, Roberts sees Bulgaria's formal adherence to the Tripartite Pact on March 1, 1941 as the point of no return in German–Soviet relations. It had a vital bearing on the eventual Yugoslav signature of the Pact on March 25: this had unfolded in a familiar scenario, but two days later, an anti-German coup in Belgrade triggered swift and massive retaliation by the *Wehrmacht*. In any case, the necessity to rescue Mussolini from the fiasco of the Greek invasion had already committed Germany further in the Balkans. The debate continues as to whether the events in Yugoslavia, the Greek resistance against invasion, or the British expedition to Salonika in February delayed the long-planned German attack on the Soviet Union (Zapantis 1982; Lampe 1996; Gallagher 2001).

Revisiting the recent historiography which deals with the Balkans' role in the outbreak of World War II has revealed many of the dilemmas addressed in scholarship of the wider conflict. Particularly persistent have been the themes of the forces driving the policies of the main war protagonists: did Germany strive for a hegemony of the region from an early date; was the Soviet Union motivated in its search for military and political alliances by its security needs; why were the Western powers unable to preempt the actions of the dictatorships? On all of these a critical body of literature has been published allowing for a better historical understanding of the issues, if not conclusive interpretation. With the expansion of sources and variety of research methods, it has been possible to draw on evidence from high politics and propaganda, economic matters and military doctrine, considerations of personalities, and power struggles. Another set of problems relates to the contribution of the local regimes, nations, and societies who are increasingly seen as active and able to influence the approach of war on the peninsula.

Erstwhile robust interest in the topic notwithstanding, there are plenty of problems awaiting comprehensive treatment. There is scope for exploring further even such familiar-sounding subjects as relations between the major European powers and the local players, not to mention the complex web of the Balkan states' own bilateral and

multilateral affairs from a range of perspectives including economic and social. Moreover, the meaningful integration of works in the different European and local languages appears a challenging task for scholars.

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CHAPTER FORTY-SIX

Poland's Military in World War II

MICHAEL ALFRED PESZKE

The Germans occupied Prague in March 1939. The Poles in response instituted a partial mobilization of their western garrisons. At this point, the British Conservative government, led by Neville Chamberlain, declared a guarantee of Polish sovereignty. This controversial change of British policy seemed to give Józef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, added status of having succeeded in changing British policy in East Europe, but it also completely changed the diplomatic picture in Europe. Roberts (1953) gives a relatively sympathetic analysis of Beck's policies. But Poland became ever more a mere pawn, rather than a gambit initiator, in the complex game of European policies. Hehn, in his provocative *A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930–1941* (Hehn 2002), discusses the complex issues. Poland was in a precarious geographical position, lacked a significant robust industrial economy. It only had one asset – its army.

What seems to have changed British policy was more than just a realization that Hitler could not be trusted but the British Chiefs of Staff's memorandum regarding the Polish Armed Forces. Simon Newman (1976) cites the comments:

The value of Poland lay not in the capacity of her army to launch an offensive against Germany, which was virtually non-existent, but in her capacity to absorb German divisions. Above all she must not be allowed to supplement them by subordinating her foreign policy to Hitler's, or to allow them free rein in the west by maintaining an attitude of benevolent neutrality. (p. 156)

Furthermore, the British chiefs stated that “it was better to fight with Poland as an ally than without her.” Hitler responded by canceling the nonaggression declaration with Poland (Foreign Office, Great Britain 1939, pp. 32–48). This was the first, possibly most important and in consequences most catastrophic, achievement of the Polish Armed Forces.

Anna K. Cienciála (1996) discusses the international situation as a major strategic question for Europe while Anita Prażmowska (1987) describes British attempts at cobbling an Eastern block to confront Germany (see specifically ch. 4, "The Financing of the Eastern Front").

The summer of 1939 saw a number of Polish–British and Polish–French staff discussions in Warsaw. It was during one of these meetings that the Poles shared their success in breaking the German codes with their Western Allies. Ronald Lewin (Lewin 1978) describes this event in his excellent monograph and concludes "they had made Ultra possible" (p. 50). The details of how the Poles actually unraveled the mystery and what happened to the Polish cryptographers can be found in Władysław Kozaczuk's book (1984). A multiauthored work, edited by the eminent Sir F. Harry Hinsley, also acknowledges the Allied debt to the Poles, writing that "I should stress the original and vital contribution made by the Poles. The Poles had always been brilliant cryptographers" (Milner-Barry 1994, p. 92).

On August 23, 1939, Poland's two neighbors, until that day ideological enemies, signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Geoffrey Roberts (1989) describes this alliance which was to have seminal effects on Poland for the next sixty years.

For its part, the Polish government had worked strenuously at making the Chamberlain guarantee into a binding treaty and finally, on the eve of the war (August 25, 1939), the British and Polish governments signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The Polish ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński (1962) describes the process leading to the final signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. The *British War Blue Book* (Foreign Office, Great Britain 1939) adds another source for understanding the British march to war in 1939. Did the British suddenly become concerned that given such a denouement, Poland's leaders might accommodate Hitler? In other words, was this a success of Beck or a success for the British in preventing the Poles from becoming Hitler's allies?

In retrospect, the unwillingness of the British cabinet to override the chancellor of the exchequer, John Simon, and to grant Poland significant loans *should* have served notice to Beck about the vigor of the British commitment to Poland. However, finally on September 6, 1939 the British government granted Poland military credits which were only realized by the exiled Polish authorities.

Beck's preoccupation with Polish rights in the Free City of Danzig, which he correctly suspected were of no importance to the French or British, led to a major disagreement with Marshal Edward Smigły-Rydz and had disastrous impact on Polish defenses.

Beck prevailed on the Polish commander in chief to form an improvised Corps of two infantry divisions to respond immediately to any German act in Danzig. This necessitated moving two active divisions into the Corridor, between Germany and East Prussia. To then firm up the Intervention Corps, the Pomorze Army was tasked with moving north to the so-called Polish Corridor to give it support. Smigły-Rydz called it a strategic absurdity even before the German attack; the divisions were lost for no cause. The strategic reserve which was being formed in the region of Łódź (*Armia Prusy*) was already deprived of two divisions, and the *Armia Pomorze* was decimated in its exposed positions.

Polish military dispositions have been severely criticized for being based too close to the German border, and thus exposed. Murray and Millett (2000) wrote that the

Poles were in a “simply impossible position, and that their most valuable industrial regions lay immediately adjacent to Germany” (p. 47). They also acknowledged a highly critical point, often ignored, that the Western Allies “as they had with the Czechs in September 1938 applied considerable pressure on the Poles to delay mobilization in order not to offend the Germans” (p. 51). The unfortunately postponed general mobilization was ordered on August 31, since the Polish intelligence accurately predicted the day of the German attack. Secret mobilization of the Polish Air Force (at that time called Military Aviation) saved the Poles from an onslaught on the peacetime bases but not from decades of silly misleading charges of being destroyed on the ground. The German historian, Cajus Bekker (1968), writes that “Despite all assertions to the contrary, the Polish Air Force was not destroyed on the ground in the first two days of fighting. The bomber brigade in particular continued to make determined attacks on the German forces up to September 16th” (p. 19). However, Bekker omits to mention that on the morning of September 17, Soviets implemented their Molotov–Ribbentrop pact and all Polish plans for continued resistance became moot. One of the few English language books on this was penned by David G. Williamson (2009).

Polish merchant ships were kept out of the Baltic. Also by staff arrangements, held in the summer of 1939, Polish surface warships were ordered to sail for the United Kingdom at the last possible hour before the outbreak of the war. The destroyer division cleared Kattegat on September 1, 1939 bound for Rosyth. The small but efficient Polish destroyer division was a not an unwelcome supplement to the Royal Navy but what was even more important was the addition of many passenger liners and cargo tonnage to the Allied pool. Paradoxically, the mutual assistance treaty saw more assistance going to the Western Allies from Poland than coming to Poland. Another myth, which has even been propagated by Poles, is that the Polish Army was a cavalry army. In fact, as Kozłowski (1974) documents, only a mere 8% of the 1939 Polish land forces was cavalry.

Following the successful German breakthrough the Polish defenses in the first week of the war, and the ensuing crisis of envelopment, the Polish commander in chief hoped to make a last stand on the so-called Romanian beachhead. The Poles naïvely hoped that military supplies from the West would be delivered to Romanian ports and transited to southeast Poland. There was a feeling in Polish headquarters by the end of the second week that the German drive had lost its strength and that if the Western Allies attacked, then the outcome of the campaign could still be reversed. But the Soviet invasion on September 17, and the failure of the Western Allies to initiate an offensive, determined the outcome. Polish Armed Forces were caught in a vice.

The official German history of World War II, multiauthored by Maier, Rohde, Stegemann, and Umbreit (1991), has two very pertinent points on September 1939. “The inadequacy of Polish political judgment was reflected in the belief of effective support from Britain and France” furthermore that the “decisive factor was the political and military starting position which it has to be admitted could not have been greatly improved.” The final conclusion of the German historians was that “The gallantry in action shown by the overwhelming mass of Polish troops and acknowledged by the Wehrmacht could do no more than mitigate the weakness just listed” (pp. 125–126). Steven J. Zaloga (2002) recently published a short but accurate account of the actual campaign.

The Polish government, and those armed forces that were physically able, crossed the Romanian or Hungarian borders. The Polish government had been promised a *droit de passage* to France by the Romanians who, under pressure from the Germans, reneged and the Polish government were interned. In the ensuing constitutional crisis, the interned Polish president appointed Władysław Raczkiewicz, already in Paris, as his successor. In turn, the new president appointed General Władysław Sikorski to the position of commander in chief and prime minister in the newly formed coalition Polish government based in Paris. It is important in understanding Polish foreign, diplomatic, and, most importantly, military history to emphasize that the Poles did not surrender in 1939. The City of Warsaw did surrender, but not the government.

The Polish government in Paris was recognized by Poland's allies (France and Great Britain and the Dominions) as well as the United States and most democracies. All prewar treaties and agreements continued to be binding and all Polish diplomatic and consular posts stayed in place, even in Japan and Italy until much later. Its civilian structure showed a constitutional continuity, but its main external and most visible face was the Polish Armed Force, which was cultivated and nourished by the Poles and also the Allies.

About 70,000 Polish military, including 9,000 air personnel (approximately 70% of the prewar establishment), also crossed the southern Polish border into Romania and Hungary. About 200 military aircraft, deprived of any bases by the enveloping enemy armies, flew to Romania. Many were subsequently used by the Royal Romanian Air Force in the war against the Soviets.

On September 26 a Polish plane (a PZL-46 Sum) that had been interned by the Romanians was surreptitiously taken over by Stanisław Riess, a test pilot for the PZL (Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze). On the pretense of flying within Romania, he flew a passenger, Major Galinat, the personal emissary of the interned Marshal Smigły-Rydz, to the general officer commanding of Warsaw. Galinat's mission was to instruct Warsaw to capitulate and for the senior Polish officers to avoid being taken prisoner of war and form the nucleus of a Polish clandestine military organization. K. A. Merrick (1989) in his comprehensive history of the role that air support to clandestine forces throughout the war writes, "Poland had a fully operative underground network in place before the Germans had finished shooting" (p. 16).

On January 23, 1940, General Władysław Sikorski in Paris made the following declaration of Polish war policy: "the recreation of the Polish Army in its greatest size is the most important and essential goal of the Government." This was part of a speech at the inaugural session of the Polish National Council in exile. The statement reported by Jacek Piotrowski in the *Dziennik* (calendar of events) of the Polish president, in essence, articulated both the political and strategic goals of the Polish government in exile, and focused on the vital importance of the Polish Armed Forces as a fundamental element of the attributes of a legitimate authority. The Polish military became the sole determinant of Polish foreign policy initiatives.

The extension of credits from both the French and British governments for its military and civilian expenditures facilitated Polish policy. The credits were leveraged by Polish gold evacuated from Poland. The evacuation and subsequent loss and then recovery of the Polish gold are well discussed by Wojciech Rojek (2000).

But the essential problem for the Poles was how to conceive a strategy which would lead to the liberation of their country, not only from German but also from the

Soviet yoke. Both France and Great Britain had declared war on Germany in accordance with their treaty obligations to Poland, but had no analogous obligations in respect of the Soviet Union. This was a major challenge to Polish foreign policy since neither ally was prepared to engage in any action, apart from very ambiguous words, on Poland's behalf vis-à-vis the Soviets.

In fact, Britain from the very first, worked to make the Soviets part of the anti-German coalition. But the Soviets were unmoved by British blandishments. In fact, the Soviets were not merely neutral but friendly to the Germans, selling them many products of which the most important was oil. Since oil was shipped by land, it defied the British naval blockade. Also, international communist propaganda was vociferous in condemning the "capitalist" war and urged workers in France and Great Britain to oppose the war effort, and even to strike.

Władysław Sikorski grasped the reality that attacking the German Siegfried Line on the west of the Rhine was a very unrealistic route to liberating Poland. Sikorski, even before assuming his double mantle, articulated a view that Poland should work for an alliance of the Balkan and Danubian countries. There were traditional and prewar warm contacts with both Romania and Hungary. With this in mind, some of the interned Polish military were evacuated directly to French Syria. The Polish unit that began to be formed was named the "Carpathian Brigade," since its destination was to enter Poland through the Carpathian Mountains. But it never did reach the Carpathian Mountains. Instead, it fought in Tobruk, and later grew into a full infantry division that was part of the Polish 2 Corps in Italy.

The history of the period after the September Campaign until the German attack on Norway in April 1940 is often viewed as the time when nothing happened, and therefore has the lore of the "Phony War," or *sitzkrieg*. This was certainly true for the land armies and air units on both sides, but anything but true for the war at sea. Also, both British and French staffs discussed the many ways in which the blockade of Germany could be made impenetrable and Germany deprived of oil, which was correctly perceived as the *sine qua non* for pursuing a successful war. Since Germany depended on Soviet oil, plans were being made to interdict this supply. The French commander in chief in the Middle East, Maxime Weygand, also believed that the thrust from the Mediterranean into the Balkans was the only practical military strategy for winning the war. Weygand now not merely planned a possible invasion through the Balkans, hopefully with Turkish assistance, but even encouraged planning for the strategic bombing of the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus. This point is well developed by Talbot Charles Imlay's article "A Reassessment of Anglo-French Strategy during the Phony War" (Imlay 2004).

Churchill also was intrigued by any permutation of an offensive which would minimize the trench warfare and direct bloodshed. A great exponent of the blockade, he wanted to grasp the nettle of capturing Norway and blocking German steel imports. He became involved in the Balkans, in Greece, and then the Aegean Campaign in 1944. But he always hoped to seduce the Turks to his side. Robin Denniston (1997) unfolds this story brilliantly.

In many ways, Polish strategic and political concepts harked back to the final days of the Great War, when in 1919 Polish volunteers of the *Polska Organizacja Wojskowa* (POW) as well as other patriotic organizations, disarmed the demoralized Germans and took control of most of Poland. The "Balkan route" recreated the Western

coalitions drive up the Danube from Greek Salonika in the final days of World War I. Sikorski obviously hoped that this time, such a drive would continue through the Carpathians into south Poland, where Western Allied forces including Polish formations would join up with the resurgent Polish Secret Army. This required a robust clandestine force. The embryonic structure of such a secret force already existed, having been created on September 27, 1939, and was soon to be formally called the Home Army (as opposed to the armed forces in exile). But to be strong enough to meet the challenge, it had to be armed, and that possibility could only come from the West and, if from the West, then only by air support. These Polish plans were refined over a period of two years, from late 1939 to mid-1941. In the second stage of planning, another dimension was added, namely moving Polish air combat units from the West to operate on liberated air fields in Poland while these air bases were to be captured and held by a mixture of Polish underground army units, reinforced by Polish parachute forces from the West.

By spring 1940, Sikorski had managed in very difficult circumstances to organize his armed forces and establish the Polish government as more than a mere symbol of Polish sovereignty. He "inherited" the British military credits negotiated prior to the onset of the war and in November signed a Polish-British naval agreement. However, he failed to negotiate an analogous air force agreement with the British, and settled for a reprehensible arrangement in which Polish airmen became part of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve and were obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the king. It should be noted that this stipulation on the part of the British Air Ministry was made on the basis of the British unwritten constitution. This precluded the stationing of foreign troops on British soil. It also should be noted that there was no such problem in November 1939 when the naval agreement was negotiated with the British admiralty. Only a part of the Polish Air Force personnel were in fact transferred prior to the French capitulation. This pact had long-term repercussions for the Poles as discussed by Michael Alfred Peszke in *The Polish Air Force in the United Kingdom* (2008). Sikorski was more successful in France, and in January, a comprehensive military agreement was signed with the French. The formation of Polish land and air forces began in earnest.

The Phony War came to an end in April 1940 when the Germans marched into Denmark and invaded Norway, while in May and June they overwhelmed French, British, Belgian, and Dutch Armies in a period of six weeks – only two weeks longer than the defeat of Poland by the Germans and Soviets.

The contribution of the Polish military to the Allied coalition was small but hardly insignificant. Polish destroyers had, for months, carried out anti-submarine and blockade imposition patrols out of Harwich. Then they took part in the Norwegian Campaign. The Polish submarine ORP *Orzeł* was probably the first harbinger of the German invasion of Norway when, on routine patrol, it intercepted the German liner SS *Rio de Janeiro* transporting German troops. In those Norwegian operations, ORP *Grom*, ORP *Orzeł*, as well as the liner MV *Chrobry* were lost. The Polish contribution to the failed Norwegian operation also included the 6,000-man Polish *Podhalanska* brigade that fought at Narvik.

The French campaign followed shortly and two Polish divisions reinforced the French Army as did over a hundred Polish fighter pilots. The French capitulation in mid-June 1940 was a military disaster for the Poles, who lost most of their ground

forces in France. But the remaining air force personnel were successfully evacuated to the United Kingdom.

June 1940 began a new chapter in Polish world war history. Winston Churchill, who had replaced Neville Chamberlain as prime minister of a British coalition government, warmly welcomed the Poles in Britain. A euphoric relationship ensued, which, like many a honeymoon, began to wear away after the Soviets became prized and essential allies in the war against Germany. In August 1940, the Poles signed a military treaty with the British. This was the bedrock of all Polish-British military wartime collaboration. The following major issues of principle were addressed, namely: financing of the Polish forces by British credits to the Polish government, based on need and escrow of the evacuated Polish gold. The British also accepted that Polish military law would govern the conduct and discipline of the Polish military in the United Kingdom and its territories with the proviso that for the Polish Air Force based in the United Kingdom, the king's regulations would prevail if the two were in conflict. Polish Air Force personnel, numbering about two thousand who had been enrolled in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve were discharged back to the Polish forces, and the new evacuees were not expected to take an oath of allegiance to the king. The British also accepted the principle that they were sovereign forces of Poland and that they would be centralized at some point in the future at the request of the Polish commander in chief. (For detailed wording of the Military Agreement see, The National Archives (TNA) WO 33/2389 and/or TNA AIR 2/2413 (www.nationalarchives.gov.uk). The naval agreement had already been signed in November 1939.)

The major Polish contribution to the Allied cause was its outstanding intelligence services on the continent of Europe. The depth of this contribution is well discussed by the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee (Stirling, Nałęcz, and Dubicki 2005). The Polish land forces were stationed in Scotland and became responsible for the defense of the eastern shore north of Edinburgh. This was the First Polish Corps, and over time, it formed the First Polish Armored Division which fought in the Battle of Falaise and contributed to the successful liberation of northwest France. Its role is described by Sir John Keegan in his chapter, "A Polish Battlefield" (Keegan 1982). The division concluded its triumphant march by entering Wilhelmshaven and then became part of the British Army of occupation.

Once the unfortunate air agreement was significantly modified, the Polish Air Force was now accepted by the British as part of the Polish Armed Forces of an independent and sovereign state. But the British Air Staff managed to keep a hand on the Poles. In his cordial memo to Polish headquarters, Sir Cyril Newall wrote "we would not differentiate the position of the Polish Air Force from that of the Polish Army and Navy, except in so far as operational considerations make a very close liaison with the Royal Air Force essential" (TNA AIR 8/295).

Sikorski had wide-ranging strategic goals in mind. He was successful in creating a Polish controlled, British-based SIGINT system, well discussed by the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee (Stirling, Nałęcz, and Dubicki 2005, pp. 463–472) and by Zbigniew S. Siemaszko (1992) who had been a member of the commander in chief's communication battalion based in Barnes Lodge. This radio surveillance system monitored German and Soviet communications and collaborated – only one way it should be emphasized – with Bletchley Park. The Poles used their own radios, manufactured by Anglo-Polish Radio Wireless and Manufacturing Company at Stanmore.

Sikorski was also successful in negotiating collaboration with the British for parachute training for a major brigade sized unit and for couriers for subversive activities in occupied Poland. The couriers were selected on the basis of being able to provide specific skills that were needed by the underground movement. The history of these brave men and even women was written by Jozef Garlinski (1969). The most senior officer to be inserted into Poland was General Tadeusz Kossakowski, an engineer whose task was to develop an underground arms production. Incidentally, General Kossakowski's group in Scotland developed the Polish land mine detector, which contributed to the British victory at El Alamein. For this the British awarded General Kossakowski with the Honorary Military Order of the Bath, one of more than ten such awards given to Polish generals. While couriers were inserted into occupied Poland by parachute, only a small number were retrieved by land travel often at great risk. Jan Karski (1944) was one of these indomitable men who reached the West and among many things reported on the horrible atrocities being visited on the Jewish population.

Sikorski was only marginally successful in developing a Polish controlled special duties squadron able to reach occupied Poland with supplies and couriers. In the end he completely failed to integrate the Polish Underground or Home Army with the strategy of the Western Allies. The armed forces in Exile had the function of serving a reserve and resource for the Home Army; as well as documenting to the world Poland's determination to fight alongside the Allies.

The Polish Air Force was the crown jewel of the Polish Armed Forces and, being based in the United Kingdom, its exploits attracted positive and immediate mass media attention. The Polish Air Force fighter squadrons made a name for themselves in the Battle of Britain and contributed to the high esteem in which the Polish allies were held. Robert Gretzyngier (2001) among many other authors, documents the successes of the Polish pilots. The Polish Air Force grew in size and throughout the war its ten fighter squadrons accounted for about ten percent of the RAF home fighter command. The most meticulous account of the Polish Air Force is by Jerzy Cynk (1998).

But the Polish government had difficulty in converting this success into a major Polish controlled special duties squadron. To a significant extent, this resulted from the shortage of appropriate long-range aircraft available to the Allies. But also the Bomber Command was loath to give up its well-trained Polish crews for missions which the RAF essentially dismissed as of minor importance to the war effort. Lord Selborne, the British minister of economic warfare, was a strong advocate of the Polish endeavor. He reminded Sir Archibald Sinclair, the minister for air, on repeated occasions of the importance that the Poles attached to Polish crews undertaking missions for the Poles. He argued on behalf of the Polish legal and moral right to have their own special duties flight writing that "for the Poles to be told that Britain cannot afford them more than 6 aircraft is a bit hard" (TNA AIR 19/815-80539). It should be noted that in addition to the fourteen squadrons, there were 275 Polish pilots, 55 navigators, and many other aircrew in the RAF Transport Command. So there were Polish aircrew trained and experienced in operating large aircraft.

Finally, by the end of 1943, three American built Liberators (B-24) joined the three Halifaxes, and the Polish Special Duties Flight (not a squadron) was moved to

Italy and bled itself by supporting the Warsaw Uprising. Michael A. Peszke (2006) describes the heroic role of the Poles in aiding the Warsaw Uprising "Polish Special Duties Flight No. 1586 and the Warsaw Uprising." The Polish Carpathian Brigade won renown in the defense of Tobruk, while the Polish destroyer ORP *Piorun* was highlighted in a piece in *Illustrated London News* for its action against the *Bismarck*. The Polish Navy had no part in the strategic planning for Poland's liberation but small as it was, it was a great flag shower. Lord Alexander, the first lord of the admiralty, wrote this tribute on February 10, 1944 when opening the Polish maritime exhibit in London.

In view of its small size, the number of operations in which the Polish Navy has taken part is almost incredible. Amongst these operations are Narvik, Dunkirk, Lofote Islands, Tobruk, Dieppe, attacks on shipping in the Channel, Sicily, Italy, Oran and patrols notably in the Mediterranean and convoy escorting. The recent work of the Polish ships in the Mediterranean has been especially brilliant. Since May 1943, one Polish submarine sank no less than 18 enemy vessels of a total of 49,000 tons. Other Polish submarines have accomplished equally meritorious work in Norwegian Waters and elsewhere, including the sinking of a large German transport ship packed with troops.

This tribute does not address the most outstanding work of the Polish destroyers, in Operation Neptune in June 1944. Michael Alfred Peszke (1999) wrote a full account of the Polish Navy in World War.

Politically, Sikorski began a successful negotiation with the Czechs for a postwar federation. Piotr S. Wandycz (1988) the eminent Polish historian of Polish foreign policy and diplomacy, gave an account of this diplomatic initiative that died as a result of Soviet opposition. Sikorski also worked assiduously to strengthen the Polish Underground Army, develop an autonomous communications network, and establish a cordial relationship with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). A prominent Polish historian, Józef Garlinski wrote the first exhaustive history of the Polish efforts at clandestine activity (Garlinski 1969). The general issue of Polish participation in the SOE is well discussed by David Stafford (1980).

The energetic Sikorski also managed to create a Polish parachute brigade whose mission was to aid the Polish Underground. By agreement, the unit was reserved for action in Poland to buttress the Polish Underground army, at the discretion of the Polish commander in chief. The British issued quarterly reports about all their British-based Allied forces. On September 30, 1943, they reported that "the Polish Parachute Brigade organized in four battalions with supporting arms has been reinforced and is now composed of the best material and is about 2,500 men strong. It is reserved in the hands of the Polish commander in chief for operations in Poland" (TNA WO 193/42-80751).

This became the goal – a strong and well-armed Polish Underground army supported by a timely insertion of the Polish Parachute Brigade to establish a centralized sovereign authority. This would be reinforced by Polish tactical squadrons from the west. Conjointly, a long-range special duties squadron would supply the Polish clandestine forces. Such an intricate operation would have been facilitated by the presence of Western Allied forces moving north from the Adriatic or Aegean Sea. William Mackenzie, the eminent historian of the British Special Operations Executive, wrote

that the Polish plan made in London by the Polish military staff was "grandiose, but was not absurd" (2000, pp. 309–317).

During this period of June 1940 to the middle of 1941, there were no major issues for the Poles, and no controversies. The first such issue surfaced as a result of the British pressure on Sikorski to make up with the Soviets after Barbarossa in June 1941. Sikorski was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to build up his forces and also by a humanitarian desire to negotiate a release of the well over million Poles in Soviet Gulags. Stalin agreed to the British sponsored agreement simply because his back was up against the wall in mid-July 1941. When the Soviet Army turned the tables on the Germans, his position became progressively more hostile. But the Polish government was split on the agreement since Sikorski was unable to get the Soviets to confirm that the Riga Treaty of 1921 defined the Polish-Soviet borders. All that the Soviets would agree on was that the Soviet-German accord that had partitioned Poland in 1939 had lost its validity. There was no refutation of the so-called elections in Soviet occupied Poland and the Poles being released from Soviet Gulags were "amnestied." The Polish president refused to counter-sign the agreement and the Polish foreign minister resigned. Anna Cienciała (1996) analyzes the agreement, which is still controversial.

Did Sikorski give in too easily to British pressure? The British greeted the agreement with great approval. It is interesting that Eden, who ignored Sikorski's death, describes him as "intrepid" on this issue (Eden 1965, p. 314). The British military spokesman overestimated the numbers of Poles being released and wrote,

I should like to stress the importance which I attach, for military reasons, to the evacuation of as many Poles as possible. We want 10,000 in this country [i.e., UK], 2,000 in the Middle East ... The successful withdrawal of the remainder – I believe that something like 150,000 are involved – would be a great contribution of good fighting men to our cause. (TNA WO216/19 3026)

But the agreement, short-lived as it was, led to the release of many thousands of Poles from Soviet Gulags. Many other thousands were victims of Soviet obfuscation and did not get the requisite information, tickets, or release from work camps. By the end of 1941, the released Poles formed an army of well over 40,000, however, the concern about missing officers, who numbered close to 15,000, was brought to the attention of the Soviet authorities. Their official reply was that all Poles had been released, and the missing officers must have escaped. As the winter war progressed, the conditions of the Poles in the Soviet Union deteriorated and General Sikorski flew from London to Moscow to meet with Stalin. On the way, he stopped in the beleaguered Allied garrison of Tobruk and inspected the Polish Carpathian Brigade. After meeting with Stalin he also inspected the Polish units in the Soviet Union. The commanding officer of the Polish forces in Russia, General Władysław Anders, was convinced that the Germans would break through the Russian lines in spring 1942, and he was aware of the dire circumstances of his forces. They were short of food, short of uniforms, and living in tents. Many were sick and the death rate was high. Food rations barely met the needs of the soldiers, but in addition there were thousands of civilians and orphans being cared for by the military. When, in April

1942, Sikorski convened a conference of all his senior generals, Anders strongly voiced the opinion that his forces should be evacuated from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and then joined by forces in the United Kingdom.

Sikorski was aware of the state of the Polish troops in the Soviet Union and also more than aware of Anders's analysis. Also, his policy of conciliation with the Soviets was not attracting support from the Polish Underground. The British also had their own plans. The earlier, overtly optimistic, assessment of the potential addition of Poles to Allied forces was modulated. The comment by Sir Alan Brooke (later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke) expressed British concerns and preferences: "Any forces in the Middle East this summer will be a Godsend to us" (Danchev and Todman 2001, p. 252).

Sikorski was convinced that the future of Polish foreign policy depended on keeping good relations with Stalin, and even more importantly, on having a Polish Army alongside the Soviets. On May 1, 1942, he sent a long message to Anders. He opined that the victory over Germany, to a large extent, would depend on the Soviet Armies, and also concluded that the Polish Armed Forces must be based on the existing war fronts in such a way that they would be able to reach Poland within the shortest possible time. He then entreated Anders to stay the course so that the Polish Army entering Poland with the Soviets would become a center of order and authority.

But the British were short of troops in the Middle East and Churchill connived with Stalin for the Poles to leave the Soviet Union. He wrote to Stalin in July 1942 as follows:

I am sure it would be in our common interest, Premier Stalin, to have the three divisions of Poles you so kindly offered join their compatriots in Palestine, where we can arm them fully. Those would play a most important part in future fighting as well as keeping the Turks in good heart. The four Polish divisions when trained would play a strong part in delaying a German southward advance. If we do not get the Poles, we should have to fill their places by drawing on preparations now going forward on a vast scale for the Anglo-American invasion of the continents.

The conclusion of his message was that the "Levant-Caspian front is almost bare" (Churchill 1948–1954, p. 269).

In 1942, the British still feared that the Germans would break the Soviets and that the Turks might side with the Germans. This would have imperiled Middle East oil supplies. Stalin was happy to do this favor for Churchill. The British got enough men for a two divisional corps, Stalin got rid of the Poles, and Anders and his Poles were thrilled to be out of the Soviet Union. Sikorski's policy was in ruins. But in reality, did it have any chance of success? Given the nature of Stalin and the shortly explosive news about the Katyn massacre, the answer is likely negative. These Polish troops became the famed 2 Corps which fought its way up Italy, from Monte Cassino to Ancona, and finished its campaign with the capture of Bologna.

The Balkan strategy, however, was far from dead. On his 1943 visit to the United States, Sikorski met with President Franklin Roosevelt and the American military leadership. His major goal was to secure American support in the intensifying war of words with the Soviets, who had proclaimed that all Poles had left the USSR and the

rest were Soviet citizens. Sikorski also argued the Balkan strategy and also attempted to negotiate directly for American Liberator bombers to serve as long-range supply planes for the Polish Underground.

Robert Szymczak researched the personal library of Roosevelt at Hyde Park and found a number of documents. The pertinent one is captioned, "Sikorski Strategy Memorandum, President's Secretary's File: Diplomatic Correspondence." Sikorski analyzed the situation as offering a potential for the Allies to drive a wedge between the German concentrations in the west (passively defensive) and the east. The wedge could be from the north or the south, which Sikorski strongly favored. He saw the likelihood of both Romania and Hungary going over to the Western side in such a case (Biskupski and Pula 1993). In Lisbon, Polish diplomats sought to bring these two Polish southern neighbors over to the Allied side. Tadeusz Piszczowski (1979), using archives of the Polish Institute in London, describes these efforts.

It is important to point out that Churchill had never lost interest in the Balkan strategy, though the British never had sufficient political or military clout to impose this strategy on the coalition of "United Nations." Dennis J. Dunn (1998, p. 195) cites one of the most influential American statesmen, William C. Bullitt, as also favoring a Balkan strategy. The American historian Joseph Rothschild was of the opinion that had the Allies moved quickly to exploit the Italian surrender, they might have been able to establish a viable presence in the Balkans, since the Romanians, and other small countries of the region would have changed sides. This was obviously the last thing the Soviets wanted.

While Sikorski was treated royally in the United States, his only concrete achievement was the inclusion of a Polish officer in the combined chiefs of staffs in Washington and a plea by Roosevelt to Churchill to make some Liberators available to the Poles. The first and only Polish member of the combined chiefs of staff was Colonel Leon Mitkiewicz, who wrote his memoirs in 1971 and described his unsuccessful attempts at integrating the Polish Underground into overall Allied strategy.

But 1943 was to be a calamitous year for the Poles. In April, the Germans stunned the world by announcing the discovery at Katyn, near Smolensk, of the bodies of Polish officers who had been sought by the Poles in 1941. They had clearly been murdered. But the controversy erupted as to who was the perpetrator. The Polish government in London was outraged since it had suspected the worst since 1940 when the correspondence between the Polish officers in Soviet captivity and their families had ceased. Sikorski asked for an impartial International Red Cross investigation, without accusing anybody. Stalin was insulted and broke off relations with the Polish government. The British government counseled the Poles to be silent. For many decades the Communist regime in Warsaw toed the Moscow line, but the truth was too evident so again only silence could be internally imposed. The best histories of this tragedy as well as of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, have been written in the West. The first was Janusz K. Zawodny (1978), but in many ways the best is by George Sanford (2005).

This was the end of Sikorski's political plans for a working relationship with the Soviets. In July 1943, when returning from an inspection of the Polish forces in the Middle East, he was a victim of a controversial plane accident at Gibraltar. He was aboard a Royal Air Force Liberator (B-24) of the RAF Squadron 511 tasked with

flying VIPs. The controversy stems from the fact that the Royal Air Force Commission investigating the accident made the following bizarre conclusion.

The accident was due to jamming of the elevator controls shortly after takeoff with the result that the aircraft became uncontrollable. After the most careful examination of all available evidence, including that of the pilot (who was the only survivor) it has not been possible to determine how the jamming occurred but it has been established there was no sabotage. It is also clear that the captain of the aircraft, who is a pilot of great experience and exceptional ability was in no way to blame. (TNA Air 2/9234)

The Polish government and the Polish Air Force command refused to endorse the Royal Air Force report. It should also be commented that the part of the Liberator in question were not recovered. The majority of Poles have been convinced that the accident was in fact sabotage, and the local presence of the Soviet agent, still a mole, Kim Philby seemed to point a finger at the Soviets who was in Gibraltar at the time as confirmed by Genrikh Borovik (Borovik 1994). German propaganda had a field day, accusing the British since it was a Royal Air Force plane flying from a Royal Air Force base. The question remains a controversy but the author would suggest that if it was sabotage then the British liaison officer with Sikorski, Victor Cazalet, MP, might have been a more significant target than Sikorski.

Cazalet had written a strong letter to his Etonian colleague, Sir Anthony Eden, on April 17, 1942 objecting to the British policy of appeasing the Soviets at the expense of the Baltic states. Calling it “an inverted Munich” (TNA FO 954/25). This attitude of strong parliamentary protest at Churchillian policy was commented on by Sir Alexander Cadogan (Dilks 1972) who wrote on April 9, 1942 in reference to the proposed treaty between the UK and the Soviets, “I hear is beginning to cause a stink amongst MP’s egged on by Victor Cazalet” (pp. 446–448). The subject of Sikorski’s accident is not mentioned by Churchill in his memoirs even though he attended the funeral mass at Westminster Cathedral and made an impassioned speech to the Polish People.

Prepare yourselves to die for Poland – for many of you to whom I speak must die, a many of us must die, and as he died, for his country, and the common cause. In farewell to you dear leader let us mingle renewed loyalties. We shall not forget him. I shall not forget you. My own thoughts are with you and will be with you always. (TNA FO 371/7683; Daily Telegraph, London, July 15, 1943)

The Polish president asked the vice prime minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who headed the Polish Peasant Party – arguably the largest party in prewar Poland – to form a coalition government. He also used presidential prerogative to appoint General Kazimierz Sosnkowski to be the commander in chief. It would be simplistic and naïve to explain all of the problems which confronted the Poles in 1944 and later as arising from the lack of mutual conception of strategic goals between these two figures. But the fact is that the prime minister was a shrewd but uneducated man, the other an ideologue who espoused nothing short of complete Polish sovereignty motivated by a sense of Polish history. Mikołajczyk came from western Poland, which had defied Germanization for well over a century. He believed that the Polish nation could survive the Russians. Sosnkowski was imbued with the national sense of disgrace at the

part played by many Poles in contributing to the partitions in the late-eighteenth century. Mikołajczyk's attempts to work with Churchill, and even to accept many of Stalin's initial demands, and his ultimate failure in the rigged elections of 1947, which resulted in his being secretly whisked out of communist Poland, are well described by Andrzej Paczkowski (1991). The final reversal of Polish fortunes came from the combined chiefs of staff who politely, but categorically, turned down Polish requests for integrating the Polish Underground with Allied strategy, but even limited aid to sabotage and intelligence equipment. As an aside, General Sosnkowski only flew Polish crewed transports on his inspections of the 2 Corps in Italy.

The next two years are a sad commentary on the Poles in exile. Their growing achievements on the battlefield were all but ignored. The liberal and left wing mass media made much of the so-called Polish feudal landlords. The leaked out news of the Tehran Conference were so horrible that many refused to believe that the Western democracies would abandon the Poles. This was the first prodrome of the fact that the Western powers had acceded to Soviet claims to eastern Poland. Well discussed by George Kaciewicz (1979).

In April 1944, the Polish and British government signed the Lend-Lease agreement. From then on, Polish military credits would not be burdened by the use of military hardware by Polish forces – land, air, or naval. However, salaries of Polish military were the fiscal responsibility of the Poles (TNA T160/399). Also in April 1944 the third and final agreement was negotiated as a protocol to the agreement of August 5, 1940 by the British Air Ministry and the Polish government regarding the Polish Air Force. From now on, there would be no question regarding whether the king's regulations or Polish military applied to the Polish air personnel. It was as for the Polish naval and land forces – Polish jurisdiction.

In July 1944, the Soviet Armies crossed into undisputed Polish territory. The Polish Underground expressed a wish to collaborate with the Soviet forces. The Polish commander in chief, General Sosnkowski, was very cautious, while Mikołajczyk, the prime minister, gave full approval. The attempts of the Polish Underground army to collaborate with the Soviet Armies are a matter of historical record. Soviet front-line commanders expressed appreciation for Polish help, but after specific operations – like liberation of Lwów – were concluded, the Poles were surrounded by Soviet political units and disarmed. The soldiers were given a choice of enrolling in the Communist forces or sharing the fate of their officers – arrest and deportation, and probably execution.

This was the background to the Warsaw Uprising. Once again, General Sosnkowski warned the underground movement about the Soviets. The Polish government in London left the decision to the civilian and military leadership of the Polish Underground state. Jan Nowak (1982) who was again inserted into occupied Poland on July 26, 1944, a mere four days before the Uprising, writes that he warned the underground leadership that help from the West could not be expected. But the cascade of events unfolded. Stalin had formed a puppet Polish government, and in late July 1944, its radio broadcasts called on Warsaw to rise up against the Germans. The sound of Russian guns could be heard in Warsaw and the population was eager to grab control of the city. The Polish Home Army commanders were also concerned that the small communist party might take control of the inevitable uprising. The uprising failed after two months and horrible human and physical

devastation. The controversial issues are why did the local Home Army commanders order the uprising in view of the demonstrated Soviet hostility, and why did the London based Polish authorities not issue more specific orders forbidding such an event. Soviet duplicity is an accepted fact in Western historiography. While the Soviets may have a scintilla of plausibility about their offensive being checkmated by the Germans a bare five miles east of the City, their bad faith is evident when they forbade Polish and Royal Air Force crews flying aid from landing on their Polish controlled territory. The literature on the Warsaw tragedy is extensive and space limits the bibliography to works by Janusz J. Zawodny (1978), Andrew Borowiec (2001), Borodziej (2006), and Jan Ciechanowski (1974). The Polish commander in chief, Sosnkowski, was so incensed at lack of Western support, that he issued a most impassioned order to the Polish forces, which in turn so aggravated and insulted the British that they forcibly demanded his dismissal. This was most reluctantly done by the Polish president.

Months before the Warsaw uprising, the British requested that the agreement regarding the Polish Parachute Brigade be modified and that it be used in operations in northeast Europe. For a while, the Poles resisted, but the British request became a demand and then an ultimatum. The Polish Parachute Brigade was used in Operation Market-Garden and suffered significant losses. The British historian William F. Buckingham (2002) devoted a whole chapter to the Poles under the title "Plagiarised, Bullied and Hijacked. The 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, September 1941–August 1944." Michael Alfred Peszke's "The Polish Parachute Brigade in World War Two" (1984), a paper on the creation and use of the brigade, argues that it was a paradigm for the whole Polish military effort in the West.

Mikołajczyk now sought help in the United States. He requested a meeting with Roosevelt in January 1944 but was put off until June. He was treated royally and much publicity was given to his visit, but he was urged to change the Polish government to reflect a friendlier attitude to the Soviets. His visit, and the charm offensive to which he was exposed, is well described by the Polish ambassador in Washington, Jan Ciechanowski (1948). The charm was directed at the Polish-American electorate beginning to grow restive with the diplomatic situation.

During that time, the Poles formed the Polish-American Congress, which began to be very active in supporting the Polish cause. Richard C. Lukas (1978) describes the attempts on Poland's behalf and the concern it caused in American political circles. Roosevelt now had to address his policy of accommodating Stalin with his concern about winning the November elections.

Pressured by Churchill to go to Moscow to meet with Stalin, Mikołajczyk was unable to reach any parameter of genuine understanding. When he returned to London he could not persuade his coalition government to agree to all the demands made by Stalin and his apologist – Churchill. Churchill's deal for Poland, which he attempted to persuade the Poles to accept, included an agreement to the loss of nearly a third of Polish territory. But what is too often ignored is that it mandated changes in the Polish government to make it palatable to Stalin. This restructuring of the Polish government to make the deal acceptable to Stalin included the dismissal of the Polish president, the commander-in chief, the Polish defense minister, and the Polish ambassador in London! The Polish coalition government refused and Mikołajczyk resigned.

But the importance of the Polish Armed Forces was reflected in the message sent to Stalin by Churchill. Apparently, the British prime minister felt the need to explain to the Soviet dictator why the Polish government was still being recognized. In volume 3 of *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Llewellyn Woodward (1962–1976) quotes Churchill's letter to Stalin of December 3, 1944 that without Mikołajczyk as prime minister, the Polish government would be treated coldly, but correctly, since "a change of Prime Ministers does not affect the formal relations between States" (p. 239). Churchill went on to point out that the Polish government had control of the considerable Polish Armed Forces. This cold shoulder even extended to the Polish government when it was not invited to the inaugural session of the United Nations in San Francisco.

The rest of the war was a deathwatch by the Poles over their sovereignty. While the Yalta Conference is not directly relevant to the issues of the Polish forces, indirectly it was significant. Churchill in his communiqué to the House of Commons attempted to put a spin on the result. But he was obviously aware of the impact on the Poles and states;

His Majesty's Government will never forget the debt they owe to the Polish troops who have served them so valiantly, and to all those who fought under our command. I earnestly hope it may be possible to offer them citizenship and freedom of the British Empire, if they so desire. (Jedrzejewicz 1962, Vol. III. pp. 334–359)

In turn the British foreign office began to prepare its policy position.

Our aim should be to preserve the Polish Armed Forces as loyal and united formations for as long as their services are required in the war against Germany, and to ensure that as many Poles as possible should be able to return to Poland at the end of the German war. (Memorandum. The Polish Armed Forces. TNA FO371/4766. N. 2724/123/55)

In late winter and spring 1945, General Anders, the acting commander in chief, attempted to negotiate the centralization of all Polish land forces in northwest Europe. This was provided for by August 1940 military agreement. But the well-founded fear that the Poles might then attempt to break through the Soviet lines to Poland negated this last Polish initiative. Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (Danchev and Todman 2001) in his diaries, alluded to his meetings with General Anders and on June 8 wrote that "He has no clear plans and just hopes for any further chance that may admit his fighting his way back to Poland" (p. 686).

The final accounting came to a head after victory in Europe and after the British (as well as Americans) in Churchill's famous phrase had "disavowed" the Polish government in exile in July 1945 and extended recognition to the Soviet imposed Provisional Government of National Unity in Warsaw (Churchill 1954, p. 564).

A communist government was established and, as a result of the Yalta Conference, recognized as the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Krystyna Kersten (1991) traces the progress of this seizure of power by small group of communists supported by Soviet military and NKVD.

The ensuing negotiations between the Warsaw regime and London were prolonged. They strongly argued that they wanted the Polish gold back ostensibly to

rebuild the country. The British in turn presented the following debit for the military credits advanced to the Polish government during the war. The total was £122 million, of which £75 million was deleted due to the Lend-Lease agreement but £47 million was for salaries for the Polish military and the British expected to be reimbursed (TNA T 160/1399).

The Warsaw regime adamantly refused to pay any costs of the Polish military but agreed to reimburse the British government out of the Polish gold for civilian salaries. On June 24, 1947 the final Financial Treaty was signed in which the British returned the Polish gold and agreed to make no claim for the repayment of £73 million spent on war material prior to the Lend-Lease agreement. They also agreed to keep in abeyance the question of repayment of £47 million for salaries.

While these financial negotiations were ongoing the British government faced the dilemma as to how to deal with the Polish forces in the west, which would not acknowledge the provisional government as having any legitimate authority. This was a paradox, since well over 200,000 armed men were loyal to a president in London, who was ignored as a mere political refugee by the host country.

At war's end, the Polish Armed Forces in the west numbered 194,460 officers and men, of which 171,220 were in the ground forces; 19,400 in the air force; and 3,840 in the navy. This included 6,700 Polish women who served in all the three branches. In combat operations in exile (i.e., after the September campaign), the Poles suffered 7,698 officers and men killed and 10,605 wounded. The land forces were administratively divided into two army corps: First Army Corps under General Officer Commanding, Lieutenant General Stanisław Maczek, consisted of the First Armored Division (part of the British Army of the Rhine) and the 4th Grenadier Division and 16th Armored Brigade both in Scotland. The 2 Army Corps under General Officer Commanding, Lieutenant General Władysław Anders, was in Italy and consisted of the 3rd Carpathian and 5th Kresowa Infantry divisions and 2nd Warsaw Armored. There were many logistical, training and liaison units, mostly in the United Kingdom but also in Egypt. Michael Alfred Peszke's "Demise of the Polish Armed Forces, 1945–1947" (2010) deals with this topic.

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CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN

Resistance inside Nazi Germany

FRANK McDONOUGH

Active resistance against the Nazi regime was undertaken by less than one percent of the German population between 1933 and 1945. It never gained popular support among the German people. There are several reasons to explain this low level of active opposition. To begin with, resisters faced a popular dictatorship that enjoyed considerable popularity. This meant terror directed against political dissidents met with a surprisingly high level of public approval as the lack of outrage in June 1934 to the ruthless blood purge of the Storm Troopers dubbed the “Night of the Long Knives” amply demonstrates. Public endorsement of terror directed against the socialist left was equally widespread. The Gestapo could also rely on tip offs from public-spirited “national comrades.” This allowed the police authorities to target its resources very effectively against opponents. Resistance in Nazi Germany was confined to brave individuals and small clandestine groups nearly all of whom were tracked down, arrested, interrogated, and often executed (Hoffmann 1977). Yet the low level of resistance should not lead to the conclusion that resistance is not an important topic of historical debate as examination of those who opposed the Nazi regime tells us a great deal about the nature of popular support for the regime and reveals the brave yet lonely life of those who did resist Hitler’s rule. As a result, resistance has been very intensely debated among politicians and historians within Germany ever since; and in recent years the topic has produced work that is now at the cutting edge of the study of the Third Reich. Yet, the extent of resistance formed a central part of the legitimacy of both states in the divided Germany after World War II. It was entangled with that other deeply emotive issue of how the German people would come to terms with the dreadful legacy of the “past that would not pass away.” In his overview of German resistance, Ger van Roon divided the anti-Nazi resistance into communist, social democratic, religious, conservative, military, and exiled groups (Van Roon 1971). Such neat divisions might suggest there was a coordinated or organized resistance to Hitler – like the French model – but this was never the case.

The early struggle between historians of German resistance was more about emotive and subjective propaganda rather than objective historical analysis. The prize of being a “good German” in the Third Reich was a label well worth having. In the communist East German Democratic Republic (GDR), the emphasis of historians was on the “heroism” of the communist resistance, led by the German Communist Party (KPD), which was the backbone of the underground resistance, produced the largest amount of anti-Nazi leaflets, and was numerically the largest group of resisters against Hitler’s regime (Niven 2002).

In the West German Democratic Federal German Republic (FDR), the focus of historians was on Stauffenberg and the July 20, 1944 bomb plotters who attempted to assassinate Hitler. A 1952 German court judgment established the principle that the “Valkyrie conspirators” were not “traitors” because they had wanted to save Germany from the criminality of the Nazi regime. It was not until 1998, however, that all the unjust sentences imposed by Nazi courts on resisters were declared null and void. Hans Rothfels, a West German, was the author of one of the first significant historical surveys of resistance to Hitler. He concentrated on the small group of generals, conservatives, and aristocrats involved in “Operation Valkyrie” and hardly mentioned communist and working class resistance. Rothfels suggested the leading figures in the conservative-military resistance – the army figures Claus von Stauffenberg and Ludwig Beck and the civilian politician Carl Goerdeler – were primarily motivated to resist Hitler by a deep moral and ethical hatred of the essential criminality of Nazism. They desired to create a “new Germany” based on principles of the rule of law, freedom of the individual, and democratic principles. For Rothfels, the “men of 20 July” were the forerunners of democracy in postwar West Germany (Rothfels 1961).

In other early postwar studies of resistance the struggle of the Christian churches, the White Rose Munich-based student group, and the liberal Kreisau Circle were also discussed, but communist resistance was downplayed or marginalized to the periphery. For West German historians, true “resistance” against Hitler was Christian, bourgeois, individualistic, and striving for democratic freedom. Gerhard Ritter’s biography of Carl Goerdeler portrays him uncritically as a principled German patriot working tirelessly to overthrow what he saw as a criminal regime while remaining loyal to the pre-1933 idea of Germany as a civilized country based on the rule of law and civil rights (Ritter 1958).

These East and West German versions of what constituted “resistance” in Nazi Germany grossly exaggerated the aims and achievements of their chosen resisters. Of course, East German historians never mentioned that communist resistance was effectively crushed by the Gestapo in the early years of the Nazi regime (Burleigh 2000) and West German historians glossed over the fact that the military-conservative resistance contained several conservative figures who supported Hitler’s regime until the military tide turned against the *Wehrmacht* in the war against the Soviet Union, particularly after the catastrophic defeat of the 6th Army at Stalingrad in February 1943 (Niven 2002).

Each state was too busy claiming to be rightful heir of a particular resistance tradition to be overly concerned with getting the facts right. Communist resistance came in for a sustained criticism in West German studies. Joachim Fest claimed the KPD was on Stalin’s payroll and most communists wanted to set up a totalitarian system based on

the Soviet model (Fest 1979). East German accounts claimed the military resistance was essentially conservative and reactionary, and more concerned to retain the power of the army and capitalist forms of business than with establishing democratic government.

Even defining the very term “resistance” formed a key part of the historiographical debate. A narrow definition restricts historical analysis to the small conservative-military elite behind the Valkyrie bomb plot, but a broad categorization extends the resistance concept to include individuals who told jokes about the Nazi regime to friends in private. Peter Hüttenberger, the first director of the groundbreaking “Bavaria project” set up at the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich in the early 1970s to investigate “everyday life” in the Third Reich defined resistance broadly as “every form of rebellion” against the claim of total rule (*Herrschaft*) claimed by the Nazi regime. This definition embraced a wide variety of dissident and oppositional actions which displayed a rejection of National Socialism, even those falling short of attempting to support or participate in the overthrow of the regime by force (Kershaw 2000).

The six huge volumes that emerged from the “Bavaria project” edited under the overall supervision of Martin Broszat represent a major breakthrough in the study of everyday life and resistance in Nazi Germany (Broszat et al. 1977–1983). They influenced a generation of historians, including Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans Boberach, Detlev Peukert, and Sir Ian Kershaw. Messerschmidt suggested “resistance” historians should concentrate on groups and individuals whom the Nazi state, the Gestapo, the civilian police force and the judiciary categorized as “resisters.” Such a typology has the benefit of making it possible to draw up different degrees of resistance. Detlev Peukert “pyramid model” refined the methodology of resistance further by beginning with the analysis of mild forms of “nonconformity” at the bottom including not giving the Hitler salute, grumbling and telling jokes, rising up to include “protest” including spreading rumors, rising to the highest point of “political resistance” at the top which involved acts of industrial sabotage, the distribution of anti-Nazi leaflets and newspapers, passing on secrets to the Allies and trying to overthrow the regime by force. This pyramid model recognizes the real difference between calling Goebbels a “poison dwarf” in private to placing a bomb under Hitler’s table, with the intention of killing him (Peukert 1987). Seen this way, resistance becomes something identifiable as attempting to block or subvert the Nazi regime’s claim to control all aspects of the “National Community.” The very act of resistance was a phenomenon that takes us inside the complex relationship between the rulers of the Third Reich and the German people. The concept of totalitarianism, which was popular among historians on the Third Reich in the 1950s and early 1960s, had depicted Hitler’s Germany as a “Big Brother” state very similar in repressive terms to Stalin’s Soviet regime. We now know that Nazi Germany was never as totalitarian as the Soviet system and it had too few Gestapo officers or policemen to be classed as a “police state.” The people of Germany in the Nazi era had far more latitude in their behavior than was possible in the Soviet Union and they were not simply “taking orders.” Given the problems involved in successfully defining resistance, Martin Broszat offered a further subtle refinement of the broad conception of “resistance” offered by the adherents of the Bavaria project by coming up with a term called “Resistenz” to explain the complex process of resistance inside Nazi Germany. The word “Resistenz” has no precise English translation, but it essentially describes a process in which certain sections of German society in the Nazi

era remained wedded to a pre-1933 set of values which increasingly felt at odds with National Socialism as its power grew. The strength of using the “Resistenz” concept as a framework of analysis allowed for individuals and groups to be examined where opposition existed alongside attitudes that exhibited approval of many of the policies of the regime. In other words, initial collaborators – even enthusiasts – who became progressively disillusioned as events unfolded, became the focal point of analysis. Broszat does not suggest those placed in the “Resistenz” category stopped the Nazi regime pursuing its key foreign policy or racial objectives, but he claims it can explain how many groups within Nazi Germany were able to water down and even subvert the implementation of certain domestic policies of the regime and thereby weaken its drive for totalitarian control. In essence, Broszat is seeking to explain the channels of conflict and collaboration that existed in German society under Nazi rule (Kershaw 2000). He is also drawing attention to the distinctive nature of German resistance to Nazism. Most opponents of Hitler’s regime in Germany occupied Europe during World War II were fighting an occupying power which had little sympathy with the local population. As a result resisters could find support, shelter, and comfort from the local population, but the opponents of Nazis in Germany itself were fighting against a popular government and a very popular leader and were regarded as “traitors” by the overwhelming majority of the people which meant that their activities had to be highly secret and they could be exposed by loyal “National Comrades.”

One of the major critics of the “Resistenz” concept and the other broad integrationist conceptions of “resistance” postulated by adherents to the “Bavaria school” of historians is the conservative historian Walter Hofer, who maintains that broad definitions of resistance have little explanatory value and tend to relativize disparate and often contradictory forms of nonconformist behavior into a concept of “resistance.” Hofer emphasized that what needed to be recognized when examining resistance is the actual effect it had on the ability of Hitler’s regime to achieve its political, military, social, and racial objectives (Hofer 1972). Klaus Jürgen-Müller also called for “resistance” to be much more narrowly and precisely defined. He wanted it confined to those people who exhibited a “will to overcome” the Nazi system and took real identifiable actions that tried to bring on or encourage its downfall, defeat, or overthrow (Müller 1985).

Hans Mommsen rejected this narrow conception as simply an attempt to breathe life into the old-fashioned elitist view of history. Resistance cannot be seen simply as a matter of adding up concrete political results. It must be examined as part of a process in which certain individuals came to reject the Nazi regime. Mommsen added yet another definitional term “*Widerstandspraxis*” [resistance practice] in the melting pot of resistance methodology. This concept partially rejects Broszat’s “Resistenz” idea that the key resisters retained a pre-Nazi value system, but it allows instead for historians to examine both the actions of resistance figures – those who did retain pre-Nazi values and were never really Nazi supporters – and also to look at those individuals who became gradually disillusioned with the whole Nazi “regeneration” project. Mommsen suggests this concept helps to explain more fully how the leading figures in the conservative-military resistance, many of whom had been loyal servants of the Nazi state and in many cases supporters of Nazi ideals, started to see that Nazism was a corrosive and criminal ideology and gradually abandoned their former support for the regime in favor of a plan to kill Hitler in order to “save Germany” (Mommsen 1991).

Leaving aside these complex semantic debates over definition, the most noticeable recent trend in the historiography of German resistance has been the sustained criticism of the motives and aims of the conservative-military resistance group behind the July 1944 Valkyrie conspiracy. This group contained leading figures in the officer corps, the civil service, the church, and included liberals, socialists, and former trade union officials. Hans Mommsen has shown that the leaders of the bomb plot were not dedicated democrats, but upper-middle class conservatives who were not supporters of democracy in the Weimar era at all (Mommsen 1991). Michael Burleigh, on the other hand, claims the “men of 20 July,” though not wholeheartedly democratic in outlook, were nonetheless passionate about the need to restore the rule of law, basic civil rights, and freedom of religious practices in a post-Hitler Germany. They all rejected Nazi methods and practices as barbaric. In such a system the army – where they saw no reason to break it up – would remain a very powerful force. On foreign policy, there was a reluctance to accept anything other than Germany’s borders of 1914, and many of the Valkyrie plotters hoped Germany would become – after a suitable period of purdah – the leader of a United Europe. With the exception of the liberal debating group attached to the plot – the Kreisau Circle – there was no real desire among the conspirators to enact major social welfare reform or state control of business (Burleigh 2000).

Richard Evans views their ideas as essentially backward looking and for all their attempts to forge a unified broad based political program, they were deeply divided on many issues (Evans 2008). According to Christian Streit, many of the leading generals involved in the plot also took part in the war crimes committed by the *Wehrmacht* on the Eastern Front (Streit 1978). As recent studies have revealed in more detail the complicity of the *Wehrmacht* in the genocidal policies of the Nazi regime, especially in Poland and the Soviet Union, the reputation of many Valkyrie conspirators has been further compromised. The contemporary Allied charge of rats deserting a sinking ship has not been completely shaken off. In their plans for governing Germany after the death of Hitler, the conservative-military resistance wanted to retain a strong army and they lacked any desire to create a national liberal democratic system. Herman Graml and colleagues have pointed out that the key leaders of the bomb plot amazingly saw no reason for the *Wehrmacht* to suffer any loss of power in any postwar peace settlement (Graml et al. 1970).

There is also the question of how the German public would have reacted to Hitler’s death had the coup succeeded. In all likelihood, the majority of Germans would have been suitably outraged and it is highly unlikely that an army led junta would have received much popular approval or endorsement. There was no chance either that the Allies would have allowed Germany the sort of latitude to decide its own affairs as many of the Valkyrie plotters imagined. The demand for “unconditional surrender” was non-negotiable. In their favor, Michael Burleigh claims that if the plot had succeeded the new government would have sought peace with the Allies and if the war had ended in July 1944 – a further 7 million deaths would have been avoided (Burleigh 2000).

Another feature of recent studies of German resistance has a general acceptance of a broader definition of what constituted “resistance.” The opening of new Gestapo files and greater access to sources in regional archives since German unification has led to an upsurge in the study of grass-roots resistance. The study of resistance was given its greatest impetus in Germany by the establishment of a dedicated museum and research center of resistance in Berlin, which reached completion in 1989. It was decided – after

some debate – that the location of the museum would be at the Bendler Block, where Stauffenberg and his co-conspirators were executed on July 20, 1944 after the failed bomb plot. The street itself was called Stauffenberg Strasse. The leading German historian of resistance, Peter Steinbach, was given the task of representing resistance in all its breadth and diversity. The exhibition includes exhibits related to the Valkyrie bomb plot, the Christian churches, the various workers' movements, liberal and conservative resistance, opponents in the arts, the White Rose student resistance group, exiled opponents, communist resistance, and heroic individual stories.

The idea of integrating all these different elements into an overall presentation of "resistance" was controversial before German unification. Conservative critics opposed Steinbach's decision to afford communist resistance a key role in the museum. After all, many members of the communist resistance had been discredited by their involvement in the repressive totalitarian GDR regime and its secret police, the *Stasi* (Niven 2002). It seemed a "true resister" – as far as conservative historians were concerned – needed to have opposed both National Socialism and communism. Socialist historians objected to the idea that the brave resistance by communists against Nazism was being downgraded for political reasons. In the end, Steinbach's original vision of a broad-based approach to resistance was finally accepted (Steinbach 1994).

Since unification, the role of communist and working class resistance – something underplayed in West German historiography – has grown in importance and significance. Hans Mommsen defends the inclusion of communist resistance as a central area of research into resistance and he suggests denying its contemporary legitimacy would be to suppress a key part of the opposition process in the Third Reich. Alan Merson, in a detailed study of communist resistance, has shown that the great majority of those who took part in resistance activities were either communists or industrial workers located in the working class urban areas (Merson 1985). The working class was the least susceptible to National Socialism before 1933. In the November 1932 election – the last democratic poll of the Weimar era – the two parties of the socialist left, the SPD and the KPD, secured 36.1 percent of the total vote, which was just ahead of the Nazi Party vote.

The earliest organized resistance to Hitler's regime came from socialists and communists. Underground communist opposition to the Nazi regime continued to exist for the whole period from 1933 to 1945. By 1939, 150,000 communists and social democrats had been incarcerated in concentration camps and 12,000 had been convicted of "high treason." Clearly, this leftwing resistance contained a hard core of KPD members. There are individual stories of the immense bravery of the numerous localized communists and socialists resistance groups who produced the vast bulk of underground anti-Nazi leaflets and newspapers. The problem with much of the historiography of the KPD is that it exhibits a tendency to eulogize the undoubted heroism of individuals who opposed Hitler without offering much critical counter-balancing discussion of the relationship between the KPD and Stalin's totalitarian regime or going into detail of the type of one-party system with which the communists wanted to replace Hitler's regime.

However, there have been many other noteworthy studies on working class resistance in Germany to the Nazi regime. Some have revealed that resistance activity in factories was often not connected to the KPD. Tim Mason showed that some workers were able, especially during periods of acute labor shortages, to make demands on employers for wage increases even without the benefit of trade unions, especially

between 1935 and 1937 (Mason 1981). The publication of the illuminating social democrat secret public opinion reports (SOPADE) showed that “resistance” and “sabotage” in armaments factories was a growing problem for the Nazi authorities in the late 1930s. Communist resistance among elite groups not connected to the KPD has also been analyzed. In Berlin, the *Rote Kapelle* [Red Orchestra] – led by Arvid Harnack, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, his US-born academic wife, Mildred, and Harro Schulze-Boyson, an official at the Air Ministry – passed on important military and economic intelligence information to the Soviet government during the war. The Gestapo was keen to portray the Red Orchestra as Soviet spies in Stalin’s payroll, but, as Shareen Brysac has shown, the group was sympathetic to socialist ideas, but was neither puppets of Stalin nor connected to KPD underground resistance activities (Brysac 2000). The Harnack/Schulze-Boyson organization contained about 150 dedicated activists who produced and distributed anti-Nazi leaflets and underground newspapers before the Gestapo tracked them down. Over 50 members of the group were executed in a series of show trials presided over by Hitler’s fearsome “hanging judge,” Roland Friesler.

Detlev Peukert has shown how some younger members of the working class in the big cities – also separate from KPD control – expressed opposition to Nazi conformity by forming youth gangs, most notably, the Edelweiss Pirates who displayed behavior that revealed a complete rejection of National Socialism. Towards the end of the war, they engaged in acts of industrial sabotage against armaments factories in conjunction with foreign workers. Peukert suggests the presence of such groups shows that the Nazi claim of total control over the youth was beginning to break down in working-class areas even before the regime collapsed at the end of the war (Peukert 1987).

It would be wrong, however, to suggest the resistance of KPD, factory workers, or youth gangs put the Nazi regime under any real pressure. Reports from the underground KPD leadership sent to Moscow during the latter stages of the war present a very gloomy picture of the strength of underground communist resistance. They highlight the fact that Nazi ideology had made serious inroads into working class industrial areas. The SOPADE reports offer further evidence on how the Nazi regime drove communist resistance into very small pockets of predominantly impoverished and marginal working class areas of the big industrial cities. Peukert suggests that even Nazi skeptics among the working class increasingly opted for silence, resignation, and a progressive retreat into domestic isolation which he terms “atomization.” Michael Burleigh claims that even the small remnants of the KPD resistance that existed during wartime was riddled with Gestapo informants, which helps to explain why so many communist resistance figures were tracked down. Gestapo files indicated that key figures involved in the resistance against the Nazi regime in working class areas at the end of the war came not from German communists, but from the poor foreign slave laborers. A united working class resistance was rendered impossible by a combination of effective Gestapo repression, divisions between the KPD and SPD, and the skilled and unskilled sections of the working class. All this produced a working class that was effectively neutralized, contained, and marginalized (Burleigh 2000).

More recently, the resistance of Christians who mounted a principled stand in opposition to Nazism has grown in importance. Early postwar studies of the “church struggle” in the Nazi era portrayed the Protestant churches, especially the “Confessional Church,” as mounting opposition to the encroachment of Nazi ideas into Christian

practices (Conway 1968). In reality, the leaders of the Protestant Church were pre-occupied with retaining independence from state control of religion. According to Robert Erickson, resistance to specific Nazi policies designed to restrict autonomy of the Protestant Church to govern itself was widespread, but opposition to the broad racial and foreign policy of Hitler's regime was extremely limited (Erickson 1990). It is certainly true that Protestant Church leaders were united in opposition to the early Nazi drive to "Aryanize" the churches and in this struggle they succeeded in retaining some limited autonomy. Yet the record of the Protestant hierarchy in speaking out against the erosion of basic civil rights and especially the persecution of the Jews was abysmal.

Catholic opposition to the Nazi regime was certainly more widespread. Priests often used the pulpit, confession box, and home visits to spread negative comments about Nazism. Some priests called the swastika the "Devil's Cross" and often refused to give the Nazi salute in public. The Nazi regime saw many dissident Catholic priests, monks, and nuns as the "enemy within." David Dietrich has also revealed that prominent Catholic bishops often attacked Nazi "master race" ideas such as forced sterilization and the Euthanasia program – aimed at the handicapped and the mentally ill (Dietrich 1990).

The main aim of Catholic hierarchy was to press the Nazi regime to maintain the "Concordat" of 1933 under whose terms the Catholic Church was given assurances of autonomy by the Nazi regime in return for staying out of political matters. This helps explain why Catholic bishops stayed silent over the Kristallnacht pogrom that decimated numerous Jewish synagogues throughout Germany in November 1938. The Catholic Church was more absorbed by its own fight for survival. It had to contend with the suppression of the Catholic press, the banning of youth organization and propaganda campaigns, and show trials on trumped up charges portraying nuns, monks, and priests as prostitutes, crooks, and pedophiles. Church tax exemptions were removed, property seized, and welfare facilities for the mentally ill, blind, deaf, and the handicapped closed down. To ward off Nazi charges of being "resisters" Catholic bishops had little choice, but to give assurances that they rejected all "subversive political activity." After all, they had agreed to "stay out of politics" under the terms of the concordat. In spite of repeated attacks on organized religious practices, church attendance grew substantially during the Nazi era, markedly so among Catholic churchgoers. New Nazi secular bank holiday parades never achieved the high level of popular support afforded to traditional Christian religious festivals. In some cases, such as the heated battle to retain the crucifix in Catholic school classrooms. Nazi rulers were forced to concede to powerful grass-root protests.

Many recent biographies have focused on religious resisters such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Niemöller, Theodor Haecker, Pater Adolf Delp, Sophie and Hans Scholl, and the other key members of the White Rose student group who were all committed Christians. Bonhoeffer claimed the key task of the churches was "not only to bind up the victims beneath the wheel, but also to put a spoke in the wheel." This task was taken up by a brave minority of clerics – the great majority of whom were Catholics. Approximately, 400 German Catholic priests and 35 Evangelical pastors were incarcerated in Dachau because of opposition activities or due to issues of religious conscience. Religious adherence was not insignificant even among the "men of 20 July." Claus von Stauffenberg attended a Catholic mass on the morning of his attempt on Hitler's life. There was a disproportionate number of practicing Catholics involved in the Valkyrie conspiracy. Before he was shot by firing squad, Stauffenberg shouted "long live holy Germany."

In many general studies of opposition the White Rose group, based around Hans and Sophie Scholl, at Munich University were portrayed as a prime example of an individual and moral rejection of Nazism. Their passages in their leaflets showing a secular rejection of Nazism such as demands for the restoration of democracy, the rule of law, and personal freedom were highlighted over other passages that emphasized the strong Christian motivations of the group (Gill 1994). More recently, the tendency to view the White Rose group in secular terms has been substantially revised, most notably, by Jakob Knab and highlighted in McDonough's biography of Sophie Scholl (McDonough 2010). The constant encroachment by the regime on organized religion was clearly the central factor that prompted the White Rose to give their lives opposing the Nazi regime. Their leaflets emphasized Christianity as the basis for moral regeneration in a post-Hitler group. They placed a very high value on human life. Knab has shown that three of the central influences on the group were the writings of St. Augustine, the Catholic theologian Cardinal Newman, and the scholar Theodor Haecker. The group was also keener to highlight the genocide against the Jews than other groups motivated by Christian principles (Knab 2005).

What is really important about the study of German resistance is not so much its numerical insignificance or its failure to force the Nazi regime to modify its inhumanity or barbarity, but what it reveals about the nature of simmering conflicts in certain sections of the German population under Nazi rule. It is also a story of incredible self-sacrifice and bravery by certain individuals, such as Georg Elser, a carpenter from Württemberg, who, acting alone, planted a bomb in a Munich beer hall (the *Bürgerbräukeller*) on the night of November 8, 1939 when Hitler gave a speech there, but left earlier than anticipated before the bomb exploded and the poignant story of Sophie Scholl who distributed anti-Nazi leaflets and was executed for "high treason." We should never forget that members of the "Red Orchestra" and the "Valkyrie conspiracy" were executed by slow strangulation. History is not merely about results, statistics, or achievements. Stories of individual sacrifice, bravery, and personal conscience have their place too. The "other Germany" may have been a small world and the "good Germans" a small minority, but their deeds are their triumph and their legacy still has resonance in the world we live in today.

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CHAPTER FORTY-EIGHT

Occupied France: The Vichy Regime, Collaboration, and Resistance

JULIAN JACKSON

In the last thirty years historians have spent almost as much time writing about the memory of the German occupation as about the history of the occupation itself. The “Vichy Syndrome,” as Henry Rousso labeled it (Rousso 1991), is a “past that will not pass,” to quote the title of another of Rousso’s books (Rousso 1998), and has become a national obsession. Interest in memory – and the memory of the war in particular – is a general historiographical trend which affects not only France, but the French case is complicated by the particular circumstances of that country’s occupation. Unlike Holland and Belgium, France was not directly administered by Germany. About two-thirds of French territory comprised a “free zone” with an independent French government based at Vichy and headed by the venerable Marshal Philippe Pétain.

It is true that over time the autonomy of the Vichy government was whittled away. From 1942, the Germans interfered increasingly in policing to combat the development of the Resistance and they started to impose harsher policies towards the Jews. They also began drafting ever-larger number of French workers to work in German factories under the system of compulsory labor service (STO or Service du Travail Obligatoire). In November 1942, after the Allies landed in French North Africa, the Germans also occupied the previously Free Zone although Vichy retained theoretical autonomy there. Finally, at the end of 1943, Vichy effectively lost any remaining independence when the Germans forced Pétain to take into his government French pro-Nazi ultra-collaborationists who had previously been based in occupied Paris. Nonetheless, up to the start of 1942, the Vichy government had enjoyed considerable freedom of maneuver. Thus, France’s status in occupied Europe resembled less Holland, Belgium, or Norway than Denmark where the Germans allowed an independent government to exist until August 1943. But although the Danish government did collaborate with Germany in many areas, it left Danish political structures largely intact – such that there were even democratic elections in 1943. By contrast, the Vichy government proceeded to carry out a kind of internal conservative counterrevolution (dubbed the

“National Revolution”) which repudiated many of the values of the previous republican regime: the motto “work, family, fatherland” replaced “liberty, equality, fraternity.”

Thus although all countries occupied by Germany have had to confront painful memories relating to the extent that their populations collaborated with the occupiers, it is easy to see why in France that memory was even more painful because of the existence of an authoritarian and collaborating regime which was not imposed by the Germans. Furthermore, the head of that regime, Pétain, was hugely popular and became the object of an almost semi-religious cult. For these reasons, the Vichy period requires the French to confront difficult questions about the nature of their own political culture and cannot be written off as an occupation parenthesis.

Such questions were initially avoided owing to construction of a post-Liberation myth invented by General de Gaulle. When he arrived in liberated Paris in August 1944, de Gaulle refused to declare that the democratic republic was now “restored” because, according to him, it had never ceased to exist. In other words, the continuity of the “true” France had resided with him in London. Vichy was a bad dream that could be forgotten – “four years to efface from our history” according to the prosecutor at the trial of Pétain – apart from the relatively small number of “collaborators” who were condemned for “intelligence with the enemy.” According to this myth, the mass of the French people had supported the Resistance as much as they could. The postwar period saw the setting up of the Comité d’Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale which set about collecting oral testimonies of resisters. The historian Lucien Febvre argued that this was a civic duty (Douzou 2005). Meanwhile, many former members or supporters of the Vichy government, such as the justice minister, Joseph Barthélemy, the foreign minister, Paul Baudouin, and Pétain’s adviser, Henry du Moulin de Labarthète, wrote self-serving memoirs (Moulin de Labarthète 1946; Baudouin 1948; Barthélemy 1989). The general line of Vichy apologists was that they had been patriots trying to protect the French people from Germany: Pétain had been the “shield” and de Gaulle the “sword.” This interpretation of Vichy received a historical consecration in 1954 in a book by Robert Aron which argued that on those occasions when Vichy did collaborate with Germany, it had been forced to do so but that it also played a double game, keeping open bridges to the British. According to Aron’s account, Vichy elites had almost all accepted this policy except for the pro-German Pierre Laval and when Pétain sacked Laval from his position of prime minister in December 1940, it was because he believed that Laval had offered too much to the Germans. Thus, there was a “good” Vichy of Pétain and a “bad” Vichy of Laval. When Laval returned to power in April 1942, German pressure on Vichy had intensified, and in this period Aron was ready to credit Laval with doing his best to resist it and protect the French population as far as possible (Aron 1958).

This reassuring depiction of France’s occupation was shattered in 1972 by what French historians now call the “Paxtonian revolution” in reference to the publication in that year of *Vichy France* by the American historian Robert Paxton (Paxton 1972). Exploiting German archives, Paxton argued two fundamental propositions (Fishman, Downs, and Sinanoglou 2000). First, he showed that there was no Vichy “double game” and that far from being forced to collaborate, the leaders of Vichy actively and voluntarily sought to collaborate with Germany – to go beyond the strict minimum

of involuntary collaboration required under the terms of the armistice signed with Germany. On one or two occasions, Vichy even came close to offering Germany a policy of co-belligerence but mostly it preferred a policy of neutrality skewed markedly in favor of Germany. In Paxton's view, this policy of collaboration failed because most of the time Hitler was not interested in it. The two brief exceptions, neither of which was followed up, were in October 1940, when Hitler's failure to invade Britain made him contemplate a strategy of putting pressure on Britain in the Mediterranean (which would involve the cooperation of Italy, Spain, and France), and May 1941, when an anti-British rising in Iraq interested Hitler in the possibility of using French bases in the Middle East. But Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 turned Hitler's attention definitively to the east.

That is not to say that the German authorities in France did not seek – and indeed need – regular and intensive collaboration from French officials, administrators, and police. But such administrative collaboration was different from the kind of state level collaboration sought by Vichy. The regime sought collaboration because it was desperate to alleviate the daily conditions under which the French population lived – for example, to relax the demarcation line between the two zones or to obtain the release of the 1.5 million prisoners of war in Germany. To achieve such ends, Vichy was ready to offer the Germans concessions which went beyond the armistice, all the more so because it was convinced that Germany had won the war. This made it prudent to start preparing a privileged position for France in the new German Europe. In Paxton's revisionist interpretation of events, Laval was sacked in December 1940, not because he was seeking collaboration but because his efforts to achieve it had not produced concrete results. Pétain had been persuaded by Laval to meet Hitler at Montoire on October 24, 1940 (after Laval had already done so two days before) and following that meeting he announced publically that he was entering the road of collaboration. The problem was that the road seemed to lead nowhere, and that was why Laval was sacked. But Pétain's continuing commitment to collaboration was demonstrated by the fact that Laval's successor, Admiral Darlan, pursued the policy no less vigorously than his predecessor.

Paxton's second proposition was that the conservative and authoritarian policies of the Vichy regime were entirely homegrown, and not imposed by the Germans. For example, although the Germans quickly started imposing their own anti-Semitic measures in the occupied zone, they had played no role in Vichy's first anti-Semitic measures, such as the Jewish Statute of October 1940 which began the process of excluding Jews from all kinds of professions including education. If these were *French* policies, it was impossible to go on dismissing Vichy as a kind of occupation parenthesis. Paxton's interpretation reinserted Vichy into French history: it was not just a German puppet. In doing this, Paxton was also careful to show that Vichy was never a monolithic regime. It drew on many French traditions, and there was always a tension between modernizers and conservatives – reflected in the subtitle of his book, *Old Guard and New Order*.

Not all Paxton's arguments were entirely novel. What he had to say about collaboration had already been partly anticipated by the German historian Erhard Jäckel in 1967 (Jäckel 1968) and his conceptual framework for interpreting collaboration drew on a pioneering article by the American political scientist Stanley Hoffmann entitled "Self-Ensnared: Collaboration with Nazi Germany" (Hoffmann

1974). Hoffmann had also published in 1966 an important article on “The Vichy Circle of French Conservatives” (Hoffmann 1974) which showed the complexity of the competing factions at Vichy. The French historian Yves Durand had also begun to explore the complexity of Vichy (Durand 1972), as had a pioneering conference at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris in 1970 (Fondation Nationale des sciences politiques 1970). But no previous study had the impact of Paxton’s. In part, this was because no one had previously offered such an overarching interpretation – Jäckel, for example, did not treat Vichy domestic policy – but also because his book appeared at the right moment. In the wake of the “events” of 1968, when students violently contested the Fifth Republic government of de Gaulle, the younger generation was in the mood to contest the myths it had inherited from its parents. This was clear from the massive impact of the 1971 film, *The Sorrow and the Pity*, which painted a picture of occupation France totally at variance with the previous heroic legend.

Neither pillar of Paxton’s interpretation has been significantly challenged subsequently, except on points of detail. An important book on Vichy foreign policy by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle using recently opened French archives which had not been available to Paxton, nuanced Paxton’s reading of the so-called Protocols of Paris, an important moment of Franco-German collaboration in May 1941 (Duroselle 1982; Burrin 1996). These Protocols were the agreement by which Darlan had offered Germany French bases in North Africa in return for the promise of political concessions. In the end, the Protocols were never formally ratified by the French, and according to Duroselle, this was because Darlan backtracked after an intervention by the anti-German General Weygand, Vichy’s representative in North Africa. Darlan used this opportunity to sabotage the agreement by demanding extra concessions from the Germans which were unlikely to be forthcoming. Paxton, however, argues that the French did go on trying to reach an agreement for the rest of the year – after all, they furnished supplies to Rommel in North Africa later in the year – and if the Protocols lapsed, it was because the Germans lost interest once Hitler turned eastwards. Despite such differences of detail, the overall picture Duroselle found in the French archives broadly confirmed what Paxton had found in the German ones. In 1989 two French historians tried to rehabilitate Darlan, who had opportunistically switched sides when he found himself in French North Africa at the time of the Allied invasion in November 1942. But the evidence they provided of Darlan’s commitment to collaboration undermined their apologetic intentions. It was clear that Darlan had tried to keep French North Africa from joining the Allies until he had no choice (Cotau-Bégarie and Huan 1989).

Nor has Paxton’s account of the internal policies of the regime been substantially contested. There are now innumerable studies of all aspects of Vichy policy – towards women, towards the young, towards the economy, towards culture (music, visual art, literature, theater, cinema), towards the Jews, and so on. These works show that Vichy was never monolithic at any moment in time and also that it evolved over time. The Vichy governments contained old-fashioned clerical conservatives, monarchists, conservative liberals (or at least people who had been conservative liberals before 1940), technocrats, corporatists, and syndicalists. Vichy also provided a home to many representatives of what historians call the “non-conformists of the 1930s” – young reform-minded intellectuals frustrated by the blockages of the parliamentary system,

keen to shake up French society and politics by exploring a middle way between capitalism and socialism. In economic policy, Vichy's rhetoric was often traditionalist, celebrating peasants, artisans, and regional folklore (Faure 1989) but the practice was very different, and anticipated many aspects of the postwar policies of economic planning and modernization. Dirigiste reality often won out over corporatist rhetoric (Kuisel 1981; Margairaz 1991). To take another example, Bernard Comte has identified a multitude of ideological currents which contributed to the elaboration of Vichy youth policy. These included social Catholics, Maurassian monarchists, former activists from the scouting movement, fascists, and so on (Comte 1991). The ideology of Vichy was syncretic, but the regime always a force field of political competitors in conflict with each other.

The policies of the regime also came up constantly against the realities of occupation. There was something curious about thinking it would be possible to remake France while the country was half occupied by enemy troops. Thus, although the regime obsessively celebrated motherhood and family – divorce was made more difficult to obtain and abortion became a crime against the state punishable by death (and two abortionists were even guillotined) – the reality was that with so many fathers and husbands absent as prisoners, never had the family been more fragile or abortions more widespread. In October 1940, the regime had legislated to restrict women working so that they could fulfill their duties as mothers but grave shortages of labor required the measure to be suspended two years later (Pollard 1998).

If Vichy was more pluralistic – indeed incoherent – than monolithic, its leaders did share a number of common values. They believed themselves engaged upon an enterprise to overcome the decadence of France, which they attributed to the ravages of liberal individualism. They wanted a return to organic “natural” communities; they were violently anticommunist. Vichy was from the start, and until the end, a regime of repression and exclusion. It abolished democratic institutions at local and national level, and set up in August 1941 special courts (*Sections Spéciales*) to persecute communists and resisters. Under Vichy, France was covered with an archipelago of camps in which were interned foreign Jews, gypsies, communists, Spanish Republicans, and so on. Some of these camps had been established by the Third Republic to harbor Spanish refugees but what was an exception under the Republic became institutionalized under Vichy. About 50,000 people were interned in the Free Zone by the middle of 1941. Denis Peschanski, the historian who has most meticulously analyzed Vichy's repressive apparatus, has also identified a “fascist” group at Vichy in 1941 around Darlan's minister of the interior, Pierre Pucheu (Peschanski 1997). In fact, in 1940 the group around Pétain had explicitly refused the idea of setting up some kind of single party on the German model, and this had caused many committed French fascists to leave for Paris in disgust. But the “fascist temptation” was never completely ruled out. In 1941 the minister in charge of propaganda, Paul Marion, who was like Pucheu a former member of the prewar fascist party the PPF, wanted to apply in France some of the same methods of political indoctrination and propaganda which he admired in Nazi Germany. Thus, one should not overplay the distinction between the fascist ultra-collaborationists Paris such as Jacques Doriot and his PPF, or Marcel Déat and his RNP (Burrin 1986). Although these people denounced Vichy as a clerical and conservative regime, the relationship between Paris and Vichy was more porous than their rhetoric suggested. Vichy's representative to the occupying

authorities in Paris, Fernand de Brinon, was an ultra collaborationist ideologue whose ideas were certainly closer to the Nazis than to the Vichy regime he was supposedly serving. The violently repressive Milice, Vichy's auxiliary police force founded in 1943, had grown out of the more decorous Legion de Combattants which was the organization of war veterans established by Vichy to sell its message to the population (Cointet 1995).

Vichy policy was also driven by an obsessive desire to maintain a semblance of French sovereignty over all French territory. This led the Vichy authorities to try to preempt German initiatives or convert them into French ones. In effect, therefore, the Vichy regime often ended up doing the Germans' dirty work for them so as to limit the extent of direct German interference in French affairs. This did not necessarily involve major crises of political conscience, since, as Marc-Olivier Baruch has shown, the Vichy authorities shared many of the same political enemies as the Germans (Baruch 1997). But such "prophylactic" collaboration sucked French officials into a process of intense and daily administrative cohabitation with their German counterparts. This accounts, in part, for the trajectories of ambitious administrators like René Bousquet (Vichy chief of police from 1942) or, at a more junior level, Maurice Papon, who served Vichy as a prefectural official in the southwest. Neither had been ideologically on the right. Indeed, they were both viewed as exemplary servants of the republican regime with patrons among the political establishment of the center-left. As Gérard Noiriel argues, the trajectories of such men were eased by the fact that Vichy's values did not represent a complete rupture with those of the preceding republican regime (Noiriel 1999). Vichy was right-wing and authoritarian but it was more than this. In *France: The Dark Years*, Jackson shows how it drew, for example, on the patriotic language of national unity which had been forged in the *Union sacrée* of the Great War (Jackson 2001). It was no coincidence that Vichy was headed by the most famous soldier of that war or that it relied upon the movement of war veterans to sell its message.

If our understanding of the working and policies of the Vichy regime has deepened over the last 40 years, Paxton's interpretation has never been overturned. On the other hand, while Paxton's book was primarily about the Vichy *regime* and not about French *society* under occupation, he did also offer observations about the reactions of the French people to the occupation. He suggested that in contrast to the myth of France as a nation of resisters, most of the population had been broadly *attentiste*, with perhaps about two percent of active resisters and the same number of active collaborators. Here his interpretation has stood the test of time less well, thanks to new sources which were not available to him. In the 1980s, historians were for the first time able to use the reports of the prefects on public opinion of the population under Vichy. Using this source, the American historian John Sweets studied opinion in the town of Clermont-Ferrand – where the *Sorrow and Pity* had been filmed – and the French historian Pierre Laborie looked first at the southwest and then the country overall. They both reached remarkably similar conclusions, which significantly revised Paxton's claims while not reverting to the previous heroic myth. What they showed were the ambiguities, hesitations, doubts, and rapidly shifting views of a population that had been traumatized and destabilized by the defeat, losing for a while its political bearings (Sweets 1986; Laborie 2001). Almost from the beginning – and despite the efforts of Vichyite propaganda to stoke up Anglophobic feeling after the British

bombed the French fleet at Mers el Kébir in North Africa – the French population was generally pro-British, anti-German, and opposed to the official policy of collaboration. At the same time, it retained faith in Pétain, believing that he was doing his best to protect the French. Collaboration was blamed on his evil counselors like Laval.

Attitudes to the National Revolution were more ambivalent. Many people had become disillusioned by the instability of the Third Republic in the 1930s and had little nostalgia for it. Equally, those who were offended by the overt anti-republicanism of Vichy could identify with some of the regime's policies like pronatalism which was not identified exclusively with the right. Women may have been alienated by the need to queue for hours just to buy the most basic necessities, but they did appreciate the regime's efforts on behalf of POWs. Prisoner wives organized themselves to support their absent husbands, and their vision of the world, constructed around a rhetoric of suffering, loyalty, and patriotism, resonated with the language of the regime. In the occupied zone, many individuals were forced to interact at all kinds of levels with the Germans for pragmatic and practical reasons, but only a tiny minority was actively committed to collaboration. This has led the historian Philippe Burrin to coin the less morally charged term "accommodation" to categorize the wide range of behavior under the occupation (Burrin 1996). There was no moral map available; individuals had to negotiate their own codes of conduct.

Indeed, one of the first tasks of the Resistance was to define categories of acceptable behavior. This was the purpose of one of the first Resistance tracts, Jean Texcier's *33 Conseils à l'Inconnu Occupé* [33 pieces of advice for those unknown people living in an occupied country] which circulated widely in the occupied zone at the end of 1940. "Collaboration" was a social construction whose meaning changed over time. Women believed to have had personal relations with Germans were particularly singled out for opprobrium. In Texcier's tract, addressed to the "*Occupé*" [male] not the "*Occupée*" [female], men were encouraged to savor in advance the thrashing they would give to women who were consorting with Germans. At the liberation, some 30,000 women were publicly humiliated by having their heads shaved for "collaboration" (Virgili 2002). Although a recent study has estimated that some 100,000 children were born to liaisons between French women and German men (Virgili 2009), many women were often, in fact, being punished for the fact that their behavior was judged not to have conformed to the ideal of sacrifice and sobriety considered appropriate for the population of an occupied country (Capdevila 1999). It is striking how the rhetoric of resistance was often cast in highly gendered terms. France had been "raped" by Germany: the Resistance represented an active and "virile" response to that humiliation while collaboration was viewed in terms of passivity and femininity (sometimes also homosexuality).

The conduct of writers, artists, and intellectuals also came under much scrutiny, and has done ever since. This partly reflects the high status traditionally accorded to intellectuals in France but also the fact that their actions were highly public. Intellectuals were subject to considerable temptations owing to the comparatively liberal cultural policies pursued by the Germans in occupied Paris. Although Jews were banned any form of cultural production, Germans otherwise allowed and even encouraged cultural activity to continue. The German strategy was to seduce intellectuals in cultural collaboration with many German officials at the embassy; the German *Institut* presented itself as genuinely Francophile. In this situation, it was not

always clear to intellectuals where their duty lay. Some convinced themselves, whether in good faith or bad, that continuing to produce was even a form of patriotism – keeping the banner of French culture flying. Many filmmakers agreed to make films for the German-financed production company, Continental, which allowed directors considerable artistic freedom. The Paris theater flourished under the occupation, and indeed witnessed considerable cultural effervescence with the first performances of important plays by writers like Paul Claudel, Jean Anouilh, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

It was in 1943 that Sartre's play, *The Flies*, premiered on the Paris stage. Sartre also wrote for the underground resistance press, and after the war as the philosopher of political "commitment," he was merciless about those who had compromised themselves in the occupation. Sartre claimed that *The Flies* had carried a coded Resistance message, but a study of the contemporary press show that almost no one succeeded in reading the code while everyone surely had known that the play was being staged in a theater which had recently changed its name because it was previously named after the celebrated Jewish actress, Sarah Bernhardt. It has also been recently uncovered that the prestigious teaching position Sartre acquired in 1942 was made vacant because it had been previously been occupied by a Jewish teacher who was barred from teaching by Vichy's Jewish Statute. It seems unlikely that Sartre would not have known this (Galster 1986; Galster 2001). None of this is meant to sustain the absurd claim that Sartre was a collaborator, but it does illustrate how difficult it was for intellectuals not to compromise themselves to some degree. Such perils did not present themselves in Poland where the Nazi objective was to eradicate the cultural life of the country entirely.

From studying French public opinion under occupation and scrutinizing in detail the conduct of particular groups, historians then moved, in the later 1980s, to examining the institutions and organizations that had acted as intermediaries between French society and the Vichy regime. Although we have seen that there were those in Vichy who looked to Nazi Germany as a model, they were not dominant, and in practice, Vichy never tried to be totalitarian. The regime was conservative and authoritarian, with more affinity to Salazar's Portugal than Hitler's Germany. It often relied on sympathizing non-state institutions to carry out its initiatives and support its policies. For example, Vichy permitted seven scouting movements to exist, and made no attempt to corral the young into one movement like the Nazi youth. What this meant was that Vichy, to some extent, tolerated the existence of "spaces of liberty" that might develop in heterodox directions at odds with the original intentions of the regime. This was true of the famous training school set up in 1940 at Uriage, near Grenoble, with Vichy's benediction. Its aim was to create a new elite of leaders for a regenerated France. Someone who played an important role in this institution was the philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, one of those intellectual "non-conformists" critical of the defunct Third Republic and hopeful that Vichy might be a vehicle to realize the antimaterialist and anti-individualistic ideas of "personalism" which he espoused. But gradually, Mounier became disillusioned with Vichy and the Uriage School was closed down in 1942, as it strayed too far from the core values of Vichy. The "spaces of liberty" shrunk inexorably. As more specific studies have been made of other social intermediaries between the population and the regime – the Church, youth movements, or cultural organizations like the Jeune France movement, which aimed

to democratize and overhaul the theater – any black and white picture of the period becomes harder to sustain. Vichy's history must be written in shades of gray.

Where did the Resistance fit into this more complex picture which emerged of French society under occupation? In the wake of Paxton's work, historians had for many years become less interested in the Resistance. But as they began to look *below* the regime – at society – resistance began to attract attention again in the 1990s. The aim now was not to return to heroic resistance narratives of the 1950s and 1960s but to reinsert the Resistance in its social context and reconceptualize it by moving beyond the clichés of armed resistance and sabotage. Whereas Paxton had suggested that anyone not actively supporting the Resistance was necessarily, in an occupied country, a “functional collaborator,” historians now suggested that one could equally be able to identify “functional resisters” who might not have *done* anything remarkable but whose silent complicity was often the precondition for the success and survival of the Resistance. The Resistance was more than those people (some 261,000 by 1994) who received a card attesting that they had been formally enrolled in a Resistance organization. Through detailed regional studies, historians probed how individuals moved from “dissidence” to “resistance,” from resistance to the Resistance, from informal resistance to organized resistance. The historian Jacques Semelin examined the wide varieties of civilian nonviolent resistance; others brought to light the informal role played by women who might not have received official recognition but played a vital behind the scenes role (the “woman in the doorway” eloquently written about by Roderick Kedward); others probed the role of the peasantry in feeding and hiding the rural based *maquis* (Semelin 1993). In 1940, the number of active resisters had been tiny but as the weight of the German occupation became more onerous and more unpopular, especially once the STO was imposed in late 1942, more and more people were drawn into the orbit of the Resistance. As young men escaped into the hills of southern France to avoid the STO, the Resistance moved from the towns to the countryside. France, while never a *society of Resisters*, did become a *society in resistance*. This allowed, and indeed forced, resistance organizations to become ever more elaborate and more complex to meet this social demand. By the end of the occupation, the scale of the clandestine press was quite astonishing.

The new historiography of the 1990s was also attentive to the complexities and divisions of the Resistance. As the emanation of a divided society, the Resistance could never be monolithic despite its rhetoric of unity. One sign of this was the highly ambivalent attitude that many resisters displayed towards Pétain at the start. New studies of the important Resistance movements *Combat* and *Défense de La France* showed how long their leaders continued to believe in the myth of Pétain (Wiewiorka 1995; Belot 2003). This is not as surprising as it might seem. Many members of Vichy's intelligence services were viscerally anti-German and were as active in hunting down German spies as they were communists and Gaullists: they arrested 200 German spies in the northern zone between 1940 and 1942 and executed 40 of them (Kitson 2008). If Vichy was an objectively collaborating regime, many people hoped at the beginning that it would be possible to resist the Germans while working within the regime.

Another reason why many early resisters had some sympathy for Pétain is that they had none for the defunct Third Republic. This was noted long ago by Henri Michel in a pioneering study of the ideas of the Resistance (Michel 1961) but it has

emerged even more forcibly in recent writing. Many early resisters deplored the alleged “decadence” of the Third Republic which they viewed with as much contempt as did the defenders of Vichy. Although some resistance organizations like Libération-Sud or Libération-Nord had left-wing and pro-republican sympathies from the start, this was far from a general stance (Douzou 1995; Aglan 1999). Indeed, what many resisters wanted initially was something not so different from Vichy’s national revolution but without the contamination of collaboration. As it became harder to harbor any illusion about Vichy, the Resistance began to find unity in opposing it. This, as Kedward argues in his important book *Resistance in Vichy France*, allowed it to rediscover republican values that had seemed tarnished before 1940 (Kedward 1978).

But even when this occurred the Resistance never became a monolith. There were always, for example, suspicions between the communists and most of the rest of Resistance. In recent years, historians have also remarked upon the phenomenon of so-called *vichysto*-resisters. These were individuals who had remained loyal to Vichy even into 1943 but gradually came over to the Resistance sometimes through opportunism but often because they really had lost faith in the regime. François Mitterrand was a perfect example of such an evolution with all its ambiguities. Even if these *vichysto*-resisters had lost faith in Pétain they remained suspicious of de Gaulle, and looked to other rallying figures like General Henri Giraud whom the Americans had tried to build up as a counterweight to de Gaulle. In other words, rather than seeing Vichy and the Resistance as two blocks, totally opposed to each other, there was a degree of permeability and exchange between them. They could even share similar values until the end. As the Resistance became increasingly implanted in the countryside, it had no difficulty in adopting the rural rhetoric which Vichy had used and turning it against the regime.

Ambivalence towards de Gaulle was not only displayed by latecomers to the Resistance. Recent historiography has not only uncovered the social biases of Resistance but also examined its high politics. This development owes a lot to the work of the resister-turned-historian, Daniel Cordier. In 1940, at the age of 19, Cordier had escaped from France to join de Gaulle. He was parachuted back into France in 1942 to work as secretary to de Gaulle’s representative to the Resistance, Jean Moulin. Moulin’s mission was to unite the Resistance movements behind de Gaulle and organize them into an underground army that would participate in the liberation of France under de Gaulle’s orders. Resistance leaders resented abdicating their independence but needed the money and supplies that Moulin could offer them. De Gaulle, on the other hand, needed the support of the Resistance to prove to the Americans that he did speak for France. Moulin was remarkably successful at uniting the Resistance, and the culmination of his work was the setting up of the National Council of the Resistance in 1943 just before his arrest. In the 1970s, Cordier was shocked to hear the former resister Henri Frenay accuse Moulin of having been a crypto-communist who had emasculated the Resistance. This led him to undertake a twenty-year quest to write the truth about Moulin using unique documents in his possession. His monumental work certainly disproved Frenay’s specific allegations, but the acerbic portrait that he paints of the Resistance leaders as irresponsible and selfish *prima donnas* unable to swallow their difference for the common cause, also reflects, if unwittingly, the Gaullist vision over that of the metropolitan resistance

(Cordier 1999). On the eve of Moulin's arrest by the Germans in May 1943, relations between him and the Resistance had sunk to a new low, and he accused Frenay of seeking American funding in order to emancipate himself from the Gaullist tutelage. This was an exaggeration (Belot 2003) but the fact that such accusations were possible demonstrates the depth of the rivalries between the London based Gaullists and the French Resistance.

One detail of Cordier's book on Moulin that particularly scandalized Resisters who were still alive was his publication of an early – and previously unknown – manifesto by Frenay which revealed a degree of latent anti-Semitism. This document is certainly authentic, and even if Frenay abandoned such ideas during the occupation, the shock caused by Cordier's discovery highlights the particular sensitivity attaching to the subject of anti-Semitism in this period. This is an issue that has attracted increased historical attention over recent decades.

Here, again, a pioneering study was by Robert Paxton (in collaboration with Michael Marrus). Their 1981 study, *Vichy France and the Jews* (Marrus and Paxton 1981) demonstrated that the Vichy regime had implemented its own policies of anti-Semitic exclusion in the period 1940–1942 quite independently of the Germans; and that these policies were generally approved by the French population (or greeted with indifference). Most shocking of all, they showed how when the Germans began to implement their policy of deportation and extermination of Jews in 1942, Vichy was ready to lend its support. On July 2, 1942, the head of the Vichy Police, René Bousquet, offered a deal (ratified by Laval and Pétain two days later) by which the French police would arrest Jews in both zones providing that only foreign Jews and not French Jews were targeted. When a huge roundup of some 12,000 Jews occurred in Paris on July 16–17, and another 10,000 in the Free Zone in August, it was the French police who carried out the arrests. Laval went even so far as to ask the Germans also to deport Jewish children because the Vichy authorities did not want to be burdened with the problem of dealing with orphans. It emerged from the Marrus/Paxton study that Jews were better off in the Italian zone than anywhere else in France. The major novelty of their approach was, first, to underscore the importance of indigenous French anti-Semitism (both at the level of state and society), and second, to refute the idea that the existence of an independent Vichy regime had saved Jews (as Vichy apologists once claimed). In their reading, there were almost no occasions when Vichy actually blocked a German policy. Two exceptions were Vichy's refusal to impose the wearing of the Yellow Star in the Free Zone and a German demand in August 1943 to remove French nationality from all Jews naturalized since 1933. If it was true that Vichy regime did become less cooperative in the deportation policy after the end of 1942 and that the rate of deportations did slow in 1943, Paxton and Marrus do not attribute this so much to Vichy's obstruction as to the fact that the Germans did not have the necessary transport available to sustain the rhythm of deportations.

More detail was produced on the negotiations between Laval, Bousquet, and the Germans by the historian and lawyer Serge Klarsfeld, whose parents had perished in Auschwitz. Klarsfeld has spent much of his life both tracking down former war criminals and painstakingly constituting a list of the names of every single Jewish deportee from France. But Klarsfeld, while further developing Paxton's analysis of the complicity of Vichy in the Holocaust, offers a different answer to the question why

the Germans did not succeed in arresting as many Jews as they wanted. Klarsfeld stresses the importance of a radical change in French public opinion that occurred in summer 1942 (Klarsfeld 1983). All authors agree that up to this point, the French population was largely indifferent and even hostile to the Jews. Indeed a recent study by Renée Poznanski has shown that many resisters and free French were not immune to anti-Semitism (Frenay was far from unusual) (Poznanski 2008). But the harrowing scenes which accompanied the mass arrests in 1942 caused a wave of shock and outrage. The Church had hitherto been one of the pillars of the regime, but in August 1942, the Archbishop of Toulouse, Cardinal Saliège, read out in the cathedral a pastoral letter condemning the arrests, and four other leading prelates followed suit.

Paxton and Marrus observe that in fact these Catholic protests were not followed up, that the Church had largely rebuilt its bridges with Vichy by the end of the year, and that in 1943, most French people became more preoccupied with the STO than the fate of the Jews (now non-Jewish French citizens also faced being “deported” and people had little idea how different the fate of Jewish deportees was from others). This may be true but it overlooks the fact that after the summer of 1942, many church leaders, including Saliège, started to support clandestine efforts to save Jews – especially children – by giving them new identities and hiding them with Catholic families or in Catholic schools. Such activities formed part of a whole series of clandestine networks of solidarity which developed from summer 1942 and involved many actors in French civil society (Cohen 1993; Poznanski 1994). Particularly important was the role played by Protestant communities in remote parts of southern France who identified with the persecuted Jews owing to their own long historical memory of persecution by the French state. The single village of Chambon sur Lignon in the Haute-Loire is estimated to have saved the lives of several thousand Jews.

In total, about 75,000 Jews were deported from France during the occupation. This figure, although appalling, represented a percentage (24%) much lower than the number who were deported from Belgium and Holland (45% and 75% respectively). This was in part due to the role played by secret networks of solidarity, and to the fact that these were able to exploit the geographical advantage of France and the existence of borders with Spain, Switzerland, and Italy. How many Jewish children were saved in this way we cannot precisely say, but it would seem that in some sense civil society came to the rescue of a population that had been abandoned by the state. The argument of Vichy’s apologists that Laval’s bargaining with the Germans had sacrificed foreign Jews (56,000 perished) to save French ones (24,000 French died) is not sustainable (quite apart from the morally dubious nature of such a bargain anyway). Without Vichy’s cooperation, the Germans would have lacked the manpower and information – the addresses contained in the files which resulted from the census of Jews carried out – to effect arrests on the scale achieved in 1942. It is therefore fitting that since 1995, when President Jacques Chirac formally acknowledged responsibility for the culpability of France in the Holocaust, the date of July 16 – the anniversary of the roundup of 1942 – has become a day of remembrance in France.

Nonetheless, the acute concentration in recent years on the fate of Jews during the occupation has led the historian Henry Rousso to question whether what he calls this “Judeocentric” approach to Vichy has not begun to distort historical understanding of the regime. While there is no denying the reality of Vichy’s anti-Semitism, it is also true that no speech of Marshal Pétain during the war ever actually singled out the

Jews directly, and exclusive concentration on the terrible fate of the Jews should, Roussio suggests, not lead us to overlook the many other targets of the regime's repression, such as communists and freemasons. Of course, neither of these two groups was singled out for extermination, but this leads to Roussio's second point that, in fact, the radical policy of extermination was different in nature from the exclusionary anti-Semitism of Vichy. Vichy's complicity in extermination resulted from the twisted logic of administrative collaboration – an awful bargain made by Bousquet to keep control of the police – although Vichy's own anti-Semitic prejudices made such a bargain all too easy to accept. To those who might worry that Roussio's argument could be used by apologists for the regime, he would doubtless reply that establishing the historical truth is the surest way of undercutting any attempts at rehabilitation. But his argument does indirectly highlight one feature of Vichy historiography since the "Paxtonian revolution": the tendency to view the occupation as a purely French affair and underplay the importance of the German presence. Vichy did exist, but the Germans were also there.

The most recent historiography, much of it by German historians, has at last begun to put the occupiers back into the picture. The issue is complicated because there were so many competing German authorities in occupied France which replicated and transplanted the "polyocracy" of Nazi Germany. These included the military authorities – the MBF – based at the Hotel Majestic in Paris; the SD-Sipo (popularly known as the Gestapo), which reported to Himmler; and the German Ambassador, Otto Abetz, who reported to Ribbentrop. The respective influence of these authorities varied over time with the influence of the Sipo-SF becoming more important after May 1942.

Since the famous 1995 exhibition in Hamburg on the "Crimes of the Wehrmacht," the stark dichotomy between a "clean" *Wehrmacht* and an ideological and exterminatory SS has been definitively laid to rest as regards the Eastern Front. But the idea has remained intact in the West where the German Army has traditionally been seen as acting "correctly" in the campaign of 1940 – apart from some incidents such as the massacre of black French troops – and during the occupation. The relative moderation of the traditionalist and conservative officers of the MBF is contrasted with the more radical and ideological attitude of the SD and Nazis. This contrast seems exemplified in the famous hostage crisis which broke out in fall 1941 following the start of the communist campaign of killing individual German soldiers. Launched with the assassination of a German naval officer in a Paris underground station on August 21, 1941, this was pursued with other shootings of Germans in Nantes and Bordeaux. General Otto von Stülpnagel, head of the MBF, tried to resist the pressure from Hitler to execute between 50 and 100 French hostages for every German killed. This crisis between the MBF and Berlin ended with Stülpnagel's resignation in February 1942.

While not denying the broad picture, the most recent research of historians like Gaël Eismann has challenged this depiction of the MBF (Eismann 2010). In the first place, far from being the exclusive preserve of traditionalist German officers, the MBF's civilian administration contained senior administrators who were committed National Socialists such as Werner Best who served in France until being sent to serve as Hitler's plenipotentiary in Denmark in November 1942 (Herbert 2010). Furthermore, the army as a whole was obsessed by the historical memory of the

Franc-Tireurs of 1870–1871 – civilians who had operated against the Germans behind enemy lines. From the start of the occupation, MBF jurists set about interpreting the international conventions regarding the treatment of a civilians in a way that lived up to the letter of the law while emptying them of substance. It issued a whole series of decrees extending the notion of collective responsibility to include a vague concept of civilian solidarity. The first anti-Semitic ordinance and many subsequent ones were issued by the MBF without any external pressure because it viewed the Jews as a serious security issue. In the famous hostage crisis, Stulpnagel's objection to Hitler's policy was pragmatic rather than ethical: he feared that mass executions of hostages would alienate the population and jeopardize the smooth working of collaboration. Nor were his alternatives to Hitler's policy always so "moderate." As a reprisal against one communist attack, he proposed to arrest and deport Jews and communists. This resulted in the arrest of some 750 French Jews in December 1941, who were subsequently deported to Auschwitz in 1942. When responsibility for keeping order in France was handed over to the SD-Sipo in May 1942, its relations with the MBF remained largely cordial. In short, the differences between the MBF and the more ideological among the German authorities in France should not be exaggerated. This is also true of the turf war between Otto Abetz, the Ambassador, and other German authorities. After the war Abetz portrayed himself as a moderate and Francophile, but he was fully committed both to reducing France to second-class status in Europe and to Nazi anti-Semitic policies (Lambauer 2001).

Overall, of course the level of German repression was much greater in eastern and central Europe than in France. There were 471 hostages shot in Germany between September 1941 and June 1942, but in Serbia between September 1941 and February 1942, the figure was almost 20,000 killed. Only the last stages of the German occupation in France witnessed examples of repression comparable to those taking place in the east – sometimes, indeed, carried out by soldiers who had been brutalized by their experience on the Eastern Front. The most famous example was the massacre of men women and children carried out at the village of Oradour-sur-Glane by the Das Reich SS Division in June 1944. But this horrific event should not be allowed to overshadow the other atrocities that occurred in the months before the liberation (Bruttman 2003). In 1944, the Germans launched several operations against Maquis groups in the Ain, Correze, Dordogne, the Plateau of Glières, and so on. In these operations, it was usually the SD and SS who perpetrated the most violent atrocities, although, in fact, the army was also complicit in this respect by the Sperrle ordinance of February 1944, which specifically permitted the killing of civilians as part of anti-Maquis campaigns. For the *Wehrmacht*, the Resistance could not expect to be treated like regular soldiers, and were no better than the feared Franc-Tireurs of 1871.

It is interesting, however, that at the end of June 1944, the MBF did begin to review its doctrine regarding whether resisters could be treated as regular soldiers. This may have been a testimony to the scale and importance that some Resistance military operations had assumed in the last stages of the war. After the D-day landings, the sabotage operations of the Resistance did certainly help the Allies considerably, even if Eisenhower's later comment that the contribution of Resistance amounted to the equivalent of 15 divisions was probably inspired more by politeness to an ally than an accurate calculation. The Resistance also played a role in the liberation of a number of important cities (Marseilles, Lille), even if, in most cases, this also occurred because

the Germans had already decided to withdraw or surrender – as in the case of Paris. France would have been liberated if there had never been a Resistance, and the importance of the Resistance was more moral than it was political. But even if a Resistance myth was constructed after the war, that is not the same as saying that the Resistance was a myth.

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CHAPTER FORTY-NINE

The Italian Campaign

ELENA AGAROSSİ

On July 10, 1943, the Anglo-American forces landed in Sicily, setting foot in Europe for the first time since their defeat at Dunkirk and provoking the surrender of one of the Axis powers less than two months later. This was the beginning of the Italian campaign. Italy remained the only European theater of war for the Western Allies until the landing in Normandy in June 1944 and the stage of hard-fought, bloody campaigns in a rugged terrain until the end of April 1945, when the Germans finally surrendered, only a week before the final capitulation of all Axis forces in Europe.

In spite of its importance in the history of World War II, and regardless of the more than 500,000 Allied troops involved and the 312,000 Allied casualties, the Italian campaign occupies very little space in the general histories of the war, which often do not have a chapter dedicated to the Italian campaign. Most of them describe the landings in Sicily and in Salerno, go on to mention the occupation of Rome only in passing, and ignore subsequent events, except for the final offensive and in some cases the race for Trieste and Operation Sunrise (the secret negotiations between Karl Wolff and Allen Dulles, respectively the head of the SS in Italy and the head of the OSS in Switzerland, to arrange the surrender of German forces in Italy). For example, in Gerard L. Weinberg's massive and famous *A World at Arms*, the only chapter devoted to this front is on "Sicily and the Italian Surrender" (Weinberg 1994, pp. 593ff.), while the other events are mentioned only incidentally as part of the general narrative.

Until the opening of the archives in the mid-1970s, all books on the Italian campaign had to rely on the official histories of World War II published by the American and British governments. The more than hundred volumes, divided into various subseries and written by military historians who had full archival access, give a comprehensive account both of the operations in the Mediterranean theater and of the strategic decisions made during the conflict by the two great powers in the various conferences. Another essential historical source is the series of volumes published by the US State Department (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, hereafter *FRUS*) and

by the British Foreign Office. All of these volumes have retained their importance even now, when all the archives related to the Italian campaign are open, vastly increasing the available documentation.

The publications on the Italian campaign have been mainly written by British and American authors, largely from the Western Allied perspective and mostly based on English-language sources only, with very few references to Italian and German sources: reluctance or inability to consult foreign-language sources has limited the use of foreign publications, unless translated into English.

The literature on the German side of the Italian campaign is not particularly extensive. Most of the protagonists – Kesselring (1953), Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Frido von Senger – wrote their memoirs, just as the Allied leaders did. Particularly important is Von Senger's *Krieg in Europa* (1960), which describes, with the benefit of hindsight, both the German strategy in the defense of Sicily and of the Gustav Line and the errors of the Allied military leaders. Other German publications include general books on the Italian campaign from the German point of view (Haupt 1977; Wilhelmsmeyer 1995).

Italian authors have concentrated on a very specific aspect of the Italian campaigns during 1943–1945: the activities of the partisan movement, about which innumerable books have been published. No comprehensive book on the Italian campaign in general has been published to date. Instead, there have been publications focusing on specific periods or aspects, mainly proceedings of conferences (for example, Felice 1994), or on the social consequences of the war. Most of the recent literature uses interviews to collect the memories of the war (Baris 2004; Gribaudo 2005).

In addition to examining specific battles and events, the majority of the more recent World War II histories that cover the Italian campaign focus only on its first year, when Italy was the only European front of the war. Thus, the books by Morris (1993), Graham and Bidwell (2004), Strawson (1987), Hoyt (2002), and Gooderson (2009), to name a few well-known accounts, sum up the second year of the Italian campaign in just a few pages. Operation Husky, the landings in Salerno and Anzio, and the battle of Monte Cassino are the most popular topics among military historians, who often personally participated in the war or served in the military after World War II.

One partial explanation for this omission, as if the war in Italy had ended with the occupation of Rome, is that the Normandy landing in June 1944 completely obscured the battle for Italy. Another more important reason is that the Allies treated the Mediterranean and Italian front as secondary from the outset. The main purpose of the Italian campaign was not to liberate Italy from the German occupation, but to divert German troops from the other two main fronts – first the Russian and then the French. The opening of the second front in Normandy not only displaced Italy from the headlines of the newspapers, but also from the main focus of the American military leaders. The Italian campaign's sense of mission – the liberation of Europe from the Axis yoke – a leitmotif of Allied propaganda when it was the only Allied operation in Europe – also dissipated with the Normandy invasion.

The Italian campaign was the result of a series of difficult compromises between political and military leaders of the American and British governments. The complex decision-making process that led the Allies to open a front in Italy and to continue operations there has been considered “the most contentious issue in the grand strategy of the war” (Noel Annan NYRB, 4/08/1993). The military operations were not

planned in advance and their implementation evolved in accordance with the changing balance of the relationship within the coalition, which was marked by conflicts and misunderstandings. It is precisely this decision-making framework we must consider if we hope to understand fully the train of events.

Contrasting opinions divided the British and American governments during the planning and execution of the Italian campaign, much in the same way that these different opinions continue to divide historians trying to evaluate it from both a military and a political point of view. In many ways, the campaign proved a test of the relationship between the Western Allies, as well as between them and the Soviet Union, whose influence in Western choices has been generally undervalued.

The historical debate on the Italian campaign has developed on two levels. On the strategic level, historians have debated the role and importance of the Italian campaign in the Allied strategy of the Mediterranean and the contrasting military and political objectives of the British and American governments. Others have studied specifically the conduct of the military operations, from the landing in Sicily to the liberation of the north, focusing on the description and reconstruction of the Allied leadership and of the military battles, without considering the relationship of the two allies at the highest level of the decision-making process. The history of the two armies is also often fragmented into the history of single units, or of specific moments in the campaign. Few historians have placed the military operations inside the general picture of the Mediterranean strategy (Strawson 1987; Morris 1993) and insufficient attention has been paid to the crucial documentation arising from the various war conferences or the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence.

However, the two levels are tightly connected because strategic choices were to determine the plans and influence the evolution of the Italian campaign. Therefore, one must start by assessing the divergent strategic objectives of the British and the American forces, and the decision-making process that governed the Mediterranean operations. Any final judgment on the importance and outcome of the Italian campaign, on its success or failure, has to take into account the strategies of the two allies.

Fundamental to our understanding of the Anglo-American debate on the Mediterranean campaign are the official British and American histories on the Allied strategy, especially the last three of the six volumes on *Grand Strategy* of the official British history edited by Howard (1972) and Ehrman (1956a, 1956b) and the American history written by Maurice Maltoff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* (1959). These authors were the first to have access to the archival documents, declassified for scholars only in the second half of the 1970s.

Other books published on this topic include T. Higgins, *Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American Controversy over the Italian Campaign, 1939–1945* (1968), who explains the British procrastination of a landing in France and advocacy of a limited war in Italy with the traumatic experience of World War I and with the national self-interest, while Mark Stoler, in *The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943* (1977) and in the more recent *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II* (2000), looks at the American position. Jones (1996) in *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–1944* gives a useful assessment of the divergent British and American objectives and of their mutual distrust and prejudices which were a source of constant controversy in the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean.

The memoirs and journals of the most important protagonists, and especially the documentation, official and personal, published over the years or available in the archives, have been very useful in reconstructing the Allies' decision-making process during the Mediterranean campaign and in clarifying the controversial relationship between the two Allies and their reaction to Soviet pressures to open a second front. From all this material it is possible to arrive at a clear picture of the strategic planning that set the scene for the Italian campaign.

The British strategy, elaborated when Great Britain was fighting Hitler alone, was based on the mobilization of existing resources, which were not only inadequate for an attack against Germany, but barely sufficient to maintain a defensive position. In such a situation, Great Britain planned to weaken the satellite Axis powers by eroding the popular support for the war, weakening the morale by such means as propaganda, bombing of the cities, and naval blockades in order to provoke serious economic distress. The British, in particular, placed enormous trust in the destructive effects of strategic bombing, and went as far to hypothesize an internal collapse of Germany and Italy, which would have rendered direct military actions unnecessary.

In this first phase, great importance was given to the secret services' elaborate plans to "set Europe ablaze," that is, to instigate resistance movements and opposition inside the countries occupied by Germany, which later would support the British army of liberation. Therefore, eventual offensive actions were initially to target peripheral areas, the "soft underbelly" of the Axis, according to Churchill's famous expression. In a second phase, beginning in 1942, the British would be ready to "reenter the continent," that is, to attack Germany. Crucial importance was assigned to the Mediterranean: during the 1940–1941 period, the British Joint Planning Staff developed plans to attack Sicily and bomb Italy – considered "the weakest link" of the Axis – as a means to provoke its collapse. The "immediate objective" was that of "eliminating Italy from the war as soon as possible."

In contrast to the British strategy based on actions in the Mediterranean, the strategy elaborated by the American command after the United States' entrance into the war in December of 1941 was based on a direct attack on the German Reich, through the shortest path: northern France. The mobilization of the necessary forces was a primary goal and the attack was to be launched as soon as these forces were available. Early on, the possibility of opening other secondary fronts was not considered, to avoid any delays in the preparations for the landing in France.

The British government accepted the American plan to make the Normandy invasion the top priority, and never officially diverted from it, as Howard (1968) has stated in his much-quoted *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War*. On the other hand, since the control of the Mediterranean, and especially Italy, was considered crucial, the British kept proposing parallel actions to pursue this specific aim. Once leaders came to consider the 1942 date originally prescribed for the invasion of France (Operation Overlord) as unrealistic, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff immediately proposed other options: first the landing in Northern Africa, then the landing in Sicily, and finally the landing on the Italian mainland. All of these plans were strongly opposed by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who not only feared a delay in the opening of the second front, but were also suspicious that the British would put aside Overlord to pursue their "imperial designs." The extent and role of political motivations on the British Mediterranean strategy, and in

particular the aim to head off a Russian occupation of Eastern Europe, has divided historians, but its significance has been confirmed by the now-available period documentation.

The first departure from the strategy elaborated by the United States was the landing in Northern Africa, decided upon in the summer of 1942 against the opposition of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, and carried out in November. The Allies gained considerable ground, securing the French troops' surrender in Algeria and Morocco almost immediately, and continuing toward Libya. By April 1943, all of Northern Africa had been cleared of Axis troops.

In January 1943, at the Anglo-American conference in Casablanca, Churchill was able to overcome the resistance of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff once again, gaining Roosevelt's support to continue operations by invading Sicily. His objective was twofold: to provoke Italy's exit from the war and to employ troops that would become available after the anticipated victory in North Africa. The American Chiefs of Staff were caught off-guard by the British diplomatic offence and were unprepared to propose any alternative plan. The British proposals prevailed thanks to the lack of unanimity among the Americans concerning the best course of action (Stoler 2000).

The Mediterranean thus became the main scene of war for much of 1943 and part of 1944, with no competing major operations during that period. The British also achieved a restructuring of command hierarchy that considerably reduced the American role within the Mediterranean theater, with the overall command of land troops, united in the 15th Army Corps, assigned to the British General Harold Alexander.

The landing in Sicily (Operation Husky) went according to plan, thanks to the naval and air superiority of the Allies and to the light resistance by Italian troops. The island was conquered in a little over a month and the Allies immediately imposed a military administration (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories, AMGOT for short) that they later extended to other occupied Italian territory.

The operation's success revealed the weakness of the Italian armed forces and the crisis of the Fascist regime, which led to an internal coup d'état two weeks later and to Mussolini's forced resignation. Husky was the only operation of the whole Italian campaign that could be considered at least a partial success. This was due to the Allied superiority in the air and on the ground, but also to the media-coverage and propaganda that accompanied it. Even so, historians have noted many mistakes in the planning and in the execution of the campaign, which prolonged the liberation of the island, including the lack of coordination between British and American assault divisions, and the rivalry between the British commander in chief Montgomery and the American George Patton (D'Este 1988; Porch 2004).

Furthermore, the Allies' great naval and air superiority did not prevent the German command from evacuating its ground troops to the toe of the peninsula in a brilliant maneuver, and subsequently deploying them against the Anglo-American forces in Salerno less than two weeks later. The success of the German defensive strategy and the able evacuation are described in the *The Battle of Sicily* by Mitcham and Von Stauffenberg (1991), who are very critical of the Allied conduct of the war and describe the battle from the Axis point of view. Also Santoni (1983) in the Italian command's official history gives a balanced view of all the forces involved and of the economic situation of the population. Sicily demonstrated an inadequate inter-Allied cooperation

and coordination, which would continue to exist in the subsequent operations in Italy. One important lesson learned by the Allies in Sicily, at great cost, was the difficulty of conducting airborne operations in support of amphibious landings. In the Sicilian case, failed planning prevented paratroopers from reaching their inland targets, with some driven into the sea and others killed by friendly fire (Nordyke 2005).

The population's welcoming attitude, after months of bombing, was amply exploited by Allied propaganda. The success of the landing in Sicily and the Italian army's poor resistance were immediately used by Churchill to argue in a letter to Roosevelt on July 17, 1943 for the continuation of the Italian campaign (Kimball 1984). Mussolini's fall on July 25, two weeks after the landing in Sicily, and the signals the new government was sending about its intention to seek an armistice – the first significant contacts were established at the beginning of August – seemed to confirm the British prediction that the Allied offensive would knock Italy out of the war.

Only in mid-July did General Eisenhower, to whom the Combined Chiefs of Staff had deferred the decision, decide to extend the operations to the Italian mainland in order to consolidate the successes up to that point. He did so notwithstanding the persistent opposition of the chief of staff, General George Marshall, and of the secretary of war, Henry Stimson, who both argued at the Anglo-American Quebec conference (August 11–24, 1943) that the Americans should not take even greater responsibility for the Mediterranean. Marshall and Stimson also obtained the official confirmation of the priority of Operation Overlord over every other operation.

Churchill, for his part, declared that operations on the Italian mainland were to be limited to capturing Rome and reaching the Pisa–Rimini line. He only added that, in case of a German retreat from the Balkans, the Allied forces could be employed to support the partisans in that area. Official declarations notwithstanding, in Quebec it became clear that the Americans considered the decision to strike at Rome as the last of their concessions regarding operations in the Mediterranean, and that they would refuse further commitments in the area. The British, on the other hand, considered Mussolini's fall and the opening of the Italian mainland campaign as a prime opportunity for conquering a region crucial for their interests, in keeping with the peripheral approach that had marked British strategy from the outset.

The decision to confront the *Wehrmacht* on the mainland was made once again with no long-term plan and without adequate resources or preparation. Very significantly, the Allies used a generic “post-Husky operations” name to denote their plans, rather than the grander “Italian campaign” that is commonly used today. It was seen as very much a secondary operation, to be carried out by forces already in the region or to be sent to Italy for a limited period of time. The only declared objectives were to keep the German forces occupied in order to alleviate the pressure on the Russian front and to take harbors and airports that might serve as bases for the bombing of Germany. The decision was based on a faulty evaluation of Germany's reaction to a possible Allied landing. Thanks to wiretapping and to the information given by the precious Ultra decrypts, the Allied secret services had concluded that Hitler planned a retreat of the German army to positions north of Rome in case of an Allied landing on the mainland. Accordingly, the Allied command foresaw the liberation of Italy's capital by October of 1943.

On September 3, 1943, the troops of the 8th Army, led by Montgomery, crossed the Straits of Messina and landed in Reggio Calabria. On the evening of September 8,

General Eisenhower declared on the radio that the armistice with Italy had been signed. By this he hoped to facilitate the amphibious landing near Salerno, to be carried out the next morning by the 5th American Army under the command of General Mark Wayne Clark. In spite of Italy's surrender, General Kesselring, commander of the *Wehrmacht* troops in Italy, decided not to withdraw to north of Rome, once he realized the Allied offensive was limited to far fewer divisions than anticipated. He immediately decided to concentrate his forces on blocking the enemy's advance. Obviously Kesselring did not know that some Allied troops had been held back for the opening of another front in the Northwest of France.

The Allies' indecisive and cautious advance, underlined by all of the numerous books on Operation Avalanche, the code name for the landing (Grigg 1980; D'Este 1991; Atkinson 2007) gave Kesselring the time to organize a sufficiently effective counterattack that for a few days the Allied troops risked being driven back into the sea. The 5th Army was able to reach Naples only on October 1, while the 8th Army moved north along the eastern Adriatic coast, taking Termoli on October 3. A slow and difficult advance through the mountainous peninsula began from here; only then did the Allies realize that Rome was not an easy target and that Hitler intended to occupy Italy as long as he could.

The Italian surrender proved to be a missed opportunity for the Allies (Agarossi 2000). The new Badoglio government that followed Mussolini's abdication did not give clear orders to its armed forces. These, for the most part, surrendered to the Germans, who had received a clear directive (Operation Achse) to disarm Italian soldiers, by force if necessary. Only the Italian navy was ordered to head towards allied or neutral harbors and a significant part of the ships avoided to be captured or destroyed by the Germans. The surrender of the Italian navy was considered a great achievement by the British, whose ships could gain control of the Mediterranean. Historians have for many years ignored the numerous episodes of Italian units which tried with no success to resist the Germans, who occupied in a few days the central and the northern part of the country. The Italian divisions in the Balkans too had no prior notice of the armistice, and in the few instances when they tried to react, like in Cephalonia, Corfu, and in some islands of the Dodecanese, they were overpowered. Officers were shot after surrender, declared guilty of having given orders to their subordinates to fight; in Cephalonia, approximately two thousand Italian soldiers and officers were either killed in action or executed immediately after surrendering. Underestimating the German resistance, Churchill had hoped to use Italy's surrender to occupy strategic posts in the Aegean, like the islands of Rhodes, Kos, Leros, and Samos. British missions were sent to these islands to convince the Italians to take up arms against the Germans, but without promising to support them with sufficient forces. The few thousand British expeditionary troops sent to seize control of the islands were taken prisoner by the Germans.

Notwithstanding this disaster, Churchill tried to keep open the option of recapturing the island of Rhodes, which he considered of the utmost strategic importance for the control of the area and for inducing Turkey into the war. He finally decided to appeal directly to Roosevelt. In a long letter dated October 7, 1943, he stated that he considered the Italian and Balkan peninsulas as "militarily and politically united" and that the Allies had to deal with "one theater." Then he insisted, "What I ask for is the capture of Rhodes and the other islands of Dodecanese" (Churchill and Roosevelt,

Kimball 1984, pp. 498–499). The Prime Minister's request fell on deaf ears. In fact, as Brooke had predicted, urging Churchill to use caution, it reinforced the Roosevelt administration's suspicions of British imperial ambitions in the area. General Marshall in particular was strongly opposed to any operation in that region, convinced that it would postpone Overlord and lengthen the war. From that point onwards, Roosevelt and his Chiefs of Staff steadfastly rejected British proposals to intervene in the Balkans advanced again in June and October 1944. In addition, the US president adopted a much firmer line on the prosecution of the Italian campaign.

It had become clear that neither a swift withdrawal of the German Army to the Alps nor the predicted capture of Rome by October would occur. Roosevelt refused to listen to Churchill's arguments and postponed further decisions regarding the war in the Mediterranean until the upcoming Tehran conference of the three Allies. The great summer success of the Red Army had, in fact, increased the Soviet role in the alliance and the American president was eager to dispel the ongoing risk that Stalin might negotiate a separate peace with Germany by involving him in the decision-making process regarding future operations. At the conference of foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943 the Soviets had shown great interest in the Italian campaign and the British hoped for their support in making it the main second front (Butcher 1946). With an unusual move at Tehran, Roosevelt decided to delegate to Stalin the decision of where the Western Allies should concentrate their military efforts in order to relieve the Eastern Front. Churchill's passionate advocacy for the Mediterranean initiative did not move Stalin, who clearly stated his preference for Overlord without any other "diversion," combined with an attack in southern France. It was thus Stalin who was the arbiter between different Western plans for the Italian campaign. The date for Overlord was set for May 1944 – later postponed by one month – in conjunction with a Soviet offensive in the Eastern Front, which Stalin promised in order to divert the German troops from the Normandy landing. The Tehran conference was a watershed in Allied planning, as it definitively relegated the Italian campaign to a secondary position and the Allied armies there to a defensive stand.

The Americans had imposed their strategy on the British leaders: Tehran was a fatal blow to the British hopes of reinforcing the Allied armies in Italy and recapturing the Balkans. In his diary, Brooke reproached himself for having accepted the withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean "to satisfy American short-sightedness" and noted "When I look at the Mediterranean I realize only too well how far I have failed in my task during the last two years" (Bryant 1957, pp. 37–38).

Historians of the Italian campaign have not dwelt upon this political turning point, which has been discussed instead by works on the Allied strategy mentioned before. Tehran had immediate consequences for the military situation and since then no deviation from the decisions taken was permitted. While the British and American Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the intention to advance in Italy to the Pisa–Rimini Line, the necessary support was not mobilized; in fact seven divisions were redeployed from Italy to England in preparation of Overlord. The Americans had won the argument that no other objectives would be allowed to delay Overlord. The British acquired the main command posts to make Britain the "senior partner" in the Italian front, although the two Western Allies had officially equal status in the AMGOT. The command of operations in France was given to Eisenhower, who thus left the AFHQ. In his place, the British General Henry Maitland Wilson assumed the role of

commander in chief for the Mediterranean (SACMED) in March 1944. The 15th Army Group, renamed Allied Armies in Italy (AAI), remained under the command of British Field Marshal Alexander.

In the meantime a civil war took hold in Italy. Following the armistice, Mussolini was freed by the Germans and created a puppet fascist government (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI) based in Salò, a small town on Lake Garda. A resistance movement, made up mostly of demobilized Italian soldiers or groups of politically engaged antifascists, started attacking the Germans and the Italian fascist units. The first episode of open struggle against the Germans happened in the town of Naples. There, on the eve of German withdrawal, the population reacted, opening fire against German mopping up of young males for work. A recent study (Griabaudi 2005) has raised significantly to over 600 the number of Italians killed in the following three days of street fighting, from September 28 to October 1, when Allied troops entered Naples. The Allies sent secret service agents to support and organize the partisans, but in the early stages, with the Allied troops mired in the mountains south of Rome, the partisan movement's contribution to the campaign consisted above all in acts of sabotage and collection of information (Piffer 2010).

In the following fall and winter months, the Allies were drawn into a battle of attrition in the worst circumstances: impervious terrain, rainy weather, and fierce German resistance prevented any real progress. The Germans fought for every inch of Italian territory, and the Allies' marginal advances were very costly. The battle of Montelungo – where for the first time Italian units fought on the Allies' side with great losses – the crossing of the Rapido river, and finally the various battles for Monte Cassino, which dragged on through the winter months, all left behind a bloody trail of ruins, including the first Benedictine monastery in Monte Cassino destroyed by Allied bombing. Of the many books written by journalists and historians with vivid accounts of individual battles along the Gustav Line, Matthew Parker's *Montecassino* (2003), which uses a large variety of sources is one of the best examples; other notable accounts include F. Majdalany's *The Battle of Cassino* (1957), J. Ellis's *Cassino: The Hollow Victory* (1984), and A. Bowlby's *Countdown to Cassino* (1995). The battle of Monte Cassino has been described by Parker as "The greatest land battle in Europe, Cassino was the bitterest and bloodiest of the Western Allies' struggles with the German Wehrmacht on any front of World War II. On the German side, many compared it unfavorably with Stalingrad" (Parker 2003, p. XVII). After the vain efforts to break through the Gustav Line, Churchill succeeded in mustering the forces for a landing south of Rome, to speed up the advance and to accelerate the liberation of the capital. Allied forces landed at Anzio on January 22, 1944. Carried out without proper preparation, the Anzio landing was a near-disaster, with the Allied troops barely avoiding being pushed back into the sea, just as in Salerno. General John P. Lucas, who commanded the troops at Anzio, was hesitant to advance quickly, letting the Germans organize and counterattack: accused of ineptitude and indecision, he was dismissed. In the following months the troops were literally stuck on the beach without succeeding to break through the German lines. The titles of the books published on this operation are often self-explanatory, from C. D'Este's *Fatal Decision* (1990) to W. A. Allen's *Anzio: Edge of Disaster* (1978).

Of the two Allied armies that fought their way through Italy, the 5th American Army, which operated on the western side of the peninsula under the command of

General Mark Clark, and the 8th British Army on the eastern side, the former has received much more attention.

While the names of Monte Cassino and Anzio are widely recognized, it is little known that in the same fall and winter of 1943–1944 fierce fighting took place on the eastern side of the Gustav Line. The battle of Sangro, a river in the Abruzzi region, and the battle for the small town of Ortona, which occupied the Allied forces for many months, have often been neglected in the general histories of the campaign, both by Anglo-American and by Italian and German authors. Only recently have historians turned to this empty space in the historiography, with several books on the Eastern Front and particularly on the battles at the Sangro River and on the Adriatic coast published in the past few years (Felice 1994; Zuehlke 2003; Doherty 2007). Among the Allied forces there were the Canadians, who had participated in the campaign since the landing in Sicily. Canadian historians have given the most accurate reconstruction of those events (Nicholson 1956; McAndrew 1996; Zuehlke 2003). The cost was very high, both in military and civilian losses. The Canadians, who were on the front line for a long period, were worn out and suffered a very high rate of nervous breakdown and desertion. The local populace had to abandon their villages and towns, and struggle for mere survival. The battle for Ortona completely destroyed the town.

In the meantime, the tactical initiative had passed on to Clark's 5th Army that resumed a major offensive in May of 1944 and finally reached Rome on June 4. There was little time to celebrate the fall of the Italian capital, because two days later world's attention shifted to the D-day in Normandy and the battle in France occupied the stage until the end.

On June 5, Macmillan commented in his war diaries that according to "the strict instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff," the Italian campaign had to be called off "at the very height of its success" (Macmillan 1984, pp. 456–457).

Churchill vainly tried to convince the Americans to abandon Operation Anvil, urging them not to deprive the Italian front of the forces necessary for reaching Trieste and subsequently Yugoslavia. All the Allied commanders on the Italian front, including General Wilson, were convinced that withdrawing troops just as the offensive in Italy reached full swing was a grave mistake, which would throw away the chance for a decisive victory. Despite Churchill's appeals to Roosevelt, a number of Allied divisions were withdrawn from the Italian war theater and redeployed to France to take part in Operation Anvil (later renamed Dragoon), where Allied troops landed near Toulon. Overall, the 5th Army in Italy lost 40 percent of its forces.

Still, the Italian front moved north with great speed for the rest of the summer, with some help from the Italian partisan movement. In August, General Alexander reformulated plans to attack the Gothic Line, the new defensive line running from Pisa to Rimini through the center of Italy, where the *Wehrmacht* had taken up defensive positions after the retreat from Rome. A pincer attack on both sides of the Gustav Line by the 8th and 5th Armies was organized, with Florence falling by the end of August. Then, after a major battle on the Adriatic coast, the 8th Army recaptured Rimini at the end of September and advanced north to Ravenna.

Despite these successes, the expectations of a quick German withdrawal from Italy were again revealed as illusory. General Alexander hoped to reach Bologna before the winter, but had to abandon his plans for lack of troops and resources after encountering stiff German resistance.

The British refused to accept a definitive abandonment of their plans, but nothing could change the American position, not even Churchill threat to resign and his direct appeal to Roosevelt (Kimball 1984, pp. 222ff.). In the discussions preparatory to the Quebec Conference in September 1944, the British Prime Minister reiterated his proposal, again with no success. At that moment the Allied advances on all fronts had raised hopes that the German forces in Italy would be overrun within a few weeks, ending the war in Italy before the end of 1944. Again in October, to an analogous Churchill's request of two additional divisions, Roosevelt replied, "we cannot withhold from the main effort forces which are needed in the battle of Germany" (Kimball 1984, pp. 347ff.). The war in Italy had now lower priority and no fresh troops could be spared for it. Churchill was writing from Moscow, where he had gone to discuss directly with Stalin a division of the Balkans into spheres of influence, in order to assure Great Britain a free hand at least in Greece and some influence in Yugoslavia.

Plans for the postwar occupation of Europe had just been discussed with the Roosevelt administration. Churchill urged against redeployment of Allied divisions from Italy, proposing instead a push towards the northeast, through Trieste and the Ljubljana gap towards Vienna. In a note to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Prime Minister had argued that Britain should have "powerful forces in Austria and from Trieste northwards at the close of the German war, and should not yield central and southern Europe entirely to Soviet ascendancy or domination" (Gilbert 1986, p. 948).

Churchill stressed the same point also with Roosevelt, who in turn expressed his preference for deploying the forces to break "quickly through the western defenses of Germany" (Roosevelt's telegram to Churchill, September 3, 1944, in *FRUS* 1972, p. 229). The Roosevelt administration's refusal to become involved in the Balkans was reflected in the communiqué from the American Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff that excluded the deployment of US occupation forces in southern Europe, including Austria, or southeastern Europe, including the Balkans (*FRUS* 1972, pp. 216ff.). This document is central to understanding the connection between the war strategy and the postwar settlement and the great divergence of British and American leaders also on the approach to a postwar international order. The American military and political leaders remained wary of involvement in southern Europe, in spite of the fact that at that moment the balance of power had changed in their favor.

The decision to stop the Italian offensive for the winter was followed by another long pause. The Italian campaign had become a holding operation: the Allied generals described standing still as "passing temporarily to the offensive defensive" (Smith and Agarossi 1979, p. 45). Only on April 9 did a coordinated offensive started again. Bologna was reached on April 21, and this time German resistance collapsed within two weeks. The large industrial cities of Milan and Turin were occupied by partisan and Allied forces without bloodshed. At the last moment, Karl Wolff was able to conclude Operation Sunrise successfully by convincing General von Vietinghoff to sign an unconditional surrender of the German troops in Italy on April 29. This went into effect on May 2, one week before the end of all hostilities in Europe.

The German surrender avoided a final clash between German and Italian Fascist forces and partisan formations, but there was the immediate problem of the eastern border of Italy – the Istria region and the Italian town of Trieste – which Tito intended

to annex to Yugoslavia. The race to Trieste was first analyzed by Geoffrey Cox and subsequently by B. Smith and E. Agarossi with more documentation on the general picture. The Cox book is a first-hand reconstruction, since he served as the intelligence officer in the 2nd New Zealand division. The commander of that division, General Freyberg, had been charged with occupying Trieste, but also with taking maximum care to avoid clashes with Yugoslav partisans. This led the New Zealanders to stop a few kilometers outside Trieste and wait to establish contact with Tito's forces, which in the meantime forced their way into the city on May 1, one day before the Allied troops. Churchill's fears of a communist takeover of the town soon materialized, with Tito forces trying to confront the Allies with a *fait accompli*, establishing an administration and disarming and persecuting Italian civilians and partisans alike. It took another month until Harry Truman, the new American president, came to realize that military operations alone were not sufficient to establish a democratic order in Europe. The liberation of Trieste ended the Italian campaign, but started a new confrontation, the cold war.

During the two years of the war in Italy, the Allied command had to organize and integrate the forces of some twenty nationalities. This was an important achievement, given the different cultures, religions, habits, and needs of the numerous participants. In the general histories of the campaign, little space is dedicated to these other frontline forces, such as the Poles, the French, the Indians, New Zealanders, and Canadians, to mention only the most important of the nationalities that fought the Italian campaign. In fact, these troops were often used in the hardest-fought battles, for example, the Polish and New Zealand units in the battles of Monte Cassino and at the Sangro, where they suffered heavy losses. Also notable was the role of the French Expeditionary Corps (CEF), led by French officers, but composed of colonial troops, mostly Algerians and Moroccans, who were deployed against the Gustav Line and in Tuscany and subsequently withdrawn from the Italian front to be sent to Normandy.

With rare exceptions (for instance, Ready 1985), the histories of the foreign units have often been written by authors of the same nationality who celebrated their sacrifices and victories, but rarely integrated them into a general narrative. Following the route of the various nationalities, we have many different campaigns. The small Jewish brigade and the quite large Polish corps were anomalous in the context of the coalition. Both of them were voluntary and both fought with an extraordinary determination to free Europe from the Nazis. Also their social composition was different from the other units, as they included many intellectuals, writers, and other professionals. In the case of the Polish corps, guided by the charismatic General Anders, their anticommunism caused bitter confrontations with the Italian Communist party, especially at the end of the war, when the majority chose not to return to a Soviet-occupied Poland.

As mentioned earlier, there is a great gap between the number of books and publications on the first period of the Italian campaign and on the second. For many years, very few authors treated the period after the fall of Rome, but the situation is now changing, and recently many publications have focused on the stalemate on the Gothic Line and the second year of the campaign (Brooks 1996; Zuehlke 2003; Holland 2008). The civil war that developed in the center and Northern Italy between antifascist partisans and militants of the RSI and the regime of terror imposed by the Germans behind the front lines caused thousands of civilian casualties (Lamb 1993).

With very few exceptions (Lamb 1993; Morris 1993; O'Reilly 2001), historians writing in English have largely ignored not only the Italian resistance movement, which was financed and armed by the British and American secret services, but also the participation of the Italian armed forces in the Italian campaign. In addition to the numerous partisan units which became more and more active after the liberation of Rome, Italy committed considerable combat troops as well as logistical support to the cause. The Italian naval and air forces were immediately used by the Allies, whereas the rearmament of the Italian ground forces was delayed, in part due to British opposition. The official explanation pointed to equipment shortages and the putative lack of fighting spirit on the part of the Italians. Perhaps more important was the preference of the British Foreign Office to consider Italy a defeated enemy with no rights to be consulted at the peace table.

The social aspects of the Italian campaign have engendered considerable interest in recent years (Griboaudi 2005; Baldoli, Knapp, and Overy 2011). As the front advanced through Italy, the civilian population was trapped between Allied bombing and violent repression by the German troops, leading to a demolition of all infrastructure. Acts of sabotage committed by the partisans were punished by the Germans with the destruction of entire villages, particularly in the Apennine region around the Gothic Line. The consequences for the civilians of Allied occupation were enormous: the bombing of cities and villages and the total paralysis of communications caused devastation and a general disarray of social life. The situation was aggravated by the inadequacy of an Allied administrative organization unprepared for a long occupation: lack of food, inflation, and the black market accompanied Allied troops in the south and central part of Italy. It became difficult to accept the occupying forces as "liberators." The north was spared such a scenario, because the Allied advance was very rapid and the destruction of industrial plants was limited.

While German reprisals against Italian civilians are well known, recent publications have also highlighted various crimes committed by Allied soldiers that were kept secret or officially denied. The apparently unmotivated killing of civilians and prisoners of war in Sicily, at Gela, during the first period of the landings, is a case in point (Carloni 2011). Better known, at least in Italy, are the mass rapes of Italian women by Moroccan troops in Ciociaria, south of Rome, since the well-known Italian writer Alberto Moravia wrote a novel about this that was also made into a film by Vittorio de Sica. The advance of these troops, after a bloody battle that broke through the Gustav Line, was marked by random violence and devastation, which have left an indelible sign in the memories of the local inhabitants whose stories have been quoted in a book (Baris 2004) and mentioned in others (Majdalany 1957). The Moroccan troops live on in popular memory in the idiom "marocchinata" that stands for brutal, wild act of violence. Interestingly, these crimes have been labeled as exaggerations or falsification by a French author (Notin 2002, pp. 502–511), in spite of the fact that they were discussed by the Pope Pius XII during an encounter with General De Gaulle in June 1944.

Notwithstanding the complete Allied air superiority, the Luftwaffe was able to strike the port of Bari in December 1943, where 17 merchantmen were sunk with many hundreds casualties. The raid, judged by Morison (1954) in his official history of American naval operations in World War II as "the most destructive enemy air raid on shipping since the attack on Pearl Harbor," had other catastrophic consequences.

One of these ships, the *John Harvey*, was carrying mustard gas intended for retaliation by the Allies if German forces resorted to gas warfare. Most of the released gas was carried out to sea, causing numerous casualties. Since gas warfare was forbidden, its existence on board of the *John Harvey* was kept secret, leading to death or incapacitation of soldiers and civilians who were not medically treated for the gas. This tragic aspect of the raid was kept secret until 1971, when a book on this episode was finally published (Infield 1971).

The military operations during the campaign also extracted a heavy price from the Italian cultural heritage. Allies used extended and indiscriminate bombing before any advance in order to save their soldiers, destroying precious art and ancient churches and palaces as well as entire towns and villages. The list of works of art, churches, palaces, and libraries with valuable and rare books destroyed during the campaign is very long. Vatican pressure on both belligerents to spare Rome succeeded in largely preserving it, although two bombing raids heavily damaged an ancient church and resulted in civilian casualties (Silveri 2007). On the other hand, in a much-debated act, the ancient Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino was completely destroyed by the Allied commander General Freyberg, who decided to bomb the monastery in the belief that it was occupied by German troops. In fact, there were only civilians who had taken refuge in the abbey under the protection of the Benedictine monks. The bombing proved not only useless but counterproductive: Germans units subsequently took positions in the ruins of the monastery, making the Allied advance more treacherous.

Overall, the historical judgment of historians on the Italian campaign has been quite negative. The established interpretation of the operational aspects of the campaign that focused on operational inadequacy and poor command decisions has not been challenged, but rather confirmed by recent historical reconstructions. Operations like the landings at Salerno and at Anzio, where the Allies were nearly pushed back into the sea by the Germans, have been much criticized, as has the totally unnecessary destruction of the abbey of Monte Cassino. The lack of leadership and initiative on the part of the Allied military leaders has been emphasized by a majority of historians, with many also noting that competition among the Allied generals frequently prevented the adoption of more efficient military strategies.

There is certainly much truth in all this, and the list of errors on which the military historians concur would fill an entire book. Even the landing in Sicily, which had been regarded as an important success from the military point of view, has been reassessed. The clash between Patton and Montgomery seriously affected the efficiency of the campaign, and above all, the successful evacuation of the bulk of the German troops across the Messina Strait made these troops available to block the Allied advance on the Italian peninsula just a few days later.

In addition, the relatively meager resources and continuous redeployment of Allied troops from Italy enabled the Germans to defend it much longer than anticipated, with the Allied troops suffering considerable casualties and hardship. In contrast with the deeply flawed operations conducted by the Allies, the defensive strategy of Kesselring has been evaluated as exemplary.

The kind of war that was waged in Italy could also have influenced a negative evaluation of the Italian campaign. Many authors have compared it to the static fighting of World War I, in contrast with mobile battles of other fronts (Von Senger

1960; Ellis 1984; Holmes 1997). A war of attrition where any advance of few hundred yards over shell-torn ground could take weeks and cost the life of many soldiers was very frustrating and difficult to accept. In Italy there was quite a high level of deserters (Bowlby 1995) and “a constant and heavy drain of psychiatric casualties” (Holmes 1997): even victory could sound very bitter.

However, what the purely military reconstructions do not consider is that a final judgment on the Italian campaign should in the first place take into account its main objectives. As we have seen, the campaign was envisaged from the beginning as a diversionary and secondary operation, a means of engaging the enemy troops prior to the landing in France and also to relieve some pressure on the Russians at the Eastern Front. From this point of view the campaign in fact did realize its main objective. As Churchill had stated, speaking on February 22, 1944 at the House of Commons to refer on the course of the battle at Anzio: “We must fight the Germans somewhere, unless we are to stand still and watch the Russians. This wearing battle in Italy occupies troops who could not be employed in other greater operations.”

There is also a general agreement on the importance of the experience gained from the errors made in Italy for the operations on the main front in Normandy. Kesselring made the point that without the Italian lessons it would have been much more difficult for the Allies to succeed in Normandy and his argument has been accepted by various authors.

Italy was also the testing ground for the institution – the first time in Europe – of an Allied military government. It has been noted that “the precedents established would therefore be far reaching in scope and would set the pattern for later operations in Europe” (Harris 1957).

There still is an open debate on whether the Italian campaign justified its terrible costs and whether the British alternative strategy of keeping pressure on Italy might have liberated the country sooner than the spring of 1945. One could speculate about what would have happened if Churchill had convinced the Americans to strengthen the Italian front, instead of redeploying the bulk of Allied troops to support the landing in southern France. But this kind of counterfactual history is not particularly helpful in understanding historical reality.

As pointed out before, only research that takes into account both the military and the strategic points of view and puts the Italian campaign in the larger context of the “grand alliance” can help us to reach a clearer assessment of this bloody and difficult campaign. The lack of such a comprehensive approach can be considered the most important shortcoming of the existing histories of the Italian campaign.

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CHAPTER FIFTY

US Foreign Policy, the Grand Alliance, and the Struggle for Indian Independence during the Pacific War

SARAH ELLEN GRAHAM

In the first months of 1943, two newspaper advertisements stating the aims of the United States' military effort in the Pacific theater were published in Indian newspapers. One featured a sketch of United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his expression quizzical, with the date "1776" in the background. Another showed a lamp illuminating a portion of the darkened globe, with Southeast Asia and India most brightly lit. The latter was entitled "For the Future of Asia." Its caption hailed Roosevelt's 1934 decision to grant sovereignty to the Philippines as testament to Washington's commitment to "free political and commercial association with all peoples of Asia."

Such was the standard fare of US war publicity in occupied and colonized areas during World War II, unremarkable except for the fact that the advertisements were published in India, and they were part of one of the United States' least effective international propaganda efforts during the war. Rather than supporting Allied strategic interests and building goodwill for US plans for the postwar settlement, American publicity in India instead sparked unease among British imperial administrators who were determined to hold on to the empire. Worse still, the notions of political freedom articulated within American war propaganda deeply aggrieved Indian leaders, particularly those of the Indian National Congress Party (INC). They pointed to Franklin Roosevelt's failure to openly support independence negotiations between India and Britain in 1942 as evidence of the American government's compact with British imperial interests, and thus of the ultimately cynical nature of US pronouncements on colonial self-determination and democracy.

Though the advertisements discussed above were not identified as US government-authored material, one had been cut from the newspaper and returned to the US

consulate by a disgruntled reader claiming to speak on behalf of all Indians. Across the clipping the reader had typed a scathing critique of America's "foolish," "mischievous," and "fraudulent" assertions of support for freedom and democracy. It has been retained within the embassy records of the US National Archives, and it strikes this author as an apt symbol of the political dilemmas that make the triangular relationship between the United States, India, and Britain an important case study for historians of the Pacific War.

What are the key historical questions raised by the relationships between India, Britain, and the United States during the war? First, India encapsulates the difficulties the United States faced in following through on its putative wartime commitments to freedom and democracy for colonized peoples. The United States faced a challenging dilemma between upholding its strategic interests during wartime and acting according to the idealistic tenets of American political culture. As such, India's experience opens broader questions about Washington's later policies with respect to the dismantling of Europe's colonies. In many ways, it provides a corrective to the postwar tendency to make a political myth out of Washington's supposedly steadfast commitment to freedom and democracy for the global south during and after the war. The reality, as India demonstrates, was much more complex.

India's experience during World War II has additional significance in that it forged a determination on the part of the Indian people and their leaders to resist the projection of US power into South Asia – sentiments that primed India for its leadership of later postcolonial political movements such as the Cold War Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. Here, the case of India begs the question of how the wartime developments in the Indo-American relationship determined their cold war diplomatic relationship.

India is also an important case for historical accounts of World War II because the constitutional status of India was an issue that generated significant tensions within the Anglo-American alliance. With the US entry into the war, British officials became deeply concerned about the prospect that the stationing of American troops and diplomats in India would encourage the nationalist movement in its demands for sovereignty. Though the United States ultimately fell in favor of support for ongoing British rule in India, it continued to propagate statements about America's commitment to freedom, democracy, and an open global trading order as postwar aims, thereby causing strain within the Anglo-American alliance. Washington repeatedly resisted requests by Britain to set up a joint propaganda command that would have brought US statements in line with the imperialist position.

These tensions over the *rhetorical* position taken by the United States on India's struggle for freedom suggests the need for a more nuanced view of Britain and America's "special relationship." It was a relationship that at times encompassed important disagreements over military and political strategy. The propaganda and behind-the-scenes persuasion that Whitehall directed toward the United States in the hope of ensuring that their position on India would prevail constitutes a particularly interesting, though not often discussed, dynamic between the two allies.

In light of these broad questions raised by India in relation to the prevailing historical understandings of World War II, I shall now evaluate several of the explanations that have been offered to account for the troubled US–India–Britain relationship. I shall not delve into the extensive literature that deals with the India–British

relationship and the Indian independence struggle itself, but instead shall focus on the diplomatic dynamics between the three nations and the ways in which historians have conceptualized these dynamics. Readers interested in the Anglo-Indian political relationship and the independence struggle will find a useful starting point in Stanley Wolpert's *Shameful Flight* (2006), Yasmin Khan's *Great Partition* (2007), and Jawaharlal Nehru's panoramic *Discovery of India* (1946). Also highlighted are what I consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of existing historical approaches and where some of the most significant new avenues for future research on India and World War II might be found.

How can we account for the contradiction between Washington's rhetorical embrace of colonial self-determination and its inconsistent diplomatic support for Indian independence? American officials sensed a strategic risk in sponsoring India's freedom movement in a strenuous fashion, and this cannot be overlooked in the first instance as a factor that militated against US support for Indian independence. The Indian subcontinent was a site for the production of war materials and supply routes for gasoline and other necessities to Allied forces in China and Burma. Despite receiving assurances from the Indian National Congress (INC) that India's participation in the struggle against Japan would not be disrupted if a timeframe for full independence was offered, US officials were persuaded by the British that any concessions to the nationalists would cause sectarian strife, civil disobedience, or even civil war, and thus disrupt the war effort.

Excellent overviews of the Allied military campaign in the Pacific, particularly its logistical elements, can be found in the work of Thorne (1978), Louis (1978), and McKercher (1999). Collectively, these and other military histories of the Pacific War contextualize the US and the British positions on Indian independence in relation to the Allies' broader strategic operations. The strategic frame is also important to the prevailing accounts of the early postwar relationship between the United States and India. Cold war geopolitical alignments brought continuity to Washington's approach to the subcontinent in the immediate aftermath of the war. The United States looked to what it perceived to be a more reliable ally – Pakistan – to establish a strategic presence on the subcontinent, locking American relations with India into a long-term pattern of estrangement and indifference punctuated by sporadic rhetorical clashes. Both Kenton Clymer, in *Quest for Freedom* (1995), and Robert J. McMahon in *The Cold War on the Periphery* (1994) survey the India–US–Britain triangular relationship and the emerging cold war world order during 1946–1947. Both accounts assess how the inauspicious precedents for Indo-American strategic cooperation during the war, in particular Nehru's deep resentment over America's moral failings on the independence issue, encouraged Washington's drift toward a strategic partnership with Pakistan, which was finalized in 1954.

Were these cold war fault-lines inevitable? That Pakistan should have been the key regional cold war ally of the United States, and thus a recipient of substantial military aid, hardly seems to have been a foregone conclusion when the cold war containment lines came into focus after 1946. Dennis Merrill's *Bread and the Ballot* (1990), a well-researched account of US financial aid and food relief for India during the early postwar years, shows that Washington clearly countenanced a closer strategic relationship with India in addition to its courting of Pakistan before 1954. The political possibilities that were present within the Indo-American relationship – what

opportunities were lost, and why – are one area that warrants further scrutiny by historians as they set out to evaluate the consequences of World War II encounters between India and the United States.

Turning to World War II itself, and it is clear that the military situation in Europe was also at stake in the intermittent discussions about India's status that took place between Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill after 1941. Although the United States was the stronger party within the relationship, the integrity of the Anglo-American alliance was, nonetheless, of the highest importance to Roosevelt and the White House. This must be taken into account when we evaluate the United States' political incentives in relation to India's sovereign status. The Grand Alliance was central to the military campaign in Europe, and Washington also required ongoing British support for the planning of a postwar settlement incorporating the USSR. Consequently, at several crucial moments, Franklin Roosevelt declined to press for independence settlement for he was loath to risk discord that might jeopardize cooperation with the staunch imperialist Churchill (Clymer 1988). Gary Hess's *America Encounters India* (1971) details this relationship, charting the development of the White House's views on India, the course of US public opinion, and the government's ambivalent commitment to the ideal of colonial self-determination in great detail. Kenton Clymer (1995) and Venkataramani and Shrivastava (1963) also effectively gather together the British and Indian responses to US policy during the war.

Whereas the attention Roosevelt gave to India during the war was divided at best, Winston Churchill worked strenuously against the prospect that America might provide decisive diplomatic, financial, or military support for Indian independence. As Christopher Thorne's work illustrates, British policy-makers had traditionally regarded the United States as prone to moralizing but unable to muster any substantive challenge to the imperial system (1978, p. 20). It was this purportedly strong, if muddle-headed, American inclination toward anticolonialism, now with greater urgency given Britain's own precarious military position in Asia, that the British government had hoped to ward off as it extolled the virtues of empire through its official public propaganda channels in the United States during the first years of World War II (Cull 1995).

The British ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, exemplified the British government's concerns about the tenor of US public opinion in a letter he wrote in 1943 that derisively observed how India's "historical and constitutional position" – by which he meant the evident necessity of ongoing British rule – needed "constant explanation" in the United States (Halifax 1943, pp. 1–2). Halifax had earlier warned Whitehall that it was "difficult to exaggerate either the interest that Americans, for recondite reasons, take in India, or their ignorance on the subject" (Scott 1942, pp. 1–2). In reply, the (British) Foreign Office endorsed Halifax's efforts, but added a rather telling caveat that hinted at the tenuousness of Britain's diplomatic position: "what we do in India is of direct importance to the United States in as much as it can affect the course of the war; in short ... India is no longer a question concerning the British Empire exclusively" (Butler 1942, pp. 1–2).

The leaders of the Indian independence movement, particularly Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, had cultivated what ties they could to establish a small sector of support for their cause among liberal journalists, evangelical writers, and the leaders of the emerging civil rights movement in the United States. They stepped up these

efforts after the British Viceroy unilaterally declared India's entry into the war in 1939, hoping to gain public support and even diplomatic intercession from Washington on behalf of their cause. The INC's statements to the US media in this context were often framed for persuasive effect by evoking American political traditions. In this vein, Gandhi had requested that the United States make all of its assistance to Britain conditional on "guarantees of human liberties. If America is true to her tradition, she should say what Abraham Lincoln would say. America would lose nothing by making stipulations concerning her war help" (Hess 1971, pp. 28–30). Such attempts by both Whitehall and the Indian National Congress to influence US opinion illustrate the significance of propaganda, public opinion, and civil society for the kind of national effort that "total war" demanded.

British and Indian attempts to shape US public opinion on the matter of colonial independence also took place against the backdrop of a changing US policy toward India after the outbreak of the war. With the establishment in 1940 of the Lend-Lease program for US economic assistance to Britain, some of which was earmarked to purchase supplies for Britain from imperial territories such as India, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle sought to reconsider America's official position on the independence question. Disclaiming America's "desire to intervene" in the affairs of the British Empire, Berle nonetheless recommended that Washington "point out that under existing circumstances it *can* express concern over the tangible results, in light of the common effort, which the British policy in India in fact produces" (Berle 1959, pp. 177).

Roosevelt had just such an opportunity to convey these concerns about British policy at a conference on Allied war aims with Churchill at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in the middle of 1941. The Atlantic Charter they jointly issued was intended to establish a diplomatic "community of interest" between the Allies, but it subsequently became the most influential propaganda document of World War II. The Charter generated high expectations among the nationalist leaders of the colonized world: Article Three conveyed the Allies' "respect for the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" (Roosevelt and Churchill 1941).

Though much was subsequently made of the Atlantic Charter as a declaration of moral principle, both Britain and the United States approached the Charter with strategic interests in mind. Churchill understood Roosevelt's attachment to the anticolonial traditions of American political discourse and acceded to Article Three in order to guarantee the flow of economic aid from the United States, though he subsequently maintained that because of its negative wording the Charter pertained only to areas conquered by the Axis. Churchill's hair-splitting clarification held that the Charter's position on occupied areas represented "quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions ... which owe allegiance to the British Crown" (Rhea Dulles and Ridinger 1955, p. 6). Though Roosevelt was genuinely committed to postwar international reform, he also saw a joint declaration along the lines of Article Three as a way to maintain American domestic support for economic aid to the Allies and to demonstrate to his own government that he had placed conditions on American financial assistance to Britain. Roosevelt's son and confidant, Elliott, thus recalled how his father hoped to test British resolve on the subject: "India, Burma – these were reproaches. Father, having once mentioned them aloud, would keep reminding his British hearers of them" (Rhea Dulles and Ridinger 1955, p. 5).

In the months between the United States' entry into the war as a full participant in December, 1941, and the ultimate failure of a British-sponsored independence offer conveyed by the British Cabinet member Sir Stafford Cripps in May, 1942, Roosevelt privately communicated his support for Indian independence several times in his correspondence with Churchill (Rhea Dulles and Ridinger 1955, p. 7). None of these statements were presented unequivocally or with anything like the level of fervor suggested by Elliott in his recollections of his father's anticolonial sentiments, however. A decisive turning point in the development of Roosevelt's views came after the final breakdown of the Cripps independence negotiations with the INC and India's Muslim League in 1942. Churchill had never genuinely supported the independence settlement, and Cripps was sent to conduct the talks in response to pressure from the British Cabinet. Churchill anticipated an Indian rejection of the deal, which would discredit the independence movement itself. Instead, Cripps had made changes to the original offer in response to demands articulated by Nehru and the leader of India's Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, paving the way for an agreement. When Churchill realized his gambit had failed and revoked the offer, Roosevelt appeared also to retreat sharply from its stated commitment to freedom and self-determination and made no public protestation.

Roosevelt had privately communicated his support for the Cripps offer to Churchill while the negotiations were ongoing, but made no public statements of support during the negotiations or after they failed. Ultimately, he failed even to press the matter of a reopening of the independence talks with any degree of strenuousness after the British Prime Minister warned him that "anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and surely deeply injure both our countries at this height of this terrible struggle" (Churchill 1970, p. 764). The key problem with Roosevelt's modest, behind-the-scenes persuasion regarding Indian independence was precisely that it took place behind the scenes. The combination of US war publicity emphasizing America's commitment to freedom, and Roosevelt's apparent indifference to the collapse of the independence talks in 1942, created an inconsistency that led to a longstanding suspicion of US motives among independent India's leaders.

Another of the key questions raised by Washington's failure to establish an amicable relationship with the Indian nationalist movement concerns the efficacy – or lack thereof – of US war publicity. The work of the Office of War Information elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe, is generally regarded as one of the most successful aspects of America's war effort, but it was not particularly effective in the case of India. Soon after Pearl Harbor, the State Department posted information officials to its consulates across India and several dedicated diplomatic and information staff to the newly opened New Delhi embassy. The instructions sent to the director of the India information operations, Robert Aura Smith, were to draft "plans for using all available facilities in India as a base for disseminating information regarding the cause of the American people and their Government against our enemies." Publicity agents should "grant the requests of Indian leaders and the Indian press ... for general news and feature information concerning the aims and aspirations of the American people" to show that America "deserved the prestige" it enjoyed in colonized areas (Sherwood 1942, pp. 4–5). The full quote runs as follows:

You will point out at every opportunity, in all conversations and in your releases to the press and radio of India, that the United States intends to preserve and to deserve its

prestige in India, and that this prestige with which the peoples of India have honoured the United States would be weakened were we to depart from our strict policy of directing our efforts to strengthening the already excellent relations existing between the Indian and American peoples at ... the defeat of the barbaric enemies who would deprive us of our homes, our hard-won freedoms, and our very lives.

A key task for US propaganda in India was to establish Washington's right to exercise leadership in any future postwar settlement for Asia. The White House thus instructed its diplomats to "present the United States in as favorable light as possible to as much of India's public as can be reached," and "sustain public morale in India through establishing the conviction that the victory of the United Nations is inevitable and that a major factor in that victory is and will be the United States" ("Enclosure 1 to Dispatch 54" 1942). At the same time, US officials reported from India that the inconsistency between word and deed was deleterious to American interests. Roosevelt's failure to condemn publicly British duplicity after the failed independence offer in 1942 had undermined America's standing: US officials reported that Indian opinion had begun to characterize Washington as yet another imperialist power in Asia.

Despite the fact that the INC recognized that US public opinion was an important constituency to cultivate in support of their aims, the Indian National Congress leadership was also inclined to make critical public statements about the United States' "quasi-imperialist" foreign policy and the gross racial and economic inequities of American society itself. Gandhi began publicly lamenting that the American military and diplomatic presence in India was propping up British imperialism. Alongside several other prominent activists, including the INC's Subhas Chandra Bose and the Naga tribal leader Angami Zapu Phizo (both of whom went so far as to advocate military struggle against the British and American forces stationed in India), Gandhi publicly questioned whether the war had any "moral basis" whatsoever (Hess 1971, pp. 65–66). The quixotic attitudes of the INC leadership left the somewhat unprepared US diplomatic staff on the ground, not to mention US policy-makers at a distance in Washington, unsure of the INC's reliability as an ally in the war effort. As such, after 1942 the Department of State was ultimately more inclined to accept British assertions that an effective independence settlement would be far too difficult to accomplish during wartime.

Military contingencies, the seeming unpredictability of Indian leaders, and Churchill's unwillingness to compromise on India's constitutional status takes us a fair way toward explaining why the United States failed to support the cause of Indian self-government more consistently during the war. But if India constituted an unusually difficult challenge for the United States in that it necessitated the elevation of strategic concerns (maintaining British support, avoiding disruptive unrest within India, etc.) over freedom for oppressed peoples, historians have pointed out that such "aberrant" conditions were in fact the norm during the cold war. The India case seen in this light thus hints at a deeper ambivalence, or perhaps what would be better described as an underlying instrumentalism, within US views on colonial self-determination for non-Western peoples.

Washington's difficulties with India were repeated many times over as America confronted anticolonial movements during its struggle against global communism. As Dennis Merrill notes, for many years the prevailing revisionist perspective on

US–Third World relations during the cold war emphasized that Washington supported colonial self-determination only on terms of its own choosing. It sponsored factions within the various colonial independence struggles on the basis of their willingness to reject Soviet influence or their desirability as trading partners, to the detriment of democracy and human rights considerations (Merrill 1992). Washington’s willingness to compromise with the British over India provides, in this view, a straightforward answer to the enduring question of whether ideals or self-interest governed US foreign policy: India was simply the first of many instances in which strategic and economic interests in the struggle for global hegemony against the USSR inevitably outweighed Washington’s fealty to its ideals of liberty.

One problem with this line of reasoning, however, is that while some US officials noted the growing strength of the Indian communist movement in the year or two before Indian independence in 1947, American policy during the Indian independence negotiations of 1942 was not obviously determined by fears about communism and Soviet expansionism. India was deemed a worthy recipient of substantial amounts of US assistance throughout the 1950s (Merrill 1990), which suggests that fears about India’s “pro-communist” sympathies were by no means the guiding logic behind American indifference to India’s independence struggle. What makes the case of India so interesting, therefore, is that it highlights complexities in Washington’s stance on colonial self-determination that ran deeper than cold war competitiveness. Michael Hunt has developed this line of reasoning, contending in *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (1987) that a three-pronged “ideology” determined US foreign policy in the global south. Hunt argues that ingrained notions of racial hierarchy and an antipathy to revolutionary change were fundamental aspects of US policy thinking that generally overrode Washington’s commitment to international democratic freedoms.

American decision-making on matters of colonial self-determination can thus be evaluated not only in terms of the strategic imperatives imposed by international circumstances, but also in light of how Washington’s own contradictory mixture of views on race, security, and the limits of liberal internationalism were at play in different contexts. In the case of India, Hunt’s framework helps to explain why US policy drifted in such a haphazard fashion between support for self-determination and the perpetuation of the empire. Racial and cultural prejudice, hinted at in the frequent references to India’s atavistic “communal problems” within US policy documentation, as well as fears of revolutionary instability, were deeper, internal dynamics that militated against US support for a handover of sovereignty to Indians themselves. The collected essays in David Ryan and Victor Pungong’s *United States and Decolonization* (2000) demonstrate the power of this analytical framework, and show how the notions of cultural difference and racial prejudice that shaped US policy in India played out in subsequent cases of colonial self-determination such as Vietnam.

While the foregoing perspective addresses the key conundrum of how to explain the inconsistency of America’s words and deeds with regard to Indian independence, there is one implication of the threefold account of American interests that has not so far been well explored in existing historical work. The contradictory imperatives that hampered US war information in India and undermined Washington’s commitment to freedom for colonized peoples did not simply render American foreign policy more self-regarding and strategic than idealists might hope. They also generated policies and diplomatic strategies that were generally ad hoc, inconsistent, and poorly executed.

The archival record of the US diplomatic missions in India bears out this insight. It reveals that staffing problems, unclear policy instructions, and a lack of reporting back to superiors in Washington undermined its dealings with the INC (Graham 2009; Pullin 2010). That the leaders of the INC were independent India's government in waiting does not seem to have been given much thought by the White House and the Department of State. For this reason, US policy regarding Indian self-determination should be of interest to political scientists as well as to diplomatic historians. India serves a good counterfactual case for students of US foreign policy. It prompts reflection on just how far American behavior was from the ideal of rationally designed, well-implemented policy, and to determine why this occurred.

One key example of the poor execution of US policy in India was the ambiguous structure of American diplomatic representation on the ground. There were significant failures in the selection of adequate personnel and the delineation of official responsibilities between them. Just how Washington's position on the Indian political situation should be communicated to the Indian people, their leaders, and the British authorities is never entirely clear in the archival material that documents America's wartime diplomacy on the subcontinent. Roosevelt appointed a commissioner to New Delhi in place of an ambassador with the beginning of Lend-Lease, but then proceeded to complicate the chain of command by dispatching his own personal representatives to India to gather information and convey the White House's views to the various parties within the independence struggle on an informal basis.

The first of these personal representatives, Louis Johnson, became involved in the independence negotiations headed by Sir Stafford Cripps in March and April 1942. After the first draft of the Cripps offer was rejected by Nehru and the Indian Muslim leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Johnson stepped in with a compromise plan that eventually gained the support of all the parties. Whether Roosevelt intended for Johnson to do so is a matter of debate, though recent scholarship has surmised that this was most likely the case (Clymer 1995). As we have seen, if Roosevelt had indeed planned to support a settlement through such informal channels, it was a strategy that was ultimately undermined by Roosevelt's own unwillingness to publicly support the deal once an agreement was reached. While Johnson's irregular status enabled him to enter the negotiations, it also provided Churchill with a way to scuttle a settlement that he had hoped would never actually be reached. After being informed (by another of Roosevelt's personal representatives, Harry Hopkins, in London) that as the President's personal representative Johnson had no official mandate to intercede in the talks, Churchill was confident that Johnson's authority could be undercut. Roosevelt's tactic of pursuing extra-diplomatic influence thus weakened his influence over the situation in India rather than enhancing it. It was a situation far removed from the streamlined bureaucracy, open information channels, and strategic decision-making that theorists of foreign policy-making regard as ideal.

The India case also represents an interesting counterfactual for evaluating the role of the media and special interests in foreign policy-making during wartime. A common narrative, both within historical writing and popular perceptions of wartime American diplomacy in Asia, tells of Washington's "loss" of China to communism. The term is shorthand for America's failure to grasp the Kuomintang's limitations as a viable Chinese government. Yet the estrangement of democratic India from the United States during the cold war might well be regarded as a failure of similar, or even larger,

magnitude. Compared to the Chungking regime, the Indian National Congress was composed of effective politicians and administrators who enjoyed substantial domestic legitimacy. The INC was committed to democratic traditions, and had a well-trained civil bureaucracy set up by the British that would be at its disposal after independence. In short, India might thus have served as a valuable and well-governed ally to the United States during the postwar period.

Why, then, were so few influential editors, scholars, members of Congress, and former policy-makers in the United States inclined to establish a robust internal debate about how US priorities in South Asia were being defined during the war? Americans who did support the cause of Indian freedom did not lack commitment to their cause so much as access to the highest levels of US policy-making (Hess 1971). Contrasting how China and India were regarded by Washington prior to 1949 highlights the importance of civil society and the momentum that certain powerful sectors of it, particularly China boosters such as *Life* editor Henry Luce, can generate in priming US foreign policy to follow a given course (Herzstein 2005).

To assess the making and implementation of US foreign policy toward India in light of its bureaucratic and imaginative failings during the war also requires taking note of an interesting point of continuity between the period of World War II, through subsequent cold war decades, and into the post-cold war period. Despite the posting of several high-profile ambassadors to the New Delhi post over the years, including Chester Bowles, George V. Allen, and John Kenneth Galbraith, the United States and India have had a notoriously frosty diplomatic relationship since India's independence was won. This suggests not a lack of ability on the part of US policy-makers and Foreign Service members so much as the historical absence of a constituency within the US government and civil society for improved relations with India. Here, Robert J. McMahon's point that American moves toward the Pakistan alliance were "driven by a remarkably imprecise and inchoate formulation of the nation's strategic needs" seems especially germane (McMahon 1988, p. 815). This analysis suggests that the causes of Indo-American diplomatic estrangement have been equally inchoate: a function of failed diplomatic imagination and a reactive policy attitude, rather than a necessity.

The wartime relationship between India, the United States, and Britain also encourages reflection on the complex ways in which Indians responded to, and ultimately resisted, the extension of US power during the war. As noted above, key INC leaders had long criticized the United States particularly insofar as America's domestic political system sustained racial segregation and seemed to make a virtue of its economic inequalities (Pantham 1983). Yet they also understood, even before the outbreak of the war, that the United States might potentially serve as a key ally in the struggle for independence (Prasad 1962; Manela 2007). The Indian diaspora within the United States was small, but historical accounts have noted how this group nonetheless sought to influence public opinion through the publication of pro-independence newsletters and advocacy to the US media (Hess 1969; Gordon 2002). These hopes were dispelled when Washington failed to intercede effectively on behalf of India during the independence talks of 1942, and the leaders of the INC would subsequently provide some of the most articulate criticisms of US foreign policy ever issued.

Just as India was precedent setting for Washington in terms of how it resolved the dilemma between ideals and self-interest in the dismantling of the European colonies,

World War II thus had an important catalyzing effect on Indian public opinion and its determination to resist American hegemony for decades after. The ideological origins of the Cold War Non-Aligned Movement can be traced back in part to the future Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's disappointment with Washington's apparent betrayal of his cause in 1942. Here, the histories of the independence struggle and the ideas that developed within it written by Indian scholars are instructive, and often polemical. Nehru and Gandhi's own writings deserve pride of place among these accounts (Nehru 1946; Gandhi 1993; Nehru, Gopal, and Iyengar 2003), alongside Bimla Prasad's *Origins of Indian Foreign Policy* (1962), R. C. Jauhari's *American Diplomacy and Independence for India* (1970) and M. S. Venkataramani and B. K. Shrivastava's article entitled "The United States and the Cripps Mission" (1963).

Assessing India's response to the political upheavals of the Pacific War also encourages reflection on the spectrum of responses to the extension of American power by colonized and occupied nations across the globe. There are many useful histories charting how individual nations responded to the wartime transition from European imperial dominance to American hegemony. These varied experiences are largely overlooked in general histories of World War II, however. Overarching political and military histories of World War II ought to provide more detailed accounts of the ways that colonized nations fashioned various forms of resistance against Western hegemony and acted as agents of their own destinies, despite the extensive constraints they faced.

Indian leaders' longstanding skepticism toward US policy contrasts markedly with the views of Australia, for instance, which at that time was a British dominion and, like India, served as a military staging point for the Pacific theater. Successive Australian governments on both sides of the political spectrum had sought a US military commitment to the Pacific since the end of World War I, and worked especially hard to secure one after Japan's expansion into Southeast Asia in the early years of the war (Barclay 1985, p. 3). Race, culture, and language influenced this longstanding Australian effort to encourage the projection of US military power into the Pacific. Extant historical accounts show that it was not so much the United States' political ideals that account for this former colony's preference for the extension of US power into the Asia Pacific, but rather Australian racial insecurities and America's apparent wherewithal to defend Australia's "way of life" (Bourke 2008).

The substantial tactical variations between the anticolonial movements of the Asia Pacific region can also be appreciated by shifting analytical focus from the major (European and Japanese) protagonists of the war to the colonized nations that saw the war as an opportunity for political and military resistance. Whereas Indians, for the most part, rejected a strategy of armed struggle against the British, the Burmese nationalist movement led by Aung San and the Indonesian independence movement, headed by Sukarno, both successfully sought arms and training from the occupying Japanese forces in an effort to guarantee their postwar sovereignty. When Washington received intelligence of these developments its ambivalence about the process of colonial self-determination deepened considerably. Despite the effective seizure of the country by Indonesian forces after Japan's retreat in 1945, for example, the United States declined to extend recognition to the nationalist government. Consequently, the development of a more nuanced comparative analysis of the politics of decolonization and World War II should be considered an important avenue for

future research. This kind of comparative analysis might also feasibly take into account the varied ways in which cultural and racial perceptions shaped American policy on colonial self-determination in different cases.

Analytical frameworks that foreground culture and discourse now have an established place in the discipline of diplomatic history, and the ultimate failure of the United States and India to reach concordance on the matter of postwar priorities can be effectively illuminated through cultural enquiry. Andrew Rotter's *Comrades at Odds* (2000) is an important starting point. This book elaborates how Americans and Indians collectively defined their national identities and suggests how these identities impacted upon the bilateral relationship during 1947–1954. The vastly divergent experiences of geographical space, gender, social mobility, and spirituality in India and America seemed to indicate an inherent, insurmountable cultural gulf between the two. Yet, according to Rotter, it was not these differences per se that made culture an important determinant of Indo-American relations, but rather the fact that political processes in each led to the harnessing of cultural difference as a set of negative projections that each collective "Self" made onto its contrasting "Other." Like Rotter, Ronald Inden employs the concept of the Self/Other nexus effectively in his study entitled *Imagining India* (1990), which explores a range of international constructions of Indian politics and society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The issue of US race relations certainly presented an awkward challenge for officials who were charged with the responsibility of constructing a desirable image of American culture to project to Indian audiences. In this, India highlights the broader difficulties the United States faced in presenting a coherent democratic message to the world when African Americans remained segregated at home. In June 1942, the OWI commenced production on two documentary films specifically for Indian audiences, entitled *Our American Allies* and *Stop That Risin' Sun*. The latter was denied release in 1943, however, because the film charted the experience of African American troops in India and officials feared it might provoke awkward questions about America's credentials as a supporter of the freedom and empowerment of subjugated nations.

The US Office of War Information's difficulty finding a coherent message on the race question was also evident in 1943 when, in an attempt to showcase American racial harmony, the US Forces Negro Swing Band was invited to play at a diplomatic event in Bombay (now Mumbai). The *Bombay Chronicle* subsequently caused great embarrassment to US diplomats by revealing that although the show had been intended to display American racial pluralism, almost no Indians had been invited to the event (Bombay Consulate 1943). The Indian media had been consistently critical of US race relations during the war, and, in the wake of the failed Cripps offer, took incidents such as the segregated reception in Bombay as a pretext to express polemical criticisms linking racial inequalities within the United States to Washington's apparent support for the subjugation of nonwhite races globally.

One of the most interesting aspects of the cultural turn within the study of international history has been the incorporation of a much wider range of source material within the discipline, such as articles of popular culture, artistic works, language, scholarly works, and other representational practices. In this respect, Rotter's work can be situated alongside the writings of Akira Iriye (1981), Frank Ninkovich (1981), Christina Klein (2003), and Robert Ivie (1999), which offer a

variety of strategies that future scholarship on India and World War II might take up in order to analyze the impact of culture on foreign policy. While Rotter's work remains the touchstone for assessing culture and the US–India bilateral relationship specifically, there are many useful accounts of Indian independence struggle and the Britain–India relationship that have been informed by cultural and discourse analysis under the rubric of postcolonial scholarship. In *Whose India?*, for example, Teresa Hubel has shown how the negotiation of Anglo-Indian cultural differences played out in literary works by British and Indian writers such as Rudyard Kipling, E. M. Forster, Mulk Raj Anand, and Swarnakumari Devi (Hubel 1996).

Another of the key achievements of the “cultural turn” within diplomatic history is that this literature questions the assumption that states should be the only object of analysis within historical research. At the forefront of this approach are histories that capture the experiences of women, civil society, intellectuals, and transnational social movements during World War II (Iriye 1997; Rosenberg 1999; Akami 2002). For the most part, however, these works have focused on cases from wartime Britain, Europe, and the United States. A productive new research agenda in this vein might assess how indigenous peoples and religious or ethnic minorities in India were affected by the upheavals and opportunities brought by the war. There exist some useful studies of the independence struggle in various provinces, especially Leonard A. Gordon's *Brothers Against the Raj* (1990) and *Bengal: The Nationalist Movement* (1974) on Bengal. *India After Gandhi*, by Ramachandra Guha (2007) briefly highlights how India's tribal groups, lower castes, religious communities, and women responded to the war and the freedom struggle (see also Forbes 1996). Guha's book also provides a brief but helpful overview of Kashmiri politics and the independence struggle. However, there remains considerable scope to build on these accounts and examine the history of World War II in ways that are attentive to the transnational and subnational actors that were impacted by the conflict and its aftermath, both in India and other parts of the global south.

World War II, and the Indian independence struggle that coincided with it, were defining moments for the three nations considered in this chapter. The United States preserved its good standing with Britain and was able to work closely with it in designing the postwar settlement in part because Churchill and Roosevelt did not suffer a “serious breach” over India. But with his compromise with Churchill's gambit on the 1942 independence settlement, and particularly by not publicly pressing for a reopening of the Cripps offer, Roosevelt lengthened his own odds of establishing an effective working relationship with independent India's government in waiting and exposed a deep ambivalence within the United States' views on colonial self-determination. Although Nehru's intellectual and political instincts had engendered an initial skepticism of the United States, had Roosevelt openly declared support for the INC Nehru might well have sought to cultivate closer ties with Washington during his decades as Indian prime minister. As it was, Nehru sought an independent course for Indian foreign policy, and in the process became one of the major intellectual and political figures of resistance against US hegemony during the cold war.

The United States made several lackluster attempts to improve its relationship with India in the first years after independence, but once again Washington failed to present its position in a persuasive way. Very few US policy-makers had emerged from the war with a sense of ease in navigating Indian politics, and this appeared to dictate in the

years to follow that America's cold war grand strategy should focus squarely on Pakistan. This set of developments has had significant implications for the Indo-Pakistan relationship and the security of the region in the decades since, particularly in relation to nuclear proliferation and the Kashmir conflict.

The stunting of the diplomatic relationship between the world's most powerful democracy and the British colony that would become its largest thus tells an important story about the outcomes of the Pacific War. It is a case study that challenges several historical assumptions about Washington's ideological role during the conflict, presenting a caution to scholars not to presume that the US always followed the "idealistic" course simply because government rhetoric suggested so. India serves as a reminder to scholars to remain attentive to issues of race, culture, and the value Washington placed on orderly, nonrevolutionary regime change in analyzing how US foreign policy was made and implemented. India also directs our gaze to the more quotidian factors that cause foreign policy, and propaganda in particular, to fail – inadequate staffing, inattentive high-level direction, and political trade-offs. Finally, the case prompts reflection on the fact that colonized peoples were not passive actors on the sidelines of history; they were not "granted" independence simply because Washington's military might brought the idealistic United States some newfound diplomatic influence over Britain and other European nations during the war. Rather, the Indian nationalist movement and their counterparts across the world fought hard against colonialism; their achievement is all the more poignant because they did so with only fitful support from the United States.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE

“P” Was for Plenty

WILLIAM H. MILLER

American industrial output was so much a foundation for Allied victory that it is often taken for granted in the literature. Moreover, outpourings from the revitalized post-Depression US industrial and agricultural economies were so vast that writers typically resort to strings of superlatives, mind-numbing tables, or economic treatises while attempting to convey the scale of US material superiority. Alternatively, the popular press relies mostly on well-researched picture books in order to portray what industrial output looked like – rows of bombers in aircraft assembly plants that look like halls of mirrors, fading into infinity, or acres of artillery, the barrels like so many Kansas cornstalks, and so on.

It is especially important to keep America’s war production in mind today, an era when one aircraft, manned or robotic, can drop a single guided munition to destroy a single target, in only a single mission. This is in contrast to World War II, when, for example, armadas of four-engined bombers were required to drop hundreds of tons of bombs on a single target, with sometimes heavy losses and a good chance of having to repeat the job several more times. New students need reminding that World War II was different from the present in many ways, not the least of which were the demands placed on American industry and society to wage global war on a massive scale. The topic of American production, or industrial mobilization, touches on all aspects of the war – technology, economics, politics, diplomacy, administration, the home front culture, strategy, and operations. “The complexity of the subject is matched by the nearly overwhelming documentation concerning it” (Koistinen 2004, p. 7). Yet the monographic literature is sparse, especially when compared to the broad and constantly growing World War II library that impels the current compendium. On the other hand, because American production touches on so many aspects of the war, fruitful references to it can be found throughout the writings on World War II.

How important was American production? The broader literature now trends towards a fuller appreciation of America’s productive contribution to victory, as

reflected in a number of the single volume narratives. At one extreme, shaped by cold war interpretive pressures, Soviet-era Russian histories downplayed the importance of abundant American Lend-Lease aid to the USSR, according to several writers (Herring 1973; Weeks 2004). Using post Soviet-era sources, Weeks demonstrates that abundant US materiel aid to Russia was important if not essential to victory, citing Soviet Army Marshall Zhukov, among others. "But, listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over to us materiel without which we could not have equipped our armies ... or been able to continue the war" (Weeks 2004, p. 1). Nonetheless, Weeks takes a more reserved view when discussing the actual operational effects of Lend-Lease aid, pending further comparative work on wartime USSR.

British historian Basil Liddell-Hart treats the subject sparingly. He notes the importance of US materiel aid to Russia, pointing out how large-scale deliveries of American tactical trucks sustained the Red Army's offensive momentum (Liddell-Hart 1970). On US Lend-Lease aid to the UK, however, he is silent, perhaps also reflecting a nationalistic slant, although aid to Great Britain comprised about half of the almost US\$50 billion of total Lend-Lease assistance. Gerhard Weinberg does not treat American productive contributions as a separate theme, but only obliquely and infrequently interweaves it into his otherwise all-encompassing account of the global war, *A World at Arms* (Weinberg 2005).

At the other extreme, in the recent trend towards fuller appreciation and treatment of mobilization in general, John Keegan consistently assigns American productive power the utmost importance (Keegan 1982, 1989, 1993). Indeed, in a chapter devoted to war production in *The Second World War*, he notes that "In the final enumeration of Hitler's mistakes in waging World War II, his decision to contest the issue with the power of the American economy may well come to stand first" (Keegan 1989, p. 219). Likewise, *In Freedom from Fear*, David Kennedy assigns a complete chapter to the subject (1999). Others give credit not only to American productive capacity but also to that of the Allies in general. Taking perhaps the most unequivocal view in *Why the Allies Won*, Richard Overy states: "The Allies won ... because they turned their economic strength into effective fighting power" (Overy 1995, p. 325). Paul A. C. Koistinen more fully develops mobilization's intricacies in *Arsenal of World War II*. "Despite advancement in weaponry, massive output was the critical World War II development, and that depended on successful economic mobilization policies" (Koistinen 2004, p. 11). The consensus less assertively holds that overwhelming American material strength was crucial, a necessary but insufficient condition for victory (Gropman 1996; Murray and Millett 2000; Davies 2006).

If the consensus holds that US production was a vital, if not decisive ingredient in Allied victory, how have historians portrayed its specific effects? Some of the effects appear to be obvious, but closer scrutiny is often necessary to comprehend fully the manifold ways in which industrial output made itself felt. As Overy notes, "The line between material resources and victory on the battlefield is anything but a straight one" (1995, p. 318). That line ran through the highest councils of war, affected diplomacy, determined the location and tempo of battle, and in crudest terms, determined where and how combatants and civilians alike would live or die, and in what amount.

To begin with, shipping is the elephant at the table in all discussions about World War II strategy and global operations. The grand narratives emphasize that the war

was a global war. However, it is important to acknowledge that if America was the so-called "Arsenal of Democracy," then it follows that the entire output of America's factories and farms had to travel to distant destinations by ship, if it could not fly (Nelson 1946; Zeiler 2011). In military terms, America had to fight the war on exterior lines of communication. Modern readers, acquainted with powerful American strategic airlift capabilities that are routinely employed in the twenty-first century, must recognize that such capacity only developed after World War II, mainly during the Vietnam War. The conduct, indeed the tempo of the Allied war effort, was enabled and constrained by the carrying capacity of huge numbers of newly built transport vessels and tankers.

Accordingly, "One of the most critical industrial achievements of the war was ship-building ... The United States, thus, had to become the 'Shipyard of Democracy,' an assignment it executed with dispatch" (Murray and Millett 2000, p. 536). Two volumes of the US Army's wartime history provide a solid foundation for understanding the issues, processes, and decisions governing global logistics and strategy, in which shipping receives detailed attention (Coakley and Leighton 1968; Leighton and Coakley 1984). Two agencies were chiefly responsible for ship construction. The US Navy was generally responsible for warship construction, while the US Maritime Commission built over 5,000 merchant ships and tankers, the ships that made global war possible. This tempers the generally accepted view that extremely high rates of merchant ship production were intended to offset losses to U-boats in the Atlantic. A single volume, *Ships for Victory*, describes the Maritime Commission's wartime construction program (Lane 2001). No comparably detailed work covering the equally impressive naval construction program has appeared in print, although *The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II* treats the navy's industrial program at an institutional and political level and within the larger topic of naval logistics (Connery 1951). Closely related to the Maritime Commission, which built the transports, the War Shipping Administration was responsible for all shipping movements and allocations, the subject of continuous, sometimes ferocious institutional and diplomatic struggles. To date, no detailed scholarly history of that agency has been published.

Because America's enemies were on far shores, expeditionary warfare became the means to engage and destroy them, a form of warfare that was by definition dependent on conventional sealift. It also called for large numbers of new types of vessels, many of which had not been invented at the war's outbreak (Friedman 2002). These amphibious assault ships, of many species, proved to be the enablers of expeditionary warfare, but were also constraints on strategic options. Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs), in particular, allowed the Allies to disgorge strong armored and mechanized forces "over the beach" in all theaters. Equally importantly, by carrying bulky supplies, they did much to supply the forces ashore, often becoming committed to sustaining post-landing operations rather than redeploying to the next invasion. Amphibious landings initiated Allied advances in all areas. Amphibious assault ships allowed strategic planners more options than previously envisaged (Miller 1991). However, initial productive plenty soon turned to shortages, as their use generated increased demands that outstripped the capacity of American shipbuilders. War fighters quickly learned how versatile these vessels were. About chronic landing ship shortages, Winston Churchill famously lamented to General George C. Marshall that American and

British plans “should be so much hamstrung and limited by a hundred or two of these particular vessels” (Churchill 1951, p. 514). Many other sources associate lost Allied opportunities with local shortages of mass-produced assets such as the LSTs, in spite of armadas of mostly American-built vessels (Hall 1955; Greenfield 1963; Millett and Murray 1988; Miller 1991; Ohl 1994; Stoler 2000; Weinberg 2005).

In the highest levels of war planning, production was at the very core of American political and military strategy. Kent Roberts Greenfield observes in *The Historian and the Army* that whereas the Axis powers had limited goals built on quick *blitzkrieg* and “naval *blitzkrieg*,” Allied grand strategy and efforts were geared towards a “war to the death” (Greenfield 1954, p. 30). This demanded the utmost in productive output as quickly as possible, and for the long run. High levels of armaments production lay at the heart of President Roosevelt’s approach to war fighting. He preferred that America expend munitions rather than military manpower. This would help to keep Allies engaged, while avoiding domestic outcries at sustained, high casualty rates (Millett and Maslowski 1994; Kennedy 1999). As the corollary to fighting a war of materiel, the American Army was lavishly supplied with armor, firepower, and motor transport. A huge air arm complemented American ground forces. All was backed by maritime war fighting and logistical capacity – shipping – adequate to sustain ground and air offensives on far shores, while at the same time carrying large-scale materiel aid to overseas allies. Production was the bedrock for these strategic choices.

Indeed, to the extent that American military manpower levels were determined less on the basis of projected operational requirements than on wartime industrial and agricultural necessities, production drove strategy. The Arsenal of Democracy had first call on the nation’s human resource (Matloff 1960; Kirkpatrick 1990; Millett and Maslowski 1994; Kennedy 1999). Putting all factors together in *The Big “L”: American Logistics in World War II*, Alan Gropman asserted that “logistics was the strategy” (1997, p. xv). Underscoring the point, Greenfield explains in *American Strategy in World War II* how the British complaint that American strategy was excessively “rigid” derived from the need to synchronize US deployment plans and industrial operations, which in turn had to mesh with myriad aspects of the mobilizing American economy. In that arena, manufacturing schedules sometimes trumped operational tempos (Greenfield 1963). This close linkage between strategy and production, among other reasons, often made American planners averse to opportunistic military ventures, as in the Mediterranean.

Scholars frequently invoke superlatives such as extraordinary, prodigious, and miraculous to describe the output from Roosevelt’s Arsenal of Democracy. Such adjectives are useful shorthand for America’s productive record, briefly sketched in the following examples. During the war, the US produced about 325,000 aircraft against Germany’s 189,000 planes and Japan’s 76,000. On the ground, 135,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery vehicles came from American assembly lines, against Russia’s 105,000 tanks and self-propelled guns or Germany’s 47,000. American shipyards built over 10,000 ocean-going vessels of all types – warships, auxiliaries, and cargo ships, plus over 80,000 amphibious assault craft and assorted small boats. The UK commissioned almost 900 warships, while Germany produced over 1,100 submarines. America’s dozen or so small arms ammunition plants delivered an astronomical 42 billion rounds (R. E. Smith 1985; Ellis 1993; Cardozer 1995; Lane 2001).

Most often, America’s wartime productive contribution is simply called “the miracle of production.” In a number of ways this rosy term, invoking concepts such

as perfection, efficiency, and harmony, has become the catalyst for a number of scholarly debates. Was it indeed "miraculous?" To what extent did the perception of miraculous achievement relate to the prewar Depression, that is, what were the linkages between the Great Depression and the Arsenal of Democracy? Was the miracle tempered by postwar concerns such as the military-industrial complex? Could the miracle have been "more miraculous?" How did it compare to other nations' productive achievements?

It is instructive to explore the various reasons why many historians are proponents of the view that US war production was at least impressive, if not monumental, taking care not to become ensnared in semantics over the use of the word "miracle." History and popular memory are especially intertwined when viewing America's wartime achievements as exceptional, an entanglement that affects how scholars engage the question of "miraculous" wartime productive accomplishments.

One view is that wartime productive output was intrinsically exceptional, without comparisons or qualifications. Some of the most laudatory writers are British. Perhaps due to his childhood exposure to American productive plenty in wartime England, Keegan persuasively describes the extent to which US wartime output was an overwhelming component of Allied victory (Keegan 1982). He also cites US efficiency as a distinguishing feature: "In absolute terms [American productivity] represented an extraordinary economic surge. Relatively, they spelt doom to Germany and Japan, where productivity per man-hour was respectively half and one-fifth of that in the United States" (Keegan 1989, p. 219). Also British, Norman Davies adds the element of time to his view of the American miracle in *No Simple Victory*, noting that even though America had not mobilized until 1941, output occurred rapidly, with "truly staggering" results (Davies 2006, p. 35). Likewise commenting on the rapidity of US mobilization, Overy writes that "Where every other major state took four of five years to develop a sizeable military economy, it took America a year" (Overy 1995, p. 192). However, Overy and Davies are not entirely correct in stating that US production ramped up in such a short time following Pearl Harbor. For example, standard naval references show that approximately 40 per cent of major US surface combatant tonnage – battleships, cruisers, fast carriers, and destroyers – completed by war's end was already under construction, often well advanced, by the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor (Silverstone 1965; Chesneau 1980; Friedman 1982; 1983; 1984a; 1984b).

Seen from other perspectives, US production accomplishments were noteworthy, but subject to qualification. Uncomfortable with using decisive victory alone as a yardstick for achievement, a number of historians ask if results could have been better, although this approach leaves unanswered the ultimate question of what standard, other than decisive victory, should be used. These critiques follow two general lines of argument. One consists of analyzing the evolution of the wartime mobilization bureaucracies, the key players, and the resulting interactions between them as wartime policy was developed. The other consists of quantitative comparisons between actual US mobilization results and those of other nations, or the prewar US economic potential.

In *Mobilizing America*, his biography of Robert P. Patterson, Keith Eiler ambivalently applies the measure of decisive victory. As undersecretary of war, Patterson was responsible for about 60 percent of the total war budget. Eiler also asks whether the nation could have done better. "Of course the effort brought decisive

military victory in all theaters of operation,” he observes, “and by this ultimate standard was unquestionably adequate.” Continuing, however, he notes that “one must also ask whether the overall effort was in fact as good as it might or should have been” (Eiler 1997, p. 466).

In the menagerie of wartime Washington officialdom, Patterson was known as an “all-outer,” a term coined by Donald Nelson, head of the War Production Board, to describe officials who believed in more extreme mobilization efforts, as opposed to the “not quite outers,” who sought to moderate the war’s economic effects (Nelson 1946). Without quantification, Eiler feels that material results were for the most part successful, albeit achieved with great bureaucratic effort that forms the core of his narrative. On the other hand, he states that “the efforts to mobilize human energies toward the common goal remained confused, uncoordinated, obstructed, discriminatory, and in serious ways, ineffective ... As a result, neither the industrial nor the military efforts reached levels that fully exploited the nation’s vast potential” (Eiler 1997, p. 467).

Another historian has adopted a flatly revisionist position that explicitly challenges the view that US achievements were miraculous. While agreeing that US strategy was grounded on production and logistics, Alan Gropman calls for de-mythologizing American wartime mobilization, lest full understanding be obscured (Gropman 1996, 1997). As a faculty member at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Gropman was impelled by the need to find ways that military leaders could profit from mobilization history’s lessons. In *Mobilizing US Industry in World War II*, he writes that “myths provoked by sentimentality regarding United States munitions production have evolved in the half century since the war ended, and these have become a barrier to comprehending the lessons of that era” (1996, p. 2).

Gropman bases his critique on two arguments, one implicit and the other explicit. First, he reviews the complex and fractious institutional history of key mobilization agencies within the federal government. His implicit argument is that the evolution of industrial public policy took too long and wasted too much organizational energy, as the War Department, the Navy Department, and a string of newly created, sometimes abandoned, civilian mobilization agencies, thrashed out working relationships and spheres of responsibility, to the detriment of the war effort. Like all such critiques, this approach presupposes that organizational perfection under harried wartime conditions, in a pluralistic society, is attainable or even definable. Nonetheless, the seeming disarray that he describes leaves the impression that things could have been better.

His explicit critique, grounded in economic statistics, is more convincing. He proposes that based on a number of indices US mobilization ought not be the subject of exceptionalist mythology. Two comparisons exemplify Gropman’s quantitative argument. Russia women comprised over 50 percent of the wartime workforce, 53 percent by 1942, whereas women comprised slightly over 35 percent of the US workforce. The USSR devoted about 75 percent of its GDP towards defeating Germany, more than any other belligerent, while the US mobilized 54 percent during peak production in 1944. He concludes that

[American] output, while noteworthy, was what a prewar analyst might have expected given the size of the country, its educated population, the status of its technology, the abundance of its raw materials, the quality of its transportation network. In short: America’s munitions production in World War II was no “miracle.” (Gropman 1997, p. 85)

Another significant revisionist, at least as averse to eulogies as Gropman, interprets US war production through the lens of political economy. Taking a measured view as to whether US production was important, Koistinen believes that "massive output was the critical World War II development, and that depended on successful economic mobilization policies" (Koistinen 2004, p. 11). Most writers on the topic, which this chapter treats, look at US war production strictly in the context of World War II. Some reach back to World War I as a touchstone. It is worth noting that Koistinen's work on World War II is important in its own context, but also because it is part of his four-volume treatment of the political economy of American warfare beginning with the colonial era (Koistinen 1996, 1997, 1998, 2004).

Yet, while he assigns importance to US industrial results, Koistinen articulates a clear revisionist manifesto.

Viewed in gross figures and in isolation, the American production effort during World War II appears impressive ... From these or similar figures has grown the notion of wartime "miracles of production" ... Such observations hold up only if the nation's prewar production potential and the achievements of other belligerents are ignored. (Koistinen 2004, p. 498)

For example, using a table that compares prewar and wartime industrial productivity among belligerents, Koistinen argues that US productive gains were flat, whereas several other belligerents showed productivity gains. Similar, primarily detailed econometric studies more fully develop this theme (Milward 1977; Vatter 1985; Rockoff 1998; Higgs 2006).

The greater portion of Koistinen's critique is grounded in his extensive treatment of the interactions among institutions and leaders as they formulated and executed wartime economic policy. This is the arena where several important historiographic themes converge and give rise to others, which are the topics of the remainder of this chapter. First are continuities between Great Depression era New Deal politics with the wartime policy-making process embodied in the mobilization agencies, especially those that worked closely with the military. In Koistinen's view, the wartime mobilization period was characterized by the collision between what he sees as the two Great Depression-era adversaries: big business and the profit motive versus reformist New Dealers. He wrote that "beginning with NDAC [National Defense Advisory Commission], and continuing throughout the years of WPB [War Production Board], the principal mobilization agencies were torn with dissention as New Deal and corporate elements battled for control over harnessing the economy" (Koistinen 2004, pp. 9–10).

Second, intertwined with the preceding theme is the reemergence of corporatist impulses and institutions, blended with a new ingredient – close civil–military relations that will later give rise to the military-industrial complex debate. In fact, Koistinen asserts that the ongoing convergence and dynamism of civil-military relations was the most powerful of the institutional forces that drove the wartime mobilization process, of which he notes "civil-military relations, and to a lesser degree ... the quality and quantity of weaponry, were the most important [factors] in shaping the political economy of World War II" (Koistinen 2004, pp. 9–10). For posterity, the World War II weaponry is gone, but American institutions remain

changed by the political economy of World War II, in response to that period's absolute need to outproduce the nation's enemies.

One way to understand American war production better is to broaden the analysis, incorporating linkages between the Great Depression and the World War II era, particularly concerning the New Deal. In this way, many of the perceived shortcomings in American industrial mobilization can be illuminated in terms of the collision between reformist impulses carried over from the 1930s with the even more urgent victory agenda imposed by global conflict. "Modifications of the traditional picture are needed in part because we tend to think of the war as a single, undifferentiated event rather than as an unfolding historical process" (Rockoff 1998, p. 81). For example, some feel that the economic benefits of rearmament did not occur until almost the war's outbreak in 1939 (Milward 1977). Yet, early in the New Deal, Roosevelt ordered that Public Works Administration (PWA) funds be used to construct warships that had previously been authorized but not funded (Cardozier 1995; Kennedy 1999). (Several of these ships were fortunately on hand to play critical roles in early Pacific fighting. Notably, the aircraft carriers USS *Yorktown* and *Enterprise*, two of three US Navy carriers at the Battle of Midway, were constructed with WPA monies. With other ships, they held the line until war mobilization *Essex*-class carriers joined the fleet starting in mid-1943.) Although this was undertaken as a job-creation measure rather than in response to any specific military threat at the time, it illustrates that, as early as 1933, linkages between New Deal imperatives and defense emerged.

Did the war end the Depression? Popular opinion believes so. Hoopes and Brinkley agree in *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal*, citing a sentiment that must have been repeated by many at the time: "The war effort indeed ended the Great Depression. In Alabama, a black worker counted his fattened pay envelope after a week on the assembly line of a defense plant and exclaimed without the slightest intention to be unpatriotic: 'Thank God for Hitler'" (Hoopes and Brinkley 1992, p. 168). In *War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945*, Milward feels that rearmament commencing in 1940 began "to achieve ... what the New Deal had not achieved" (Milward 1977, p. 51). Others are more reserved, but still link wartime economic expansion with the end of the widespread economic distress that characterized the Depression (Weinberg 2005).

A more encompassing interpretation proposes a tighter linkage between the economic fact of the Depression and wartime mobilization (Keegan 1993; Kennedy 1999). Not only did the wartime industrial buildup and military acquisitions spell an end to the Depression. The great pool of unemployed workforce and unused industrial capacity was immediately available to start mobilization, without competition from a fully functioning economy. Kennedy contrasts this with World War I mobilization experience, when an already busy economy proved to be an obstacle to wartime requirements, then presents the complementary relationship between Depression and war. He concludes that "not only did the war rescue the American economy from the Depression; no less significant, the Depression had in turn poised the economy for phenomenally rapid conversion to war production" (Kennedy 1999, p. 618).

When it comes to the issues that have most recently engaged historians of American mobilization, those concerning the intersection of New Deal politics, expanding military roles, and big business have generated some of the most provocative writing. This discourse may well be animated by ongoing contemporary political debates

about the balance between government, reform, and free enterprise – debates echoing those that took place during the New Deal. Those debates were not suspended “for the duration” in World War II. On the contrary, they were integral to the formulation and discharge of mobilization public policy in the halls of Washington bureaucracies, in what several writers now call the “Battle of the Potomac” (Huntington 1957, p. 338; Hooks 1991).

A number of writers characterize the wartime mobilization policies as defeats for New Deal progressivism (Kennedy 1999; Koistinen 2004; Waddell 2008). Their critique generally highlights several key issues. One is the degree to which small business would have a share of the \$315 billion war budget. Another is the relaxation of antitrust regulations as a way to stimulate industrial output. Less specific but most prominent in these critiques is the placement of business executives in the highest levels of mobilization decision-making. These are often characterized, sometimes disparagingly, as “dollar-a-year” men because they declined meaningful federal pay for the duration since they were independently wealthy or remained on their corporation payrolls.

Other writers have less sympathy for perceived attempts to sustain or even expand New Deal progressivism in the midst of global war (Hooks 1991; Carew 2010). Biographers for high-ranking civilian and military mobilization leaders, such as General Lucius Clay, Ferdinand Eberstadt, James Forrestal, General Brehon Somervell, and Robert Patterson are also prominent in this camp (J. E. Smith 1990; Dorwart 1991; Hoopes and Brinkley 1992; Ohl 1994; Eiler 1997).

How have these themes played out in the literature? Early writers weighed in with histories that emphasized the opposing views. For example, Bruce Catton, director of information for the War Production Board, wrote an insider’s account, the title of which signals his view of the dollar-a-day men: *The War Lords of Washington* (Catton 1948). Economist Eliot Janeway, whose *The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II*, a postwar history of the mobilization struggle, characterized Catton’s piece as: “a sincere and idealistic indictment of the Government [sic] for failing to use the war crisis to make our industrial machine more responsive to the needs of democracy” (Janeway 1951, p. 364). Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s biography, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (Stimson and Bundy 1947), sheds light on the vexing character of wartime Washington politics that carried over from a bitterly contentious peacetime. Concerning the ongoing struggle between New Dealers and their congressional opponents on the right,

Stimson would have found it hard to decide which angered him most, the congressional rear guard which looked at every wartime act through the distorted lenses of a rancorous mistrust, or the self-righteous ideologists who had multiplied around the President in the brave new years after 1933 and who now could not understand that the natural enemy was in Germany and Japan, not in Wall Street or among the brass hats. (Stimson and Bundy 1947, p. 471)

Similarly, Kennedy observes that the “deeply held beliefs” about New Deal progress carried over into the mobilization period, nurturing suspicions that industry would use their new power to roll back recent reforms (Kennedy 1999, pp. 429–430). According to Koistinen’s analysis, American business fully intended to use its

rehabilitated status to “tighten its hold on American society” (Koistinen 2004, p. 9). In fact, Koistinen generally sees New Deal reformism as the victim of resurrected big business influence, as wartime imperatives shifted the agenda from Depression-era reform concerns to wartime growth. He feels that the early War Production Board should have given more weight to small business, labor, and New Dealers so as to “tap the nation’s full economic potential” (Koistinen 1984, pp. 95–96).

Kennedy frames the debate in terms of the New Deal’s pursuit of “economic security and social equity” versus production, “expansion, not stability” (Kennedy 1999, p. 623). In *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership*, a sympathetic analysis of Eberstadt and Forrestal, Jeffery Dorwart (1991) paints a starker picture of the conflict, couched in terms of entrenched attitudes and personalities. “Vice-President Henry Wallace and Leon Henderson, head of the Office of Price administration, and other staunch New Dealers insisted that the introduction of people like Forrestal into the government united reactionary businessmen, the military, and ‘economic royalists,’ who would attempt to remove federal antitrust laws and regulations.” For their part, the dollar-a-year corporate executives brought into the war mobilization agencies to lend their executive expertise to the war effort felt that the New Dealers were “disruptive.” The “dollar-a-year types thought of themselves as patriots sent to unite diverse economic interests behind the mobilization program” (Dorwart 1991, pp. 31, 32).

Two of the most recent commentators on the conflict line up on opposing sides. Steve Waddell’s *Toward the National Security State: Civil–Military Relations during World War II* accuses the collective civilian upper management of the US military mobilization effort – Patterson, Forrestal, and Eberstadt, among others – of being “implacably hostile to the reform dimension of the New Deal.” Those wartime leaders were suspicious that “New Dealers were simply using the defense emergency to extend and expand their push for social reform and for expanded government authority over the private sector” (Waddell 2008, p. 29). On the other hand, in *Becoming the Arsenal: The American Industrial Mobilization for World War II, 1938–1942*, Michael Carew repeats the argument, but with players and positions reversed. About the leadership of the Supply Priorities Allocation Board, chaired by New Dealer Vice President Henry Wallace, Carew writes that “there was a gravitational pull of ambitious and politically sensitive government civil servants to this new and promising government activity. Among these were former New Deal officials, who saw government management as a continuation of the reforms of the 1930s” (Carew 2010, p. 189).

The “Battle of the Potomac” was by no means a stalemate. A number of recent historians have written about the role of the military in the important home front struggle to arm, equip, and sustain Allied forces. In this group’s view, military leadership was disinterested in promoting reform, much less controlling the US economy, focusing instead on their statutory obligation to win the war (Millett and Maslowski 1994; Ohl 1994; Gropman 1996; Eiler 1997).

The enduring issue of civil–military relations in the context of US war mobilization also has engaged a number of recent scholars (Hooks 1991; Koistinen 2004; Waddell 2008; Carew 2010). Koistinen sees the alliance between the military and business during the war as the fulcrum in changing the balance of power from New Dealers to business, and in suspending reform at least “for the duration.” He wrote that

"corporate America succeeded in bending the reformers and professionals to its will. It did so only with the crucial support and clout of the armed services ... Modified civil-military relations of World War II, therefore, helped neutralize reform to the benefit of both the corporate and the military worlds" (Koistinen 2004, pp. 9-10).

Waddell's critique goes beyond accepting the military's single focus on victory, implying that the high-ranking officers responsible for procurement and supply were more than indifferent to New Deal impulses.

The military services were insulated from most popular pressures and aloof from the New Deal political coalition; unlike the New Dealers they had no agenda for challenging corporate power and influence through their management of mobilization. In fact, as historian Albert Blum has noted, "Army and Navy planners ... inevitably lined up with the opponents of the New Deal." (Waddell 2008, p. 28)

In *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life*, Jean Smith offers a substantial and nuanced interpretation countering Waddell's liberal critique that the military leadership was inherently hostile to New Dealers. In her view, the nation was fortunate to have high-ranking officers who not only had mastered the intricacies of managing large civil works programs during the Depression, but had forged close working relationships with key Roosevelt administration leaders. She observes that

by mid-1942 the Army leadership was completely in step with the Roosevelt administration. From General Marshall down, the Army's high command had worked with the New Deal, trusted it – and in turn were trusted by it. ...[Generals Marshall, Somervell, and Clay] were as much a part of Roosevelt's political team as Morgenthau and Hopkins. In the later squabbles the Army had with Donald Nelson and the War Production Board, the simple military-civilian dichotomy does not fit. For the fact was that Marshall, Somervell, and Clay were usually closer to the White House, and certainly closer to Hopkins and Morgenthau, than Nelson and the WPB. (J. E. Smith 1990, p. 15)

Other key military figures were well-placed to perform their parts in the nation's mobilization effort. Admiral Land, who as head of the US Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration, oversaw the construction and management of over 5,000 transports and tankers, was unusually effective, according to Koistinen. "Few wartime agencies equaled the high quality of the War Shipping Administration" (Koistinen 2004, p. 510). While professional qualifications were important for all such positions, in wartime Washington effectiveness often derived from access to Roosevelt. Lane observes: "Another reason for the dominating position which Admiral Land held as the Commission's chairman from 1938 to 1946 was the close personal relationship between him and President Roosevelt. Their friendship had begun in the Navy Department some twenty-five years earlier" (Lane 1951, p. 12). Lane also notes that Lewis Douglas, in direct charge of the War Shipping Administration was likewise a Roosevelt intimate.

The fact is that the military, responsible for winning a war, did not credit New Deal reformism as relevant to that endeavor. In *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski present a representative rebuttal to critics such as Waddell, Koistinen, and Blum. "The War and Navy Departments tended to favor the business point of view, since they wanted

industry to provide the weapons of war as quickly as possible in enormous quantities, and they believed that reform of the American economy would inhibit the war effort” (Millett and Maslowski 1994, p. 430). Nonetheless, the 1930s New Deal overlapped into the US economy’s wartime redirection towards massive military production, as we have seen in the foregoing.

In like fashion, the war production effort extended *beyond* the war years in many ways. Most of the wartime ammunition plants and munitions depots have proven to be adequate into the twenty-first century. American armed forces, and those of many allied nations, retained various World War II weapons and items of ammunition into the early Vietnam War era. Likewise, substantial numbers of World War II warships formed an important, but decreasing component of US naval power, into the early 1970s. As for air power, swift technological advances rendered almost the entire wartime air arsenal obsolete, much of it the moment the airplanes rolled off the assembly lines. In a strange reprise of the previously mentioned wartime photos that show endlessly long assembly lines, one of the most enduring photographic images of aviation productive plenty depicts square miles of warplanes blanketing postwar surplus disposal centers, waiting to be melted down as scrap.

After the war, the dozens of wartime mobilization agencies quickly folded up and ceased to exist. The final production superagency, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, faded into the Office of Temporary Controls, abolished in 1947. More durable domestic political changes wrought by the war took root beyond victory in 1945. In *Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac*, Gregory Hooks presents the irony of New Deal economic interventionist impulses having set the stage for the future military-industrial complex, by conditioning the body politic to accept close government–industry ties. He notes that “although [the New Deal’s] social democratic agenda was abandoned as a consequence of the mobilization, it left a legacy of policy tools and institutional resources that affected the post-war period. These tools and resources, however, were permanently transferred to national security agencies” (Hooks 1991, p. 1).

A number of writers see the wartime era as the incubator for today’s “military-industrial” complex (MIC) (Nash 1979; Hooks 1991; Koistinen 2004; Waddell 2008). The MIC is widely decried, echoing President Eisenhower’s cautionary invention of the term itself. However, some scholars grant its wartime utility. Gerald Nash’s *The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America, 1933–1945* sees the period not only as the genesis of the MIC, but of the “organizational society.” As for the alliance between government and the corporations, “it led to a phenomenal production record” (Nash 1979, p. 134). Koistinen too, not a friendly critic of close military partnership with industry, wrote that “[during the cold war] as during World War II, [the military-industrial] complex operated to the immediate economic benefit of most within the society. In the long run, however, it created profound problems for America” (Koistinen 2004, p. 515).

Koistinen has devoted his scholarly life to studying the political economy of American wartime, so it is fitting to give him the penultimate word on US World War II production. He wrote that

The intense and ongoing tumult of World War II mobilization was not about how to harness the economy for war. On the basis of World War I and interwar developments,

the nation in 1940, unlike the nation in 1915, knew what it had to do. Instead, the unending strife of World War II mobilization involved struggles for power and position among interest groups and classes. (Koistinen 2004, p. 10)

However, "That it worked as well as it did is perhaps the marvel" (Gropman 1996, p. 136).

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CHAPTER FIFTY-TWO

Generating American Combat Power in World War II

EDWARD G. MILLER

The United States in mid-1944 stepped up its global offensive against the Axis homeland. By mid-September, troops of the First Army, exhausted from the pursuit across France and Belgium, were fighting inside Germany a few miles from the ancient imperial city of Aachen. Bombers and fighters of the Army Air Forces hammered oil refineries, marshaling yards, and other industrial targets across Germany. Thousands of miles to the east, Army Air Forces engineering units in the Marianas were laying out the big airfields that would house the B-29 bomber offensive against Japan's home islands. GIs and marines were recovering from capture of Saipan, Guam, and other islands. Naval aircraft hit the Philippines in preparation for the upcoming invasion of Leyte.

Each of these operations, and hundreds more like them, were at the end of supply lines that extended around the globe, connecting factories in the continental United States with the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, China, the Caribbean, Africa, the Mediterranean, and northwest Europe. Conducting and sustaining global combat operations required synchronization of elements as diverse as military strategy and materiel requirements, industrial production, mining of raw materials, troop unit activations, naval research and development, government regulations, the labor supply, and business needs. Military personnel did not need to know the details, but their survival often depended on how well the government and industry integrated all of these elements. A basic understanding of how the US generated and deployed combat power is at least as important as knowing how the military employed it.

The battlefield story of World War II is without a doubt the best-documented event in history. Less well known are the details of industrial mobilization, materiel requirements determination, military production, and supply. In fact, there is no comprehensive single volume history of the battlefield impact of American logistics in World War II, and students of the conflict must work hard to mine the very limited inventory of secondary sources of information, most of which are decades old. The lack of research, particularly into the vital areas of military supply, maintenance, and

transportation, and the lack of interest in these topics among scholars, means that there is not a lot of debate on issues, though there is some room for it. On the other hand, the larger political/military policy issues have received some more recent attention and there is some debate on the Roosevelt administration's approach to organizing the national economy for war. Following is a brief review of the more important sources behind the story of how American military and industrial planners estimated the mix of ground, air, and sea forces to carry out strategic plans.

As impressive as they are, numbers tell only part of the story. Between 1939 and 1945, the US Army, including the Air Forces, grew from 190,000 personnel to nearly 8 million; the navy and Marine Corps grew from 145,000 to over 3 million (Gropman 1997). Most of the army's limited fleet of combat vehicles was already obsolescent when the war began in Europe in 1939. While the air arm had developed many modern designs, mass production capacity was almost nonexistent. The navy's inventory of auxiliary ships (repair, tug, troop transport, etc.) and smaller combat ships such as destroyers was equally inadequate. Specialized landing ships and smaller landing craft did not exist. Neither the War nor the Navy Department headquarters were organized to plan and direct worldwide operations of the scope necessary to fight and win the war. Staff bureaus entrenched in Washington for a century or more controlled the day-to-day business of both departments and they freely exercised a vast amount of political power. The New Deal government under Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly had the will to organize production efforts and allocate resources nationally, but it also faced a host of political constraints regarding an acceptable level of central direction of the economy. Months after the war began in Europe, America remained unwilling to commit itself to anything but partial mobilization.

There is no better place to begin than the work of Paul A. C. Koistinen, whose study of "the political economy of American warfare" resulted in two definitive volumes that cover the period 1920–1945. Koistinen's groundbreaking work is important particularly for its discussion of the impact of national politics on the organization and operations of the American military and the private sector. He shows clearly that the military did not function in a vacuum; rather, the army and navy administrative bureaucracies often dealt directly with Congress, bypassing service headquarters and the executive branch. Koistinen is also correctly critical of military's interwar institutional resistance to change. He points out in the first volume (Koistinen 1998) applicable to this discussion that the army's utterly chaotic World War I mobilization experience led to legislation in 1920 that sought to prevent its supply bureaus "from disrupting future economic mobilization" (Koistinen 1998, p. 5). This important bill, known as the National Defense Act of 1920 strengthened the purchasing oversight authority of the Assistant Secretary of War (ASW) and authorized him to initiate and supervise army procurement and industrial mobilization planning. Yet it was only on the eve of World War II that Congress provided the necessary administrative machinery to support the ASW. The chief of staff of the army throughout the interwar years exercised more real power than the civilian ASW because the chief of staff controlled the War Department's general staff and he also had some oversight of the virtually independent supply bureaus. Supervisory authority for the navy's requirements planning and procurement was also divided among its old-line and politically powerful supply and administrative bureaus, plus the chief of naval operations and the assistant secretary of the navy (ASN). To complicate interservice coordination further, the

army and navy had different approaches to supply planning. The navy was always mobilized in the sense that it had statutory authority through the constitution to maintain a standing active-duty fleet. It was therefore almost always ready to undertake overseas operations. Navy Department leadership preferred to develop very specific war plans and to spend time on practical challenges such as ship design, weapons development, and readiness. The War Department faced a very different challenge since the regular army/air force was so small. Its leaders would depend on the National Guard (the legislatively authorized reserve force) and a draft to furnish most of its combat power. Koistinen (1998) also argues that the development of multiple contingency plans complicated the War Department's ability to focus the efforts of its limited staff. On the other hand, the army had a broader perspective than the navy on concerns such as industrial mobilization and materiel requirements planning.

Alan Gropman of the National Defense University generally agrees with Koistinen, and together, they offer the most complete and relatively recent studies, particularly on the politics and economics behind production and mobilization. Gropman edited a multi-author work (1997) that appeared before Koistinen's books cited here, but he relied on the latter's earlier published research to frame his discussion on the limitations of interwar efforts to improve procurement planning. Other authors in this volume provide a very good and thorough discussion of a wider range of related topics.

Gropman argues that the Army-Navy Munitions Board, created in 1922, sought to coordinate the demand for common-use supplies and munitions required by both branches of the military. Unfortunately, the Board had no operating budget (the lifeblood of Washington, DC) until the eve of World War II. It did sponsor industrial mobilization planning work and assisted service efforts to compile lists of strategic raw materials. The 1920 legislation mentioned above also authorized the army to establish its Industrial College, an institution to train officers from all the services in industrial mobilization processes and organization. Gropman identified an undercurrent of intent to educate officers in the actual control of industry and concluded that "the notion of the army completely directing industry in the United States strikes one as arrogance at worst and naïve at best." Gropman adds that it was "symbolic of the suspicion which soldiers held for businessmen" (Gropman 1997, pp. 5–14). He appears to treat the Industrial College less kindly than does Koistinen (1998), who correctly mentions its importance as a key element of the interwar mobilization planning bureaucracy.

Interwar army plans hinged on the concept of a congressionally designated Mobilization Day, or M-Day –the date at which Congress would presumably either declare war or allow the President to mobilize the National Guard. On M-Day, both the War and Navy Departments would begin to let contracts and increase production at their own manufacturing arsenals, which, due to their limited capacity, were little more than incubators of production and engineering expertise. As technology grew more complex between the world wars, the risks of beginning production upon declaration of war or emergency became more apparent. Speaking to an Army Industrial College class in 1937, the army's chief of ordnance, Maj. Gen. William H. Tschappat, highlighted the importance of what many might consider mundane objects – machine tools, metal presses, jigs, and fixtures. Military requirements called for significantly more precision than that required for civilian products. Even the obsolescent M-1903 Springfield rifle required 103 different metal dies; 463 jigs and fixtures; 506 cutting

tools, and over two thousand working and inspection gauges. Such equipment had to be on hand before weapons production could start. The inherent problems with initiating production on M-Day were apparent, but at the time, the military could do little to change the practice. Tschappat also noted that the army and navy had an estimated requirement of 427,000 tons of explosive propellants on M-Day. The entire domestic production capacity in 1937 was only 5,100 tons per year (Tschappat 1937). The general referred to powder, not finished rounds of ammunition, but it is interesting to compare this estimate to the more than 203,000 tons of ammunition consumed in a single month in early 1945 by the US 12th and 6th Army Groups in Europe (SHAEP 1945).

The 1937 Tschappat lecture and SHAEP G-4 study mentioned above are examples of an increasing amount of primary source material available via the Internet. The National Defense University (of which the Industrial College of the Armed Forces is now a part) publishes many transcripts of guest speaker presentations online, beginning with 1924. These accounts give valuable insight on decision-making and also often shed light on personal relationships and politics. The army's Combined Arms Research Library currently offers well over a thousand primary source operational documents related to World War II alone.

The wartime director of the US Employment Service, John J. Corson (1947), told Industrial College students that as late as spring 1940, there were still nearly 8 million unemployed with another 45 million persons employed in industry and 8 million in agriculture. Just over four years later, there were 65 million in the labor force and another 11.8 million in uniform. Ten million new workers were employed and millions more had changed industry or shifted from agriculture to production jobs. The void in the pool of available labor caused by the expansion of the armed forces (including the Coast Guard) and the addition of jobs directly related to war industries, enabled most of the prewar unemployed to find work if they wanted it. The US government itself hired about 1.5 million civilian employees, many dedicated to managing the war effort or working for the uniformed services. Those in the military, federal government, and private sector producing goods directly related to the war totaled about 18 million by 1945. Yet Corson did not believe the country managed its workforce well. A local draft board, for example, might defer a prospective soldier or sailor with a particular family situation, and to fill the draft quota, they might substitute a skilled employee of an essential industry such as copper mining. Substituting unskilled labor for skilled industrial employees was common, though the specific impact of the practices on the battlefield is hard to determine. This is one example of a topic that might deserve scholarly attention.

Domestic politics also drove the pace of the nation's preparations for war. John D. Millett of Columbia University candidly reminded officers at the re-designated Industrial College of the Armed Forces that "I think Mr. Roosevelt, under the circumstances of 1940 and with a presidential election coming in November, did not dare to suggest that this country was committed to war. I think such action would have created the impression, and that he was determined to avoid that impression." Millett, a member of the Army Service Forces staff during the war, believed that domestic political reasons in part caused the emergency apparatus set up to control the war effort to become "big, sprawling [and] wasteful." It "touched every part of government, not just the military and State Department" (Millett

1950, p. 15). Gropman (1997) might agree with this assessment. Only after President Roosevelt assembled a team in which he was confident, and when war was a stark reality, could he drive ahead with the necessary prewar planning.

One positive example of federal involvement that had a direct impact on the deployment and supply of the forces abroad was the War Shipping Administration (WSA). The merchant fleet was a major element of the nation's ability to project and sustain combat power. Trade and economics drove interwar development of the fleet and the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Shipyard capacity grew significantly between 1938 and 1943, with cargo vessel production doubling annually after 1940. The pre-World War II Merchant Marine Act and simplification of the building process contributed to the vast expansion of the fleet. This included elimination of features that did not directly affect the efficiency of the ship, worker training enhancements, efficient use of subcontractors and suppliers, and maximizing the capacity of both private and government yards. The WSA was a success story in that it controlled allocation of space and priority of effort in conjunction with the British. The WSA did not control the ships operated by the navy and the army (whose transportation corps operated a sizable specialized fleet), but it did help ensure efficient use of the space available within all parts of the maritime fleet (Koistinen 2004, pp. 254–258).

Estimating the battlefield impact of the highest levels of domestic politics is, on one hand, relatively easy. One can declare with some certainty that these considerations directly affected the timing of decisions relating to procurement planning, contracting, and production. The detailed impact is harder to estimate. Again, we must turn to the two most widely known scholars. Gropman (1997), like Koistinen (2004), is critical of the achievements of the wartime production effort, noting that the US GDP grew by only 52 percent from 1939 to 1944. Since munitions output was virtually nonexistent in 1939, a significant increase in production should be expected, not necessarily celebrated. These authors ask why the accomplishments were not greater, especially since excess national capacity simultaneously enabled growth in consumer spending. Comparing the US record with that of allies and enemies, they note that the American advantage in raw materials, transportation infrastructure, and technology should have led to even greater production achievements. This assessment is probably accurate, but one must also ask whether more government direction of the private sector, and especially military involvement, would have been counterproductive, if not politically unacceptable. This is a topic that probably requires more investigation, and those interested should also begin with Koistinen's 2004 work, which is the only single-author, comprehensive study of the US World War II mobilization process.

Researchers must dig deep to glean the details of the lower (within the military departments) levels of decision-making and events that affected battlefield operations. Primary sources such as the Army Industrial College lectures cited here are a rich source of information on production manpower, recruitment and training, industrial design and a host of other complex systems and processes at the military departmental level. Other authors in Gropman's study (1997) discuss economics, infrastructure, and joint (army/navy) logistics in the Pacific. The most detailed discussion on weapons production and service-specific military/industrial relations is found in the aging, but still reliable "official" histories by the army that cover the Technical Services

(Ordnance, Quartermaster, Corps of Engineers, etc.). Some of these studies are mentioned below as suggestions for further reading. The army air force's equivalent study on the topic, titled *Men and Planes*, also remains the basic source for understanding aircraft production, aircrew training, and logistics. Regrettably, there is no similar detailed series covering navy and Marine Corps approaches to these topics. Missing even from the army and air forces studies is discussion of the personal relationships between key military officials both in Washington and in the field (keep in mind that many of the key personnel were still alive when the official histories appeared). The best study of this kind is Ohl's (1994) biography of General Brehon B. Somervell, who led the massive Army Service Forces organization. Ohl's study broke new ground in that it detailed the influence on wartime strategy and operations of a non-combat arms leader.

Also having an impact on battlefield performance are the specific processes involved in calculation of materiel and personnel requirements needed to implement military strategy. Pre-World War II legislation, such as that mentioned above, set the peacetime composition of the armed forces. The 1940 legislation that mobilized the National Guard and enacted the draft drove wartime supply and materiel requirements for which the army (including the air forces) began to let contracts well before Pearl Harbor. Yet because military strategy developed over time, most requirements were simply unavailable early on to government coordinating agencies such as the War Production Board and also to industry.

Pending new research, Coakley and Leighton's exhaustive 1968 study remains the best source for information on the challenges faced by the army and navy in putting combat power in the hands of the theater commanders. A combat fleet was inherently deployable to any theater. Army leadership, on the other hand, wanted to create a pool of different types of units from which a theater commander might tailor a specific force to meet the requirements of an individual campaign.

Coakley and Leighton also present a concise review of the Army Supply Program (ASP), which was the basic planning document used by the War Department staff to estimate ground and air materiel requirements, plus those common items the army procured for the navy. With limited exceptions both services used the same tanks, trucks, small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, and ammunition. One can imagine the level of effort required to accomplish these calculations for literally hundreds of thousands of items using only adding machines and slide rules, plus the earliest electronic computing machinery. Coakley and Leighton (1968) correctly remind readers that estimates had to account for the equipment and supplies necessary to organize and train units, maintain operations in combat zones, replace combat losses, and to stock the global supply "pipeline." Estimates passed through the War Production Board to industry, which synchronized production schedules to the schedules of unit activation and overseas movement. These plans in turn hinged on the availability of cargo ships. Industrial output peaked in 1943, when emphasis shifted from front-loading the pipeline with sheer volume, to a focus on previously neglected equipment such as heavy cargo trucks.

Another example of the value of Coakley and Leighton's work is that it points out that mid-war production difficulties did not originate from a lack of capacity (recall Gropman) as much as from the inability to maintain a skilled and dependable labor

pool and the complex processes involved in moving raw materials to the factories. For example, an inadequate supply of finished aluminum rather than a shortage of aluminum ingots slowed aircraft production early on. Finally, the authors recall that the navy challenged the army's 1941 Victory Program and follow-on estimates that it needed over eight million personnel for both ground and air forces. The navy maintained that even if the manpower figures were accurate, there would not be enough shipping to move a 100-division army and accompanying air forces. Further, the navy needed the manpower. Thus production and logistics, not strategy, drove the mid-war decision to cap military strength.

In another insightful lecture available online through the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. Leroy Lutes, wartime Director of Operations of the Army Service Forces, in 1947 acknowledged the limitations of interservice cooperation. He added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee system was inefficient, as were separate War and Navy Department procurement processes and the failure to institute all possible common interservice equipment design standards. The army had two (air and ground) separate and very large logistical organizations with many redundancies. While the War Department gave theater commanders wide latitude on the conduct of operations under the strategic direction of Allied leadership, it did not force them to adopt standard logistic organizations and methods – the army had over 150 different types of service units by the end of the war. Centralization in early 1942 of the army's separate supply arms and services (Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps, Corps of Engineers, Medical Department, Signal Corps, etc.) through creation of the Army Service Forces (ASF) was partially successful, though it never led to full implementation of uniform procedures. Lutes made at least three other presentations to the Industrial College, and they are all a valuable source of "insider" information. Robert H. Connery's unique study of the navy and industrial mobilization covers equally important ground (Connery 1951). Though dated, it remains the best single volume secondary source for the Navy Department's industrial mobilization and strategic logistics accomplishments. Connery sets the achievements (addition of ten battleships, 18 aircraft carriers, 10 heavy cruisers, and 82,000 landing craft of various sizes) into the context of bureaucratic reorganization and business process adjustment. The department spent some \$13 billion (1944 dollars) on ordnance alone, and made \$90 billion in total expenditures (or about \$1.2 trillion 2010 dollars). As with the War Department, independent bureaus early on often gave only lip service to the desires of the operational admirals. A congressionally mandated reorganization of the Navy Department strengthened the power of the secretary of the navy and (mirroring the army's experience after World War I) made the undersecretary of the navy responsible for coordinating materiel and logistics activities. The chief of naval operations became responsible for determining materiel and manpower requirements, fleet readiness, and many support functions.

Connery goes on to provide examples of the problems confronting the reorganized Navy Department's placement of important contracts. Dupont, Bethlehem Steel, and General Motors received a very large percentage of contracts while many of the thousands of other manufacturers that could meet at least one navy materiel requirement received no prime contracts. While such practices led to underutilization of national plant capacity, they might also have saved money and time when large prime contractors used local vendors to reduce shipping costs for component items and

assemblies. Perhaps careful study of sources such as this and the primary source material available through government agencies will lead to new conclusions about the efficiency of the US production effort.

Connery's discussion of the impact of combat on decisions regarding the composition of the fleet, and thereby, production, is equally insightful. Early fleet actions in the Pacific (for example, the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea), clearly demonstrated the primacy of the aircraft carrier over the battleship. This led to postponement and ultimately cancelation of contracts for five *Montana* class "super-battleships" and reduction in a program for *Alaska*-class heavy cruisers in order to release manpower and production capacity for construction of new aircraft carriers of the *Essex* class. Connery also points out the impact of concurrent development of strategy with decisions on weapons design, production, and requirements determination. For example, the decisions reached at Tehran in late 1943 not only set the target date for a second front in Europe, but also drove an immediate increase in the schedule for producing landing ships. Here is perhaps another alternative argument regarding the American production record. Plant utilization, while an important measure of efficiency, was under the circumstances of a wartime emergency arguably less important than meeting overseas needs.

Writing in Gropman's 1997 anthology, Hugh Conway and James E. Toth offer additional valuable commentary on naval expansion which they argue began in the mid-1930s with legislation that permitted construction of new ships within the limits imposed by the Washington and London treaties. Naval shipyard capacity between 1939 and 1942 increased from ten yards and 46 ways capable of turning out large oceangoing vessels, to 70 yards with 330 large capacity ways in the US alone. A vital overseas base program included design of prefabricated building components that could be rapidly shipped and assembled in austere environments. By 1943, the navy had about 200 standardized designs for barracks, hospitals, warehouses, communications facilities, aircraft hangars, ammunition magazines, and floating dry docks. Engineering plans existed for roads and utilities, with estimates for construction materials and the manpower required to build them. The Bureau of Medicine could estimate in great detail the construction material required for several types of hospitals and clinics. Plans such as these enabled accurate estimations for equipment (sawmills, rock crushers, or asphalt plants) and related materials for base construction.

Conway and Toth also link both army and navy overseas base construction efforts to the origins of campaign planning concepts still used by the US military. The sheer magnitude of overseas operations forced the military to move some aspects of centralized planning from Washington to the theaters of operation. These plans, not necessarily those made in Washington, DC became the tools for coordinating the production and transportation schedules, which in turn all but dictated the timing of offensive operations around the world.

Finally, Conway and Toth remind us that the army faced a significant problem in aligning its US-based installation construction program with the arrival of the troops mobilized for combat training. This program was also hurried in design and implementation. In the fifteen months between enactment of the draft and mobilization of the National Guard in September 1940, and Pearl Harbor, contractors built housing for 1.5 million troops and completed 42 new airfields, including housing and technical facilities such as hangars and shops.

Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, the wartime Chief of Ordnance, in 1946 published a unique first-hand view of the army's work in design, development, production, and field support of weapons, including combat and other automotive vehicles such as trucks, artillery, and ammunition. The Ordnance Department also managed a network of contracting offices, supply storage depots, and training programs for the hundreds of thousands of soldiers performing ammunition supply, weapons, fire control, and automotive maintenance functions. Campbell argues that the Department's prewar mobilization planning work enabled it to quickly and significantly expand its industrial production and contract management capacity during the war. No doubt Campbell had personal reasons to ensure his side of the logistics story reached the public, but the lack of scholarly documentation of these events makes this a source of information that remains valuable today. One example of an important but rarely discussed topic is his review of the Department's rapid decentralization of contracting, research, and development functions to its regional offices. This sped up the identification of sources of supply, contract negotiation, quality control inspections, and vendor payment processing. Campbell's discussion of contractor-operated ammunition plants and the general contract management and production support that the army provided the Navy Department for commonly used items is also a valuable insight into how the US prosecuted the war. (The navy's comparable organization was the Bureau of Ordnance. It was responsible for contracting for and/or producing itself, naval guns, specific ammunition and propellants, armor, and related equipment.)

General Campbell (1946) also emphasized the importance of the government incentivizing the private sector to be a willing, not forced, participant in the industrial mobilization and production effort. Campbell recalled that many business leaders were understandably reluctant to risk large amounts of capital in financing the expansion of plant capacity with very limited, if any, peacetime application, such as facilities for production of large-caliber ammunition. He also discussed actions that gained the willing cooperation of business, such as changes in tax laws to expedite the write off of costs, and creation of the Defense Plant Corporation, which enabled the government to build specialized manufacturing facilities operated by the private sector. The Ordnance Department initiated a program that led to financing construction of 73 specialized plants at a cost of \$3 billion (approximately \$42 billion in 2010).

Thompson and Mayo (1960) also surveyed the prewar state of US armaments – the army in 1940 had fewer anti-aircraft guns than the British had emplaced around London – in their exhaustive history of ordnance procurement and supply. Again, we have a dated, but still authoritative account that remains the basis for discussion of US ground forces weapons development between the wars. Their discussion of the manufacturing record notes that by the end of the war, the Ordnance Department had designed 60 types of artillery weapons and managed production of 750,000 pieces with 40,000 different parts. These were complex items, built to extremely close tolerances in both the gun and sighting equipment. In the case of the 155 mm gun, contracts for the carriage and limber went to locomotive, railroad passenger car, and earth moving equipment manufacturers. A contract for the recoil mechanism went to an elevator company because of its experience in producing complex hydraulic components. Fire control (sighting) contracts went to firms specializing in

cameras, microscopes, and the mass production of other precision devices. A steel mill equipment manufacturer produced the cannon itself.

Thompson and Mayo also reviewed the tank production record and do not make excuses for the comparative quality deficiencies of US armored fighting vehicles and their later war German counterparts. A reader carefully reviewing their facts will find that army politics as well as engineering technology influenced vehicle design. Ordnance had a very limited budget between the wars, and produced only 33 new tanks through 1935. The army had only 1,000 in its inventory in 1940. Heavy manufacturing corporations could not meet the demand for both combat vehicles and artillery, and the automobile industry became involved in both armored vehicle production and in helping the army with standardizing component parts and spares among many subcontractors. This was important in that the US needed numbers quickly. The tanks had to be reliable, useful across the globe, and relatively easy to transport by cargo ship. US manufacturing executives knew the capabilities and quality standards of the likely subcontractors and vendors, and they also knew how to schedule the production of complex equipment. Their cooperation with the Ordnance Department's automotive contracting, R&D, and production operations enabled the army to purchase and manage about 600,000 different combat and tactical vehicle parts and manufacture nearly 86,000 tanks and over 2 million cargo trucks. Thompson and Mayo do not discuss the national level scope of utilization of plant capacity and related production issues mentioned above. Still, their discussion of the situation and the accomplishments leads one to acknowledge that despite the inefficiencies and bureaucratic wrangling, the American effort was an impressive one.

Students of the navy's wartime effort have even less information available to them than the person interested in ground and air forces developments. The higher-level study by Connery mentioned above is basic to understanding the navy-industry relationship, and a complimentary study, also dated but valuable is Duncan S. Ballantine's cited below as a suggestion for further reading. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent to the army's detailed histories covering the production and logistics pipeline. The best source is Rear Admiral W. R. Carter's studies of fleet logistics support in the Pacific and other theaters. Carter's volume on the Pacific (1953) provides critical analysis of organizational and command problems, though it may be difficult for some readers unfamiliar with naval organization to follow. Carter argues that the navy did not achieve a good combat/support ship balance in the Pacific until well into World War II, and no doubt this was a reflection of the service's action-oriented culture as opposed to a more balanced institutional view of the importance of logistical support. Nevertheless, the navy knew it had a problem on its hands and it organized the Service Force, Pacific Fleet, which itself received valuable support from the War Shipping Administration/Merchant Marine, particularly from the civilian fuel tanker fleet. Carter uses at-sea refueling as an example of the complexity of maritime logistics. At-sea refueling was a dangerous process occupying large (75×25 mile) zones in the open ocean, and occurring on designated dates and times. Fuel tankers arriving from forward bases, Pearl Harbor or directly from the US, rendezvoused with the battle fleet, refilled their oil bunkers, and then departed. Carter also argues that the navy eventually organized a very comprehensive approach to combat support. The Pacific Fleet for example established firefighting schools and refined

procedures for evacuating casualties from ships to base hospitals located in New Zealand and Australia. It identified the need for specialized oceangoing salvage tugs that ultimately prevented loss of ships that could not maneuver on their own. Salvage procedures improved to a state by 1944 that even heavily damaged ships were recovered and repaired either in theater or temporarily repaired to enable them to reach Pearl Harbor or bases in the continental United States.

Although building heavy repair shops overseas consumed resources that might have gone toward other priorities, they also reduced time lost for major repair. By mid-1944, facilities in the Solomon Islands repaired 261 vessels including one battleship, three light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers. Theater-based dry docks were deployed by the end of 1943; overseas fuel storage depots helped maintain a theater-based reserve and safety margin in case of temporary interdiction of shipping lanes. A base at Espiritu Santo stocked fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and even maintained cold storage for perishable food. A new fleet of oceangoing service ships built after the war began to re-stock the land bases continuously that in turn kept service ships in operation and enabled the mounting of successively larger amphibious attacks. The support organization for fleet logistics eventually included large mobile service squadrons that distributed fuel, provisions, and general stores to shore bases and the fleet. Support vessels included several hundred stores ships, barges, fuel oil tankers, hospital ships, barracks ships, tenders, tugs, repair ships, ammunition barges, water distilling ships, and floating dry docks. Naval logistics in the European theater of course involved considerably shorter distances, but were no less vital.

Details of logistical support of individual operations are even harder to come by than coverage of logistics and procurement in general. Archival sources remain the best source of information, and online primary source material should assist researchers who may be unable to visit government sites. Bridging the gap between published secondary sources and primary source records requires just a basic understanding of how planners computed logistical requirements. These sources include documents such as the March 1945 after action report by the Navy/Marine Task Force 56 covering the Iwo Jima Operation, and available online through the Army's Combined Arms Research Library (<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/CARL/>).

For example, the numbers and types of combat vehicles in an amphibious attack determined the requirement for "POL," or petroleum, oil, and lubricants. Some armored vehicles, including Marine Corps tanks, used diesel fuel, but most tanks and virtually all wheeled vehicles used gasoline. Planners considered which supply items to ship with the assault forces and what could wait until the forces were established on shore and supply dumps or ships were relatively secure from direct enemy fire. They also calculated lead time for supply ship sailings, which in turn dictated what the cargo ships carried, the quantity of a particular item of supply, how they were packed and transported (on pallets or in bulk), and even where they were placed aboard ship (priority for unloading). These supplies ranged from ammunition, to spare parts, to construction materials for bases. Logistical plans also considered hospitalization, sanitation, and medical evacuation considerations.

Water requirements varied between location, such as Italy or Saipan. The military departments also set standard resupply rates for ammunition, generally based on rounds per weapon per day. Theater commanders in turn allocated available ammunition based on the local supply status or the need to accumulate reserve stocks to

support upcoming operations. This was an especially important consideration in the Pacific due to the particularly long distances between combat forces and supporting ammunition dumps – the supply bases at Eniwetok and Saipan were 1,600 and 2,300 miles respectively from Iwo Jima. In short, the challenges were vast, if not insurmountable. The United States arguably faced a set of time and distance factors that no other nation did.

US Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean area was the command controlling all army forces participating in the late-war Central Pacific drive. It included Army Service Forces and Air Service Command units located across several hundred thousand square miles from Hawaii to Guam, Kwajalein, Saipan, Fiji, New Zealand and many other sites. Its periodic logistics report for September 1944 describes a force of 102,000 support personnel alone manning units of every type from station hospitals, weather detachments, quartermaster, ordnance ammunition supply, automotive and armaments maintenance, war dog platoons, fire fighting units, post offices, transportation truck companies, airways communications units, radio stations, bakeries, engineer construction, graves registration, and so on (Headquarters, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area 1944). Another 27,800 government civilian employees performed duties such as accounting, security, personnel management, and law enforcement. Certainly there was waste in the hurried organization of forces of this size, and overhead consumed most supplies at the same rate as the combat forces, but the functions were absolutely essential to the success of combat operations.

On the other side of the world, the Allied crossings of the Rhine in March 1945 were themselves significant operations whose success depended on manpower and materiel-intensive temporary bridging, often constructed under enemy fire. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) reported in the spring of 1945 that the US 12th Army Group and the US/French 6th Army Group had a combined “ration strength” of 1,754,315. This force, plus Army Air Forces units on the European continent, consumed 693,935 tons of supplies between February 24 and March 23, 1945. This included 133,000 tons of food and 203,000 tons of ammunition. Quartermaster units issued almost 7,000,000 gallons of fuel. The effort to maintain this forward flow of supplies from the ports of entry on the continent, through the network of road and rail transportation to “truckheads” and “railheads” required overseas movement of many more tons to keep the continental pipeline filled. Supporting each of Eisenhower’s 61 US combat divisions required about 180–212 cargo truck shipments per day, plus hundreds more to supply non-divisional units. Picture about two thousand cargo trucks per day, moving constantly just to sustain a portion of the US-supported force in the European theater (SHAEF Report, 1945). Requirements in Italy and the Mediterranean were an additional workload. This was only part of the logistical infrastructure that saw materiel shipped from domestic factories to ports such as New York, then traveling well over 3,000 miles to another port, where cargo was offloaded, and shipped a few hundred more miles to ground and air units whose locations might change on a daily basis. The US 12th Army Group alone numbered 1,259,000 in May 1945. Imagine picking up the population of a major American city, moving it 3,600 miles and keeping it supplied as it attacked Germany (G-1 (Personnel) Section, 12th Army Group 1945).

The wartime expansion of the Army Air Forces (AAF) mirrored that of the ground and service forces, and involved much more than the manufacture of aircraft. Here again, the best source is an older one, the Air Force's (AAF) version of the army's "official history." Craven and Cate (1955) note that in 1939, America's aircraft production capability was concentrated among a handful of companies. Some of them owed their existence to small government orders. Most planes were built largely by hand and despite events overseas, industry was reluctant to risk capital on plant expansion (a reflection of General Campbell's points noted above). Orders from Britain and France (before mid-1940 of course) helped finance some expansion of capacity. President Roosevelt's May 1940 request to Congress for 50,000 planes per year, was, however, not tied to any specific war plan and led to concerns in the War Department that the army's expansion would be greatly unbalanced, diverting resources from the ground and service forces. The authors also discuss requirements estimates. The AAF in 1941 estimated its overall requirements at 2.1 million personnel and 239 groups plus separate squadrons (about 63,000 planes), a figure not far from 2.4 million personnel, 243 groups, and 108 separate squadrons equipped by 1945. Infrastructure expansion was equally impressive – the AAF built over 300 bases and well over 400 gunnery and bombing ranges in the United States (Craven and Cate 1955).

Most airframe designs were set or under production by 1941, though all underwent constant modification and improvement to engines, weapons, payload, and safety equipment. These changes did not generally drive up costs because the industry by 1942 finally adopted mass production techniques that led to reduced costs and build time. For example the cost of a B-17 airframe (less engines, weapons, radios) in 1940 was \$301,000; in 1945 a significantly improved plane cost \$187,742. Man-hours to produce a B-17 fell from 35,000 in January 1943 to 18,600 a year later. The cost of a B-29 fell from \$893,000 to \$509,000 between 1943 and 1945.

The aircraft industry approached the task largely by increasing the capacity of existing plants, though the famous Ford plant at Willow Run, Michigan was a notable exception. Industry at first faced a lack of engineering and management staff, and machine tools remained in short supply into 1942. Other than the Ford plant, the most significant automotive industry contribution to aircraft production was in engines. Despite the apparent need for skilled labor, manpower was not a significant problem. Industry saw a twenty-fold increase in its workforce between 1940 and 1943, but design changes simplified construction and enabled hiring of unskilled minorities and women. Absenteeism was an issue at times, leading the AAF to complain about manpower shortages. Aluminum supply was a problem through 1942 for several reasons. The WPB blamed poor industrial management, and the AAF blamed the aluminum producers. What Craven and Cate call "the most serious fault with the whole aviation production program," was the AAF's failure early in the war to order enough spare engines and other assemblies. Fixing the problem was hard for some time because of the need to use capacity to meet orders from Britain and because of the attrition through wear and tear on planes operating in undeveloped areas (Craven and Cate 1955, p. xx).

The AAF organization for procurement and logistics management changed during the war, but in general, the Chief of the AAF was responsible to the Assistant Secretary of War for materiel procurement and production. The Air Technical Service Command,

after late 1944, was the point of contact for industry. The subordinate Materiel Command conducted research and development, and procured aircraft. The Air Service Command stored, distributed, and maintained materiel. The scope of the task and the overhead is apparent when one considers the tens of thousands of aircraft operated and maintained by 2 million personnel around the world.

The ground forces' transportation corps moved AAF supplies and equipment overseas. Air service commands in theater managed the flow to service groups (which might consist of over 1,000 personnel) and less mobile air depot groups that directly supported the aircraft units. Air service organizations performed maintenance, engineering, repair parts supply, fueling, and ammunition handling. Like the other services, the AAF put enough materiel (ranging between about 60 days of supply to 180 depending on the theater of operations) in the "pipeline" to maintain operations if sea lanes were blocked. Between January 1943 and August 1945, the AAF shipped about 19 million tons of supplies overseas, with over six million going to the European theater alone. AAF maintenance practice involved using an aggressive inspection and preventive maintenance program and to avoid downtime for overhaul. Increasing complexity lengthened the airframe and engine overhaul times over the course of the war. Production by 1944 was at a level that enabled replacement of damaged or worn aircraft. This allowed maintenance personnel to spend more time on preventive procedures and ultimately improved availability rates that in turn maintained pressure on the enemy. Still, the average useful life of an Eighth Air Force heavy bomber at the height of the European theater air war 215 days, during which the plane averaged 47 flying days, and was unavailable due to inspection or maintenance an average of 49 days. Long supply lines and intensive maintenance requirements were two reasons for the large personnel overhead within the AAF (Craven and Cate 1955).

Coordinating the effort to supply a marine rifle company mopping up resistance on Peleliu, or an artillery battalion outside Aachen, Germany was an exceptionally complex process that consumed literally millions of military and civilian government employees, and tens of millions in industry. The works cited here reflect many of the best available types of primary, secondary, and archival material that review the end to end processes of estimating national production capacity, the labor pool, contracting and financing, materiel development, transportation/distribution, and tactical resupply. Though most sources are dated, and the entire field requires a substantial amount of reflection and new research, the known record is impressive. An update of activities within the Navy Department is in order, as is a new study of impact of fleet logistics and overseas base construction on both navy and marine combat operations. The story of army logistics in the Pacific is nearly nonexistent as is the story of events in lesser-studied theaters such as China-Burma-India. Operations in New Guinea and the Philippines, for example, lasted many months and took place in austere conditions that remind one of some contingency operations today. The army's official histories remain valid for details on topics as varied as aircraft production, labor unrest at war plants, and the shortage of 5-gallon fuel cans in Europe. Likewise, the AAF history mentioned here is a valuable source, but there is still no brief, non-technical study of the direct impact of logistics on front line ground or air combat. Published sources cover one element or another of combat power generation, but none tell the end-to-end story in a single volume. This may be too much to ask, but it seems to be something worth considering. After all,

at the end of this complex chain of events were the individual soldier, airman, marine, sailor, and coast guardsman, often with little more than a shirt or field jacket between them and the enemy.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE

American Anti-Semitism during World War II

STEPHEN H. NORWOOD

Anti-Semitism was more intense during World War II and the years immediately preceding it than at any time in American history. It mounted steadily after 1890, reinforced by influxes of Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Lutheran immigrants bringing with them strong, theologically rooted anti-Jewish prejudice, and by a Protestant elite alarmed by the rising number and impact of Eastern European Jews. Severe economic distress during the Depression, along with Hitler's assumption of power in Germany in January 1933, resulted in the formation of numerous American anti-Semitic groups. Over a hundred such organizations emerged between the time Hitler became chancellor of Germany and US entry into World War II in December 1941, far more than had existed before. These groups disseminated massive amounts of anti-Semitic propaganda, some of it supplied by the Nazi regime in Germany.

American historians and Jewish studies scholars have devoted little attention to anti-Semitism in the United States during World War II. College-level American history textbooks largely ignore the subject, although Jews were systematically discriminated against in employment, housing, and admission to colleges and universities, and were frequent targets of violence and harassment. The small body of scholarship on American anti-Semitism during World War II focuses on its wartime intensification and on the indifference of the US government, the media, the military, and much of the public to European Jewry's plight as it was being annihilated. A few scholars have written on anti-Semitism in American higher education, in the army, and in the Foreign Service and State Department in the period immediately prior to World War II.

Anti-Semitic agitation unleashed violence against Jews during World War II on a scale never previously witnessed in the United States. Savage street beatings of Jews occurred with great frequency in Boston and New York. Jewish leaders in those cities described the anti-Semitic violence as "small pogroms" (Norwood 2003, p. 233). Jewish stores were vandalized and their merchandise destroyed, and synagogues and

Jewish cemeteries desecrated. Bands of Irish Catholic youths, influenced by the propaganda of Charles Coughlin's Christian Front, a leading anti-Semitic organization of the 1930s, were responsible for most of the violence.

Efforts to pressure the US government to initiate serious measures to rescue European Jewry from annihilation were undermined by the anti-Semitism that pervaded America's universities, Congress, the State Department, and the US armed forces. Although a serious American wartime effort on behalf of European Jews might have prevented the murder of several hundred thousand of them, the US government never intended to save any significant number, as David S. Wyman demonstrated in *The Abandonment of the Jews* (1984). It made no effort to lower immigration barriers, thereby denying Jews refuge in the United States. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt was finally pressured to establish the War Refugee Board in 1944 to save Jews and others targeted by the Nazis, he provided it almost no authority or financing.

The violence inflicted on Jews during World War II set them apart from every other white ethnic group. Only African Americans had consistently suffered violence on a comparable scale. Indeed, African American leaders emphasized the similarity between the wartime beatings of Jews and earlier assaults on black people. Jews were the only ethnic group that felt the need during World War II to establish organized security patrols in American cities, to protect their communities from violent attack. The Yiddish press compared these Jewish self-defense units to those established in czarist Russia to combat pogromists (Norwood 2003).

From the late 1930s through World War II, anti-Semitic bands terrorized entire Jewish neighborhoods, including Mattapan, Dorchester, and Roxbury, where most of Boston's Jews resided; Manhattan's Washington Heights; and wide areas of the Bronx and Brooklyn. Gangs of anti-Semitic youths repeatedly launched "Jew-hunting" expeditions, assaulting Jews, including children and the elderly, who often feared to venture outside to attend synagogue services. They physically mutilated some Jews, and tore the clothes off Jewish girls.

During World War II, the police and municipal and state officials generally ignored these outrages, which the non-Jewish press almost never reported prior to 1943. The largely Irish-American police, often sympathetic to Coughlinism, repeatedly denied the existence of anti-Semitic outbreaks and joined government officials in dismissing them as ordinary acts of juvenile delinquency, unrelated to anti-Semitism. The police themselves sometimes joined the marauding youth in assaulting Jews (Norwood 2003).

The contemporary "whiteness school," which asserts that American Jews after World War I rapidly acculturated to become part of a "unitary Caucasian race," does not acknowledge the pervasive anti-Semitism in the United States during the interwar period and World War II. Nor does it consider anti-Semitism qualitatively different from other forms of prejudice against southern and eastern European immigrants. Such scholars as Matthew Frye Jacobson in *Whiteness of a Different Color* (1998) and Karen Brodtkin in *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America* (1998) argue that congressional legislation in the early 1920s that severely restricted immigration from southern and eastern Europe, along with large-scale African American internal migration from the south to the north beginning during World War I, caused a sharp decline in perceptions of ethnic differences among white

people, with only black people henceforth subjected to intense prejudice. Anti-Semitism became insignificant as Jews during the interwar period came to be identified as white. The “whiteness school” asserts that even the poorest European immigrant, including Jews, having been defined as white, enjoyed racial privileges at the expense of black people.

The most influential early explanation for American anti-Semitism, advanced by John Higham in *Send These to Me* (1975), rooted it in hostility to the city that resulted from agrarian dislocation. Higham associated anti-Semitism primarily with the countryside and small towns, increasingly eclipsed by the burgeoning cities. Resentful of urban-industrial society’s economic dynamism, rural and small town folk attributed the stagnation and decline of their communities to banks’ financial manipulation, which their anti-Semitic stereotypes led them to associate with Jews. According to Higham, as the percentage of Americans residing on farms and in small towns steadily diminished and an urban population increasingly shaped Americans’ outlook and culture, anti-Semitism necessarily declined. In his explanation, Higham stressed the economic causes of anti-Semitism, ignoring its deep theological roots. He failed to link the hoary anti-Semitic image of the parasitical, deceitful, materialistic Jew with medieval Christian stereotypes, themselves rooted in the gospels (Norwood 2003).

By contrast, Leonard Dinnerstein in *Anti-Semitism in America* (1994), maintained that anti-Semitism in the United States increased during the decades preceding World War II, and he gave serious attention to its roots in Christian theology. Like John Roy Carlson in his muckraking *Under Cover* (1943), Dinnerstein emphasized the dramatic escalation of anti-Semitism during the 1930s. Demagogues sympathetic to Nazism, such as William Dudley Pelley, Gerald Winrod, and the Catholic radio priest Charles Coughlin, developed significant followings after 1933. Pelley, who formed the paramilitary Silver Shirts almost immediately after Hitler came to power, and Winrod, leader of the Defenders of the Christian Faith, were both Protestants. Like the Nazis, all three men charged Jews with directing both international communist and banking conspiracies designed to give them control of the United States. They claimed that to achieve this end, Jews engaged in financial machinations that allowed them to dominate the economy, weakening gentile resistance by undermining society’s moral fabric.

This anti-Semitic fantasy was strongly influenced by *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a turn-of-the-century forgery by the Russian czarist secret police that purported to reveal an organized Jewish plot to take over the world, allegedly launched at the first Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzerland in 1897. Auto magnate Henry Ford, during the 1920s one of the world’s wealthiest men and America’s most prominent anti-Semite, distributed massive quantities of the *Protocols* in pamphlet form and as excerpts published in his organ the Dearborn *Independent*, which attained the second highest newspaper circulation in the United States.

Directly modeled on Germany’s Nazi movement, the virulently anti-Semitic German-American Bund, founded in 1932 as Friends of the New Germany, staged numerous pro-Hitler rallies until the government banned it after US entry into World War II. The Bund spread Nazi propaganda with the assistance of German diplomats, and maintained youth camps to instill Nazi beliefs in children. It displayed particular strength in northern New Jersey and Manhattan’s Yorkville section, often called Nazi-occupied territory. Neighborhood theaters there regularly screened Nazi propaganda films from Germany.

In 1938 Coughlin launched a vituperative anti-Semitic radio campaign. During the late 1930s, his Sunday radio broadcasts over forty-seven stations reached several million listeners. Coughlin began his public anti-Semitic diatribes in 1934, charging financial manipulation by Jewish bankers had brought on the Depression. That year he invoked the stereotype of Jewish criminality, dating from the gospels, when he denounced Jewish bankers as “financial Dillingers,” associating them with the decade’s most notorious robber (Magil 1935). Coughlin’s newspaper *Social Justice*, sold in front of Catholic churches in many American cities, began publishing sections of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in 1938. The same year Coughlin published an article in *Social Justice* under his byline, much of which he plagiarized from Josef Goebbels (Strong 1941).

Soon afterward, Coughlin’s supporters founded the Christian Front, which circulated anti-Semitic and defeatist propaganda until the end of World War II. In New York the Christian Front was led by Paulist priests; its office address was that of the Paulist Fathers. The Christian Front’s following was overwhelmingly Irish Catholic. Brooklyn’s Catholic diocesan newspaper, the *Tablet*, published Coughlin’s weekly radio addresses in full, along with a considerable amount of other anti-Semitic material. In the period immediately preceding World War II, the Christian Front organized boycotts of Jewish businesses. Emulating Nazi storm troopers, its members picketed Jewish stores to enforce the boycott, shouting anti-Semitic epithets at those who entered.

The Christian Front espoused an aggressively anti-Semitic brand of isolationism. Francis Moran, leader of the Christian Front in Boston, aroused his audiences by asking, “Who are the blood suckers plotting to send our boys to die in England?” and they would yell back, “The Jews!” (Warren 1996). “Blood sucker” evoked the medieval blood libel that Jews kidnapped, tortured, and murdered Christian children, extracting their blood to mix with Passover matzo (Norwood 2003).

The Christian Mobilizers, a split-off from the Christian Front led by Joe McWilliams, adopted explicitly violent rhetoric. In many New York City neighborhoods during the late 1930s, speakers from both the Christian Front and the Christian Mobilizers delivered nightly anti-Semitic harangues on the same block. McWilliams was an ardent admirer of Hitler. Like the Christian Front, the Christian Mobilizers were composed largely of working- and lower-middle-class Irish Catholics.

During the 1930s, anti-Semitism pervaded the more affluent, better-educated sectors of the American population, including the nation’s elite colleges and universities, which helped Nazi Germany enhance its image in the United States. Heavily engaged in European affairs, the elite colleges and universities were in a position to influence significantly American opinion about the Third Reich. They provided Nazi government officials, diplomats, and visiting faculty members and students with a platform to propagandize for Hitler. America’s leading institutions of higher learning invited high Nazi officials to campus, where they delivered addresses praising the Third Reich. At the same time, university administrations severely punished students and professors who protested these invitations. Prominent American academics were flattered to accept honorary degrees from Germany’s universities, after they had expelled their Jewish faculty members and Nazified their curricula.

Until World War II began, many American colleges and universities participated in student exchange programs with Nazi Germany’s universities. Impressionable

American students returned from study in Germany extolling the Third Reich. The German universities housed them with Nazi families and enrolled them in classes taught by Nazis. The Hitler regime sent only ardent Nazis to study in the United States. They operated as propagandists for the Third Reich on American campuses. The elite Seven Sisters women's colleges spearheaded the student exchange movement with Nazi Germany, and participated in special tours of the Third Reich for American collegians that the Hitler regime organized to showcase its "achievements." Seven Sisters colleges encouraged their students to attend the virulently anti-Semitic Oberammergau Passion Play in Bavaria (Norwood 2009).

American academia's willingness to maintain student exchanges with Nazified universities is striking because only a few months after assuming power, the Nazis staged massive book burnings across the Third Reich. The book burnings reflected the Nazis' militant anti-intellectualism, which resulted in a sharp deterioration of academic standards in German universities. American university administrators were willing to send their students to study at institutions that propagated Nazi racial theories and such bizarre subjects as "Aryan physics" (Norwood 2009).

While forging friendly ties with Germany's Nazified universities, American institutions of higher learning systematically discriminated against Jewish applicants in both student admissions and faculty hiring. College administrators negatively stereotyped Jews as too focused on academics. They considered Jews too intense and lacking in the social skills of the gentleman or lady. In the period immediately following World War I, American colleges and universities, determined to restrict Jewish enrollment, began to deemphasize academic achievement in admissions. They required prospective students to state their religion, mother's maiden name, and grandparents' birthplace on the application; placed considerable weight on interviews by administrators or alumni and principals' recommendations; and stressed extra-curricular activities. Universities often gave preference to students applying from parts of the country or state where few Jews resided (Norwood 2009). Noting the commitment of Harvard, America's most prestigious university, to screening out Jews, Jerome Karabel commented in *The Chosen* (2005): "Even at the height of a war against a fanatically racist, anti-Semitic enemy, it seemed that nothing – not even the reports of the extermination of European Jews already making their way into the newspapers – could dislodge Harvard's policy of restricting Jewish enrollment" (p. 180).

Universities similarly restricted the hiring of Jewish faculty members during the interwar period. Dinnerstein noted that only about 100 Jews held positions on the arts and sciences faculties of American universities in the mid-1930s. The paucity of Jewish faculty members contributed to academia's quiescence about the Nazi threat. Entire disciplines, including English, history, and chemistry were essentially off-limits to Jews.

America's institutions of higher learning, with their longstanding tradition of barring Jews, displayed little interest in hiring Jewish refugee scholars expelled from German universities. Some wealthy American Jews shied away from providing funding for placing refugees on university faculties because they feared it would provoke an anti-Semitic backlash. Most of the Jewish refugees universities did hire were accorded short-term positions (Norwood 2009).

American universities warmly received Nazi leaders like Germany's ambassador to the United States, Hans Luther, and Ernst Hanfstaengl, Hitler's foreign press

chief. In late 1933, President Butler of Columbia declared that Luther was entitled to the “greatest courtesy and respect.” Butler terminated the appointment of instructor Jerome Klein for protesting the Columbia administration’s inviting Luther to champion Hitler’s policies on campus (Norwood 2009, pp. 76–77). Harvard extended a similarly friendly welcome to Hanfstaengl, a Harvard graduate, when he attended his 25th reunion in 1934. The Harvard student newspaper, the *Crimson*, called on the administration to award Hanfstaengl an honorary degree (Norwood 2009).

American college and university administrations ignored the boycott of German goods and services launched by American Jewish organizations in 1933. Prominent university presidents made trans-Atlantic voyages on ships flying the swastika flag. American schools also sent students across the ocean on German vessels (Norwood 2009).

Harvard president James B. Conant permitted Harvard Law School dean Roscoe Pound to receive an honorary degree from the University of Berlin, personally awarded by Nazi ambassador Luther at the Law School. Conant ignored a vociferous protest from Law School professor Felix Frankfurter, who charged that the administration was lending its prestige to the Hitler regime by hosting the ceremony on campus (Norwood 2009).

More than twenty American colleges and universities sent delegates to Nazi Germany in June 1936 to celebrate the University of Heidelberg’s 550th anniversary, after the Nuremberg Laws had deprived Germany’s Jews of their citizenship. The festivities, carefully orchestrated by Josef Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda, were marked by fiery Nazi speeches, which the participating American universities did not publicly challenge. President Butler of Columbia, angered that students picketed his mansion to protest their university’s sending a delegate to the Heidelberg celebration, expelled undergraduate Robert Burke, a leader of the demonstration, permanently destroying his academic career (Norwood 2009).

American academia’s most prestigious foreign affairs symposium through 1941, the University of Virginia Institute of Public Affairs roundtables, contributed to the Hitler regime’s efforts to present Germany as a nation with legitimate grievances and reasonable objectives. Its conferences on American-German relations presented Nazis and their sympathizers as distinguished guests entitled to a respectful hearing. The Institute’s directors sought the advice of Nazi Germany’s embassy in Washington in securing speakers, and frequently invited Nazi apologists and anti-Semites from the United States.

The revisionist school of World War I historians also generated some sympathy for the Third Reich among the American public, although that was not their direct intention. These scholars argued that the Allied powers were as, or more, responsible than Germany for causing World War I and had severely wronged Germany at the Versailles Peace Conference. The implication many Americans drew from the revisionist allegations was that it was unfair to hobble Germany’s armed forces and oppose its rearmament and that its expansionist designs were at least partially justified (Norwood 2009).

Even after the horrific Kristallnacht pogroms in November 1938, American university administrators expressed little enthusiasm for calls to establish scholarships for refugees from Nazi Germany. Nor did administrators join those demanding that the US government lower immigration barriers or stiffen economic sanctions

against the Third Reich. University administrations required students or private benefactors to cover the refugees' expenses except for tuition, and provided few scholarships. They reserved a large proportion of refugee scholarships for non-Jews (Norwood 2009).

Anti-Semitism was rampant during the 1930s and World War II in the US army. In *The "Jewish Threat,"* Joseph W. Bendersky (2000) noted that the army's response to Nazism and the Holocaust was "conditioned by decades of institutional racial and anti-Semitic thought" (Bendersky 2000). Indeed, clear parallels can be drawn between the army's response and that of academia. The army's high officer corps and administrators at America's elite colleges and universities were mostly of old-stock Protestant, upper- and middle-class background. Bendersky stated that the US army consistently "throughout the first half of the twentieth century ... oppos[ed] Jewish immigration [to the United States] on racial and anti-Communist grounds" (p. 258). Although few US army officers fully embraced Nazi ideology, a considerable proportion sympathized with some Nazi programs and goals, just as did many university administrators. President Butler of Columbia and Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard College, for example, during the mid-1930s considered Germany's desire for more land legitimate (Norwood 2009). High army officers, like many university administrators and conservatives, believed that Germany's rearmament would protect the West from Soviet expansionism.

Leading army officers and university administrators complained of an anti-Hitler bias in the American press. Shortly after the Nazis assumed power, the US military attaché in Berlin charged that American correspondents' reports from Germany were causing Americans to become unnecessarily antagonistic to the Third Reich. He attributed their alleged bias against the Hitler regime to Jews' excessive influence in the American media (Bendersky 2000).

American university presidents expressed similar outrage about US press coverage of German affairs. President Walter Hüllihen of the University of Delaware, which established the nation's principal Junior Year Abroad program in Germany at the University of Munich, declared in May 1933 that American newspaper reports from the Third Reich were "grossly exaggerated, in many cases utterly false." University of Arizona president Homer Shantz, after leading a tour of American educators and college students to Nazi Germany, expressed strong disapproval of American press coverage of developments there, claiming the newspapers focused on "the worst possible events" (Norwood 2009).

Bendersky stated that the US army's leading officer training schools, the Army Industrial College and the Army War College, sponsored numerous anti-Semitic lectures. The Industrial College prepared officers for upper echelon command positions, and the War College enrolled the best Industrial College graduates. At the end of World War II, over sixty percent of American active duty generals were Army War College graduates. The War College's commandant (1927–1932), General William D. Connor, was an ardent anti-Semite who maintained that Jews inordinately influenced American politics. As superintendent of West Point from 1932 to 1938, Connor helped shape the outlook of many officers who served in World War II (Bendersky 2001).

The Army War College invited the nation's "preeminent racial theorists, eugenicists, and anti-Semitic thinkers" to lecture there. They assigned to the officers enrolled

there “the major racist and anti-Semitic works” of the interwar period (Bendersky 2001). These lecturers emphasized the importance of protecting the racial purity of America’s European stock, threatened by Jews and other immigrants from eastern and southern Europe.

The Army Industrial College invited Lothrop Stoddard, “America’s foremost racist intellectual,” to lecture on “The Racial Factor as a Determinant in National Policies.” Stoddard was the author of *The Rising Tide of Color* (1920), which warned that inferior non-white peoples threatened to overrun the civilized societies of the West. Impressed with Nazi eugenics policies, Stoddard studied them in Germany for several months after the outbreak of World War II. In a magazine article, he claimed that “the Jewish problem” was rooted in Jewish biological difference. His analysis of Jewish heads revealed “Mongolian” and “negroid” influences, suggesting that Jews were an inferior, non-white mongrel race. The University of Virginia Institute of Public Affairs invited Stoddard to participate in its roundtable in 1941. Bendersky stated that “War College teaching ... promoted racial ideas that fostered ... a strong antipathy toward Jews” (Bendersky 2000, p. 267).

The America First Committee (AFC), which spearheaded the effort to prevent US intervention in the European war on the Allied side, contained significant anti-Semitic elements, whose influence in the organization became increasingly apparent. The AFC was formed during the summer of 1940 and continued operations until the Japanese attack on the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Although the AFC’s leadership included some liberal isolationists, the organization had the backing of the nation’s most prominent anti-Semites, Henry Ford and Charles Coughlin. Ford, who accepted the Hitler regime’s highest medal for foreigners, the Grand Service Cross of the Supreme Order of the German Eagle, from the Nazi consul-general in Detroit in a public ceremony in 1938, served on its national committee.

The AFC aggressively campaigned against Lend-Lease legislation that would enable the United States to send much-needed war materiel to Britain, standing alone against the Nazi armed forces. Britain’s military position was precarious because it had been forced to abandon much of its military equipment when it evacuated its troops from France at Dunkirk in June 1940. Germany’s eastern flank was protected by its August 1939 Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. AFC national committee member William Castle, who testified against Lend-Lease before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had denounced President Roosevelt in 1939 for “going out of [his] way to insult Reichsfuehrer Hitler” (Norwood 2009, p. 151). Castle had repeatedly made anti-Semitic statements while serving as assistant secretary of state after World War I (Weil 1978). After Congress passed Lend-Lease in March 1941, the AFC lobbied against the use of US naval vessels to convoy merchant ships to Britain.

Wayne S. Cole, in the principal institutional study of the AFC, conceded that “many supporters of America First held anti-Semitic views” (Cole 1953, p. 136), but he argued that the AFC leadership “tried to prevent anti-Semites from addressing” its meetings (p. 133). Cole quoted the AFC’s eastern organization director as opposing the injection of anti-Semitism into its chapters, but admitted that “not all national and local America First leaders were cool or hostile toward followers of Father Coughlin” (p. 136). He reported that the vice-chairman of the AFC’s Boston chapter praised its Coughlinite members and that leaders of some local chapters were

militant anti-Semites. The national AFC leadership removed none of them (pp. 137–139). In Brooklyn, the AFC was “little more than the Christian Front by another name” (Dinnerstein 1994, p. 129). Cole acknowledged that aviator Laura Ingalls, “one of the [AFC’s] most active speakers” in late 1941, was convicted as an agent of the Nazi government, calling this “a serious blot” on the AFC. But he minimized this, arguing that far more “patriotic” speakers addressed AFC rallies, and that Ingalls was active in the AFC for “less than half of its history” (Cole 1953). The German embassy in Washington drafted Ingalls’s AFC speeches. In *Storm on the Horizon* (2000), Justus Doenecke, another leading historian of isolationism, gives anti-Semitism almost no attention when describing the AFC and other elements opposing intervention.

John Roy Carlson (Arthur Derounian), whose exposé of American pro-fascist groups in 1943 was based on investigations he conducted for four years while posing as an adherent of that movement, portrayed the AFC as riddled with anti-Semites. He noted that the AFC accepted him as a volunteer even though he identified himself on his application as a member of the virulently anti-Semitic pro-Hitler Christian Mobilizers. When Carlson asked the AFC interviewer whether she knew about the Christian Mobilizers’ activities, “she nodded, smiling.” Working at the AFC’s New York office, Carlson encountered “a daily stream” of “friends” he had worked with or come into contact with in fascist organizations. He reported that when he attended an AFC rally at New York’s Madison Square Garden on May 23, 1941, at which aviator Charles Lindbergh was the featured speaker, a howling audience refused the request of the presiding official to join in singing “God Bless America” because the song was written by a Jew (Carlson 1943). The *New York Times* the next day confirmed that the audience refused to sing “God Bless America” (*New York Times*, May 24, 1941).

At an AFC rally in Des Moines, Iowa on September 11, 1941, Charles Lindbergh, a leading spokesperson for the organization, combined isolationism with anti-Semitism in a speech that drew national attention and condemnation from the Roosevelt administration. In October 1938, Lindbergh had accepted from the Nazi government Germany’s Service Cross of the German Eagle with Star, a high medal for civilians. Marshal Hermann Goering personally bestowed it on him in Berlin. Lindbergh refused calls from American anti-Nazis to return the medal. In Des Moines, Lindbergh declared that “the three most important groups” pressing the United States to enter the European war were “the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration.” Lindbergh drew on the longstanding anti-Semitic charge of Jewish dual loyalty, asserting that American Jews subordinated US interests to those of European Jewry. He hinted darkly that Jews would be responsible for an anti-Semitic backlash if they continued to support American intervention against the Axis: “they will be among the first to feel [the] consequences” of US entry into the war. Lindbergh reinforced the anti-Semitic thrust of his speech by repeating the hackneyed charge that the Jews’ “greatest danger to this country lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, our radio and our government” (*New York Times*, September 12, 1941).

That same month, isolationist US senator Gerald Nye, Republican of North Dakota, launched an AFC-inspired Senate subcommittee investigation into what he alleged was a Hollywood movie industry propaganda campaign to draw the United

States into the European war. Nye implied that Jews directed the campaign, listing 17 men with Jewish or Jewish-sounding names as heading the largest Hollywood film studios (Chambers 2006). Like Lindbergh, Nye suggested that America's interests were not the Jews' major priority, describing the studio heads as vengeful, foreign-born men whose anti-Nazi "hate propaganda" was driving the country into a disastrous war (Carr 2001). Wendell A. Willkie, Republican presidential candidate in 1940, who headed the Hollywood studios' legal team, charged that Nye's purpose in conducting the hearings was to pressure the movie industry to stop making pictures that accurately depicted Nazism and accused Nye of anti-Semitism. Willkie noted that of the "more than 1,100 feature pictures produced since the outbreak of the present war, only some fifty have had anything to do with the issues involved in the war" (Carr 2001, p. 258).

Although the AFC disbanded after US entry into World War II, numerous groups sprang up opposing unconditional Allied victory, calling themselves "nationalist." The Christian Front persisted after Charles Coughlin's clerical superior, Archbishop Mooney of Detroit, ordered him to withdraw from non-religious activities and the US government in 1942 banned *Social Justice* from the mails as seditious. The Christian Front remained very influential in New York and Boston despite its lack of support for America's war effort. Mothers' clubs, many of whose members were active in the AFC, depicted the Roosevelt administration as heavily influenced by Jews, whose commitment to unconditional victory undermined American interests. They tried to turn mothers of servicemen against the war by instilling fear that their sons would be killed, a tactic also employed by English-language Nazi propagandists broadcasting from wartime Germany, such as "Axis Sally" (Mildred Gillars). The Mothers' movement began to form soon after Germany invaded Poland in 1939 and during the war developed into a decentralized network of over fifty groups. Lyril Clark Van Hyning, leader of We, the Mothers Mobilize for America, the largest Mothers' group, was a virulent anti-Semite and former member of the pro-Nazi German-American Bund (Jeansonne 1996).

The Brooklyn Catholic priest Edward Lodge Curran, the "Father Coughlin of the East," rallied Coughlinite forces during World War II for a negotiated peace. He charged that Jews had drawn the United States into the war. Curran praised Marshal Pétain, head of France's puppet Vichy regime installed after the Nazi conquest, and denounced Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French. Curran was the main speaker at Boston's heavily attended wartime Evacuation Day exercises, celebrating British troops' departure from the city during the Revolutionary War. The annual commemoration, funded by the Irish-American dominated municipal government, provided an occasion to express hostility to a key American ally against the Axis. At the 1943 event, isolationist US Representative Hamilton Fish of New York declared that he was honored "to speak from the theater of the great British defeat." John Roy Carlson in 1943 reported that Boston was "seething with anti-semitism [and] defeatism" (Norwood 2003).

The Christian Front distributed inflammatory anti-Semitic literature throughout the war, accusing Jews of shirking military service and profiteering. The charge that Jews avoided serving in the armed forces ignored the US military's own data, documenting Jews' participation at a rate above their proportion in the population. Professor Gordon Allport, chairman of Harvard's psychology department and one of

the nation's foremost experts on prejudice, declared that the circulation of this anti-Semitic literature was Axis-inspired. He warned that it would precipitate violence and brutality against Jews, which indeed it did (Norwood 2003).

In October 1943, the New York newspaper *PM* began a series of articles by Arnold Beichman documenting an "organized campaign of terrorism" against Boston's Jews. Bands of largely Irish Catholic youth, inspired by the still thriving Christian Front, had staged repeated "Jew-hunting" forays into heavily Jewish neighborhoods, inflicting serious injuries. The state senator and representatives from these districts declared that their constituents were living in mortal fear. *PM* and the *New York Post* described a similar wave of anti-Semitic violence in New York City (Norwood 2003).

During the war, isolationist Mothers' groups pressed for a negotiated peace with the Axis and in early 1944 lobbied Congress in an effort to prevent an Allied invasion of western Europe. *New York Post* columnist Victor Riesel reported in February 1944 that *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was distributed at meetings of the Crusading Mothers of Pennsylvania, the most active Mothers' group in the East (*New York Post*, February 3 and 4, 1944). Elizabeth Dilling, who led the Mothers' groups' campaign against Lend-Lease in 1941, told John Roy Carlson that she was the author of *The Octopus*, a "scurrilously anti-Semitic book" published under the name The Reverend Frank Woodruff Johnson (Carlson 1943, p. 216).

In August 1943, the Peace Now movement was established in an effort to continue the AFC under a new name, committed, like the Mothers' groups, to a negotiated peace with the Axis. Its corresponding secretary, formerly office manager of the AFC's Washington office, used her AFC contacts to establish Peace Now chapters. In January 1944, Victor Riesel reported that isolationist US senators Gerald Nye and Burton K. Wheeler had advised at least one Peace Now leader. Riesel noted that Peace Now was open to Coughlinites, anti-Semites, and Nazi sympathizers, many of whom considered it a "respectable front" for their agitation (*New York Post*, January 24, 1944). William L. Shirer, one of the journalists most conversant with German affairs, declared that Peace Now's "chatter" resembled Nazi propaganda broadcasts from Germany.

Also backing a negotiated peace (with Nazi Germany) was the rabid anti-Semite Gerald L. K. Smith, a prewar Coughlin ally who, in January 1943, founded the America First Party (AFP), hoping to recruit old AFC supporters. The AFC's leaders had barred Smith from membership because his anti-Semitism was too explicit. Ernest Liebold, a top Henry Ford aide, impressed with a Smith speech in which he identified "Christian character" as "the true basis of real Americanism," had introduced him to Ford in 1937. Liebold presented Smith with a bound set of Ford's newspaper, the Dearborn *Independent*, the vehicle for his nationwide anti-Semitic campaign during the 1920s (Baldwin 2001). Influenced partly by Ford, Smith launched his own anti-Semitic campaign in *The Cross and the Flag*, a newspaper he founded in 1942. In June 1944, columnist Marquis Childs warned that the AFP, allied with We, the Mothers, might wield influence at the next Republican Party convention. Both groups were determined that the convention nominate a "nationalist" presidential candidate to run against President Roosevelt. Using an anti-Semitic slur, the AFP denounced the convention front-runner, New York governor Thomas Dewey, as "Tommy the Cantor." Childs noted that the AFP had helped a candidate who "talks the whole Fascist line" win the Republican Congressional nomination in a Chicago-area district (*The Washington Post*, June 28, 1944).

During World War II various “Black Fuehrers” promoted the Axis cause in New York’s Harlem, America’s largest African American district. Shouting “Heil Hitler!” at street rallies, these black separatists praised the Nazi doctrine of “racial purity” and hatred of Jews, and called for a Japanese victory over the Allies. Reporting on a Harlem speech by Jamaican-born Robert Jordan, most prominent of the “black Nazis,” John Roy Carlson noted: “Time and again [he] evoked loud cheering at the mention of Hitler’s name (Carlson 1943, p. 163).” Federal authorities alleged that Jordan had planned to establish a “colored division” of the AFC. Jordan claimed that Jews ran the British Empire. He depicted Japan as liberator of the “dark races” and named his organization the Ethiopian-Pacific League to suggest a Japanese-black alliance. Another West Indian-born Black Fuehrer, Carlos Cooks, declared that he chose Nazism over democracy, and that “the Japanese have never lynched or exploited the Negro” (Carlson 1943, p. 156; Singer 1945).

The Black Fuehrers maintained close ties with white anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi groups like the Christian Front. Robert Jordan regularly invited Joe Hartery, a top lieutenant of Christian Mobilizers leader Joe McWilliams, to address his meetings (Carlson 1943). Marc Gallicchio in *The African American Encounter with Japan and China* (2000) describes Jordan’s pro-Japanese agitation and anti-Americanism during World War II, but ignores his militant anti-Semitism.

The Nation of Islam (NOI), headed by Elijah Muhammad, mixed support for the Japanese military effort with virulent anti-Semitism. It taught that Jews were the most dangerous of the white “devil” race created by a mad scientist about six thousand years before, and incapable of good behavior. The NOI proclaimed that black scientists in Japan had built an immense “Mother Wheel” that hovered above the Earth, housing hundreds of aircraft that would attack and destroy all whites in the United States and Britain. Britain was to be punished for issuing the Balfour Declaration promising the Jews a homeland in Palestine.

During World War II there was considerable anti-Semitism at the higher levels of the US armed forces. Largely indifferent to the plight of European Jewry, the armed forces provided troops little information about its annihilation. Because military service was associated with patriotism, anti-Semites had long accused Jews of shirking it. Many American officers, influenced by anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jews as physically weak and cowardly, assumed they made poor soldiers and would try to avoid combat (Bendersky 2000; Moore 2004).

Bendersky states, “From the beginning of the war, the army resisted every major initiative or proposal for rescuing or assisting European Jewry” (2000, p. 347). It refused Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s requests to assist in rescuing Jewish refugees after the War Refugee Board (WRB) was established in January 1944 to save “victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death” (p. 333). The army would not use its communications facilities for rescue operations and refused to transport even small numbers of Jews to safety in North Africa and Palestine. After the US military in 1944 developed the capability to bomb the Auschwitz gas chambers and the rail lines leading to them, the War Department refused to do so, even as US heavy bombers attacked industrial targets less than five miles away (Wyman 1984).

During the war, neither of the army’s major publications for troops, the *Stars and Stripes* and *Yank*, identified Jews as the principal target of Nazi genocide. In October

1944, *Yank* rejected an article describing the Auschwitz-Birkenau annihilation camp because it drew on reports that the editors considered “too Semitic.” The editors wanted an article that “did not deal principally with Jews.” The *Stars and Stripes* reports and editorials on the death camps omitted mention of the word “Jew” (Bendersky 2000, pp. 345–346).

In June 1945, *PM* revealed that the US Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) had since March 1944 administered an English composition correspondence course to US troops in the field that contained anti-Semitic propaganda. The course workbook reprinted a chapter from Andre Siegfried’s *America Comes of Age* (1927) that read “like sections of *Mein Kampf*.” The USAFI had soldiers and sailors “absorb Siegfried’s ideas on the immigration problem,” and then compose an essay expressing them. *PM* called Siegfried’s views “Fascist,” providing examples from the assigned chapter, including: (a) “Protestants of Nordic origin are readily assimilated into American life ... and the ‘Jewish race’ almost not at all”; (b) American Jews ranged from “banker” to “verminous refugees from the ghettos of the Ukraine and Poland”; (c) “the Jew” is “an intellectual revolutionary to the point of suspicion” and is “just what the Americans do not want”; and (d) “The Gentile fears, and with reason, the competition of the Jew in business, and despises him as a matter of course” (*PM*, June 24 and 27, 1945).

David Wyman in *The Abandonment of the Jews* (1984), the most influential study of America’s response to the Holocaust, argued that pervasive anti-Semitism in parts of the executive branch, Congress, and the general population was a major cause of US failure to mount serious rescue efforts for European Jewry. The US government confirmed in November 1942 that the Nazis and their collaborators were systematically annihilating Europe’s Jews. President Roosevelt “did nothing about the mass murder for fourteen months” before establishing the WRB, which his administration rendered largely powerless. Throughout World War II, Congress, the State Department, the executive branch, and the public resisted lowering immigration barriers to admit more Jewish refugees into the United States. Moreover, State Department wartime policies restricted the number of Jews admitted to only a tiny percentage of the already minuscule national origins quotas. The State Department not only remained indifferent to rescuing Europe’s Jews, but “continually feared that Germany or other Axis nations might release tens of thousands of Jews into Allied hands,” which would place pressure on it to admit more Jewish refugees (Wyman 1984, pp. xiv, 6, 8–9).

In *A Pretty Good Club* (1978), Martin Weil described the wartime State Department and Foreign Service as dominated by men disdainful of Jews. Inclined toward appeasing Nazi Germany during the 1930s, they remained indifferent during the war to the plight of Europe’s Jews. American diplomats most prominent in European affairs, the most prestigious branch of the Foreign Service, were often alumni of exclusive New England colleges and preparatory schools, committed to producing a “Christian gentleman,” for whom the Jew served as a negative reference. The Foreign Service discriminated against Jews and excluded them from the more desirable assignments. Like college interviews, the Foreign Service oral examination was in part designed to screen out Jews.

Public opinion polls showed a high level of hostility to Jews immediately prior to and during World War II. The Opinion Research Council (ORC) in March 1938 reported that a majority of Americans believed that Nazi Germany’s persecution of

Jews was “wholly or partly” the Jews’ fault. In June 1944, the month of D-day, the ORC found that 24 percent of Americans considered Jews in this country a “menace to America,” while only 6 percent viewed Germans in the United States as a menace (Stember 1966). Wyman cited polls from 1938 to 1946 that showed over half the American population considered Jews “greedy” and “dishonest” (Wyman 1984).

Wyman stated that mainstream press and radio failed to devote significant attention to the annihilation of European Jewry, treating it as a secondary story, and that the American Protestant Churches and the Catholic Church remained nearly silent. By contrast, the media provided considerable coverage of Nazi violence against non-Jewish civilians in occupied countries.

Laurel Leff, in *Buried by the Times* (2005), found that America’s most prominent newspaper, the *New York Times*, consistently downplayed news of the Holocaust during the war. It largely restricted coverage of the mass murder of Jews to inside pages under smaller headlines. By contrast, it often reported “German reprisals against resistance movements in occupied countries and Nazi persecution of Christians” (Leff 2005, p. 177). Publisher Arthur H. Sulzberger, a classical Reform Jew, did not consider Jews a people and “remained resolute that Jews as Jews should not ... do anything special to save their fellow Jews” (p. 200). When the *Times* finally published an editorial on the Warsaw ghetto uprising six months after it was crushed, it did not mention that those who rose up against the Germans were Jews (Leff 2005).

US government indifference to European Jewry’s plight persisted into the immediate postwar period. US occupation authorities in Germany subjected Holocaust survivors to humiliating treatment in squalid displaced persons camps. Some of these were former concentration camps. General George Patton, who served until fall 1945 as military governor of Bavaria, which contained the largest number of Jewish displaced persons in Germany, considered them “lower than animals” (Blumenson 1985, p. 281; D’Este 1995, p. 755). Patton ordered the Jewish DP camps “surrounded with barbed wire and armed guards” (Bessel 2009, p. 269). Robert H. Abzug’s *Inside the Vicious Heart* (1985), a study of American reaction to the concentration camps, stated that Patton’s anti-Semitism “became a rabid, paranoid rage” (Abzug 1985, p. 157). Patton opposed the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals and obstructed de-Nazification efforts. US occupation authorities did not acknowledge the uniqueness of Jews’ experience under Nazi occupation. They favored displaced persons from German-occupied areas and considered those from countries that had allied with Germany “enemies.” This meant that Jewish Holocaust survivors were often treated more harshly than Ukrainians, Poles, or Balts who had served in the *Wehrmacht* or the SS or otherwise collaborated with the Nazis (Abzug 1985). Some of those guarding the Jews were former Nazis.

Pressure from Jewish organizations and others concerned about Allied mistreatment of displaced persons led President Truman to appoint State Department official Earl Harrison to investigate conditions in the camps. Harrison reported in August 1945: “We seem to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate them” (Stone [1946]1978, p. 4). Public opinion polls continued to reveal a high level of anti-Semitism immediately after World War II, with a significant majority of Americans opposed to relaxing immigration barriers to permit Jewish displaced persons to enter the United States.

Two of America's largest metropolises, Boston and New York, experienced repeated anti-Semitic violence during World War II that severely alarmed the Jewish community. Research is needed on wartime assaults on Jews, desecration of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, and vandalism against Jewish stores and homes in large cities outside Boston and New York, in small towns, and in the south. This would provide a fuller sense of the intensity of anti-Semitism in the nation. It would allow for more comparison of Catholic and Protestant theological influences on anti-Semitism.

Scholars have ignored the widespread use of anti-Semitic instructional materials in the American school system and the influence of teachers and administrators sympathetic to the Christian Front in public and parochial schools during World War II. (Stephen H. Norwood is completing such a study as part of a book on American anti-Semitism.) There is no study of anti-Semitism in the US Navy, considered the most racist of the armed services.

Considering the recent escalation of African American anti-Semitism, expressed particularly by black nationalist and campus organizations, more study is needed on its roots during World War II. The most in-depth study of black anti-Semitism's roots and evolution is Eunice G. Pollack's "African Americans and the Legitimization of Antisemitism on the Campus" (Pollack 2011). Stephen H. Norwood's "Old Wine in New Bottles" in the same volume examines the American Left's views of, and responses to, anti-Semitism during World War II and the periods immediately preceding and following it (Norwood 2011).

No work systematically compares wartime anti-Semitism in the United States with that in other Allied countries like Britain, Canada, and Australia. Nor are there comparative studies of how Allied occupying powers in postwar Germany and Austria abandoned serious de-Nazification efforts, or treated Jews who survived the Holocaust ("displaced persons"). More work is needed on the relationship between the US State Department's obstruction of efforts to rescue European Jewry during the Holocaust and its subsequent attempts to block the establishment of the state of Israel after World War II.

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PART VI

Aftermath and Consequences

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR

War Crimes in Europe

CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING

During World War II atrocities of unimaginable scale have been committed by Nazi Germany in order to unite Europe forcibly under the swastika. The suffering of the civilian population both in Germany and in occupied territories was without doubt unprecedented. Not only the means of modern warfare made a difference; the systematic persecution and murdering of Jews, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, and other minorities warranted an entire death industry, which in its shocking results remains unparalleled until today.

When speaking about “war crimes” we have to differentiate between different concepts. The term “war crimes” is often used to embrace all atrocities, which took place during the war. As a legal term “war crimes” pertain to prohibited acts in the context of international humanitarian law; these war crimes have to be discriminated from the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and, for that matter, the crimes against peace (Cassese 2008, p. 41). In the following we will adhere to the more general term of “war crimes” and discuss also the Holocaust, forced labor, and medical experiments as well as crimes committed as part of the war.

Furthermore it has to be kept in mind that, at the time of World War II, the concept of holding individuals criminally responsible for acts which they have committed in office as ministers or agents of a state, was rather new. It was only as recent as 1864 that the first Geneva Convention was established, addressing certain rules which would be applicable to ameliorate the fate of the wounded and shipwrecked as well as prisoners of war during armed conflicts. Immunity from criminal responsibility was the general concept in public international law for acts attributable to a state. Therefore it was impossible to prosecute the German Emperor Wilhelm II for waging an aggressive war and for atrocities committed during World War I, like the usage of gas as a means of warfare (Bassiouni 2002, pp. 283–285). Yet after World War II, the immensity of the atrocities would no longer carry such a concept. As Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the USA at the Nuremberg trial,

most fittingly expressed in his opening address: "The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated" (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. II, p. 99).

When talking about "crimes" one has to take into account, that a "crime" is a social concept of control, implying public censure and stigmatization for the perpetrator. Therefore a "crime" is connected to certain rule of law-parameters. This means that not every immoral act is per se a "crime"; not even every prohibited act is necessarily a crime. In order to be punishable as a crime the law must declare certain behavior as criminal and foresee a specific sanction in case of a breach of the law. Regularly this legal determination must have taken place before the act has been committed. In legal terms this requirement is called the prohibition of retroactive criminality (*nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege*).

These basic parameters have been questionable with a view to atrocities committed during World War II. The new concept of individual responsibility in the Westphalian system of public international law was hard to execute if it were done in a liberal manner. Yet, as has been expressed by Justice Jackson in the above quote, it would have been a disaster for the survival of civilization and the credibility of the international legal order, had the system not been able to find an adequate legal answer to these immense atrocities. The list of crimes, which was established in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, was thus in many regards new. Before we turn again to the execution of the law and the prosecution after the end of World War II (see below), we will now look at the different crimes, which have been committed by Nazi Germany.

The "crimes against peace" was the first category of crimes contained in Article 6(a) of the Charter of the IMT (International Military Tribunal). "Crimes against peace" were perceived of as the ultimate crimes as they were directed against the sovereignty and independence of national states and thus the most obvious attack on the society of states. To criminalize aggressive war was most important in particular for the USA. It is fair to say, that it was US policy at that time to teach a lesson to Europe, where US military intervention was warranted for a second time in not only 40 years (see Jackson 1947; International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. II, p. 153).

Yet it was most difficult to say, what indeed established a "crime against peace." Article 6(a) of the Charter IMT defines the crime as follows: "Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." The only point of reference there was in international law, was the Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928, which, however, pertained to the behavior of states and contained no explicit criminal sanction.

From the factual side it could hardly be denied, that Nazi Germany waged a war of aggression against most of its neighbors and beyond. The incorporation of Austria into the German Reich on March 13, 1938, took place under enormous political pressure and the occupation of the Austrian territories by the German Army in executing "Case Otto," even if there was no bloodshed. Next was Czechoslovakia. In a first step, Hitler managed to isolate Czechoslovakia politically in that the UK, France, and Italy agreed to German occupation of the Sudetenland in the Munich Pact of September 29, 1938.

In a second step, the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia were occupied militarily and also incorporated into the Reich by March 15, 1939 ("Case Green").

Whereas these annexations were mainly achieved by political and diplomatic moves, the following occupations were military operations. The invasion of Poland starting September 1, 1939 under the code name "Case White" marks the beginning of World War II. Hitler has again tried to deceive Poland and other states in publicly supporting the non-aggression pact with Poland, which had been concluded in 1934. He also made clear only days before the Munich Agreement, that with the Sudetenland, the international problems for Germany in Europe had ended. However, official claims were raised from fall 1938 onwards to unite the Free City of Danzig with the German Reich. While consultations were under way to establish a corridor between Danzig and the Reich, Hitler ordered secret mobilization in April 1939 aiming not at Danzig but at Poland itself. Other than with Czechoslovakia and Austria, an invasion of Poland would imply also a war in the west, as in particular the Anglo-Polish agreement would force England to stand by Poland in case of an attack. Yet Hitler managed to isolate the west from the east in that he concluded a pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939 (Hitler-Stalin Pact also referred to as Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact named after the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the German Reich). In a secret additional protocol, territorial and regional rearrangements of Northern and Eastern Europe were contained, amongst them an agreement on the division of Poland amongst Germany and the Soviet Union. From this moment on, war was a certainty.

In order not to appear as the attacker, the German Security Police and *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD), staged several border incidents (Operation Himmler), blaming Poland for attacking the German radio station at Gleiwitz and other institutions along the border on August 31, 1939 (Gleiwitz-incident; see International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. IV, pp. 242–244). The day after, on September 1, 1939 the German *Wehrmacht* moved across the Polish border and the Luftwaffe bombed Polish cities. On September 3, 1939, England and France declared war on Germany, yet without any immediate consequences. On September 17, 1939 Stalin attacked Poland from the east. World War II had begun.

What followed was the attack upon the two neutral states Denmark and Norway in April 1940 (the Weser Exercise). This move was strategically necessary in order to anticipate the occupation of the Norwegian ports by the Royal Navy, thus secure the dominance over the Baltic Sea and guarantee the supply of the German war industry with iron ore from Norway. Again, Hitler Germany broke bilateral anti-aggression treaties without batting an eye.

Just a month after the Weser Exercise came the attack on the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg ("Case Yellow") despite permanent assurances uttered by Hitler he would spare the Low Countries and respect their neutrality. The invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands also paved the road to Northern France and thereby circumvented the massive French defense line along the river Rhine, the so-called Maginot line. The attack on the Low Countries started on May 10, 1940. On June 22, 1940 the French Government had to sign an armistice in Compiègne. The war in the west was over within weeks.

On April 6, 1941 the German Army attacked Greece and Yugoslavia and thus brought the war to Southern Europe together with its ally Italy. After the subjugation

of these two states, almost all of Europe was under Nazi domination. Only Hitler's partner in the partition of Poland, the Soviet Union, needed to be destroyed. Operation Barbarossa started on June 22, 1941. With about 4.5 million troops and some 600,000 motor vehicles on the side of the Axis Powers, the invasion of the Soviet Union remains the largest in the history of warfare. Whether or not Stalin planned to attack the German Reich himself, which is disputed amongst historians, the attack on the Soviet Union by Germany remains a breach of the treaty of non-aggression of 1938.

Hitler had torn all of Europe into war. He has attacked one country after the other using different political and diplomatic tactics to distract from his actual plans. Neither neutrality nor bilateral agreements could keep him from pursuing his plan to subdue all of Europe under Nazi domination. With these wars the Nazi-elite conspired to commit crimes against peace, as the military operations were in blatant breach of international law.

With these wars Germany brought death, suffering, and destruction as inevitable consequences of warfare to the whole of Europe. But even more than that; Hitler's war was a war of extermination as will be discussed below.

Whereas the "crimes against peace" pertain to the politics of a state and embrace the question of whether it was right or wrong to resort to armed violence in the first place, the concept of "war crimes" pertains to rules which apply if an armed conflict occurs (*ius in bello*). These are the "rules of the game" so to speak. They are to be viewed as independent from the question of who started the war in the first place (*ius ad bellum*) and apply to all parties in the same way. These rules are meant to ensure a humane warfare to the greatest extent possible. Thus they foresee the protection of combatants in that they are privileged to be held as "prisoners of war" (POWs) and not as criminals. They guarantee protection of medical personnel and of people *hors de combat*. They outlaw carpet bombing and the use of certain weapons like poisoned gas. In general, the rules of war aim at avoiding unnecessary suffering ("Martens Clause"). The overall idea of this set of rules is based on reciprocity. In other words, a state will abide to these rules because he hopes that the opposing party will do likewise. Thus, by adhering to the rules of warfare when treating persons of the opponent party, a state protects its own people (Safferling 2011, pp. 213–214).

Human experience also tells us that in every war both sides commit war crimes. In the special situation of war, in which the killing of human beings is generally allowed and people have to live with the constant fear of being victims of an attack themselves, the inhibition threshold for violence recedes on a general level. For these reasons individual trespassing is inherent in an armed conflict.

However, the Nazi warfare followed a different rationale altogether. The aim of the war in Europe was only partially to subdue the neighboring states, to gain living space, and to dominate Europe politically. In particular in the east the aim of the war was the destruction of the Slavic population (Hillgruber 1982, p. 519). In this regard the Nazi invasion in Eastern Europe differed from an ordinary war in that it was a war of enslavement and of extermination (Nolte 1984, p. 451). The operation "Barbarossa" was thus a military campaign in which law of warfare was largely suspended. However war crimes were not limited to the eastern territories as will be shown by the following examples.

- 1 A special measure concerning the Eastern Front was issued on May 13, 1941, by Hitler through the chief of the supreme command of the *Wehrmacht*, Keitel, the so-called *Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlass* [Decree concerning the jurisdiction of military courts]. The harmless name contained a rather brutal measure for fighting civilian resistance against the German troops (so-called partisans). It stated that any person who had committed a crime against the German troops needed not to be prosecuted by an ordinary or a military court; rather it was allowed to shoot fleeing persons on the spot and suspects on order of an officer. Similarly collective force might be used against villages upon order of the commander of the battalion. At the same time it was ordered that German soldiers were not to be held accountable for criminal behavior against the civilian population by military courts. A judiciary would only be re-established on order of the Supreme Command of the Army upon total “pacification” of the area. Thus, in reality, the population of the occupied territories in the east was outlawed by this order.
- 2 Only days later, on June 6, 1941, the *Kommissarbefehl* [commissar order] was issued with the full name: *Richtlinien für die Behandlung politischer Kommissare* [guidelines for the treatment of political commissars]. It was thereby ordered to identify any political commissar within the Soviet troops and annihilate them immediately without trial. The order was again a blatant breach of international humanitarian law and symbolized the war of extermination. It was extended by Gestapo instructions on July 17, 1941, to also include other “intolerable elements,” such as functionaries of state and party, all public officials and their deputies, leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions, leading personalities of the business world, members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence, all Jews, and all persons who are found to be agitators of fanatical communists (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. IV, pp. 258–259). Yet it proved counterproductive as surrender of members of the Red Army to the German Army was delayed as the morale amongst Soviet soldiers was boosted. Thus the Commissar Order was taken back on May 6, 1942. However, it remains unclear to what extent and how long the order was executed (affidavit of O. Ohlendorf, United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality 1946, vol. V, p. 343). The number of people who were victims of the “special treatment” will never be determined. There were random killings and deportations to concentration camps or labor camps. What remains particularly shocking is the fact that the plans for these orders were all laid as early as May 1941, at least a month before the attack on the Soviet Union (Harris 1999, p. 245).
- 3 The so-called *Nacht- und Nebelerlass* [night and fog decree] of December 7, 1941 contained the order by Adolf Hitler, that any resistance against the German State or the occupying power was to be followed by death sentence. It was executed in such a way that the alleged dissidents were taken away from their homes by night and disappeared (into the fog). The captives were deported to concentration camps and imprisoned in Germany, where they were tried secretly by special courts or the notorious “People’s Court.” The decree was intended to be cruel and brutal in order to spread fear amongst the population in occupied territories and thereby deter from acts against the German occupying forces. This

decree was to be executed in particular by the Supreme Command of the German *Wehrmacht* under Wilhelm Keitel. The captured people were to be transferred to the SD or Gestapo for deportation and further treatment. Around 7,000 people from France, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, disappeared under the Night and Fog Decree, very few surviving the war. Spreading fear and producing terror amongst the civilian population is a prohibited method of warfare under the Hague Convention.

- 4 On October 18, 1942, Hitler went even further and issued the top secret *Kommandobefehl* [commando order]: "From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man" (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. IV, p. 441). In a supplementary order Hitler announced that non-compliance with these orders would be severely punished. The order aimed at protecting German troops against sabotage in the homeland. The unlawfulness of this order was well known in the German Army. In 1940 the Supreme Command of the Army issued a directive, which stated that uniformed enemy paratroopers are to be treated as combatants (Messerschmidt 1996, p. 171). The *Kommandobefehl* effectively deprived all enemy soldiers who were found behind the lines of the legal status as enemy combatants. This was a clear breach both of the Hague Convention and of the Geneva Convention of 1929, according to which enemy combatants have a right to be taken as POWs if in the hands of the enemy.

Even after the landing of the Allied forces in Normandy the Commando Order was reinforced (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. IV, pp. 453–454). Weeks before the end of the fighting in May 1945, Keitel withdrew the order. In the Nuremberg trial the accused military leaders denied to have helped drafting the order and emphasized their inner opposition against it. Yet there can be no doubt that the decree was distributed to the relevant parts of the *Wehrmacht*, which meant that it was executed. None of the military leaders protested or resisted the order (Taylor in International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. XXII, pp. 325–326).

- 5 On 4 March 1944 it was ordered by the chief of Gestapo, that any captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or a not-working, non-commissioned officer is to be turned over to the chief of the security police and of the security service. They were to be transported to the Mauthausen concentration camp, where they were to be dealt with according to the *Kugel Erlass* [bullet decree], which meant that they were to be shot (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. III, pp. 505–506). The order contained an exception for British and American POWs. In these cases the Supreme Command of the army (the head of the Prisoner of War Section) had to decide whether to proceed according to the *Kugel Erlass* or not. In order to deceive the Army Information Bureau, the International Red Cross and representatives of the Protective Powers reported captured POWs as "escaped and not captured."

It is unclear how many POWs were killed by *Aktion K*. It is said that around 5,000 persons lost their lives in Mauthausen as "prisoners K." – 85 percent of them were Soviet prisoners (Stelzl-Marx 2000, p. 91).

This order was a blatant breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929. According to Article 50 of the Geneva Convention 1929 only disciplinary measures were allowed in case of escape.

The responsibility for this *Erläss* remained unclear even in the Nuremberg trial. The Supreme Command of the army was named in the *Erläss* as the origin of the instruction by the Gestapo. Yet Keitel being head of the Supreme Command renounced to have had knowledge of this criminal order and opined that Hitler must have given the order directly to Himmler (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. XVIII, p. 43). Also Göring claimed to have been left in the dark. Only Kaltenbrunner admitted to have been notified of the *Erläss* but merely accidentally (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. XI, pp. 303–304). In view of such a manifest breach of international humanitarian law it is not surprising that those accused in Nuremberg tried to escape responsibility by denying knowledge.

- 6 Reprisals were in the first half of the twentieth century seen as a legitimate tool to discipline the enemy to follow the rules of international humanitarian law. In case a violation of international humanitarian law occurred, the party that was the victim of this violation may, as a proportionate reaction, resort to a belligerent reprisal, that is, violate the rules of warfare itself. Since the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 a belligerent reprisal is no longer possible as all military activity must comply with the Conventions (Kempen and Hillgruber 2008, pp. 275–276).

During World War II, however, Germany has made excessive use of reprisals in particular against the civilian population. The most commonly known example in this regard is the total destruction of the Czechoslovakian village of Lidice on June 10, 1942. The murdering of all 173 male inhabitants above the age of 16 and the deportation of women and children to concentration camps was meant to be retaliation for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, the former chief of the Reich Main Security Office. Allegedly, two people involved in the murder of Heydrich were hiding in the small village northwest of Prague. Lidice was not the only act of wanton destruction and illegitimate retaliation against the civilian population. Similar incidents took place in the village of Putten in the Netherlands, at Arendonck, Hechtel, and Lommel in Belgium, in Televaag, Norway, Marseille and Oradour-sur-Glane in France, Kalavryta in Greece, and parts of Warsaw in Poland. Similarly, civilians were killed in retaliation for the bomb plot in Rome on March 23, 1944 – 335 Italians were killed in reply to the killing of 33 members of the police regiment “Bozen.” These acts were ordered for the purpose of preventing or avenging acts of resistance by inhabitants of occupied territories (Harris 1999, p. 206). They were illegal as Article 50 of the Hague Convention prohibited collective punishment against the civilian population (Prauser 2002, pp. 295–302).

- 7 Finally, a word has to be said regarding the Katyn massacre. As has been said above, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had agreed upon invading Poland from both sides and dividing it amongst one another. Soviet troops were first welcomed in Poland as it was hoped that the Red Army would join in the fight against the Germans. These hopes were quickly quashed as Soviet troops captured and disarmed Polish soldiers and deported them as POWs across the Soviet

frontier. In these camps the Soviets began to interrogate the prisoners and separate those who were viewed to have a pro-Soviet attitude and those who were declared enemy of the Soviet authority. On March 5, 1940, the order was signed by Josef Stalin to execute more than 25,000 Polish nationals and counter revolutionists. The intention was most probably to weaken the Polish intelligentsia considerably and thus prevent Poland from regaining strength in the near future (Weinberg 2005, p. 107). As Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the mass graves were discovered in the Katyn forest. The German propaganda machinery made a case against the Soviet Union and brought in international observers. However, Stalin denied responsibility and in turn claimed that Germany slaughtered the Polish leaders. As soon as the Red Army recaptured the area, the Soviets started a cover-up operation blaming Nazi Germany for the massacre. However, the attempt to convince the Western allies failed and the claims brought against the German accused at the Nuremberg trial had to be dropped eventually. Recent research, which was made possible by declassification of Russian documents, proves that the massacre was ordered by Stalin.

It was often said, that the official German Army, the *Wehrmacht*, was not responsible for the war crimes which were mentioned above. Rather it was said, the German soldier was closely following the laws and customs of war and was a symbol of chivalrous behavior on the battlefield, and only the SS or the Secret Police fulfilled the criminal acts and committed the arbitrary killings and massacres behind the lines. It turns out that this was not the case. The Supreme Command of the German forces was involved in most of the murderous orders issued by Hitler. Also, these were mostly executed in cooperation with SS and Secret Police. Despite resistance against Hitler within the *Wehrmacht*, as by Admiral Canaris, Chief of *Abwehr* or by Graf von Stauffenberg, who initiated the attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, the *Wehrmacht* and its leaders remained loyal to the Führer in fulfillment of their oath of allegiance to him. Often enough – as can be seen by the cross-examination of the chief of the Supreme Command of the German Forces, Wilhelm Keitel, this was done being fully aware of the unlawfulness of the orders (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. X, pp. 626–627).

“Crimes against humanity” was a new concept introduced into international law by Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT. The term was previously mentioned in a common declaration of France, England, and Russia of May 24, 1915, pertaining to the massacre of the Armenian minority in the Osman Empire. In Nuremberg it was used to cover those atrocities that had been committed against the civilian populations but could not be brought under the scope of “war crimes.” Even if the list of crimes named in Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT – namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population – entails ordinary crimes that are punishable under every national legal order, the specific international character lies in the systematic or widespread attack on civilians. Because of the massive scale or the organized approach, humanity as such is affected and not only individuals. It was, however, unfortunate that the new concept was seen as being closely linked to the war as such. It was felt, that otherwise one would intrude into internal affairs of a state, in this case Germany (Jackson 1947, p. 331).

This is regrettable because the persecution of the Jewish population started long before the outbreak of the war. Thus the “Nuremberg Race Laws” of 1935 or the *Reichskristallnacht* of November 9, 1938, could not be brought before the International Military Tribunal. Later on in Control Council Law No. 10 this was corrected and the link to war was abandoned.

With the beginning of the war on September 1, 1939 and the occupation of Eastern Europe the persecution of the Jews reached a new level. The new territories needed to be “Arianized.” This task was handed over to the SS. The four *Einsatzgruppen* which were formed by the SS, followed the *Wehrmacht* and established a regime of persecution and terror against the Jewish population of Poland and the Soviet Union. These mobile execution committees murdered around one million Jews, Sinti, Roma, communists, and others. They killed men, women, and children alike.

On July 31, 1941, Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* [Main Security Office of the Reich], was assigned the “final solution” for the Jewish problem. His job was to develop a systematic strategy to wipe out the Jewish people from the European continent. At the *Wannsee-Konferenz* on January 20, 1942, Heydrich discussed the technical details of the overall and systematic deportation of the Jews with several ministers and state secretaries. The deportation of Jews was organized by Adolf Eichmann, who was head of the Referat IV B4, responsible for *Judenangelegenheiten* within the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*.

As the shooting of Jews through the SS-*Einsatzgruppen* proved to be inefficient and too stressful for the executioners, more remote methods were developed to exterminate human beings. At first gas-vans were used. People were shuffled into the back of a truck where they slowly suffocated of carbon monoxide. To accelerate the extermination special camps were established in the district of Lublin under the codename “Aktion Reinhardt.” From summer 1942 until fall 1943 around 1.75 million people were killed in the Bełżec, Sobibor, and Treblinka camps. The center of the “final solution,” however, was the Auschwitz concentration camp. Here a special cyanide-based gas called Zyklon B was used for extermination. The Commander Rudolf Höss witnessed at the Nuremberg trial and reported rather cold-bloodedly to have organized the killing of around 3 million people in Auschwitz. His testimony in Nuremberg was the first time that the extent of the Holocaust became publicly known. He was later handed over to the Polish authorities. He was prosecuted and sentenced to death. On April 16, 1947 he was executed on the grounds of the former concentration camp (Harris 2004).

From 1942 onwards Jews from all over Europe were transported to Auschwitz under inhumane conditions. The main person responsible for organizing these transportations was Adolf Eichmann. For him the extinction of the European Jewry was his own war within the war and he was determined to win his war even if it became clear that the war as such was lost. Eichmann was later tried and sentenced to death in Jerusalem where he had been brought from his hiding place in Argentina by Mossad (Bach 2010, pp. 275–285).

In the aftermath of World War II a new concept of crime was crafted: genocide. The word was used for the first time by Raphael Lemkin (Lemkin 1944, p. 79), a Polish jurist who managed to escape Nazi power but lost almost his entire family in the Holocaust. On his initiative the United Nations adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide on December 9, 1948. Even if this convention

came too late and could thus not influence the prosecution of the Nazi crimes because of the prohibition of retroactive criminality, the world community made clear by adopting this convention that the annihilation of an ethnic, religious, national, or racial group is a special, perhaps even the ultimate, crime in international law.

The Nazi regime established a widespread and complex system of forced labor. People from mainly Eastern Europe were brought to Germany to work under inhuman conditions, but dissidents, POWs, homosexuals, Jews, Jehovah witnesses, Sinti and Roma, communists, criminals, and homeless were also brought to labor camps. The forced labor system followed several purposes: (a) to substitute the German workers who had to serve as soldiers, (b) to provide the German industry with a cheap work force, (c) to raise state income by charging fees for the lending of foreign workers, and (d) extermination through labor.

In all areas of the German economy forced laborers were used. The wide range of usage went from slave labor in concentration camps, in stone pits, in the mining industry or ammunition factories, to farm workers. Some 15 million displaced workers were held in Germany, making up 20 percent of the German work force (Panikos Panayi 2005, pp. 483–502). The conditions under which the workers were held were unheard of. The heavily overworked and underfed deportees did not receive any medical attention. Incidentally, even the employers complained that the workers were useless due to their poor physical condition.

The German war industry profited immensely from the forced labor program of the Nazis (Eichholtz 2000, pp. 24–29). This was an important issue in the Nuremberg follow-up trials against Flick (Case No. V), IG-Farben (Case No. VI) and Krupp (Case No. X). In the trial against the major war criminals before the IMT no case was brought against German economic leaders; however, those politically responsible for the massive deportation and the distribution of laborers were charged. This was mainly Fritz Sauckel, who acted as plenipotentiary general for Labor Deployment from 1942 until the end of the war. Named by Robert H. Jackson the “greatest and cruellest slaver since the Pharaohs of Egypt” (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. XIX, p. 516), he was sentenced to death in Nuremberg. Albert Speer, who became the Reichsminister of Armaments and War Production in 1942, managed to persuade the tribunal that he did not know of the pitiful situation of the forced laborers (Fest 2006, p. 257). He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

The Nazi party aimed to conform the German society to its ideology of race separation, persecution of Jews and other minorities, and superiority of the Arian race to the fullest. It did so not only by using the terror of secret police and incarceration of political dissidents, but also by utilizing the “ordinary” channels of legislation and the authority of the judiciary. Even if Hitler seriously disrespected lawyers and courts, many German lawyers proved to be willing followers and helped establishing the Nazi terror regime (Kastner 2001, pp. 236–237). It might even surprise to mention “legislation and jurisprudence” in a chapter about war crimes in World War II. Yet many of the acts of legislation and judgments of certain branches of special courts, but also of many ordinary courts, resulted in such great injustice that this is exactly what they are: international crimes. After all, this is the message of the Jurist Trial, Case No. III of the subsequent trials at Nuremberg.

Thus the drafting of the *Nürnberger Rassegesetze* [Nuremberg Race Laws] by high ranking civil servants within the *Reichsjustizministerium* [Ministry of Justice] was seen

as a war crime as it served as the legal basis for sterilization of people in order to annihilate the Jewish race and other minorities. Inheritance laws were modified in such a way that thousands of Jews lost their property to the Reich. Family and marriage laws were amended so that the racial ideology could be achieved. Nazi party members were granted amnesties for crimes committed against “unwanted” individuals.

Within the court system, special chambers were established within the ordinary judiciary to prosecute dissidents and political opponents for treason. The notorious People’s Court, which was established as early as 1934, was capable to try any act that was directed against the Third Reich as *Wehrkraftzersetzung* [disintegration of defensive capability]. Its long-term president, Roland Freisler, handed down one death sentence after the other, the best-known death sentences being that against the *Weißerose* [White Rose] resistance group and that of the “traitors” of July 20, 1944.

The judiciary further collaborated with the Secret Police in executing the *Nacht und Nebel Erlass*. Criminals were sentenced to draconian sentences, often resulting in the death of the person concerned. The sterilization practice and eugenics programs, which resulted in the death of thousands of people who were called “asocial,” were counted as crimes against humanity. Likewise thousands were treated as lunatics and held under inhumane conditions in asylums.

Another field of judicial terror was military laws and military courts (Bryant and Kirschner 2008, p. 65). The harshness of the sentences handed down for desertion was unparalleled: 30,000 soldiers were sentenced to death and about 23,000 were executed (Messerschmidt and Wüllner 1987, pp. 15, 49, 87).

Many of the worst and most influential Nazi jurists were not available for trial after the end of the war. The former minister of justice, Franz Gürtner, had died in 1941 and Roland Freisler was killed during an air raid in Berlin on February 3, 1945. The later minister of justice, Otto Thierack, committed suicide after he was taken in custody on April 30, 1945. In the Jurist Trial, which took place in Nuremberg from February 17, 1947 until December 4, 1947, of the sixteen accused four were sentenced to life term imprisonment, four were acquitted, whereas the others received prison sentences between five and ten years. There were no death sentences. The judgment could thus be seen as too lenient. All of the convicted were granted early release in the 1950s. One also has to keep in mind that no other jurist was punished for his role in the judiciary of the Nazi-system. Quite to the contrary, in some regions of Germany, all of the former Nazi judges and prosecutors were taken on to serve as jurists in the Federal Republic of Germany (Frei 1999, pp. 69–100).

At the end of this short overview of the most heinous atrocities committed by the Nazi regime during World War II, we want to take issue with the practice of medical experiments on POWs, inmates of concentration camps, or mentally ill persons. The particularly obnoxious behavior of doctors and medical personnel who should, according to their oath, work towards preserving human life and healing the wounded, was made the topic of the first subsequent trial at Nuremberg, the so-called Doctors’ trial (Case No. I). Amongst the accused were Karl Brandt, who was Hitler’s personal physician, Karl Gebhardt as Himmler’s medical attendant, and several other doctors who worked in concentration camps. The facts brought forward against the doctors contained several medical experiments in concentration camps and the research in racial hygiene. In Dachau for example, medical experiments were conducted on living humans for testing whether it would be possible for a parachutist to jump from 12,000

meters (approximately 36,000 feet) or whether he would risk his life due to oxygen deprivation. Similarly, tests were conducted as to how long a human being could survive in ice-cold water. Simulations on concentration camp inmates resulted in their certain death. In Sachsenhausen, inmates were infected with icterus, in Buchenwald with spotted fever, and in Dachau with malaria in order to gain knowledge on the course of the disease and the chances of healing. Experiments on POWs and other deported persons were held as being contrary to the laws and customs of war.

Euthanasia programs, like the Aktion T4, which performed mass sterilizations and mass murder of “undesirable” members of Nazi society, specifically those with physical and mental disabilities, were highlighted at the trial and declared as a crime against humanity.

The sentences were considerably higher compared to the Jurist Trial. Of the 23 accused, seven were sentenced to death and executed on June 2, 1948, five received life term, four were sentenced to imprisonment between 10 and 20 years, while seven were acquitted. All of those sentenced to prison terms were released by 1955.

The military tribunal, however, did not satisfy itself with judging the accused. Rather in its judgment of August 20, 1947, it laid down the so-called Nürnberger Kodex [Nuremberg Code], in which basic parameters for medical experiments are being formulated and which is still applicable today. Other trials against doctors were conducted in Dachau and in Hadamar, which was one of the main psychiatric hospitals where T4 was performed.

The prosecution of war crimes is a relatively new development. Indeed it took place for the first time in history after World War II and exclusively against the Germans. After World War I it was still impossible to prosecute the German emperor before an international tribunal as the Netherlands granted him asylum (Bassiouni 2002). Despite the fact that the Allied powers had drafted a list of several hundred war criminals and handed it over to Germany, only some 12 persons were prosecuted during 1921/1922 by the *Reichsgericht*. These so-called *Leipziger Prozesse* resulted in eight convictions, with lenient sentences which were hardly executed (Safferling 2011, p. 47).

In the course of World War II the Allied powers decided not to repeat the same mistake again and declared the prosecution of Nazi war criminals as one of the goals of the war in the Moscow Declaration of October 30 and November 1, 1943. A twofold approach was foreseen: whereas national authorities should prosecute those crimes that could be localized geographically, a joint enterprise should be established for crimes without territorial link. In view of the massive scale of the war crimes committed by Germans, it would have been unfeasible to try every alleged war criminal on an international level.

Consultations between the Allied powers on how to fulfill the commitment made in the Moscow declaration started after the war. These talks turned out to be rather difficult as there was no general agreement on how prosecution should proceed. A charter for the International Military Tribunal was finally adopted by the four Allied governments, and was supported by a further 19 states, in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, (Safferling 2011, p. 50). The tribunal convened for the first time where the indictment was served on 24 accused. On November 20, 1945 the trial was opened in Nuremberg and lasted until October 1, 1946. The bench of the accused was a mixture of politicians, military leaders, and even economic leaders, most

prominent amongst them Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, Wilhelm Keitel and Albert Speer; as Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels committed suicide to avert prosecution. Martin Bormann, Hitler's secretary, was tried in absentia, but it later emerged that he was already dead at the start of the trial. The trial was dominated and sponsored largely by the USA. Justice Robert H. Jackson can be seen as the mastermind behind the IMT Charter and acted as chief prosecutor during the trial. The judgment was surprisingly differentiated: twelve death sentences, three life imprisonments, and four prison sentences of between 10 and 20 years, with three acquittals. The death sentences were executed on October 16, 1946. All of the convicts were hanged except for Göring who somehow managed to poison himself shortly before the execution. The remaining prisoners were brought to Spandau in Berlin. By 1966 all had been released with the exception of Rudolf Hess, who died in prison in 1987.

The Nuremberg trial of the major German war criminals is the birth of the direct form of execution of international criminal law (see International Military Tribunal 1947). It was not possible to establish a permanent International Criminal Court during the cold war, but the idea was taken up by the UN Security Council in 1993 by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The International Criminal Court (ICC) was finally founded in 1998 with the adoption of the Rome Statute.

The vast majority of war criminals were prosecuted by national authorities. Within Germany this was done by the occupying powers and based on Control Council Law No. 10. Most prominent amongst these national trials were the 12 subsequent trials in Nuremberg staged by the US. Apart from Nuremberg a series of trials was conducted in Dachau and Hadamar. The UK, France, and the Soviet Union also conducted war crimes trials in Germany. Apart from that, other European states, such as France, Poland, and Italy, prosecuted war criminals in their respective countries. Apart from criminal prosecution a classification system was introduced in the three Western zones of occupation in the course of the de-Nazification process. In these so-called *Spruchkammernverfahren*, German lay judges decided, based on Control Council Law No. 104, whether the person concerned was a main offender, an activist, a lesser offender, a mere follower, or whether the person should be exonerated. In the 1950s, however, most of the convicted persons were granted amnesties and released.

Germany abolished CCL No. 10 in the first year of the Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. For several years no prosecution of former Nazi criminals took place. The so-called Ulmer *Einsatzgruppenprozess* refueled prosecution of World War II related crimes in 1958. Shortly afterwards the *Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen* [Central Agency for the Investigation of National Socialist crimes] was founded in Ludwigsburg. Around 7,000 indictments were prepared by this agency (Rüping 2006, pp. 286–295). Public attention focused on the so-called *Auschwitzprozess*, which took place from 1963 to 1965 in Frankfurt, and which demonstrated to the German public the magnitude of the Holocaust (Dix 2010, pp. 287–298).

On the international level the trial, starting in 1961 against Adolf Eichmann in Israel, received most attention. Eichmann as the main organizer of the Holocaust was sentenced to death in 1962. Prosecution of war criminals still continues until today as can be seen with the trials against John Demjanjuk in Munich and Heinrich Boere in Aachen.

A war is not a lawless status. State sovereignty does not imply that a government can do with its population as it pleases. The horrors of war and the consequences of total disrespect for human life by government authority have materialized nowhere else in such intensity as during World War II. Massive abuse of human rights cannot be excused as an act of state, but is a crime, which is followed by prosecution and punishment.

When studying the crimes committed in World War II, we are often shocked to see what one human can do to another. It is even more upsetting when one considers the high level of education and civilization that Germany had before the rise of the Nazi party. The systematic organization of enslavement and extermination to establish a "master race" remains unparalleled. Certainly, it must not be forgotten that the Allied forces have also committed war crimes. The Katyn massacre is one of them, and another is the carpet bombardments of German cities full of refugees from the east which could not be justified by military necessity and had the sole purpose of spreading fear and terror. In that sense the words of Robert H. Jackson in his opening address at the Courthouse in Nuremberg must be remembered:

We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice. (International Military Tribunal 1947, vol. II, p. 101)

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CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE

Anglo-American Postwar Planning

CHARLIE WHITHAM

In terms of postwar planning, the very expression *Anglo-American* is a contentious one. Put simply, the mere existence of joint planning does not of itself confirm the existence of parity, equality, unity, or even agreement of the participants. As much of the scholarship reviewed in this section will attest, “allied” planning for the peace was, certainly in terms of resources, enthusiasm, and (arguably) ownership, a decidedly more American affair than it was British, and even less Canadian or French. But it would also be inaccurate to refer to the wartime planning effort as exclusively American, even if there were many in Washington that perceived it as such. This is because so much of the United States’ vision for the postwar world was predicated, like it or not, on there being a prominent role for its erstwhile economic competitor and main ally against the Axis. In short, Britain was an indispensable partner – albeit perhaps a junior one – in shaping the peace. Indeed, much of the scholarship about wartime planning, even that which casts the US in the most imperious of lights, identifies areas of compromise and collaboration between the two powers, some regarding quite significant matters of policy. This awkward marriage was an expression of the shifting fault lines of global power in the 1940s, where the two remaining democratic nations fought the Axis (in alliance with a politically excluded Soviet Union) and simultaneously engaged each other over a transfer of world powerdom – what Randall Bennett Woods (1990) fittingly dubbed “a changing of the guard.”

Accordingly, there seems ample justification in referring to Allied postwar planning as an Anglo-American exercise, but one that is best interpreted within the wider narrative of their “special” wartime relationship – a relationship critically informed by their discrete, and not always harmonious, postwar objectives. For the US, American leaders were determined that the outcome of this second world conflagration would result in the creation of an international order best suited to the advancement of American political and economic ambitions through ending regional blocs. Indeed, such was the obsession of American planners with achieving the right postwar

settlement that the thin line separating war aims from postwar aims was often crossed. This phenomenon was most noticeable in American discussions with Britain, a relationship as complex as it was unparalleled. Britain was all at once a major economic competitor, a vital strategic ally in the fight for Europe, and a crucial partner in establishing any new postwar international order. However, given its more vulnerable status, much of British diplomacy with the US was directed to the chief aim of survival. Postwar planning for the British was approached far more pragmatically than it was for the Americans, whose determination to directly link postwar objectives with the prosecution of the war was a source of great irritation to the British who were less mindful of any grand visions of a new postwar order – especially if it entailed sacrifices from them. Foremost amongst British ambitions after the war was the safeguarding of the colonial empire and, to the best of its ability, retention of world power status in the political, economic, and military realms. The notion that Britain may be compelled to make more sacrifices in the interests of an American vision of liberalized trade and liberated colonies was naturally resisted during the war. Hence it was inevitable that the underlying differences between the emerging superpower and the aging empire – some minor and some quite profound – would be played out in the various planning forums of the war.

Still, the high levels of similarity between their respective postwar visions – the maintenance of economic freedoms and collective security – permitted a considerable degree of cooperation between the British and US leaderships during the war over the principles, if not the timing and application, of postwar objectives. Certainly, when military victory seemed assured after 1942 politics played a larger part in their relations and began, as Warren F. Kimball quaintly put it in *Forged In War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the Second World War* (1997), “a sugarplum dance in their heads” (p. 197). In the end, the physical imbalance between the two nations, the high British material dependency on the US, several diplomatic miscues, and ultimately national self-interest combined to wreck any chance of a *Pax Anglo-Americana*. The outcome of these historically specific challenges in the relations between Britain and the US is at the heart of scholarship on the Anglo-American wartime “special” relationship, and as many have noted, Anglo-American postwar planning is as much a tale of great power rivalry as it is of a common cause to build a mutually beneficial future.

The following discussion is limited to those areas of planning that, if not exclusively comprised of officials of the US and British governments, were led and shaped by British or American planners. This is especially the case in respect to establishing postwar economic organization, the cornerstone of Anglo-American planning, which took place under the auspices of the United Nations Organization and involved 35 other nations, but in terms of policy was exclusively an Anglo-American affair. A distinction has also been made between planning engagements and the myriad other Anglo-American encounters of the war that took place as part of the regular diplomacy between the two countries and is dealt with elsewhere in this *Companion*.

There are few texts that deal exclusively with postwar planning, and the field still relies heavily upon a hardcore of very old texts written soon after the war. One of them is *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation* (1950) by Harley A. Notter, the chronicler of US State Department endeavors in postwar planning. It is a large and highly detailed work dedicated to charting “how” as opposed to “why” State Department policy was made by way of this “extraordinary process” (p. 2). As such

Notter concentrated on the institutional framework for decision-making and the key decision-makers. The longevity of his work was helped by the fact that Notter enjoyed privileged access to government documents that would take decades to reach the public. In the economic sphere, a noteworthy text is *Economic Planning for the Peace* (1953), written by E. F. Penrose, economic adviser to John G. Winant, US Ambassador to London during the war. Though not an "official" history, this is as close as we get to one: Penrose charts in great detail the various efforts at American and British economic planning up to 1947. Indeed, Penrose's aim was to critique postwar planning to understand better why it failed. Though dated, the basic outline of economic planning traced by Penrose is a bedrock source for all serious treatments of Anglo-American planning. Another elderly but by no means dated book that deserves special mention is Richard N. Gardner's *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (1956, 1986), a magnificent tome of detail that has supplied historians for years as an ambitious history of the Anglo-American effort to construct a liberal world economic system after the war. The only recent book that integrates both economic and political aspects of American postwar planning is Georg Schild's *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks* (1995), which is an excellent treatment of the subject. Together these books form the backbone of scholarly attention on postwar planning and are essential starting points for research in this field. Thus much of what follows is what the author has gleaned from a small number of specialist texts and larger treatments of the Anglo-American wartime relationship, a topic on which there is ample record. Given the scope and size of this chapter it has therefore been impossible to include every instance that a particular planning effort has been mentioned, and the author apologizes beforehand for excluding many worthy texts in favor of those considered most significant in their contribution to our understanding of the planning experience. What follows is a roughly chronological survey of postwar planning milestones that involved representatives of both nations.

Nowhere were the boundaries of the Anglo-American relationship more exercised – before or since – than in their planning of new international economic instruments for after the war. It was the meeting ground of two immutable realities of the mid-twentieth century: British power giving way to the rising US giant but American reliance on the British to assist in achieving that transition. This paradox caused inevitable tension between the two powers at all levels of their diplomacy and planning, but most notably in their planning for a new postwar liberalized – or multilateral – economic order. Both nations were aware of, and in places had begun making plans for, economic potentialities in the postwar period, and it was not long before these plans were united as the war gradually brought both sides together. The first such encounter took place during talks about aiding the Allies.

As in most areas of Anglo-American contact during the war, the arrangements for aiding the Allies to fight the war was no simple administrative task. Discussions about levels of aid, in what areas, and at what cost were complicated by the wider and longer-term economic interests and ambitions of the two powers. Consequently Lend-Lease is one of those areas that straddled both wartime and postwar planning. So it was that as soon as Roosevelt was able to assist the hard-pressed British more directly after his third election victory in November 1940, the complex assessment of Anglo-American needs was undertaken and Lend-Lease was born. This bold initiative recognized Britain's lack of dollars to purchase US material and the American desire to avoid the

suffocating weight of debt that so distorted the political and financial landscape after 1918. After a three month battle with Congress, in March 1941 Roosevelt's "arsenal of democracy" was empowered to lend or lease equipment overseas to promote the defense of the US. Warren F. Kimball's *The Most Unsordid Act* (1969) remains the seminal work on the foundation of Lend-Lease. However, this act of transatlantic friendship quickly became sullied when London and Washington sat down to discuss what the US wanted in return for its help. One of the earliest and most useful texts that dealt with the convoluted negotiations surrounding Lend-Lease and "consideration" for it (what became Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement) was Gardner's *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (1956). Gardner upgraded Penrose's *Economic Planning for the Peace* (1953), whose section on Article VII does not attribute sources and concentrates on Ambassador Winant's role (pp. 11–32). Signed in February 1942, the Mutual Aid Agreement was ostensibly about the terms of settlement for Lend-Lease goods Britain would receive, but the talks gave both sides another opportunity to discuss and refine their postwar economic objectives that according to Gardner "went well beyond the hastily drafted economic clauses of the Atlantic Charter" (p. 54). By way of a quid pro quo for Lend-Lease, Gardner traced State Department pressure to extract a firm British commitment to jointly forge a liberalized postwar world economy by ending trade discrimination through British Imperial Preference, the main bone of contention from the 1930s. After eight months of intermittent negotiation, the State Department failed to commit the British to halt Imperial Preference but won a vague commitment to end trade discrimination depending on "governing economic conditions" and to begin conversations on the subject "at an early convenient date." This compromise language was also a feature of the Atlantic Charter signed in August 1941 as Article VII was being negotiated (dealt with below). Still, Article VII was "significant in reaffirming" that the two governments would work together to establish a liberalized economic system after the war (p. 68).

The historian David Reynolds, in his influential *Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance* (1981), devoted considerable attention to the background debates over Lend-Lease which he depicted as being far from a generous and unsullied act: "The British hoped to shift as much as possible of the financial burden of the war on to the USA, so as to safeguard their postwar position. The Americans, equally naturally, resisted British efforts and at times used Britain's crisis to advance their own ends" (p. 166). In a short discussion of Article VII, Reynolds incorporated new British evidence to that of Warren Kimball's earlier article "Lend-Lease and the Open Door: the Temptation of British Opulence" (1971), based on US sources in which Reynolds suggested confrontation with the State Department over liberalized trade could have been avoided "if the British had been more tactful and forthcoming" over consideration and forced a stronger reaction from the Americans. Reynolds' conclusion stressed the mutuality of the two opposing camps – the defensive British unwilling to unilaterally drop preferences and the aggressive Americans using their economic leverage to open up the Empire – by arguing that Article VII was actually a balanced compromise with the emphasis "less on what the USA could get back as on what both governments could contribute to the creation of a better world" (p. 278). The battle over Article VII helped the Americans better understand the complexities of shifting to a liberalized world order and the British began to conceptualize "a possible alternative to bilateralism" (p. 280).

Our understanding of Lend-Lease has since been embellished using both British and American documents by Alan P. Dobson in his two books *Wartime Aid to Britain* (1986) and *The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940–1987* (1988), where Lend-Lease is placed at the start of a longer narrative about Anglo-American relations. Unlike Gardner, for Dobson (1988) the wrangling over Article VII did not make any firmer the Anglo-American plans for the postwar order. Instead, British obfuscation and American reticence to press their allies led only to “a perpetuation of the equivocation and ambiguity” that surrounded the commitments of the Atlantic Charter (p. 34). Indeed, Article VII was only the beginning of a series of problematic encounters between the two governments over the operation of Lend-Lease and how it impacted on British postwar economic commitments. Dobson (1988) argued that Lend-Lease was constantly used by the Americans, and especially the State Department, as leverage to further commit the British to open their empire to world trade after the war. Indeed, Lend-Lease itself muddled Britain’s economic waters, creating a dependency and possibly limiting control over dismantling the controls so earnestly demanded by the Americans. In the end the British failed to obtain American commitments to help the British economy with a postwar export drive and a continuation of Lend-Lease after the defeat of Germany (pp. 34–74). Indeed, the “battle” over Article VII may have been over, but the “struggle,” according to Randall Bennett Woods, of American multilateralists to break Imperial Preference had just begun. Woods, in *A Changing of the Guard* (1990), his leading examination of multilateralism and wartime Anglo-American relations, argued strongly that it was economic questions about the postwar world that came to dominate their relationship, so much so that “Britain’s military struggle against overwhelming odds would be paralleled by a struggle against similar odds with the American multilateralists” (p. 61). This struggle would be heightened when the planners looked to erect definite instrumentalities later in the war.

The political canopy for Anglo-American planning during the war was the famous and very public statement of war aims embodied in the Atlantic Charter. Signed amidst great ceremony after a short conference at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland between 9 and 12 August 1941, the Charter was a deliberate attempt by the US to avoid the fate of President Woodrow Wilson in the last war when his belated effort to instill peace aims on the entente powers led to an incomplete and fatally compromised postwar settlement. Like Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the Atlantic Charter addressed the political, economic, and ideological components of a postwar order based around eight “common principles” pertaining to political freedom, respect for sovereignty, free trade, and a new international security system – topics that echoed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech of January 1941 (freedom of speech, worship, want, and fear).

To this day the most vivid account of this historic meeting between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill remains that of the “official” British reporter at the scene, H. V. Morton. His uncritical narrative *Atlantic Meeting* (1943) extolled the virtues of comradely union signified in “one of the most remarkable documents in history” (p. 17). These themes were first tested by primary documentary evidence in Theodore Wilson’s extensive *The First Summit* (1969). Wilson established much of what has become the accepted version of a meeting that was more of “an exploratory confrontation” than one with defined objectives, and it was Roosevelt above all who

wished to postpone political questions until later in the war. As Wilson explained, although “circumstances ensured that some kind of statement on war aims would arise,” that it would “take the form of the Atlantic Charter was not at all certain” (p. 179). Indeed, for Wilson the Charter’s influence was “severely limited” as being merely the “embodiment of a real yet informal alliance” between the two nations and a “tentative compromise statement of their credos” (pp. 262–263). Also, the extent that the Charter was a genuinely “Anglo-American” document has been heavily disputed. Indeed, scholarship since has highlighted how US officials used the meeting to extract postwar concessions from the British, evident in Articles Three and Four which were perceived as indirect attacks on British power. Article Three provided for the “right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live” and the restoration of self-government to those currently deprived of it, which Churchill saw as undermining British control over the colonies. Article Four, again if literally read, was an economic attack on the Empire in seeking that all nations be granted “access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world.” This Article echoed discussions currently taking place in Washington and London over the matter of “consideration” for British receipt of Lend-Lease.

The anti-colonial sentiments of Article Three of the Charter and their impact on British colonial thinking are exhaustively plotted and analyzed in *Imperialism at Bay* (1977), the work of eminent historian William Roger Louis, who maintained that this part of the Atlantic Charter was so profound it “led to a recognition within the Colonial Office that Britain’s basic colonial policy would have to be examined and defined” (p. 133). For Louis, the anti-colonial leanings of Roosevelt were more than just sentiment or the reflection of American self-interest in dislodging the British Empire. Rather, self-government was a fundamental American principle that, as Louis wrote in his article “American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire” (Louis 1986), “was a force in itself which helped to shape the substance of defense, economic, and foreign policy” (p. 264).

Wilson’s version of contention and compromise in the Atlantic meeting is underlined by Reynolds (1981). But unlike Wilson (1969), who believed Roosevelt’s expectations of the conference were “not entirely clear” (p. 264), Reynolds (1981), contended that the British arrived at Newfoundland unaware that a statement of war aims was what Roosevelt was after, and that the president used his meeting with Churchill primarily to push for British acceptance of liberalized trade principles and self-determination for the colonial Empire after the war (pp. 257–258). This account is reinforced by Dobson (1988), who showed that the Americans, especially the Department of State, pushed for clauses that bound the British to drop Imperial Preference, but in the interests of expediency Roosevelt – who prioritized propaganda over detail – agreed a softened clause over trade and a watered-down commitment to postwar decolonization (pp. 28–29) to ensure a statement was produced. Despite these concessions, for the British the Charter fell well short of a commitment by the Americans to fully join the fray against Hitler: all they got was, what Reynolds (1981) termed, a declaration of “grand but vacuous phrases about the post-war world” (p. 214). Reynolds has since tempered this observation in his book *From Munich to Pearl Harbor* (2001) by arguing that the Charter represented “a community of Anglo-American values” (p. 145). John Charmley’s hefty critical work on Churchill and the special relationship, *Churchill’s Grand Alliance* (1995), similarly portrayed

the Charter as a poor return for the British and an effort by Roosevelt “to ensure that the British underwrote American war aims” so as “to meet the fears of those many Americans ... who were afraid that America was underwriting British war aims” (p. 37). There is also an interesting cross-section of opinions about the Charter in the fiftieth anniversary conference collection *The Atlantic Charter* (1994) edited by Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther. More recently, Victor Rothwell in *War Aims of the Major Belligerents* (2005) went further in stressing the propaganda value of the Charter over its substance, citing both leaders as placing little weight in its contents. He pointed to utterances from Churchill that “democratic freedoms” and “free trade” would never be exercised at the expense of the Empire, and that Roosevelt saw the Charter as a democratic counterpoint to the Third Reich (which in August 1941 might soon engulf the USSR). Further, Roosevelt harbored doubts about creating a “new” League of Nations (he favored an Anglo-American world police force), and later found the clauses on freedom and trade problematic when dealing with the German problem and Soviet-occupied Europe (pp. 115–117).

As ever, the context and timing of the Atlantic Charter was what mattered, and both leaders left Newfoundland claiming that the meeting advanced – if only partially for the British – their respective interests. Vague or not, the Atlantic Charter supplied the basic outline for Anglo-American relations – trade liberalization, decolonization, and global security – for the remainder of the war and supplied the foundations of their joint planning organizations for the postwar world.

An area of Anglo-American planning that thoroughly showcased the complexities of the wartime relationship was that relating to the Caribbean. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was established in 1942 as a forum to discuss social and economic matters common across the Caribbean possessions of Britain and the US, namely Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and the British West Indies. The Commission was the brainchild of the sugar baron and Roosevelt acolyte Charles Taussig, who served as co-chair of the Commission alongside his British counterpart, Sir Frank Stockdale. Taussig convinced Roosevelt, then the British, that the region deserved a more focused treatment of its severe problems of poverty, monoculture, and political inequality. The decay of the region since the retreat of the sugar cane industry and over-dependence on other agricultural goods, together with widespread rioting in the British possessions in 1938 and further dislocations brought by the war, made the American offer of a helping hand in the region difficult for the British to refuse.

However, from the outset the Commission was dogged by profound differences between the participants over the organization’s remit. Taussig originally wanted the Commission to discuss political issues alongside socioeconomic ones, but this was rejected by the British Colonial Office which was sensitive about raising the delicate subject of political reform in its crumbling West Indian colonies. The Commission proposed a variety of remedies – first crystallized in the recommendations of the inaugural West Indian Conference of 1944 – to widen and modernize the economic base of the territories and to improve the education and social conditions of its inhabitants. But American efforts to better inter-regional trade and diversification through the creation of a Caribbean trading “bloc” was stiffly resisted by the British who perceived these actions as motivated by anticolonial sentiment or otherwise undermining of British influence in the region. However, the reforming ambitions of the Commission

were narrowed as postwar priorities changed and when Taussig died in 1946 the Commission lost its Anglo-American tag and was transformed into a bastion against communism that included the Dutch and French possessions in the newly named Caribbean Commission.

Literature that was specifically concerned with the AACC was hard to find until the 1990s, with only passing commentary from larger works on the Caribbean. Even so, the verdict was very negative. Renowned historian of the region, Gordon K. Lewis, in a rare mention of the organization in what became a standard text on the Caribbean *The Growth of the Modern West Indies* (1968), condemned the AACC as an “imperialist” body dominated by “Europeans” and established only to maintain political “stability” in the West Indies during the war. In practice, this meant “the consolidation of the growing American influence in the region” at the expense of fostering genuine West Indian advancement (p. 350). The release of primary documents in the 1970s and 1980s did little to diminish this interpretation of the AACC as a mere vehicle of US power. It was not until Fitzroy Baptiste in *War, Conflict and Cooperation* (1988), that the AACC was written about utilizing fresh sources, while Lester D. Langley’s *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century* (1989), is another informative text but covers only lightly the AACC and the war period. Cary Fraser presented a fine account of the politics of the AACC in *Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism* (1994), which takes a longer view of Caribbean history that begins in 1940 with American attempts to reform the political landscape in the region.

It was not until very recently that a detailed account of the diplomacy surrounding the AACC and its relationship to the wider discourses about the “special relationship” was undertaken. Building on the work of Baptiste (1988) and Fraser (1994), Charlie Whitham’s *Bitter Rehearsal* (2002) charted the rise and fall of Anglo-American involvement in the AACC, and how ultimately plans for the organization ran aground on US ambitions and assumptions regarding the postwar world, in this respect sharing the fate of other grand Anglo-American schemes (see later). While agreeing with Lewis about the overarching imperialist context of British and US involvement in the AACC, Whitham stressed that it was not so much political objectives – which were anyway topics outlawed from the AACC by the British from the outset – as economic motives that were linked to the creation of a multilateral world order, such as the breaking of Imperial Preference and the extension of US markets, that drove American engagement in the colonies: “The AACC was therefore in many ways a prototype for the role that America perceived for itself in the post-war world” (p. 190). In this regard, Whitham claimed, the experience of the Commission was much like a “rehearsal” of debates – involving trade freedom, commercial access and trading blocs – that were taking place simultaneously between London and Washington about the economic future of the Empire (and the rest of Europe) as the war neared its end (p. 194). To this mainly politico-economic thesis that tied the fate of the “Anglo-American” element of the AACC to the wider demise of the US postwar project, Jason C. Parker in *Brother’s Keeper* (2008) has added a broader interpretation of US policy in the Caribbean in what he called an “ensemble” of three interconnecting “R’s”: realism in the military-strategic context; social, political, and economic reform; and race, informed not only by US possession of territories in the region but also by the substantial African American population at home (p. 40). In this more plural sense the AACC, in Parker’s words, “provided a template for cooperation and the stimulus

of competing colonialisms” in the push for West Indian independence and a “trial-run” for US national security doctrine for the cold war (p. 66).

The Atlantic Charter and Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement had established – albeit vaguely – the general parameters of agreement over an Anglo-American vision of a postwar world economy devoid of the protectionism, discrimination, and financial instability that had characterized the previous decade. If finding agreement over principles was hard, discussion over the practicalities of establishing this new order were to prove even more difficult. Anglo-American planning was along two paths: finance and trade.

The most detailed commentary of Anglo-American financial planning is Armand van Dormael’s *Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System* (1978), which used newly released primary documents to chart in detail the proceedings of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 where the Allies agreed on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Densely narrative and packed with large quotations, Van Dormael offered little analytical commentary of the events. Gardner (1956), in his account of the talks – based on mainly secondary and some official primary sources – is less descriptive and, though written earlier than Van Dormael’s book, is still quoted extensively in any survey of Bretton Woods (pp. 71–100, 110–143). These studies have been supplemented by Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., whose *A Search for Solvency* (1975) discussed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and relied mainly on secondary works, and the comprehensive treatment by Schild (1995).

In short, at Bretton Woods two “plans,” one by the British economist John Maynard Keynes and the other by the American economist and Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, Harry Dexter White, were reconciled. It was, as Scott Newton in his *The Global Economy* (2004) recently called it “an ingenious compromise” between the original plans (p. 17). Optimism that the British and American visions of a future multilateral world economy were compatible was echoed in parallel discussions in Washington about the liberalization of world trade. In the autumn of 1945 the British successfully held out against yet more American pressure to drop Imperial Preferences and import restrictions as a condition for joining a new International Trade Organization (ITO) to join the sister organs around finance established at Bretton Woods. American relaxation over these issues convinced the British that what was being created for the postwar economy was a more genuinely “Anglo-American” project which “was truer to the spirit of wartime optimism” than even Bretton Woods (p. 22).

Unlike negotiations over the Atlantic Charter and Article VII, the experts at Bretton Woods were given relatively free rein to arrive at very technical solutions without political interference. Yet as the war drove to a conclusion in 1945, political questions about the practical transition to a multilateral order inevitably closed-in on the experts. In terms of the Bretton Woods agreements, although the Keynes and White plans were very similar – they both outlined a mechanism for currency stabilization and financial assistance to war-damaged nations – the IMF and IBRD that emerged definitely favored the American version. According to Gardner, whatever the negotiators thought of the results, Bretton Woods exposed major technical differences which rested upon vastly differing perceptions of how, and when, the new postwar order would take place: basically the Americans wanted a much faster

transition to the new architecture than the British felt capable of. This is why the British regarded Bretton Woods with skepticism and the British Parliament took several months to ratify its conclusions. Eckes (1975) went further in claiming that technical differences were “not insurmountable. The chief obstacles were political” (p. 106). Gardner (1956) claimed British doubts were linked to assumptions about transitional financial aid from the US, as without this Britain would be unable to support the IMF or IBRD. “Without a meeting of minds on these matters,” Gardner concluded, “it was hard to see how the two institutions [IMF and IBRD] could be made to work” (p. 143).

By the end of 1945 it was becoming clear that there would be no meeting of minds as the US government pushed hard for acceptance of its economic vision. After a grueling encounter with the Americans in the winter of 1945–1946 about a transitional loan, at the inaugural meeting of the IMF in March 1946 it was obvious that the IMF would be used by the Americans to advance currency convertibility, fixed exchange rates, and trade liberalization upon its members. Such was the dissatisfaction with this outcome that Keynes argued for Britain to leave the IMF but, being so dependent on the US for assistance, for Newton (2004), the British “lacked both the international influence and the financial clout to make their views prevail” (p. 23). As for the proposed ITO, Gardner (1956) noted that American experts had convinced themselves that what the British had agreed would be sufficient to undermine Imperial Preference, when in fact domestic British opinion was firmly opposed to any such reductions without very substantial concessions from all over the world (pp. 154–158). Indeed, in contrast with American success in dominating the outcomes of Bretton Woods, their liberalizing plans for the ITO ran aground on domestic and international opposition, eventually collapsing before Congress. Gardner (1956) identified three main reasons for the ITO’s failure: a late start that missed the “full flush of wartime enthusiasm”; neglect of the under-developed nations; and being unsuited to the realities of a war-torn world economy. The ITO, unlike the IMF and IBRD, “did not have a chance to die: it was simply still-born” (Gardner 1956, pp. 378, 379). The preamble to the abortive ITO was adopted as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which became what Harold G. Vatter in his *The US Economy in World War Two* (1985) described as the “chief vehicle” for international efforts at trade liberalization (p. 159). The best single treatment of the history of trade liberalization during the war is that of Thomas W. Zeiler, whose *Free Trade, Free World* (1999) is rich with archival sources that significantly updates the checkered story of what Zeiler branded the “grand fantasy” of the ITO (, p. 1). For Zeiler, “politics and diplomacy” had “pushed the British towards the US” in agreeing to the ITO in the first place, but it was factors largely outside of the multilateralists’ control which determined the fate of the ITO: “ideology, domestic politics, and diplomacy supplanted pure economic considerations and theories of efficiency in commercial relations” and left the Americans with a GATT system that offered only a “moderate form of multilateralism.” Eventually the realities of waging the cold war ended the liberalizers’ dreams (pp. 195–196).

“In the end,” as Newton (2004) concluded, “the ‘new order’ that emerged from the war was Washington’s version” (p. 24). Alan S. Milward, in his earlier groundbreaking treatise on war economics, *War, Economy and Society* (1977), put it more strongly when he argued that the IMF and the World Bank were “subordinated to United States

control and operated no longer in the universal interest but as instruments of United States policy" (p. 364). Fred L. Block, in his excellent summary *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (1977), felt the Americans could "look with pride" at their success in bettering the British (p. 68). For Reynolds in his latest *From World War to Cold War* (2006) it was "agreement on American terms, but offering real benefits to Britain" (p. 64). Even Eckes (1975), who is more deferential to American efforts to accommodate, commented that "in the final analysis Bretton Woods inaugurated an economic Pax Americana" even though it "achieved an economist's peace" (p. 284). Schild (1995) agreed that the IMF and IBRD "created the basis for a successful penetration of global markets by American business" (p. 186). These verdicts received a paler echo in the work of economist Filipo Cesarano, whose theoretical treatment of the Bretton Woods system *Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods* (2009), supplied one of the most recent summaries of the negotiations (though still heavily dependent on Gardner's 1956 composition). For him, it was the "greater bargaining power" and "political preponderance" of the US that led to a "hybrid plan" which ultimately failed to deliver. American rigidity and British weakness compounded by a "laggard theoretical approach" eventually ruined chances to properly reconstruct an Anglo-American liberal economic order (pp. 159–188). Most agree with Milward (1977), however, that as it became clear the postwar world economy needed major intervention to revive it, and with the rise of East–West tensions, the Bretton Woods institutions, bypassed by the Marshall Aid and the cold war, were nonetheless "protoplasmic" – or vague – enough to allow the eventual postwar world to "form what it wanted of them" (p. 364).

Alongside the highly technical negotiations that dominated the creation of the proposed postwar economic architecture was a discussion about the broader political framework of the future world order. This was America's "second chance," as Robert A. Divine described it in *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (1967), to correct its failure to lead the international order after World War I and end the tradition of American isolationism (p. 5). Discussion about a future world political and security organization had circulated through London and Washington since the beginning of the war in Europe, and were explicitly mentioned in Article Eight of the Atlantic Charter, but it was not until early in 1944 that definite plans were floated about what this organization should look like. Schild identified American planning efforts as being in two phases: between 1940–1944 the US planners devised their own plans until in 1944 they were ready to discuss them with the Allies (p. 50). British plans were guided by their experience of the League of Nations, and proposed a structure for the "United Nations" that comprised a council, an assembly, and a secretariat, and that obliged member states to supply armed forces to be used at the discretion of the council. American plans were similar to the British, and the Allies were invited to a conference at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, DC, to establish the new organization. These plans are usefully summarized by Schild (1995, pp. 66–70). There was little difference in the Anglo-American visions for the United Nations Organization – which had been most enthusiastically and meticulously planned by the Americans – only the Soviet Union feared the socioeconomic pretensions of the new organization would detract from its primary duty in providing security. Soviet disquiet was eased by the proposition that allied domination of the UN would be enshrined in veto powers for Britain, the US, France, China, and the Soviet Union.

The UN was formerly established at a conference in San Francisco in April 1945, and though loosely based on the precepts of the Atlantic Charter, the new UN Charter bore the birthmarks of the wartime alliance, or as Martin Folly's recent survey *The United States and World War II: The Awakening Giant* (Folly 2002), phrased it, the Charter "reflected more the Great Power attitudes of the Big Three and the realities of their strength" than any internationalist idealism (p. 114). Much, of course, has been written about the UN and its activities since its creation, and brief descriptions of its origins can be found in a multitude of general histories and textbooks. Outside of Notter's (1950) technical survey of official US preparation for establishing the new international organization, the first major academic treatment of the negotiations surrounding the UN came with Ruth B. Russell's *A History of the United Nations Charter* (1958). This was followed by the aforementioned work of eminent historian Robert A. Divine (1967), which leant heavily on Notter and Russell for government insights but was primarily concerned with what remains a unique study into the "transformation of American attitudes" towards internationalism during the war (p. 4).

The most complete history of the founding of the UN that utilizes original primary sources is Robert C. Hilderbrand's widely cited *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Post-War Security* (1990). This book is thoroughly and richly researched and remains a treasure-trove that continues to be a starting point for historical discussion of this organization. Hildebrand's focus was international security and he sought to understand why the UN failed to live up to the ideals of its original planners and emerged "a less forceful and authoritative world body" (p. 4). He found that wartime idealism was crushed under the weight of hard-power realities of the postwar world: "a forceful United Nations had run afoul of the Great Powers' growing concern over their own interests and security" (p. 256). Schild (1995) concluded that the State Department saw the UN as nothing more than a "crisis-management institution," which was broad enough to satisfy British and Soviet anxieties (p. 187). There is also a useful discussion of the wider activities of the UN in contemporary perspective in the conference collection of Ernest R. May and Angeliki E. Laiou entitled *The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations, 1944–1994* (1998). If academic orthodoxy has it that the UN buckled to power politics – and eventually superpower rivalry – then this viewpoint neglects, as recent scholarship suggests, the relevance of the UN as a motivating force behind the prosecution of the war, certainly for the US. This is mentioned in passing by B. J. C. McKercher in *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-Eminence to the United States, 1930–1945* (1999), which attributed President Roosevelt's favoring of the term United Nations over "Allies" as "genuflecting to American opinion" (p. 326). Dan Plesch has elaborated this theme further in *America, Hitler and the UN* (2011). For him, the UN during the war was more than just a "formal culmination" of the Anglo-American alliance for which the Atlantic Charter was the "political foundation": it rallied domestic support for war in the US, held the Allies together and established structures for peace building that have lasted for decades (p. 185).

There are two other areas of postwar planning that were less central to Anglo-American objectives and occupied less diplomatic energy but were nonetheless significant for our discussion on the planning experience: atomic weapons and civil aviation.

As well as lingering relationships between the service areas of the two militaries – especially in the realm of intelligence – one other area of wartime military planning that survived the ending of hostilities was atomic weapons development. British,

French, and refugee German scientists had begun work on an atomic bomb in 1940 but rejected American calls at the end of 1941 to join forces. Thus Britain watched from the sidelines as the US launched an independent project that overtook the British team in just six months. When the British then asked to join the US project in 1942 it was declined. After a persistent effort led by Churchill the British scientists were eventually granted participation in the US Manhattan Project. But the Quebec Agreement of August 1943 had three conditions. First, both parties agreed not to use the weapon on each other, and second, not to use it against another state without the other's consent. Lastly, Britain could not gain from any commercial benefits arising from their findings without the permission of the president. Early discussions are plotted by defense studies expert John Baylis in *Anglo-American Defence Relations* (1984), and it was clear from the outset that the US wished to be in control of this "joint" project with the British as very much the junior partners. This was a consequence, as Margaret Gowing in her article "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Special Relationship'" (1986) put it, of the "superior" British "missing the bus," for had the two projects "become closely intertwined they could not easily have been pulled apart" (p. 119). This is precisely what happened. The Americans never really trusted the British, who suspected the Americans of being determined, as Gar Alperovitz in his landmark *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (1996), stressed, "to achieve a near-total worldwide monopoly" after the war of atomic technology and raw materials (p. 161). This desire became more pronounced as the war neared its end, with the revocation on 21 June 1945 of the "consent" clause of the Quebec Agreement – which the British endorsed – which bestowed upon the US the gift of unilateral use of the atomic bomb just prior to dropping the device on Japan (p. 174). Eventually any notion of joint working on atomic development was vanquished with the passing of the McMahon Act in 1946 which outlawed the passing of classified atomic information to any foreign power. As Gowing (1986) stated, after the war as far as atomic relations were concerned Britain, the "important poor relation," effectively "counted for nothing" (p. 121).

The tale of wartime Anglo-American atomic relations made visible how the balance of power was fast shifting away from Britain – in this regard over science and technology – and towards the US. Their atomic relationship would, however, improve after 1957 within the context of the cold war and develop into yet another unique collaboration that persists to this day.

Until recently one area of Anglo-American postwar planning which had gone unnoticed by academics was civil aviation. Notter (1950), for instance, devoted just one page to the technical outcomes of the only wartime conference on the matter at Chicago in 1944 (pp. 356–357). The "other air battle," as it is called by the subject's principal expert, Alan P. Dobson, began at the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference of November 1944, where British delegates were confronted with identical challenges as others charged at the time with negotiating with the Americans over postwar economic matters, such as Article VII or Bretton Woods, namely intense pressure to agree on terms acceptable to US interests.

Given American assumptions that their productive and technological prowess, together with a larger and wealthier population, would lead to natural US predominance in civil aviation after the war, American negotiators, led by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, insisted on an aviation equivalent of free trade – "open skies."

This hardline approach by the Americans meant that the British were compelled to accept US terms for a more liberalized system of international aviation both at Chicago and at their next meeting in Bermuda in 1946 where Dobson in *Peaceful Air Warfare* (1991) described how “the Americans got most of what they wanted” (p. 192). The Bermuda system would help the US play the “dominant role” in world aviation for the next thirty years (p. 211). Dobson’s research has been augmented by that of Jeffrey A. Engel, whose monograph *Cold War at 30,000 feet* (2007) on US aviation policy during the cold war starkly identified the confidence of US wartime aviation diplomacy: “Because only Britain stood in the way of complete American market dominance, Roosevelt’s aviation planners viewed the postwar world as their oyster” (p. 40). This hyper-confidence in their commercial dominance meant that little attention was paid to actual “planning” in US civil aviation matters, relying instead on a series of hard-nosed meetings with international players and leaving the private US air industry to reap the rewards. This stance contrasted with that of the British, whose government devoted considerable energy to constructing a postwar aviation plan that envisaged, unlike the Americans, a crucial role for government. This ensured that the Americans would not have it all their own way after the war, and especially as the cold war shrank their differences by pushing the two competitors closer together and proving the “enduring strength of their alliance” (p. 300).

In conclusion, it is clear that, as much of the literature is embedded within larger treatments of the relationship as a whole, “opinion” on Anglo-American planning is naturally framed within this wider discourse. Judgments about the level of “balance” within the relationship naturally colors verdicts about the success of various aspects of Anglo-American planning. In the scholarship about the “special” relationship, assessments about balance have shifted across a spectrum which began after 1945 with the pedaling of uncritical notions of complete parity between the two nations fostered by Churchill (as both major actor and popular chronicler of history), to versions of overbearing US power from the “revisionists” of the New Left in the 1960s, resting somewhere in between these two poles with the “post-revisionist” accounts of the 1970s and 1980s using the hindsight of archival evidence. The latter deduction – that most of the time neither of the two powers had it entirely their own way – remains the orthodoxy of today. In his latest summary of the relationship, Reynolds (2006) pitched: “The fact of eventual agreement on common, if compromise, policies is surely as important as the colorful disputes through which those agreements were often reached” (p. 52). Kathleen Burke, in her recent vast survey *Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America* (2007), reasoned that, “The treatment of the UK by the US tended to vary relative to the region and the problem, and to the extent that America needed British aid” (pp. 658–659).

As highlighted at the beginning, the absence of holistic accounts of the Anglo-American *planning* experience makes assessment of the scholarly verdict on this subject, beyond general attitudes about the relationship as a whole, especially difficult. Still, based on the main accounts it seems safe to say that these planning efforts were not genuinely “joint” – less “Anglo” and more American. The preponderance of American power relative to Britain is an oft-noted motif of their wartime relationship, certainly in regard to economic matters. British attitudes to participation were more begrudging than enthusiastic, obliged not volunteered. Whether it was a form of “competitive cooperation,” a mere “collaboration” or an “ambiguous partnership,” they were

nonetheless “allies of a kind”: they were forced to plan whether they liked it or not. In this sense Anglo-American planning for the peace, no matter how it was informed by the ideological precepts, cultural traditions, and structural conditions of the past, was very much a product of the exigencies of the world crisis that both powers found themselves in and struggled to control during the 1940s. Planning for the future was based, unsurprisingly, on assumptions framed by those unique conditions. Despite ambitions to the contrary, no Anglo-American order was evident when the fighting stopped in 1945. The war-fighting bodies, such as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Combined Boards, but also atomic planning, were all disbanded. Even the postwar organizations that were painstakingly negotiated and created during the war emergency were unable to deliver as the unforeseen realities of the postwar world dawned. The UN, IMF, IBRD, and ITO all lost ground to the new international political landscape of the cold war. “In the post-war world,” Reynolds (2006), concluded, “greater American power and the multiplicity of America’s and Britain’s peacetime interests meant that each mattered less to the other” (p. 71).

This last quotation is a fitting postscript to Anglo-American efforts at postwar planning, which in the end were overcome by international considerations and circumstances that neither power anticipated nor planned for. The postwar vision of a liberalized global economic order within a capitalist democratic framework was buckled by a war-torn world and reshaped in a cold war setting. Wartime planning is therefore a tale of broken dreams and high expectations, but ones based on widely held assumptions and beliefs of the time in a period that remains unprecedented for its physical, ideological, and transformational challenges. The two nations were thrown together at a unique moment in history.

As noted in the opening commentary, the tale of Anglo-American postwar planning is virtually inextricable from the wider narrative of their wartime relationship – a narrative itself incomplete, it seems, without wholesome reference to their joint planning efforts. Certainly any attempt to chart a separate or distinct lineage for these efforts risks losing the vital and unique historical context of the events. Any study of wartime planning must therefore begin with a trawl of the key works on the Anglo-American wartime relationship, with precious few guides – let alone recent ones – to narrow the research focus. Finding untapped primary sources is also extremely limited for the war period: we have probably seen all we are going to see from the government archives. Yet there is always room for fresh interpretation, especially in the area of US motives and of British dependency. Anglo-American wartime planning becomes most fascinating, it seems, as a tale of a rising superpower jostling for advantage against an erstwhile competitor struggling to survive. Still, in the areas of personnel – namely “who were the planners?” – and the obvious overlap between planning to prosecute the war and planning for its aftermath (such as the Combined Boards), there appears still more room not only for fresh interpretation but for more “flesh” to be grafted onto the empirical “bones” of this field. The Combined Boards, for example, were perhaps the truest expression of cooperation in the pantheon of Anglo-American wartime planning operations, yet precious little has been written on what Eric Roll claimed in *The Combined Food Board: A Study in Wartime International Planning* (1956), were the Boards’ “lessons for both peace and war” (p. 3). Outside of Roll and H. Duncan Hall’s *North American Supply* (Hall 1955), which was based on British records only, there has been no concerted research of the diplomacy,

discussions or controversies that must have attended these huge and most critical administrative organizations that inevitably overlapped the longer-term planning preparations of the two governments. Further study of this and other areas of Anglo-American postwar planning may hopefully add not only to our knowledge but also our appreciation of the extent, the influence and the importance of the planning experience to our understanding of this pivotal phase in world history.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-SIX

The Cultural Legacy of World War II in Germany

SUSANNE VEES-GULANI

The famous poem “Inventory” by the German author Günter Eich, conceived in a POW camp in the second half of 1945, perfectly illustrates the immediate German postwar (cultural) situation. The author needs to take stock: “This is my hat, / this is my coat ... this my tarp, / this my towel, / this my string.” Life presents itself stripped to the roots and ownership is limited to the most mundane material things – a coat, a towel, a piece of “string.” Similarly, the poem’s language is extremely stark. The recovery from the past and the new beginning in a changed world requires a return to the essentials – both in physical as well as metaphysical terms, which includes a redefinition of the old lexicon. Yet the task of language goes even further. The only stanza that carries emotion and articulates desire refers to the writer’s most important tool, the pencil lead: “The pencil lead / I love the most: / In the day I write the verses, / I thought of at night.” From the start, Eich thus asserts the key role that literary expression plays in the process of redefining what it means to be German after the complete loss of a brutal war that Germany had caused and after the immense and unimaginable cruelty Germans had perpetrated during the Nazi times. It allows new thoughts and ideas, reflections and memories, and novel ways of expressing them to become tangible. Through the poetic, past and present can be grasped and dealt with and a future envisioned.

The idea of complete change through a *Kahlschlag* [clear-cutting], a term with which the writer Wolfgang Weyrauch (1949) tried to theoretically grasp and name this postulation, never completely lived up to its radical notions or took hold for longer than the immediate postwar time. The movement often also lacked the necessary complex reflections on the past or became too engaged in its eagerness to advance to a new future. In addition, it was soon overshadowed by an emphasis on escapist literature stressing the esthetic and emotional experience of the individual independent from external circumstances and widely ignoring the destroyed cities and structures that characterized Germany.

Even the writings of the authors of the famous *Gruppe 47* [Group 47], which considered itself the figurehead of the movement, did in reality not live up to the group's own, carefully crafted, "myth" of a radical new cultural beginning. Hermann Kinder, (1991) was first to note this discrepancy between expressed goal and actual literary output; subsequent research about this topic was then summarized and expanded in Stephan Braese's *Bestandsaufnahme: Studien zur Gruppe 47* [Taking stock: Research on Group 47] (1999). Klaus Briegleb's allegations about a strong anti-Semitic current in the group have made waves, but are by no means without controversy (2003). Heinz Ludwig Arnold, in his very readable "narrative of reflections," as he calls his book *Die Gruppe 47* [The Group 47] (2004), does not see any evidence for these accusations, but rather concentrates on the development away from the group's initial concerns to a marketing phenomenon. Yet literature and art have always been important catalysts in reformulating a country's identity after upheaval, and in the case of postwar Germany it did take on an exceptionally important role. Not much else was left to express one's ideas, doubts, and fears and reflect upon the situation. The country was physically and psychologically completely destroyed since the war had reached every level of society. The war's and the subsequent occupation's consequences were overwhelming, the guilt associated with Germany's path inescapable. So while the 1945 "Zero Hour" thus remained a fantasy rather than an actual occurrence, the lively discussions that did take place in German literary circles (Brockmann 2004, pp. 1–20) and the postwar "rubble literature" postulate, a phrase established by Heinrich Böll, do centrally illustrate the awareness of the magnitude of the caesura "1945" for Germany and the key role literature played in the way Germans tried to reimagine themselves and their country after World War II was over.

Today, the caesura of 1945 cannot be seen without connecting it to the next fundamental change in Germany's postwar history – "1989/90," the German reunification. One of the most visible consequences of the war, the division of the country into East and West Germany, into two different political systems that offered vastly contrary experiences for their residents, thus came to an end. Similar to 1945, in the unified Germany, defining a German nation and what it means to be German have again become key issues within culture and society. Yet at this point, the wish for a national communal identity that accommodates both the new situation in Germany and the larger European context goes hand in hand with a shift in self-view: Germans today often characterize themselves within their society by what connects them with others, what they have communally lived and suffered through, rather than by what distinguishes them from each other (Assmann 2006).

This trend contrasts with the situation in 1945 when many emphasized a break with the past, which soon in literature started to lead to a concentration on one's existential orientation and on the future of the inner self instead of a group orientation. While Germans then seemed to follow a separate path in defining themselves because of their country's special position and situation, they now appear to utilize more readily common paths of national identification and definition found in other (Western) European countries. The new movement, often referred to, sometimes with praise, other times with suspicion, as a normalization in Germans' relationship to history and memory, involves not the breaking with the past, but rather an embracing of aspects of history that offer the possibility to create unity. Thus even over sixty years later, the Nazi past and World War II in both West and the former East Germany have

become an important basis for finding and defining this new national identity, which many Germans of all ages yearn for, as well as for establishing a personal identity. Literature has continued to be a key venue for these debates and reworkings.

Not every German agrees on the same interpretation of the Nazi past. Yet the majority still sees it as the most fundamental formative event of their country's current state, and the commemoration of this past has taken on an important cultural role. Germans of all generations emphasize that the Nazi times and World War II are inseparable both from their family histories and from German society as a whole, but also changed and impacted severely the rest of Europe and indeed the world. Consequently, Germans need to consider this period in history when trying to find a common basis for what it means to be German. Since 1945, the National Socialist past, the Holocaust, and World War II have been debated among postwar generations of Germans, inseparably bound to German self-understanding, as well as the way Germany has been viewed from the outside. The discussions have transpired in a web of dichotomies: silence and speaking, guilt and responsibility, official discourses and family conversations, historical facts and individual memories, expectations from abroad and inner-German views.

As I have shown in my contributions to *Generational Shifts in Contemporary German Culture* (Cohen-Pfister and Vees-Gulani 2010), with this strong link to the war in recent German history, it is thus not surprising that the period since 1945 is usually discussed in generational terms, with a starting point in 1933–1945. The categories of first, second, and third generations have established themselves strongly in the German discourse. These generational definitions are temporal in nature. The first generation implies those who actually experienced, as adults, the Nazi era and subsequent transition to postwar German society; the second describes their children, born at the end of the war or shortly thereafter and often involved in the student movement of 1968; while the third generation refers to the grandchildren of the first generation, who experienced unification mostly in their late teens and early twenties. This three-generation model to view and define history and memory frequently also enters cultural production. Many literary and filmic works on 1933–1945 are written from a distinct generational perspective, defined both by time and by memory, as Sigrid Weigel points out in her important essay “Generation as ‘Symbolic Form’” (2002). Members of the first generation rely on their status as historical witnesses, while those of the second generation often qualify their texts as written out of conflict with this generation and its attitudes. The third generation, for its part, has been deemed to view this legacy with a new sobriety in its attempt to balance official and private frameworks of remembering the war and its aftermath. It is thus not surprising that, particularly in the German context, the idea of generation as a theoretical concept and as a way to grasp history and past and current developments in culture has received wide attention.

Weigel combines her observations of memory generations after 1945 with trauma and guilt, which she sees transmitted in transgenerational ways. So, while those of the second and third generation do not have actual memories of National Socialism and World War II, and little direct information from the first generation, they are still affected belatedly by both trauma and guilt. “‘Generation,’” Weigel states, “has become a category of memory, with a genealogy anchored in the unconscious ... the figure of the transgenerational incorporates within itself both, break and genealogy”

(p. 269). The memory is thus heritage for subsequent generations and is experienced as a “debt.” Weigel sees this idea of debt externalized in the combination of historical guilt and money debt, namely the reparation payments, but also the idea that the period of 1933–1945 can be seen as a historical debt that can never be fully repaid.

The prominent cultural and literary scholar Aleida Assmann aims in *Geschichte im Gedächtnis* [History in memory] (2007) to show that the rigid outlines and groupings of a three-generational model are nothing more than simplifications of much more complicated interrelations of temporality and historical experience. To capture these complexities more precisely, Assmann thus introduces “inter-generations” into her model, for those age groups who did not fully experience key caesuras or took part in important formative events during the twentieth-century German history. In her categorization, the Flakhelfer, or ’45-generation (anti-aircraft assistants), is also the last generation that today can still offer more than just small childhood glimpses about the Nazi past; however, with its members in their late seventies and eighties, this age group is rapidly disappearing. They precede an inter-generation, the “war children” who, while not easily defined as their own group, often align themselves either with the 1945 generation or the following 1968 generation. The strong self-identification of the 1968ers with their generational position made it difficult for what Assmann calls the “’78 inter-generation,” a group identified by Reinhard Mohr as “onlookers” or the younger siblings of the 1968ers, to find their own way (1992). Finally, Assmann diagnoses the “’85 generation,” a generation, who, though partially socialized before the fall of the wall, has spent the majority of their adult life in a post-unified Germany, and a world characterized by globalization.

With this model, Assmann grasps more precisely the origins of the attitudes and expressions we find in postwar literature, yet the necessarily very short intervals of this periodization show its shortcomings in grasping a more inclusive interpretation and makes one wonder about the usefulness to speak of temporal generations. At the same time, generational models are not simply externally applied to add structural coherence to developments of the past. They are also not solely based on memory, but do ground themselves in an interplay of biology (time of birth) and the occurrences of events that indeed do affect everyone within generational groups. Sociologist Karl Mannheim already pointed to these dynamics early on in his 1923 essay “On the Problem of Generations” (1952) by shifting attention to the sociohistorical dimension of generations, and newer studies (for example by Eigler (2005) and contributions in Cohen-Pfister and Vees-Gulani (2010)) support that symbolic, historical, and sociological generational interpretations cannot be separated.

In addition, generational identity in its varied forms is widely embraced. There is the common feeling among many to be a part as well as a representative of a larger group of similarly aged people in their society, particularly with comparable social backgrounds, with which they believe to share experiences and thus common traits and attitudes. Bernd Weisbrod warns that such alliances can also be belated affiliations, since “generation consciousness ... often dresses up an *ex post* interpretation of shared experience” to lend “extra credibility” (Weisbrod 2007, p. 23). However, this assessment does not necessarily imply the uselessness of generational models. When looking at the dealings with the Nazi times and World War II since 1945, the generational perspective and the identification with a generational stance has become increasingly important the further removed from the times. Since memory happens

inevitably “after the fact” and the remembered is thus always mediated, shifted, adopted, and distorted, the impulse to interpret events and happenings through a generational lens shows that it is not only helpful, but indeed vital to look at generations when studying German memory structures of the recent past. In this context of dealing with self-definitions in generational terms, it is thus especially interesting to observe periods of generational shifts and changes.

The generational approach to German postwar society and culture can be paired with the periodization that Historian Norbert Frei identifies in West Germany’s handling of the National Socialist past in *1945 und wir* (2005): a phase of “political cleansing” from 1945 to 1949, *Vergangenheitspolitik* [politics of the past] in the 1950s, a long period of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* [exploring the past], followed finally in the late 1970s by the *Vergangenheitsbewahrung* [conservation of the past] (p. 26). This last phase, Frei explains, describes the ongoing development in which the mostly political debate about the Nazi past has been replaced by the effort of keeping it current through its commemoration.

While Frei pins down the beginning of this phase of commemoration before unification, it has continued beyond 1989/1990. In cultural terms, it encompasses both West and former East Germany and serves as a basis for German identity. More than 60 years after the end of World War II, not only have Nazi Germany and the war events not lost their thematic presence, but their popularity has even increased dramatically in cultural production and general discussion. Interestingly, while its significance has thus risen, its actual execution has diversified since unification and the rise of the members of the third generation as cultural and societal leaders. In this context, David Bathrick has introduced the idea of an ongoing “democratization of memory” in the post-unification period (Bathrick and Rose 2011). The approach allows a pluralistic vision of the past, which gives room to a multitude of memories and has thus gotten beyond the more singular idea of “debt” as outlined by Weigel.

Bathrick’s view appears to resemble Anne Fuchs and Mary Cosgrove’s memory definitions in the discussion of post-unification literature about World War II, which they summarize under the heading of “memory contests.” Fuchs and Cosgrove emphasize that memory contests reflect “a pluralistic memory culture which does not enshrine a particular normative understanding of the past” (2006, p. 2); however, the term also implies challenges and oppositions between different views of the past that are in competition with each other. Fuchs, furthermore, defines memory contests as “articulat[ing], question[ing], and investigat[ing] the normative self-image of previous generations” (p. 169). Due to this more inquisitive and confrontational implication of “memory contests,” Norbert Frei groups the idea of a memory contest with the period of “exploring the past” rather than with the current memory phase in Germany. In fact, the change from “memory contest to memory culture” is understood as marking the beginning of a new phase of remembering the Nazi times (p. 26). In a similar vein to Frei, the term “democratization” as introduced by Bathrick, suggests the notion that we have reached a point in German postwar culture when, within an established framework of responsibility for the past that has been formed over decades, various experienced and imagined memories of World War II across generations can coexist without necessarily being in conflict. By accepting this diversity instead of emphasizing difference, these memories can still be part of a communal identity.

This “democratization” in the representation of the past shows itself in the public debates about German wartime suffering that have started to emerge alongside the discussion of German perpetration during the Nazi times in recent years. The debate began as a literary discussion with the now famous poetic lectures by the writer W. G. Sebald in Zurich in 1997. In his talk “Air War and Literature,” which he published a few years later as an expanded book version, *On the Natural History of Destruction*, with commentary (2003), Sebald criticizes postwar authors for excluding German wartime suffering from their works by adhering to a general taboo of the aerial bombardments during World War II and of Germans as victims of war events: “There was a tacit agreement, equally binding on everyone, that the true state of material and moral ruin in which the country found itself was not to be described” (p. 10). According to Sebald, the writers neither provided insight into the war experience to those who were born later, but whose environment was still shaped by the powerful psychological and physical consequences of the war events, nor did they explore the esthetic possibilities of the topic. Rather, they were preoccupied with redefining themselves so as to appear favorably in the new postwar Germany.

W. G. Sebald was probably taken by surprise by the wide response to his lectures in the culture sections of various German newspapers and among their readers. After all, his earlier comments about the subject, such as an essay in 1982, or multiple references to aerial bombardments in his literary works, had gone largely unnoticed. After unification and fifty years after the war, the topic hit a nerve in the German population. Contributions to the debate are collected in *Deutsche Literatur 1998: Jahresüberblick* (Hage, Moritz, and Winkels 1999) and, together with some later reflections, in Lothar Kettenacker’s *Ein Volk von Opfern? Die neue Debatte um den Bombenkrieg 1940–1945* [A country of victims? The new debate about the air war] (2003). While some applauded Sebald’s move to speak out about these events, since they thought it to be time to address a subject that had had such a large impact on the population, others suspected that such exploration was an attempt to divert attention away from German guilt and perpetration.

The publication of Jörg Friedrich’s *The Fire* (2006), first released in German in 2002, on the air war caused a new wave of discussions in Germany, which focused particularly on the chapters that described the experiences of German civilians on the ground in rather emotional and impressionistic instead of historical terms and did not shy away from using language reserved for the Holocaust – burning air raid shelters as “crematoria,” or the air war as a “war of annihilation.” Yet while criticism abounded, the book also quickly became a bestseller. Friedrich’s volume of photographs, *Brandstätten* [Sites of fire] (2003), which included pictures of bombing victims that are reminiscent of iconic concentration camp photographs, heated up even more the debate about the appropriateness of such discussions of German suffering.

In the meantime, more serious scholarship had also been set in motion, starting with Voker Hage’s *Zeugen der Zerstörung* [Witnesses of destruction] (2003) and my book *Trauma and Guilt: Literature of Wartime Bombing in Germany* (Vees-Gulani 2003). Both show that the research into the relationship of Germans to these war experiences in postwar times reveals that Sebald’s assertions have to be reevaluated in a number of ways. The studies analyze in depth Sebald’s assumptions, qualifying the supposed lack of literature dealing with the bombings appropriately by offering many text examples that prove the opposite. Hage’s book also includes several interviews with writers who lived through the air raids. I chose a psychiatric approach to the

literature about the bombings and offer detailed analysis of exemplary texts. I show how their authors are caught up in the interplay of German guilt and posttraumatic stress. In addition, I expand the focus beyond German literature and include texts with a Jewish as well as an international perspective. A historical study that also touches on cultural production, particularly film, about the theme of German suffering, in this case among expellees and German POWs, is Robert G. Moeller's important work *War Stories* (2001). Moeller convincingly makes apparent that "against the background of certain forms of public memory in the 1950s, the themes of German victimization that surfaced in the 1990s were not particularly novel; rather they represented the forceful return of what had never been completely repressed" (p. 20).

Stories of German wartime suffering during and immediately after the war – under the bombardments, the German flight and expulsion from the East, German resistance movements, the rapes of women, and the plight of German soldiers – have become some of the most exciting new themes of writers and filmmakers, as well as scholars. The grand success of such books as Günter Grass's novel *Crabwalk* (2004; released in 2002 in German) about the sinking of a ship full of German refugees from the East, the reissuing of earlier, and partially forgotten works, such as Gert Ledig's *Payback* (2003; released in 1956 in German), as well as television productions *Dresden* (2006), and *The March of Millions* (2007), or such films as *Sophie Scholl – The Final Days* (2005) or *A Woman in Berlin* (2008), show how the theme enjoys continued and widespread interest among the German population of all ages and has expanded beyond the discussion of the bombings. Both popular and academic books about the topics, from a historical and cultural angle, have increased dramatically and the studies are often highly interdisciplinary in approach. Noteworthy in literary and filmic studies, to name just a few, are Laurel Cohen-Pfister and Dagmar Wienroeder-Skinner's *Victims and Perpetrators 1933–1945* (2006), Bill Niven's *Germans as Victims* (2006), Helmut Schmitz's *A Nation of Victims?* (2007), Stuart Taberner and Karina Berger's *Germans as Victims in the Literary Fiction of the Berlin Republic* (2009), and Paul Cooke and Marc Silberman's *Screening War* (2010). Most contributions to these collections concentrate on one or two literary or filmic works from the entire postwar era that can be subsumed under the heading of German wartime suffering, but taken together a complex picture about the role of the topic of German wartime suffering in postwar Germany emerges.

Indeed, there has not been a public and private taboo concerning the German war experiences. In terms of the soldiers' experiences, particularly their traumatic return home, there is no lack of literary or filmic expression, as Moeller already suggested in the beginning of the debate. The plight of the soldier dominated the immediate postwar literature, showing men who are on the inside as destroyed as the cities that they return to are on the outside. Be it the chain-smoking lonely but stoic men in Heinrich Böll's stories in midst a cruel war or wandering aimlessly through the destroyed cities, or Wolfgang Borchert's lost hero in the drama *Draußen vor der Tür* [The man outside] (1947), these depictions found a ready audience after 1945. While aiming for a stark new style, the authors drew on a long tradition of war literature from the soldier's perspective, and reworked many of their own experiences. Crimes committed by the military, however, were rarely problematized, and films such as *The Murderers Are Among Us* (1946), which focuses both on the criminal practices of the army and the psychological toll of war, were an exception. Similarly, the Holocaust was rarely thematized at this time.

While the stories about the soldier's plight lost their popularity by the end of the 1950s in West Germany, and had been replaced by the tale of the positive socialist (work) hero in the East, the innocence of the *Wehrmacht*, whose members were generally suffering under the brutality of warfare and, it is implied, the Nazi politics, was rarely questioned in West Germany. When the Holocaust and German crimes did come into focus in West Germany throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there was again little discussion about the role of the *Wehrmacht*. Military crimes were perceived as having been committed solely by SS units, not regular military units – a myth that was not only fostered in German literature and film, but also found its way into many Hollywood productions.

This does not mean that there was no criticism of the generation of those who had been participants in World War II. Most of their children made up the 1968 generation, a generation that distinctly defined itself in contrast to their parents. The student movement in Germany shared many aspects with its international counterparts – there was a sense that the countries were caught up in decrepit structures that needed to be opened up and democratized, particularly in the university and justice system. They also fought against the persistence of social norms concerning sexuality and other personal freedoms. Specific to the German case, however, was that in their children's eyes, this system was a direct consequence of their parent generation's involvement in National Socialism and World War II.

Most telling in this respect is the so-called *Väterliteratur* [father literature] from the 1970s and 1980s. In these often-autobiographical texts, the authors do not try to understand the parents, but rather question them, sometimes aggressively, for their values, behavior, and engagement during the Nazi times. At this point in Germany, such confrontations were a necessary step in defining both a personal and national identity for these younger generations, and in calling attention to the Nazi crimes and a continuation in thinking patterns that previously too often had been ignored in West German society. Yet the broad rejection of an entire generation, and the branding of all its members as simply fascist, actually also hindered a more complex approach that would have given insight into the complicated webs of involvement and entanglement. It thus helped little in investigating and debunking individual myths and misrepresentations, such as the involvement of parts of the *Wehrmacht* in atrocities.

This involvement was also still only touched upon in such war dramas as *Stalingrad* (1993), where individual fanatical National Socialists function as the adversaries to the sensible regular *Wehrmacht* members. Only with two exhibits on the *Wehrmacht* and its crimes in the late 1990s and early 2000s did a wider discussion about the involvement of the *Wehrmacht* in Nazi crimes really start taking place. This debate, portrayed with its controversies in Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter and Ulrike Jureit's *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte* [Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*: Results of a debate] (2005), or Wolfgang Wetze's *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality* (2006) also led to a renewed literary treatment of war experiences, which at times even directly reflects on the exhibit.

There has always been interest in the topic of civilian German wartime suffering as well. In regards to the experiences of the bombings, individual cities continuously maintained commemoration rituals and local books about the city's destruction by the air war were published. Witness reports and stories were also collected. Within families and in private conversations, individual experiences in the bombing war were

shared and communicated to subsequent generations up to a certain extent, depending also on the level of trauma associated with the events by the individuals. However, wider public discussion of the suffering of the population because of the air raids only took place indirectly via rebuilding debates and the wide distribution of photo books that documented the destruction, as well as through films whose plots played out in the ruined cities. In contrast, in East Germany, local commemoration rituals, particularly in Dresden, which had been largely destroyed in February 1945, took on a strong political dimension and the circumstances of the air war were revised to fit the state's needs. Since the GDR defined itself as an antifascist state, its inhabitants were necessarily in hindsight characterized as victims during World War II. The bombings were widely commemorated in state-run events to urge publicly for peace and to protest what was proclaimed as the consequences of the aggression of the fascist Western governments. Gilad Margalit outlines in *Guilt, Suffering, and Memory* (2010), that, while the final political message was obviously different in the West German events, the actual commemoration rituals were surprisingly similar. This closeness in topic, but difference in intent, is also true for cultural production. In Wilfried Wilms and William Rasch's *German Postwar Films* (2008) contributors demonstrate, for example, how both East and West German's immediate postwar films featured rubble prominently, but that in the movies in the Soviet zone and early GDR the connection of the destruction with socialist political goals was merged almost instantaneously.

In both states, the bombing experience was also picked up and described in literary texts, which often worked through personal experiences of the authors. Early on, for example, in Hans Erich Nossack's *The End* ([1948] 2004), poems and short stories by Wolfgang Borchert, and Gert Ledig's *Payback* (2003), but also in Alexander Kluge's story on the bombing of Halberstadt (1977), Dieter Forte's *Der Junge mit den blutigen Schuhen* [The boy with the bloody shoes] (1995), and *In der Erinnerung* [In memory] (1998) or Walter Kempowski's *Das Echolot: Fuga Furiosa* [Sonar: Fuga Furiosa] (1999) and *Der rote Hahn* [The red rooster] (2001); and in the East, in Heinz Czechowski and Volker Braun's poems on the destruction of Dresden. There are also Wolf Biermann's songs and writings about Hamburg. Yet until recently, many of these texts had not found a sizable readership and were not discussed critically in great detail.

But public attention to civilian German wartime suffering differed vastly depending on the topic. As the contributions in *Coming Home to Germany* (Rock and Wolff 2002) make clear, while there was little official and nationwide discussion of the bombings in West Germany, German refugees from the East actually played a significant role in the politics and society of the Federal Republic, even to the point of having their own party representing them in the German parliament. One can assume that in the cold war climate of the postwar period, it was acceptable to portray German wartime suffering without much reflection when it had been inflicted by the Red Army or by countries of the Soviet bloc. In the case of the bombings, however, which had been committed exclusively by Western Allies, such discussions could have easily created major rifts between the new friends. With the expellees' destinies fitting less smoothly into East German politics, the GDR, however, largely suppressed the refugees' experiences.

The rapes of German women by soldiers, many committed by the advancing Red Army, were obviously even less thematized in East Germany. In the West, the rapes became a part of anti-Soviet cold war propaganda, but details or individual stories

stayed diffuse and were ignored. The discourse rather appeared to continue National Socialist propaganda efforts, which tried to portray the Russian soldiers as ruthless monsters, but without paying attention to the actual victims. While other stories of German suffering were always part of family history, from the deprivations of the soldiers' hard lives, the lack of food during the war years, the hardship of the flight to the experiences of the loss of homes and possessions by the bombs or by expulsion, these female stories of the past were hardly shared by their victims, particularly not with male relatives, since they were carrying a level of personal shame other events did not. Instead, the German female experience became stereotyped and celebrated as that of the "Trümmerfrau" [rubble woman] who started the rebuilding process by heroically clearing away the rubble in the destroyed cities after 1945. The indignant outcry at the initial publication of the diary *A Woman in Berlin* in 1959, a text that depicted the repeated rapes by soldiers of the Red Army and the way women arranged themselves with the situation in order to survive, illustrates the unease within German society about this topic.

Only with the rise of feminism, and particularly in the cultural realm, did a discourse start about the destiny and suffering of German women during and after the war. In *Germany, Pale Mother* (1980), for example, director Helma Sanders-Brahms tries to explore, by telling the story of her mother, the victimization of women in patriarchal systems. Sanders-Brahms not only portrays sexual victimization through the male victors (interestingly, in this case American soldiers), but also describes the continued oppression of women after their German soldier husbands and fathers returned home and tried to reestablish their lost sense of self-worth by ruling their families. The most controversial contribution to this discourse, *BeFreier und BeFreite* [Liberators take liberties], directed by Helke Sander (1992), also features a distinctly feminist approach. Sander sees the silence surrounding the plight of the women directly related to "the social censure of rape as a crime." As Laurel Cohen-Pfister further describes, much criticism, for example by Atina Grossman, was leveled against Sander because she did not ground her film historically, but rather portrayed the rape of German women by Russian soldiers as a universal story of female victimization. She did not identify them clearly as part of the perpetrator culture (Cohen-Pfister and Wienröder-Skinner 2006). Interestingly, when *A Woman in Berlin* was reissued as a book in 2003, it became one of the most successful publications of the year. It was not the lack of guilt that stirred the emotions of the readers, but rather the repeated shock at the horror of the experience and the suffering of women in the early days of the occupation (Cohen-Pfister and Wienröder-Skinner 2006). The discourse thus clearly has shifted and the rapes of women in 1945 by the occupation forces have fully risen to the same level of consciousness in German society as other war experiences.

As we have seen, since reunification, the literature that focuses on German war experiences has become an integral part of German cultural production as well as of public discussion, and is occupying an important position in German Studies in academia. One can characterize the literature dealing with World War II as a "literature of remembrance," an assessment that also holds for many filmic texts as well. These texts are multigenerational in two ways; first these works usually feature plots and questions that span two, three, or even more generations and often depict German history through the lens of one family's microcosm and the changes that occur within it. In literature, they thus often take the form of family novels, as current studies by

Friederike Eigler (2005), Anne Fuchs (2008), Caroline Schaumann (2008), and Helmut Schmitz (2007, 2009) plausibly demonstrate. While part of an international trend, the Nazi past and German war experiences and their lasting consequences take on a particularly important role in these German works. With this multigenerational approach, the authors at the same time respond to a generational understanding of postwar German history and reinforce the generational model.

Second, several generations of writers are involved in this process of revisiting the wartime experiences. There are, in effect, three generations of German writers today exploring the Nazi past. The first generation, writers such as Christa Wolf, Günter Grass, and Martin Walser, spent their youths in Nazi Germany and were sometimes active participants. The second generation, represented, for example, by Peter Schneider, Uwe Timm, and Ulla Hahn, were only very small children at the end of the war or born shortly thereafter. The new, third generation of authors, born in the 1960s and 1970s, includes writers such as Olaf Müller, Tanja Dückers, Julia Franck, and Emma Braslavsky.

While the members of the first generation are, on the one hand, witnesses and thus thought of as particularly apt to write about the war experience, they have, on the other hand, also become recently suspect in their intentions. Günter Grass, for example, waited until his autobiography *Peeling the Onion* (2007; released in German in 2006) to reveal publicly that he had joined the SS at the end of the war. Martin Walser, when receiving a prize for his autobiographical novel *Ein springender Brunnen* [A spouting fountain] (1998), caused controversy with a speech in which he, according to Ignatz Bubis, at the time the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, committed “intellectual arson” by talking about an “exploitation of [German] shame” and the use of Auschwitz as a threat against Germans. The debate was an important step in the discussion of the legitimacy of the question whether Germans can be seen as victims and what limits need to be established in such debate before a multitude of remembering becomes one of foregrounding one experience, namely German suffering, while suppressing the other, namely the suffering of the victims of the Holocaust (Schirmacher 1999; Kovach and Walser 2008). Caroline Pearce sees these debates about Walser and Grass as part of a ‘dialectic of normality’ present in Germany since the late 1990s, which addresses the influence of Nazi references upon normality in the present (Pearce 2008). It should also be pointed out that ambivalence with this generation does not only stem from involvements in or comments about the Nazi past. In the case of Christa Wolf, for example, it is her unsure relationship to the GDR and its apparatus of surveillance that has also discredited her in the eyes of many members of the public to make morally valuable statements. Yet more important than their political failings, it appears that there is a general feeling that it might be time to look elsewhere, to writers of a younger generation, who were either small children during the war or born after it, for a more balanced view of the past.

The output of the first generation is also necessarily shrinking simply due to the passage of time, and the members of the second generation, many of them now well-established writers, are gaining center stage in their treatment of the Nazi past and World War II. They are not the voice of youth any longer. This position has been taken over by the third generation, and the 1968ers find themselves in the role of parents. So, even though the literary works are preoccupied with memory, a majority of the texts today are produced without firsthand memories of 1933–1945, and the

focus thus often lies on events the authors have never experienced. This situation is true for the audience as well. Since even those who reached their teens during the Nazi times are now approaching eighty, most readers also do not have actual memories about the war and National Socialism.

Despite these conditions, however, the texts have proven very successful. The literary works are usually fictional, but many writers weave into the tale personal facts of family history, often in the form of documents such as diaries or pictures, and personal reflections. This balancing act between fact, imagined fact, and fiction, between reality and imagined reality, and past and present perspective, leads to the second interesting concept connected to this literature about the “Third Reich” and its consequences. As mostly family novels, the works reflect history from a personal level. At the same time the reader reactions show that they do not actually, and are not intended to, unfold their impact only in the private realm. Instead of serving as sources for individual identity formation, the texts often function as a basis for a public communal German identity beyond individual self-definitions, political lines, and across generations. Author and audience together embark on reimagining the past and present. Not surprisingly, one of the most popular books of this genre, Uwe Timm’s text about his brother who was killed in the war but had also been a member of the SS, bore the German title: *Am Beispiel meines Bruders* (Timm 2003), (literally: “By the example of my brother,” but published in English under the title: *In My Brother’s Shadow*). The works are thus taken as possible models for how Germany can define itself anew in relation to its National Socialist past.

Timm is part of the second generation of German writers who now turn to the past for the second time, after they had been active participants in the student movement of the 1960s. So, even though they do not have direct memories of National Socialism and the war, they share a past that is heavily defined by the war experiences of their parents and their own confrontations with this generation. At the same time, they obviously did not arrest their lives and thinking in the 1960s and 1970s. Current literature by the 1968 generation is also informed by the vast societal and political transformations that have taken place in Germany—changes they themselves helped to bring about. Since their days as protesters, intense discussions about National Socialism have taken place for decades in Germany. German responsibility and guilt for the Holocaust are firmly established and accepted in mainstream culture and politics. In addition, this generation also sees itself as active participants in the project of defining anew what it means to be German in the twenty-first century.

With works by these authors also comes a reevaluation of the father literature of the 1970s and 1980s that was born out of the intense generational conflict between parents and children in the student movement, and in which children harshly confronted their parents. Ernestine Schlant still saw this type of literature as “virtually formula novels” since they shared “so many substantive, structural and linguistic characteristics” (1999, p. 79). Now, Anne Fuchs points out that despite these limitations the texts did offer a “valid contribution . . . by exposing the intergenerational dynamics that shaped post war family life” (2008, p. 21). Yet even though father literature is now less harshly judged than in the 1990s, today’s works of the second generation are still measured by the way that they have started to overcome the rigidity of the confrontational novels of the past and have reached a balanced view which neither denies German war experiences nor German perpetration.

Timm's *In My Brother's Shadow* (2003) is often referred to as the prime example for this type of "appropriate" literature. While reflecting on his brother, Timm really explores the relationship to his father, which Helmut Schmitz calls a "complex psychohistorical portrait ... characterized by tentative empathy and a revision of [Timm's] own histor[y]" (2009, p. 81). In contrast, critics often display less enthusiasm about Ulla Hahn's *Unschärfe Bilder* [Blurred pictures] (2003), another book of the genre (though entirely fictional). In this novel, a daughter confronts her father about his role in the war and the possible crimes he has committed as a soldier. The German sociologist and prominent researcher about the Nazi past in family memory, Harald Welzer, for instance, is shocked by what he understands as a plea for blurriness in family memory in the novel (2004). Hahn's text has thus, according to those critics, strayed too far from the father literature in the 1970s and 1980s, replacing the extreme of unreflected criticism with similarly thoughtless empathy. I have shown that such approaches to these texts are, however, simplistic, and how strongly many writers of the second generation still cling to the more aggressive models of the 1960s and 1970s when evaluating current literature about Nazi Germany and World War II (Cohen-Pfister and Vees-Gulani 2010).

These expectations for literature dealing with the war and the Nazi past do not seem to differ much depending on the generational affiliation of the writer. Consequently, authors of various ages, particularly from the second and third generation, are usually grouped together, since they focus on the same overall theme, stay within the same genre, and produce their works at the same time. Also, the lack of personal experience that combines these authors appears to allow them to be categorized together more closely. In addition, the turn of many former left-leaning 1968ers towards mainstream bourgeoisie also suggests that there might be little difference between their literary output about the past and that of younger authors.

Yet in fact, younger writers adhere to a different frame of reference when exploring the German past, which is often overlooked in critical discourse. They are neither caught up in reevaluating their own previous attitudes towards the National Socialist past nor their own earlier attempts to grasp them through literature. Instead, with these writers, history becomes story. While offering possibilities of identification with past German communal experiences, they explore the theme with a new sense of freedom in both form and content. Be it Olaf Müller's parodic approach in *Schlesisches Wetter* [Silesian weather] (2003), Emma Braslavsky's comical take on expulsion in *Aus dem Sinn* [Forgotten] (2007), or Tanja Dückers' pairing of the sinking of the ship *Gustloff* that carried fleeing Germans in 1945 with a same-gendered love in *Himmelskörper* [Celestial bodies] (2003).

It is noteworthy that interest in German war experiences is not only limited to German authors any longer. Before, international literature was predominantly restricted to the portrayal of the suffering under German perpetration, with the possible exception of the Dresden bombing in such novels as American Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse-Five* (1969) and Dutch writer Harry Mulisch's *Het stenen bruidsbed* [The stone bridal bed] (1959). Lately, however, this focus has expanded. German films and texts about German war experiences have found a large echo and gained international attention, and the international film industry has discovered German stories as plot. The film *Valkyrie* (2008) shows the attempted assassination of Hitler by a group of military leaders around Stauffenberg as an action thriller, and *The*

Reader (2008) focuses on the psychology and societal problems of a former concentration camp guard. In *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close* (2005), Jonathan Safran Foer taps into the firebombing of Dresden to understand the loss and trauma caused by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

For the future, the topic of German wartime suffering still offers plenty of room for investigation. More book-length studies that distinguish between the various differences in circumstances of German war experiences and their representation and role in past and present German and international culture could help to understand better both the events themselves as well as their wider cultural and societal impact. This approach also needs to include a clearer evaluation on how the various experiences were allowed to surface in the two Germanys and the underlying political nature of such discourses. Finally, a distinction must be drawn between second and third generation cultural production about the war and National Socialist past. Critics need to ask themselves in how far their judgments are still caught up in older models established by the second generation during and after the student movement and how appropriate such models are in a world in which even reunification is becoming more and more history than memory.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-SEVEN

World War II in Historical Memory

MARC GALLICCHIO

For the Americans, it eventually became the “Good War,” fought by “The Greatest Generation,” labels that simultaneously highlighted the nobility of the crusade against Germany and Japan while implying the absence of popular dissent at home. For Russians, it was the Great Patriotic War, a name that smothered any suggestion that Russians may not have been united in defense of the socialist fatherland. In England, it was the People’s War, a name that recalled “England alone,” a nation in which class boundaries disappeared and a new destiny was forged. The French refer to “The Dark Years” to acknowledge the humiliation of occupation and the shameful legacy of Frenchmen betraying other Frenchmen. Japanese on the political left prefer “Fifteen-Year War” to emphasize Tokyo’s aggression in Asia. Nationalists on the right have countered with a revival of the term “Greater East Asia War,” a label that recalls Japanese wartime propaganda. Official media in the People’s Republic of China employ several labels, including “The Anti-Japanese War,” for which the dates 1937–1945 are often used, and, more commonly, “The War of Resistance.” In East and West Germany, it was “the Second World War” an almost aggressively non-descript label that seemed determined to avoid any hint of Germany’s leading role in the conflict. For Jews of all nationalities, it was the Holocaust. (This chapter looks at collective memories of World War II in *some* of the major participating countries but does not deal with the vast body of scholarship that addresses how the Holocaust has been remembered and commemorated by survivors and the Jewish community.)

The variations in nomenclature used to describe the global war in the mid-twentieth century suggest the diversity of wartime experiences. Today, as economic globalization blurs boundaries and creates transnational cultures, memories of World War II remain stubbornly nationalistic. In part, this is a reaction to the “crisis of national identity” produced by globalization (Hutton 2000, p. 534). Scholarship on the topic of World War II memory reflects this particularistic approach to remembrance. Anthologies and volumes of collected essays abound, but there are few comparative

studies and transnational studies are even rarer. The most common comparative studies deal with Germany's and Japan's attempts to acknowledge their war guilt (see Buruma 1994; Bookbinder 2010). Comparisons, such as Jacqueline Scott and Lilian Zac's "Collective Memories in Britain and the United States" support the conclusion that memories remain discrete and unshared (Scott and Zac 1993). In this case, the authors found that although similar age cohorts in both countries identified World War II as the most important event of the last 60 years, the citizens in both countries remembered the war very differently. One can imagine other comparisons, the siege of Leningrad and the London Blitz for example (Smith 2000; Kirschenbaum 2006). American and Russian recollections of World War II as the "Good War" also invite comparison. In each of these cases, however, differences outweigh similarities reinforcing the perception of World War II memories as highly nationalistic.

Daiqing Yang and Xiaohua Ma have identified groups cooperating across international boundaries to hold Japan to account for its wartime actions (Yang 2007; Ma 2007). For the most part, however, memories of the war collide at international borders, they do not cross them intact. Quarrels stemming from divergent memories of the war have become a staple of international controversy between Japan and its neighbors, especially the Peoples Republic of China. Recently Russian officials reminded neighboring nations that the sacrifices the Soviet Union made in the Great Patriotic War saved the former Soviet satellites from the barbarity of Nazi rule. Instead of expressing their gratitude, Lithuanian authorities demanded reparations for the Soviet occupations of 1940 and 1944 (Weiner 2001).

When historians study the subject of memory and World War II, they usually proceed from several generally accepted ideas about what is variously called collective, social, or popular memory. The first is that memory is a reconstruction of the past, not a reproduction. Decisions about what to preserve inevitably result in decisions, conscious or unconscious, to ignore or forget some other aspect of the past. Frequently, those decisions are culturally and politically sensitive, especially since what is remembered is crucial to a society's identity and sense of itself. Those groups that have a stake in what is remembered debate, challenge, and contest which version of the past will be remembered. A second, generally agreed upon, point is that those debates often reflect present day concerns. In this way, contemporary issues contribute to a framing of the past. A third point is that although elites may try to create officially sanctioned memories, their efforts do not go unchallenged by less powerful groups seeking to assert their own versions of the past. In this respect the struggle to assert particular memories of World War II are internal as well as international in scope. Finally, in explaining the creation and transformation of World War II memories, historians often use the term "myth" to describe dominant narratives, usually stories of national unity and shared sacrifice in perilous times that have taken hold in the public imagination. In these cases, historians also hasten to add that myth is not synonymous with lie. They note instead that the term myth is used to describe how popular discourses at the time and later shaped the way people think of, recall, and, in many cases, actually experienced the war (Calder 1991; Smith 2000).

In studying the creation of collective memory, historians usually study a variety of sources including concrete manifestations such as monuments, museums, and cityscapes, as well as assorted expressions of popular sentiment such as film, fiction, internet sites, reenactments, and even computer gaming. According to some scholars,

the circulation of historical images through popular culture has helped to erase “the boundaries between entertainment and education and between memory and history” (Rosenberg 2003, p. 121).

A common theme for historians looking at memories of World War II in the United States is to note how with the passage of time Americans came to view the struggle against the Axis powers as *The “Good War”* a label first introduced by Studs Terkel in his oral history collection of the same name (Terkel 1985). Terkel placed the quotation marks around “Good War” to indicate his skepticism about describing any war in that way, but in selecting that title he also acknowledged how most Americans had come to view the war in the wake of the morally questionable crusade in Vietnam. The cartoonist Gary Trudeau gently lampooned such simplistic memories of the war in a *Dooniesbury* strip that showed a callow bartender at a Yale reunion awestruck by an older alumnus who served in World War II. The young student/bartender wistfully wonders what it was like to fight in a war that was “unambiguous and noble, where our purpose was clear.” “Well that’s certainly why I signed up, son,” the alumnus replies. He then explains that he was initially classified as a security risk because his father lived in Lithuania, although he was jailed first by the Soviets and the Nazis. In the meantime, his mother booked passage on a ship full of Jewish refugees that was denied entry into New York. “By then,” continues the alumnus, “the Soviets were our allies, so I was returned to duty just as my best friend, a Japanese-American, was interned. I wound up fighting the Japanese alongside Communist Partisans in China.” After a pausing to take that information in, the youthful bartender says “Still, compared to Vietnam.” “No comparison,” replies the veteran, “to begin with, we had *much* better music.”

In less humorous fashion historians Michael C. C. Adams, in the facetiously titled *The Best War Ever*, and Kenneth D. Rose in *Myth and the Greatest Generation*, likewise note how Americans’ memories of World War II varied from the experiences of those who fought (Adams 1993; Rose 2007). Over time, however, even the veterans’ memories of the war began to conform to the celebratory tone that dominated American remembrances of the war. It would be somewhat easier to understand how secondary memories of the war, meaning the memories of those who did not directly experience it or who were not alive at the time, might idealize the experience. But as Rose notes, GIs who were as a rule skeptical of patriotic appeals during the war had become “aggressively patriotic” sixty years later. Although neither Rose nor Adams examines how such a transformation occurred, they both illustrate in ample detail that the war-time experiences of Americans in uniform and at home were far from idyllic. On the home front, recovery from the depression came at the price of social dislocation, failed marriages, juvenile delinquency, and tedious and often dangerous war industry work. The GI experience, especially for those who fought on the front lines, could be terrifying, cruel, and brutalizing. As cartoonist Bill Mauldin explained, American GIs were “so damned sick and tired of having their noses rubbed in a stinking war that their only ambition will be to forget it” (Rose 2007, p. 254).

In light of these circumstances, how did Americans come to adopt a nostalgic view of the war? John Bodnar offers the most recent and comprehensive analysis of this process in *The “Good War” in American Memory* (2010). Bodnar identified three competing modes of remembrance in the United States: the heroic, the humanitarian, and the critical. The humanitarian view was internationalist and embraced Franklin D. Roosevelt’s

Four Freedoms. Advocates of this vision viewed the war as a regrettable necessity justified by its goal of building a better world for mankind. The critical view quickly found its way into popular fiction and film following the war. Proponents of this view disparaged any suggestion that war might be ennobling or serve idealistic ends. Critics and humanitarians emphasized the suffering and loss caused by the war. According to Bodnar, mourning is a prominent theme in any remembrance of the war. The heroic interpretation, however, eschewed mourning in favor of extolling American courage and bravery. The heroic or traditional view saw the war as a crucible in which the superiority of American values was proven.

Bodnar notes that all three views were kept alive in the decades following the war, although the officially sanctioned heroic view dominated and ultimately triumphed by the end of the twentieth century. Of the three views, the heroic most readily served the interests of an expansive foreign policy, especially during the cold war. During the contest with the Soviet Union, Americans were reminded through various media that they had not saved the world from barbarism only to see most of humanity enslaved by communism. By the end of the twentieth century, the collapse of the Soviet Union, conservative reaction to the cultural upheaval of the 1960s, and the aging of the veterans who fought the war had converged to create intense public interest in commemorating World War II. For the most part, these ceremonies adopted the heroic approach in which “the sweet sounds of valor ultimately eclipsed the painful cries of loss” (Bodnar 2010, p. 9).

Television journalist Tom Brokaw played to this sentiment with his best selling *The Greatest Generation* (1998) a collection of stories based on letters and interviews with participants in the war. Intended as a tribute to his father’s generation, the book became a run-away best seller and the term Greatest Generation quickly entered the common vocabulary. Generational politics had been a feature of American society since the 1960s. By the 1990s, most Americans were familiar with the term Baby Boom generation, used to describe those born after the war. In identifying the war-time generation as the Greatest Generation, Brokaw provided a label where there had been none and simultaneously crystallized long-running cultural disputes into easily understood categories. Almost immediately, the Greatest Generation became a foil against which succeeding generations were tested and found wanting. The postwar Baby Boom generation was singled out for special criticism in this regard. Caricatured as pampered and unacquainted with the kinds of sacrifices their parents had endured, the Baby Boomers became a popular target for conservative commentators.

Generational differences played a prominent part in the national controversy over the plan to display the *Enola Gay*, the B-29 Superfortress that dropped the atomic bomb over Hiroshima. The bomber, which had become a derelict, was to be refurbished and incorporated into an exhibit marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum (NASM). Titled *Crossroads: The End of World War II, and the Dawn of the Cold War*, the doomed exhibit ran into problems from the start. Supervising the script were two former academic professionals who were born after World War II and whose consciousness had been influenced by the perils of the atomic age and the Vietnam War (Heinrichs 2007). Skeptical of celebratory histories, they sought to produce an exhibit that would inform viewers of the scholarly debates over use of the bomb and encourage questioning of accepted assumptions about the use of American power.

The veterans groups that wanted an exhibit built around the *Enola Gay* saw the museum's role as commemorative rather than provocative. The most formidable representative of the commemorative approach was the Air Force Association (AFA), a powerful private group that promoted air force interests and championed a strong defense.

The tension between the two approaches probably doomed the exhibit from the start, but NASM's curators did not help their cause. The first draft of the script was seriously flawed. Instead of raising questions for viewers to consider, it pushed them towards a predetermined conclusion that was "essentially antiwar and anti-nuclear" (Kohn 1995, p. 1062; Linenthal 1995). The AFA read the first draft as an indictment of air power and responded by launching a media campaign to discredit the authors and restore the commemorative function of the exhibit. Although the script underwent numerous revisions at the behest of an advisory committee, most critics were unwilling to forgive NASM for its original offense. The AFA's efforts rallied political conservatives who saw the proposed exhibit as evidence of an unpatriotic mindset that had infected Washington. The AFA's campaign and the distorted depictions of the script in the news media also provoked the ire of World War II veterans. As mediated through the press, it appeared that NASM's curators were questioning the justness of the war and arrogantly dismissing the experiences of those who had fought it. Conflicting versions of the past, what were in effect competing memories, had become entangled in a web of competing institutional and political interests. The conservative *Washington Times* highlighted the generational schism running through the controversy when it complained that the exhibit was "a symbol of the cultural conflict between the Washington elite and the generation that fought and won the war" (Heinrichs 2007, p. 225). Ultimately, the Smithsonian canceled *Crossroads* and displayed only the forward fuselage of the bomber with a video.

For all of the controversy surrounding the exhibit, August 6, 1945 had never enjoyed the national recognition reserved for other World War II anniversaries. In paying tribute to "The Greatest Generation," two dates stood out among the others in significance: December 7, 1941 and June 6, 1944. December 7, the date of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor offered an opportunity for solemn remembrance of how a righteous nation rallied to turn an appalling defeat into lasting victory. The Normandy invasion on June 6, 1944 could be celebrated as the turning point in the European war when American forces successfully landed in France and began the drive that culminated with Hitler's suicide in his bunker.

In *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*, Emily S. Rosenberg shows that when Americans "Remember Pearl Harbor" they often cannot agree on what they should be remembering. For some, Pearl Harbor is a story about foreign treachery. Others see it as a monstrous instance of governmental conspiracy and presidential deceit. The traditional/heroic view presented the attack on Pearl Harbor as a cautionary tale that recalled earlier frontier myths of defeat followed by triumph. In this telling the sunken memorial of the USS *Arizona* served as a reminder of the need for vigilance in a dangerous world. Rosenberg is particularly adept at explaining how late twentieth century American culture could sustain different versions of the Pearl Harbor story at the same time. One of her key insights is in linking the "memory boom" of the late twentieth century to economic globalization and the flourishing consumer culture in America. Consumption, as in the purchase of memory related

products, was a reaction to globalization that reinforced one's identity. This was the case with the major motion picture *Pearl Harbor*, released in the summer of 2001 after a marketing campaign that employed documentaries, magazines, and popular histories to hawk movie tickets and authentic Pearl Harbor era gear. The movie, which played as a romance, was almost completely devoid of historical context or political significance. Its main appeal came from its overt attempts to capitalize on the celebration of the Greatest Generation then underway.

Remembering Pearl Harbor served a variety of purposes, but nearly everyone who recalled the events of December 7, 1941 saw them as having marked a turning point in history. As Rosenberg observes, this reinforced a "nation-centric view" in which World War II began on the date of the attack (p. 188). That view is problematic not least because it reduces the importance of long-term developments in contributing to the outbreak of war, but because it also minimizes the significance of events that might have more meaning for other nations.

The drawbacks of this turning point approach to history are amply demonstrated in Americans' provincial and distorted assessment of their nation's role in defeating Germany. For Americans, the Allied invasion of France on June 6, 1944 stands as the turning point in the European conflict even though Soviet troops had already pushed the *Wehrmacht* back to the eastern border of Germany. As Mark Stoler notes, before D-day the Red Army accounted for 90 percent of German casualties. Even after Overlord the Russians "inflicted casualties on the Germans that exceeded by two hundred thousand the total number of German troops deployed against Eisenhower's forces" (Stoler 2001, p. 189). Nevertheless, on the 40th and 50th anniversaries of D-day Americans highlighted their nation's part in saving Europe and all but ignored the sacrifices made by the Red Army.

Not surprisingly, Russians resented what they perceived as Americans' warped view of the past. This disjuncture in war memories complicated postwar relations between the former Allies as leaders in each country drew different lessons from the past. In *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, historian Melvyn Leffler takes it as a given that "ideology and memory," were of central importance in shaping the worldviews of Soviet and American leaders (Leffler 2007, pp. 8–9). Both sides saw the war against Germany as a "good war" against unmitigated evil and both agreed that the war taught the costly lesson that military weakness invited aggression. But there the similarities ended. In American memory, the war had been launched by totalitarian governments that exploited the economic chaos of the global depression to begin their unimpeded campaigns against weak, disorganized, and demoralized democracies. After the war, American leaders made military readiness and restoration of the liberal capitalist system their chief priorities. Viewing the Nazi-Soviet Pact as evidence of the perfidy common to totalitarian regimes and mindful that the next Pearl Harbor could be a nuclear strike against the homeland, Americans distrusted diplomacy and put their faith in a forward defense strategy that encircled the Soviet Union with military bases and alliances (Sasaki 2007).

Soviet leaders, most of who had participated in the war or experienced its ravages first hand, believed that the enormous sacrifices of the conflict justified expansion of the nation's borders and control over those neighbors whose intentions could never be trusted. After all, the Red Army had single-handedly crushed the *Wehrmacht* while the Allies maliciously delayed the cross channel invasion. Any attempt to deprive the

Soviet Union would be viewed as a sign that the capitalists sought to finish what Hitler had started on June 22, 1941 (Stoler 2001).

Russian memories of the Great Patriotic War (also translated as The Great Fatherland War) have received considerable attention from historians in recent years. Michael Ignatieff's "War Memorials in Russia" was an early speculative foray into the subject that highlighted the persistence of what he termed the "cult of the Soviet war dead" into the late Soviet era (Ignatieff 1984, p. 161). Like other memory scholars Ignatieff described war commemoration as a process of selective remembering. In the case of the Soviet Union, war memorials, monuments, parades, and other rituals of remembrance presented an image of Soviet unity in the war while avoiding any suggestion that some of the empire's inhabitants welcomed the invader as a liberator or fought for reasons other than to save the Soviet experiment. Like the memorials at Pearl Harbor, Soviet monuments depicted the war beginning in 1941. The date of June 22, 1941 is the Soviet equivalent of Pearl Harbor, the turning point marking the beginning of the Soviet Union's miraculous rise to world power. The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the invasion of Poland and the Baltic states were detached from the story and deemed forgettable.

This view of the war suited the purposes of the Soviet regime. "War memorials are the churches of the Soviet military build-up" (Ignatieff 1984, p. 161). They also reminded Soviet citizens in the decades after the war that they could honor their parents' sacrifices by meeting their production quotas. But the omnipresent graveyards and monuments to the war also made tangible Soviet professions of peace; how could they want another war when the costs of the last one were such a visible part of daily life? According to Nina Tumarkin in *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*, the myth making began with the German invasion but the authorized memory of the war was reshaped by successive leaders as they sought a usable past to legitimize their policies (Tumarkin 1994). In Stalin's last years, the war was cast as a heroic struggle against evil in which the Soviet leader played the part of master strategist guiding his devoted comrades to victory. When Khrushchev took power his indictment of Stalin's iron-fisted rule included a denunciation of the misbegotten policies and brutal misrule that left the Soviet Union vulnerable to the Nazi onslaught. Presiding over a stagnant economy and sclerotic bureaucracy Leonid Brezhnev sought to rally Soviet citizens to greater efforts by reminding them of the enormous sacrifices their elders had made during the war. Under Brezhnev the Cult of the Great Patriotic War complete with relics and ritual observances was deployed to shame Soviet citizens who were too young to remember the war and too apathetic to care. In Brezhnev's Russia, the war was transformed from "a national trauma of monumental proportions into a sacrosanct cluster of heroic exploits that had once and for all proven the superiority of communism over capitalism" (p. 133).

War remembrance was fashioned to bolster the legitimacy of the Soviet system, but Soviet citizens still found ways to mourn the loss of loved ones even as they venerated the mythical heroes created by the cult. This relationship between state sponsored commemorations and individual memory and the tension between local and national versions of the past is explored in depth by Lisa Kirschenbaum in *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1945: Myth, Memories, and Monuments* (Kirschenbaum 2006). Like Tumarkin, she illustrates how the state's version of the myth of the 900-day siege shifted over time in response to the changing requirements of different regimes. Kirschenbaum

shows that the myth of blockaded Leningrad as a heroic city was formed even while the siege was taking place. The siege itself was, of course, all too real, but the stories that the government told about it, tales of the collective struggle of civilization against barbarism, omitted the more sordid experiences of degradation that accompanied the widespread starvation in the city. Leningraders embraced the state sponsored mythology because it comported with their own deeply ingrained myths about the city's unique character and identity. After the war Stalin sought to delete the siege from the official history of the war because the localized story of heroic resistance competed with the "cult of Stalin's wisdom and talent" (p. 116). Following Stalin's demise, the siege reemerged from the memory hole and became the subject of many of the thousands of monuments to the war that appeared on the Russian landscape between the 1950s and late 1980s.

Although the monuments to the siege were intended to nurture the Cult of the Great Patriotic War, Kirschenbaum shows that designers and artists, many of them survivors of the blockade, subverted the state's purpose by infusing their subjects with meaning that conveyed the individual suffering and pain endured by the *blokadni*. State authorities ultimately accepted these personal touches because they realized that citizens were more apt to embrace the authorized narrative of the war if they could access it through some more intimate connection. In this way, local and state memories interacted to permit a multitude of different memories to survive under the auspices of the seemingly monolithic Cult of the Great Patriotic War.

The works by Ignatieff, Tumarkin, and Kirschenbaum ably demonstrate the mutability and instability of collective memory even in totalitarian societies. Ultimately, the Soviet state's project to dictate an authorized version of the past proved unavailing. Soviet leaders promoted a myth of Russian valor that rested on the premise that the enormous suffering of Soviet citizens would pave the way for a brighter future. But after several decades, when that future appeared to promise only more scarcity and hardship, Soviet citizens, especially those who were too young to remember the war, lost interest. Significantly, the break-up of the Soviet Union that began during the era of Glasnost was accompanied by revelations about the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the massacre in the Katyn Forest. As the Cult of the Great Patriotic War crumbled the state it was intended to sustain dissolved also. The reality of Soviet suffering and ultimate victory remained but how they would be remembered, and by whom, became one more source of political conflict in post-Soviet Russia.

In England, the myth of the People's War had more staying power than the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union. The term People's War emerged during the early stages of the conflict and was embraced by government agencies and the general population as a way of asserting social unity in the face of grave danger. Recent studies by Angus Calder, Malcolm Smith, and Mark Connelly acknowledge that British citizens experienced and remembered the war as one in which all were united in a common cause even though ample evidence exists that shows English society to have been disunited and fractious in the midst of war (Calder 1991; Smith 2000; Connelly 2004). British memories of the war dwell disproportionately on 1940, the time of England alone. That was not quite the case, of course, given the substantial support the nation received from its imperial possessions. Nevertheless, like Pearl Harbor, the image of England standing in solitary defense of civilization fit readily into a national mythology that included the familiar stories of the Spanish Armada and Napoleonic Wars.

In popular memory 1940 began with the miracle of Dunkirk, continued with the Battle of Britain, and reached its climax in the Blitz. Dunkirk, according to Smith, was immediately interpreted as signaling a democratic regeneration of English society in which an ossified system of privilege gave way to a modern forward-looking society. The "spirit of Dunkirk," shorthand for the ability to prevail in the face of overwhelming odds, became a long-lived part of the vernacular even for people who did not know what Dunkirk was. The story of the Blitz, in which London plays the central role, reinforced the belief that 1940 proved the superior courage, resourcefulness, and morality of the united British people as they withstood the onslaught from the Luftwaffe. British propaganda reinforced these interpretations but, as in the Soviet Union, the public accepted them because they gave meaning to the hundreds of thousands of individual sorrows they experienced. Popular culture, particularly film and television, and political rhetoric conveyed these memories to subsequent generations that had no direct experience of the events of 1940 (Smith 2000).

The consequences of having 1940 loom so large in public memory have been significant for the development of postwar Britain. The Labour Party framed the dramatic events of 1940 as the starting point of a new approach to governance. Drawing on the popular memory of the war Labourites argued that the same managerial skill and centralized planning that carried Britain through the perils of 1940 could transform England into a prosperous society. Another consequence of the focus on 1940 was that the civilian experience received more attention in British memory than it did in the United States where the war was remembered mainly through the efforts of men and women in uniform. Britons were also more likely to speak of the tragedy and futility of war than their American counterparts (Scott and Zac 1993; Field 2002). Finally, England alone in 1940 became a template that could be placed over subsequent international crises, notably Suez and the Falklands, much the same way the lessons of Munich or Pearl Harbor were invoked by Americans officials. Even more controversial was the way in which British popular memory of the war reinforced British aloofness from the continent and, according to Connelly, fueled British chauvinism.

Connelly also notes that in highlighting 1940, collective memory of the war in England has been shaped more by selective remembrance rather than outright falsification. The Battle of the Atlantic has faded from the public consciousness although it could be argued that it was at least as important as the Battle of Britain. The strategic bombing campaign over Germany was elided from official remembrances almost as soon as the war ended, although it has loomed increasingly larger in German collective memory.

Needless to say, France does not fare well in British public memory of the war. Americans are, if possible, more severe in their judgment. For many Americans the public image of France has been defined for all time by the French collapse in 1940 (Costigliola 1992, p. 244). That view has been immortalized in American popular culture in numerous places including the popular animated television comedy *The Simpsons*. In a 1995 episode, the Scottish Groundskeeper Willie, after being pressed into service as a French teacher, greets his young students with the salutation "Bonjour ya cheese-eatin surrender monkeys." The phrase was subsequently reprised in editorials and television commentary when France opposed the United States' led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2007, its cultural significance was affirmed when it was included in the *Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations*.

In France, of course, the experience of the defeat and occupation in the period 1940–1944 is nothing to laugh about. In his classic work, *Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Rousso 1991), French scholar Henry Rousso likened the legacy of the occupation to a collection of diverse symptoms “whereby the trauma of the occupation, and particularly that trauma resulting from internal divisions within France, reveals itself in political, social, and cultural life” (p. 10). According to Rousso’s diagnosis, the memory of Vichy had passed through four phases which together he termed the “contours of the neurosis.” First came the “mourning phase,” in the decade immediately after liberation in which all involved found it convenient, even necessary, to concentrate on reconstructing the nation. During the second phase, 1954–1971, Frenchmen accepted the Gaullist myth that most Frenchmen had been part of the resistance to the Nazi occupation. In this formulation, the Vichy regime was viewed as an anomalous event in French history that was disconnected from what preceded and followed it. During this period, historian Robert Aron even found acceptance for his thesis that Vichy’s leaders had acted as a shield for the nation protecting it from the worst consequences of the German occupation. That comfortable illusion was disrupted forever by a period of searching inquiry that followed from the student uprisings of 1968. The two landmark cultural events in this phase, 1971–1974, were the publication of Robert Paxton’s *La France de Vichy* and Marcel Ophuls’s disturbing documentary, *The Sorrow and the Pity*. Together these works destroyed the myth of Vichy as a shield and confirmed instead that Vichy’s right-wing leaders had willingly cooperated with the occupiers in order to bring to fruition plans for reconstructing France into a more authoritarian and exclusionary state. In short, Vichy could not be dismissed as an anomaly; rather it was the outgrowth of a Franco-French civil war between the Left and Right that dated to the 1930s.

The period of discovery, which Rousso termed “the broken mirror,” was followed by one of “obsession” that continues today. During this last phase, French historians, filmmakers, and various political and civic groups investigated the history of the occupation, particularly its imprisonment and deportation of minorities and ostracized groups such as Jews, Freemasons, and political refugees from elsewhere in Europe. Revelations of Vichy’s participation in the deportation of 70,000 Jews, of which fewer than 3 percent survived, produced counter claims and denials that the Holocaust had happened. In short, investigations into the Vichy era perpetuated existing divisions. Consensus, in the form of collective memory, remained as elusive as ever. On the other hand, the French could no longer be accused of ignoring or covering up their past. Indeed, as Rousso lamented in *Vichy and Ever-Present Past* (Conan and Rousso 1998) television and print journalists given to sensational revelations, untrained intellectuals, and members of a younger generation intent on shaming their elders had turned the “duty to memory” into an unhealthy obsession that obscured as much of the past as it revealed.

Most of the citizens of Europe today would argue that Germans also have a duty to memory, and most Germans would agree. But as is usually the case, it is not easy to reach agreement on the particulars of that memory. The Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) integration into the Western alliance a scant five years after the war complicated the problem of memory and invited an awkward silence on the matter from West Germany’s new partners. The British comedy *Fawlty Towers* famously

broke that silence in a 1975 episode titled "The Germans," in which two German couples visit a small resort hotel run by the querulous Basil Fawlty. When Fawlty learns that the Germans will be staying at his inn he admonishes the staff "Whatever you do, don't mention the war." Fawlty subsequently suffers a concussion and in his altered state mentions the war in front of the Germans at every opportunity. He is finally sedated by a doctor, but not before he goose steps through the dining room in front of his appalled guests (Riera and Schaffer 2008).

Almost overnight, "Whatever you do, don't mention the war," became a common British expression in situations that required a polite silence in order to avoid embarrassing someone else who is present. It has also been enshrined in *The Oxford Dictionary of Catchphrases* (Farkas 2003). It is not known what effect, if any, the famous punch line in "The Germans" had in the Federal Republic. As it happened, "The Germans," broke the silence about the war just as the citizens of the FRG were on the verge of a national reexamination of the war that would produce much recrimination but little laughter.

As previously noted, the manner in which Germans have dealt with memories of the war is often compared to how Japan has remembered the war. There are similarities in those experiences. The Allies administered war crimes trials in both countries after the war. The victors also conducted purges and re-education programs in Japan and Germany. In both cases, Allied interest in bringing war criminals to justice and in purging those societies of noxious doctrines diminished with the onset of the cold war and the incorporation of Japan and Germany into the US led alliance against the Soviet Union. Despite these similarities the former Axis partners have approached the process of remembering the war much as they fought it, in a series of isolated, uncoordinated, and often unplanned reactions to internal and external conditions.

Germany, more specifically West Germany, typically gets better marks from writers and commentators for having confronted its dark past. Although the Federal Republic was at first slow to take responsibility for the actions of the Third Reich, the government in Bonn eventually indemnified Jewish survivors by making payments to the state of Israel and established memorials to the Holocaust that placed the blame for that unprecedented crime squarely on the heads of the German people. As Paul Bookbinder notes, the return of anti-Hitler exiles such as author Thomas Mann and Chancellor Willy Brandt to positions of prominence in postwar Germany facilitated this process of facing up to the past (Bookbinder 2010).

Generational dynamics also contributed to West Germans' confrontation with their past. In 1979, the broadcast of the American made television miniseries *Holocaust* initially rejected by some networks in the FRG, prompted an outpouring of questions and recriminations from younger Germans who wanted to know why they had not been told more about this crime from their own parents. According to Bill Niven, however, the popular outrage following the airing of the program amounted to an episode in a process of remembering that did not reach fulfillment until East and West Germany were reunited in the 1990s (Herf 1997; Niven 2002). In the interim, German leaders took one step forward and one step back.

In April 1985, Chancellor Helmut Kohl provoked sharp criticism when he invited President Ronald Reagan to attend a wreath laying ceremony at the military cemetery in Bitburg where the bodies of SS troopers lay with the fallen soldiers of the *Wehrmacht*. In obliging Kohl, Reagan agreed to avoid visiting any concentration camps on the

grounds that it would unfairly reawaken feelings of guilt among Germans, only a small number of who remembered the war and “none” of whom were old enough to have been involved in it. It was an odd observation from a president who along with his vice-president had served in the war and who had, only a year before, commemorated the D-day invasion while surrounded by American veterans of the war. Even if Reagan thought few people in Germany remembered the war, he surely knew that the point of such memorial ceremonies was to insure that people did not forget it and the crimes committed by the Germans. As Jeffrey Herf explains, cold war politics, specifically a desire to strengthen German–American ties following what is known as the Euromissile controversy, lay behind Reagan’s absurd remarks. For his part, Kohl used cold war politics to pursue a domestic agenda that included absolving German soldiers of complicity in the crimes of the Nazi regime. Ultimately Reagan laid wreaths at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and the Bitburg cemetery. Although the president may have seen this as a compromise, symbolically it appeared to suggest a rough equivalency between the victims of the Holocaust and the German soldiers who died in the war (Herf 1997).

The Kohl–Reagan commemoration did not go unchallenged. On May 8, 1985, three days after Reagan’s visit, Richard von Weizsäcker, the president of the West German Parliament, used the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Germany’s surrender to address head on the issues that Kohl and Reagan sought to bury in the name of the anti-Soviet alliance. Weizsäcker dismissed the convenient fiction that Germans living during the war did not know what was happening to their Jewish neighbors. Although he conceded that few may have been directly involved in the deportations and mass murders, he also asserted that only willful ignorance would have enabled someone to pretend that they did not know crimes were being committed on a grand scale. In addressing this emotionally difficult issue, Weizsäcker also sought to convey what he viewed as a proper sense of chronology to his listeners. He asserted that the Holocaust, invasion of Russia, and the subsequent destruction and division of Germany, could be traced directly to the origins of the Nazi regime supported by so many Germans. Seeing these events as links in a causal chain, Weizsäcker identified German communists and Russians equally as victims of the Nazi regime.

As Herf showed, there had always been West German political leaders who were willing to challenge the self-serving myths that treated all Germans as victims of Nazism. Even those leaders, like Konrad Adenauer, who feared a reactionary backlash if the government probed too deeply into the crimes of the wartime era, supported indemnities to Jewish survivors and recognized the state of Israel. By the mid-1980s, however, West German citizens, many of them members of the postwar generations, played a more active role in contesting efforts to create an officially sanctioned memory that exonerated the wartime generation wholesale. The situation in East Germany was quite different. There, official policy grotesquely continued to equate Jews with international capitalism. Instead of forging an anti-fascist alliance between communists and the Jewish victims of the Nazi regime, East German policy treated the “cosmopolitan” Jews as a selfish interest group that sought a privileged but undeserved place among the victims of the Third Reich.

The unification of Germany facilitated a more inclusive memory of the war and made it more difficult for West Germans to blame the “totalitarians” in the East or the East Germans to blame the “fascists” in the West for the crimes of the Nazi state

(Niven 2002). But younger Germans, who were comfortably distant from the wartime era, also played an important role in confronting the past. One of the milestones on the road to that more inclusive forthright memory was the creation of the traveling exhibit "War of Annihilation – Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*, 1941–1944." Originally an adjunct to another 1995 exhibit on the end of World War II, "Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*" surprised its creators in the Institute of Historical Research by attracting large crowds in its own right. The exhibit, which looked at the army's activities in the eastern war, provoked intense controversy by exploding the myth of the "clean army" and depicting in grim detail the ways that ordinary German soldiers perpetrated crimes against humanity. Conservatives questioned what good could come from dredging up this awful past and they cited the inclusion of some incorrectly identified photographs in the exhibit to condemn its overall veracity and delay its showing in the United States. After a panel of scholars reviewed the exhibit and sustained its conclusions about the complicity of the *Wehrmacht* in war crimes, the exhibit resumed its tour. It was now more difficult to sustain the illusion that the *Wehrmacht*'s professional officers and enlisted men were also victims "caught up" in the Nazi regime's crimes.

Despite the exhibit, the aura of *Wehrmacht* still held sway in some circles, as attested to by numerous popular computer games such as *Panzer General* and its off-shoots, and the practice of some war re-enactors of dressing up in German uniforms, including an American congressional candidate, whose group shared a "common interest in the German side of the war and want[ed] to tell the story of the average combat soldier of the German military" (Schwarz 2010). When Germans remembered the war they still recalled the suffering of the population at the hands of vengeful Russian invaders and a merciless Allied bombardment, the latter having gained greater prominence following the end of the cold war, but they were also more willing than earlier generations to acknowledge and commemorate the suffering inflicted on Jews, communists, and others deemed "unfit to live" by ordinary Germans serving a popularly supported Nazi regime.

The rehabilitation of the Federal Republic of Germany, and subsequently a reunited Germany, took place under the watchful eye of an international community keenly sensitive to any hints of lingering Nazi sympathies within the governing parties. The leaders of East and West Germany obliged their allies by condemning the Nazi regime and highlighting their own connections to movements in the earlier Weimar period (Herf 1997). Japan's experience differed from Germany's in that it was occupied by only one of the victors and thus was not divided into zones. More importantly, the American authorities kept the bureaucracy largely intact and left the emperor untouched as the head of state. As a consequence of occupation policy, the war crimes tribunal heaped sole responsibility for the war on a small number of Japanese leaders. This policy absolved the Japanese people and the emperor from accepting responsibility for the war's many crimes against humanity and fixed their memories of the war on the conflict with the United States, thereby minimizing Japan's war in China (Orr 2001). Today, Japanese primary and secondary school students continue to see the war with the United States, as opposed to China, as the main theater of action. Their perception of Japan as a victim of the war decreases markedly, however, the more they learn about the war in China. In other words, these perceptions are not static (Koshiro 2001).

Although perceptions of the war have been skewed among the broader public, it is important to note that the lessons of the war have been widely discussed and debated in Japan almost from the moment it ended. James Orr (2001), *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, and Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (2006), are among the historians who have done much to dispel the myth that the Japanese have sought to forget the war. Seraphim shows in considerable detail how different groups, such as the left-wing Japanese Teachers Union and the conservative Japan Association of War Bereaved Families, organized around divergent views of the war and pursued separate agendas in their interactions with the state. Generally speaking, during the Cold War the issue of wartime memory in Japan was an internal affair.

The end of the cold war and Japan's reconnection with Asia brought questions about Japan's wartime conduct back into the realm of international politics. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, the same year that Ronald Reagan visited Bitburg cemetery, provoked protests throughout Asia. Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet officials continued these controversial visits into the twenty-first century. Critics argued that by visiting the shrine, which memorializes Class A war criminals along with the more than two million Japanese who died serving the emperor in World War II, the offending officials were signaling their approval for Japan's most egregious wartime conduct. Conservatives countered that they were simply honoring those who gave their lives for the country.

The visits to Yasukuni Shrine led foreign and domestic critics to make the inevitable comparisons to what were perceived as Germany's more forthright and constructive efforts at atonement. For a time, critics focused on the politically volatile issue of official apologies. Various Japanese premiers bowed to international opinion and rendered the desired public apologies only to have critics complain that the statements were made grudgingly and were so carefully worded as to belie the assurances that they were heartfelt. Even Socialist Prime Minister Murayama's 1995 speech referring to Japan's "colonial rule and aggression" failed to placate critics who viewed it as representing his views alone and not those of the public.

Of course it did not help matters that Japanese officials continuously made outrageous statements that left alarmed observers wondering if the only things these nationalists remembered about the war were its propaganda slogans. Statements by prominent Japanese denying the Imperial Army's culpability for the Nanjing Massacre or its forcing into sexual slavery thousands of so-called comfort women, were two of the hot-button issues that provoked domestic protest and roiled Japan's relations with neighboring countries. The long-running controversy over history textbooks that glossed over Japanese aggression by referring to Japan's "advance" into China or that treated the invasion of China as Southeast Asia as an attempt to liberate subject peoples from European rule were other familiar examples of how some Japanese authorities tried to present the war in a more favorable light (Hicks 1997).

Such views were also reflected in Japan's popular culture. The release of the major motion picture *Pride* (1998) which depicted General Tojo Hideki sympathetically and credited Japan with inspiring India's independence as well as the popular *manga* series *Treatise on War* which also trumpeted Japan's role as a liberator indicated that at least a segment of the Japanese population found these views plausible (Yang 2007). The depiction of Japan as liberator was also well received in some parts of the Japanese

bureaucracy. In 2008, Toshio Tamogami, the Air Force Chief of Staff, sparked an international controversy when he won an essay contest with an entry that defended Japanese colonialism in China, charged Chiang Kai-shek with dragging Japan into war in 1937, and asserted that Japan was trapped into attacking Pearl Harbor. When Tamogami was announced as the author of "Was Japan an Aggressor in Asia?" he was immediately sacked, but the furor provided Japan's Asian neighbors more reason to protest what they perceived as resurgent militarism in Japan.

It is difficult to discern the extent to which Japan's neighbors, especially China and both Koreas, sincerely view these episodes as cause for alarm. One suspects that there is at least some degree of opportunism at work in the denunciations that are issued every time someone in Japan tries to excuse his country's actions during the war. Certainly there are officials and influential private groups in Japan who believe that they need to change how most Japanese view the war before they can realize their goal of a more militarily independent Japan. Nevertheless, it seems clear that memories of the war's destructiveness remain a powerful determinant in contemporary Japanese politics.

In light of the devastation visited on Japan by the American bombing campaign which culminated in the explosion of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is not surprising that most Japanese have adopted a skeptical attitude towards the use of force as an instrument of policy. Although Japan has rearmed, the restrictions contained in the American imposed peace constitution have served as a serious impediment to military activity beyond its home waters. In 2005, Prime Minister Joichi Koizumi underscored this point when he made an unusually powerful address acknowledging Japan's aggression in World War II and expressing the standard remorse and heartfelt apologies for the death and destruction it inflicted on others. He went further than previous statements, however, by asserting that Japan's postwar history constituted "six decades of manifesting its remorse on the war through actions," and assured listeners that "each and every Japanese, through his or her own experience and peace oriented education, sincerely seeks international peace" (Seraphim 2006, p. 284).

The widespread sense of victimhood in Japan reinforced the pacifist sentiment enshrined in the constitution. As self-serving as that outlook is, Japan's victim status has also served as a means of understanding that the destruction of the war was a shared experience throughout Asia. James Orr has shown that beginning in the 1960s, textbooks subtly recognized Japan's role as an aggressor in Asia. More recently, various groups have built monuments and museums that candidly depict Japan's role as the perpetrator of violence against others. That change has required Japanese to jettison a truncated narrative of the war that detached the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the invasion of China. In the 1980s, the atomic bomb museum in Hiroshima was expanded to include exhibits acknowledging the city's role as a garrison town in Japan's expansion into Asia. In the early 1990s, the city of Osaka opened Peace Osaka, a museum that forthrightly presented Japan's war in China as an act of aggression (Ma 2007; Bookbinder 2010).

At the turn of the new century, The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal 2000, comprised of representatives from throughout Asia and led by a female Japanese journalist, met in Tokyo and found the Imperial Army guilty of having forced thousands of Asian women into sexual slavery. The unofficial tribunal also laid the

ultimate blame for the practice at the feet of the emperor and called on the government to make restitution to the survivors. Finally, in a recent defamation suit, a Japanese court ruled in favor of Nobel Laureate Kenzabaru Oe who had accused the Imperial Army of having forced the inhabitants of Okinawa to commit suicide rather than surrender to the Americans. In response to the publicity surrounding the case, the Ministry of Education approved reinserting previously deleted references to the mass suicides into officially authorized textbooks.

These efforts to acknowledge frankly the nation's aggression in World War II have met stiff opposition from right-wing politicians and conservative groups like the powerful Association of War Bereaved Families. In some instances these opponents of what they perceive as a form of historical self-flagellation have succeeded in altering or even closing what they deemed as controversial presentations of the past. Nationalists complain that Japanese citizens will not be able to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century if they continue to think of their country as a deviant in need of special restraint. They are particularly concerned by the transnational alliances recently formed to bring attention to the Imperial Army's system of sexual slavery, its involvement in chemical and biological warfare experiments on prisoners, and the Rape of Nanjing. They point to a double standard in which Japan is held to account for its alleged crimes but the use of violence by other countries, including the United States, is seemingly ignored (Seraphim 2006; Ma 2007).

Efforts by Japanese nationalists to sanitize memories of the war have been met by vigorous protests in China. In some respects, the conflicting memories of the war reflect the growth of nationalism in China and Japan following the end of the cold war. Japanese conservatives explicitly insist that each nation is entitled to its own understanding of history. Officials in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) see evidence of incipient militarism in such statements. For decades, the Peoples' Republic has sought to make memories of the war against Japan concrete through the building of war museums and memorials. Aimed at a new generation whose connection to the past is mediated through secondary memory, these sites often reflect the current political concerns of the government in Beijing. In the 1980s, war museums often contained a message of hope for the continuation of peaceful relations with Japan. But by the 1990s, they were more likely to admonish visitors on the need for eternal vigilance against a resurgence of Japanese militarism. More generally, these appeals seek to "accelerate national solidarity and social progress" so that China will never be "bullied and humiliated again" (Ma 2007).

For their part, Chinese officials have used the international spotlight to remind the world of Japan's conduct in the war. In 1997 Chinese President Jiang Xiamin stopped in Pearl Harbor on his visit to the United States and in his first public act in the country laid a wreath at the USS *Arizona* memorial honoring the sailors slain in the Japanese attack. His chosen successor, Hu Jintao followed suit in 2002. Three years later, Hu told an international conference "We cannot avoid history. I want [Japan] to deal with the problem properly" (Gallicchio 2007).

Fears of a resurgent Japan have led to an effort to construct shared memories of the war between the United States and China. By the 1990s, commemoration of the wartime alliance between the US and China had become an asset in Beijing's diplomatic portfolio. The visits by Jiang and Hu to Pearl Harbor were the most visible examples of this instrumental approach to memory. The construction of a museum in

Chongqing honoring the wartime efforts of American General Joseph Stilwell and the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) was another. It is not clear, however, how effective these efforts have been. It is safe to say that most Americans have little knowledge of the war that was fought in China.

The PRC's calculated approach to promoting an official memory of the War of Resistance was also evident in Beijing's treatment of the Nationalist (Guomindang) role in the war. Beginning in the 1980s, the PRC presented a history of the war that recognized the Guomindang's contributions to the anti-Japanese war. In part, this emphasis on a China united against the aggressors was part of a larger program that sought to "create some legitimating basis for continuing Communist rule other than Communist ideology itself" (Waldron 1996, p. 977). There is also some evidence to suggest that PRC hoped that this more inclusive remembering of the war would aid the process of reconciliation with the Guomindang ruled Republic of China on Taiwan (Mitter 2007).

Although the ruling Communist Party seeks to construct a single dominant narrative of the past by controlling news and entertainment media, school curricula, and the construction of cultural sites, there are obvious limits to how far it can go in this endeavor. Government officials cannot control how Chinese citizens interpret such sites any more than they can eliminate dissident views within their own party. The public reception given to director Lu Han's *Nanjing! Nanjing!*, a commercially and artistically successful movie about the Japanese army's pillaging of that city in 1937, illustrates the point. Although Lu's movie was approved by Chinese censors and funded in part by the government's film board, thousands of viewers denounced it for its sympathetic portrayal of a single Japanese soldier who is depicted as being appalled at the slaughter being committed by his comrades.

The PRC, like other countries, also cannot control how its official rendition of the war will be perceived by skeptical observers beyond its borders. In much the same way that Chinese officials found Japanese apologies incomplete and insincere, critics on Taiwan continue to accuse the PRC of ignoring the Guomindang's (Kuomintang) central role in the war. In 2011, the Republic of China's President Ma Ying-jeou declared that

Although most people in Taiwan are gradually forgetting that segment of history and China is trying to cover up the truth of that war, I believe that the truth must be told, even though each side interprets the war from its own standpoint after a separation of more than 60 years.

As if to demonstrate what Ma meant by each side interpreting the war from its own standpoint, the Central News Agency report on his speech referred to the conflict as "the Second Sino-Japan War, in which Kuomintang (KMT) troops led by then Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek defeated Japanese invading forces in mainland China, helping bring an end to World War II" (CNA 2011).

Memories of World War II in Asia remain entangled yet discrete. As a consequence of this situation, war remembrance retains the potential to disrupt international relations throughout the region. Chinese officials perceive the efforts of some Japanese groups to whitewash the history of the war as the first step in a campaign to challenge Beijing's growing ascendancy in Asia. Japanese nationalists point to the

transnational alliance between citizens groups and the Chinese government as evidence of a growing ideological encirclement. In the meantime, American officials worry that Okinawans' memories of exploitation by Japan are leading that island's residents to perceive China sympathetically as a fellow victim, a development that only increases the already strong opposition to American bases on the island.

How will World War II be remembered years from now? It seems safe to say that as the wartime generation passes from the scene, some of the passion associated with remembrance and commemoration will fade. French efforts to expunge the sins of the Dark Years through trials of Vichy officials will expire when the last of the wartime officials does. There will still be exposés about past misdeeds but without live subjects they will lose the aura of spectacle that currently accompanies such cases. The hunt for Nazi criminals also has a built-in expiration date. Memories of the war will fade in other ways. Already we have reached the point where political leaders in most countries no longer draw on the lessons of World War II as a part of their personal experiences.

Apart from looking at how leaders internalized the lessons of the war, scholars dealing with World War II have shown more interest in the formation of collective as opposed to individual memory. With that lacuna in mind, future scholars may want to explore further how individual memories were affected by group memories, especially those promoted by the state. Lisa Kirschenbaum's study of the siege of Leningrad is a good example of how rewarding that approach can be.

Another line of inquiry for future scholars would be to learn more about how specific sites of memory and acts of commemoration are received and interpreted by different groups or individuals. The case of Japanese visitors to the *Arizona* memorial is instructive here. Surveying the Japanese tourists who ventured out to the *Arizona*, Yujin Yaguchi found that in keeping with the themes of Japan's post-war peace education, most visitors came away from the memorial believing that it demonstrated the tragic wastefulness of war, a message at variance with Americans' reading of the monument as a warning of the need for eternal vigilance in a dangerous world. (Yaguchi 2007)

The scholarship on collective memory and World War II provides some basis for additional generalizations. As noted, generational changes will be important, although exactly how they will affect the efforts of different societies to remember the war is impossible to predict. One can imagine that fading personal memories will lead to a reassessment of the war's importance in most societies. Today we are likely to see the war as the pivotal moment in modern history; increasing distance from those calamitous years may lead new generations to see more continuity between the prewar and postwar eras. We can also be certain that despite the efforts of governments to determine how the war is remembered, competing groups within each society will continue to bedevil any campaign to produce an official memory of the war.

The passage of time and transnational cultural exchanges may lead to some convergence, although here the evidence is more suggestive than confirming. To take one case, college students in Japan and the United States agree in almost the same percentages that the United States should issue an apology for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But a significant percentage of the American students qualify that response with the proviso that Japan must also apologize for Pearl Harbor. Moreover, students in both countries strongly disagree over why the bombs were used (Asada 2007).

In the end it should not be surprising that the forging of a transnational understanding on how the war should be remembered remains an elusive quest. No two peoples experienced the war in the same way nor did any two countries fight it in a way that would encourage the preservation of shared memories. Even allied countries fought the war at different times and for different reasons. Globalization's paradoxical tendency to sharpen national identities in an age of increasingly porous boundaries will only add to the difficulty of producing agreements on how the war should be remembered by the countries that fought it. Although the war ended more than 65 years ago memories of the war will remain doggedly nationalistic because they are as much about the present as the past.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT

The Place of World War II in Global History

GERHARD L. WEINBERG

When people look back on World War II, two facets immediately come into view. In the first place, there are the almost unbelievable human losses and physical destruction. Exactly how many lost their lives will never be known, but the most reliable estimates suggest a figure of over sixty million. It should be noted that this figure does not include the wounded. Added to this staggering loss of life is the vast destruction. Among the capitals of the world, Warsaw and Manila were hit worst, but they are mentioned merely to represent the hundreds of cities and towns on all continents from Dutch Harbor in Alaska to Darwin in Australia which were more or less damaged by bombing, shelling, or the deliberate burning down of communities.

The second facet people see is the division of the world into victors and defeated: the Allies on one side, and the powers of the Tripartite Pact on the other. At the end of almost six years of fighting in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and after fourteen years of upheaval and fighting in Asia and the Pacific, one side had forced the other to capitulate. And in the final months of fighting as well as immediately afterwards, population movements either caused or contributed to by the war continued on a vast scale. The end of the shooting by no means brought an end to the suffering (Spector 2007).

What did this mean for the participants, at that time almost all nations on earth? For the defeated, this meant complete occupation for all except Finland. But occupation was only the obvious sign of a lost war. For the Germans, defeat meant the end of an effort to become the dominant power on earth. The intended demographic revolution, initiated inside Germany in 1933 with the compulsory sterilization of those with allegedly hereditary defects, and accelerated inside and outside the country with the invasion of Poland which started World War II in 1939, had been decisively halted, as had the integral concept of killing all the world's Jews. In the process, of fighting toward these goals, almost three times as many German soldiers had been killed than in World War I (Overmans 1999).

For millions of Germans, defeat meant that they would neither be settled somewhere in the Ukraine or North Caucasus nor assigned to guard or garrison duty somewhere in Africa, Asia, or the western hemisphere. One may well doubt that many Germans are greatly disappointed. If the Nazi government had called for individuals in Germany's cities to register for settlement in the new defense villages in the East, they would probably not have gotten millions to sign up; but people would, of course, not have been asked. There would have been prepared lists published in the newspapers, and families could have looked for their names and, if listed, packed up to move and begin life anew in places they had been assigned to. Only the high-ranking leaders of the armed forces and the black-shirted SS, who had already been given or promised stolen estates, may at times in the postwar years have thought longingly of the vast acres they had lost. (Some indication may be found in the files listed in *Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, VA., No. 2: "Records of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism,"* published on paper and microfilm by the National Archives and Records Administration.)

On the other hand, defeat saved the lives of many Germans. Liberation from National Socialism meant that the many severely wounded German veterans would not be murdered by their own government as "lives unworthy of life." Their lives would hardly be easy, but they could live them out with their surviving relatives. The same thing would be true of others scheduled for so-called euthanasia if Germany won. And the program under which 400,000 Germans had been forcibly sterilized by 1945 could not gather additional victims.

In the religious as in the cultural life, defeat freed the Germans from great dangers. All religions were supposed to disappear from the country; it is no coincidence that all plans for future German cities and residential areas were drafted without space for churches (Dülffer, Thies, and Henke 1978, p. 212). In art and music, literature and architecture, there would be only what might be described as National Socialist realism. Even those who might at times prefer to close their eyes or ears to what they can see or hear now will need to recall that their freedom to enjoy the music and art that they appreciate, requires the freedom of others to create and enjoy theirs.

For millions of Germans defeat meant the loss of their homes. We can see here one of the tragic results of the attacks on and destruction of the peace settlement at the end of World War I. At Versailles an attempt had been made to adjust the borders of Europe to the population. Though not invariably implemented carefully and justly, this was a most significant progressive concept that was never appreciated, especially in Germany. The Third Reich put forward the opposite principle: the boundaries should be drawn up first, and then the population shoved in whatever direction the new borders called for. This procedure was applied to the Germans themselves at the end of the war by the victors. The alleged defects of Versailles on Germany's eastern border were corrected but at a very high price. A German general captured in Tunisia was overheard to tell his fellows that they would jump for joy if Germany could receive another Treaty of Versailles, but there was not the slightest chance of this happening (Neitzel 2007, p. 13).

The majority of the Germans who fled or were expelled from the former eastern territories and other portions of Europe settled in the Western zones of occupation in Germany. In the difficult and slow but steady development of a democratic parliamentary republic with its very substantial economic growth, they would be able

to see, perhaps later than many, the truth of the assertion of that great theologian and opponent of Hitler's, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, that for the Germans like all others, defeat would be better than victory (Von Klemperer 1992, p. 273). As for Austrians, so many of whom had cheered the annexation of their country by Germany in 1938, the seven years of being Germans taught a high proportion of them that they were indeed a different people, so different in fact that they would call their language not German but the "Landessprache," the language of the country.

Italy had paid for Mussolini's thoughtless entrance into the war with the loss of its colonial empire and endless destruction. Participation effectively ended the independence Italy had attained in the nineteenth century as it had to be rescued by its German ally in 1941. Only the victory of the Allies could restore the independence of the country, a process that was already under way in 1945. Here, too, defeat rather than victory at the side of an overbearing Germany proved a blessing for the people. The colonies had been a financial burden for a basically poor country; and it was only in the postwar era that Italy made dramatic economic progress, especially in the industrial field, becoming one of the leading national economies in the world. In the years of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Italy had attempted to play the role of a great power, the economic basis for that role had always been lacking; it was only after defeat that Italy's economy rose to high rank. It may serve as an indication of this rank that the basis for the European Common Market that would eventually become the European Union was laid in the Treaty of Rome.

Japan, like Italy, lost its prewar conquests. Here, too, destruction marked the land, but on nothing like the scale which would have been produced by a climactic final campaign in the home islands. Under the impact of the atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war, the Japanese government had abandoned the idea of fighting on to the bitter end at a cost of a considered acceptable 20 million Japanese casualties and instead capitulated (Giangreco 2009, p. 122). Japan's situation at the end of the Pacific War resembled that of Germany in 1918 rather than that in 1945. A large part of Japan's military, some 7 million men in the army and over a million in the navy, was still in service, stationed not only in the home islands but in substantial areas Japan had conquered and still under Japanese control. But because Japan was obliged to surrender and accept occupation, there has been since 1945 nothing like a stab-in-the-back legend in Japan, and nobody, or practically nobody, in the country has followed the example of so many Germans who after World War I argued that Germany should have continued fighting in 1918. It was precisely such notions which the Allies in World War II wanted to preclude by demanding unconditional surrender, and in this they were successful with both the Germans and the Japanese. A few Germans did think about a third world war, Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb for one (Meyer 1976, p. 80); and there might have been some equally blind individuals in Japan; but for the overwhelming majority of Japanese once – as for most Germans twice – was enough.

The Japanese dream of a huge empire was gone. In this case also one may question whether there were really that many Japanese who wanted to leave their homes and settle in such conquered places as Guadalcanal or New Guinea – to say nothing of the Aleutian Islands that were some years ago used as places of exile for misbehaving teenagers. There is also the question of whether an enlarged Japanese Empire, with a colonial system which to judge by the Korean model would have been far worse

than any other, could have lasted without involving Japan in endless warfare against nationalist uprisings of all sorts.

Before the advocates of a militarily aggressive foreign policy had shot their way into power in Japan, there had been elements in the country which had pushed for a democratic system at home and a conciliatory policy abroad. The foreign policy of Shidehara Kijuro, like that of Gustav Stresemann in Weimar Germany, was constantly under attack at home; but it pointed in sound directions. After the defeat of Japan, the elements shunted aside earlier had a new opportunity to rebuild on the ruins left behind by the military adventurers, and the reformist plans of the Americans – with their insistence on land reform, the development of independent trade unions, and the political emancipation of women – provided them with excellent support for their efforts.

For the victorious powers, victory provided a long hoped for relief from terrible dangers. Exhausted and exhilarated simultaneously, they hoped for a period of peace. Although their cooperation had been marked by differences and troubles, they had held together. The British and the Americans hoped that this could continue after the war, but all indications suggest that Stalin never entertained this sentiment. In any case, relations between the Allies deteriorated rapidly after the war. Aside from the differences between their systems of government and outlook, two problems were of outstanding significance in creating difficulties. The first was the question of the future of the smaller states of East and Southeast Europe; the other was that of the future of Germany.

While in the countries liberated by the Western powers communist parties were (and still are) legal and at times partners in the government, it quickly became evident that in the areas of East and Southeast Europe, whether they had fought on the Allied or the Axis side, Soviet pressure moved in the direction of one-party communist dictatorships. The free elections that according to the Yalta agreements were to be held in Poland already before the end of the war in Europe were put off for over forty years. After the events of the summer of 1944, when the Soviets made it possible for the Germans to crush the Polish uprising in Warsaw, the Polish question had become symbolic for the whole relationship between the eastern and western allies. Over this issue their relationship deteriorated increasingly rapidly from 1945 on, now that the threat from Germany no longer cemented them together.

The differences over the German question were also becoming obvious in 1945. In the last days of the fighting in Europe the Soviets flew in a group of communists led by Walter Ulbricht who were to establish a new regime under Moscow's auspices in the Soviet zone of occupation and hopefully all of Germany. The Soviet leadership began building the new structure with a roof and would try in subsequent decades to erect underneath this roof a structure that could hold it up. This proved to be as impossible in politics as in architecture. The Western powers from the beginning followed a different procedure. They decided to start at the bottom, and slowly at that. They would entrust responsibilities to Germans first at the local level, try to get the Germans accustomed to democratic customs and procedures, and then step by step establish German authorities at higher levels. As this process went forward, political parties, newspapers, and magazines would be licensed to create a controlled but still vigorous area of public debate. A roof was put on this developing structure only in 1949, and with obvious and substantial German participation even if under Allied influence. From the political as from the architectural point of view, this would prove

to be a far more sensible procedure. This is not to suggest that all had been planned carefully beforehand or was implemented without friction or mistakes; but now that the Germans after reunification themselves have a chance to rebuild on the ruins of a dictatorial regime, both they and observers from outside may become more charitable in assessing the performance of the Western Allies in and after 1945.

The breakup of the wartime alliance over the issues of the independence of the East European countries and the German question together with some other issues would mark the postwar era. In this connection, it is essential to note a most significant difference in the circumstances under which the two world wars ended. At the conclusion of World War I, all the major powers of Central and Eastern Europe had been defeated: first the Central powers had defeated Russia, and then the Western powers had defeated Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. This quite extraordinary situation of 1918–1919 is thrown into relief if we compare it with the situation at the end of prior wars in that region. In the many wars that the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires had fought against each other in preceding centuries, one or the other had emerged as winner. The winner had then taken territory or spheres of influence from the loser. Because all the major powers in the area had been defeated, at the end of World War I the smaller peoples of this part of Europe were able to arrange – or try to arrange – their own affairs as they saw fit for the first time in centuries. Even the victors in the war could not enforce their concepts in this region because they neither occupied it militarily nor could possibly persuade their own peoples to maintain and employ the military forces necessary to enforce their views.

World War II initiated by Germany terminated the experiments at independence by the peoples of Eastern Europe. At the end of this war, one could hardly expect the extraordinary situation at the end of World War I to recur. Either Germany would win, and then the independence of the smaller countries would disappear, or the Soviet Union would win – and then their independence would also be terminated. Only Yugoslavia, Albania, and Finland were able to evade this fate because of special circumstances in each case. For 40 years, the countries from Estonia to Bulgaria disappeared as truly independent actors from the international scene. It would turn out that it was all not as simple for the Soviet superpower as Stalin may have imagined, but for decades Moscow made all the critical decisions. One should remember the international conference at which the Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko got up during a plenary session and left the hall to the astonishment of the representatives of the satellites who had not been tipped off. One by one they stood up and followed him. It turned out that Gromyko had wanted to go to the toilet; one by one the others returned to their seats, slightly embarrassed.

One of the most important results of World War II has been that the countries between Germany and Russia have been forced to start over after an interval of half a century. They were led into a dead-end alley as further victims of the great conflict. Under exceedingly difficult circumstances they are now working on building a new and better future for themselves. It has been the great good fortune of the Germans that because of the insistence of President Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisors on an invasion of Northwest Europe, the majority of Germany's population was spared this ordeal. Had the Western Allies pursued the further operations in the Mediterranean which the British urged, they might well have reached Bulgaria and Albania, and perhaps also parts of Yugoslavia and other bits of Southeast Europe. But,

the Iron Curtain would have run East–West instead of North–South, with all of Germany north of it and hence under Soviet control. Those Germans who complain about the costs and difficulties of reunification ought to give some thought to the farsightedness of American leadership in World War II which spared Germany three-quarters of the problem and provided that three-quarters with the framework for coping with the new challenge.

The countries of Western Europe regained the freedom they had lost in 1940 due to the strategy of the Western Allies. France especially regained full independence quickly and obtained a role in the occupation of Germany and Austria. Its leader, Charles de Gaulle, wanted not only control of the Saar territory, that the Allies were prepared to allot to France, but tried to unsuccessfully to annex a piece of northwest Italy, a project halted by President Truman (Grams 1994). The liberated peoples of France, like those of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, had suffered greatly, but with some American help, they were not only able to reconstruct their democratic systems but also to begin moving them in new directions. Here the victory of the Allies brought with it a movement pointing to Europe's future. One striking example can be seen in connection with the European reorganization in 1814–1815, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Three areas – the Netherlands, what had been the Austrian Netherlands, and Luxembourg – were joined into one state under the Dutch crown. In the nationalist tidal wave of the nineteenth century, first Belgium and then Luxembourg broke away from the Netherlands. The independence movements of these states were originally directed, not surprisingly, against Holland. One major result of World War II was the formation of Benelux: the furnace of war melted old ways of thinking and produced new initiatives. Here, as in the case of Italy, there are geographic symbols: the European authorities in Brussels and the Treaty of Maastricht for a European Union.

This development brings up one of the most significant changes by which the place of World War II in history will be assessed: the end of the Franco-German antagonism. One might have anticipated just the opposite: on the one hand, the terror regime of the Germans in France, accompanied by a degree of economic exploitation that makes the post-World War I reparations demands look like small change, and on the other hand, as a result of this experience, a French policy in postwar Europe designed to preclude any German unity of whatever kind. The war, however, brought other perceptions to the fore in both countries, a process most easily recognizable in the agreement of the French government to the reunion of the Saar territory with the Federal Republic of Germany.

In regard to the change in German–French relations, the symbols were personal, not geographic. No one could accuse German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of opportunism when he advocated close German–French relations. He had argued for such a policy in the Germany of the 1920s when that was about the least popular line for anyone to take in the country. And no one could accuse Charles de Gaulle of being subservient to or a collaborator with Germany. He was, as all knew, the man who had personified defiance of and resistance to Germany. It is sad that a second world war was needed to bring about this great change, but surely in this case, late is far better than never. There are some clear indications that a somewhat similar reconciliation may be taking place between Germany and Poland. Difficulties certainly exist, and the heritage of resentments is great, but the signs point to a better future here also.

For Great Britain, the war meant that her role as a world power was ended, even though not all inside or outside the country recognized this right away. In wars against the Dutch colonial empire and against French and Spanish efforts to obtain a dominant role in Europe, England had secured its own position as a world power. The two wars against Germany's attempts to dominate the globe destroyed England's position. How had the same process, which had once raised the nation, now debilitated the status of England? Simply put, it was just too great an effort; the strain was beyond bearing. This reversal is most clearly visible in two aspects of the rise and fall of Britain's position.

While Britain had, in prior wars, almost invariably increased her colonial possessions, primarily at the expense of her European rivals, this situation was reversed by the two world wars because of their great difficulty. Instead of utilizing its military power to defend its colonies and perhaps add to them, in both world wars Britain had to call upon her empire to assist in the defeat of Germany in Europe. The colonial accessions resulting from World War I in no way invalidate this point: in the first place, most of them were allocated to the Dominions, not Britain herself. Second, they were all supposed to be headed for independence, a process that had by 1939 already moved forward substantially in the case of Iraq. The members of the Commonwealth looked back on their participation in World War I as their point of coming-out into independence: on the hill in Ottawa in front of the parliament building stands the monument to the Canadian soldiers who fought at Vimy Ridge, and every April, the Australians on Anzac-Day recall the landing of their soldiers at Gallipoli.

The colonial question in general will be reviewed shortly, but it must first be noted that the participation of forces from the Commonwealth and empire was even more important for England in World War II than in World War I. Of the many signs of this significance, only three will be mentioned as illustrations: units from the worldwide empire constituted a large proportion of the British forces fighting in North Africa, Canada took over a major segment of the Battle of the Atlantic, and India provided over two million soldiers for the largest volunteer army of the war. The postwar situation was far different for Britain in 1919 than in 1815, and this was even more the case after 1945.

A second characteristic of the changed status of Britain was a complete reversal of the country's financial role in the war. In prior wars England had almost invariably assisted its allies with subsidies or loans. In addition to covering its own war costs, it had helped its allies cover theirs. In World War I, it had still been possible for England to finance its war effort. It is true that England obtained credits from the United States, but these were in part taken out to cover the expenses of allies of London whose credit was weak, and the rest was more than offset by direct credits which England provided to its allies. This was entirely different in World War II. As could be – and was – anticipated, Britain's financial situation, not yet recovered from the damage imposed by the last war, was not up to the costs of another great conflict. Only some financial assistance from the Commonwealth and extensive aid from the United States enabled Great Britain to fight on after late 1940. Victory was simply too expensive for the state's financial resources.

In August 1939 a German diplomat warned a member of the Foreign Office that only Russia and America could emerge as victors from a new war. He asked: "How would England like to be an American Dominion?" The British diplomat replied "that

she would infinitely prefer to be an American Dominion than a German Gau.” There was no suggestion in the United States that England be made into a Dominion (Divine 1971, pp. 38–39). The danger of the island kingdom becoming a German Gau was, however, real; the Imperial War Museum in London has reprinted both the German military government handbook for Great Britain and the very extensive arrest list. There is, further, an interesting facet of the notorious Wannsee-Protocol, the record of the German conference of January 1942, in which the apparatus of the German government as a whole was harnessed to the European portion of the program to murder the world’s Jews. Included in the listing of those to be killed were the Jews of Britain, estimated at 330,000. Several questions were discussed at the conference, but this point was taken for granted and no discussion was thought necessary. It was assumed that all of Britain, including Ireland, was to become a German Gau.

The demands of a war which surpassed the capacity of Great Britain left it in search of a new role in the world in spite of its being one of the Big Three victors. This was, and remains, a difficult process. It would be a serious mistake to pass it by with a slight smile. What the future holds in this regard is difficult to predict. Just one illuminating example: in the international civil aviation conference held in Chicago during the war to work out rules for the postwar era, there was a serious clash between the British and the American delegations. The basis of this controversy is worth noting. The British were afraid that if they were not allowed rules which in effect would allow them special preferences, they would be hopelessly outmatched in postwar competition, while the Americans insisted on a more open market. With great – and greatly resented – pressure, the Americans pushed through most of their demands. Today, British Airways is one of the largest and most successful civilian airlines in the world and plays a major role in civil aviation’s most profitable route, that across the North Atlantic.

Mention of the civil aviation conference raises a further aspect of World War II that will mark its place in modern history. With the United States playing a leading role, and President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull personally engaged, preparatory steps were taken during the war for the establishment of the United Nations Organization and a host of other structures like UNESCO and the Food and Agriculture Organization. If one asks, why all this organizational activity and such extensive American participation, one must, of course, first recognize that all hoped that the second world war in the century would be followed by a more successful attempt at an international system to protect the peace than had been established in 1919. As for the United States role in it, one must recall the way in which American leaders of the time saw their own experiences at the end and after World War I. Practically all of them had been deeply involved in the events of that period. They had seen first how the granting of an armistice to Germany at a time when some of their Republican opponents were calling for unconditional surrender had contributed heavily to their loss of the midterm Congressional election of 1918. Thereafter, they had struggled in vain for the ratification of the peace treaties and American entrance into the League of Nations. President Wilson had predicted that if the United States turned its back on the world, there would be another war in 20 years; now his prophecy had been realized in the most awful way conceivable.

Roosevelt, perhaps more than anyone, was determined that this time it would be different. Few recall that as candidate for vice-president in 1920, he had suffered his only electoral defeat; it is certain that he remembered. He made sure that this time

high-ranking members of the Republican Party would be involved in the process of establishing the UNO, that the American public come to recognize the importance of such an organization for them, and that the preliminary and organizing conferences for it as well as its headquarters all be located in the United States as a means of engaging the American public. He himself died before the San Francisco Conference, but he had set the path. This time, the people of the United States should see themselves as playing an active role in world affairs – to secure their own interests if for no other purposes – and in this endeavor he was to be entirely successful. More and more Americans came to see the past in this regard the way he did, and they were willing to do things differently this time in the hope that such an attitude and the policies designed to implement it would preclude a third world war. Joining the UNO was approved in the Senate by a vote of 89 to 2.

Some further aspects of the United Nations Organization need to be mentioned, but first something must be said about the way the war changed the United States beyond its altered role in international affairs. The economy of the country had not only grown massively, but it had changed geographically. In addition to expansion in the traditional areas of industrial strength, new centers had been developed, especially in the west and northwest. Furthermore, the need for a rapid build-up of American forces had led the government to look for training bases and flying facilities in regions of the country where the weather could be expected to facilitate year-round operations; hence the tremendous growth of what is now known as the Sun Belt. The demographic, economic, and political shift within this country toward a larger role for the South, Southwest, and West is the product of decisions made in Washington during World War II.

These shifts carried with them further changes, or at least the beginnings of them. Although there has been some argument about this, the war opened up a whole variety of avenues for change in both the field of race relations and in the area of opportunities for women. The more dramatic alterations would come later, but much of the foundation for them was laid during the war. In addition, the passage of the GI Bill of Rights, especially its educational provisions, opened up America to social mobility in a way nothing else in the twentieth century had accomplished.

A word should be said about the fate averted by victory. As early as the summer of 1928, Hitler had assumed that Germany would fight the United States. While the German government had been working on weapons systems for that war, it had not gotten around to preparing either an occupation handbook or an arrest list as it had for England. But German occupation policy elsewhere provides clear indications of the terrible future awaiting the American people. One feature of German policy that was ruthlessly applied everywhere their power could reach was the killing of those in mental institutions, old folks homes, and with what they considered physical defects. The young woman who was Miss America in 1990 would have been murdered for being deaf. Furthermore, since German plans looked toward the killing of all Jews on earth, the two Jewish doctors who conquered polio would have been killed, and that dreaded disease would have continued to flourish. These are aspects of the war's meaning for the United States worth contemplating.

Two further aspects of the UNO require comment: the role of China and the increasing number of newly independent states. The British and Soviet governments were most reluctant to agree to Roosevelt's insistence on China being treated as a

great power during the war; they thought he was crazy to push this issue and China's being allotted a permanent seat in the Security Council. But the president saw a future world without colonies and one in which a reconstructed China would play a major role in Asia and, as a friend of the United States, restrain any other power in Asia – something that after the defeat of Japan could only mean the Soviet Union – from attaining a dominant role. It is hardly surprising that such concepts did not garner applause in London or Moscow. Developments inside China went in a different direction from that Roosevelt had hoped for. The long war with Japan destroyed the nationalist regime; Japan's campaign in China brought the communists to power there. But regardless of who controlled the country, it would play a new and major role in world affairs. The Germans had lost their special extraterritorial treaty rights in China as a result of World War I; the Western Allies gave up theirs during World War II; the rights and territories extorted by the Russian Empire would poison postwar Soviet–Chinese relations even as their governments were supposed to be allied. As for internal modernization, a comparison between today's Taiwan and the People's Republic of China suggests that a nationalist regime might have done at least as well as those waving Mao's Red Book, but that is something the Chinese people will have to work out for themselves.

The other remarkable aspect of the UNO in the decades after World War II was the dramatic increase in membership. This is the internationally visible manifestation of the process of decolonization. As Roosevelt had hoped and foreseen, the history of colonialism, already affected by World War I, was effectively ended by World War II. The United States had decided to leave the Philippines before the war; in this case the war actually delayed the process. Similarly in India the war originally meant postponement rather than acceleration, but that was only the initial impact. As a result of the war, everything changed: at the bottom, an Indian army made up primarily of Indian soldiers led by Indian officers could not be employed against the people of India, at the top it was the Allied commander of the last years of the war, Lord Louis Mountbatten, who arranged the transfer of power.

The example of India, the most populous of the colonies, may serve as representative for the whole process of decolonization. One by one, sometimes peacefully, sometimes accompanied by great bloodshed, almost all remaining colonies became independent as the colonial powers had for the most part lost both the ability and the will to hold empires as a result of the war. The French resisted the trend more than others, very much to their own and their former colonies' disadvantage. Decolonization, it should be noted, extended to those who had remained neutral in the war: Spain and Portugal. A new chapter in the history of what had been the expansion of Europe into the world began. Three aspects of this new chapter merit further attention: the old–new boundaries of the former colonies, the special situation in the Near East, and the colonies of Russia and the Soviet Union.

The borders have to be examined first. The new states inherited borders designed by the Europeans to accommodate their interests and had been drawn without regard for, or much knowledge of, the peoples in the affected areas. That as a result there were and still are all sorts of problems involving structure and boundaries in the newly independent states ought not to occasion much surprise. And that these have been and remain most difficult in what had been India, the largest and most populous of the former colonies, needs to be seen as part of this problem.

These difficulties were greatly accentuated in the Middle East as a result of Nazi actions. In the winter of 1938–1939 the British switched their policies towards the Germans and the Arabs. Up to that time, the London government had tried to appease the Germans and to repress the Arab uprising in the smaller of the two mandates carved out of the original Palestine mandate. Now this scenario was reversed. It was decided that Britain would fight Germany the next time it attacked any country that defended itself, but this meant that the troops in Palestine had to be brought home and London would have to try to appease the Arabs. Jewish immigration was practically halted and all plans to establish a tiny Jewish state within the mandate were dropped. The war turned all this into other directions.

On the one hand, the Jews in Europe who had survived the killing of some six million Jews by the Germans were almost all determined to go to Palestine; on the other hand, the leadership of the extremist Arab nationalists had aligned themselves with the Germans – in view of the promise of the latter to murder all Jews in the Middle East – and were therefore discredited. A new partition of the former mandate followed, with a Jewish state now to be larger than that contemplated in the discarded partition plan of 1937. Wars and other troubles followed. These would be further complicated by the fact that with the vast majority of East European Jews murdered during World War II, a high proportion of the Jewish immigrants came until 1989 as refugees from the newly independent Arab states and hence were resentful of persecution by Arabs rather than Germans, Poles, or Russians. At the same time, the Arab states, with few exceptions, insisted on a continued war with Israel.

The third aspect of the decolonization process which must be addressed is that of the Soviet and Russian colonial empires. This represents merely a portion of the impact of World War II on Soviet society, but there is an advantage to starting with it. Nothing demonstrates more dramatically the false direction into which Moscow steered than the fact that precisely in the years when the other colonial empires in the world were being dismantled, the Soviet leadership was erecting a new Soviet colonial empire in Eastern Europe on top of the Russian colonial empire built by their Romanov predecessors. In the Baltic States they followed the example of France in Algeria – annexation and mass settlement; in the rest of Eastern Europe they tried to copy the British colonial concept of indirect rule, that is, rule through dependent local authorities selected by the imperial power.

Why did the Soviets, who were always so proud of their far-seeing scientific understanding of historical evolution, so completely miss the real trend of the time? In trying to answer this question, one must look at two effects of the war: fear of possible new dangers and pride as well as consolidation because of the victory. The terrible experience of war should make it easy to understand why security concerns merged with ambitious expansionist plans in Stalin's policies. All this had been made possible by German actions. In World War I, the German imperial government had done whatever it could to help the Bolsheviks obtain power in Russia. Then, instead of recognizing the advantages of a peace which placed a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia, the Germans could not wait to terminate their existence. Having once again obtained the dubious blessing of a common border, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. It was this invasion that provided the Soviet regime with its only period of true legitimacy in the eyes of the mass of its population. It was this government which had held together the state in its great

crisis, had thereby averted rule by people who had accomplished the extraordinary feat of making Stalin look benign, and had defeated the supposedly invincible German army. Without the consolidation of the Soviet regime as a result of this, there would not only never have been such vast expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, but the whole system would most likely have collapsed even sooner under the burden of its own incompetence as it did in the 1980s. The war had inflicted terrible losses on the country – some 25 million dead – and immeasurable destruction, but it had given the government decades of superpower status in the world and of added viability at home.

A further new development of the war which attests to its historical significance is connected with the fact that this prolongation of Soviet rule in Moscow did not lead to a new world war. The production of nuclear weapons, whose use helped end the war more quickly, had, precisely through that use, dramatically illuminated the possible costs of any new conflict and had thus made all major powers far more cautious. Because the leaders of the Soviet Union really did believe that history moved on railroad tracks according to a schedule laid down by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, they saw no need to run unnecessary risks. Since they knew the direction of the world historical process ahead of time, no dangerous push was needed to accomplish the triumph of their vision that was inevitable in any case.

There was here a fundamental difference from the view of Hitler who was always worried about not moving fast enough, who very much regretted not having gone to war in 1938, and preferred to have war sooner rather than later (Weinberg 1995, pp. 147–148). If someone is absolutely determined to have war, there is really nothing other than surrender that one can do to avoid it. But because the Soviets were confident of ultimate triumph, the NATO countries could simply wait them out. There was always the possibility of a miscalculation – the Berlin crises of 1948–1949 and 1958–1961 as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis offer particularly dangerous examples – but with sufficient self-confidence and deterrent weapons, one could await the future in a Cold Peace. With caution and good luck the waiting approach worked. A sad result is that the peoples of the former Russian Empire have to start over again; here the war delayed rather than accelerated developments.

It is particularly in connection with the role of the Soviet Union in the war that important open questions remain. Until there is a full opening of the presidential archive, the degree to which Stalin was prepared to make a separate peace with Germany will remain a subject for speculation, informed speculation, but speculation all the same (Weinberg 1996, pp. 173–183). Until wartime intelligence and cryptographic records become accessible, many other questions about Soviet policy during the war also cannot be resolved. It should be noted that because of the failure of the United States Department of State to insist on the inclusion of an access clause when the captured Japanese records were returned to Tokyo, there remain issues about Japan in the war that need further light (Drea et al. 2006). An especially important issue in this regard is that of Tojo Hideki's actual role during the period October 1941 to July 1944 when he combined the offices of Prime Minister and Minister of War. A critical – but generally ignored – aspect of the problem of records that remain closed is that these are physically deteriorating and will be inaccessible to their guardians like everyone else if they are not microfilmed (Weinberg, "The End of Ranke's History?" in Weinberg 1995, pp. 325–336).

It should be noted that even when the records are accessible, many open questions about the war remain to be explored. Only one is mentioned here to serve as a sample of the many questions that remain unanswered. Why was the army of Vichy France so enthusiastic about fighting the friends of France but under no circumstances the forces of Germany, Italy, or Japan? In August 1940, the French fought the British and Free French at Dakar, but at the same time would not resist the Japanese occupation of northern French Indo-China. In the summer 1941, it fought bitterly to hold off British and Australian forces in Syria while simultaneously accepting peacefully the Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China. In early 1942, Vichy urged the Germans to persuade the Japanese to occupy the island of Madagascar; when with American support the British landed on that island, the French fought them for months. When American troops landed in French Northwest Africa in November 1942, hundreds were killed by French forces. When German and Italian forces landed in Tunisia and occupied unoccupied France that same month, not one of these soldiers was scratched. Each of these events has been reviewed separately, but no one has looked at them together to consider the puzzle raised by this pattern. Here is only one of many questions that await further examination.

From a considerable distance we see how the world was altered by the greatest war ever. It had shown that modern industrial society has an incredible capacity for destruction. It had also shown that human beings have the capacity to deny their own humanity and transmute themselves into something else: the mass murderer Kurt Franz referred to his participation in mass murder at the killing center of Treblinka as "The Good Old Days" (Klee, Dressen, and Riess 1988). The victory of the Allies saved the world from the practitioners of "The Good Old Days." That victory brought the defeated as well as the victors an opportunity to make a new start: in overcoming the hatreds of the war, in new international organizations – whatever their defects – in new forms of cooperation in Western and Central Europe, in the freedom of former colonial peoples, and in the construction of democratic systems in many countries – Germany and Japan included.

Just as the war demonstrated the destructive capacity of the modern world, so the postwar years showed that humanity's capacity for rebuilding can also not be overestimated. But reconstruction cannot be confined to the building of houses and the repair of bridges. Physical reconstruction is important, but it cannot stand alone. A final, but especially significant, break in history was caused by the war through its impact on the religious life of many. After a century in which especially but not only in the Western world all belief in religious values had declined, World War II brought an even more dramatic break. How could human beings believe in a gracious God who allowed such things to happen? Is there any possibility of rebuilding the concept of humans created in the divine image after so deep a descent? One might consider that this is the central issue in the reconstruction of the world after the war. Instead of exclusive preoccupation with and adulation of oneself, people must once again find ways to recognize in the faces of others – whatever their color, religion, or nationality – the image of fellow human beings created in God's image. If we cannot do that, the end of World War II shows us what the end of human history will look like. No one can claim that we have not been warned.

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